

APPENDIX I

MODES OF SUFFICIENT SIGNIFICATION

About pages 14, 17-20, 58-59, 119-123.

Every spoken word is the voice of sufficiency: when one talks, he claims his illusory individuality as absolute. The limits of the speaker are also reality's; this last one is not meant to be the speaker's *own* reality, as he wants it to be, but the *absolute* reality. The infinity of every happening is given as finite, every concept as arbitrarily enclosed. Since the subject, when talking, pretends to be the absolute Subject. Every spoken word has a Subject pretending to be absolute.

The illusion of individuality in its potential form, as the "*each-time-Subject*" who talks, is intention: that is what the subject who talks, whom we need to assume in every argument (as they mark the character in dramas' scripts), believes to will. Therefore, the criterion [read: parameter/standard] for the speech meaning is the *each-time-intention* (the potential intention). That is also the reason they generally don't ask: "What did you say?", but rather "What does it mean...?".

And the criterion for intention, the more or less profound, various and vast complexity degree of its relations, is the individual worth.

I. Direct mode

By pointing out a fact¹, the Subject affirms his own person by directly placing his own real correlative outside of himself: “This is here”, “This is not here”... “This has been... had been... was”.

The fact is the present determination².

The “aorist” does not involve any intention towards time but towards the action only (intense action)³. The narrator creates the fact regardless of time. It’s a current event that the Subject pretends to be independent from time⁴: the substantial action⁵.

¹To say something is to point out a fact, not a name without an attribute or an attribute without a name: each *κατηγορία* is *κατηγορία ἑτεροιώσεως*, not *ἑτεροίτητος*. When I say “this”, I’m not saying but “different”; on the other hand, when I say “this is”, I’m pointing out a fact, since I’m pointing out a mutation. — “It is” is different from “It becomes”, “It changes”, ecc.; it’s not the opposite of “it is not”, because “it is not” is only conceivable as “self-destroying” or “being destroyed” — hence *μάλ’ αὔθις* as a mutation. To ascribe the “it is” to the “this”, is to indicate a lack of mutation. Naturally, the same argument — fitting even better — can be said for particular relations: for example, “it’s here” is not the opposite of “it is not here”, but the *different*; “to eat” is not the opposite, but the *different* of “not to eat”. Consciousness is nothing but consciousness of mutations (or movement: in time — space — relativity). Without mutations there is no consciousness. We are conscious of stability only as something different from mutation.

²*μήπως θορυβώμεθα*: the past is over in so far as we refer it to the intention’s present; the determination of intention is therefore always actual [present].

³*γίγνεσθαι οὐχ οἷόν τε τό ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι*. ARIST., *Metaph*, B 4. 999 b 11.

⁴Hence the use of the so called “gnomic aorist” in the Greek language to indicate those relations which are meant to be considered per se, unbound from time — any time (those which are so curiously called “general truths”).

⁵The verb “to be” lacks in the “aorist” tense (meaning that its “preterit”

II. *Conjunct mode*

1°. When I say “this *shall* be” = “has [yet] to be”, the “being” of it is not current, but in that “has to” lies the potential of its being.

2°. When I say “this *would* be”, I mean “this came to be”: so to say that its potential is preterit [past and concluded], overcome by time, not actual; in the present, which I believe to be the absolute reality, free from every contingency, it is impotent¹: and I understand its impotence because I recognize its potential to be limited and finite towards contingences.

3°. When I say “this *would have been*”, I mean “this came to have been”: its potential is doubly preterit since its “limited potential”, which in the 2nd point I didn’t know whether or not it would overcome contingency, I now recognize as concluded in the past and I “know” this cannot come to be any more.

4°. When I say: “I *want* this to be”, the “I” contains in itself the determined potential of this reality, of the “this” that is not currently present but “*shall/will*” be². I currently realize this determined potential.

5°. When I say: “Whoever ponders is ill”, I’m not thinking

tense has not the same meaning as the Greek’s “aorist”) because, when it doesn’t refer to one relation in particular but to the substantial being unbound from time (not “this is here” but instead “this is”: *ἔστι*, not the enclitic), can’t be but in the present, because it is indeed the verb that refers to substances. In Italian, “fu” [*it was*] = “non è” [*it is not*]. In Greek, indeed, the aorist tense of *εἶναι* does not exist.

¹As well as each one of us is impotent towards reality according to the postulate of absolute potential.

²English people express the future tense using *shall* and *will*.

about any ponderer, but rather about the necessity of pondering, by which I refer to all the ponderers.

6°. When I say: “They ponder so that they get ill”, I’m not thinking about any particular illness, but rather about the necessity [] of illness.

7°. When I say: “They ponder in order to get ill”, I’m not thinking about any particular illness, but I recognize the purpose of “pondering” as to get ill.

8°. When I say: “They are healthy although they ponder”, I’m not thinking about what they ponder about, but rather about the lacking potential of the pondering act to make one ill.

9°. When I say: “They get ill although they don’t ponder”, I’m not thinking about what they ponder about, but rather about the lacking necessity of the pondering act to make one ill.

In all these cases, the Subject refers to events which are not happening in his present, but which he’s currently living through an element from his direct reality, at one time (1°, 4°) the potential (simple future or using “to want”); at one time (2°) the impotence (conditional [would]); at one time (3°) the finite impotence (unreality); at one time (5°, 6°) the necessity (reason, sequentiality); at one time (7°) the purpose; at one time (8°) the lacking of potential; at one time (9°) the lacking of necessity (both of them generally referred to as concessive).

Now, since there’s no other reality but the Subject’s one, these facts are as well included in his reality, which he relives in the connection between that reality and the present moment: that is the conjunct reality.

Conjunct reality is a re-discovering. It’s the Subject redetermining himself in the face of his own determination:

a self-reliving: a “reflection”, a knowledge. Conjunct reality is properly said to be subordinate, since in the Subject’s reality there are indeed objects, controlled by the thought, matter and shape.

Conjunct reality is always actual [taking place] in an element of direct reality, in whose thought it is mentioned. Every conjunct instance can be reduced to the form: “I know that this is”, “I know that this is not”, “I know that this may...”, “I know that this has to...”, ecc; where by “this” I mean to refer to a conjunct reality fact¹.

The elementary mode of conjunct reality is “I believe this to be”, where conjunct reality is manifestly the actual reality of the “I”².

¹This becomes clearly evident in the so-called consecutive: 1° (direct): *κραυγήν πολλήν ἐποίησαν, ὥστε καὶ οἱ πολέμιοι ἤκουον*: 2° (conjunct): *κραυγήν πολλήν ἐποίησαν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἀκούειν = οἶδα ὅτι τοιαύτη τις κραυγή οἷαν ἐποίησαν, ἀφ’ ὅθεν οἱ πολέμιοι τότε ἦσαν, ἤκούσατο*. Personified in: *οἶός τε εἰμί (δρᾶν)*.

²Italian and Greek languages extend direct mode as well to those relations that, although only expressed as to be “conjunct” to a direct relation, are by this last one acknowledged to be real. The focus is once again on the current moment (see the historic present and the aorist’s uses). For example: “You know that the horse runs – *οἶσθα ὅτι ὁ ἵππος τρέχει*”. The “You know” implies that conjunct reality is not only real for the subject “You”, but that is the one reality, real for every subject: hence the Subject reaffirms his rights and takes it as direct reality. – Latin language instead doesn’t stretch the meaning of *scis* that much, and considers its object as related to the “You” only, as a conjunct reality that, as long as it remains such, can’t act as a direct (we are either plebeians [common people] or patricians [aristocrats]) –: *scis equum currere*. Moreover, “You see that this is”. In the “You see” it’s clear that the Subject’s intent is assuming this to be real; or: *oblitus es quid initio dixerim – ἐπιλέλησαι ἃ κατ’ ἀρχὰς εἶπον* – “You forgot *what* I said in the beginning”.

(Latin features the conjunct mode through the linguistic attraction *ea quae* [dixi] into *quid* [dixerim]: demonstrative and defined relative into undefined relative. Greek features the direct mode, although using the attraction of demonstrative and relative (*ἐκεῖνα ἃ*) into defined relative (*ἃ*). Italian features direct mode without attraction (this being due to some reverential fear towards

Particles are not all subjunctive, some of them are unchanging (that, because, if, *ὥς, ὅτι, ὥστε, εἰ*) and dependent from the intention; others are necessarily coordinative (e, *καί, ma, δέ, ἀλλά*); others are necessarily subjunctive (*ἄν, ὅταν*, ecc., *acché, purché, affinché, ἴνα*, ecc.), and tie in with the tonal shifts of the melody.

The first person in the speech is not intention's Subject. It's clear that, concerning the intention, the 1st, the 2nd and the 3rd persons are not different, since they are considered as real and so they are placed outside of the intention: they're an element of its direct reality¹.

1°. In the matter of direct reality, this is clear in itself: when I say "I am", or "You are", or "This is", I don't mean by the "I" to refer to something that happened earlier than the illusion, but rather to a mode, like many others, of the same illusion. This is why Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* proves anything but: *equus currit - ergo sum*.

2°. In the matter of conjunct reality, each element of direct reality has the same worth: "I believe this to be" or "You believe this to be". In both cases, the intention is the same, that is to say that the thing is not per se, but only as much as it belongs to the reality of a direct reality's

Latin): in the Italian direct clause, the demonstrative is marked as the object, and the relative clause is considered as a narrative apposition in the place of a noun/adjective: for example "my first words", a quibble allowed by Latin. After all, it shows to be independent with sentences like "Hai scordato quanto dissi da principio" [=You forgot what I said in the beginning], so as to get close to Greek). In Italian and Greek, this is possible thanks to that "in the beginning", which claims what has been said to be real; and it's possible even without this, every time the Subject's intention assumes them to be nonexistent (known, forgotten, ecc.) both in the Subject's and in direct reality.

¹In the mirror, I see myself amongst other things.

element, whatever it is. The Subject does not believe, he “*knows*” the thing [object] is nothing but believed in, even when he states: “I believe it is”; because, if he experienced this belief directly, he would say: “this is”. Therefore, in both cases indifferently, the thing is considered to exist not in the Subject’s thought, but in the thought of an element of it.

III. Correlative [mutual] mode

Two conjunct realities are mutually contemporary one into the other: their mutuality is simultaneously experienced by the Subject.

1°. “He will do that too when you will do that”. The acting potential of the “He” is not directly current [taking place at the present moment] for the Subject, but [it is assumed] in and through the necessity of taking the “You” as a condition; which is in turn assumed in and through the conditioned acting potential of the “He”. What is directly current for the Subject is their mutual relationship. The two realities lean one onto the other, just like a stick is supported by another stick falling, so that the more one tends to fall, the more it supports the other.

2°. “If you did that, he would do that too”. Similarly, one’s impotence is taking place into the other’s, in their respective contingency; and both, by being mutually actual [happening], are simultaneously taking place in the Subject’s perspective.

3°. “If you had done that, he would have done that too”. Which is the same case, once again preterit, hence it results in a mutually determined unreality.

IV. Imperative mode (which is not a mode)

It's not interpreted reality, it's life; it's the intention living itself in the present, not faking an actuality [present] which is by all means finite and sufficient: it's as real as the Subject, because indeed it is not finite in the present, but actual [taking place] as a will. The Subject, here, overwhelms his words with his own life: he's not talking, he's living.

Hurrah for the imperative!