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The Test Case of Constitutional Monarchy

Stephen C. Bosworth

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HEGEL'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY



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The Test Case of Constitutional Monarchy

STEPHEN C. BOSWORTH

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The Test Case of Constitutional Monarchy

Stephen C. Bosworth

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A B B R E V I A T I O N S

An.	<i>Anmerkung</i> refers to the "remarks" which Hegel himself added to his numbered paragraphs, e.g. <i>Rechts</i> , PP279An.
Bold	The bold words in the passages quoted from others have been emphasised by the original author. However, when they appear within my own free translations of Hegel, they mark where my translation is different from Knox's.
[square brackets]	Square brackets mark the editorial additions to quotations which seem to be justified by the immediate context.
<i>Eng.</i>	"About the English Reform Bill" (1831) by Hegel
<i>Enz. I, II, III</i>	Volumes I, II and III of Hegel's <i>Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Science's</i> (Enzyklopadie).
<i>Domestic Affairs</i>	Hegel's "On the Recent Domestic Affairs of Wurtemberg".
<i>G. Cons.</i>	Hegel's <i>The Constitution of Germany</i> .
<i>Geschichte</i>	Hegel's <i>Philosophy of History</i> (Geschichte).
<i>Italics</i>	Italics mark the emphasis I give both to my own words and to those quoted from others.
<i>Logik I, II</i>	Volumes I and II of Hegel's larger <i>Science of Logic</i> .
p.	A page number in the relevant English translation or text.
page	A page number within this book.
<i>Philosophie I, I, III</i>	Volumes I, II and III of Hegel's <i>History of Philosophy</i> (Philosophie).
PP	The numbered paragraphs in Hegel's works, e.g. <i>Rechts</i> , PP273.
quotation marks	'Single' inverted commas mark my own special terms and phrases, "Double" inverted commas mark the words of others.
<i>Rechts</i>	Hegel's <i>Philosophy of Right</i> (Rechts).
S.	A page number in the relevant German Text.
<i>Wurt.</i>	Hegel's <i>Evaluating the Proceedings within the Assembly of the Country's Representative Chamber of the Kingdom of Wurtemberg in the Year 1815-1816</i> .
Z.	<i>Zusatz</i> . Refers to the less reliable or authoritative "additions" which Hegel's editors made to his numbered paragraphs based both upon Hegel's and students' lecture notes.

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P R E F A C E

This work is based on the thesis accepted for the award of a Ph.D in March 1984: *Democratic Monarchy - A Critical Reconstruction of Hegel's Constitutional Theory*. It has been thoroughly revised in the light of the intervening publications. It examines Hegel's political philosophy through the window of his constitutional monarchy. While its analysis is more obviously relevant for and to the remaining hereditary monarchies, sultanates, and sheikhdoms around the world, its conclusions are also important for the understanding, formulation, or modification of modern republican constitutions. It challenges the two opposing assumptions about 'monarchy',

- 1) that it is only an archaic and irrational institution which should have no part in today's world, and
- 2) that it ought to have an enduring role purely because of its mystical power to unite tradition and human needs.

Thus, modern republican arguments are assessed together with those of Plato, Kant, and Marx in order most severely to test Hegel's model. It is discovered that these challenges as well as the inner logic of Hegel's own philosophical system require his constitutional monarchy to be transformed into 'democratic monarchy'. The argument is also based on fresh translations of key passages.

Since October 1983, when the thesis was submitted, four books, one Ph.D. thesis, one chapter, two reviews, and three articles have been published having some potential relevance to the argument:

- 1983 F.R. Cristi, "The Hegelsche Mitte and Hegel's Monarchy", *Political Theory*, 11:4, pp.601-622;
- 1984 Karl-Heinz Ilting, "Hegel's Concept of the State and Marx's Early critique", trans. by H. Tudor and J.M. Tudor, *The state and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy*, Z.A.Pelczynski, ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press;¹
- 1987 Howard Williams and Michael Levin, "Inherited Power and Popular Representation: a Tension in Hegel's Political Theory", *Political Studies*, Vol.35, pp.105-115;
- 1987 William Maker, ed., *Hegel on Economics and Freedom*, Macon, Georgia, Mercer University Press;
- 1987 Taik-Ho Lee, *In Rehabilitation of Hegelianism*, Ph.D. thesis, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- 1988 Richard Dien Winfield, *Reason and Justice*, Albany, State University of New York Press;
- 1988 Tom Nairn, *The Enchanted Glass: Britain and its Monarchy*, London, Radius;
- 1989 Anthony Arblaster, "Taking Monarchy Seriously", *New Left Review*, Issue 174, pp.97-110;
- 1989 Victor Kiernan, "Meditation on a Theme by Tom Nairn", *New Left Review*, Issue 174, pp.111-120;
- 1989 Steven B. Smith, "What is 'Right' in Hegel's Philosophy of Right", *American Political Science Review*, Vol.83, No.1;
- 1989 Edgar Wilson, *The Myth of British Monarchy*, London, Journeyman Press and Republic.

None of these works has forced any fundamental changes to the original case for 'democratic monarchy' but they have suggested some clarifications and additions. All of these will be detailed later, but several of their arguments can be usefully highlighted here.

(1) Karl-Heinz Ilting, "Hegels Begriff des Staates und die Kritik des jungen Marx," *Rivista di Filosofia* N.7-8-9, 1977:119, pp.93-113.

Of course, most academics regard any concern with monarchy as "ineffably silly - like women's fashion magazines".¹ However, Tom Nairn, for one, has taken it seriously of late, if only because he sees it as providing a "Royal dummy in the British mouth"² tending to inhibit the development of socialism in general and a socialist Scotland in particular. Even more recently, Edgar Wilson, another republican, wrote a very readable attack upon the British monarchy. In fact, his implicit challenge to my original conclusions have led me to make certain adjustments. To use one of his more colourful expressions, the type of hereditary head of state favoured here would probably be called, "bicycle-monarchy",³ after one of the means of transport used by the former Queen of the Netherlands. This characterisation is apt because my model constitution does not require its monarch to display anything like the "extravagant grandeur"⁴ currently exhibited by the British monarchs. In any event, the case for 'democratic monarchy' will be seen to refute Wilson's claim that,

"Whatever utility monarchy may have, may be equally served by alternative institutions which are less objectionable."⁵

At the same time, it will be contended that this sort of monarchy would form the most rational complement to a wide variety of modern societies, whether their economies are largely organized by *laissez-faire*, social democratic, or socialist principles. As a result, Wilson would be unable to justify the following comment regarding this model constitution which he makes about the "British Monarchy":

[It] is a substantial obstacle to more real freedom ... both because it exemplifies and sustains gross maldistribution of social status and economic power, and because it is the main instrument of coercive constraint by organized propaganda.⁶

Wilson accepts Rawls's criterion of "fairness": inequalities in the distribution of various social and material goods are permissible provided "that the inequalities result in compensating benefits for everyone ...".⁷ 'Democratic monarchy' will also be seen to pass this test.

Accordingly, it will be argued here that,

- 1) an *hereditary head* of state is an essential part of the most rational constitution; and that this constitution also,
- 2) is *democratic*,
- 3) is *written*, and has,
- 4) a "*parliamentary form*",
- 5) an *independent judiciary*, headed by a supreme court,
- 6) a prime minister and council of ministers selected by arrangements similar to those provided by the fundamental law of Germany, namely, the "*constructive vote of no confidence*" procedure (Articles 63, 67 & 68), and
- 7) a parliament composed of two houses,
 - A) the *elected chamber* is *sovereign* between general elections,
 - a) directly with regard to legislative questions, and,
 - b) indirectly with regard to executive and judicial questions,
 - B) the *non-elected chamber* (composed of some hereditary and some life peers) has only an advisory role.
- 8) The elected house of parliament is chosen by *universal adult suffrage* by,
- 9) an electoral system called, '*associational proportional representation*'.

As 'democratic', this constitution provides for rule by the 'majority' and for each adult to have the effective legal right to participate equally in the making of sovereign state decisions,

- a) directly in referenda to decide on any proposed changes to the constitution, and
- b) indirectly with regard to legislative, executive, and judicial decisions (through the choice of representatives to the elected assembly).

In the ideal state, the legal right of all adults to vote would be made 'effective' by the legislation, policies, and programmes sufficient to remove any of the known obstacles to such political participation, e.g. poverty, intimidation, and ignorance.

(1) Kiernan, p.113. (2) *Ibid.*, p.120. (3) Wilson, p.177. (4) *Ibid.*, p.151.
 (5) *Ibid.*, p.4. (6) *Ibid.*, p.146. (7) *Ibid.*, p.151.

One month after the original thesis was submitted, Cristi published his article. Through a survey of some of the literature and some of the key passages from Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, Cristi correctly shows that it is possible to read Hegel as favouring "absolute monarchy". He says that this is because it would provide the best guarantee for the free market individualism ("atomistic particularity")¹ which was coming to dominate the modern world when Hegel was writing. He writes that this monarchy is "liberal" in the minimal sense that it is not a "despotic regime bent on tyrannizing civil society and its members".² Yet, "political power is monopolized by one center of decision, the monarch, who can alternatively decide to irradiate a large measure of his power to other subordinate authorities or retrieve it in its totality".³

Accordingly, Cristi gives the most authoritarian interpretation possible to PP275 of the *Philosophy of Right*:

"The power of the monarch contains in itself the three moments of the totality [including] ... the moment of ultimate decision as the self-determination to which everything else reverts and from which everything else derives the beginning of its actuality. This absolute self-determination constitutes the distinctive principle of the power of the monarch ...".⁴

Thus, "constitutional monarchy" is interpreted merely to be a cover for *absolute* monarchy.

However, Cristi can be accused of distortion because he does not quote any of the strong textual evidence on the other side which suggests that a genuinely limited monarch was what Hegel had in mind. In such a constitutional monarchy, as in the 'democratic monarchy' to be defended here, the throne would not have more than symbolic and ceremonial functions unless and until the other organs of the state failed to secure the unity which is a condition for a rational state. Therefore, at best, Cristi's article is a useful corrective for anyone who might naively have assumed that Hegel can, without any difficulty, be counted as one of "the fathers of Western democracy".⁵

It is not possible to determine with certainty whether Hegel himself had something close to 'democratic monarchy' in mind. This will be verified by the analysis of the two sets of his conflicting passages relevant to this question. However, the determination of what is the most accurate reading of Hegel is not the primary concern here. Instead, it is the discovery of a model constitution which can withstand the most rigorous philosophical criticism available. To this end, Hegel's political theory and philosophical system are seen as offering the widest and deepest pool available of such arguments for our consideration.

Itling's chapter, published in English a year after the thesis had been completed, can be read largely to confirm its conclusions. In sharp contrast to Cristi, he marshals plausible evidence from Hegel's works prior to the publication of the *Philosophy of Right* in October 1820⁶ to show that Hegel was a "republican" from 1795, and synthesised the principles of republicanism with those of monarchy in his lectures between 1818-1819.⁷ Itling then argues that Hegel, for temporal political calculations during the restoration period, not for philosophical reasons, dropped the republican element almost entirely from the *Philosophy of Right*.⁸ In this light, the model of 'democratic monarchy' suggested here could be seen as having resulted from my having picked up the remaining echos⁹ in the *Philosophy of Right* of Hegel's own republicanism.

Therefore, Itling plausibly claims that Hegel only retreated from his long standing republicanism in between 1819 and 1820 as a prudential tactic to secure the publication of the *Philosophy of Right* after the Karlsbad Decrees which had extended prior censorship even to scientific works.¹⁰ Itling's argument is appealing even though he, like Cristi, also exaggerates the extent to which

(1) Cristi, p.611. (2) Ibid., p.618. (3) Ibid., p.613. (4) Cited by Cristi, p.614.

(5) Cited by Cristi, p.601, from Henning Ottmann, *Individuum und Gemeinschaft bei Hegel*, Vol.I, *Hegel Spiegel der Interpretation*, Berlin, de Gruyter, 1977, p.226.

(6) Itling, p.94. (7) Ibid. (8) Ibid., pp.100, 101 and 112.

(9) Itling, for example, discusses *Recht* PP261 and An. in this regard, p.100.

(10) Ibid., p.98.

Hegel retreated into "authoritarianism".¹ Thus, it might be said that Hegel,² Iltting³ and I are all democrats⁴ in one sense or another. However, we would still seem to differ with respect to the question of monarchy. I, arguably with the support of Hegel himself, see it as essential to the fullest democracy. Iltting sees it largely or entirely to have been an expedient of accommodation to the restoration monarchies of the time, "a politically motivated decision".⁵ Also, Iltting correctly criticises Hegel for not making it clear exactly how his assertion that the "moments' of universality, particularity, and singularity must be represented by special institutions (*Rechts*, PP273) ... was related to the universal end of the state ('the individual's destiny is the living of universal life" (PP258An.). In effect, the present work seeks to make good this "inadequacy"⁶ by offering an elaboration of the relevance of this "practical syllogism"⁷ both with regard to the fulfilment of individuals and to the three function and three organ structure of the model democracy.

In the context of the above, the article by Williams and Levin adds nothing new. Their summaries of the tensions between "inherited power and popular representation", both in the literature and in Hegel's own writings, are quite unobjectionable. However, because they did not attempt an improving reconstruction of Hegel's constitutional theory themselves in order to resolve these tensions, they did not engage in the philosophical debate offered here.

Finally, I would like to express my appreciation for the help that I have received in the writing of this book. I am especially indebted to Professor Raymond Plant of Southampton University for his prudent tutorial guidance. Dr. G. Sathaye, my colleague and friend, carefully read previous versions of the original thesis and offered many useful suggestions. My immediate colleagues at Portsmouth Polytechnic gave me the time to begin the required research by relieving me of many of my teaching duties for one year. Students read or listened to versions of some of the arguments presented here and their criticisms forced me to clarify them. My wife and two daughters both encouraged and tolerated my efforts. For the production of this revised version of the original thesis, two institutions provided material assistance. As a guest Associate Professor of Political Science at Eastern Mediterranean University, currently on leave from Portsmouth Polytechnic, E.M.U. arranged for the original thesis to be typed onto disc so that the editing job could be eased. Portsmouth Polytechnic provided both the hardware and software needed to produce a laser printed master copy.

Steve Bosworth
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October 1990

- (1) *Ibid.*, p.101.
- (2) *Ibid.* pp.95, 96, & 97n.18: Consider Hegel's "explanatory notes to PP122 [of his winter 1818-1819 lecture course on *Natural Law and the Science of the State*]: 'Princely power consists of the empty final decision; there is as yet no question of objective decisions based on reason.' This is the business of the government. Cf.PP124An. 'The regent puts his name to it.' 'It is often not important which decision is made, only that some decision should be made.' (cf. Iltting, *Hegel diverso*, Bari, 1977, p.35ff.).
- (3) *Ibid.*, p.95.
- (4) The argument that Hegel is one sort of democrat would seem to be supported by Taik-Ho Lee, *In Rehabilitation of Hegelianism*, Ph.D. thesis, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1987, Abstract: "popular sovereignty [is] ... retained and absorbed in Hegel's theory of the state".
- (5) *Ibid.*, p.112.
- (6) *Ibid.*, p.109.
- (7) *Ibid.*

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The commonly assumed dichotomy between democracy and monarchy will be shown to be false in the light of the model constitution to be outlined. Hegel's own political philosophy goes along way toward synthesising the two but the conceptual completion of this task is attempted here. Hegel's constitutional monarchy is not perfect, but arguably it does offer the closest available approximation to the best framework for modern political life. Here it has stimulated its own critique from within his wider system and then its reconstruction as 'democratic monarchy'¹ in the face of strong republican arguments. To whatever limited extent institutional arrangements can help to shape events, it will be argued that *democratic monarchy* would be the most supportive of the sort of human life which is both free and rational.

The question of Hegel's monarchy has been almost entirely ignored² by philosophical analysis. When dealt with at all, it has usually been,

- 1) mentioned blandly without understanding or critical comment;³
- 2) drained of all philosophical significance either by portraying it simply,
 - a) as *typical* for a man of his time and circumstances,
 - b) as *expedient* if he wished to attain high status or influence within the Prussian state, or
 - c) as a skilful political ploy to detach monarchy from its absolutist past (rooted in the doctrines of 'divine right' and 'legitimacy') in order to help open it to more liberal reforms;⁴ or
- 3) or simply rejected.

Commentators in the last category display varying degrees of hostility to Hegel's monarchical theory but they have not shown any penetrating philosophical analysis in doing so. Instead, they seem to display only the republican prejudices with which I myself read Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*⁵ for the first time. Of course, it must be admitted that Hegel's complex, unusual, and obscure exposition of his philosophical grounds for an hereditary head of state does not make the removal of such prejudices easy. Thus, different writers have simply asserted that an hereditary head is not necessary (Reyburn, Stace and Taylor), is "smuggled in" (Berki), is "obscure and implausible" (Pelczynski), is "irrational" (Marcuse), or is "nauseating" (Hook).⁶

In contrast, shortly after the first substantial draft of the original thesis was completed, the articles by Yack⁷ and Brudner⁸ were published. Each offered different justifications for Hegel's

- (1) 'Single' inverted commas will be used to mark my own special terms while the words of others will be marked by "double" inverted commas.
- (2) Given the nature of Richard Dien Winfield's book, it is surprising that he does not even mention Hegel's monarchy, *Reason and Justice*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1988.
- (3) For example, Richard A. Davis, "Property and Labour in Hegel's Concept of Freedom," William Maker, ed., *Hegel on Economics and Freedom*, Macon, Georgia, Mercer University Press, 1987, p.207.
- (4) For example, Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, C.U.P., 1972, p.187.
- (5) When I have consulted the German text, references to Hegel's works will use a key word in the German title. Thus, the *Philosophy of Right* will be footnoted as "*Rechts*" after the *Grundlinien der Philosophie der Philosophie des Rechts*.
- (6) H.A. Reyburn, *The Ethical Theory of Hegel*, Oxford 1921, pp.241-252. W.T. Stace, *The Philosophy of Hegel*, New York 1955, paragraphs 619 and 620. Charles Taylor, *Hegel*, Cambridge 1975, p.440. R.N. Berki, in Z.A. Pelczynski (ed) *Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives*, Cambridge 1971, pp. 202-3. Z.N. Pelczynski, *ibid.*, p.25 and 231. H. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, London 1941, p.218. S. Hook, in *Hegel's Political Philosophy*, W. Kaufmann (ed), New York 1970, p.90.
- (7) Bernard Yack, "The Rationality of Hegel's Concept of Monarchy", *American Political Science Review*, Vol.74, 1980, pp.708-720.
- (8) Brudner, "Constitutional Monarchy as the Divine Regime: Hegel's Theory of the Just State, *History of Political Thought*, Vol.II, No. 1. Spring. January 1981, pp.119-140.

monarchy. While the argument developed here is prefigured in some respects by both, both fail to see that a fully rational constitution must also be democratic. Nevertheless, extracted from the rest of Yack's argument, I agree with the following points:

- 1) Hegel's "hereditary monarch is the necessary apex of the rational political order",¹ an "interdependent unity".²
- 2) "The rational state requires a depersonalized power of final decision, exercised by an actual person. The fundamental problem of politics cannot be wished away. Someone must have the final say in any human society".³ "The most personal form of sovereignty makes impersonal, rational rule possible".⁴
- 3) "By depoliticizing (or depersonalizing) the regime at the top, the monarch creates the conditions in which freedom of political association and competition can continue without disturbing the general rational administration of the state".⁵
- 4) Also, for practical reasons, the actuality of a rational monarchy would depend on "public acceptance of a dynastic tradition".⁶
- 5) "Since [constitutional monarchy] requires a tradition of accepting a royal family, as well as the historical experience and political conditions of post-Napoleonic Europe, Hegel's rational constitution is not a universally applicable blueprint for the best regime. It would have been absurd for the authors of the American constitution to try to impose this form of government The sad fact is that the rational and free constitution is *not* possible everywhere."⁷

The last admission that the most rational constitution does not simply provide a "blueprint" for every time and place should not be taken necessarily to exclude the possibility that it might serve as a 'model' for all. In this sense, it will be argued that 'democratic monarchy' both provides a key for understanding all constitutions, including republics, and may suggest some modifications which would help any regime provide a better framework for free and rational human life.

Thus, it is argued later that constitutions ought to be assessed according to the extent to which they inherently foster 'the maximization of both the quality and quantity of free, rational human life'. The meaning of this phrase will be elaborated in due course and it will be shown, with 'philosophical necessity' (Chapter Six) to follow as a moral principle from Hegel's own concept of "Reason" (Chapter Seven). Similarly, it will be demonstrated that maximizing the *quantity* of 'free and rational ... life' entails the conclusion that the model must be 'democratic'.

Implicitly, Yack's article rejects this conclusion, but perhaps only because he is a victim of the common but false assumption to be corrected here that monarchy and democracy are inherently incompatible. This mistake encouraged by his tacit equation between "democracy" and the "ancient republics".⁸ Paraphrasing Hegel (*Rechts*, PP279), he criticises these republics for their reliance on the principle of "election". This left "the content of their public decisions ... to chance". They "required leaders of great talent, but could not guarantee their continued presence".⁹ The same cannot be said of democratic monarchy. Yack also exaggerates the difficulties with elected officials in the following two passages and naively assumes that these same dangers are not perhaps even more applicable to his more authoritarian monarch:

- A) "Any particular individual or group of individuals, elected or self-appointed, is bound to be partial and not represent the universal will of the nation, ... if only because they must depend on their own limited insights";¹⁰
- B) "It is much harder to identify the universal will of the nation with elected or appointed figures. They remind one that ... they bring personal ambitions and perspectives to government".¹¹

His comments seem to add up to a denial of the assumption central to modern democracies that it is desirable for rival political parties to compete for the main public offices. This is confirmed by his criticism that republics only can generate "an artificial collective will"¹² and that such "popular will" does "not end the personal competition for the ultimate power of decision in the state".¹³ It also seems to deny what is affirmed here, namely, that the rational life of a people is encouraged both qualitatively and quantitatively by "competition" within and between political parties. It denies that such political parties tend to be spurred both to articulate and to rule according to "the universal will".

These views make it clear that Yack and I understand quite differently, points 2) and 3) quoted above. He sees the "depersonalized power of final decision" as justifying authoritarian hereditary rule. I see it as grounding a constitution which provides for the "power of final decision" to be

(1) Yack, p.710. (2) Ibid., p.712. (3) Ibid., p.715. (4) Ibid., p.716. (5) Ibid., p.715. (6) Ibid., p.710. (7) Ibid., p.718. (8) Yack, p.712. (9) Ibid., p.712. (10) Yack, p.714. (11) Ibid., p.717. (12) Ibid., p.714. (13) Ibid., p.714.

exercised in an effective manner,

- a) by the citizens themselves in referenda on any constitutional proposals, and, at general election times, with regard to their representatives, but between general elections,
- b) by the "collective will" of the elected assembly as long as it continues to generate its own working majority and thus constitutes a legal or "actual person",¹
- c) by one of a list of elected officials (governor general, deputy governor general, or speaker of the elected chamber) if such a majority fails, or
- d) by the hereditary head of state, but only in the absence of b) and c).

It will be seen later why this absence is not as unlikely as republicans might be inclined to assume. In any case, the monarch in my model constitution indeed helps to create "the conditions in which freedom of political association can continue".²

The conflict between Yack and myself may stem from our different understandings of "depoliticized" and "depersonalized". My head of state is depoliticized only in the sense that if he has had only to perform the ceremonial jobs symbolizing the unity of the relevant society and state, he will *not* be seen as involved in *party* politics. However, if she or he has had to exercise 'effective', as well as 'symbolic', sovereignty for some time, he or she will most definitely be, and be seen to be, 'political' in the wider sense of the term. While Yack's monarch would always be political in this wider sense, mine would not be except in the above mentioned circumstance.

Yack and I agree that the monarch is depersonalized in the sense that primogeniture is no respecter of personal qualities other than times of birth. We also agree that the monarch is depersonalized in the other sense that she or he plays a role in a rational constitution which minimizes the chances that merely personal whims will capture "the regime at the top".³ However, he mistakenly believes that the risk of this is minimized when an hereditary official permanently has the effective "power of final decision".⁴ I argue that it is minimized when the monarch is given this power only if and when a leadership which is positively supported by a working majority in the elected assembly fails to materialize. I would add, but Yack would not, that elected representatives and officials in a rational constitutional order would also tend to be depersonalized, simply by the procedures giving them office and by the institutional framework within which they must operate.

Brudner's article offers some points of agreement with the argument to be developed in the following chapters but it conflicts at other points. We both attempt, "to elucidate Hegel's theory of constitutional monarchy and to show how a sensible person could take it seriously".⁵ We agree that Hegel's constitution is "organic" in the sense of it having been derived from within his philosophical system. Therefore, he makes an advance beyond Yack by mentioning the relation between the three "moment" structure of Hegel's system and the three organs of Hegel's state: universality (legislature), particularity (executive - judiciary and bureaucracy), and individuality (the crown).⁶ However, his brief account of these relations fails to clarify the inner connected triplicity of the relevant moments, functions, and organs. Here, *Chapters Two* and *Eleven* address this problem. Also, in spite of Brudner's imprecise formulations, he correctly reminds us that Hegel's concept of the rational state is not to be equated with any past or existing state merely because it has arrived at a "contingent compromise" between "monarchical and republican elements". At most, such states "obscurely"⁷ illustrate Hegel's concept of the state. However, the argument offered here conflicts with Brudner,

- 1) most definitely when he asserts, without explanation, something which all of the textual evidence denies. He writes that Hegel does not identify "the paradigm of modern constitutional monarchy ... with the constitution of fully developed Reason";⁸
- 2) in his assumption, shared by Yack, that Hegel's constitutional conclusions were in no way democratic. Thus, he writes that, "under popular sovereignty, government cannot escape the appearance of being a faction popular sovereignty leads to political fragmentation";⁹
- 3) in his suggestion that "constitutional monarchy begins *logically* from a dominant Crown".¹⁰ He should have said that it is derived logically from the concept of 'Reason as a constitution'. Consequently, Hegel's constitution begins *historically*, not "logically", from a "dominant Crown"; and

(1) *Ibid.*, p.715. (2) *Ibid.* (3) *Ibid.* (4) Yack, p.715. (5) Brudner, p.121.

(6) *Ibid.*, pp.125-127. Note that these terms receive somewhat different translations in the following chapters.

(7) *Ibid.*, pp.129 & 130. (8) Brudner, p.130. (9) *Ibid.*, p.124. (10) *Ibid.*, p.130n.37.

- 4) possibly when he implies that Hegel's "God" cannot, or ought not, be reduced to "Reason",¹ assumed here to be the ground of all being (including rational human life). He might reject a humanist interpretation here which does not exclude the possibility that "Reason" may itself become entirely known and understood by human reason (see *Chapters Six and Seven*).

Before turning to outline the broad structure of my argument, the fundamental purpose for which this whole enterprise has been erected should be made explicit. This is to say, that this thesis seeks to foster 'free, rational' political thought and activity. This goal, in turn, is required by the more general prescription which the rest of the work will clarify and elaborate: 'Act so as to maximize the quality and quantity of free, rational living in the world'.

Crudely speaking, *democratic monarchy* could be likened empirically to the existing Japanese, Scandinavian, Benelux, Spanish and British Constitutions.² This is to say that it could be characterized as 'a parliamentary democracy with cabinet government'. Its hereditary head of state formally appoints the prime minister but his cabinet is made fully accountable to an elected chamber. The elected chamber is elected by universal adult suffrage but with a *new* system of proportional representation to be discussed in *Chapter One*.

As already implied, in order to defend *democratic monarchy*, I am going to have to argue against Hegel at certain points. At other times, I will receive Hegel's assistance against various republican arguments. *Chapter Two* refutes both 'parliamentary' and 'congressional' republican attacks. *Chapters Three, Four, and Five* will specifically consider those republican theories which can be extracted from Plato, Kant and Marx. Therefore, the book might be said to be divided into *two parts* separated by *Chapter Six*. This chapter stops to define and examine the methodology used throughout. It explains how 'philosophical necessity' characterises the strongest conceivable case that could be made out for any conclusion. Thus, the *first part* presents the main features of democratic monarchy and attempts to defeat various opposing republican arguments. The *second part* explores the extent to which democratic monarchy is compatible with Hegel's philosophy and political theory.

In *Chapter Three*, Plato's *Republic* is used as a heuristic spring board to introduce the philosophical case for democratic monarchy. Some will say that I *twist* Plato's republican argument into a support for my model constitution. Similarly, they will say that in later chapters, I attempt to *stretch, pull or drive* Kant, Hegel and Marx to the same prescriptive ideal. To some extent, such charges would be fair, but no apology is necessary for two reasons. Firstly, my glosses and reconstructions are usually made possible by the elements of residual ambiguity that these philosophers have left within their own formulations. Secondly and more importantly, in all cases I have sought readings and modifications of these theories in order to discover the strongest possible arguments *against* democratic monarchy as well as the strongest ones *for* it. At no time have I knowingly 'violated' the texts. When I go further than the texts can be stretched, this is declared. I am also aware that I have frequently departed from the so-called 'standard interpretations' of these four philosophers. This would not bother me unless this meant either that I had missed their strongest arguments.

In Hegel's case especially, different commentators have frequently given baldly *contradictory yet equally plausible* interpretations. This is not surprising when we consider the enormity of his complex system and the notorious obscurity of many of his formulations, i.e. what Marx charitably called the 'stylistic peculiarity of Hegel'.³ To a somewhat lesser degree, the same problems arise when examining most any theorist; certainly Plato, Kant and Marx are not exceptions. For this reason, I do not expect that all of my interpretations and reconstructions will be accepted by all as unchallengable. The incompleteness, obscurity, diffuseness, complexity, or prolixity of their words would make such an expectation naive.

I can only hope that my interpretations and modifications will be found both to be plausibly fair to the philosophers examined and as contributing to our common discovery of the most rational model constitution. At least I can hope that my suggestions may constitute a fruitful part of the agenda for any philosophical investigations in search of such a theory.

(1) *Ibid.*, see pp.125 and 131.

(2) I say 'crudely' because I adopt the same attitude towards my model as did Hegel, namely, that the "rational state" is not to be simply equated with any historically existent, "particular state" (*Rechts*, PP258An., i.e. the "Remark" to paragraph 258).

(3) K. Marx, *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'*, translated by Joseph O'Malley and Annette Jolin, C.U.P., 1970, p.13.

C h a p t e r O n e :
T H E M O D E L C O N S T I T U T I O N

Because my model constitution can be seen as derived from Hegel's philosophical system and yet also departs from his own constitutional theory at certain points, it provides the basis for an intimate test of Hegel's political philosophy. Thus, the wide ranging comparison offered here will cast a penetrating light into Hegel's theory of the state. This chapter will first outline the structure of 'democratic monarchy' and then consider some of its practical advantages. Later, it will be seen how these are rooted in the more philosophical groundings to be elaborated in the chapters concerned with Plato, Kant, Marx, and, of course, Hegel. Accordingly, in support of the 'model constitution', this chapter will largely confine itself to laying some of the descriptive foundations for arguing that,

- 1) an *hereditary head* of state is an essential part of the most rational constitution; and that this constitution also,
- 2) is *democratic*,
- 3) is *written*, and has,
- 4) a "*parliamentary form*",
- 5) an *independent judiciary*, headed by a supreme court,
- 6) a prime minister and council of ministers selected by arrangements similar to those provided by the fundamental law of Germany, namely, the "*constructive vote of no confidence*" procedure (Articles 63, 67 & 68), and
- 7) a parliament composed of two houses,
 - A) the *elected chamber* is *sovereign* between general elections,
 - a) directly with regard to legislative questions, and,
 - b) indirectly with regard to executive and judicial questions,
 - B) the *non-elected chamber* (composed of some hereditary and some life peers) has only an advisory role.
- 8) The elected house of parliament is chosen by *universal adult suffrage* by,
- 9) an electoral system called, '*associational proportional representation*'.

As 'democratic', this constitution provides for rule by the 'majority' and for each adult to have the effective legal right to participate equally in the making of sovereign state decisions,

- a) directly in referenda to decide on any proposed changes to the constitution, and
- b) indirectly with regard to legislative, executive, and judicial decisions (through the choice of representatives to the elected assembly).

In the ideal state, the legal right of all adults to vote would be made 'effective' by the legislation, policies, and programmes sufficient to remove any of the known obstacles to such political participation, e.g. poverty, intimidation, and ignorance.

While most of the above features do not need much further explanation, several do:

- 1) the hereditary head of state,
- 2) the non-elective chamber,
- 3) the sovereignty of the elected assembly,
- 4) the 'constructive vote of no confidence' procedure, and
- 5) 'associational proportional representation'.

Before these are addressed, however, the intended status of the 'model' constitution must be made clear. This is especially important in view of what many people might feel are grandiose claims that will be made for democratic monarchy, e.g. 'most rational', 'best workable ideal',

'philosophically necessary'. It claims to be established by the most rigorous argument as the best 'general, prescriptive guide' for political action. Although it hopes to be conceptually precise in its formulation, of course, its prescriptive implications for every political problem in all the existing countries of the world will rarely be immediately obvious. Even if we were to assume for the moment that it had already been fully established philosophically, I do not expect that this, by itself, would usually tell us *exactly* how we should conduct ourselves within the problematic of every concrete context. Usually, many additional practical and theoretical difficulties would have to be faced first. Thus, the formulation of operationally precise prescriptions for any empirically concrete state is beyond the scope of this thesis. I do not deny the importance of finding suitable courses of action in these cases, especially for those people directly involved. However, a detailed philosophical consideration of the problems contained even in one such concrete reality would add volumes to this work.¹ More importantly, such an enterprise would draw us into the uncertainties which are unavoidably attached to any action in the world which is partly moved by forces which may not yet be scientifically understood and partly by human wills which are 'free' and thus must always remain to some extent unpredictable.²

In one sense, therefore, this book is taking an easy way out. Yet, it seeks to define a *model* which will address, rather than be undermined by, such uncertainties. A 'model' can enjoy this immunity because it is a more abstract entity. It only hopes to offer a *general* way of coping with these uncertainties. It hopes to be an enduring conception of the ideal constitution. Some such conception is a 'philosophically necessary' reference point for the unavoidably uncertain assessment of rival tactics to be applied to any concrete situation. It ought to be a part of every political calculation. While I would argue that such a conception has an intrinsic as well as a practical value, it cannot be denied that most people (even "philosophers" under pressure or in moments of weakness) may act not as a result of such refined considerations but from impulse, feeling, instinct or intuition. The model, therefore, attempts to prescribe the *rational goal* of political activity with respect to constitutional arrangements. It seeks to formulate a guide to action, not to prescribe operationally precise tactics. Thus 'democratic monarchy' hopes to be *general*, not in the sense of being vague but in the sense of being a clear model which *all* should add to their probabilistic calculations concerning how they *ought* to conduct themselves in any given political situation.

With regard to the question of the hereditary head of state, a number of clarifications must be made. The monarch's constitutional obligation to exercise effective sovereignty in certain circumstances must be explained. He or she may receive this constitutional duty only as a member of the 'state prerogative council'. One designated member of this council is charged by the model constitution to make the essential sovereign decisions when the elected assembly fails to produce a 'working majority'. It is this majority which would normally make these decisions. In such times of crisis, the state prerogative council, formally called and chaired by the monarch, would meet in order to *advise* one of its members on how to exercise one or a combination of four prerogatives:

- 1) to appoint the prime minister,
- 2) to appoint a chairperson for the elected assembly,
- 3) to prorogue or dissolve the elected assembly, or
- 4) to require that any proposed constitutional changes be first ratified by the electorate in referenda.

Only the last one could be exercised when a 'working majority' existed in the elected assembly. The 'state prerogative council' would be composed of the following, assuming that none of the relevant offices was vacant. They are listed in order of their priority with regard to the personal exercise of the prerogatives:

- a) the 'governor general' and the deputy governor general(s),
- b) the 'speaker' of the elected chamber and deputy speaker(s),
- c) *the monarch*,
- d) the 'leader' of the non-elected chamber and deputy leaders,
- e) (in the absence of a 'speaker', the 'chairperson' and deputy chairperson(s) of the elected assembly - whether elected by a mere plurality or appointed by a previous exercise of the prerogative), and
- f) (the next adult heir to the throne if invited by the monarch could also participate, but he or she could not personally exercise the prerogatives until he or she inherited the throne).

(1) See *Chapter Six*.

(2) *Ibid*.

The practice of consulting one another in the 'state prerogative council' would both help the current holder of the prerogatives to think through any proposed courses of action and help to prepare the other men or women who might later be called upon personally to exercise these same constitutional powers. All exercises of the prerogatives by one of the above officials would be formally proclaimed in the name of the state prerogative council, the monarch, and the people. Each of the elected officials on the state prerogative council would be selected, as far as is possible, to have the qualities which Wilson rightly believes they ought to have, namely, to be, ... demonstrably able, representative, accountable, impartial, and capable of legitimate action in the national interest when necessary.

Thus, the monarch, personally would have this constitutional right only if the elected officials who would normally also be members of this council and who would have priority were not available for any of the reasons to be elaborated later. Thus, the model's monarch could have this substantive role as well as remaining the prime symbol of the basic unity of his or her society. Later chapters will argue that the intrinsic qualities of an hereditary head of state makes it the institution best suited to serve as the apex of a society's symbols of unity. For most every particular state, this unity is complex and incomplete. It is usually a unity of an existing society both with its past and its future, as well as being a unity of its individuals, families, groups, associations, and of its various state functions and organs. The monarch's many ceremonial functions are meant dramatically and symbolically to affirm this unity.

In any case, no member of the state prerogative council has the right to exercise any of the first three prerogatives unless, because of intense factionalism, the 'working majority' in the elected assembly has either evaporated or has failed to materialize in the first place. A 'working majority' is present when at least 50% + 1 of the members of the assembly elect the prime minister, continue to give his or her council of ministers votes of confidence when asked, and pass the legislative, self-dissolving, or referenda proposals requested by the council of ministers (i.e. the 'executive council'). The history of parliamentary systems in the world has clearly shown that such majority support for executive council cannot be taken for granted, even or especially under many of the existing electoral systems. With regard to this problem, it must be noted that the model sovereign assembly is elected by the system to be described shortly: 'associational proportional representation'. The inclusion of proportional representation may fuel the fear that the model would make majority support for any executive council less likely than it needs to be. Whether such scrupulously democratic representation of the people would, in fact, makes "majority government" more or less likely in the long run is difficult to say. It is a question which is not capable of being settled by philosophical investigation. However, rigorous argument can show that this electoral system is a necessary part of a rational democracy. At the same time, provision must be made for any such potentially destabilizing eventualities. The model constitution's arrangements for the exercise of the above prerogatives fully address this issue.

With regard to the prerogative to appoint the prime minister when no candidate has secured majority support, the model constitution says that the holder of the prerogative should then appoint the candidate who has the support of a *plurality*, unless this, in his or her judgment, would

- (1) Edgar Wilson, *The Myth of British Monarchy*, London, Journeyman Press and Republic, 1989, p.178. Wilson's discussion of constitutional reforms (Chapter 34) has led me to add the largely elected 'state prerogative council' to the original argument. However, my retention of the monarch as an essential member of this council runs against the thrust of his book. Both Wilson and I are 'democrats' because we are 'rationalists'. However, while I argue that a particular sort of limited monarchy would institutionally strengthen democracy, he sees "democracy" and "monarchy" as "incompatible ... in principle" (p.1). His main concern is the more narrow one of entirely defeating the many arguments for the *British* monarchy while mine is to outline a general constitution to serve as a rational guide to any modern state. Nevertheless, his avowed aim "to examine the [British] monarchy at the level of principle" (p.2) or "broadly from a philosophical perspective [concerned, as it is, with arguments about] ... truth ... and rightness..." (p.2), provides us with another side to our common ground. Both of us are seeking the most "rational" constitution. Wilson would probably call the type of hereditary head of state favoured by me "bicycle-monarchy" (p.177), presumably after one of the means of transport sometimes favoured by the former Queen of the Netherlands. This characterisation is apt because my constitution does not require its 'monarch' to display anything like the "extravagant grandeur" (p.151) currently exhibited by British monarchs. My hereditary head of state would have, as Wilson put it, been forced or "persuaded to continue as hereditary ceremonial head of state at Equity rates, plus expenses ..." (p.162). Still, as has been made clear, my model constitution requires the monarch to retain some of the effective constitutional powers which the Swedish monarch lost in 1974 (p.175).

threaten the unity of the society more than the appointment of an alternative candidate. With the same consideration in mind, and in the same circumstances, the holder of the prerogative would also have to decide whether to appoint a 'caretaker' prime minister, instead, and thus to dissolve the assembly and trigger a new general election. The current holder of the prerogatives ought to have the same consideration in mind if and when an existing prime minister suffers a plurality vote of no confidence, whether he or she had initially received majority support or not. No question of prerogative arises when an existing prime minister is replaced by a different leader elected by a working majority, whether the existing prime minister was initially elected by a majority or merely appointed by prerogative.¹

As we have seen, if the elected assembly were to fail to produce a working majority, it would normally be the 'governor general', who the model constitution would require personally to exercise the above prerogatives. She or he must be elected by at least 2/3rds of the elected assembly (for a term of one year longer than the maximum time between general elections). Similarly, a 'deputy governor general' would be elected to perform these same prerogatives in the governor general's absence, indisposition, or incapacity. The deputy would also be charged automatically to assume the office itself, either upon the existing governor general's death or upon his constitutional removal from office.² The governor general could be removed from office by the elected chamber for any reason by a 2/3rds 'vote of no confidence' or by being convicted in the supreme court of having committed unconstitutional or other acts previously specified by law. In this event, the constitution would require that a new deputy governor general be elected. In the absence of a deputy in such circumstances, the 'speaker' of the elected chamber would be next in line to perform these prerogatives, the 'speaker' having been elected by at least 50% + 1 of the members of the elected assembly.

Therefore, the hereditary head of state would be constitutionally required personally to exercise these prerogatives only in the unlikely event that no 'governor general', 'deputy', or 'speaker' currently existed. Nevertheless, this may occur when the elected assembly lacks a working majority and the previously elected governor general, speaker, and their deputies had since died, been killed, or fallen into incompetence. In this case, the assembly would probably also be too divided even to elect a new speaker by a simple majority (50% + 1), let alone a new governor general by a 2/3rds majority. Of course, in order to conduct its business at all, without having had to rely on the current holder of the prerogative to appoint its chairperson, the assembly would have had to elect its own chairperson. When the chairperson has been chosen by a majority, he or she is called the 'speaker' here; if merely by a plurality, the 'chairperson'.

The reason for the above order of priority between the members of the 'state prerogative council' is supplied by the recollection that the exercise of these prerogatives has the sole purpose of fostering as much voluntary, and therefore 'democratic', unity in the society as is possible in spite of the current disunity displayed in the elected chamber. Thus, the holder of these prerogatives is charged with the task of "holding the ring" until sufficient practical rationality has returned to the elected chamber so that it can form a working majority and thus resume its own sovereign constitutional powers. The most important of these would be to replace the existing prime minister, if it wished, by electing its own man or woman. The desired voluntary unity of a society would seem clearly to be better encouraged by a person exercising the above prerogatives who had himself received at least 2/3rds support, rather than by one who had received the support of only between 50% and 2/3rds as in the case of the 'speaker', less than 50% as in the case of the 'chairperson', or had never been voted upon at all as in the cases of the monarch and 'leader' of the non-elected house. The adoption of the '2/3rds' majority for the election of the governor general is not entirely arbitrary. It is probably the lowest percentage of support that an elected official could receive without being thought by a substantial section of the community as representing only a factional interest. Another seeming psychological truth is relevant. The minimal unity defined as 'the bare absence of violence' is likely to obtain in a society which can muster a 2/3rds majority for its governor general if only because the 1/3rd minority sees that it would face odds of 1 to 2 if it were to use force in an attempt to get its own way.

- (1) This last feature indicates that the model adopts the "constructive vote of no confidence" and other provisions of the German constitution to be discussed shortly, i.e. (Articles 63, 67 & 68).
- (2) A society could logically choose to provide itself with more than one 'deputy governor general' in order to increase its security, but the length of this list of deputies would have to be balanced against the corresponding extra expense.

The very presence of the monarch in the above order needs to be explained, especially to democratic republicans. Again, it must be emphasised that an hereditary official is charged here with the personal exercise of the prerogatives only when no other person elected by a majority is available. In this event, however, he or she is given this constitutional power so as dramatically to signal to the members of the elected chamber (as well as to the public at large) that, for the moment, it has failed, and the longer it continues its factional squabbling, the more likely it will be that an unconstitutional, non-rational, involuntary, and probably anti-democratic unity will be imposed upon them, either from within or from without. This alarm is rung most clearly by the monarch because he or she is the leading member of a family which previously had a history of itself ruling - possibly without reference to reason but certainly without reference to democracy. It is precisely because the monarch represents such an institution that his personal exercise of the prerogatives gives his society an additional chance and stimulus to recapture its capacity to rule itself democratically. The monarch's role here is the clearest, yet least lethal personification of two related practical truths:

- a) If there is a power vacuum, it will be filled by non-reason if not by reason.
- b) If the majority cannot rule itself, it will be ruled by 'the one' or by 'the few' (rationally or not).

An hereditary official's accession to the prerogatives, in itself, is the best non-verbal declaration of the near and present danger of rule by non-rational forces. In this way, monarchy as an institution reminds each generation of its lower possibility so that it may grasp its higher possibility.

At the same time, because a monarch achieves his position by hereditary succession, his ability to function as the head of state in this substantive role is likely to survive any prolonged electoral divisiveness which may plague a society or its representative assembly. The same cannot be said of any of the elected officials discussed above. However, this not only makes it probable that he will be in place to perform this service for his society when needed, it also makes him the most likely focus of any eventual reassertion of autocratic rule. However, this is exactly why his personal exercise of the prerogatives sends the alarms ringing more loudly irrespective of his own democratic or anti-democratic intentions. It is only when the full range of the more obviously democratic institutions have temporarily failed that the monarchical element in this model constitution is called upon to act in order to foster the effective return to democracy. It is this dialectic of apparently opposite principles which are synthesized in 'democratic monarchy' in order best to strengthen both rational and democratic life in modern societies.

In further justification of the above order, it would seem less likely that a monarch's initial exercise of any of the above prerogatives would be perceived as partisan when compared to similar decisions which might be taken by the 'leader' of the non-elected chamber. This is because this leader is associated with the chamber which is expected to take an unflinching part in the political debates of the day while the monarch is prohibited from doing so. The monarch's ceremonial functions are initially more likely to have associated him or her with the benevolent maintenance of society's unity. Nevertheless, the 'leader' would seem to be better placed than would the 'chairperson' of the elected assembly (whether elected or appointed). This is because the latter has already been a participant in the elected assembly's factionalism, either having been elected by a plurality in the chamber and therefore having been openly not supported by more than half of its members, or, by having been imposed on the assembly from outside by a previous exercise of the second prerogative. Thus, the monarch's initial exercise of any of the prerogatives is seen as less likely to be greeted with factional suspicion than would similar action taken either by the 'leader' or by the 'chairperson'.

This last point opens the way for a clarification of the place and role of the non-elected chamber in the model constitution. It will be recalled that the non-elected chamber has an advisory function only. Thus, its 'teeth' are small. In addition to being placed in a highly visible position, freely to speak its mind publicly and to offer its considered advice to the other organs of state, it can do no more than asking the elected chamber to think again by requiring it to vote once more before a contentious bill could become law. This 'house' is justified by its capacity to raise the level of public debate. Because its members attain their positions by processes different from those which select representatives to the elected chamber, they would be more likely to complement and augment, rather than simply duplicate the deliberations which occur in the 'lower house'. It is composed of a combination of hereditary and life peers but on a smaller scale than the British example. The fixed number of life peers would be elected by the elected chamber for life. Such arrangements should produce a debating chamber in which the hereditary members could

speaking freely because of the relative economic independence which their tied lands would give them. For the same reason, they could afford the time and the money that is frequently necessary to engage in the sort of independence research which might be of public service. Since the life peers should include members with long and proven records of distinguished public service, their speeches and reports should frequently be very instructive. Therefore, in their various ways, both sorts of members should be able to enhance the *quality* of the deliberations, both of the general public and the other organs of the state which have more substantive powers.

The outline on the first page of this chapter refers to 'the prime minister and the council of ministers' as being 'selected by arrangements similar' to the German "constructive vote of no confidence". The relevant sections of Germany's "Fundamental Law" are as follows:

Article 63

- 4) If no candidate [for Chancellor] has been elected [by a majority], ... a new ballot shall be held without delay, in which the person obtaining *the largest number of votes* [i.e. a 'plurality'] shall be elected. ... If the person elected did not obtain ... a majority, the Federal President must within seven days either appoint him or dissolve the Bundestag.

Article 67 (Vote of no confidence).

- 1) The Bundestag can express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor with the majority of its members and by requesting the Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President must comply with the request and appoint the person elected.
- 2) Forty-eight hours must elapse between the motion and the election.

Article 68 (Vote of confidence - Dissolution of the Bundestag).

- 1) If a motion of the Federal Chancellor for a vote of confidence is not assented to by the majority of the members of the Bundestag, the Federal President may, upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor, dissolve the Bundestag within twenty-one days. The right to dissolve shall lapse as soon as the Bundestag with the majority of its members elects another Federal Chancellor.
- 2) Forty-eight hours must elapse between the motion and the vote thereon."¹

Thus, the model constitution's current holder of the prerogatives has no discretion with regard to the appointment of the prime minister as long as a working majority exists in the elected assembly. It also gives him or her the same discretion to appoint a prime minister, supported only by a plurality, in the absence of a working majority. However, democratic monarchy also gives even greater discretion in this absence: the current holder of the prerogative could instead decide to appoint, as prime minister, anyone he or she judges will be more conducive to the lawful unity of the state. For the same reason, the model's holder of the prerogative has the additional discretion to replace or to sustain an existing prime minister if he or she has since failed a constructive vote of no confidence by a plurality. In this way, the model provides for the establishment of a 'working plurality' in the absence of a 'working majority'. The former is dependent on the discretion of the current holder of the prerogative powers while the latter is not.

Finally, we must briefly describe the system of 'associational proportional representation' (A.P.R.)² by which the normally sovereign assembly is elected. This system has no close historical precedent, even though it will be seen to incorporate the better features of those that have been used.³ Nor does any other political theorist suggest a close approximation to it. Rather, it could be characterised as a modification of J.S. Mill's plan⁴ in the light of an imaginative reconstruction of Hegel's representation for "corporations".⁵

Firstly, associational proportional representation (A.P.R.) is based on universal adult suffrage. It organizes the general elections which must occur at least every five years. Under this system, individual adults have the annual right to register their preference to channel their general election votes through any one of a wide range of *voluntary* associations. These associations would themselves have had previously to registered their own desire to be represented directly in the elected chamber. Thus, a voluntary association would automatically become an

- (1) S.E. Finer, ed., *Five Constitutions*, Brighton, The Harvester Press, 1979, pp.218-220.
- (2) Wilson's characterisation of the current British single member electoral system as "iniquitous" (*Ibid.*, p.191.6), might be taken as an indication that he would be favourably disposed toward A.P.R.
- (3) E.g. the 'party list' system (Holland, Denmark, Ireland and Israel) and 'two vote' system (Germany) systems.
- (4) Mill's scheme adopted Hare's plan which suggested the application of a variety of what we now call "the Single Transferable Vote" (STV) system to the whole of Britain. Electors living in one constituency were to be allowed to vote for candidates in other constituencies; "Representative Government", *Utilitarianism; Liberty; Representative Government*, Everyman's Library, London 1962, pp.261-8.
- (5) See *Chapter Ten*.

'electoral association' and have the right to send at least one deputy to the elected house as long as a sufficient number of citizens, country wide, had also declared their preference to vote through that association. The minimum quota for such representation would be calculated by dividing the number of registered voters by the number of seats in the elected chamber.

Whether the society was dominated by what Marx called a "capitalistic mode of production" or by a "communistic mode of production",¹ it would still contain an extensive range of interests based on geographical proximity, of identities based on common occupational concerns, and of groups based on common political beliefs. Some of the voluntary associations which would tend to grow from these various common interests, identities and beliefs could thus become 'electoral associations'. It is argued that both capitalist and communist societies would be strengthened by A.P.R.² Thus, the lists of electoral associations which might emerge in either sort of modern society could well include geographical constituencies (e.g. those organized as municipal or as county councils), trade unions, commercial associations, self-managing sectors of production, communes, and political parties. Proportionality would be provided in A.P.R. by giving to each elected deputy the voting power in the 'elected chamber' equal to the number of citizens who had actually cast their ballots within his or her association on election day. Thus, the total voting power present in the elected chamber would be exactly equal to the number of citizens who had in fact voted in the country. In order both to fix the total number of deputies and to avoid any one deputy having vastly more voting power than another member, associations which had $1\frac{1}{2}$ or more of the minimum quota of registered voters would have the right to send more than one deputy to the lower house. Those with 2, 3, 4 or X times the quota would send 2, 3, 4 or X deputies. Each such deputy would have a voting power in the chamber equal to $1/2$, $1/3$, $1/4$, or $1/X$ of the votes cast through his or her association.

This electoral system, more than others, would foster 'rational living' because it would encourage *more people* to register, vote, and to participate more widely in the collective decision-making processes of their society. A.P.R. would tend to do this firstly by allowing each citizen to *choose* to cast his or her one vote through the association which he or she feels, for whatever reason, best represents his or her interests or ideals. Secondly, it would combat apathy by giving every person a good reason both to make the effort of registering and of voting because every vote would count. No vote would ever need to be wasted and every vote continues to count in every vote taken inside the elected chamber. Each vote might not only help determine who is elected but would automatically increase the voting power of the deputy(s) from the association of the citizen's choice. It would assist the development of patriotism or general social responsibility in the citizenry, one condition for the growth of the widest possible political rationality. According to Hegel, these feelings will tend to emerge from the more limited but spontaneously existing group identities which already have organized themselves into voluntary associations.³ It provides (like the existing 'first past the post' systems) for the most effective accounting of deputies to their electorates. This is facilitated by the fact that the lists of those registered to vote through each association would be a matter of public record. The principle of the secret ballot would be retained, however, by designing all ballot papers so that any voter could easily and secretly choose to add his or her vote to the weight in the assembly of an electoral association (and candidate) other than the one within which he or she is publicly registered.

The model adds to this high degree of accountability by providing a 'recall' system similar to those which already exist in some of the states of the U.S.A. Thus, voters within a given electoral association would themselves have the possibility of triggering off a new election for their own deputy(s). All that would be required is that a designated percentage (e.g. 10%) of voters sign the official petition to this effect. These provisions seek to complete the thoroughly *democratic* character of the model constitution. They help to extend as much as possible the institutional scope for all people effectively to participate in the collective decision-making processes of their society.

Democracy is one of the implications of the relevant formulation of the prime moral prescription already asserted in the *Introduction*, namely, 'the best constitution will tend to maximize the quality and quantity of free, rational living in the world'. The *quantity* of actualized rationality is increased as more people have the institutional opportunity effectively to become involved in the deliberative processes which have the constitutional authority either to impose or to remove binding obligations on all citizens. Shortly, it will be explained how the *quality* of that rationality is encouraged by the institutional structure of the model itself.

(1) See *Chapter Five*. (2) See *Chapter Ten*. (3) *Ibid*.

However, the *quantity* is fostered especially by *democratic* monarchy's A.P.R. and recall systems. They help to organize 'popular sovereignty' within a maximally failsafe constitutional framework. They help to guarantee that the model's preference for working majority rule will itself provide a ladder for the majority of the whole population effectively and rationally to rule themselves. In spite of these hopes, however, one cannot exclude the possibility that a full actualization of the model on paper might still only become the vehicle by which a rational minority rules the rest who have currently proven themselves incapable of self-rule. Still, rule by a rational minority would be best in either of the following two circumstances:

- 1) when the articulated mass of the people momentarily fails to achieve, or fails to renew, their potentiality for rational self-rule, or,
- 2) if, the majority of the population continuously proves itself either disinclined or unable rationally to rule itself, even when the ideal social and political conditions are present.

The model constitution offers the most favourable institutional framework for the materialization of rational rule, whether with the explicit support of a majority of the citizenry or by a benevolent minority in the face of popular indifference or antagonism. Either way, the model would offer the best framework for testing, with minimal risk, the extent to which humankind has or does not have the deep and consistent capacity for rational self-rule.

The way in which the shape of democratic monarchy's own institutions both reflects the structure of rational thinking and thus tends to enhance the rational *quality* of political participation will be fully elaborated in later chapters. Nevertheless, an early glimpse of this argument is offered,

- 1) firstly, by the suggestion that the model's institutions are arranged so the three fundamental 'functions' of state (law-giving, particularizing, and uniting) are jointly yet differentially performed by the the three main 'organs' of the state: assembly, government (the council of ministers supervising the bureaucracy, and the system of courts headed by the supreme court), and the monarch;
- 2) secondly, by asserting that 'rational' thinking and acting involves making one's *particular* choices conform to *general* principle so that they form a consistent or *unified* whole, and
- 3) thirdly, by noting that the above functions and organs embody these same conceptual *moments* as follows:

MOMENTS	FUNCTIONS	ORGANS
generality	law-giving	assembly
particularity	particularizing	government
unity	uniting	monarch

The greater representativeness and large numbers in the assembly help to make it better able than the other two organs to arrive at truly *general* conclusions (laws) which are also rational. However, these same numbers make it impossible for it to deal with all of the particular decisions which a state must make. These same numbers make it less likely always to achieve the unity which is a condition of a rational society. This is why the *particularizing* decisions are sensibly left to the bureaucratic and judicial hierarchies, supervised as they are, by relatively small groups: the (executive) council of ministers and the supreme court, respectively. The key difference between these two agencies of particularization is that,

- a) a 'judge' requires someone else first to request him to decide some dispute according to existing law before he or she can act, while
- b) an 'executive' can act entirely on his or her own initiative, both to apply existing laws or to solve perceived problems according to his or her interpretation of the 'spirit' of the law but not literally covered by existing laws.

Executive decisions are only under the general supervision of the assembly. For example, if it does not like the decisions being taken by the current council of ministers, it cannot make them itself but can only elect a new prime minister. Of course, both separately and together, the assembly and executive council will seek to establish or re-establish a *unity* to their own liking, but again, their numbers make these organs less able than the one designated member of the 'state prerogative council' to guarantee unity. It has already been explained how the monarch's unique qualities strengthen the uniting function of this council.

The remaining chapters will elaborate on the argument begun here. They will attempt to show how 20th Century Platonists, Kantians, Hegelians and Marxians might, by extending the logic of their own positions, be driven to endorse democratic monarchy as their own general, prescriptive guide. The next chapter will test the model against the the cases that can be made for two different types of republican constitution.

Chapter Two : COMMON REPUBLICAN ARGUMENTS

While the previous chapter sought simply to present the model constitution, this chapter will defend it against various common republican arguments. Before reading Hegel, I naively supposed that such attacks would defeat every sort of monarchy but this chapter will show why every republican constitution is inherently inferior to democratic monarchy. The most obvious implication of the model is that the head of state should not be elected. While the previous chapter began the explanation of why the head of state should be hereditary, the second part of this chapter hopes to confirm this argument with a feature by feature comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the two types of head.

Before turning to that comparison, however, it will be helpful to distinguish between two types of republican constitution: 'congressional' (after the example of the U.S.A.), and 'parliamentary' (after the examples of Germany and Italy).¹ The first part of this chapter assesses the faults and virtues of these two kinds of republican constitution and finds that the *parliamentary* form (even with an elected head of state) is inherently better than the *congressional* form. So, the second-best parliamentary constitution, one in which the head of state is elected, is still better than any congressional republic organized according to the American version of the famous doctrine of 'the separation of powers'.² This is referred to here as 'the separation of *branches*' in order sharply to distinguish it from 'the differentiation of organs' which is incorporated into the parliamentary model. This also underlines the conclusion that the model constitution must have a parliamentary form. It will be recalled that the ideal constitution provides for a division of labour between the three *distinct* organs which nevertheless are charged *jointly* to perform the three functions. The arrangement of this 'division' and of these 'distinct' organs and functions is taken to be the only valid teaching of the 'separation of powers' doctrine.

In contrast, the American interpretation requires that there be no overlap of personnel between the three branches (legislative, executive, and judicial). More importantly, it excludes any branch from acting on its own from selecting or replacing the people who hold offices in one of the other branches. In contrast, the parliamentary form gives the elected chamber the constitutional power to elect and replace the 'chief executive council'. The other key difference between the congressional and parliamentary forms is that the latter explicitly recognizes the 'uniting function'. The parliamentary system is more rational because it distinguishes yet unites the three functions and organs in such a way as to give a people a greater institutional support for the

- (1) The 'model' could be called a 'parliamentary monarchy' (after the Dutch or British examples).
- (2) It is, of course, Montesquieu who put forward the doctrine of the 'separation of powers' in its first substantial form. However, he did not use this exact phrase, (*The Spirit of the Laws*, Hafner Press, New York, Book XI, Chapter Six. See Franz Neumann's *Introduction*, p. Lii). Democratic monarchy departs from Montesquieu's formulation at several points. The former makes cabinet government explicit while it is perhaps only implicit in Montesquieu, p.158. Thus, Montesquieu's ambiguity might allow either the reading which became the the American view or the interpretation adopted here for the model. Another relevant difference is that the model as well as Hegel's own constitutional monarchy explicitly recognizes one constitutional function additional to the three listed by Montesquieu, Kant and the U.S. Constitution (legislative, executive and judicial), namely, 'the uniting function', for which the monarch has the formal responsibility.

consistent achievement of its collective unity. A parliamentary system assists a people more than does a congressional system both to formulate and to implement its own unity over time. It fosters a unity which is,

A > more accountable,

B > more deliberate,

C > more flexible, and

D > more clearly perceived by the public.

In these ways, it tends to maximize both the quantity and the quality of free, rational living.

A > Greater *accountability* is encouraged by the fact that a majority of the members of parliament can, in effect, elect and remove the cabinet. This makes them accountable to the electorate for the executive council of the day. They cannot hide behind a constitutional impotence as can a congressional majority, criticising on the side lines of particularizing power. Parliamentarians are accountable for the council of ministers and its acts because they have the constitutional power to replace the prime minister, whether he or she had previously been elected by them or simply appointed by the holder of the prerogatives acting in an earlier absence of a working majority. The congressional form gives a constitutional excuse for each branch to complain about the others without *doing* anything about it, i.e. without being put to the test of placing its own theoretical options into practice. Some conflicts between the branches thus tend to be left to fester, each branch tending to undermine the authority of the other, no branch having to take full responsibility for the results. Each can more easily deny responsibility for any unpopular decisions, for the ineffectual (because undermined) decisions, or for the vacillation.

B > Because accountability is less clear in the congressional system, this tends to make *deliberation* less rational, i.e. more compartmentalized and less complete. The elected representatives and officials as well as the electors tend to be less inclined to tie up their considerations of *general* principles and laws with particularizations into *one* package (i.e. into a totality). Each branch tends to devote itself only to one side of deliberations and no person or branch takes the responsibility for the complex unity or lack of it. This '*separation* of branches' violates the rational demand that the organs be distinguished but not separate: "what disorganizes the unity of logical rationalness, equally disorganizes actuality."¹ The divisions between the branches, in turn, make it more difficult for the public rationally to lay blame on, or give praise to, the various officials. Therefore, the public itself will tend to be less able independently to arrive at a sufficient consensus to elect only those candidates for the branches who will work together in the way it desires. In a congressional system, the electorate also tends to find itself less able to formulate and to put into practice at election time the complex *unity* which this system makes their elected representatives less likely to achieve between elections. By contrast, the parliamentary system tends to force the elected representatives both to formulate and to implement *one package* which the electorate can assess as a whole both in the light of the past working majority's performances and of the manifestos of the competing parties.

C > The parliamentary system is more *flexible* by assisting a dynamic unity to be achieved in no matter what changing circumstances may obtain at the time. To begin with, it allows both laws and their particularizations to be quickly changed by changing the council of ministers if required. Such may be necessary as a result of changed perceptions, problems or majorities. Like the congressional system, still the parliamentary system makes provision both for the execution of established laws or for new particularizations even when there is no majority in the elected chamber. However, the congressional form relies more heavily upon the virtue, strength and skill of one practically irremovable man, the president. The parliamentary system's flexibility is more comprehensive because, while a skillful head of state can equally appoint a strong prime minister, if the head of state happens to be weak in a parliamentary constitution, he or she still has the chance of appointing a strong prime minister. A weak president in a congressional constitution does not have the same scope for openly delegating the effective leadership of the executive organ to one other person. In this way, the parliamentary system provides one more chance than does the congressional system that a clear and firm governmental

(1) *Enz.* III, PP541An.

unity will be secured. Over all, therefore, the parliamentary system is more flexible in guaranteeing unity, a unity which is maintained by a firm executive, whether a working majority is absent or present, and if present, whether it has changed its mind or not.

The executive of the day within the parliamentary system tends to be more authoritative because it can only briefly be challenged by a majority in the elected chamber only for a short time before it is either again openly supported (or repaced) by a majority (or supported or replaced by a plurality with the agreement of the current holder of the prerogatives). In contrast, a president's authority in the congressional form can be diminished over an extended period of time by the continued opposition of a congressional majority, a conflict which may not be removed until the next fixed election or even longer, or until the completion of a long court case, or until the completion of a long impeachment procedure. Such a paralysis may prevent a society from escaping serious or fatal injuries. Such a stalemate is structurally prevented by the parliamentary system. While a long period of opposition between the *branches* is not unusual within the congressional systems, it is impossible between the corresponding *organs* of a parliamentary constitution. Lengthy conflict may sufficiently diminish the authority of the branches concerned so that a people fails to select its own deliberative unity. Such conflict may make each branch vacillate within its own sphere, and if it acts, its authority may be undermined by the opposition of another branch so that its action is either ineffective or counter productive. Again, this may result in that people falling victim to events which no one intended and for which no branch can be held accountable. This catalogue of eventualities exposes the possibility that the congressional form may hinder rather than aid a people's deliberative political life. The parliamentary constitution reduces the chance that a people will suffer such a fate by providing an authoritative yet accountable executive in a much wider range of circumstances.

D> The lack of stalemate between the organs has the additional advantage that the *public* will more easily be able to *perceive* what has and what has not been the result of the working majority's and its executive's intentions. If they have no policy, this will not be as easily disguised as it can be in the congressional form where an opposing branch can be blamed by the president for his or her own failure to implement a policy which he or she only insincerely espouses. If the executive has a genuine policy, this and the degree to which it has succeeded in particularizing that policy, will be more easily seen in the parliamentary form. If this policy and particularization have established a unity rather than a self-contradictory multiplicity, this also will be more plainly seen by the public. This clarity should assist all concerned to apportion praise or blame accurately. If the existing executive has succeeded in particularizing a clear unity, then all citizens are able to decide more easily whether they wish to support it or replace it at election time. In this way, the parliamentary, more than the congressional constitution, assists a people consistently to achieve its own unity - knowingly, flexibly, deliberately, and accountably. Thus, the parliamentary form is more rational. It gives greater institutional support for the maximization of the quality and quantity of free, rational living.

While the parliamentary form encourages this, it does not depend as much as does the congressional form for its survival on rationality being the ever present quality of all those who have been elected, let alone of most of the electorate. If all judges, congressmen and the president had the ability and commitment to reconcile their differences with others by rational deliberation, it is assumed here that the congressional constitution would also function without any lengthy opposition between the branches. Given such consistent and widespread rationality, a people would find little difficulty in consistently choosing its own unity even through the less rational congressional form. However, to the extent that this rationality is not present, there will be conflict and the consequent degrees of irresponsibility, lack of deliberation, inflexibility and clouded public sight, perhaps leading to the very destruction of a state and its constitution. The parliamentary constitution is not as vulnerable to this because it is flexible enough to secure a more authoritative and accountable executive council even when initially or temporarily there is insufficient practical rationality among the elected representatives to allow them to form a working majority. Because its cabinet tends to particularize an accountable, deliberate and clearly known unity, the parliamentary form also encourages the more extensive participation of an expanding public rationality if and when it develops. The parliamentary form complements such participation in proportion to its real growth among its officials, representatives, associations, and electors.

If the case has now been made that a parliamentary republic is more rational than a congressional republic, next we can turn to the more obvious question posed by this work: 'Within

a parliamentary constitution, is an hereditary head of state more rational than an elected head?' However, before comparing the flaws and virtues of these two, it will be useful to formulate what republicans commonly say about this issue:

'Royal inbreeding makes the birth of mentally handicapped heirs more likely than are such births in the population at large. In any case, an elective process eliminates imbeciles and, moreover, guarantees that the head of state will be one of the most seasoned and skilful politicians with a proven record of public service. Election guarantees both a head of state's competence and commitment to parliamentary democracy. Also, a republican constitution makes provision for the removal of senile or otherwise dangerously incompetent or dangerously anti-democratic heads of state.'

Some of the points raised by this criticism of monarchy will be discussed in the following sections, but now it can be made clear that the model's constitutional monarchy both does not restrict royals to the marriage of royals, and that it is equal to the best republic in its provision for replacing dangerous heads of state.

The model constitution provides for the impeachment and replacement of a monarch in a way similar to that for the removal of an existing governor general outlined in the previous chapter. Firstly, like every other state official, they can be removed from office by being convicted in court (in the supreme court in this case) for having violated his or her office as defined either by the model constitution or by laws which conform to that constitution. It will be recalled that the governor general can be removed for any reason by a 2/3rds majority of the elected assembly, a deputy having already been elected and ready to take over. The principle of the 'constructive vote of no confidence' also applies to the removal and replacement of the monarch. The procedure would begin by a 50%+1 majority vote in the assembly immediately to suspend and replace the monarch for no more than two months. However, suspension would be transformed into removal upon the agreement of a referendum held within this time. Both the assembly's vote and that of the public would have to be *constructive* in that the person who would assume the monarch's functions would have to be named at the same time. This person would take over temporarily during the period of the two months suspension but permanently if confirmed by the referendum.¹ In order maximally to retain the hereditary character of the head of state, the assembly should select a replacement judged by the assembly to be suitable and considered in the following order:

- 1) firstly, the next heir from the existing royal family,
- 2) secondly, a person from a different royal family, or
- 3) finally, anyone else.

If there appears to be a suitable heir from the same royal family but he or she is not yet old enough to assume the functions of the head of state, a suitable 'regent' should similarly be chosen,

- a) firstly, from the existing royal family,
- b) secondly, from the 'state prerogative council', each member being considered in the order of his or her priority in the council, or
- c) finally, anyone else.

The previous chapter outlined the argument both for the figurehead and prerogative roles of the hereditary head of state. His succession was said best to alert a people to its own lower possibility by reminding them that if they do not rule themselves rationally, they risk being ruled by non-reason. This non-verbal reminder stems from his or her non-elective succession, resulting as it does from natural (or non-rational) processes which do not depend on self-consciously rational determinations. Thus, a monarch personifies the truth that if a people fails to attain its higher potentiality of deliberative self-rule, then one of its lower potentialities will be actualized. Non-rational or even anti-rational subjectivity will rule if rational subjectivity does not. An elected head of state could never as clearly signal this danger. On the contrary, his very election would tend to obscure a people's sight of this residual, if not present, threat to democracy. The monarch dramatises this danger at the same time as symbolising the aspiration for a *unity of general and particular* decisions which is so vital if a society is to thrive. These are the two sides of his figurehead role. Just as the deliberative subjectivity of a people is based upon their natural subjectivity, so, only a monarch who consistently submits to the deliberations of the working majority and its council of ministers most transparently personifies both the deliberative and the natural subjectivities which alone can repeatedly secure the developing unity of a society. A constitutionally limited and hereditary head of state most

- (1) The model's procedure for the removal of a supreme court judge is exactly the same as for the monarch.

transparently represents the appropriate relation between *nature* and reason in the political world. This is why a monarch intrinsically makes a better figurehead than any elected official: president, governor general, speaker, or chairperson.

In the absence of a working majority, the 'caretaking' role of the monarch, in the context of the 'state prerogative council', helps to secure the institutions which provide both the opportunity for the citizenry to organize themselves into electoral associations and for their deputies to organize themselves into a new working majority. Both of these are required if the rational structure is to be filled with democratic life. As caretaker, the head of state's task is to foster the emergence or re-emergence of democratic self-rule. In order to give the minority factions time to re-think, to re-negotiate, and to re-form a working majority, he or she "holds the ring". Thus, a collective unity may be assisted to revive in spite of the divisiveness which is currently dominant. He or she is protecting the existing parliamentary institutions. In both roles, the model's monarch is claimed to be an integral part of the model constitution which would contain the best 'carrots' and 'sticks' to assist a people to maximize their rational living. The monarch's non-elective character would best alert all concerned that the state of affairs which had called his or her caretaking role into existence was a less rational actuality than would be rule by an executive elected by a working majority. Thus, his or her role would be more clearly seen as second-best, as a last resort, or as a failsafe, rather than as a satisfactory substitute for working majority rule. This awareness should help to spur a divided society to construct or reconstruct a democratic unity which would again confine the monarch to his or her figurehead role. In contrast, an elected head of state's caretaking role would less obviously be 'second-best'. His elective legitimacy is more likely to tempt a president to subvert the parliamentary institutions. He would be more encouraged to complete with, rather than submit to the wider deliberative unity which could be led later by a new working majority's prime minister. In similar circumstances, we are more assured that the model's governor general is less likely to be the sort of person who would want to subvert the democratic constitution. This greater confidence is suggested by the fact that at least 2/3rds of the representatives of his or her fellow citizens would have implicitly expressed their own confidence in this regard. While the 'speaker' may only have had the support of 50% + 1 of the elected house, he or she would initially have been elected and sustained in office because of his or her commitment to parliamentary sovereignty and known capacity to act impartially and fairly as between the parties in the house. Here, 'president' refers only to a head of state who is elected by a system which requires the victor to receive at least 50% + 1 of the votes on the first ballot (or, if this proves impossible, to receive either a majority or a plurality on a later ballot), either of the voting electorate as a whole or of the members of the elected chamber. It should be noted that any advantages they would be in having such a president who was elected on the first ballot exercise the prerogatives, have already been integrated into the model constitution by its giving priority over the monarch to the 'governor general' and the 'speaker' and their deputies in the 'state prerogative council'. By the same token, the argument of the previous chapter for giving priority to the monarch over the 'chairperson' would apply equally to the 'president' who had won only as a result of a later ballot.

Now that the inherent superiority of a monarch over a second or later ballot president in the performance of the caretaking role has been suggested, it remains to offer a more systematic comparison of the two kinds of head on this score. Thus, it will be contended that a monarch is better than a president on five counts, inferior on none. The caretaking role requires a head of state to have at least one key quality which the purely figurehead role does not demand. He must have the skill to select a good prime minister. In the figurehead role, he need only sign his name to what others have already decided. In the caretaker role, however, the holder of the prerogatives is most importantly charged to foster the return of majoritarian parliamentary rule. In order best to do this, he must provide a clear and firm executive council by appointing a prime minister who has a strong personality, who has great practical political skill, and who is committed to the earliest possible return of working majority rule. A council of ministers led by such a prime minister will tend to provide the clear lead which will not only tend to preserve the existing democratic institutions but will provide a focal point in support of which, or against which, a new working majority and loyal opposition can most easily form themselves.

The comparison of the monarch and the 'president' (who might only have been elected on a second or subsequent ballot) will be organized by the answers to five questions: *logically*, which head is more likely,

- 1> to exist at all, let alone have a strong power base in the face of the factional divisions?
- 2> to alert the citizenry and their representatives to the fact of their current failure to have achieved enduring, working majority rule?
- 3> to act in such a way as not to inflame the current minority factionalism?
- 4> to appoint a prime minister who is committed to parliamentary democracy? and
- 5> to appoint a prime minister with the requisite political skill?

1> An hereditary head is more likely to be available to perform the caretaking role. Even when a president is available, his currently suspected or demonstrated minority status would tend to make him 'a lame duck'. From what I have already said, it is clear that hereditary succession, being independent of the contingent achievement of majorities or pluralities, offers a greater guarantee that there will actually be a holder of the prerogatives in office to perform the caretaking role when this is required. In a parliamentary republic, this could be placed in serious doubt, especially if the majority party happened to collapse just before a presidential election. This danger would be partially removed, at least in theory, by the best republican constitution which would provide for the election of a plurality head when no candidate achieves an overall majority. However, in such a case, the new president would have been publicly shown to be opposed by a 'segmented majority'¹ and supported only by a defined faction or minority. This demonstration is hardly likely to help him to be received by the elements that composed the segmented majority as a 'caretaker', i.e. as an impartial arbiter, preserving the democratic constitution for the benefit of all. The effect would be similar even if he had been elected by a clear majority well before the collapse of the majority in the elected assembly. This very collapse could fuel the doubt that his majority had also dissolved. Whether the existing president had been shown to be opposed by a segmented majority or whether there was only good reason to doubt the current existence of his majority support, he would be weakened, hardly the best figure to perform the caretaking role.

2> An hereditary caretaker head is a more dramatic demonstration of a people's current failure to achieve parliamentary self-rule. This has already been explained.

3> An hereditary caretaker head is more likely to be perceived by each of the warring factions as impartial. His hereditary rise to the throne allows him more easily to be seen as independent of the factional struggle which destroyed the majority in the elected chamber. Therefore, he is less likely to be seen as unfairly favouring one faction over the others. Each party will be more inclined to look upon him as an impartial arbiter. They will tend to have more confidence that he or she will allow them an equal constitutional chance to achieve their aims, by making new party alliances or by gaining the necessary electoral support. Such perceptions would foster the attitude of a 'loyal opposition' which is so important if democratic self-rule is again to be enjoyed. In contrast to these implications of hereditary succession, the electoral succession of a president has forced him publicly to align himself throughout his career with one set of interests rather than with others. This may lead opposing parties to despair of a constitutional path for the achievement of their aims. A president is thus less likely to be able to 'hold the ring' peacefully because his past is more likely to spark off civic disorder.

4> They are equally likely or unlikely to appoint a prime minister who favours the earliest possible return to parliamentary rule. However, a monarch would inherently find it more difficult to disguise any attempt on his part to frustrate its return. The answers to questions four and five depend on our answer to the question, 'which head is himself more likely both to be committed to parliamentary democracy and to be politically skilful?' While both heads would seem equally likely (or unlikely) to be committed to the earliest possible return to parliamentary rule because both have lived within the same society, the non-election of a monarch would make it more difficult

(1) A majority composed of disparate factions which have not agreed on one candidate to represent them all.

for him than a president to disguise any attempt which he might nevertheless make to frustrate or subvert its return. His rule would be more readily seen by the public as being a 'last resort' while a president's rule, because he is elected, might appear to be a possible or fully adequate *substitute* for the elected rule by a parliamentary majority and its prime minister. This perception would tend to increase a president's temptation openly or covertly to replace the parliamentary institutions either with those of a congressional republic or those of a dictatorial 'plebiscitary democracy'.

5> They are equally likely or unlikely to appoint a prime minister with the requisite political skill because each head is equally likely or unlikely,

- a) to be without mental incapacity,
- b) to have a beneficially strong personality, and
- c) to have the requisite political education and experience.

5a> While either head of state is equally likely or unlikely to suffer from mental illness, it can be argued logically that royal heirs would be more likely to be feeble minded and presidents more likely to be senile. The risk of either disability occurring would seem to be extremely small but the most rational constitution must plan for every foreseeable contingency. It is possible for a feeble minded heir to succeed to the throne because an otherwise competent monarch might nevertheless not have the heart to take the requisite steps effectively to deny the throne to his or her loved but feeble-minded child. Of course, electors would be much more likely to ignore any feeble-minded candidate for the presidency. A sitting president, however, would be more likely to become senile because of the much higher average age of presidents. Older monarchs would tend equally to be subject to this disease. However, the probable existence of a wider royal family and of an eligible heir would seem to make it easier either for the senile monarch to be persuaded to abdicate or for the succession of the heir to be quietly engineered by others. This might be done by the royal family alone or in consultation with the other organs of state in spite of an incapacitated monarch's refusal to cooperate. It must be remembered that the formal removal and replacement procedure already outline could probably not be used assuming, as we are here, the absence of a working majority. While the best republican constitution would also designate a line of succession in cases of emergency, and while the president's own family and friends might similarly be able to persuade an incapacitated president to resign, a royal family would tend to provide a larger number of loving yet authoritative and disinterested persuaders who would tend also to have more scope for instituting the succession less controversially and divisively even when it is against the reigning head's will. Because of the lack of a family connection, those next in line for the presidency would be more subject to the charge of personal power seeking.

These points lead to the conclusion that a monarchy has a marginally better chance of removing a dangerously abnormal head of state in the absence of a working majority and thus has a better chance of having a better caretaker head. This follows not because it was found less likely that a monarch might be dangerously incapacitated but because a royal family's replacement of such a monarch, either with his heir or with another member of the family, would be both more likely to succeed and less likely to inflame the minority factionalism in the elected assembly and population. This second point is confirmed by the recollection that each official in line for the presidency (e.g. a vice-president) would tend, more than an heir, to be associated with one of the contending factions. Therefore, the elevation of any one of these officials to the presidency would be more likely to be interpreted by opposing factions as a key battle lost which would now require them to carry on their struggle either outside of, or in opposition to, the existing constitution. Of course, the other perception of the replacement of the president as being the result of someone's successful scheme to gain personal power would have a similar destabilizing effect. In contrast, the royal family's effectual making of a new monarch would tend to occur and would be more likely to be seen as occurring independently of the factional struggles. If so, all parties would be more likely to accept the authority of the new monarch as a caretaker head of state and would thus be more likely to accept the authority both of the prime minister and of the executive council which he or she would appoint.

5b> While both might have a beneficially strong personality, a monarch would be less able to disguise the perversion of his strength when acting to subvert the return of representative government. If the head has a strong personality himself and is committed to representative democracy in addition to having suitable formal education and experience, then he is likely to see

the need for appointing a similar person to be the caretaker prime minister. An hereditary and an elected head would seem to have an equal chance of having or not having such a strong personality. However, if these skills were directed against, rather than to assist the re-emergence of working majority rule, as argued in answer to the first question posed above, the strong monarch inherently would be less able to disguise this than a strong president.

Sc> Neither caretaker head is likely to be better on the basis of their somewhat different sorts of political education and experience. The very process which produces an elected head would tend to make him a master at *competitive* political practices. If these were the only skills required of a caretaker head, the president would easily be seen to be the best. In this case, the contrast would seem especially strong if we were to compare,

- 1) the scant political knowledge and skill of a monarch who was twenty years old and who had just succeeded to the throne, to
- 2) the richer knowledge and skill of an elected head of state who was sixty years old and had himself been a prime minister.

However, such a presidential advantage could be balanced by the possibly greater caretaking skill which a monarch might have in arbitrating, reconciling or mediating. These qualities would be cultivated by the monarch's greater average number of years of actually performing the functions of a head of state. This calculation follows from the probability that individual monarchs would tend to reign longer than individual presidents can hold office. A president, when elected, is not likely to be as young as an heir. For monarchy, this advantage might be increased by the fact that the future role of an heir would be quite well known from the time of his or her birth. Both this fore-knowledge itself, and the appropriate preparatory formal education which this fore-knowledge would recommend for an heir, may act better to prepare a monarch for the caretaking role than might the school of competitive politics necessarily attended by a president. It might even be argued, that the constant factional struggle which a president, as a successful party politician has had to engage in, might make it more difficult for him to delegate effective political power to another person: a prime minister.

Thus, the arguments for the greater political education and experience of either of the two sorts of head seem to me to be evenly balanced. I see no way of determining whether the life time of competitive political practice which the president may bring to his office is more or less use than the early specialized education and 'on the job experience' which a monarch may bring to the handling of crises. Therefore, if the whole argument between the elected and the hereditary heads hinged on this issue alone, a draw would have to be declared. However, the findings with regard to the first four questions which have already tipped the scales heavily in favour of democratic monarchy cannot be altered by the addition of equal weights to each side on this last account. Moreover, it should be recalled that the model constitution's 'state prerogative council' has already incorporated the advantages both of election and of heredity with regard to exercises of the caretaking role.

With this more detailed *comparative*¹ testing of parliamentary monarchy against various republican constitutions, we have completed the more descriptive and practical stage of the argument. The remaining chapters will develop and test the more philosophical foundations for the model constitution. These will be introduced in the next chapter through the eyes of Plato.

(1) *Chapter Six* will explain that 'comparative tests' are integral to the search for 'philosophical necessity'.

C h a p t e r T h r e e :
F R O M P L A T O ' S R E P U B L I C
T O D E M O C R A T I C M O N A R C H Y

Plato's *Republic* provides us with a familiar vantage point from which to begin to consider the philosophical underpinnings of democratic monarchy. It will supply a heuristic spring board for appreciating these. As already implied, I will attempt to stretch or pull Plato's republican argument until any twentieth century Platonist sees how he might also be driven to support democratic monarchy by the inner logic of his own philosophy. Again, I do not assume that my interpretations and reconstructions of Plato, will be easily seen by all as unchallengeable. Plato's words are too incomplete and ambiguous to allow such an expectation.

A philosophical debate is possible only on the assumption that we as rational beings may be able to find truth and wisdom. It is because this is the great enterprise to which Plato directs us¹ that an examination of his arguments will offer some preliminary clarifications of this work's central concerns and terms. I take Plato's "dialectic" to provide us with an approximate definition of human 'rationality' and thus the criterion of what 'rational living' means. Its nature will be discussed shortly but first its relation to our theme must be clarified. The suggestion that democratic monarchy is rational means that this constitution best supports both the search for wisdom by 'dialectical reasoning' and the lives which follow the moral precepts discovered by this process. Democratic monarchy plans best for the fostering of free, rational living in a society,

- 1) whether no people or *few* can be relied upon to be dialecticians (philosophers) in anything like Plato's sense and, therefore, trusted to rule; or
- 2) whether *most* if not all people can attain the political essentials of such philosophical wisdom and, thus, can be trusted to govern themselves democratically.²

Democratic monarchy would best foster rational living in the different conditions which might obtain: when no, few, many or all people have the innate potentiality to become philosophers in Plato's sense. This proposition will progressively be elaborated but I can say now that, if we assume, as a Platonist must, that the rational search for wisdom and truth is possible, we are at the same time unable to dismiss out of hand that one (at least the one making this assumption), few, many or all may be capable of ruling rationally.

In contrast to Hegel's "dialectic" which is primarily conceptual and Marx's which is primarily historical in execution, Plato's "dialectic" refers to a method of enquiry. Plato distinguishes this method from the deductive reasoning that is required in the mathematical studies and which his potential rulers must practice between the ages of 20 and 30 (arithmetic, plane and solid geometry, harmonics, and astronomy). With these disciplines, one must uncritically start with axioms and definitions and then proceed to deduce various theorems or conclusions. In contrast, dialectic is the process by which one can lay bare and examine the possible axioms and definitions of any such

- (1) The *Republic*, 475 b + e, 485 b + c. All quotations are taken from the Desmond Lee translation of *The Republic*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974. They have been checked against the other translations listed in the bibliography.
- (2) It will be argued in *Chapter Five* that Marx believed that this democratic self-rule will be possible partly as a result of the vast majority of the population being educated by their struggle with the "capitalist mode of production" and then as positively fostered by their life within a "communist mode of production". It can also be argued that he derived this view partly on the basis of some implicit Platonic assumptions about the potential rationality of human nature.

theorems. It can go on to assess whether the axioms which might be discovered by this imaginative analysis are replaceable by different sets of axioms and definitions. Dialectic "climbs up the ladder" of abstraction to the "forms" and ultimately to "the form of the good".¹

Plato's voice in *The Republic*, Socrates, surprisingly refrains from giving what he considers to be a philosophically adequate definition of "the good"² but he does point to it by analogies (especially the "sun" in the simile of the cave). In spite of this shortcoming, however, I will propose the following definition of the good in order to complete his argument. The "good" is 'Reason' or 'the rational'. As an adjective, "good" thus refers to all which directly or indirectly tends to maximize the quality and quantity of free, rational living³ (i.e. the prime prescription here first announced in the *Introduction*). This interpretation of "good" as that which promotes 'rational living' might be seen as suggested both by "the good's" strong association with "justice" and by various other references such as the following:

I call anything that harms or destroys a thing evil, and anything that preserves and benefits it good (608 e).

...what is good is not destructive, nor what is neutral (609 b).

Plato is satisfied that he has given a philosophically adequate definition of "justice" as "proper functioning". Proper functioning refers both to society and to the soul. Thus, justice is the best coordinate organization of the three social functions (producing, guarding and ruling), the three classes (producers, auxiliaries, and rulers), and the three natural types of individual. According to Plato, each individual has three motives or elements within their soul (appetitive, spiritive and rational), but only one of these dominates each type of person. Thus, in Plato's coordinate scheme, adult individuals who are dominated by the following elements are "justly" required to perform the related social function for which she or he is best suited. The soul of each type of person is represented by a different metal as follows:

DOMINANT ELEMENT	SOCIAL FUNCTION	METAL
appetitive	producing	bronze & iron
spiritive	guarding	silver
rational	ruling	gold

"Justice writ large" is thus achieved when each class is performing the function for which it is best suited. "Justice writ small" is present when each element of the soul is performing its appropriate function, i.e. when the rational element assigns to itself the task of both dialectically searching for wisdom and of limiting the other two elements to the measures of their gratification which will not disrupt the soul's harmony. The "gold souls" who become the philosopher rulers thus seek knowledge and to rule both themselves and the other two classes according to the moral precepts discovered by reason.

In line with the above suggested meaning of "good", as that which maximizes the quality and quantity of rational living, one can see how "justice" could be characterized as "the form of the good" as it applies both to individual and to collective human conduct. Thus, Plato's ideal state is seen as "ideal" because:

- 1) it best fosters *internal* rational life (i.e. dialectical thinking for all those whose gold natures make this possible given an appropriate education), and
- 2) it best encourages *outer* rational life, i.e. those behaviour patterns in the rest of the population (silver, bronze and iron) which approximate as nearly as is possible to those with philosophic natures.

In this connection, justice is the special case of "the good" which applies directly to human organization. Other applications of "the good" refer to the qualities and arrangements of nature, for example, those which provide either material or inspirational bases for the development, enjoyment and extension of human life in the light of the procedures and tentative conclusions of dialectical reasoning. Again, "the good" is that which directly or indirectly contributes to the maximization of the quality and quantity of free, rational living in the world.

(1) 534b.

(2) 506 d + e.

(3) This phrase will frequently be abbreviated simply to 'rational living'. This is on the understanding that 'reason', at least with freedom of the mind, is impossible.

This interpretation of Plato makes it clear that the prescription of rational living primarily seeks a world in which all potentially rational souls actualize this power by coming ultimately to organize their individual and collective lives by dialectical reasoning. Such deliberation,¹

- 1) is nourished by (and therefore it must value) the varied delights of art, religion, play, and humour;
- 2) is dependent upon (and thus it must value) many automatic, spontaneous, habitual, and emotional qualities; and
- 3) is dependent upon (and therefore it must value) a vast array of elements, creatures, and structures in nature.

All these together constitute a complex network of what might be called the non-rational but spiritually and existentially necessary conditions for the actualization of rational human life. Of course, this is only to recognize the obvious point that rational living is both predated and simultaneously supported by many other natural and social realities and thus it must also involve much consideration of all those factors which are not capable of becoming self-consciously deliberative themselves and are thus not rational in a narrow or direct sense. 'Reasoning' must be concerned not only with *reasoning* but with its non-rational conditions. One of the tasks of dialectic is to identify and to re-shape, when necessary, these beings and structures so they come better to provide the ground upon which explicit rational living can flourish, e.g. agronomy.

Therefore, these non-rational beings and structures can, nevertheless, be said to be 'rational' in two *indirect* senses:

- a) because they can be classified, and their laws understood by the reasoned disciplines of scientific investigation, and
- b) because they serve or can be made to serve the interests of dialectical reasoning.

Chapters Six and Seven will suggest that the above indirect and direct senses of 'rational' are contained within Hegel's "Reason". He and I take Reason to be the essential core of the whole human and natural world. In Plato's proximate terms, this essential core of the world is "the good", i.e. that which alone makes order and preservation actual in the face of the "chaotic matter" (*Timaeus* and *Statesman*) of which he suggests the existent world is also composed.

The prescription that we should act so as to maximize rational living thus enjoins us to take steps to make the natural, social and political environments better if possible both to foster deliberation and activity in conformity to deliberation's tentative conclusions. It is the burden of this work to claim that democratic monarchy is the best specification of the constitutional part of such an environment, that it is the most rational constitution for modern conditions. It might seem that it is an exceptionally odd proposition even to associate Plato's philosophy with the model because of his well known dismissal of "democracy" in favour of his elitist republic (his "aristocracy"). However, in spite of these obvious differences between Plato's republic and democratic monarchy, both constitutions seek to foster and to reflect the dialectic. Nevertheless, we would be forced to agree with Plato's conclusion that philosophers *alone* should rule if the following chain of four of his implicit but doubtful empirical assumptions proved to be as unavoidable as is his prescription to serve "the good":

- 1) Only a *few* people both have the potential to acquire knowledge (by dialectical reasoning) and accordingly to subordinate their desires for physical gratification and social praise.
- 2) An *infallible* education and selection system can be devised both to discover those few and to lead them to knowledge.
- 3) When one has attained moral knowledge, one is not capable of acting contrary to its imperatives, i.e. an *evil* will is impossible.
- 4) Once one has moral knowledge, one will *consistently* display the self discipline which it enjoins and cannot unconsciously lose it either by illness or by old age.

A successful denial by us of any one of these would cast serious doubt on Plato's own political conclusions. In fact, not a single scientific or philosophical argument seems to require us to accept any one of these assumptions as they stand. Most empirical (and thus inconclusive) evidence would seem to encourage their rejection. In the face of the questionable status of these assumptions, therefore, the best constitution would plan both for those empirical circumstances which might conform to, and those which might contradict them. This is precisely the claim made for democratic monarchy. Democratic monarchy caters for the maximization of rational rule whether *all* or *no* citizens prove capable of being genuine *philosopher rulers* in Plato's sense; whether or

- (1) A more complete analysis of the procedures and horizon of this 'deliberation', 'dialectical reasoning', or of what 'rational' means here will be given in *Chapter Six*.

not *evil* willing is possible; and whether or not moral and political *virtue* can be *lost* once attained. While democratic monarchy encourages philosophic rule, it neither expects nor depends on it. Of course, if true philosopher rulers were to emerge for a time, at least in that respect, the community would be better off. However, it is argued here that the very structure of democratic monarchy would tend over time to foster a united package of legislative, executive and judicial decisions, even in a community without philosophers, which would approximate to those which would issue from philosopher legislators, executives and judges.

It is not sufficient simply to assert the sovereignty of "Reason" without also translating this into an operational definition of the exercise of political authority. This is what the model constitution begins to do. In particular, we have seen how it caters for our serious doubt that any ruler can be completely relied upon. In effect, it assumes that neither "philosophical" nor non-philosophical officials are wholly to be trusted - the non-philosophical ones for all the reasons which Plato gives himself. Officials who were previously found to be philosophers in Plato's sense could not be wholly relied upon because the educational and selection process might have made a *mistake* in their cases or because the official concerned might have an *evil* will, or because he might have *lost* the necessary knowledge or self-discipline. These truths argue for a constitution in which each organ of the state is constructively checkable either by another organ or by the citizens as voters. Democratic monarchy arranges for this.

Plato does not face this problem explicitly, but an imaginative and sympathetic reader ¹ of *The Republic* might suggest that Plato would say that a falsely promoted or corrupted philosopher king could be demoted again by a majority vote of the other philosophers. On the other hand, a supporter of the model would argue that such judgements are better guaranteed when a different body, less dependent on the official in question, has the constitutional authority to appoint and remove him from office. In order to meet this argument, Plato would have had to suggest that his philosophers would form both the citizenry and the officials in a constitutional monarchy. Thus, a latter day Platonist would have to adopt a version of the model constitution allowing the vote only to "philosophers". However, it will be argued shortly that the our doubts about the four empirical assumptions mentioned above implies that Platonists ought to accept universal adult suffrage.

It will be recalled that the characters in *The Republic* too readily agreed to the suggestion that only a few have the potentiality to be philosophers. They agreed presumably because of their common and understandable prejudices. However, they did not explore the possible egalitarian implications of their plan agreed elsewhere for equal opportunity in education to be given to each new generation. This is even more remarkable because they also accepted that potential philosophers had been corrupted by unjust societies. They did not consider the possibility that most if not all souls might be born "gold". If so, after having benefited from the proposed scheme of education, most or all would prove themselves to be philosophers. This would suggest that philosophic and communal democracy rather than a society ruled by a small elite would logically have to be demanded by Plato's own definition of justice: each must perform the function in the circumstances for which she or he is best suited. In this event, the majority of the population (i.e. philosophers) would appreciate the necessity of their taking turns to perform the material production functions, as well as the guarding and ruling functions.

In a large enough state (which in principle could extend to the world), this philosophical majority would see that they would have to form the assembly either by a system of *election*, as in the model or by systems of rotation or lottery. However, a lottery would be defensible from a Platonic point of view only if all citizens could be guaranteed to be philosophers. However, this is one of the assumption already cast into doubt. If there is no *infallible* education and selection system, if there is the possibility of *evil* willing, and if there is the possibility that knowledge and virtue can be *lost* through illness or old age, this means that any designated philosopher may not currently be worthy of the title. If he was, he may still abuse his knowledge and rationality later or he may have lost both through illness. At the same time, some persons who did not received the title of philosopher may have deserved it and thus, intentionally or not, been denied "justice". Such doubts could not be minimized until a genuinely equal opportunity education system

(1) Chapter Six will distinguish between two types of *imaginative* readings of a text: '*lenient* interpretation' and '*improving* additions'.

for producing philosophers had existed for several generations. Human history seems not to have produced even one example of such a society, although some have been less remote from this ideal than others. In the face of such unremoved doubts, therefore, philosophers can only say that greater injustice (as defined by Plato) may be done by 'selecting' rather than automatically allowing all adults to be citizens.

The basic argument for universal adult citizenship, however, is that it registers philosophy's inherent respect for all human beings as *potentially* rational. Plato's philosopher must presume (until proven otherwise) that each person, either is, or may become a self-controlling dialectical reasoner. Each may be capable of 'rational living'. This assumption supports universal adult suffrage because such suffrage encourages rational living. Also, voting gives an additional practical point to reasoning and for enjoying the the general freedoms of speech, press and association.

If universal adult citizenship, when combined with the other arrangements of democratic monarchy, would maximally encourage rational living, it would help to fulfil Plato's own prime prescription to philosophers: to act so as to make the existent world more closely approximate to the ideal world which is ordered by "the form of the good", i.e. to go "on till he has made human nature as acceptable to God as may be".¹ This same Platonic prescription, however, has required me to criticise four of Plato's presumed empirical assumptions. Consequently, we have seen how the model constitution could be supported by the inner logic of Plato's philosophy. In addition, democratic monarchy would provide the best framework both for testing the validity of Plato's four assumptions and for coping with the reality whatever it might be. The model would encourage the maximization of rational living whether the social reality were discovered to accorded with his four empirical assumptions or not.

The next chapter will approach democratic monarchy through a consideration of Kant's philosophy.

(1) *Republic*, 501c. (1) *Ibid.*, 588 c - 589 c.



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Chapter Four: FROM KANT'S REPUBLICANISM TO DEMOCRATIC MONARCHY

Having already considered Plato's position as well as some of the common republican arguments against democratic monarchy, this chapter will seek especially to examine the republican theory which might be extracted from Kant. Nevertheless, it will be shown that his philosophy can be read to provide a broad support for the model. This demonstration should help any twentieth century Kantians to begin to appreciate how they might also be driven to endorse it as their own prescriptive ideal. As suggested earlier, I do not assume that all will find my interpretations and reconstructions of Kant to be obviously unchallengeable. The incompleteness, complexity and prolixity of his words would make such an expectation unrealistic. While *Chapter Six* will footnote the largely compatible relation between my reading of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and this work's methodological foundations, this chapter will examine how his moral and political philosophy can be seen both to provide alternative expressions of the most general prescription upon which democratic monarchy rests and of some of the specific arguments for many of the key features of that constitution.

First, the many formulations of Kant's "categorical imperative" can be read to have an implication which is the same as that of my own prime prescription: 'Act so as to promote free, rational living'. Kant's categorical imperative seeks to guide all "rational" and "autonomous" ¹ beings as to how they "ought" to respond to their sense of "duty" ² to all other rational beings. The following quotations illustrate this point:

The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as legislating universal law by all his will's maxims, leads to another very fruitful concept...viz., that of a *kingdom of ends*.³

The practical imperative will therefore be the following: Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end never simply as a means.⁴

The achievement of the highest good in the world is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law.⁵

... therefore the supreme good (as the first condition of the highest good) is morality; and happiness, though it indeed constitutes the second element of the highest good, does so only as the morally conditioned ... consequence ...⁶

... metaphysics in dealing with reason ... treats of those elements and highest maxims which must form the basis of the very possibility of some sciences, and of the use of all. That, as mere speculation, it serves rather to prevent errors than to extend knowledge, does not detract from its value. On the contrary this gives it dignity and authority, through that censorship which secures general order and harmony, and indeed the well-being of the *scientific commonwealth*, preventing those who labour courageously and fruitfully on its behalf from losing sight of *the supreme end, the happiness of all mankind*.

- (1) I. Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. by J.W. Ellington, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1981, p.39.
- (2) I. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. by Lewis White Beck, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1956, p.130.
- (3) Op. cit., *Grounding*, p.39
- (4) *Ibid.*, p.36
- (5) Op. cit., *Practical*, p.126.
- (6) *Ibid.*, p.123.
- (7) I. Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, St. Martin's Press, New York 1965, B879.

The above reference to the "world", the "kingdom of ends", "the scientific commonwealth" and "the happiness of all mankind" have some strong political implications. Also, in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant explicitly writes of his ideal constitution in the sort of broad terms which could be read at least out of context, to support democratic monarchy:

A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others - I do not speak of the greatest happiness, for this will follow of itself - is at any rate a necessary idea, which must be taken as fundamental not only in first projecting a constitution but in all its laws.¹

This quotation's reference to "human freedom" also suggests that my own prescription of 'maximizing rational living' can be alternatively restated as 'maximizing human freedom'. This is possible because it is the freedom of rational beings living in a community which is my concern. In this light, the most free (or rational) constitution will be made up of those standing arrangements which, more than any others, help to foster the sort of political context within which rational discourse, deliberation and behaviour can thrive and not encounter politically removable barriers.² Thus, by definition, 'rational living' is free and 'freedom' is living in accordance with the processes and conclusions of the 'dialectical reasoning' outlined in *Chapter Three*³ and to be detailed in *Chapter Six*.

The above 'most free (or rational) standing arrangements' also define what Kant, Hegel and I mean by "right". Kant says that "justice",⁴ or,

Right is therefore the sum total of those conditions within which the will of one person can be reconciled with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom

....

Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual's will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with universal law is right.⁵

In its "strict" Sense, Right can also be envisaged as the Possibility of a general and reciprocal Coercion consonant with the Freedom of Everyone in accordance with Universal Laws.⁶

Kant can also be read to speak both for Hegel and for me when he stresses that we rational beings have the "unconditional" obligation to foster a rational constitution, right, or "the rights of man":

... both aspects, philanthropy and respect for the rights of man, are obligatory. And while the former is only a conditional duty, the latter is an unconditional and absolutely imperative one; anyone must first be completely sure that he has not infringed it if he wishes to enjoy the sweet sense of having acted justly.⁷

... although politics in itself is a difficult art, no art is required to combine it with morality. For as soon as the two come into conflict, morality can cut through the knot which politics cannot untie.

... all politics must bend the knee before right⁸

Having suggested the place of Kant's political writings within his wider critical and moral philosophy, I can now turn to a more direct discussion of his political theory as it is presented piecemeal in a number of his separate essays. While there is no doubt that Kant is a "republican", it is not clear that this necessarily implies the rejection of all monarchies (especially not of democratic monarchy) as one might at first suppose. It is true that the more obvious implication of his words is opposed to monarchy. What he says certainly dismisses *absolute* monarchy but his words never explicitly reject what he calls a "limited monarchy"⁹ (of which democratic monarchy is a variety). In fact, his phrases are ambiguous enough to allow us to construe them as support for any 'parliamentary' constitution whether it has an elected or an hereditary head of state. However, they do not allow us to read them in support of a 'congressional' constitution. We will see this in

(1) *Ibid.*, A316, B373.

(2) By implication, *Chapter Six* will argue that the possibility of *free* evil willing by individuals or groups may constitute one sort of "political barrier" which could not be removed entirely.

(3) Kant, of course, usually uses "dialectical" in a pejorative sense.

(4) There are two translations of the parts of Kant's *Metaphysik der Sitten* (1797) which I will be quoting. H.B. Nisbet, in Hans Reiss, editor, *Kant's Political Writings*, C.U.P. 1971, uses the title of the whole work, "The Metaphysics of Morals". John Ladd, uses the title of Part I of the work, *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice* (Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Rechtslehre), Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis 1965.

(5) *Ibid.*, Nisbet, p.133; Ladd, p.35

(6) *Ibid.*, Nisbet, p.134. This is the sub-title for Section E.

(7) *Ibid.*, Nisbet, "Perpetual Peace", p.129.

(8) *Ibid.*, p.125.

(9) *Ibid.*, Nisbet, "The Contest of Faculties", p.187

the following two quotations. The first declares the "sovereignty" of the representative assembly (the "corps of deputies")¹ and the second, makes it clear that this appropriately includes the power to appoint and dismiss the executive or "ruler". We thus seem to have Kant, by implication at least, supporting the essentials of parliamentary government with cabinet responsibility to the representative assembly, the key difference between the 'parliamentary' and 'congressional' systems. Kant observes:

Any true republic ... is and cannot be anything other than a representative system of the people whereby the people's rights are looked after on their behalf by deputies who represent the united will of the citizens ... [*The assembly of these deputies, as the united people then does not merely represent the sovereign, but actually is the sovereign itself.*]²

The sovereign (Beherrscher) of the people (the legislator) cannot ... also be the ruler, for the ruler is subject to the law, through which he is consequently beholden to another party, i.e. the sovereign. *The sovereign may divest the ruler of his power, depose him, or reform his administration ...*³

That this parliamentary sovereignty must for Kant be exercised by a *majority* of the representatives in the "corps of deputies" is made clear in the passage shortly to be quoted. His justification for this also can be seen to provide a basis for *Chapter One* more specific formulation of 'working majority rule' which asserted the constitutional right of the 'working majority' in the elected chamber to prevail over any opposition that might arise from any combination of the non-elected chamber, the government (executive and judiciary), and the monarch. Kant does not fully spell out every step by which he derives majority rule from his *a priori* principles, but he presumably would argue as follows: at first sight, the principles that *all* have the potential to be rational, that the autonomy of each person must be respected, that each is to be treated as an end in himself, and that laws should be universal in form, together imply that in a republican "kingdom of ends" all decisions must be *unanimous*. Unanimity, however, would depend not just on the *potential* but on the consistent and *actual* rationality of *all*. Therefore, in the realization that not all may consistently actualize this potential, an actual rational being will consent to a constitution or "original contract"⁴ which authorises majority rule to be "right" within the commonwealth. I take this to be Kant's argument behind the following:

An entire people cannot ... be expected to reach unanimity, but only to show a majority of votes (and not even of direct votes, but simply of the votes of those delegated in a large nation to represent the people). Thus the actual principle of being content with majority decisions must be accepted unanimously and embodied in a contract; and this itself must be the ultimate basis on which a civil constitution is established.⁵

Such a majority will is the best empirical evidence that the citizenry are what Kant calls "a people of mature rational powers"⁶ and have risen to something like the universal view which is required of us by Kant's first formulation of the "categorical imperative", "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law".⁷ Kant seems to be agreeing that the requirement of politics for majority rule is necessary and right as an empirical approximation of philosophy's demand for universality.

Before considering those additional details of Kant's constitutional proposals which are relevant to the question of democratic monarchy, I should recall that his constitutional arguments were only a part of his wider political thinking which also prominently included a passionate appeal for world peace. He was fully aware that this goal could not be secured in the near future and that there were many difficulties, but he hoped, nevertheless, for a "gradually expanding federation".⁸ He says that this is the "one rational way in which states co-existing with other states can emerge from the lawless condition of pure warfare".⁹ Kant is aware that many say that "human nature" makes such a world order impossible but in answer he writes:

I ... cannot and will not see it as so deeply immersed in evil that practical moral reason will not triumph in the end, after many unsuccessful attempts, thereby showing that it is worthy of admiration after all. On the cosmopolitan level too, it thus remains true to say that whatever reason shows to be valid in theory, is valid in practice.¹⁰

(1) Ibid., "The Metaphysics of Morals", Nisbet, p.149, Ladd, p.92

(2) Ibid., Nisbet, p.163, Ladd, p.113.

(3) Ibid., Nisbet, pp.141-2; Ladd, p.82.

(4) Op. cit., Nisbet, "Theory and Practice", p.77.

(5) Ibid., p.79.

(6) Ibid., Nisbet, "The Contest of Faculties", p.187. (more fully quoted later).

(7) Op. cit., *Grounding*, p.30.

(8) Op. cit., Nisbet, "Perpetual Peace", p.105.

(9) Ibid.

(10) Op. cit., Nisbet, "Theory and Practice", p.92

Of course, Hegel ridiculed these Kantian views¹ but any detailed consideration of this controversy is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it may be useful both briefly to record that my sympathies are broadly on Kant's side of the argument (given that his hope is in the face of his recognition that world peace is most improbable for the foreseeable future). Also, I assert that if a world state were ever to prove achievable, democratic monarchy should provide its constitution.

These views of Kant's are exemplified in the following extract but it also makes clear that Kant sees peace as ultimately dependent on the evolution of republican constitutions. He says that "All forms of state" ought to be,

... based on the ideal of a constitution which is compatible with the natural rights of man, so that those who obey the law should also act as a *unified* body of legislators. And if we accordingly think of the commonwealth in terms of concepts of pure reason, it may be called a *Platonic ideal* (republican noumenon), which is not an empty figment of the imagination, but the eternal norm for all civil constitutions whatsoever and a means of ending all wars. A civic society organised in conformity with it and governed by laws of freedom is an example representing it in the world of experience (republican phaenomenon), and it can only be achieved by a laborious process, after innumerable wars and conflicts. But this constitution, once it has been attained as a whole, is the best qualified of all to keep out war, the destroyer of everything good. Thus it is our duty to enter into a constitution of this kind; and *in the meantime*, since it will be a considerable time before this takes place, it is the duty of *monarchs* to govern in a republican (*not a democratic*) manner, even although they may rule autocratically. In other words, they should treat the people in accordance with principles akin in spirit to the laws of freedom which a *people of mature rational* powers would prescribe for itself, even if the people is not literally asked for its consent.²

The above references to "monarchs" and "not a democratic ... manner" signal two possible implications which might seem to require us to hold that Kant could not see 'democratic monarchy' as the "ideal". First, "monarchs" are associated with "autocratic rule" which ought to "treat the people in accordance with principles akin in spirit to the laws of freedom.....even if the people is not literally asked for its consent". The more obvious implication of these phrases is that a monarch's governing "in a republican manner" is only a step towards the ideal. Yet this passage does not necessarily drive us to this conclusion because it does not explicitly consider the case where the monarch *must* ask the "corps of deputies" for its consent (i.e. democratic monarchy). I see no way that a Kantian could successfully resist this sort of monarchy. It would seem to conform entirely to the logic of his ideal. In fact, Kant could be read to be acknowledging just this point in a footnote starting on the previous page in which he distinguishes between an "absolute" and a "limited" monarch by saying that the latter "must first ask the people whether or not there is to be a war, and if the people say ... no ..., then there will be none".

Nevertheless, there are some other of Kant's arguments which also might very easily be read by extension to imply the rejection of any sort of monarchy even though they only explicitly criticise an hereditary nobility. These implications occur as part of his argument for the promotion of subjects and the appointment of state officials only according to individual merit. He says of the "prerogatives" of a nobility, that since, rationally,

.... it is impossible for the universal will of the people to agree to so groundless a prerogative; the sovereign [the monarch] cannot make it valid either. It may be, however, that an anomaly of this sort has crept into government in past ages (as with the feudal system ...) In this case, the state can make good its mistake by a gradual process ... The state thus has a provisional right to allow such dignities to persist as titles until public opinion allow realises that the hierarchy of sovereign, nobility and people should give way to the more natural division of *sovereign* and *people*.

While Kant uses the term "sovereign" quite unsystematically, sometimes to refer to an autocrat and at other times to refer to a ruling aristocracy, to the whole people in a democracy, or to the representative assembly in a republican constitution (as in the earlier quotation), in the above passage and in many other contexts, it seems to refer to a monarch. In fact, the last phrase in the quotation above can be plausibly read to confirm rather than to undermine the position of the monarch as the earlier part of the quotation might be read to imply. Such texts give us reason to

(1) See *Rechts*, PP259Z, PP324An. & Z, and PP333An.

(2) Op. cit., Nisbet, "The Contest of Faculties", p.187.

(3) "Metaphysics of Morals", Nisbet, p.153; Ladd, pp.97-98.

question whether Kant cared at all whether the head of state was hereditary or chosen according to merit. The above passage leaves us to wonder this in spite again of the seemingly strict meritocratic tone of the following words:

... every member of the commonwealth must be entitled to reach any degree of rank which a subject can earn through his talent, his industry and his good fortune.¹

That Kant holds that there needs to be a "physical" or "moral" person to be the "head of state" is clear from the following quotation. However, it does not necessarily require the head of state to be one person, let alone hereditary, because Kant unfortunately used the phrase "head of state", as widely and as ambiguously as he does "sovereign":

... this head of state (the sovereign) is only an abstraction (representing the entire people) so long as there is no physical person to represent the highest power in the state²

The above passages confirms my conclusion that Kant's words on the question of monarchy are equivocal. While he never explicitly endorses constitutional monarchy, let alone 'democratic monarchy', neither does he ever explicitly reject constitutional monarchy as one formulation of his ideal.

While his arguments for meritocracy would seem more clearly to exclude the hereditary chamber within my 'democratic monarchy' and less clearly the institution of monarchy itself, he does not explicitly consider, and his arguments would not seem to be able to resist, the strong case for these elements of the model. At the same time, one might even argue that references like the one above to "limited monarchy" suggest that he would accept what might paradoxically be called 'republican monarchy' as one formulation of his "model"³ constitution. This is to say, that a few of his words when added to his usual silence on these questions might be taken, if the reader is so disposed, to imply possible support for such a monarchy. At the same time, a combination of Kant's clear arguments, his ambiguity, his silences, and my conjectures about his unknowable intentions, has provided us as yet with no Kantian reasons to modify the contentions of previous chapters. In fact, it is my view that those arguments should lead a Kantian to favour a 'representative monarchy' over a 'representative republic'.

The question of whether such a 'republican monarchy' is the same as *democratic* monarchy is a second question raised by the first of the above three quoted extracts where Kant says, that "in the mean time it is the duty of monarchs to govern in a republican (not a democratic) manner". Kant defines "democracy" in the Rousseauian⁴ sense as direct popular control, i.e. a state in which the "supreme authority" is exercised *directly* by "all those who together constitute civil society".⁵ However, since I use 'democracy' in the sense of a representative democracy, there seems to be only a semantic difference between a 'republican' and a 'democratic' monarchy.

Nevertheless, there is a clear difference between Kant's and my representative democracy when it comes to the definition of the electorate and the system for electing the "corps of deputies". Kant says nothing about the appropriate system of representation. He gives us no guidance on whether a 'first past the post' or some proportional representation system would be a part of his "morally superior state".⁶ I take it that this silence gives us no reason to resist the strong case offered in *Chapter Two* arguing that 'associational proportional representation' (A.P.R.) would tend most to foster the maximization of both the quality and *quantity* of communal deliberations. On the question of the electorate, Kant, like Hegel⁷ but unlike Plato, automatically excludes women⁸ from "active citizenship".⁹ Thus, Kant excludes women from the right to vote for "deputies". This thesis assumes that such a restriction of the electorate has only a cultural explanation rather than a philosophical justification and thus that no modern Kantian (or Hegelian) could sustain an opposition to women's suffrage. In addition to women, however, Kant relegates all "subjects" who are not their own "masters" to "passive citizenship". In one less than convincing explanation of what he means by 'not being one's own master', he writes about an economic dependence which forces one to allow "others to make use of him" and which supposedly results from one only having his

(1) Ibid., Nisbet, "Theory and Practice", p.75

(2) Op. cit., "The Metaphysics of Morals", Nisbet, p.161; Ladd, p.109.

(3) Ibid., "Perpetual Peace", Nisbet, p.118.

(4) *The Social Contract*, Book III, Chapter IV.

(5) Op. cit., "Perpetual Peace", Nisbet, p.100.

(6) Ibid., "Theory and Practice", p.91.

(7) See later chapters for references.

(8) Op. cit., Nisbet, "Theory and Practice", p. 78 quoted below.

(9) Ibid., "The Metaphysics of Morals", Nisbet, p.139; Ladd, p.79.

labour rather than owning a "commodity" to sell, i.e., being able only to guarantee "one's labour (prostatio)".¹ On this basis, Kant gives the following examples of those who should be denied "active citizenship": apprentices, servants, shop assistants, labourers, barbers, tithe-holders, domestic tutors, travelling blacksmiths and woodcutters. Examples of those judged to be worthy of full citizenship are the following: small and large landowners, artisans, tailors, artists, tradesmen, and wig-makers.²

In seeming contrast to the above lists which contain contentious and culturally bound examples, earlier, Kant had offered a less problematic formulation of his voting qualifications even though, as we have said, it excludes women:

The only qualification required by a citizen (apart, of course, from being an adult male) is that he must be his own master (*sui iuris*), and must have some property (which can include any *skill, trade, fine art or science*) to support himself.³

If by "any skill" he had meant 'an ability to perform any useful service to the community' so as certainly to include those relegated in the above list to being mere "subjects", then Kant's definition of citizenship would have been much closer to that contained in democratic monarchy. However, it is because even this requirement may deny the presumption of rationality to some adults which Kant's own categorical imperative can be read to enshrine, that even this formulation may fall short also of the model's universal adult suffrage. In one respect, however, his view is perfect from the model's point of view. He does not weight the vote of each person in proportion to his "commodities", "property" or "skill" but argues for a one-citizen-one-vote system:

... artisans and large or small landowners are all equal, and each is entitled to one vote only. ...The number of those entitled to vote on matters of legislation must be calculated purely from the number of property owners, not from the size of their properties.⁴

It is worth recalling as well that, in line with our previous discussion of Kant's meritocratic argument, he does not, of course, see the above divisions as being hereditary and he insists that all must be allowed to earn the vote by their "ability, industry and good fortune".⁵

At the same time, Kant expressed some doubt about the possibility of administering his division between "active" and "passive" citizens justly. He admits in the footnote on the same page "that it is somewhat difficult to define the qualifications which entitle anyone to claim the status of being his own master". Indeed, it would seem so "difficult" that my model does not contain this division at all. This is not to deny, however, that Kant's words raise some valid principles. They could be taken more broadly to imply the importance of two which my political philosophy would also endorse: It is desirable both that each citizen,

- 1) have the power of 'rational self mastery' and that they
- 2) be 'economically independent' of the pressure which other individual citizens or minority groupings of citizens might attempt to exert upon them.

In line with the first principle, my own ideal, as well as presumably Kant's, would not only exclude children from voting but any 'adults' who by objective criteria could be proven to lack a required minimum of 'rational self mastery' (e.g. the feeble minded and the insane). At the same time, my own system of universal adult suffrage would accept the unavoidable probability that at least some individually unpredictable electors of whatever age may in fact vote destructively. However, I know of no reason to expect that this destructiveness would be any more than that which would tend to be perpetrated by any differently defined electorate including Kant's, made up as it was, of "landowners" and "wig-makers". What is quite certain is that in Kant's system, many actually or potentially rational "women", "apprentices" and "labourers" would correctly have a sense of injustice at being arbitrarily excluded from the community's deliberations, i.e. at being denied that they are "ends in themselves" and "co-legislators". Kant himself says that,

... a citizen must always be regarded as a co-legislative member of the state (i.e. not just as a means, but also as an end in himself), and he must [for example] therefore give his free consent through his representatives ... to every particular declaration of war.⁶

- (1) *Ibid.*, Nisbet, "Theory and Practice", p.78.
- (2) These lists were compiled from *ibid.*, and from *op. cit.*, "The Metaphysics of Morals", Nisbet, p.139; Ladd, p.79.
- (3) *Op. cit.*, Nisbet, "Theory and Practice", p.78
- (4) *Ibid.*
- (5) *Ibid.*
- (1) *Op. cit.*, "The Metaphysics of Morals", Nisbet, p.166-7; Ladd, p.118.

In any case, we must remember that democratic monarchy (and perhaps Kant's own model constitution) does not leave a commonwealth's fate totally in the hands of voters who may be "self-seeking". Both Kant and I see our respective constitutions as ideal, partly because their structures help to channel human relations in such a way that the various destructive effects of human selfishness tend to cancel each other out. I agree with Kant's observation that, ... a good organisation of the state [because if] arranges that self-seeking energies are opposed to one another, each thereby neutralising or eliminating the destructive effects of the rest. And as far as reason is concerned, the result is the same as if man's selfish tendencies were non-existent, so that man, even if he is not morally good in himself, is nevertheless compelled to be a good citizen.

The "good organisation" of democratic monarchy explicitly plans for the contingency that, for a time, the elected chamber may be dominated by merely sectional interests or the "self-seeking" which might make the formation of a working majority impossible. It does this by providing for the monarch to act in this case within the 'state prerogative council' to appoint his own prime ministers until a working majority has been re-formed.

At the same time, it should be recalled that one of the arguments for 'associational proportional representation' was that it recognizes a broad range of electoral associations within which citizens may more easily discover their wider identity. Their membership and participation in such associations and the representation which these have in the elected chamber were seen to provide a spiral staircase of broadening interests and relationships which will tend to foster the development of the alliances within and between the associations which would make majority and party government possible.² This is to say that democratic monarchy guards against most levels of destructive self-seeking which may come to exist in a society. Its voluntary associations and its representative system also are institutions which would tend to foster the development of sufficient levels of common interest and mature rationality so that working majority rule becomes a reality. The welfare provisions of democratic monarchy not only help to guarantee the material and educational conditions for all to become actual "rational beings", they help to secure the *one-citizen-one* vote feature. Without such a guarantee, the wealthy would tend to acquire much more political power than the poor.

It may be worth noting that some of Kant's own words might also be imaginatively construed to suggest a welfare role for his ideal state. Since Kant says that "active citizens" must not be "obliged to depend for their living (i.e. food and protection) on the offices of others (excluding the state)", he might, by implication, be at least allowing that "active citizens" could have an economic dependence *on the state*. Whether Kant had this in mind or not, my constitution would allow such a dependence. In my model, the social security and other welfare measures upon which some would find themselves having to rely, would of course, like everything else, ultimately stand or fall on the will of working majorities in the elected chamber. Nevertheless, as Kant might also desire, such arrangements would remove the occasion for individuals to become beholden to other individuals or to minority factions. Again, these provisions are part of my ideal because they would help to extend 'the *quantity* of rational living'.

Welfare measures are frequently already informally present within independent families and thus the following quotation might also be taken logically to suggest that Kant's model commonwealth could be some sort of welfare state. He says that his ideal would be characterised by a "patriotic" rather than by a "paternal" government:

A patriotic government (*regimen civitatis et patriae*) means that although the state itself (*civitas*) treats its subjects as if they were members of *one family*, it also treats them as citizens of the state, i.e. in accordance with *laws guaranteeing their own independence*. Thus each is responsible for himself and does not depend upon the absolute will of *anyone* equal or superior to him.¹

These possible intimations of welfare measures are quite unequivocally confirmed when Kant says that,

... the government is authorized to require the wealthy to provide the means of sustenance to those who are unable to provide the most necessary needs of nature for themselves.⁴

(1) Op. cit., Nisbet, "Perpetual Peace", p. 112.

(2) *Chapters Ten and Twelve* elaborate the same argument in relation to Hegel.

(3) *Ibid.*, Nisbet, p. 141; Ladd, p. 82.

(4) Op. cit., Ladd, p. 93.

The prior suggestion that these provisions should foster "independence" is also confirmed when Kant recommended that one who is in need should be given "a certain sum of money" rather than be well taken care of by a "magnificent institution - such as a Greenwich Hospital - which is served by highly paid personnel, where his freedom is nevertheless extremely limited."¹

So far in this chapter, I have considered,

- 1) the general relation between Kant's political and his wider philosophy,
- 2) his argument for the sovereignty of the representative assembly and for majority rule,
- 3) whether his republicanism necessarily rejects monarchy,
- 4) his definition of the electorate and the representative system, and
- 5) his welfare measures.

Now we can explicitly turn to the way Kant unites all these features within his "separation of powers" doctrine (legislative, executive and judicial). While Kant's doctrine can be seen as similar in some respects to that contained within democratic monarchy, even though it is much less elaborate, it is also significantly different. First, it is different by not explicitly recognizing the 'unifying function' and second, of course, in not being committed to an hereditary head of state. Kant sketches the three "powers" in the following extract. Like Hegel and most other writers as well, Kant uses "power" (Gewalt) ambiguously. On some occasions it refers to what *Chapter One* called a 'function', and at other times an 'organ'.

Every state [ought to contain] three powers, i.e. the universally united will is made up of three separate persons (*trias politica*). These are the ruling power (or sovereignty) in the person of the legislator, the executive power in the person of the individual who governs in accordance with the law, and the judicial power (which allots to everyone what is his by law) in the person of judge (*potestas legislatoria, rectoria at iudiciaria*). They can be likened to the three propositions in a practical operation of reason: the major premise, which contains the law of the sovereign will, the minor premise which contains the command to act in accordance with the law (i.e. the principle of subsumption under the general will), and the conclusion, which contains the legal decision (the sentence) as to the rights and wrongs of each particular case.²

Before discussing this paragraph in some detail, I must say that while Kant does claim that this separation of powers is "necessary *a priori*" on the same page, he only hints in the above passage at how this might be so by drawing the various parallels with the propositions of a syllogism. Neither here nor elsewhere does he go on to expound its derivation from these roots systematically. However, by piecing together what he does say in support of the three powers at various places, his argument would seem to run as follows: as philosophers, we must assume *a priori* that we as humans *may* be capable of being rational and thus of seeking both to know and to abide by universal laws. On the other hand, however, we know both ourselves and probably others as frequently to be tempting to bend or to ignore such laws for personal or factional gain, especially if we think our illegality will not be detected, by others, or if detected not punished. Therefore, since all men and women must be assumed to be pulled in both of these directions, a constitution should be so constructed that the affairs of state are conducted under the public eye, leaving no state official or body (i.e. its "physical" or "moral"¹ persons) in the position of being his own or its own legislator, executor and judge. If each of these three *functions* of state is performed jointly yet primarily by each of the three *organs* (as outlined in *Chapter One*) then, not only all subjects but especially all state officials are put in the position of at least completing their activities under the scrutiny of others. Each should have a "master" as Kant puts it:

... if he lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master. For he certainly abuses his freedom in relation to others of his own kind. And even although, as a rational creature, he desires a law to impose limits on the freedom of all, he is still misled by his self-seeking ... into exempting himself from the law where he can. He thus requires a master to break his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free.²

Appropriately, Kant extends his distrust of "man" even to philosophers. He remarks that it, ... is not to be expected that kings will philosophise or that philosophers will become kings; *nor is it to be desired* since the possession of power inevitably corrupts the free judgement of reason. Kings should not, however, force the class of philosophers to disappear or to remain silent, but should allow them to speak publicly.³

- (1) Op. cit., Nisbet, "Perpetual Peace", p. 112.
- (2) *Chapters Ten and Twelve* elaborate the same argument in relation to Hegel.
- (3) Op. cit., "The Metaphysics of Morals", Nisbet, p. 141; Iadd, p. 81.
- (4) Op. cit., Nisbet, "Idea for a Universal History", p. 46.
- (5) Op. cit., "Perpetual Peace", p.115. Perhaps Kant's exaggerated choice of words can be explained by his desire to deflect the censors from any thought that he might himself be seeking political power.

Quite plainly, this is an attack upon Plato's prescription which is that philosophers should be the sole legislators, executors and judges. At the same time it is a reinforcement of the above argument in favour of the separation of powers. In a constitution so ordered, even the sovereign representative *assembly* must depend on the executive and judicial organs to apply its law. A government *minister* is both constrained by the law and subject to the decisions which judges may make in disputes under the law which he may have with subjects. A *judge* is not only bound by the law but is confined only to respond to the legal initiatives which may be taken by others.

While this argument seems valid, the above extract's surprising reject the *desirability* of philosophers being kings. Nevertheless, this could perhaps make Kantian sense either,

- a) if it only expresses the truth that one would have an additional reason to mistrust the academic work of a philosopher if he had political power; or
- b) if Kant is here attempting to reassure the censors that he is just a harmless academic rather than a politician.

However, if Kant is saying what the words can more easily be taken to mean, namely, that self-consciously rational men should take no active part in performing the necessary state functions, this would contradict the whole thrust of his writing elsewhere which asserts the possibility that "pure practical reason" can and *ought* to have a shaping effect on human affairs. Equally problematic is his assertion that "the possession of power *inevitably* corrupts the free judgement of reason". He should have said that it *frequently* corrupts. This correction as well as my remark above would seem to be encouraged by his own acceptance of the possibility of a "moral politician".¹ This gloss would also be assisted by our seeing this *corruptibility* as largely removed by a system as in the model in which the organ's of state jointly yet differentially perform the three integral functions of the state. If this is so, that Kant may only have meant that the possession of absolute or constitutionally *unlimited* power, like that held by Plato's philosopher rulers, *almost certainly* corrupts. The model's differentiation of the organs would help both philosopher and non-philosopher legislators, executors and judges to resist the temptations of power.

In the passage quoted near the beginning of our discussion of the separation of powers and which outlined their character, Kant seems to be attempting to explain why he favours these three powers rather than another three. In effect, he seems to say that the structure of formal logic demands it. The legislative organ is associated with the *universal* form of the major premise in a syllogism, the executive organ is associated with the connecting of the *particular* with the general laws which characterises the minor premise, and the judicial organ is associated with the *singleness* of each conclusion it must render regarding individual disputes. In a different tract, Kant states the case for the separation of the legislative and executive organs in only somewhat different terms:

Republicanism is that political principle whereby the executive power (the government) is separated from the legislative power. Despotism prevails in a state if the laws are made and arbitrarily executed by one and the same power [organ]
... any form of government which is not representative is essentially an *anomaly*, because one and the same person cannot at the same time be both the legislator and the executor of his own will, just as the general proposition in logical reasoning cannot at the same time be a secondary proposition subsuming the particular within the general.²

At first these explanations of Kant's three organs might seem abstract and perhaps not even relevant because, while it is true that the characters of the major premise, minor premise and conclusion can indeed be so distinguished, one person or group can in fact consider and relate all three. Syllogistic arguments do not literally require three different people to work together to complete them. If this were to be what Kant meant, therefore, it would not stand up but perhaps he meant instead to suggest that if three persons concentrate on each of these three elements of rational decision-making, this division of labour will both help to make each step be performed with greater precision and excellence and help to alert all members of the state, including its officials, to the logical structure which should characterize the collective deliberations of rational beings. This excellence and awareness, therefore, would increase 'the *quality* of rational living' in the republican community as well as establish the three publicly known and mutual "masters" with each necessarily having to observe the work of the other two in order to carry out its own prime function.

(1) *Ibid.*, p.117.

(2) *Ibid.*, p.101.

Kant briefly expounds the united yet articulated character of the operations of these three organs as follows:

The three powers in the state are related to one another in the following ways. Firstly, as moral persons, they are coordinate (*potestates coordinatae*), i.e. each is complementary to the others in forming the complete constitution of the state (*complementum ad sufficientiam*). But secondly, they are also subordinate (*subordinatae*) to one another, so that the one cannot usurp any function of the others to which it ministers; for each has its own principle, so that although it issues orders in the quality of a distinct person, it does so under the condition of a superior person's will

Shortly, I will consider how democratic monarchy reinterprets this "coordinate" and "complementary" character of these three powers, but first, I must attempt to answer the question which may arise from our remembering that Kant is claiming both that the representative organ is sovereign yet that each organ has two masters in the other two organs. How can the "sovereign" have a master other than itself? I have already quoted the passage in which the supremacy of the "corps of deputies" was asserted through its ability to remove the executive. The question remains, therefore, who is to remove the sovereign? If we look at this question more carefully, we can see that Kant need not be read to be advocating anything which departs from the arrangements in the model where the elected chamber only has the right to remove and replace, not the executive or judicial *organs*, but, their office holders. Kant does not make this entirely clear but if we are explicitly to add as democratic monarchy does, the provision that before any minister or judge could be removed, a named replacement would have to be designated to assume the office immediately upon the removal of the previous official, this would help solve the problem. Such an arrangement would insure that at all times, *directly* independent executors and judges would be in office. Named officials would always be in place with their full constitutional authority to speak out or to act in their own constitutional ways to restrain the representative assembly when they judged this to be warranted, e.g. when they judged the assembly to be usurping the primary executive or judicial functions, or to be violating its own legislative trust.

With such a provision, while the corps of deputies, as the sovereign republican voice, is *indirectly* also its own executor and judge because it can appoint and remove these office holders; *directly*, it is not its own executor and judge. This interpretation of Kant is perhaps strongly suggested by a few of his own words:

... the executive power alone possess the supreme authority to apply coercion in accordance with the law
 the executive power of the supreme ruler (*summi rectoris*) cannot be opposed (i.e. it is irresistible), and the verdict of the supreme judge (*supremi iudicis*) cannot be altered (i.e. it is without appeal).
 neither the sovereign [representative assembly] nor the ruler [executor] may pass judgement; they can only appoint judges as magistrates. The people judge themselves ... by juries

In addition to these direct checks upon a possibly antirepublican representative assembly, I should also recall that at general election time, the citizenry would have the opportunity to *replace* any offending deputies with others who seemed to be more likely to defend the appropriate differentiation of functions and organs. In this sense, it is the electorate which is the "master" of the sovereign representative body.

So far, these interpretations of Kant agree with the corresponding provisions of democratic monarchy. At the same time, I must repeat that Kant's words are frequently equivocal and incomplete as they stand so that they could as easily be read in support of a 'parliamentary' constitution with an elected head of state. In order fully to complete this claim of rough correspondence, however, it remains to be explained both why the 'unifying function' should be added to Kant's list of three "powers" (legislative, executive and judicial) and why the judicial and executive functions are better seen as just two ways in which the 'particularizing function' is appropriately performed. The latter conclusion in democratic monarchy leads to the formation of two parallel hierarchies of executives and administrators, on the one hand, and of judges and juries on the other hand, which together constitute the 'governing organ'. I have already argued that while they both are primarily concerned to apply the law of the land to particular and single cases, the way the two appropriately do this is different. Executives are charged to take initiatives while judges are not. My argument in favour of arranging the two hierarchies within the one 'governing organ' is that this not only makes pragmatic sense but that it most clearly

(1) Op. cit., "The Metaphysics of Morals", Nisbet, p.141; Ladd, p.81.

(2) Ibid., Nisbet, pp.141-142; Ladd, pp.81-83.

demonstrates that this constitution is a structure of reason, i.e. both are more readily seen as applying the universal to the particular as can minor premises (when combined with universal premises) imply conclusions. In this way, a 'parliamentary constitution' both distinguishes and relates the two manners in which laws can and should be applied. However, Kant's intimations of the logical basis for the difference between the executive and judicial functions are somewhat mistaken. In associating the "minor premise" with the executive functions *only*, and the judicial function with the "conclusion" *only*, he loses sight of the fact that both executives and judges "subsume" single cases "under the general will". Equally, both arrive at "conclusions ... as to the rights or wrongs of each particular case".¹ This is to say that both must exercise the "judgement" which "distinguishes instances where the rule applies".²

In later chapters I will consider how democratic monarchy can more easily be seen to be rooted in Hegel's similar yet different explanation of how the functions are manifestations of the three logical "moments" of "generality, particularity and singularity" (Allgemeinheit, Besonderheit und Einzelheit). I can say now, however, that "generality" easily corresponds to Kant's "*universally* united will" of the "major premise" and that "particularity" corresponds to the "subsumption" of "each *particular* case" which relates both to the "minor premise" and the "conclusion". However, the way that "singularity" relates to the findings of this chapter is not so obvious and it is to this question that we will now turn.

The case will be argued more fully later but its thrust will be that the 'unifying function' discussed in *Chapters One* and *Two* correspond to the moment of "singularity". The unifying function, as will be recalled, fulfils the requirement that for a society to survive and especially to thrive rationally, there needs to be an overall consistency between the various statutes which constitute its laws, between the various executive and judicial decisions, and between these laws and these decisions. Kant *implicitly seems to recognize the importance of this unity* and although he does not explicitly translate this appreciation into an argument for a separate organ to be formally responsible for this vital function as Hegel and I do, a modern Kantian would seem to have no reason to resist this conclusion. Such a Kantian would seem to be put in this position, for example, by many of Kant's own phrases which seem clearly to recognize the need for this unity, e.g.,

... the universally *united* will ...¹

[Legislation] ... for a commonwealth ... requires freedom, equality and unity of the will of all members. And the pre-requisite of *unity*, since it necessitates a general vote (if freedom and equality are both present), is independence. This basic law, which can come only from the general, *united* will of the people, is called the original contract.²

A republican constitution is founded upon three principles: firstly ... freedom for all ... men; secondly, the ... dependence of everyone upon a *single* common legislation (as subjects); and thirdly ... equality for everyone (as citizens).³

It is perfectly true that the will of all individual men to live in accordance with the principles of freedom within a lawful constitution (i.e. the distributive unity of the will of all) is not sufficient for (the goal of eternal peace to be attained) Before so difficult a problem can be solved, all men together (i.e. the collective unity of the combined will) must desire to attain this goal; only then can civil society exist as a single whole.⁴

It is also worth noting that my separation of the monarch from the governing organ does not substantially conflict with Kant's words where he charges the chief "executive"⁵ (i.e. the monarch where there is one) with the task of appointing "ministers" and the public officials who serve them: ... (rex, princeps) that moral or physical person who wields the executive power ... is the agent of the state who appoints the magistrates ... and their superiors (ministers) who are responsible for administering the state (gubernatio).⁶

(1) *Ibid.*, Nisbet, p.138; Ladd, pp.77-78.

(2) *Op. cit.*, Nisbet, "On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice'", p.61.

(3) *Op. cit.*, "The Metaphysics", Nisbet, p.138; Ladd, p.77.

(4) *Op. cit.*, Nisbet, "Theory and Practice", p. 76.

(5) *Op. cit.*, Nisbet, "Perpetual Peace", p.99.

(6) *Ibid.*, p.117.

(7) In democratic monarchy, the monarch is *formally* not only the chief executive but the chief legislator and the chief judge as well. At the same time, the prime minister is the *primary* chief executive.

(8) *Op. cit.*, "The Metaphysics of Morals", Nisbet, p.141; Ladd, p.81.

This would seem to be just another way of interpreting the view of the monarch which Kant applauds when he reports that Frederick the Great "said that he was merely the highest servant of the state".¹ Of course, this accords with the model constitution. Also within it, the monarch is at least *formally* always the highest state official. This is his or her figurehead role. He or she should only be the *effective* head of the executive as well when the caretaking role is thrust upon her or him by the absence of a working majority in the elected chamber and when only a weak prime minister can be found for appointment.

This chapter has tried to show both that Kant offers no republican arguments which seriously threaten democratic monarchy and that most of his relatively few and unsystematic words can even be imaginatively construed to offer varying degrees of vague support for it. More surprisingly, perhaps, the next chapter will make similar claims about Marx's political theory. It will argue that democratic monarchy would be the best framework for Marx's "communal constitution".

(1) Op. cit., Nisbet, "Perpetual Peace", p.101.

Chapter Five:
FROM MARX'S COMMUNAL CONSTITUTION
TO DEMOCRATIC MONARCHY

Up to a point, it could be said that the model constitution issues from a synthesis of Hegel and Marx's critique of him, that its monarchy comes from Hegel while its democracy comes from Marx. The remaining chapters will clarify the extent to which this simplification is true. Of course, this chapter concentrates on the Marxian element of this synthesis but it must be admitted that because Marx showed only scant interest in discussing either the constitutional details of existing states or of his own future communist society, very little can be said with certainty about what his view of 'democratic monarchy' might be. What is developed here as Marx's own ideal constitution has had largely to be constructed by me from the plausible implications of the relevant fragments which Marx scatters within several of his works.

The least controversial claim is that Marx's preferred constitution is "democratic". The further suggestion, however, that by extension he should logically support democratic monarchy will probably seem much more doubtful to most readers. At the same time, some *crude* Marxists might want to dismiss even the first claim as trivial. They might go so far as to claim that the very notion of a Marxian ideal constitution is made void by his materialist approach to the analysis of history and society. Such interpreters would say that every constitution is only a part of the "superstructure" and therefore could have no independent power to shape human life. They say that constitutional theories should be replaced by more fundamental economic analysis because political arrangements are ultimately determined by the dominant "mode of production" within any given "social formation". I refer to this as a 'crude' interpretation for several reasons. *First*, it ignores the inherent importance which Marx himself gives to thoughtful political activity as displayed by his own strategic and tactical involvements before, within, and after the First International. *Second*, it fails to take account of those passages, such as the following, which can be read to suggest that Marx did have a conception of something like a model constitution in mind: ... democracy is *the essence* of every political constitution ... It stands related to other constitutions as the genus to its species; only here *the genus* itself appears as an existent ... opposed to those existents which do not conform to the essence.¹

Third, this overly deterministic interpretation of Marx relies on a simplistic understanding of Marx's occasional references to the "inevitable"² character of future events and upon narrow readings of such phrases as the following:

It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.³

... laws ... working themselves out with iron necessity.⁴

- (1) Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'*, edited by J. O'Malley and translated with Annette Jolin, CUP, 1970, p.30.
- (2) See for example, K. Marx and F. Engels, "The Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848)", in *The Revolutions of 1848*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, pp.79 & 90; and *Capital*, Vol. I, Penguin, 1976, Postface, pp.102 & 103. Also see the following for Marx's expression of confidence in the future, but with a less deterministic tone: "The Civil War in France", p.232; "Speech on the Hague Congress", p.326; both in *The First International and After*, Penguin, 1974.
- (3) Preface to "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", *Early Writings*, Penguin, 1975, p.425. Also see K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology*, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5. Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1976. p.37.
- (4) *Capital*, *ibid.*, p.91.

It overlooks the mutual shaping powers of body and mind which arguably are contained even in the above phrase, "social existence", especially when such as the following voluntaristic passages are considered:

Men make their own history, but not [completely] of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted.

... circumstances make men just as much as *men make circumstances*.²

Just as ... at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have *raised themselves* to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.³

Mankind thus inevitably *sets itself* only such tasks as *it is able to solve*, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation.⁴

The next to the last extract above could be Marx's own explanation of how he, a child of a middle class family, came consciously to align himself with the proletariat after his study of "the historical movement as a whole". *Fourth*, a deterministic⁵ rendering of Marx must be rejected in the light of Marx's recognition of human fallibility, e.g. he praised the Paris Commune for, ... acting in bright daylight, with no pretensions to infallibility ... not ashamed to confess blunders by correcting them.

He also criticised the Commune for making various tactical mistakes, e.g. just before 21 March 1871, he judged that the,

... Central Committee made itself ... guilty of a decisive mistake in not at once marching upon Versailles, then completely helpless ...

Such recognition of a "mistake", as well as of any notions of skill, virtue and right would be irrelevant or impossible if all were completely determined by material processes and forces beyond human control. Therefore, the narrow materialist's attempt to dismiss our search for a general, prescriptive constitution in Marx will not detain us any longer.

Marx both openly and implicitly declared his support for "democracy" and its institutions in pamphlets written from the 1840s to 1870s. Marx's "Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'" (c. 1843) gives us a striking example:

The democratic element should be ... the actual element that acquires its rational form in the whole organism of the state.⁶

It is not until 1871, however, when Marx wrote about the Paris Commune in "The Civil War in France" that he offers us something like a comprehensive outline of "really democratic institutions".⁷ He approvingly claimed that in its political practice and plan, the Commune had achieved "a government of the people by the people".⁸ More fundamentally, Marx sees democracy as providing the essential means for achieving the change from the capitalistic to the communistic mode of production, i.e. he held that the Commune "at last discovered ... the political form ... under which to work out the economical emancipation of labour".⁹

Marx never systematically presented his theory of the state but an examination of "The Civil War in France" will help us to infer the outline of such a theory. Following Hegel, I usually use the term 'state' to denote 'that *organized unity* of a whole people which they recognize (at least tacitly) as sovereign'. In contrast, Marx uses the term more narrowly to refer only to such an authority in *class* societies. In this sense of the "state" as 'the agent of class rule', Marx

(1) "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", *Surveys from Exile*, Penguin, 1973, p.146.

(2) *The German Ideology*, op. cit., p.54.

(3) "Manifesto", op. cit., p.77, See *ibid.*, p.52, for a similar passage.

(4) Preface to "*A Contribution ...*", op. cit., p.426.

(5) The next chapter will offer a refutation of 'total, external determinism'.

(6) "First Draft of 'The Civil War in France'", op. cit., p.252, Also see p.219.

(7) *Ibid.*, p.204.

(8) Op. cit., p.116. Implied endorsements for the following can also be found: "universal suffrage" (e.g. "The Chartists" (1852), *Surveys from Exile*, op. cit., p.264; the freedoms of speech, press and association (e.g. "The Eighteenth Brumaire", op. cit., p.186: "... to simplify the state administration, reduce the army of officials as much as possible, and finally let civil society and public opinion create their own organs independent of the power of government", (and "The Curtain Raised", *The First International and After*, op. cit., p.399); "popular sovereignty" (e.g. "The Eighteenth Brumaire", *ibid.*, p.195) and "popular government" (e.g. "The Curtain Raised", *ibid.*).

(9) Op. cit., p.212. (10) *Ibid.*, p.217. (11) *Ibid.*, p. 212.

occasionally refers to "the dictatorship of the proletariat" ¹ as a "workers' state" ² as well as to "the modern state", ³ i.e. to what is more informatively, but rarely, called "the bourgeois state".⁴ However, when Marx was writing about the Paris Commune, he seems to have adopted an even more restricted use. Here, "the state" referred exclusively to the *bourgeois* state, especially as it had evolved in mid-nineteenth century France, where "a centralized and organized governmental power" ⁵ had established itself so that it could coordinate and control the "great central state organs".⁶ Thus, he referred to the "state parasites" ⁷ with "great independence from society".⁸ He spoke of, The centralized state power, with its ubiquitous organs of standing army, police, bureaucracy, clergy, and judicature - organs wrought after the plan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labour ... serving ... middle class society as a mighty weapon in its struggles ...

It is this very restricted meaning of "the state" which I take him to intend when he wrote about what he took to be the Commune's correct view that, at least in France,
.... the working class cannot simply lay hold of the readymade state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.⁹

A month earlier, Marx had made the same point more dramatically in his famous letter to Kugelmann (12 April 1871) by saying that "the precondition for every real people's revolution on the continent" is not "to transfer the military-bureaucratic machine from one hand to another, but to *smash it*".¹¹ Thus, the Commune sought "the reabsorption of the [bourgeoisie's] state power by society,"¹² by "the communal form of political organization".¹³

This was, therefore, a revolution not against this or that Legitimate Constitutional Republican or Imperialist form of state power. It was a revolution against the [bourgeois] *state* itself, this supernaturalist abortion of society, a resumption by the people of its own social life. It was not a revolution to transfer it from one fraction of the ruling classes to the other, but a revolution to break down this horrid machinery of [bourgeois] class domination itself.¹⁴

Accordingly, during its brief survival,¹⁵ the Commune began to "break down this horrid machinery". It did away with the police in Paris.¹⁶ It transformed the standing army (i.e. the Paris National Guard) into a "militia" or an "armed people" ¹⁷ which in peace time would require from each citizen only an "extremely short term of service",¹⁸ but in war, "every able man".¹⁹ It sought to reduce the numbers of "functionaries" ²⁰ as much as possible, transforming the remaining "officials of all branches of the administration [and judges] ²¹ ... into [elective] ²² responsible and revokable agents of the Commune ... at workmen's wages".²³

The "Commune" was also the name given to the democratically elected assembly which was to retain full legislative and executive powers ²⁴ and thus to which the above "officials" were made responsible. Members of this assembly were elected by "universal suffrage" ²⁵ from the 20 wards or "arrondissements" ²⁶ of Paris. Members were to be responsible to their electorate, their election to be "revocable at short term".²⁷ In any case, as implied almost 30 years earlier in his "Critique of 'Hegel's Philosophy of Right'", Marx wants the "electors" to have "the option of deliberating and deciding themselves about public affairs or of delegating definite individuals to discharge these things ...".²⁸ Thus, Marx would probably have favoured at least the 'recall' and 'referenda' provisions outlined in *Chapter One*.

- (1) "The Class Struggles in France: 1848 to 1850" *Surveys from Exile*, op. cit., pp.61, 92 and 123; "Critique of the Gotha Programme" (1875), *The First International*, op. cit., p.355. Also see in "The Manifesto", op. cit., "The sway of the proletariat" (pp.78 and 85) and "to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class to win the battle of democracy" (p.86).
- (2) "The Class Struggles", op. cit., p.84; "Conspectus of Bakunin's Statism and Anarchy", *The First International*, op. cit., p.337.
- (3) "The Civil War", op. cit., pp.206 and 211. (4) "The Manifesto", op. cit., pp.74, 76 and 77.
- (5) "Civil War", op. cit., p.250. (6) Op. cit., p.211. (7) Ibid., p.211 and 247. (8) Ibid., p.250.
- (9) Ibid., p.206.
- (10) "The Civil War", *ibid.*, p.206. Marx implied that much the same problem would face the proletariat almost everywhere but specifically mentions Prussia and Austria on p.250.
- (11) K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1962, p. 463.
- (12) "Civil War", op. cit., p.250. (13) Ibid., p.254. (14) Ibid., p.249.
- (15) From January 28, March 3, 18 or 26, 1871 - depending on which event one judges to mark its beginning - to May 28, 1871.
- (16) "Civil War", op. cit., pp.219, 251 and 268. (17) Ibid., pp.209 and 210. (18) Ibid., p.251.
- (19) Ibid., p.238. (20) Ibid., pp.210 and 251. (21) Ibid., p.210. (22) Ibid. (23) Ibid., p.209.
- (24) Ibid. (25) Ibid. (26) Ibid., p.246. (27) Ibid., p.209. (28) O'Malley, op. cit., p.123.

Marx goes on to report the Paris Commune's constitutional plans for the whole of France as follows: ... the commune was to be the political form of even the smallest country hamlet ... The rural communes of every district were to administer their common affairs by an assembly of delegates in the central town, and these district assemblies were again to send deputies to the national delegation in Paris, each delegate to be at any time revocable and bound by the *mandat impératif* (formal instructions) of his constituents. The few but important functions which still would remain for the central government were to be discharged by Communal, and therefore strictly responsible agents. The unity of the nation was not to be broken, but, on the contrary, to be organized by *the Communal constitution* ...

While asserting the democratic character of the Commune, Marx did not claim that it had achieved a change in the mode of production. Referring to the actual measures that it put into effect, he said that "there is nothing socialist in them except their tendency".² It did "intend to abolish class property ... to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of production ... into mere instruments of free and associated labour".³ It did hope for the achievement of "communism ..., united cooperative societies ... to regulate national production upon a common plan".⁴ Presumably, for these reasons, Marx occasionally called the Commune a "communal republic"⁵ or a "social republic".⁶ For its international character⁷ and perhaps for its moral superiority, he called it "the Universal Republic".⁸ Therefore, for Marx, the Commune is "the political form of social emancipation".⁹ While it could "not do away with class struggles, through which the working classes strive to the abolition of all classes",¹⁰ the "Commune is ... the organized means of action".¹¹ It "affords the *rational* medium in which that class struggle can run through its different phases in the most *rational* and humane way".¹² Marx repeats this claim and again undermines his crudely deterministic interpreters by saying that, "The working class know that they have to pass through different phases of class struggle".¹³ They know that their "*spontaneous* action" in "the Communal form of *political* organization"¹⁴ can make "great strides" in "the progressive work of time" toward "the superseding of the economical conditions of the slavery of labour", toward "a new organization of production".¹⁵

Therefore, with the help of "The Civil War in France", we have some idea of Marx's constitution for any future communist society: a democratic decision-taking system, with full legislative, executive and judicial powers held by a maximally devolved hierarchy of delegate assemblies. This "Communal constitution"¹⁶ may not at first appear to be compatible with, let alone, as claimed here, to entail 'democratic monarchy' as its own prescriptive ideal. Before defending this view, however, the problem posed by two additional features of Marx's theory must be resolved.

The first might be supposed to arise from the anticipation that in communist society, "the state withers away", as Engels put it.¹⁷ If "in true democracy the political state disappears",¹⁸ as Marx put it 20 years earlier, then perhaps there is no need for a constitution. If so, the question of Marx's possible endorsement of the model constitution with its "hierarchical investiture"¹⁹ need not arise. However, this problem only occurs because of the misunderstanding of what Marx means by "the state". It is clear that this future society will indeed need a constitution for its 'state' in my sense of the term: 'the sovereign organization of a society'. The problem is complicated somewhat by a second feature which was explicitly added to his suggestions for communist society in 1875 when Marx drew the distinction between "the first phase of communist society" and "a more advanced phase",²⁰ the first having a "workers' state" and the second having no "state" at all. Marx also saw the *first phase* as quickly making the communistic mode of production dominant, at least in one country. However, it would not as yet have grown sufficiently beyond the bourgeois attitudes and these would require it to organize work on the principle of each worker receiving only in proportion to his or her labour. By contrast, in a *more advanced phase*, in addition to

(1) Ibid., p.210. (2) Ibid., p.262. (3) Ibid., p.213. (4) Ibid., p.213. (5) Ibid., p.255.

(6) Ibid., p.259. (7) Ibid., pp.216 & 239. (8) Ibid., p.239. (9) Ibid., p.252. (10) Ibid., p.253.

(11) Ibid., p.253. (12) Ibid., p.253. (13) Ibid., p.253. (14) Ibid., p.254. (15) Ibid., p.253.

(16) Ibid., p.210.

(17) F. Engels, *Anti-Duhring* (1878), Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1969 (1st printing 1947) p.333; translated more literally as "goes to sleep of itself ... dies off" (schläft von selbst ein ... stirbt ab.)

(18) "Critique of 'Hegel's Philosophy of Right'", op. cit., p.31.

(19) "Civil War", op. cit., p.211.

(20) Critique of the Gotha Programme", *The First International*, op. cit., p.347.

having developed on a world wide scale, anti-communistic attitudes would have had to diminish and productive capacity expand sufficiently to allow a much different principle to apply: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!"¹

The "bourgeois state" and "the worker's state" are only special cases of the "state" as 'the agent of class rule', i.e. of "the state" or "political power" understood as "the organized power of one class for subordinating (Unterdrückung) another".² Accordingly, it is Marx's view that the *bourgeois* state should be transformed into the worker's state, into the first phase of communist society. In turn, the worker's state should eventually wither, "vanish",³ "die off",⁴ or be "superseded"⁵ if a more advanced communist society is to be attained. In this latest society, "the public power (die öffentliche Gewalt) will lose (verliert) its political character".⁶ Also, although Marx does not say so explicitly, we could quite plausibly suggest that he had it in mind for this "communal constitution" for France to be extended to the whole world, i.e. the advanced communist society. If so, the national assemblies would send delegates to a world assembly.⁷ Of such a phase, it could be truly said that it had allowed the "re-absorption of the state power by society"⁸ that the,

... few but important functions which still would remain for a central [world] government were to be discharged by Communal, and therefore strictly responsible agents unity to become a reality by the destruction of the state power ... the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power ... to be amputated.⁹

Again, this world "public power" operating according to a "communal constitution", could be seen as just another formulation of the organized "anarchy" which Marx claimed to be the appropriate goal for all socialists:

To all socialists anarchy means this: the aim of the proletarian movement - that is the abolition of social classes - once achieved, the power of the state, which now serves only to keep the vast majority of producers under the yoke of a small minority of exploiters, will vanish, and the functions of government become purely administrative.¹⁰

I construe "purely administrative" only to mean that the government within the sovereign organization of society would cease to be the agent of class subordination.

Now that the two phased character of Marx's future society has been addressed, we can turn to the contentious claim that 'democratic monarchy' should be seen as the best model constitution for both phases, for the dictatorship of the proletariat and for classless society. This reconstruction of Marx's "Communal constitution" includes the plan that the 'elected chamber' would be at the head of the maximally devolved, yet hierarchically arranged, delegate assemblies of the world. Accordingly, this chamber of the world would proportionately represent all the national, city or regional "communes", as well as all of the other voluntary 'associations', according to the electoral system of associational proportional representation (A.P.R.) outlined in *Chapter One*. Such a communal assembly would seem fully to meet Marx's requirements.

Still, on the face of it, the hereditary features of democratic monarchy would seem to conflict with almost everything Marx says both specifically in regard to the Prussian, French and British monarchies, and about monarchy in general. He refers, for example, to Hegel's constitutional

(1) Ibid.

(2) "Manifesto", op. cit., p.87.

(3) "The Alleged Splits in the International", *The First International*, op. cit., p.314.

(4) Engels, op. cit.

(5) *hebt ... auf*, "Manifesto", op. cit., p.87.

(6) Ibid.

(7) "The Commune was ... the truly national government" and yet "emphatically international", "The Civil War", op. cit., p.216, cf. p.239.

(8) Ibid., p.250.

(9) Ibid., p.210.

(10) "The Alleged Splits", *The First International*, op. cit., p.313.

monarchy as an "unhappy hybrid".¹ Nevertheless, these attacks on monarchy need not be read as a threat to the essence of monarchy. Instead, they may be seen merely as understandable responses to the dominantly anti-democratic character of the monarchies of the Europe he was analysing, and to Hegel's clearly anti-democratic phrases. Thus, it is argued that Marx's energetic rejections of absolute, feudal and bourgeois monarchy, as well as of what he takes to be Hegel's monarchy, do not weaken the case for democratic monarchy.² The need to defend the model from his particular attacks is obviated by the fact that it diverges from these monarchies just at those points which are vulnerable. It is a thoroughly democratic organization of popular sovereignty while they were not. Moreover, the distinctive ability of an hereditary head of state to provide both the best symbol of a society's unity and a unique institutional guarantee against the total breakdown of the rule of reason enables the model to accept one more of Marx's scathing jibes against Hegel as a compliment to itself. Marx wrote that hereditary institutions are based on "zoology".³ Indeed, the monarch dramatically sounds the alarm that "zoology" always rules when 'rational humanity' fails. The model provides the best institutional guarantee for the achievement, maintenance or restoration of rational living even in 'the human zoo'. For the same reasons, Marx would have logically to praise rather than ridicule this sort of monarchy as "the last charm against anarchy".⁴

- (1) "Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right', op. cit., p.83. Taken out of context, some of Marx's phrases might, however, seem to mark his acceptance of monarchy as desirable, e.g. "a ... developed idea of democracy. Democracy is the truth of monarchy, monarchy is not the truth of democracy the *monarchical moment* is no contradiction within democracy" (Ibid., p.29). Presumably, Marx did not intend "monarchical moment" to mean 'an hereditary head of state' here but only the abstractly perceivable and complex 'unity' which "a ... developed idea of democracy" must have. The fact that these phrases are embedded within an unrelenting attack upon monarchy would seem to counsel this interpretation. However, even if these words probably do not constitute an obscure confirmation of the model, they may remind us of the argument that an hereditary head of state can best both symbolize and help guarantee the *complex unity* which a real democracy must achieve and repeatedly renew. Again, if taken out of context, the following passages suggesting that communism might emerge peacefully within the monarchies of Britain and Holland, might imply that he could agree with the model constitution: "The workers will have to seize political power one day in order to construct the new organization of labour; they will have to overthrow the old politics which bolster up the old institutions We know that heed must be paid to the institutions, customs and traditions of the various countries, and we do not deny that there are countries, such as America and England, and if I was familiar with its institutions, I might include Holland, where *the workers may attain their goal by peaceful means*. That being the case, we must recognize that in most continental countries the lever of the revolution will have to be force; a resort to force will be necessary one day in order to set up the rule of labour" ("Speech on the Hague Congress" (1872) *The First International*, op. cit., p.324.). Marx does not explicitly say that it is the democratic institutions of these three countries which might make a peaceful road to communism possible, but this implication, especially in the case of England, is strongly suggested by Marx words twenty years earlier in 1852 when he was discussing "universal suffrage", one of the Chartist's six points: "the carrying of universal suffrage in England would ... be a far more socialist measure than anything which has been honoured with that name on the continent. Its inevitable result, here [England], is the political supremacy of the working class" ("The Chartists", *Surveys from Exile*, op. cit., p.264.). Similarly, in the July of 1871, Marx is reported to have said in an interview, "In England ... the way to show political power lies open to the working class. Insurrection would be madness where peaceful agitation would more simply and surely do the work" ("The Curtain Raised", *The First International*, op. cit., p.395.). Later, Lenin recalled the relevant passages of Marx and Engels which this chapter has already quoted. He argued not only that "democracy" (V. I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, p.31) would also "wither away" with the "proletarian state", but that Marx's assertion of the need "to smash the bureaucratic military machine" (ibid., p.64) had also made it clear that violence would be necessary in all modern states since they had developed the sort of centralized state apparatuses which had characterized mid-nineteenth century France. While this Leninist gloss on Marx is plausible, Marx's own words are ambiguous enough to allow us to see him as continuing to accept that a peaceful path might be possible even in such states as long as they also contained strong democratic assemblies which, because they represented civil society, might be able to prevent the "bureaucratic-military machine" from acquiring such a great and dangerous independence. Having suggested that the above passage *might* indicate Marx's own willingness to accept a very limited monarchy for his communist societies, I must again emphasize that nowhere does he make this explicit, and the tone of almost everything he wrote would much more easily lead us to suppose the opposite. Therefore, perhaps the most that can be said is that his words never explicitly exclude 'democratic monarchy'.
- (2) See *Chapter Twelve*.
- (3) "Critique of 'Hegel's Philosophy of Right'", op.cit., p.106.
- (4) "The Eighteenth Brumaire", op.cit., p.218.

These justifications remind us of the positive reasons why a follower of Marx should logically embrace democratic monarchy as his or her own model. A future communist society, like all societies will have to face the previously discussed possibility that 'working majorities' may evaporate or fail to materialize in the first place. Also, in the light of socialism's egalitarianism, it must be recalled that the model would allow a monarchy within a communist society to be significantly different, both in relative scale and in style, from most past and existing monarchies. Great reductions in the monarch's private wealth and in the size of the civil list would probably be seen as appropriate. 'Communist monarchy' certainly need not be like the mid-nineteenth century British monarchy about which Marx commented: "Royalty, with its 'barbarous splendours' its court, its civil list and its flunkies ...".¹

Marx's own implicit acceptance of the possible failure of 'working majorities' can be inferred both from what he does and does not say. For example, he does not deny that,

- 1) even in a classless society, *conflicts* may still arise from non-class differences, e.g. age, personal, psychological, pathological, opinion;
- 2) in order to minimize the chances that communist society will fall absent mindedly or be pushed unwittingly into becoming another class society, it is necessary for each new generation to be educated about the historical origins of advanced communist society, about the residual dangers which all societies must continue to face and about the reasons for seeing communism as the best imagined for humankind.

The *first* assumption is never voiced by Marx but it would save him from the charge of utopianism. It is also a possible implication of his praise of the Paris Commune for making delegates and officials both "responsible and revokable". Similarly, the following two implicit endorsements of the parliamentary form would seem to rest on the same assumption:

- a) his criticism of "the National Assembly" of the Second French Republic, twenty years earlier, "when it lost control of the ministerial portfolios".²
- b) his criticism of the same republic's "two heads at the top".³

Parliamentary control of the "portfolios" and the possession of a single "head" would not be necessary for an advanced communist society unless he thought disagreements and conflicts were thought to be possible.

The second assumption concerning the necessity of education would not seem to be at all controversial. Thus, we can turn immediately to the task of explaining how the continued need for the appropriate education of each new generation will tend to be directly and indirectly facilitated by the institutions of democratic monarchy better than by any other known constitution. It is contended here that as an institution, an hereditary head of state is an essential part of the communal constitution which would encourage better than any other the development in each new generation of a conscious appreciation of the real foundations, the inherent dangers, and the ethical superiority of the classless society in which it lives. First, the apparent contradiction in public life of having, on the one hand, a hereditary head and, on the other hand, a reflective and sophisticated working majority and its government which confine the crown to ceremonial functions provides an empirically real anomaly. This seeming contradiction could spur developing minds to question, and, perhaps by something like a Socratic dialogue, eventually to appreciate its dialectical explanation. It would seem to be the best paradox to stimulate the study and thought which has the prospect of finding a philosophically correct understanding of the complex foundations upon which enduring public life in a classless society could rest. It displays a patterned paradox which would help to lead the pre-rational mind to a rational conception of public life. Nature and human history provide the foundations for all societies and classless society would be no exception. The special educational advantage which having a communal monarchy would offer to a communist society is that such a constitution would be a relatively visible miniature of the complex natural and historical realities which had produced this constitution and society. By study and thought, the monarch's attainment of office by birth could be seen by a Marxist to recall the quite natural self-assertiveness which some humans were led to display over others in social formations prior to advanced communism. Because these societies were dominated by the "primitive communistic",⁴

(1) "The Chartists", op. cit., p.262.

(2) "The Eighteenth Brumaire", op. cit., p.160.

(3) Ibid., p.186.

(4) *The German Ideology*, op. cit., p.33; "Manifesto", op. cit. p.65 & p.67n.13 (Engels); *Grundrisse*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, p.107.

"ancient"¹ slave, "asiatic",² "feudal",³ or "bourgeois"⁴ modes of production, this required natural self-assertiveness to become the paternalistic, arbitrary, or egoistic rule of some over others. Communal monarchy would thus preeminently record in its own institutions the great extent to which this self-assertiveness had been tamed in classless society through a long historical process to become the rational *self*-determination of the whole species.

To the extent that the study and thought of each generation thus comes to appreciate its society's institutions as the forms by which the species has come to maximize the quality and quantity of rational living, it would see the ethical superiority of communist society over all previous social formations. This should help each person to develop the conscious resolve to sustain classless society against any residual or recurring threats. One of these was posed above: the possible loss of a voluntary working majority in the communal assembly. Such a loss, especially if prolonged, would both mark and encourage a degree of social disintegration which could lead to the reassertion of class society. If the communal constitution were also monarchical in the sense of the model, this loss would require the monarch, in the context of the 'state prerogative council', to appoint the prime minister at his or her own unconfined discretion. Therefore, in democratic monarchy, this loss is dramatically signalled by the public activity of its institutions. The monarch's caretaking role both marks and helps to limit the damage which might otherwise follow a collapse of a working majority and the relative loss of collective rationality which such a contingency embodies. The monarch's appointment of a prime minister in such circumstances would both broadcast the danger and give a people and its communal assembly some time to recreate a working majority before it is too late. It would both highlight the problem and give some additional time for a rational solution to be found. The monarch's *unconfined* appointment of a prime minister helps a people and its representatives consciously and constructively to respond to the natural and historical truth that unless they assert themselves rationally through majority self-rule, they will be ruled by some person's or by some minority's paternalistic, arbitrary or egoistic self-assertion. The power vacuum will be filled one way or another. Democracy is the 'carrot'; monarchy is the symbol of the 'stick'. Thus, if Marx is interpreted to have both assumed that,

- 1) majorities may not always be secured even in the advanced communist society, and that
- 2) each new generation in such a society must be educated about the foundations, dangers and superiority of classless society,

then a communal or democratic monarchy should also be his model constitution.

With regard to Hegel's part of the synthesis mention earlier, later chapters will also examine those passages, which were probably not available to Marx. Some of these will be seen perhaps to have a democratic implication. The most striking example is offered by the editor's addition to paragraph 290⁵ where he says that "it is of the highest importance" that "the multitude ... become organized for only so is it ... powerful".⁶ In spite of a few such hints, it is true that Hegel's words more usually discourage a democratic interpretation, even when they are ambiguous or suffer from what Marx calls Hegel's "stylistic peculiarity".⁷ Therefore, Hegel's unadulterated words clearly make a thoroughly democratic construction impossible. A reconstruction is necessary. Thus, the model constitution could be said to arise, for example, from my agreement with Marx's criticism of Hegel's insistence that the monarch should have the right to appoint his ministers at his own "unconfined discretion".⁸ As we have seen, democratic or communal monarchy would require the leader of the majority party in the elected chamber automatically to be appointed as prime minister. The second clearly anti-democratic paragraph is not discussed by Marx. It places the conduct of foreign affairs "directly and solely"⁹ in the hands of the monarch instead of in those of the foreign minister and cabinet with the support of the working majority.¹⁰

- (1) The German Ideology, op. cit., p.33; "Manifesto" op. cit., 85; Preface to "A Contribution", op. cit. p.426; *Grundrisse*, ibid. pp.105-7.
- (2) Preface to "A Contribution", ibid., p.426; *Grundrisse*, ibid., p.106.
- (3) "Manifesto", op. cit., p.68; Preface to "A Contribution", ibid., p.426; *Grundrisse*, ibid., pp.106 & 107.
- (4) "Manifesto", op. cit., e.g. pp.71 & 83.
- (5) *Rechts*, PP290Z.
- (6) See *Chapter Twelve*.
- (7) "Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'", op. cit., p.13.
- (8) *Rechts*, PP283.
- (9) Ibid., PP329.
- (10) See *Chapter Twelve*.

Let us conclude with the assertion which will be elaborated more fully in *Chapter Ten*: the model is not only the most rational constitution, it offers an ideologically neutral organization of society. Accordingly, it allows the maintenance of capitalism or the establishment of communism. It allows either to be lost or restored depending on the current will of the people.

This chapter has sought to show why a follower of Marx should logically endorse democratic monarchy as his or her own general prescriptive guide. Future chapters will consider why followers of Hegel should come to the same conclusion. The next chapter, however, both lays the methodological foundations which will guide these later chapters and which have implicitly provided the grounds upon which this and all previous chapters have rested.



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C h a p t e r S i x :
M E T H O D O L O G Y A N D
' P H I L O S O P H I C A L N E C E S S I T Y '

The first five chapters have sought both to introduce democratic monarchy and to test it against various republican arguments. Before I continue to assess it with regard to Hegel's philosophy in the last six chapters, however, this chapter will stand back from the specific constitutional arguments for a moment in order to pursue a higher level methodological question, 'How is it philosophically possible to resolve conflicts between competing theories of whatever sort?' The answer to this question will have a much wider import than the precise concerns of this book yet it will involve, by implication, the outlining of the general method by which democratic monarchy is shown to be the best model constitution. Thus, this method will be seen to order the investigations contained in the remaining chapters just as it has been the implicit guide for the arguments in the earlier chapters.

If the method proves to be valid for the examination of *all* competing theories, even those in conflict with each other about questions of method, this is partly made possible by its being 'reflexive' in the sense of being 'self-critical'. It includes the philosophical demand that the best methodological framework must contain a self-critical perspective. This framework can be described with regard to its aim which is to search for a 'philosophical necessary' theory. Such a theory is an alternative expression for 'truth' and it will be defined shortly. However, it will be helpful to recall *Chapter Three's* suggestion that our methodology has been largely suggested by Plato's "dialectic". Like Plato, I expect that conflicts between theories will be best resolved and truth found in the context of an extended Socratic dialogue. For this reason, I occasionally want to write in the first person plural. This is one way for me to register my understanding both of my methodology and of my constitutional arguments as being distillations of many real and imaginary discussions with others (with friends, colleagues, students, and with a number of political and philosophical works). It also serves to suggest the hope that this book may stimulate continuations of Plato's *intersubjective* process.¹ Previous chapters have repeatedly deployed the terms 'rational', 'reason' and 'rationality' in these Platonic ways. This chapter's specification of our methodology provides a more complete definition of these terms. It makes clear how the central claim, that democratic monarchy is the most rational constitution, amounts to the contention that its institutions would best foster the resolution of conflicts by deliberations which approximate to investigations in search of a philosophically necessary theory.

The methodological framework argued for here is such that it will not be easily rejected, whether one has positivist, empiricist, materialist, rationalist or idealist leanings. This is so because it is rooted in each of these approaches. At least, it may provide an item on the agenda for any philosophical search for the best methodology. Again, this approach requires the scrutiny of competing theories in search of a 'philosophically necessary' theory. Such a theory would have to be seen in our dialogue as *comprehensive* and to have flawlessly passed all known tests: *experiential, logical, and comparative*.

(1) Kant says that the "touchstone whereby we decide whether our holding a thing to be true is conviction or mere persuasion is ... external, namely, the possibility of communicating it and finding it to be valid for all human reason". *The Critique of Pure Reason*, op. cit., A820, B848.

Comprehensiveness

The demand that a philosophically necessary theory be *comprehensive* requires that it be concerned with *all* the areas of sensuous and non-sensuous experience¹ of which we are aware to date. This is to say that it must address itself to all the empirical evidence of the world coming to us through our five senses as well as to every other awareness which may not be entirely reducible to such sensuous experience. A comprehensive theory would thus have to give an account, for example, of matter, light, plants, and historical events, as well as, of our emotions, dreams, reasoning processes and the abstract categories² of thought itself. Such demands make it clear that a comprehensive theory would have to integrate within itself not only a political theory but, for example, theories of nature (the physical sciences), of psychology, of society and of the whole of human history. This is to say that a political theory which could claim philosophical necessity would have to show how it is an integral part of a comprehensive theory. Of course, it must be admitted that most if not all known political theories fall far short of this requirement but this chapter is only concerned to outline the methodological conditions of our attaining what seems to be the highest possible aim of human enquiry: philosophical necessity. This is not to say that it has ever been achieved or that it can be easily secured by us.

Not Absolute Necessity

Before going on to discuss the three remaining conditions for philosophical necessity (experimental, logical and comparative tests), it should also be made clear that even if we were ever to judge a theory to be philosophically necessary, we could *never* claim it to be 'absolute'. This is the case in spite of the other grand-sounding adjectives which have been used to describe it: 'all', 'comprehensive' and 'necessary'. Philosophical necessity is *not* 'absolute necessity'. Absolute necessity is humanly unachievable because it would give an account of all experience - past, present *and future*, i.e. an account which would leave us *no doubts* as to its truth. Philosophically speaking, while we must by definition eliminate all our *specific* doubts about a theory before we could authorize its being called philosophically necessary, we could not remove all our *vague* doubts. For example, the vague doubt seems irremovable that tomorrow *may* bring a new perspective which *may* require us to modify or reject the theory which we currently judge to be philosophically necessary. The difference between specific and vague doubts is that in a *specific* doubt we have a definite test or enquiry in mind which we have not yet conducted. Depending on the results, we see *exactly* how it may force us to reject or modify the theory under review. For the unavoidable, residual *vague* doubts we would have no such precise anticipation. Instead, they arise from our recognition that we have neither read all that has been written nor have we had dialogues with all living philosophers. Similarly, we are aware that new readings of works previously read may produce significantly new perspectives. Such doubts are said to be *vague* because with them we as yet have no specific reason to think that this or that new experiment, this or that new book, this or that re-reading, or this or that new discussion will provide us with a crucial test of the theory in question. We recognize that they *may* do, but we have no *specific anticipation* of how. As soon as we have such an anticipation, the theory under discussion cannot claim the title of philosophical necessity until it survives the new specific test. Just before this test, the theory could be called 'the best', or 'the unrefuted', but not the 'philosophically necessary' theory. We would have had to eliminate *all our* specific doubts about a theory before we could judge it to be philosophically necessary, i.e. all the specific doubts which any participant in our intersubjective search is able to sustain. If the dialogue is able to remove all such doubts for a time, for that time, the theory under review would appropriately be granted the status of philosophical necessity, never absolute necessity. This holds even if we recognize the remote

- (1) I am using "experience" (Erfahrung) differently from Kant. For him, it is equivalent to "empirical knowledge" which issues from the arranging of "appearances" (Erscheinungen) and "sensations" (Empfindungen) under the "Categories" (Kategorie) of the "understanding" (Verstand) and its "laws" (Gesetzen). Instead, I use 'experience' as a blanket term also to include every other possible item of consciousness, e.g. also what Kant calls "thought-entities (Gedankwesen, Gedankenwesen), "imagination" (Einbildung), "thinking" (Denken), "representations" (Vorstellungen), and "ideas" (Ideen). While Kant's use refers to the result of a mediating process, my use also includes those seemingly isolated or only vaguely related items which may only be immediately present in our consciousness at any given time. These items, so to speak, are awaiting mediation, i.e., awaiting analysis and synthesis into the consciously worked out, articulate and unified whole which is a 'theory'.
- (2) Also in contrast to Kant's "categories" which only refer to those prime and pure "concepts" (Begriff) under which "appearances" are to be organised. I use it as an equivalent for the many concepts and "conceptions" which together compose Hegel's philosophical system.

possibility that a theory which one day attained this status might year after year maintain this position. As time passed, people would tend to view it with more and more confidence and it would justly retain this status perpetually if it happened to *coincide* with the humanly *unachievable* absolute theory mentioned above. This is to say that while we might some day formulate a theory which *is* absolute, we could never *know* that we had done so. This is to say that, with one exception, a philosophically necessary theory could coincide with the absolute theory. If this happened, we could not know that it had happened. The unavoidable exception would be our lack of the knowledge that we possessed the absolute theory. The inescapable presents of the vague doubts make it impossible for the absolute and the philosophically necessary to coincide in this respect. We could *never* exclude the sort of vague doubts discussed above.¹

Another example of such irremovable doubts would seem to arise from the imaginable possibility that the world of our experience may contain an infinite number of *irreducible* potential experiences. Here, 'irreducible' means 'not capable of being seen as just another instance of a type of experience already noted by us'. If the world is composed of such an infinity (and we could never know with certainty one way or the other), we could be perpetually prevented from ever formulating a theory which we considered to be 'comprehensive', let alone 'philosophically necessary'. This prevention could be effected by our continually being exposed to at least one new seemingly irreducible experience before we had time to integrate the previous one into our currently leading theory. We must also emphasize the fact that it would seem that we could never exclude the possibility of this infinity even if we had achieved a theory which seemed to be philosophically necessary. We could not exclude it because our securing of such a theory may have been possible only because of our experience of but a segment of this infinity.² The next chapter argues that this denial of *absolute* necessity leads us to interpret Hegel's "conception of Reason" just as one of his names for his system. This system is read to aspire to the status of *philosophical* not *absolute* necessity. This is the case in spite of the fact that Hegel frequently

- (1) These claims for 'philosophical necessity', like Hegel's many suggestions that we as "spirit" may come to know the "Infinite" (e.g. *Enz. I, PP60Z*) and see *Chapter Seven*), might easily be seen as conflicting with Kant's many assertions that we can never "know" the "thing in itself" (*die Sache an sich selbst*) or "noumenon". However, to the reader who is so disposed, this conflict may not necessarily be interpreted to be present in Kant's words. For example, we might read Kant's denial of the knowability of noumenon as just another way of referring to the unavoidable 'vague doubts' discussed here. This interpretation would be facilitated first by seeing noumenon as just another name for "the ground of the order of the world" (op. cit., *Critique of Pure Reason* A696, B724). Thus, it seems that the search for 'philosophical necessity' would require such a concept as the 'absolute theory' or "the thing in itself" (called "Reason" in *Chapter Seven*) in order to think about and to interpret the "world of appearance" (A802, B830). The same concept seems to be a condition for reconciling this world with the "experience" of "practical freedom" (A802, B830 and A803, B831). In Kant's idiom, noumenon or "the ground of the order of the world" is a necessary "idea" which is not "experienced" or "known" but "thought". As a necessary thought, therefore, I see that it would have to have a defined place within a philosophically necessary theory, just as does the concept of an 'absolute theory'. Kant writes, and I agree, that "noumenon" is a condition for interpreting, rather than itself being, "an object of our sensible intuition" (B307). Accordingly, he says that he accepts the so-called "negative" (rather than the "positive") meaning of noumenon for which "it is still an open question whether the notion of noumenon be not a mere form of concept, and whether an object whatsoever is left" (A253). If noumenon or the thing-in-itself were thus taken to the "ground of the order" in this "negative" sense, Kant's position might also be seen as compatible with Hegel's claims in spite of Kant's repeated phrases which suggest the contrary. We might consider, as well, whether our inability to determine with complete certainty whether a given philosophically necessary theory wholly coincides with the 'absolute theory' might not be an instance of what Kant calls a "determinate knowledge of the ignorance which for us is unavoidable" (A767, B795).
- (2) Kant seems to give expression to similar 'vague doubts' when he says, for example, that the "regulative idea" of God as "deistic" (*ibid.*, A675, B703) is "*postulated only problematically ... in order that we may view all connections of the things of the world of sense as if they had their ground in such a being*" (A681, B709). He says that this being or this "something we cannot think otherwise than on the *analogy* of a real substance" (A675, B703), "we must think" it in "the pursuit of that complete systematic unity in our knowledge to which reason at least sets no limits". As such it is thought to be the ground of this unity of appearances but, as he says of the grounds of the soul, "simplicity and other properties of substance are intended to be only a schema ... not the actual ground of the soul [for] these may rest on altogether different grounds, of which we know nothing" (A683, B711). Thus Kant refers to such "regulative ideas" as "devices" (A676, B704) or as "heuristic fictions" (A771, B799) which must be assumed not in the "absolute" but in the "relative sense" (A676, B704).

refers to this conception as the crowning achievement of "absolute spirit" (Geist). This is read as equal to saying that it appears to be 'comprehensive', 'complete', 'reflexive' or 'in-and-for-itself'.¹

More than Scientific Necessity

Also, before turning to consider the experiential, logical and comparative tests for philosophical necessity, it will be convenient at this juncture to distinguish 'scientific' from 'philosophical' necessity. In order to attain 'scientific necessity', a theory need not intend to be comprehensive but need only relate to a segment of our experiences. Nevertheless, such a theory must flawlessly pass all the experiential tests for that segment as well as the relevant logical and comparative tests discussed more fully below. This distinction between 'philosophy' and 'science' follows one of Hegel's uses which has the ancient meaning (e.g. Aristotle's) referring to any systematic treatment of an area of experience, e.g. mathematics and ethics as well as physics. This use contrasts with the more modern empiricist and positivist meanings which prefer to reserve the term for those bodies of knowledge which can be decisively tested by our five senses. 'Science' can also refer to non-sensuous experiences as it does in Hegel's "science of logic". If the area of experience to be studied by a 'science' is defined philosophically, then a relevant theory in this field which became seen as scientifically necessary might also secure the status of philosophical necessity. This is because to define a science 'philosophically' is explicitly to place it within a comprehensive theory. On the other hand, if the area of the science in question is not defined philosophically but only tacitly or arbitrarily, then theories concerning it could attain no higher status than 'scientific necessity'.

A Comprehensive Theory Must Both Be Descriptive and Evaluative

Within our non-sensuous experience there seems to be only two sorts of motives for theorizing. We want to know both *what is* the case and *what ought* to be the case. We want a philosophically necessary theory which both *describes* and *evaluates*. Since both are concerns within our non-sensuous experience, both must be answered by a theory which claims to be comprehensive. To use Hegel's terms, both must be seen as "moments" of one "totality". While the questions of *is* and *ought* are distinguishable, they are not separable. Each logically depends upon the other. Even the physicist who simply enjoys the attempt to understand the laws of motion is at least implicitly affirming the human *value* of understanding 'the is' of the world. This example serves also to emphasize that here, the term 'descriptive theory' is being used in a wider than usual sense. It includes *abstract* descriptions like those expounded through casual laws and Weberian "pure types" as well as the simple empirically concrete reports of past or present events and entities. Thus, the following interrelated list of empirical science concerns are also called 'descriptive': casual, explanatory, predictive and probabilistic theories. In contrast, the term 'evaluative' refers to all arguments concerned to specify *what ought* to be the case in the world. It includes all those theories which are more commonly called moral, ethical, normative or prescriptive. It will be argued that, in some ways, the *evaluative* as well as the *descriptive* aspects of a theory are subject to the tests of experience, as well as to the tests of comprehensiveness, logic, and comparison.

A Comprehensive Theory Must be Reflexive

A truly comprehensive theory would have to be 'reflexive'. It must be 'self-critical' in the sense of including within itself a scrutiny of its own foundations: it would have to give an account of its own *history* and conceptual generation. It would have to include its own *epistemology* (i.e. a theory about the appropriate criteria for assessing the validity of competing methods for the discovery of knowledge.² Plato's theory in *The Republic* was not completely *reflexive* because he admittedly relied on similes and myths when such questions were raised, e.g. the simile of the cave. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is a challenging example of this reflexive, philosophical pursuit and Hegel frequently addressed himself to these reflexive questions in his system and in his history of philosophy. Marx's brief discussions of the relations between material

- (1) This meaning would appropriately not exclude the 'vague' doubts which must always remain and which ceaselessly invite us to discover new questions, arguments and tests.
- (2) 'Knowledge' here is not restricted to Kant's use which usually refers only to a valid account of "appearances". My use designates valid accounts of any area of consciousness, including moral principles. Kant says rather that such principles are "indispensably necessary" (A328, B385) in relation to human activity while I say that they are 'philosophically necessary'. I take this only to be difference of words.

social history, ideologies, and science also provide outline answers to these questions.¹

Experiential Tests

It will be more convenient, first, to discuss the tests of experience which a theory would have to pass before it could achieve the status of 'scientific necessity'. The extra demands made by philosophical necessity will be added later. The tests of experience require that a theory be *compatible* with the relevant sensuous (i.e. empirical) or non-sensuous elements about which we are aware. 'Compatibility' requires a descriptive theory 1) accurately to *report* the concrete area of experience concerned and 2) to present a fully adequate abstract description of this area. An *abstract* description uses theorized concepts, categories and definitions. It will be seen as *adequate* if these seem to capture the essence of the relevant area. If so, the theory *explains* how each item is an example of the *logical linkage* discussed in the next section. For the empirical sciences, descriptions are correctly argued by Popper and others to be abstractly adequate if they constitute causal theories which are also predictive. This makes them empirically testable. In this case, compatibility requires the predictions to square with the events predicted. If a predicted event does not occur, the theory is said to be "falsified",² i.e. demonstrated to be somewhat mistaken. The non-sensuous descriptions of others can be tested by our own introspective experiences. We can report them to each other and we can discuss them. An example of such a description has already been provided by the earlier assertion that, philosophically, we want both to describe and to evaluate. Each of us can check this and any other non-sensuous description both by introspection and by discussion.

The experiential testing of evaluative theories again requires compatibility. The evaluative theory must be *relevant* to the area of experience concerned, i.e. it must be able to specify the extent to which each factor within that area is or is not as it *ought to be*. If the knower of both 'the is' and 'the ought' of a given situation consequently believes that he or she has the power to change some factors in the direction of how they *should be*, then he or she is logically required by his or her evaluative theory to act accordingly. Such a *knower* ought logically to be such an *actor*. An evaluative theory in such circumstances is also a *prescriptive* theory. A given evaluative or prescriptive theory may prove to be inadequate when measured against this experiential test because it does not offer evaluations (or prescriptions) on each factor within a situation in question. The theory's formulation may be too vague or it may have been originally framed for a different age and so its implications for some contemporary question may not be obvious. For example, because Plato's definition of justice was formulated in relation to the ancient Greek world, the evaluative implications of this definition for the question of proportional representation in modern Britain are by no means obvious. Until someone has devoted the time and

- (1) There are certain methodological and political similarities between the views here and those of Jürgen Habermas. His "critique" or "critical sociology" also includes an "intersubjective structure" *Theory and Practice*, Heinemann, London 1974, p.28) and a reflexive element (pp.3, 24, 37, 37, 79, 153, 211, 254 and 276). He also seeks "a comprehensive concept of rationality that does not hesitate to reflect on its own interrelationship with the historical stage of development attained by the knowing subjects ... (p.280). While he does not explicitly discuss specific constitutional arrangements, my democratic monarchy's capacity to help maximize rationality would seem to complement many of his phrases, e.g. "Critique... only finds its own rationality in its partisanship for rationality" (p.276); "moving forward in the direction of emancipation", "enlightened communication to be institutionalized in the political sphere", "dissolution of all substantial forms of domination", "noncompulsive consensus" (p.278); "social intercourse which ultimately is freed from the compulsion and domination of nature - and thereby achieves the political autonomy of adult maturity" (p.261); "the institutional preconditions for practical discourse among the general public" (p.3); a constitution which would both allow for "a decentralized and uninhibited discursive formation of the public will" (p.4), and a liberation from "systematically distorted communication ... by the process of critique" (p.9) and which would provide "an organized praxis adequate for the requirements of enlightenment on a mass scale" (p.16) which in turn, would require "the effective equality of opportunities" (p.23). Of course, I also agree with him that "a political struggle can only be legitimately conducted under the precondition that all decisions of consequence will depend on the practical discourse of the participants ..." (p.34). Habermas also reminds us of *Chapter One's* acceptance of the uncertainties attached to any political action when he writes that "No theory and no enlightenment can relieve us of the risk of taking a partisan position and of the unintended consequences involved in this" (p.36). Similarly, we are reminded of the suggestion that the empirical establishment of a democratic monarchy would provide the conditions for a significant 'experiment' when he observes that "Attempts at emancipation ... are also tests; they test the limits within which human nature can be changed and above all, the limits of the historically variable structure of motivation, limits about which we possess no theoretical knowledge ..." (p.37).
- (2) Karl R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, p.36.

imagination required to elaborate Plato's political theory into prescriptions for 20th Century conditions, his prescriptions will continue to seem irrelevant. To the extent that it is irrelevant, it will have failed this test of experience. However, because there would seem to be nothing to prevent someone from working up each vague or outdated evaluation into a relevant theory, a failure of the above sort would not permit us to reject any evaluative theory altogether. Nevertheless, even a clearly relevant prescriptive theory could still be shown to be experientially inadequate either because it proved to be so in practice or was found theoretically to be so as a result of our discovering that its expectations conflict with the implications of the predictive theory we currently accept. In either case, the prescribed actions would have been shown to be unworkable¹ or to be counter-productive.²

The possibility that a prescriptive theory may logically conflict with a predictive theory raises a further problem. If our leading descriptive theory were able to sustain the doctrine of 'determinism' (i.e. *total, external determinism*), then, every prescriptive theory would be disposed of as having no power to shape the empirical world. All political theories in the sense used here would suffer the same fate. In the light of this threat, I propose next to show why the threat of such determinism cannot be sustained. Two sorts of determinism have been proposed. Those like Hobbes' mechanistic conception imply that the determining process operates by humanly knowable³ causal laws. This determinism also suggests the possibility of our achieving a totally accurate *predictive* knowledge of every future detail. The second type of determinism does not believe that the determining process can be known by humans, e.g. the Epicureans see the determining process as spontaneous and therefore not humanly knowable in advance while St. Augustine believed events to follow from the partially unknowable laws and will of God.⁴ The threats posed by these two types of *unknowable* determinism can swiftly be removed by our noticing the self-contradictory character of both positions. Both claim to *know* something which they also say is *unknowable*.

It will take more time to refute knowable or totally predictive determinism.⁵ Nevertheless, its threat can be removed by our considering the following thought experiment. Since such a predictive

- (1) I take this to be one of the implications of Max Weber's argument, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, The Free Press, New York, 1949, pp. 52-55.
- (2) This is the point made by Marx when criticizing Feurbach in his Thesis II as follows: "The question of whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not [merely] a question of theory but is a practical question" (K. Marx, "Concerning Feuerbach", *Early Writings*, The Pelican Marx Library, 1975, p.422).
- (3) Hobbes' position amounts to the claim that the laws of "body" and "motion" are in principle knowable. His determinism can be extracted from his *Leviathan*, Basil Blackwell Oxford, n.d., edited with an Introduction by Michael Oakshott, pp. 5, 17, 27, 38, 243 & 440.
- (4) Not only does this seem to be the flaw in St. Augustine's argument in the *City of God* (Everyman's Library, 1945, see especially the last sentence of Book V, Chapter X), but similarly seems to be present in Kant's assertion of human freedom and responsibility, on the one hand, and his argument, on the other hand, that God as postulated "must be omniscient, in order to be able to know my conduct *even to the most intimate parts of my intention in all possible cases and in the entire future*" and "He must be omnipotent, omnipresent, eternal, etc." (op. cit., *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 145).
- (5) Alvin Goldman, *A Theory of Human Action*, Princeton Univ. Press, 1980. His Chapter 6 outlines a special case in which such prediction could not be total. This case is like the one in the first part of my argument to follow shortly. He analyses the problem of the predictor having to disclose his true prediction about an agent's future action to the agent, an agent which the predictor has discovered is *determined* to do the opposite of any disclosed predictions. The "logical impossibility" of such a true prediction to be disclosed allows Goldman, at least momentarily, to distinguish "determinism" from "predictionism". However, Goldman's claim on this basis that "determinism" is "tenable" (though not proven) is, in effect, undermined by his own later claim, which I see as correct, that knowable determinism implies that a complete "book of life" could in principle be written for each one of us before we had fully lived our lives. If so, my argument is that once I read my book of life, I believe I could deviate from its predictions, at least on trivial matters. This is to say, using his own terms against him, such a belief is "logically impossible" with "determinism". It is important to stress, however, that neither this way of putting it nor my own argument removes determinism 'absolutely'. Determinism is not removed at all for those people (if there are any) who may *believe* that they could never deviate from disclosed predictions concerning them. Even for those, like myself, who believe they could deviate, it does not exclude the imaginable doubt arising from the following logical possibility for which I can see no argument by which we could either affirm it or deny it: "An *unknowable* or only as yet unknown set of causes may have determined me both to feel that I am free and to argue that I am free' (as I am doing here). While for these reasons, determinism has not been entirely refuted, in this form, it is not a threat to prescriptive theories. Our inability to know that we are determined in this way, does not logically prevent us from believing that we are free and responsible for doing what is right.

theory claims to be *total*, it must accept the challenge to predict where I will be in exactly five minutes. Logically, I must either be entirely inside my house or at least partly outside my house. Also, as *total* determinism, it will accept the challenge to predict my location even if I were to be told the prediction before the five minutes had passed. That I had been so informed should be accepted merely as one more factor to be taken into account by the predictive calculation. Would not each one of us be as confident as I am that they could step outside of their house if the prediction were that they will be inside, or that they could step inside if the prediction were that they will be outside after the five minutes? Of course, in some cases a fire in the house or the door being locked might prevent us from falsifying some such predictions, but we would only need to disprove one prediction to show that the predictive determinism is not total. Neither could the total determinist escape this refutation by saying that he had not given us the true prediction and that we had in fact behaved in exactly the way that he had secretly predicted to himself. In response to this we would require him to teach us his predictive theory. With this theory, if it were for the moment presumed to be valid, each one of us could calculate a prediction for himself or herself. Each of us, I assume, could similarly prove the calculation to be false by doing the opposite of one of these predictions. Nor shall the total determinist escape by saying that the prediction failed because his information or his theory is as yet incomplete. While we fully accept that a knowledge of such a complete determinism would indeed be so demanding and difficult that none would seriously claim to have achieved it today, the thought experiment is deliberately constructed on the assumption that this level of presumed competence had now been attained.¹

While the above thought experiment indeed seems to refute determinism, some may say that it has only demonstrated a trivial empirical effect which a knowing *free* human will can have. However, determinism would still be falsified by such a demonstration. If 'trivial' means 'small' bodily movements, it should be recalled that some such movements can have effects which evaluatively are surely not trivial in other senses, e.g. tipping over a lighted paraffin heater; refraining from maintaining the brakes on one's car; deciding to vote this way rather than that way in a marginal constituency. The above argument has removed the threat which determinism may have posed to the prescriptive potency of evaluative theorizing. Nevertheless, the potential and actual shaping effect of any given evaluative theory will vary depending on the theory and on the empirical circumstances concerned.

To summarize, experiential tests of evaluative (e.g. political) theories can show that a given theory is either *compatible* or *incompatible* with our experience of relevant area. If compatible, this means that it is seen as clearly capable of prescribing actions which have some prospect of success. If incompatible, it is shown a) not to be wholly relevant, b) to require counterproductive actions or c) to require the impossible.

Logical Tests

Logical tests require a theory to be 1) clear, 2) coherent, and 3) simple. It has already been asserted that in some cases 'an evaluative theory also becomes a prescriptive theory', that 'a knower must 'logically' become 'an actor' seeking 'to change some factors in a situation in the direction of how they should be'. The reason why this is 'logical' and why we accept the importance

- (1) In spite of the differences, this refutation of determinism is essentially the same as that offered by Frederick Olafson, *Principles and Persons: An Ethical Interpretation of Existentialism*, the John Hopkins University Press, 1967 (in Paul W. Taylor, *Problems of Moral Philosophy*, Wadsworth 1978, p. 672). Plato does not address this question explicitly. While his political theory would seem to assume 'free will' at least for his philosopher rulers, a literal interpretation of "The Myth of Er" in *The Republic* (618b) would confine such freedom to the choices of future lives which all "souls" must make just before they pass through "the river of forgetfulness" and are reborn into this world. While most of what Kant says is compatible with the view here (e.g. op. cit., *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 104) he seems to contradict both me and himself when he says that "if we could exhaustively investigate all of the appearances of men's wills, there would not be found a single human action which we could not predict with certainty ..." (op. cit., *Critique of Pure Reason*, A550, B578. Marx does not address this issue of 'free will' directly but his own political activity, his belief in the possibility of a future "advanced phase of communist society", discussed in the previous chapter, and his enthusiastic writing would make no sense if such a power were not at least tacitly assumed. In spite of this, we noted some of his phrases which seem to deny this autonomy to conscious human activity.

of testing both descriptive and evaluative theories by experience is because we non-sensuously experience the impossibility of thinking in any way other than according to the fundamental logical principle that 'the truth is one', i.e. 'the *axiom* of non-contradiction'.¹ It is logically impossible for us to accept that opposites can both be true at the same time and in the same sense, that 'A' and 'not A' can both be true. It is impossible both that an hereditary head of state is more appropriate to a given modern state than is an elected head AND that a president is more appropriate than is a monarch for the same state. Before we might become aware of this law as a principle, contradictions intuitively bother us. Experiential tests rest on the assumption that any contradictions that might appear between elements of our experience and our theory shows that the theory is mistaken. We cannot rest easily with the discovery that items of our sensuous or non-sensuous experience seemed to demonstrate that 'A is the case', while an element of our non-sensuous experience (i.e. our theory) says that 'A is *not* the case'. Our unease in such circumstances leads us to re-check our experience, and if required, to reject the theory. We seek to make our new theory compatible with all of our experiences to date. This is an example of the "dialectical"² relation between theory and experience. In a science we try to discover a theory which is compatible with a defined but limited area of experience while in philosophy we seek a theory which is compatible with *all* of our experience. Equally, since a theory is one complex element of our non-sensuous experience, we could say that philosophy attempts to discover a complex non-sensuous experience (i.e. a theory) which is compatible with all other non-sensuous and sensuous experiences. In addition to this requirement of comprehensiveness for a philosophically necessary theory, the logical tests discussed in this section check to see that this complex non-sensuous experience is consistent with itself, i.e. that it is, in fact, *one* theory. If a theory under review is discovered to be ambiguous or seems clearly to contain two opposing elements, it is not one but a mixture of at least two conflicting theories. Our logical scrutiny may enable us to reformulate and repair such a theory so that we are left only to test a *clear* and coherent theory against the experiential criteria already discussed and against the comparative criteria yet to be elaborated.

Coherence requires all the elements of a theory to be seen as parts of one system. Its elements are logically linked both to the whole and to each other.³ To be *logically linked* means that one element of a theory is required by another, either by extension or in order that self-contradiction in the whole may be avoided. In our earlier example of an evaluative theory which might prescribe the knower to take specified actions, this was seen to be logically required because such actions, were seen as helping to remove the experienced contradictions between one's evaluations and one's sight of the existing world. To the extent that our values come to live within the practices of our world, our evaluative and descriptive theories of that world will not be in conflict and the axiom of non-contradiction will be satisfied.

So far, we have seen both how logical scrutiny requires a theory to be *clear* and *coherent*, i.e. logically linked and avoiding self-contradiction. The last requirement that a theory be as *simple* as possible means that it should be no more complicated than the varieties of experience demand. If over-elaborate theories are cut down to their simplest form, nothing important is lost which could not be recaptured merely with the aid of arithmetical multiplication. This point can be

- (1) This axiom is usually but paradoxical referred to as "the law of contradiction". See Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, ed. and trans. by John Warrington, Introduction by Sir David Ross, London, Dent, 1966, pp.123-125.
- (2) Here "dialectical" is being used not so much in the Platonic as in the Hegelian and Marxian senses which imply a mutual shaping power between thought and action. This is in contrast to Kant's usually pejorative use of "dialectical" to refer to "illusions" into which pure reason is prone to fall (e.g. op. cit., *Pure*, A406, B433 to A568, B596).
- (3) Kant goes so far as to say that in the case of "transcendental assertions which lay claim to insight into what is beyond the field of all possible experience, ... they are so constituted that what is erroneous in them can never be detected by means of any experience. Transcendental reason consequently admits of no other test than the endeavour to harmonize its various assertions" (ibid., A425, B453).

illustrated by a version of the Old Testament's *Genesis* which prefaced the existing story of creation by saying that, in the very beginning, God 1 created god 2, and then god 2 created god 3, and then god 3 created god 4, and so on until god 100 created the world. If we were not to eliminate such superfluities, we would have no chance of approaching either a scientifically or a philosophically necessary theory. The one potential theory of this character which might exist would be progressively lost under a growing heap of endlessly multiplying versions both of itself and of other theories.¹ This sort of diverting and boring endlessness is one example of what Hegel called "the spurious infinity" (*die schlechte Unendlichkeit*) to be discussed in a later chapter. He distinguished this infinity from "the genuine Infinity", a version of which I see as one of the clear competitors for the status of philosophical necessity, given its logically linked character and seeming completeness.

A complete assessment of the systematic logic of Hegel's conception of monarchy will be seen to be beyond the scope of the argument here. Such an assessment would require many more volumes than Hegel himself took to expound his system in the first place. It would require a step by step examination of the relation between this conception and each of the many hundreds of other categories, distinctions, relations, arguments, and conclusions of which his system is composed. As such, the analysis contained in the later chapters will offer only a small contribution to such a completely methodical project. Nevertheless, they do seek to consider the most difficult, important and controversial issues related to the question of whether either Hegel's or the model's constitutional monarchy can be granted the status of philosophical necessity. It can helpfully be said now that they find no serious gaps between the thrust of his political argument and the rest of his system. More importantly, they see democratic monarchy as entirely complemented by an interpretation of the rest of Hegel's system. However, we will note some of the *superfluities* within Hegel's presentation which would have to be removed before it could be granted the status of philosophical necessity. For example, for simplicity's sake, the many equivalent terms for "Reason" should not be used, e.g. "the Idea", "the universal Spirit" (*Geist*) and "the world Spirit".

In this section we have seen how logical tests require a theory to be

- 1) *clear* (i.e. precise and unambiguous)
- 2) *coherent* (i.e. systematic, logically linked and consistent), and
- 3) *simple* (i.e. parsimonious² or not superfluous),

before it could be granted the status either of scientific or philosophical necessity.

Comparative Tests

The axiom of non-contradiction can also be seen to inspire the comparative testing of theories. As soon as we notice that another theory purports to deal with the same field(s) of concern as the one under review we are driven by this axiom to compare them. If there are two competing theories we know that they both cannot be true at the same time and in the same sense. If they prove to be irreconcilably different, at least one of them must be false. They may both be false but they cannot both be *true*. The axiom of non-contradiction tells us that we can approach either scientific or philosophical necessity only if the competitors can be reduced to one. There are four ways in which this might be achieved. The first two ways again seek to eliminate all but one by submitting the competitors to the above a) experiential and b) logical tests. If more than one theory survives these tests, we can still attempt to reduce them to one by c) checking more carefully to see whether in substance, they might not in fact only be optional formulations of the same theory. Such a reconciliation of any superficial differences between competitors might allow all of them to be seen as *absorbed* or assimilated into one theory. Two theories concerned with a limited section of experience and which had both survived these first three comparative tests might still be reduced to one if d) one of them were shown also to relate to a wider segment of experience and to have flawlessly passed all the relevant tests in these areas as well. The other theory would be subordinated to this one because of its silence or failure in the face these wider tests. In fact, if the wider theory were so broad as to prove to be *comprehensive*, it would appropriately be granted the status of philosophical necessity. However, if it proved not to be comprehensive but only wider than any other, it would appropriately be accorded the status of

(1) This is an elaboration of the principle of "Occam's razor".

(2) Kant also explicitly demands this in *Critique of Pure Reason*, op. cit., A623, B652; A623, B652, A649, B677; A652, B680.

scientific necessity. The bulk of the argument here has been and will continue to be concerned with the testing of democratic monarchy by *comparing* it with competing constitutional theories. Summary

The proposed methodology for assessing the validity of competing political theories would equally allow us to examine all other types of theories. Therefore, it has been argued that all competing theories, including (evaluative) political theories, are best measured against the four criteria for philosophical necessity:

- 1) *Comprehensiveness*: philosophy must be concerned with all areas of *experience*, e.g. it must be *descriptive*, *evaluative* (e.g. *prescriptive* in relation to the present and future) and *reflexive* (e.g. contain its own epistemology and methodology). The area of a *science's* concern may be more limited. The status of 'absolute necessity' can *never* be granted to a theory.
- 2) *Experiential Tests*: a theory must be *compatible* with all of the experiences concerned, e.g. the prescriptive aspect of an evaluative theory must be seen to be *relevant* to the future which one has in mind.
- 3) *Logical Tests*: a theory must be *clear*, *coherent* and *simple*. These tests and the rest of the criteria are required by the *axiom of non-contradiction*.
- 4) *Comparative Tests* attempt to reduce the competing theories to *one* by eliminating as many as possible,
 - (a) with experiential tests,
 - (b) with logical tests,
 - (c) by *absorbing* the remainder into one theory, or
 - (d) by seeing which one has the widest experiential scope.

This chapter attempts to formulate the fundamentally *reflexive* aspect which would seem to be an essential element of any theory having the status of philosophical necessity. Its reflexive element itself seems to be philosophically necessary. It seems flawlessly to satisfy the four criteria associated with comprehensiveness, experiential tests, logical tests and comparative tests. Each of the four criteria can be seen as an articulation of any one of the other three. Thus, for example, the requirement that a theory be comprehensive,

- a) is the demand that a theory pass *all* known experiential tests (sensuous and non-sensuous); or
- b) is the demand that a theory conform to logic's axiom of non-contradiction and thus prove both to be self-consistent and consistent with *all* other sensuous and non-sensuous phenomena;¹ or
- c) is the demand that a theory show by *comparison* how *all* other theories are either flawed by experiential or logical tests or are appropriately seen as having been absorbed into itself.

The four criteria offer *four* ways of expounding the *one* criterion for philosophical necessity, i.e. the one integrated system of criteria or the one critical perspective, each of whose articulated distinctions can be fully understood only with reference to the set of other distinctions which together constitute the methodological totality. The demonstration of this interrelatedness uses the sort of *dialectical reasoning* found in the works of Plato, Hegel and Marx.² The way the exposition of each part leads to the other parts, to the totality and back again to itself is the wider *reflexiveness* which characterizes every part of a dialectical totality. We have been concerned here with the *fundamental* reflexiveness which critically examines the epistemological and methodological bases for all sorts of scientific and philosophical theorizing. We have offered a theory about all theories and therefore a theory which must also be about itself.

Interpretations and Translations

Finally, it will be helpful to explain how I have sought both to read all of the philosophers discussed and to translate Hegel's texts. History has given us many philosophical and political texts which provide us with a rich source of competing theories. A selection of these has thus given me a demanding testing ground for the constitutional and methodological arguments considered

- (1) This formulation recalls Kant's "ideal of pure reason" which requires "the scheme [to follow]...the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all knowledge of nature" (ibid., A674, B702).
- (2) Marx rarely reflected on his "dialectic". However, at one point, he argued that the "syllogism" of "production" ("generality"), "distribution" ("particularity"), and "consumption" ("singularity") is not only a matter of balancing ... concepts" but also of "grasping real relations". *Grundrisse*, Pelican Marx Library, Harmondsworth, 1973, pp.89-90.

here. Initially, I read these works with the intuitive aim and then with the conscious goal of discovering a political theory which could be called philosophically necessary. As a result, these texts have been studied in a particular way. At some points they are *clear* and at other points not. When they are ambiguous, I have sought to record this. In these cases, I have also tried either to think of an interpretation of the vague words or to replace the pregnant silences with words which would make the theory being considered less likely to fall foul of any of the four criteria of philosophical necessity. The results of such attempts are here called *lenient* interpretations or *lenient* additions. However, if a passage, whether ambiguous or not, seemed not to lend itself to a construction which would allow it to escape being judged deficient according to one of the four criteria, then I have tried to identify the precise *changes* in the words which would allow it to do so. Such *improving* changes are also called here, *reconstructions* or *modifications*. Accordingly, I have changed some of Hegel's words, e.g. my *improved* version of *The Philosophy of Right's* PP283 says that the monarch's "discretion" to appoint his prime minister is constitutionally *confined* by the will of a working majority in the elected chamber and by the rules of the 'state prerogative council' even though Hegel himself says that the monarch's discretion in this matter is "unconfined". Such *improving* changes have required me to speak of defending the model which is a *reconstructed* version rather than of Hegel's own constitutional monarchy.

Of course, Hegel is not the only theorist who requires such treatment. For example, Plato's brief references both to upward and downward mobility according to merit (415b&c and 423d) may lead us *leniently*¹ to add more of the practical details of just how the children from the economic class might be given an equal opportunity to become philosopher rulers. Also, Plato's expressed hope that after several generations even the philosopher rulers will accept the foundation myth (414b&c and 415d) requires us to *improve* upon his words if a Plato-like theory is not easily to fall into the contradiction of first hoping that his philosophers will literally "believe" a myth and later arguing that they will have comprehensive philosophical "knowledge".

Thus, the aid which this work has received from Hegel has followed from some *clear* readings, from some *lenient* interpretations and from some *improving* alterations of his words. Stage by stage, the following chapters make clear the ways in which democratic monarchy have issued from such a mixture of readings, interpretations, and alterations. In addition to the few *improving* changes to Hegel's texts which will be discussed, I have consistently translated the many quoted passages in a *lenient* manner. This approach has issued in many *free* translations. When Hegel's German seemed ambiguous enough to lend itself to several possible translations, I selected the one which would accord most easily with what I argue Hegel *should* be saying. Therefore, these *free* translations record my *lenient* interpretations of Hegel's German. This plan has been followed in order to present these readings and arguments as simply as possible. This is to say, that I have chosen not to complicate the substantive arguments within the body of the following chapters by the problems of translation. Instead, these problems and my solutions to them are precisely recorded in the *Appendix* and in the *Glossary* of terms.

Appendix B includes an ordered list of my *literal* translations of the passages receiving a free and lenient translation in earlier chapters. A comparison of these should make it clear which parts of the former resulted from lenient interpretations.

This chapter has outlined this work's methodological foundations. At the same time, it has given, by implication, more exact specifications of the related meanings of the following key terms: reason, rationality, philosophy, and necessity. The next chapter will begin to show how this approach and these terms can be interpreted to be similar to Hegel's own.

(1) This approach which tries to improve the faulty arguments of others before deciding whether or not they should be entirely rejected is, of course, frequently exemplified in the character of Plato's Socrates. Also, Kant seems to follow a similar path by giving what I call lenient interpretations. When Kant writes of Plato, for example, he says that, "If we set aside the exaggerations in Plato's methods of expression, the ... spiritual flight from the ectypal mode of reflecting upon the physical world-order to the architectonic ordering of it according to ends ... [It] is an enterprise which calls for respect and imitation" (*ibid.*, A318, 375.) Hegel and Marx rarely show such benevolence when treating the formulations of others.



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C h a p t e r S e v e n :
H E G E L ' S S Y S T E M

Previous chapters have both argued directly for the merits of democratic monarchy and have shown how republicans might be driven by the logic of their own value assumptions also to endorse the model constitution. This is the case to the extent that these accord with my own prescription: 'Act so as to maximize rational living'. Kant came closest to accepting this prescription explicitly but I find it to be implicit in the other republican arguments as well as in Hegel's philosophy. In fact, it can be argued itself to be 'philosophical necessity'. No participant in a philosophical dialogue could sustain his or her rejection of this principle without self-contradiction.

This chapter begins to trace the extent to which the model constitution is rooted within Hegel's own philosophy. The model claim to philosophical necessity will be seen to rest heavily both on Hegel's social and political theory and on his wider system. I say this in spite of the fact that several of Hegel's formulations in *The Philosophy of Right* are plainly incompatible with democratic monarchy. While later chapters will weigh the degrees of support and hostility to the ideal constitution which might be read into Hegel's social and political theories, this chapter is concerned with his wider philosophy. It begins to explain how his system can be read to provide a comprehensive theory within which democratic monarch fits even more neatly than does Hegel's own constitutional monarchy. Later chapters will show how democratic monarchy was fashioned by making some 'improving' changes to the political part of Hegel's philosophical system.

Given the great enormity of his system and the notorious obscurity of many of his formulations, it cannot be expected that all will see my interpretations as obviously correct. For example, perhaps not everyone will be happy with the equation that this chapter makes between "Reason", "the Idea" and "God".¹ Some will not readily agree that there is a prescriptive side to Hegel's analysis of "actuality" (*Chapter Eight*). Many may question the claimed parallel between Hegel's "necessity" and my concept of 'philosophical necessity' (*Chapter Nine*). Others may want to challenge the account of how each section of *The Philosophy of Right* builds to become an outline of the subjective and objective conditions for a rational state (*Chapters Ten to Twelve*). In some cases, the enforced brevity of this work may encourage such doubts. Nevertheless, it intends to deal with the most important issues. At least, it hopes to provide a clear and strong 'position paper' to be placed on the agenda of any later disputations. This chapter will not explicitly draw out many of the political implications of Hegel's wider philosophy, but its focus on "Reason" should implicitly help to clarify the main claim for democratic monarchy. This is, using Hegel's² words, it is a "rational constitution",³ it is a "hieroglyph of Reason".⁴ A state so organized is an "architectonic of ... life's rationality".⁵ It is a central feature of "the rational living of self-

- (1) In the article mentioned in the *Introduction*, some of Brudner's formulations might be read to suggest that he would deny this reduction of "the divine" to "the rational", of "God" to "Reason" (e.g. pp.137-8). See also his insistence on the "divine-human distinction" (p.131).
- (2) I would also say that in a model state, we "desire nothing except what is an expression of rationality" (Rechts PP272Z). 'Z' refers to the less reliable additions which Hegel's editors constructed by combining students' with Hegel's own lecture notes.
- (3) See the *Glossary* for references to this and to many other of Hegel's special terms. There, the original German terms are noted and occasionally the problems of translation are discussed.
- (4) *Rechts*, PP279Z.
- (5) *Rechts*, Preface S.19 (p.6). 'S' numbers refer to the pages in the German text. These will also be added to the paragraph (PP) numbers when the paragraph is more than one page long.

conscious freedom".¹ This chapter will begin the argument for seeing democratic monarchy as a logical part of Hegel's comprehensive theory. While empirically existent constitutions are not analysed here in order more fully to pursue the countless number of possible *experiential* tests for the philosophical necessity of the model, the more important *comparative* tests are offered. Reason²

Because "Reason" is taken to be the central concept in Hegel's system, only it and its equivalents among Hegel's special terms will be capitalized. Hegel argues that "philosophy" is possible only on the assumption³ that we may be able to discover "the truth" about "the universe":

Philosophie I, S. 13-14 (p. xiii):

The courage to search for the truth or the belief⁴ in the power of the human spirit is the first condition for the pursuit of philosophy. Humankind, because it is spirit, can and should respect itself as worthy of the highest. We humans cannot think too highly of the greatness and power of our spirit. With this conviction, nothing will be so coy or difficult that it will not reveal itself to us. The essence of the universe which at first is hidden and locked away has no strength to resist the courage of our struggle to know it. It must layout its wealth and depth before the eyes of the searcher for his enjoyment.⁵

- (1) *Rechts*, PP270An., S.423 (p.170). 'An.' (Anmerkung) refers to the remarks to the paragraphs which Hegel added himself after the first edition.
- (2) *Vernunft*.
- (3) This "assumption" according to Kant would presumably be called a "transcendental idea" which is "necessary" in the "relative sense" for the "speculative employment" of reason and in the "absolute sense" *Critique of Pure Reason* (ibid., A676, B704) for the "practical employment of pure reason" (A841, B869). At the same time, he says that because this assumption does not offer an object of possible experience and cannot be given an "apodeictic" (A624, 652) proof but can only be shown to be "useful" (A826, B854) in the first case and "in the highest degree fruitful and ... indispensably necessary" (A328, B385) in the second case, this assumption is still "problematic" (A256, B311). This is to admit that such an assumption *may* only be a "regulative" idea or a "heuristic fiction" (A771, B779). However, both because of, and in spite of, these same reasons, I take this assumption to be 'philosophically necessary'. In effect, this is to recognize that a philosophically necessary theory may also include what Kant calls "principles", "postulates", "hypotheses", "schema", "representations" and "intuitions".
- (4) I have no reason to read Hegel's use of "belief" to be essentially different from Kant's exposition of it as distinct both from "opining" and from "knowing". Kant says that "belief" holds a judgement to be true on grounds which are both "subjectively sufficient and at the same time taken as being objectively sufficient". "Opining" is such a holding of a judgement as is consciously insufficient, not only objectively, but also subjectively (yet it is "more than arbitrary fiction"). When "the holding of a thing to be true is sufficient both subjectively and objectively, it is *knowledge*" (ibid., A822, B850). The difference between the "objective sufficiency" in believing and knowing is that, in the latter case, it "is sufficient where, in the former, it is only *taken as being* sufficient". Kant illustrates this difference by proclaiming his "firm belief" (A825, B853 and A826, B854) in "the existence of God" in spite of the fact that he says, I can cite nothing which necessarily presupposes this thought as the condition of my explanations of the appearances exhibited by the world". On the other hand, he says that "nothing decisive can be cited against it". He also says that this "useful" postulate which sees the world as a "purposive unity" as if ordered by a "supreme intelligence" is one which experience "so frequently confirms". At the same time, "I know of no other condition under which this unity can supply me with guidance in the investigation of nature". This postulate is seen as analogous to "the highest of all genera ... which comprehends under itself all manifoldness ; genera, species, and subspecies" (A659, B687). In this thesis, for similar reasons, I proclaim my "firm belief" in the objective reality of "Reason" which Hegel also sometimes calls "God". I argue that this postulate is 'philosophically necessary' yet I choose not to call it God because "Reason" less misleadingly notes my agreement with Kant's comment that it is "a matter of indifference whether it be asserted that divine wisdom has disposed all things in accordance with its supreme ends, or that the idea of supreme wisdom is a regulative principle in the investigation of nature", i.e. "it must be a matter of complete indifference to us, when we perceive such unity, whether we say that God ... willed it ... or that nature has wisely arranged it thus" (A699, B727). This chapter uses "Reason" to name what Kant calls the articulated and "organized unity" (A676, B704) believed to be present in nature, human activity and thought. I prefer the term "Reason" to "God" also because it is less likely to imply my agreement with another of Kant's views which I deny, namely, that "moral sentiment" (A820 B857) requires us to go further by saying that "I am morally certain that there is "a future life" (A828, B856) in which those "worthy of happiness" will be rewarded in exact proportion to their moral worthiness.
- (5) At the following points, Hegel uses a similar tone to express his optimism concerning philosophical study: "thought is all truth" (*Philosophie II*, S.164(p.149); "Reason (Idee) as [the conception of Reason] is absolute and all truth ..." (*Enz. I*, PP236); and "absolute truth" (*Enz. I*, PP242 and PP244). As asserted in *Chapter Six*, I take Hegel's "absolute" not to mean 'absolute' but to mean 'philosophically necessary', i.e. not to mean so certain as not to allow any 'vague doubts' to persist.

In the next passage, Hegel refers to the above "essence of the universe which at first is hidden and locked away" as "Reason which has being" but which may not be as yet discovered by us, i.e. not yet reconciled with "our self-conscious reason":

Enz. I, PP6:

... it is equally important to understand that the content of philosophy is none other than the domain of Reason-as-the-living-human-spirit which originally brought itself forth into the world. This is to say that *actuality* is philosophy's subject matter. Our initial consciousness of this content we call *experience*. Even a sensuous study of the world distinguishes between what is only inessential appearance (i.e. transitory and insignificant experience) and what inherently and genuinely deserves the name, "actuality", i.e. distinguishes between external and inner definite existence within the wide realm of experience. In this respect, philosophy is to be distinguished *only in form*¹ from such empirical sciences (i.e. the other modes of becoming conscious). It shares with them the same experiential content. Philosophy must also be compatible with actuality and experience.² Indeed, this compatibility is at least one external test of the truth of a philosophy. Conversely, for science as well as for philosophy, it is seen to be the highest and ultimate aim to bring about a reconciliation of our *self-conscious reason* with the *Reason which has being*, i.e. with actuality. This is to say that, while we all experience both self-consciousness and being, both science and philosophy seek to know the rational correspondence or compatibility between consciousness and being. This reconciliation can be attained by the philosophical knowledge of Reason because

Enz. I, PP6An.:

.... Some of what is rational (vernünftig) is actual, and all of what is actual (or only part of what exists) is rational.³

Chapter Six defined the difference between 'science' and 'philosophy' as one of scope. Science may be concerned with a limited area of 'experience' while philosophy must attempt to make the connections between all areas. The above paragraph is taken to agree with this when it says that they are to be "distinguished only in form". In a similar vein, PP7 and An. go on to say that the content of "philosophy" is "taken from our own observing and considering of the external and inner world as presented within our experience of nature" and of both objective and subjective human living, i.e. "as presented in nature, in spirit and in the breast of humankind". He also says that we call some "sciences ... empirical only because of the sensuous starting point which they take. Like philosophy, however, their essential aim is to develop thoughts about experience or what is present-to-hand, i.e., laws, general propositions or a theory". Again, such a "theory" if achieved would constitute the above "reconciliation" between "the Reason which has being" and "self-conscious reason".

In the light of the above passages, we are now in a position to begin the interpretation of what Hegel means by "Reason". It is 'the sense which is there to be made of all our experiences'. It is that which must "reveal itself" to "the courage of our struggle to know it". It is the "rational" structure of all the "being" which we can "experience" whether or not we have yet done so. It is that which our "self-conscious reason" attempts to discover as a result of "considering" all its experience of both the "external and inner world", of "nature and ... humankind". As suggested

- (1) As in this case, my free translations have taken the liberty of some time underlining words which Hegel did not.
- (2) Hegel's clear acceptance here of the principle, that "Philosophy must also be compatible with actuality and experience", would help to provide him with a defence against Marx's polemic which implied that he was not interested in measuring his ideas by the world: "Hegel, however, is a philosopher of right, and develops the generic Idea of the state (die Staatsgattung). He is not allowed to measure the Idea by what exists; he must measure what exists by the Idea", *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'*, op. cit., p.55. Of course it is true that Hegel did not fully measure his philosophy by what Marx took to be the processes of the actual world. Marx seems to have ignored Hegel's distinction between "actuality" and "existence" (see *Glossary*) which will be discussed in the next chapter.
- (3) This last sentence illustrates well the difference between my *free* and *literal* translations (see the Appendix). This famous epigram is more literally rendered, "What is rational that is actual; and what is actual, that is rational". My free translation is less obscure because it explicitly uses Hegel's distinction between "existence" (which included both essential and "inessential appearance") and "actuality" (which included only the essential or rational reality). He says that "the obvious is not always the essential", *Rechts PP272Z*). Marx seems not to have noticed that Hegel made this distinction and this may explain why he offered some unnecessary criticisms of Hegel, e.g., "Hegel is not to be blamed for depicting the nature of the modern state as it is, but rather for presenting what is as the essence of the state. The claim that the rational is actual is contradicted precisely by an irrational actuality, which everywhere is the contrary of what it asserts and asserts the contrary of what it is", *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'*, op. cit., p.64.

earlier, philosophy must assume that our experience may have a knowable-rational structure and "Reason" is Hegel's name for that "object". This is to say that it names that objective structure both at the stage in human development when a knowledge of it is not yet pursued, i.e. when it is only a possible "object" (objekt) of human consciousness, and at the stage when it has consciously become an "object" (Gegenstand) of human inquiry. When as a *Gegenstand*, it first comes into our view, it is "intuited or ... *unmediated* Reason" (*Enz.* PP244), i.e. it is 'all experience', 'simply that which includes everything else', the all embracing vague 'One' or 'the black box into which everything is thrown'.¹ Thus "Reason" is Hegel's name for the most *comprehensive* object which can come before our minds. It is similar to what other philosophers have called "the Good", "God", "the Absolute", "Substance", "Being", "the Ultimate" or "the Idea". The fact that Hegel sometimes varies his own exposition of "Reason" by using some of these alternative names is understandable, especially if we see Hegel's philosophy as a *dialectical* result of his own real and imaginary dialogues with previous philosophies. In fact, it would seem appropriate for us to see, Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* as his report on this extended dialogue and to see his *Encyclopaedia* as an outline of the most important conclusions of that dialogue. That Hegel himself saw his philosophy as partially resulting from and thus surviving such *comparative tests* seems to be clear from the following:

Enz. I, PP13:

The most recent philosophy, provided that it *is* philosophy, is the result of all previous philosophies and must therefore contain the principles of all these philosophies. In consequence, the most recent philosophy is the most developed, the most rich and the most concrete.²

The *Appendix* and the *Glossary* record Hegel's own use of such equivalents for "Reason" as "the Idea" and "the Absolute". However, in order to minimize both ambiguity and superfluity, both within the free translations and within the expositions here, I will either replace or supplement the original equivalent terms by "Reason". When the original term remains, it also will be marked by an initial capital letter, e.g. "the in-and-for-itself Will".³ When "reason appears without a capital, it refers to the subjective thought process (i.e. "self-conscious reason"⁴ which consciously seeks to know "Reason". The object (Gegenstand) of reason is Reason. Both when reason is seen in its simplicity and grasped it in its complexity, its name will not change. This is because "Reason is its own result and as such, this result is as much unmediated as mediated".⁵ Often, when Hegel is speaking of one aspect or stage of this "unmediated and mediated" Reason, he misleadingly refers simply to it as "Reason", i.e. he does not explicitly qualify it by the appropriate adjective. Thus, it is not always clear when he is only speaking of one such aspect rather than of the whole of Reason. In an attempt to avoid this ambiguity, when necessary, I will add what I take to be the appropriate qualifiers to "Reason". Most frequently, 'as phrases' will be added but sometimes 'of phrases' or 'adjectives', e.g. Reason-*as*-logic, *as*-nature or *as*-human-spirit (e.g. Reason-*as*-the-monarchical-organ of the constitution); the conception of Reason; and *unmediated* Reason.

Conception⁶

Because "philosophy is conceptual knowing"⁷ when we have achieved a full grasp of Reason in all its dynamic complexity, we have attained what Hegel calls "the conception of Reason".⁸ In the language of the above extract from *Enz.* I, PP6, it is this "conception" which reconciles "our self-conscious reason with the Reason which has being". In the words of *Chapter Six*, "the conception of Reason" is read to be Hegel's name for the comprehensive *theory* or system to which he is proposing that we grant the status of *philosophical necessity*. Thus "the conception of Reason" would provide

- (1) I see Hegel's "Reason" or Kant's "God" as also characterized by Kant as the "transcendental principle" which is presupposed by "the unity of rules", "a systematic unity ... inherent in the objects" (op. cit., A650, B678 and A651, B679). Kant assumes this unity in spite of our also being "free to admit as likewise possible that all powers may be heterogeneous" (ibid.). Nevertheless, he says, and I agree, that "reason finds itself constrained to assume" (A811, B839) this unity "since without it we should have no reason at all, and without reason no coherent employment of the understanding, and in the absence of this no sufficient criterion of empirical truth (A651, B679).
- (2) For additional textual confirmations that Hegel accepts the importance of what I call *comparative tests*, see, e.g. *Philosophie I*, S.49 (p.30), *Logic II*, S.249 (p.580) and S.264 (p.591).
- (3) *Rechts*, PP3-1An.
- (4) *Enz.* I, PP6.
- (5) *Enz.* I, PP213Z.
- (6) *Begriff*.
- (7) *Enz.* I, PP16OZ.
- (8) *der Begriff der Idee*, *Enz.* I, PP236.

the best conscious foundation for the theoretical definition, assessment, generation, defence, and renewal of 'rational living'. Hegel uses many equivalent terms for "the conception of Reason" and these are recorded in the *Appendix* and in the *Glossary*. Again, in order to minimize ambiguity and superfluity, only this phrase will be used in the free translations except at the points where Hegel himself employs the equivalent terms which *Chapter Six* has already refined, i.e., 'knowledge', 'system', 'philosophy', and 'theory'. The human achievement of "the conception of Reason" in modern times is said by Hegel both to mark and to be Reason's own highest development. This is to say, that when conceiving Reason, we have become "Reason-as-philosophy",¹ the element of Reason which has being and now has risen to the thinking of Reason. The "conception of Reason" is "Reason thinking itself".² In this rational "subjectivity"³ of the philosopher, Reason attains its own self-knowing. Within this subjective knowing, the all inclusive "object" (i.e. Reason) has made itself its own "object" (*Gegenstand*). In "the conception of Reason", Reason knows itself. In Reason, the conceiving process has its all inclusive object while in "the conception of Reason", Reason has its own highest development as "subject". This subject is any human being who has achieved the philosophical knowledge of Reason.

In various ways, the above paragraph's discussion of 'Reason-as-the-conception of Reason' expresses the *reflexive* character which *Chapter Six* argued a theory must have before it might claim philosophical necessity. Hegel's "Reason" and his "conception of Reason" purport integrally to include the same theory of itself i.e. to include a theory of our theorizing process (i.e. an epistemology and methodology). Speaking more precisely, "Reason" can have this reflexivity explicitly in Reason's conception of Reason only because "the conception of Reason" was already implicitly within "the Reason which has being" before philosophers came explicitly to conceive it. The reflexive return to itself which thus characterizes the movement of "Reason" and its special self-completing achievement are well represented by Hegel's image of a circle:

Philosophie I, S.46 (p.27):

This movement is a concrete sequence of developments or elucidations. We must not imagine these to be arranged into some spuriously infinite straight line but into a circle, i.e. into a line which turns back into itself. On the periphery of this circle are a great number of circles. The whole is a great, within-itself-bending-back series of developments and elucidations.'

The circle in FIGURE 1 portrays my interpretation of this reflexive, returning "movement" of Reason. While Hegel speaks above of the "great number of circles ... on the periphery", each presumably representing one "development" or one "elucidation" of Reason, my exposition will be initially simplified by referring instead to these as 'arcs'. Just as the "totality" of these arcs constitutes the circle, the totality of these developments and elucidations define Reason. Each arc represents a development, aspect, or "moment" of Reason. Again, these will be distinguished from the "Reason" which is their totality by various qualifiers, e.g. Reason-*as-nature*. Also we will consistently follow Hegel's occasional practice of referring to these aspects or arcs as "specific elements of Reason" (*die bestimmte Ideen*).⁵ The human achievement of "the conception of Reason" is the closing reflexive arc portrayed at '12 o'clock' in FIGURE 1. FIGURE 2 again portrays this arc separately as that special circle "on the periphery" which reflexively completes Reason's circle. The arrows in FIGURE 1 start and end with Reason in order to recall that Hegel's Reason is "as much unmediated as mediated".⁶ This is to say, that Hegel's "Reason which has being" first is "nature" (i.e. "intuited or ... unmediated Reason" or "Reason-as-nature").⁷ From within nature, "Reason-as-the-human spirit" develops in history until, with the essential aid of the "elucidations" of the categories and distinctions which are given by "Reason-as-logic", humans begin to approach the achievement of an "adequate conception"⁸ of the rational totality of nature and of human living, i.e. of "Reason". The "movement" which is traced by the arrows in FIGURE 1 relate to the *time* sequence of Reason's "development" from nature to philosophical consciousness, more precisely, from nature to the explicit "conception of Reason". In contrast, the arrows in FIGURE 2 portray the logical order in which Hegel's own elucidations of Reason are presented by him within his *Encyclopaedia*. As a *logical* "sequence", it starts with the most abstract and general categories

(1) *Enz.* III, PP577.

(2) *Enz.* I, PP36.

(3) *Enz.* PP215 and PP232Z.

(4) Hegel also uses this image elsewhere, e.g. *Enz.* I, PP15, PP17 and PP181An, and *Rechts* PP267Z. In a similar manner Kant uses the images of a "sphere", *Critique of Pure Reason*", op. cit. B780, and of "horizon" (B686, B787).

(5) *Enz.* I, PP213An. (6) *Enz.* I, PP213Z.

(7) *Enz.* I, PP244. (8) *Logic* II, S.271 (p.597).

FIGURE 1: Reason




FIGURE 2: the conception of Reason




FIGURE 3: Reason-as- the-conception of Reason





FIGURE 4: Reason-as-the-monarchical-organ and the conception of the monarchical organ



("being", "naught" and "becoming") and then moves eventually to the exposition of the most "rich" and "concrete" categories and distinctions (e.g. "constitutional monarchy"). This is to say, that it begins

- 1) with an outline of all the "elucidations" and "specific elements of Reason" which humans find they require even to think about thought (together, the several hundreds of these constitute 'the conception of logic', i.e. *Enz. I*: the "science", or better, the 'philosophy' of logic),
- 2) moves on to the analysis of the additional "specifications" required for the study of the physical sciences (together, the many hundreds of these constitute 'the conception of nature', i.e. *Enz. II*: 'the philosophy of nature' and, finally,
- 3) moves on to expound an outline of the further categories and "actualities" required for a study of all the significant aspects of human living (together, the several hundreds of these make up 'the conception of the human spirit', i.e. *Enz. III*: 'the philosophy of spirit').

It is because a complete "elucidation" of human living must include an account of the human "development" of philosophical consciousness, that such elucidation discovers itself as already *being* an elucidation of philosophical consciousness by virtue of its earlier expositions of logic, nature and humankind. At this point, elucidation finds itself to be within a circle. It discovers that to go on is only to repeat, to correct, or to refine the account of the many hundreds of "specific conceptions" already traced. This is the discovery of the fundamental *reflexiveness* within "the conception of Reason". This is represented by the arrows in FIGURE 2 which both start and finish with "the conception of Reason".

It has already been suggested that Hegel's "Reason" and "the conception of Reason" respectively have the same emphases of "objectivity" and "subjectivity" as did the two phrases quoted much earlier: "the Reason which has being" and "self-conscious reason".¹ This difference of emphasis will continue to be employed throughout, i.e. "Reason" and every "specific element of Reason" mentioned will refer to *objects, beings* and *actualities* irrespective of whether they are yet seen by a given human consciousness while "the conception of Reason" and each "specific conception" of which it is composed will refer to a *consciousness, a knowing, or a theory* of such objects by human *subjects*.

This method of recording this useful distinction is followed with the support of the passages already quoted and with the wider support of Hegel's own exposition, e.g. his saying in *Rechts PP272An.*, that "Reason" (*Idee*) is "more concrete" than "conception".

It must be stressed that this difference is only one emphasis. The mutual dependence of "Reason" and "the conception of Reason" and the self-mediating character of this dependence would make their separation false and requires that 'Reason-as-the-conception of Reason' become "grasped as Object-Subject".² The "objective" emphasis of Reason is recorded in FIGURE 1 by the three major "specific elements of Reason" being placed on the *convex* or outer side of the three corresponding arcs. In contrast, the "subjective" emphasis of conception is represented in FIGURE 2 by the three major "specific conceptions" being located on the *concave* or inner side of the three corresponding arcs. FIGURE 3 simplifies and incorporates these features of FIGURES 1 and 2 and thus portrays the complex reflexive or self-mediating unity of "Reason". FIGURE 3 also seeks to illustrate the point that, for every convex object or "specific element of Reason", there should be a corresponding concave "specific conception", i.e. a philosophical, subjective or rational theory of that object. FIGURE 4 offers an example of this 'hand in glove' relationship by locating "Reason-as-the-monarchical-organ" on the convex side of the absent arc of the "Reason-as-the-human-spirit" arc and by placing "the conception of the monarchical organ" on the concave side of that arc. In *Chapter Eleven*, FIGURE 9 will show more fully the way in which this 'absent arc' is made up of a chain of circles, each representing a "specific element of Reason" and each with a different level of "generality".

In the following passage, Hegel explicitly confirms, in a theological idiom, that Reason's full development is dependent on its rising to self-consciousness through the human attainment of "the conception of Reason", i.e. without this "knowing the Divine Spirit could not become the in-and-

(1) *Enz. I*, PP6.

(2) *Enz. I*, PP214.

for-itself General" (i.e. could not become 'Reason-as-the-conception-of-Reason'):

Philosophie I, S.96 (p.75):

The essence of my human spirit which is my "self-conscious reason" is my essential being, my very substance without which I could not be actual. This essence is the combustible material, so to speak, which can be kindled and illuminated by the general Essence as such (i.e. by "Reason") which is the object of philosophical study. Only in so far as this phosphorous is in humankind is the comprehension, the kindling and the illuminating possible. Only thus is the feeling, intuiting and *knowing* of God [i.e. of Reason] within the scope of humankind at all. Also, without this essence which is the divine spirit within humankind, the Divine Spirit could not become the in-and-for-itself General.

This is another statement of Hegel's view that the "teleological" aim of nature and of human history is the human attainment of the sort of knowing and willing which is contained within and demanded by "the conception of Reason". Such knowing and willing forms the core of "rational living".¹ This is both the inherent aim, and the eventually to become self-conscious aim, of human life and history. This aim implies my own, often repeated prime prescription: 'Act so as to maximize free, rational living'.

This chapter, has begun to outline the case for our seeing either Hegel's or my monarchical conclusions as 3) a *logically* integral "element" of a 1) *comprehensive* theory, a *reflexive* theory which claims to embrace all 2) "*experience*" and which accepts the demand of our 4) *comparative* tests that today's leading philosophy must "contain the principles" of all "previous philosophies". However, one more question remains to be discussed here. Hegel's frequent use of the adjective, "absolute", and his occasional reference to "Reason" as "the Absolute", might at first sight lead us to charge him with claiming something for his system which *Chapter Six* argued was humanly unachievable, namely, 'absolute necessity'. I have found no passage in which he either clearly claims this sort of 'absolute necessity' for his philosophy or in which he explicitly accepts the unavoidability of the residual 'vague doubts' in *Chapter Six*. Nevertheless, I *leniently* read such an acceptance to be implicit in his frequently saying that "every individual is a child of his time" and that it "is foolish to imagine that any one philosophy could go over and beyond its contemporary world"² in his saying that he has given "scepticism's demand that we "doubt everything" its appropriate place within his conception of Reason,³ and in his plea to be excused from any inadequacy in his "execution" of the search for "the truth" about "the value of things, of insights and of human actions"⁴. Such words also assist the *lenient* interpretation of Hegel's use of "absolute" so as *not* to indicate his view that he had achieved the 'absolute theory' but rather to refer to the reflexive or self-completing character of his philosophy. Such a gloss is also suggested by the phrase which he frequently used as inter-changeable with "absolute", i.e. "in-and-for-itself" (an und für sich), the feature outstandingly characteristic of 'Reason-as-the-conception-of-Reason'. This reading when added to the other findings of the outline of Hegel's philosophy within this chapter allows us modestly to assert that no obviously insurmountable obstacle has been found in his wider system to granting the status of 'philosophical necessity' to the model's monarchy. Also, Hegel's system seems to accord with the perspective defined in *Chapter Six*. The method by which "self-conscious reason" can become "reconciled" with "the Reason which has being" would seem to be the same as the method by which we search for 'philosophical necessity'. Its four criteria contain all of the "rational" demands that we can place upon a theory which purports to secure this reconciliation. In the modified words of the previously quoted epigram of PP6An., 'What is rational is philosophically necessary'. The search for philosophical necessity accepts Hegel's view that philosophy is only possible on the assumption that the object of its study (i.e. all experience) has a finite, knowable and rational structure. This structure, Hegel calls "Reason which has being" or simply, "Reason". The "conception of Reason" is taken merely to be Hegel's name for a 'philosophically necessary theory'.

The next chapter will explore whether Hegel's conception of "Reason" prohibits or allows the generation of *prescriptions*, e.g. the formulation of a *model* constitution.

- (1) *Rechts*, PP270An. (S.422).
- (2) *Rechts*, S.26 (p.11).
- (3) *Enz.* I, PP7An.
- (4) *Logik* II, S.243 (p.575).

Chapter Eight: HEGEL'S PRESCRIPTION

Chapter Six argued that a theory would have to be evaluative as well as descriptive before it could hope to be comprehensive let alone philosophically necessary. It went on to argue that such a theory would also have to be evaluative in relation to any current or future choices of action which might be facing us, i.e. it must also be *prescriptive*. It was said that the axiom of non-contradiction logically leads us to prescribe actions which are calculated to help our present or future worlds to become more in line with the scale of values arranged within our currently leading theory, i.e. it enjoins us to act wherever possible in order to maximize the actuality of these values. *Chapter One* explained why this book is concerned only with the formulation of a 'general, prescriptive guide'¹ to action. It might be supposed that we would have had little difficulty in assuming that Hegel also saw his constitutional monarchy as offering such a prescriptive model given the previously quoted claims which he attached to it: "rational", a "hieroglyph of Reason", etc. This impression would be encouraged by a reading of the several clear prescriptions that Hegel offered on various occasions and which will be discussed shortly. This is to say, that the view that Hegel's philosophy had a prescriptive side to it might have been largely taken for granted if it were not for one of his paragraphs which plainly implies that prescription is a philosophical impossibility. This paragraph is the famous "owl of Minerva" passage in the Preface to *The Philosophy of Right*. It clearly denies that a philosophical "science of the state" can ever teach "the world" how it "ought to be". This passage will be translated and studied in a later section of this chapter. First, several passages in which Hegel is clearly offering some general and specific prescriptions will be considered. These later analyses will establish that an evaluative and prescriptive dimension is nevertheless inherent to Hegel's system, ordered as it is by his prime value, i.e. by "Reason". The first two are those which most obviously relate to constitutional questions:²

Rechts, PP28OZ:

Within a rational constitution, ... the monarch only has to do with the *formal* decision and thus he is only required to be a human being ... He need only ... say "yes" and to place the dot on the "i" ... The ... pinnacle ... *should* be such that the personal attributes of the monarch's character are not significant This specification for the monarch is *rational* because it accords with the conception of Reason-as-the-constitution ...

Rechts, PP32OZ:

The subjectivity of the monarch is by itself abstract but it *should* be a concrete ... ideality which spreads itself over the whole state.

By implication, these words clearly prescribe how each one of us should act when we have the opportunity: 'we should either maintain or build a constitution for the states in which a monarch would be seen as the *formal* "pinnacle" of decision making, i.e. the formal "subjectivity" which helps maximally to guarantee that this state will concretely secure for itself a unity of decision-making over time'.

With regard to the question of a monarch's role before a rational constitution becomes established, Hegel said that the independent intervention of the monarch is sometimes "required and *justified*" in order to remove an obstacle to the administration of justice which might be caused by

- (1) Habermas would seem to call such a 'model' a "critical theorem", *Theory and Practice*, op. cit., p. 32.
- (2) Under 'prescription', the *Glossary* lists additional passages which are clearly prescriptive, and some which are not so clear.

a "clique of officials". Hegel took "Friedrich II's "overruling of the lawyers' arguments in the "Arnold Case" to be an example of such an intervention.¹ In the context of another undeveloped constitution, Hegel clearly states his support for the King of Wurtemberg's proposals for constitutional reform:

Wun., S.471 (p.254):

Are not the quoted proposals nothing other than the sort of constitutional fundamentals which we *must* recognize and accept with the *highest approval*?

The next two clearly prescriptive passages make broader constitutional points:

Eng., S.86 (p. 297):

... when the aristocratic element in England as compared with the democratic element is the most significant force ... and when it finds its security and stability in the submerging of the people it rules into collective sensuality and into ethical depravity ... it is to be recognized as a *good* sign of the reawakening of the *moral* sense within the English people that they now have a feeling of the need for *reform* which involves a repugnance at that depravity. At the same time, we recognize that it *should* have become accepted that the *correct way to seek the improvement* is no more merely by the moral means of notions (*Vorstellungen*), by admonitions or by a union of isolated individuals in order both to avoid becoming beholden to the system of corruption and to work against it, but is *by the alteration of institutions*. The usual prejudice of laziness which always clings to the old faith in the goodness of an institution even when it hangs upon a wholly *depraved* set of circumstances has finally given way. Therefore, a thoroughgoing reform has become all the more demanded ...

Eng. S.89 (p.300):

Hitherto, the features which have an important part to play in those ... *glorious and fortunate advances* have been *lacking* in England. Among these features, the scientific codification of the law *stands the highest* ...

Hegel is clearly congratulating the English now that their "moral sense" has been reawakened. This is true in spite of the fact that Hegel disapproves of the specific reforms being proposed.

However, he does go on to imply a prescription that the reformers work to alter the existing institutions and especially to seek "the scientific codification of the law".

The last passage to be considered below reveals Hegel's prescriptiveness by unambiguously showing him to recognize that the free will of humans, places upon them some "responsibility" both for the "good" and for the "evil" in the world. Unavoidably, his words imply that it is only because humans have the capacity "to know" and to will the good that they can be held "responsible". This view requires us "logically" to conclude that this responsibility enjoins a philosopher to try to offer the sort of knowledge which would help people to will the good in the present and future, i.e. that he should attempt to offer general prescriptions. Hegel starts out by taking great care to emphasize that "the cunning of Reason" which he has just discussed must not be interpreted to reduce us merely to the tools or "means" of "Reason":

Geschichte, S.49 (p.33):

While we may allow that the aims of most individuals and their satisfaction are sacrificed because an individual's happiness must in the main belong to the realm of chance, a view which accepts that for the most part individual's are to be seen as abandoned by Reason and to be considered under the category of means, yet there is one misreading of this view which we must oppose. It must not be taken to separate individuals in every respect from Reason, i.e. from the Highest. Immanent *within individuals, there is an eternal or divine property which is in no way subordinate* to Reason. This property is found, for example, in people's moral, ethical and religious lives ... (S.50). When we speak of a "means" to an end we at first imagine that the means stands outside the end or has no share in the end. In fact, even natural things at large must have a characteristic within them which accords with the rational end which is the conception of Reason. Less than other creatures, humans behave according to that wholly external relation while their freedom also provides them with the opportunity to satisfy personal aims which may be different from the aim of Reason. *Humans have a share in that aim and that is why they are ends in themselves.* Humans are not mere formal ends in themselves as are living things ... whose properties are indeed *rightly* subordinated to human life and used as means. In contrast, humans are ends in themselves in the sense that they form the content of the *rational* aim ... It is only because this divinity is in humans that they can be an end in themselves. From the outset, this property is *self-conscious reason* and so far as it is active and self-determining, it is called *freedom* ... This property partially raises humans above the realm of external necessity and chance. However, it must also be said that to the extent that individuals can appropriately claim freedom, to that same extent *they are responsible* (*Schuld*) for ethical and religious corruption ... This is the mark of the absolute and high specific characteristic of humankind. *A human being can know what is good and what is evil* and this specific

(1) *Rechts*, PP295An. See Knox's explanatory note 61.

(2) This sentence reminds one of Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative, *Grounding*, op. cit., p. 36.

characteristic is *logically the willing of either good or evil*. In one sense, humans can have the responsibility for ... all ... the good and evil in the world. Only animals are genuinely without responsibility ... (S.51).

(S.54) This may be enough discussion about the means which Reason or the world Spirit uses in history in orders to realize its own conception. Put simply and abstractly, this realization results from *the activity of human subjects* within which Reason is present as their immanent and substantial essence. At first, Reason is still obscure though it is their hidden foundation. (S.55)

The recognition of this "responsibility" helps to explain why occasionally Hegel did, by implication, clearly offer prescriptive guidance to his fellows as already exemplified both with regard to the role of the monarch and in relation to constitutional reform both in Wurtemberg and in England. Shortly, this recognition will lead us also to read Hegel's "Reason", "rational", "genuine Infinity", "actual", "right", and, thus, the many hundreds of other evaluative references within Hegel's theory, as logically helping to provide a systematic basis for such prescriptions. First, however, we must face the inescapable fact that in "the owl of Minerva" paragraph, Hegel clearly denies by implication that philosophy can offer any political prescriptions.

Hegel's Denial of Prescription

Since the following quotation plainly limits philosophy to *retrospective* knowing by saying that "philosophy is always too late" to teach "the world" how it "ought to be", it also, by implication, unavoidably denies prescription to philosophy. This is why it is argued here that it must be altered if a similar paragraph is to be retained within the 'text' of a philosophically necessary political theory. Each of the following improving *modifications* is keyed to the points marked within the translation:

*1): insert the word, 'almost';

*2): insert the word, 'usually';

*3): insert the word, 'usually';

*4): insert the phrases, 'if philosophy's rational ideal world is to assist actuality's structuring process in any way, a citizen seeking to use this ideal must, more importantly, be aided by the empirically existent tendencies which are already strong within that process. Be that as it may, usually...';

*5): or instead of '*4', perhaps only insert 'alone' here; and

*6): insert the word, 'usually':

Rechts, S.27 (p.12):

One more word remains to be said about the teaching of how the world ought to be. Philosophy (*1) *always* comes too late to give it anyway. As the thought of the world, philosophy (*2) *first* appears in time *after* actuality's structuring process *has been completed* and has made itself ready to be conceived philosophically. The rationally ideal world as distinct from the empirically real world (*3) *first* appears within the ripeness of the relevant empirical actuality. This is a teaching of the conception of Reason, and history equally shows it to be necessary. This rational ideal grasps this same empirical world in its substance. This ideal builds this world up into an intellectual realm. Therefore, (*4) when philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of living become old. With this grey in grey, (*5) that shape *is not able* to rejuvenate itself but only to know itself: the owl of Minerva (*6) *first* begins its flight with the falling of the dusk.

If philosophy's "grey in grey" only comes *after* "a shape of living" has matured and if this shape cannot be "rejuvenated", why did Hegel attempt to offer the English the quoted advice on how to "reform" (i.e. rejuvenate) their corrupt constitution? Did he not *prescribe* the "scientific codification of the law"? Would not such codification be one result of the "science of the state" and did not these prescriptions in some sense attempt to help "to construct a state as it ought to be"? The argument in *Chapter Six* and Hegel's own clearly prescriptive practices (as listed in the *Glossary* and as exemplified above) stand irreconcilably opposed to this "owl of Minerva" paragraph and this is why it has been *modified*. If we were inclined to let Hegel off lightly for this bald contradiction within his work, we might conjecture that perhaps it was due to his calculation that if the Prussian censors read his owl of Minerva paragraph, they might be soothed away from reading on to discover the implied selective criticisms of the existing Prussian constitution, e.g. for its lack of a living representative assembly.¹ This conjecture could also be seen as fitting in with

(1) The fact that Hegel experienced censorship both earlier as editor of the *Bamberger Zeitung* and later with his article *About the English Reform Bill* gives this suggestion some plausibility. Also, T.M. Knox says about the publication of *The Philosophy of Right*, that the "reason why it was delayed 18 months can hardly have been anything except fear of the censor". See "Hegel and Prussianism" in *Hegel's Political Philosophy*, W. Kaufmann (ed.), New York 1970, p.16. Also see my report on Ilting's view on this issue in the *Preface*, page 7.

the Preface's last paragraph which might be interpreted as Hegel's attempt to alert the careful reader to this way of evading the censors. There he says that the Preface as such could only offer an "external and subjective ... introduction to the standpoint of the book". By implication, perhaps he is saying that it should not be seen as constituting a part of his "scientific exposition". Because we cannot be sure whether the presence of the Prussian censors did or did not have this significance for Hegel, we are still faced with the problem of the owl of Minerva paragraph's clear denial of any possibility of philosophical or scientific prescription. Clearly, it must be rejected or modified if we are to move toward a philosophically necessary political theory.

Conflicting Readings

This bald contradiction within Hegel's exposition could lead us to interpret many ambiguous passages in two conflicting ways depending on whether they were read together with the the owl of Minerva paragraph as it stands, or together with his prescriptive practice and the proposed modified version of this paragraph. One example of such possible conflicting interpretations is provided by a passage which occurs in the Preface a page earlier:

Rechts, S.26 (p.11):

This book, in so far as it contains a science of *the state*, seeks nothing else but to *conceive* and to present the state as an inherently *rational* entity. As a philosophical work, it must be as far as possible from the attempt to construct *a state as it ought to be*. The teaching which may be within this book *cannot* extend to instructing the state about what it ought to be. Far more, it teaches how the state or the ethical universe should become philosophically known ...

Hegel's own owl of Minerva paragraph would incline us to read the "cannot" in the above translation as resulting from the fact that "philosophy always comes too late". However, Hegel's prescriptive practice suggests that the "cannot", instead refers to the philosophical priority which Hegel and I give to the discovery of the "inherently rational" state, i.e. the "rational ideal" or 'model'. Hegel is perhaps saying here, that this task is difficult enough for one book and so "this book cannot extend to instructing" any one empirically existing "state about what it ought to be". A "science of the state" must *first* attempt "to conceive ... *the state*" as it ought to be and "be as far as possible from the attempt to construct *a state*, as it ought to be". While the conception of the rational state, no doubt, has many prescriptive implications for every existing state, the drawing of these implications are of secondary importance and are too numerous, detailed and subject to the contingencies recalled at the beginning of *Chapter One* to be included in one book. They are secondary in the sense that they would be impossible to see until we have built a model state within our "intellectual realm". They would be too numerous and contingent to the extent that they went *beyond the obvious* prescriptive extensions. While "Reason-as-constitutional-monarchy" is seen here as obviously implying the general prescription that we should help to maintain or to build constitutional monarchies in our world, it is a much more detailed and uncertain question to determine how best to do this in each, let alone in every, political system. For example, within the political environment of the United States, does the model of democratic monarchy prescribe that we should work for the institution of monarchy immediately or instead for a 'parliamentary' as opposed to the 'congressional' arrangements in the first instance? Even for the British case, the detailed prescriptive implications are not wholly obvious. While the model clearly suggests that we should support the monarchical system, only a much longer analysis might allow us to see whether or not the model (which combined with the relevant empirical evidence and arguments) also implies that the civil list should be reduced, that the Church should be disestablished, or that the electoral system should be made proportional without delay. These are important local questions but philosophically they are not the first questions. Prior is the search for a rational model which may serve as the general prescriptive goal. This model is certainly the primary concern of this work and may have been Hegel's also.

By First Discovering the "Rational Ideal" State to Serve as the General Prescriptive Goal, Philosophy Escapes the Charge of Subjectivist Moralizing.

'Subjectivist moralising' is what Hegel refers to as "negative fault finding" in the next passage to be translated. It is the sort of shallow criticism or prescription which results from what an "idiosyncratic individual ... spins out for himself in his isolation" from "ideals which phantasy has produced".¹ The sort of prescription which this chapter is affirming escapes the charge of subjectivist moralizing because it first seeks a philosophical ideal, a model discovered with regard to the "more comprehensive design" (für den allgemeinen Zweck) of Reason. This is why such a model can stand as a realistic general goal for the guidance of action.

(1) (*Geschichte*, S.51-54, (p.34). (2) *Ibid.*, S.37 (p.22).

Returning to the above passage (*Rechts*, S.26), I see it also as rejecting the easy criticism of existing states which anyone can offer and which does not require the critic to judge any state against the standard of an openly formulated rational model. This view is more explicit in the following extract. The *rational* model is a formulation based on actuality, i.e. based on the discovery of "the genuine value" or the "positive aspect" of all past and present empirically existing states.

Geschichte, S.53:

It is easier to see the deficiencies within individuals, within states, and within the changes in the world than it is to discover their *genuine value*. While engaged in this *negative fault finding* ... one stands over events without grasping that these events themselves are predominantly shot through and through with a *positive aspect* ...

While *Enz. I*, PP6An. would also seem to be ambiguous in the sense that it leads to two conflicting interpretations depending on whether or not it is read together with Hegel's own owl of Minerva paragraph, it is glossed here as an elaboration of the above criticism of 'subjective moralizing'. It charges the "acuteness" of the "abstractive understanding" with criticizing without a rational model and thus of only being concerned with "trivial ... external and transitory ... political arguments". I understand Hegel to be saying that "such trivial objects" are not the *primary* "interest of a philosophical science". In the first instance, "philosophy has only to do with Reason and, therefore, with actuality". The "abstractive understanding may indeed rightly find in such cases, much that does not accord with ... definitions" which are popularly believed to be "correct". In this sense, "Who is not acute enough to see much in his environment which ... is not as it ought to be."

The next example of a quotation which lends itself to two conflicting readings is the "child of his time" passage that immediately follows the above "science of the state" extract from the Preface:

Rechts. S.26 (p.11):

Because some of what is, is Reason, the task of philosophy is to conceive what is. As for the individual, everyone is a child of his time anyway and therefore philosophy also is its time grasped in thoughts. It is ... foolish to imagine that any one philosophy could go over and beyond its contemporary world ... If, in fact, a theory goes over there and behind the world as it is to build a world as it ought to be, then, indeed, that world exists but only in an individual's intentions - a fluid area in which an individual is left to build anything that he might fancy.

While the owl of Minerva paragraph would lead us to read, "the task of philosophy is to conceive what is", as an earlier statement of the merely *retrospective* "knowledge" which that paragraph grants, Hegel's prescriptive practice and *Chapter Six's* requirement that a philosophically necessary theory be prescriptive leads this phrase to be construed as a restatement of the famous epigram first written two pages previously in the Preface:

Some of what is rational is actual and all of what is actual (or only part of what exists) is rational.

This is to say, that not every aspect of "what is" is "Reason" but only those features which are "rational", i.e. those which provide some of the "objective guarantees"¹ or conditions for the human achievement of "the conception of Reason" (i.e. the "teleological aim") which orders the whole of Hegel's system as mentioned near the end of *Chapter Seven*.

The Threat To Prescription From Determinism

On the other hand, if read together with Hegel's owl of Minerva paragraph alone, the statements that it is philosophy's task "to conceive what is", that every individual "is a child of his time" and that "it is ... foolish to imagine that any one philosophy could go ... beyond its contemporary world" might seem to confirm a 'total, external, deterministic' view of the world's "structuring process" which is only knowable in retrospect, i.e. "the owl of Minerva *first* begins its flight with the falling of the dusk". Exactly the same sets of conflicting interpretations would flow from the next section's five related translations. Similarly, they also might be read to threaten any rational prescription by asserting that the future is entirely outside the scope of deliberate, human control. They could be easily taken to assert a 'total, external determinism' if they were read in isolation from the above recognition on Hegel's part of human "responsibility" or read in isolation from his clearly prescriptive practice. In this recognition and practice, I see one of Hegel's voices fighting against the ambiguous, deterministic voice which is again exhibited in the next section. The first voice helps me to remove the threat posed by the second voice to prescription.

(1) *Rechts*, PP286An.

Five Deterministic, Yet Equivocal Passages

In the first of the five ambiguous extracts quoted below, it is suggested here that two *lenient* insertions be made: 'enduringly' and 'for the most part',¹ at the points marked *1) and *2) respectively:

1) *Enz. I, PP209Z:*

Reason is as cunning as it is strong. In the main, cunning resides within the mediating activity in which the existing objects and people influence and wear each other down. They are left to follow their own natures. Reason does not directly interfere with this process. Nevertheless, only Reason's aim is *1) brought forth. One can in this sense say, that Reason or divine Providence as absolute cunning retains itself within the world and its process. Reason or God has left human beings with their particular passions and interests to continue to shape events even though what thereby comes to pass is the fulfilment of His intentions. What comes to pass is *2) other than that at first intended by the people involved.

2) *Geschichte, S.52 (p.35):*

... we say that universal Reason is *accomplishing* itself ... (S.53) Now, in contrast to those simple ideals, the insight to which philosophy *should* lead is that *the actual world is as it should be*, i.e. that the genuine Good, the general and divine Reason also has the power to *bring itself* to completion. The most concrete notion² of this Good, of this Reason, is God. *God governs the world*. The content of His governing, His plan, is world history. Philosophy wishes to grasp this plan because only that which is carried out according to this plan is actuality. What is not in accordance with this plan is only *foul existence*. Those who have those simple ideals seem to view the world as if it were only an appearance of mad or foolish happenings. This appearance fades before the pure light of this divine Reason (Idee). Reason is no simple ideal. Philosophy wishes to know the content of these happenings, i.e. to know the actuality of the divine Reason ...

3) *Enz. I, PP234Z:*

The discontented striving fades when we know that the ultimate aim of the world is as much completed as continually completing itself.

4) *Enz. I, PP6An.:*

Philosophy has only to do with Reason (Idee) and therefore with actuality. Reason is not so impotent that it only ought to be but is not actual.

In the light of the complications of the above arguments, it should be emphasized that while "the ultimate aim of the world" is somewhat dependent on human "self-conscious reason" and willing because humans are "reasonable", this is not the same as saying that the achievement of this aim (i.e. the achievement of 'Reason-as-the-conception of Reason') is dependent on any one individual or nation. No, as Hegel says in the next translation, Reason or "the world Spirit" has "nations and individuals enough to exempt some from having to contribute to this achievement". Given limitless time and space, if some individuals, governments or peoples fail to assist the advance of Reason in the world, it is in the highest degree probable that others in other times or places will not so refuse.

5) *Philosophie I, S.55 (p. 36):*

... the length of time which Reason or the world Spirit requires to achieve philosophy can at first surely strike us as being as astonishing as the immensity of space of which astronomy has come to speak. We must recognize, however, that Reason is not in a hurry It has time enough just because it is eternal. It is not confined to any one time span. Exhausted and ephemeral beings ... do not have enough time. Who does not die before he has finished many of his aims. It is not time alone, however, which is used for the acquisition of Reason-as-the-conception of Reason. It costs much else. As a result, it does not matter that Reason has spent many races and generations in its labour to come to consciousness or that it has made a huge display within history of rising up and passing away. Reason is rich enough for such a display. It has produced its work on a large scale. It has nations and individuals enough to exempt some from having to contribute to this achievement.

This "time" and this "exemption" is taken to grant, by implication, the negative power of some individuals, governments or peoples to frustrate, *for a time*, some of the actualizations of Reason. If so, they also have the positive power to accelerate or at least not to retard "actuality's structuring process". That some "peoples" or "governments" may so retard this process is explicitly recognized by Hegel in the following text which directly relates to the aim of this book to help define the philosophically necessary model constitution. Here, Hegel speaks of the actual or "*true*

(1) This second phrase is present in the above mentioned "cunning of Reason" passage (*Geschichte*, S.49 (p.33)).

(2) *Vorstellung*. Hegel's reference here to "God" as *Vorstellung*, as opposed to his claim that "Reason" is a *Begriff*, would seem to lend Hegelian support to my own preference for replacing God by Reason as at the centre of the comprehensive theory which can be held to be philosophically necessary.

constitution towards which each people must move". That this is a prescriptive "must" rather than a deterministic 'must' is clear from his saying later that, while "a government *must* recognize when the time for constitutional change has come", in fact, it may not do so and this same government and its "inessential arrangements may retain the upper hand" for some time. From his prescriptive position, Hegel also says that "it *is essential* to know what the *true* constitution is" because "what may stand against the true constitution has no durability".

Philosophie II, S.112-13 (p.97-98):

Because every people falls within the historical process, the *true* constitution is certainly not suitable for every people at every time. Just as the individual human is raised by his education within a state from having a perspective of isolated singularity to that of adopting the view of the general interest, so each people is educated over time. Each nation as a child during its barbarian stage tends to move towards a more rational structure. Humans do not remain where they are but alter over time. The same is true of a people's constitution and it is in this context that we can ask the question of what is the true constitution towards which each people *must* move. This true constitution once discovered could be said to stand in front of each historically existing nation as that towards which it tends to go. With the passage of time, each people must alter its existing constitution so that it continually is brought nearer to the true constitution The constitution of a people *should* truly express that people's consciousness of its own spirit, its own living ethical practices. It should give these immanent structures the form of truth. A people's constitution should enshrine that people's knowledge of itself. If for a people that view is no longer true which its constitution still expresses as the truth and if its consciousness or conception of itself and its reality are different, the body and living spirit of that people are disunited and divided. In this case, one of two things can happen. First, the people may either by a violent internal eruption smash that law which is still valued by the existing constitution or it may alter those particular elements of the law which no longer express the truth of its ethical practices. A people may do this when its spirit has moved beyond its existing constitution. Second, a people may not have the understanding or strength of spirit either quickly or slowly to remove such elements. In this case, that people will either retain its *inferior* law or it will become subordinated to a *superior* people which has reached a *higher* constitution.

In this context, we can see why it *is essential* to know what is the true constitution. What may stand against the true constitution has no durability, has no truth, and it cancels itself out. It has a temporary definite existence but it cannot support itself. It has been valued but it cannot continue to be valued. That it *must* be repealed or abolished lies in the very conception of the constitution. This insight can only be reached by philosophy. A non-violent political revolution can occur only when a similar insight is widely held

A government must recognize when the time for such change has come. If, however, the government is tied to the temporary arrangements, ignorant of that which is the truth, taking the inessential, valued arrangements as a defence against the essential arrangements (i.e. against that which is contained within Reason (*Idee*)), then the government effectually over-throws itself under the pressure of this spirit of Reason. With the dissolution of its government, a people dissolves itself unless a new government becomes established. Alternatively, the existing government and the inessential arrangements may retain the upper hand.

Following this long passage and returning now to look at the second of the five ambiguous extracts translated above, Hegel is saying that "philosophy wishes to grasp this plan" so that it can better prescribe which aspects, if any, of the existing arrangements or institutions should be altered in order to make them more closely approximate to the "true constitution", to the rational model which philosophy sees as part of that "plan". Philosophy should recommend changes to the extent that they would tend to make the empirically existent institutions more "actual" and less examples of "foul existence".

The Threat To Prescription From Merely Retrospective Knowledge

With regard to the before mentioned *retrospective* knowledge which the phrase, "child of his time", might be taken to signify and which is plainly accepted by the owl of Minerva paragraph, this limitation on philosophy is clearly removed by Hegel's own prescriptive practice and by his recognition of human "responsibility". It tends, also to be removed by the three passages summarized next which suggest that philosophy may attain the sort of knowledge which is relevant for the future as well. The first says that "philosophy does stand above its time in form" and "is the inner birth place of the human spirit which will later become an actual social or political formation".¹ The second says that "time was required before the principle ... of Socrates

(1) *Philosophie I*, S.74 (p.54). Haldane's translation is confused.

could become part of wider public self-consciousness".¹ The third says that philosophy, as "the thinking human spirit of world history strips off every restrictedness of the particular spirits of the nations ... and ... raises itself toward a knowing of Reason-as-the-conception of Reason".² Shortly, the evaluative and prescriptive implications of Hegel's "Reason" and "actuality" will be discussed, but first, we must return to the above "child of his time" extract in order to finish the examination of the set of conflicting interpretations to which it gives rise. While the owl of Minerva paragraph denies that we might help to "construct a world as it ought to be" for the present or near future, the proposed gloss does not exclude the possibility of our building up a realistic, "actual" or "rational" ought to be world "into an intellectual realm", i.e., a 'model' which would have prescriptive implications for the near future. Accordingly, the rejection of a philosophy's going "over [there] and behind its contemporary world", is interpreted only as a dismissal of subjectivist moralizing, e.g. a rejection of the ought to be worlds of the "abstract understanding", or of the "phantasies" of naive utopians, or of a religious other worldliness. In the same vein, the Preface rejects an "idle ideal".³

Previous and later chapters discuss the model constitution in greater detail. This chapter elucidates the general *evaluative* character of the whole of Hegel's philosophical system within which the model constitution is seen to have its place and from which its political prescriptions can be developed. Accordingly, it must finally be argued that Hegel's system is *evaluative* to its very core. First, Hegel recognizes the existence of an endless multiplicity of partly repetitive and thus boring experiences which he calls the "spurious infinity". This "infinity" can only be defined by contrasting it to what he calls the "genuine Infinity" or "Reason", i.e. to the finite number of specific elements of Reason of which the genuine Infinity is composed. *Chapter Seven* suggested how one such element (i.e. 'Reason-as-the-conception of Reason') enables this list of such elements to be finite by its reflexive completion of the circle of Reason. Each within this totality of elements is a *valued*, specific aspect of the indefinite multiplicity of possible experiences. However, each is valued only to the extent that it is seen either to be an "elucidation" or a "development" of Reason, only to the extent that it is seen to be a condition for, or a result of Reason's "structuring process". These specific elements of Reason are of three types:

- 1) those which compose "Reason-as-logic" ("categories"),
- 2) those which compose "Reason-as-nature" ("actualities"), and
- 3) those which compose 'Reason-as-the-human-spirit' ("actualities").

FIGURES 5 and 6, to follow, recall the pictorial interpretations in *Chapter Seven* and summarize the above elaborations. The very circumference of the circle in FIGURE 5 is composed of "the genuine Infinity" because it characterizes both the objective and subjective (i.e. the convex and the concave) aspects of Reason. All of the points on the rest of the page outside the circle represent the "spurious infinity". The claim is that "the genuine Infinity" as "Reason" expresses the *valued* "essence" or the "positive aspect" of all experience. Similarly, the circumference of the circle in FIGURE 6 is composed of "the logical categories", of 'the natural actualities' and of 'the human actualities'. Outside the circle, the spurious infinity is alternatively called "inessential appearance". The *Glossary* of these terms lists more of the many superfluous, because interchangeable, words which Hegel also uses to register these same distinctions.

Chapter Six claimed that a theory would have to be evaluative in order to be comprehensive because the desire to know what *ought* to be is one of our non-sensuous experiences. It is one of our motives for philosophical pursuit. In fact, it seems that no explicit theoretical attempt to reject this aim could escape self-contradiction. This is why there is a fundamental *evaluativeness* which is reflexively embedded in the very search for philosophical necessity. *If we value* this search, we must value the experiences or the particular arguments, perspectives and pieces of evidence which offer us any assistance in this search. For example, we must value the particular experiential, logical or comparative tests which may help us rationally to eliminate all but one of the competing theories. Also, to the extent that we value the achievement of philosophical necessity, to that same extent, we must logically value the natural, social, political, cultural or historical developments, structures or conditions which arguably encourage the success of this search. These

- (1) *Rechts*, PP274Z.
- (2) *Enz*, III, PP552.
- (3) *Rechts*, S.24 (p.10).

FIGURE 5: Reason as the genuine Infinity which by contrast defines the spurious infinity





FIGURE 6: Reason as the categories and actualities which by contrast define inessential appearance



same conditions could equally be said to support 'the maximization of free,rational living'. In this regard, for example, we might see the reduction of poverty; and the increases in literacy, in public education, in the freedom of speech, in the freedom of the press, and in the freedom of association; as historical developments which make the relevant philosophical dialogues more widely possible and thus more likely to succeed. Speaking with a more precise reference to the concern of this book, it sees "the positive aspects" of constitutional experience contained within "Reason-as-the-constitution" as providing some of the "actual" political conditions for a people to approach a philosophically necessary theory. The existence of a rational constitution would help to encourage a people to achieve the teleological aim defined by Hegel and summarized by another modified version of his epigram:

'Some of what is philosophically necessary is rational living; and all of what is rational living is philosophically necessary.'

This chapter has re-written Hegel's owl of Minerva passage in line with the discovery that the offering of political prescriptions follows logically from the evaluative character of Hegel's wider system. The next chapter examines Hegel's "necessity" and discovers that the meaning of his "inner necessity" is close to the 'philosophical necessity' of *Chapter Six*. The next chapter will also secure the logic of his system against J.N. Findlay's charge that Hegel rejected 'the axiom of non-contradiction'.



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Chapter Nine : HEGEL'S NECESSITY

Chapters Eight to Eleven have the task of elucidating those fundamental features of Hegel's wider system which will contribute to a sharper understanding of his constitutional monarchy. The previous chapter has prepared the way for seeing Hegel's constitution as having a prescriptive significance. The next chapter will examine the social and economic foundations, as Hegel saw them, for his political arrangements. *Chapter Eleven* explains how his system requires the rational constitution to display the three moments of "generality", "particularity", and "singularity". This chapter considers what Hegel means by the "necessity"¹ of constitutional monarchy. Hegel's "Inner Necessity" Is My 'Philosophical Necessity'

Hegel uses "necessity" in two distinct but integrally related ways. One refers to the "objective" processes of the natural and human worlds which would make many things happen even if people had never chosen deliberately to shape events, i.e. "external necessity". The other use refers to the compelling character of the arguments and evidence for the human derivation and testing of theories about these worlds, i.e. "inner necessity".² While Hegel does not always explicitly use the two distinguishing adjectives, *external* and *inner*, the contexts usually make the two meanings clear. "The cause" and effect "relationships"³ of "external necessity" initially are seen to characterize "the Reason which has being" or simply, "Reason", while "inner-necessity" is seen to characterize "self-conscious reason's" discovery of "the conception of Reason". The "conception of Reason" is a subjective "thinking" about "external necessity".⁴ The "conception of Reason" includes a theory of external necessity, and is thus a "reconciliation of *inner* with *external* necessity. This thinking recognizes external necessity's "objectivity",⁵ but holds that it must not be seen as "alien". Inner necessity "overcomes" the seeming difficulty of making "the transition from external necessity to freedom". The conception of the inner necessity of Reason secures the theoretical condition for our "liberation". 'Reason-as-the-conception of Reason' knows external necessity not to be "external" in the sense of a deterministic force, alien to our knowing and willing selves but as "the cunning of Reason" which provides this our rational subjectivity with its very being, its foundation, its material, and the medium for its exercising of its freedom. It finds a world which is life giving and intelligible. We find ourselves at home in the existing world in the sense asserted by the previously quoted epigram:

Some of what is rational is actual, and all of what is actual (or only part of what exists) is rational.⁶

This is to say, that this discovery of "inner necessity" enables us, firstly, to see the sense in which the world as it exists is already rational enough to allow our rational selves to feel not utterly at odds with it. This makes despair rationally avoidable. Secondly, this discovery helps us to see those parts of our existing world which are not rational and, therefore, not actual; and, thirdly, to act freely and responsibly to assist the existing world become more rational. The prescriptive significance of this third result of our achieving a knowledge of this inner necessity is again clearly given voice by Hegel himself in the following extract which distinguishes between

(1) *Rechts*, PP279Z.

(2) See the *Glossary* for lists of references to these terms.

(3) *Enz.* I, PP153.

(4) *Enz.* I, PP159An.

(5) *Enz.* I, PP158Z.

(6) *Enz.* I, PP6An.

"natural" and "human" external necessity. Here he is discussing the difference between "the laws of nature" and "human laws". He writes that "an inner voice says what human laws *should be*"¹ because "humankind finds within itself the test of what is to be accepted as valid":

Rechts, Zusatz S. 15 (p. 224):

There are two kinds of laws, laws of nature and human laws. The laws of nature simply are and are thus accepted We become acquainted with both sorts of laws as those laws which are simply there. Thus the citizen and the positive jurist ... stand and remain no less than the natural scientist by what is given. However, the difference is that the human spirit of critical study is aroused by ... the variety of human laws as between peoples and times. This calls our attention to the fact that these laws are not absolute ... Here, there necessarily enters the possibility either of a clash between one of these laws and our inner voice or of their agreement. Humankind does not remain satisfied with what has definite existence, but it claims to have the standard of what is right within itself. While humankind can have a sense of being subjected to an alien governmental authority by external necessity and force, in no case can we feel the same way in relation to the necessity of nature. An inner voice says what the human laws should be and within itself humankind finds the test of what is to be accepted as valid Here, therefore, is the possibility of a conflict between what is and what ought to be, between a human law which has been determined arbitrarily and the right that has being in-and-for-itself and which remains unaltered Humankind must meet its own reason within the laws it accepts as right. Humankind must, therefore consider the rationality of the laws which pass for right and this is the subject-matter of our science of the state The present world has a pressing need for this science because the culture of the time ... has placed thought at the pinnacle of all that should be valued. Theories have placed themselves over against the definitely existing human laws and each theory wishes to appear as in-and-for-itself correct and necessary

Based on the perspective recalled in FIGURE 6, FIGURES 7 and 8, to follow, attempt to summarize the above interpretation of the relations between these various sorts of necessity. FIGURE 7 seeks to remind us both that "external necessity" has a shaping power before any humans become free actors and, yet, that it helps to foster the development of this freedom. FIGURE 8 shows how the liberating "inner necessity" retains external necessity by thinking it within "the conception of Reason". FIGURE 8 replaces the labels of "external necessity" with 'natural necessity' and 'historical necessity'. 'Historical necessity' is taken more accurately to express the "human" necessity which was implicitly present in the "human laws" discussed in the above passage. Another version of the above epigram may also help me to summarize this section's findings:

'Some of what has inner necessity has historical necessity, and all of what has historical necessity has inner necessity'.

Findlay's Criticisms

While J.N. Findlay's *Hegel: A Re-examination* usually offers an accurate and sympathetic account of Hegel's system, several parts of his commentary need to be considered in the light of an elaboration of Hegel's "inner necessity". The "inner" or 'philosophical' necessity interpreted in FIGURE 8 represents the claim that the *Encyclopaedia's* discovery and elucidation of the many hundreds of "specific conceptions" together constitute "the conception of Reason". *Chapter Seven* said that Hegel's philosophy of logic² seeks to outline all the categories which we require in order to think about thought, and that his philosophies of nature and of the human spirit³ seek to expound the additional distinctions and relations required for the study of nature and humankind. To be more specific, Hegel's plan was to start with the most general yet abstract and thus the most empty and vague requisite elements and to go on to show how a study of these necessarily leads to the discovery of all the others which are less and less abstract and more and more concrete until an outline of the whole of experience is secured. Following this "methodical"⁴ plan, Hegel begins with *vague* "being" (Sein) and finishes with the complex yet *precise* "conception of Reason".

(1) This passage will also be seen to provide additional support for the claim that Hegel himself must have recognized that his *Philosophy of Right* would have a prescriptive significance.

(2) *Enz. I.*

(3) *Enz. II and III.*

(4) *Enz. I, PP24Z, PP42An., PP88An.*

FIGURE 7: external necessity





FIGURE 8: inner necessity with natural and historical necessity



What does it mean to claim "inner necessity" for the derivations of the many hundreds of these specific conceptions? If these derivations are taken to have 'philosophical necessity', we can say exactly what this claim means. It would mean that we can see how every category and distinction is discovered from within the preceding discussions (i.e. that they are logical) and that the resulting interconnected list of categories appears to capture the essence of all our experience, including the non-sensuous experience of competing philosophical systems. The chain of derivations would be seen as philosophically necessary if it seemed:

- 1) to be comprehensive,
- 2) to be compatible with all known experience,
- 3) to be logical, and
- 4) to defeat or absorb all known competitors.

This is what Hegel is taken to mean by "inner necessity". He makes much the same claim for these derivations by saying that they are "dialectical".¹ This adjective both emphasizes that each category is in some sense "*contrary*" to the previous and following categories and yet is only an element within the differentiated totality which is "Reason", and that they all are the surviving results of *dialogues* with previous and contemporary theories.

J.N. Findlay's reading of Hegel differs from mine at several points. While I agree with him that Hegel holds his derivations to have a greater "rigour" than can be claimed for merely mathematical deductions, Findlay does not say with me, following Plato, that this is because a "dialectical" system also must scrutinize the competing assumptions upon which rival theorems are based. Findlay and I disagree even more sharply, however, when he says that this "rigour" requires a "unique starting point" and a "unilinear dialectical chain":²

Hegel assumes ... that a dialectical system is in a sense more rigorous than a mathematical system. For whilst in the latter there are many starting points and many alternative directions that proof may take, in a dialectical system there are both unique starting-points and a single line of proof.³

Hegel himself shows some flexibility on the question of his "starting point".⁴ The reasons why he chooses to begin with the most abstract category is because it is more efficient to start with the simple and then to work up gradually to the complex. With this plan, the dominant direction of elucidation can always be toward the more and more concrete. Any other starting point would require us first to analyse it into its simpler conceptual pre-conditions, i.e. require us, in fact, to *go back* to Hegel's point of departure before we could *go forward* to the richer and more complex derivations. Having said this, however, I do not see, for example, how the system would have been altered if he had begun his exposition with "naught" (Nichts)⁵ rather than with "being" (Sein).⁶ Both seem equally abstract and each seems equally capable of being discovered within our thinking about all experience, including within our thinking about the other category.

As for the claim that Hegel's system is "unilinear", Findlay neither cites nor do I know of any text in which Hegel says this himself. In any case, such a claim would have been impossible to sustain for the reasons that Findlay himself points out.⁷ We have only to think, for example, of the ease with which Hegel could have discussed the monarchical organ after, rather than before, the other two organs. This is illustrated by the order of the presentation in *Chapter One*. I must also differ from Findlay's view in the following extract where he says that the derivations or "transitions" are only "necessary ... in the rather indefinite sense" which is present in "a work of art". Neither do I read Hegel as ever claiming that every category is part of a "triad" or that "absolute rigour" characterizes his system, if this means claiming more than the rigour of philosophical necessity or more than the "in-and-for-itself" or reflexive rigour present within "the conception of Reason":

A study of Hegel's dialectical practice will show, further, that in spite of anything he may say regarding their necessary, scientific character, his transitions are only necessary and inevitable in the rather indefinite sense in which there is necessity and inevitability in a work of art. His dialectical triads certainly reveal a community of style, but ... There is not ... one continuation which alone seems obligatory, but rather a number of possible continuations, some of which seem more fitting than other ... To look for absolute rigour in the Dialectic is to ignore the illumination it has for the sake of some quasi-mathematical interconnection which it does not and cannot possess.⁸

- (1) See *Glossary*.
- (2) J.N. Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-examination*, London 1959, p.71.
- (3) *Ibid.*, p.70
- (4) See *Enz.* I, PP17, PP86An., PP159Z and PP186Z.
- (5) *Enz.* I, PP87. (6) *Enz.* I, PP86.
- (7) *Op. cit.*, p.73. (8) *Ibid.*, p.73.

In the next passage to be quoted, Findlay discusses what Hegel calls his "theory" of "contrariety". It has already been said that all the elements within Hegel's "dialectical" system are in one sense "contrary" to each other. In contrast and without giving his source, Findlay asserts that Hegel's exposition of contrariety "plainly" rejects "the law of contradiction" (i.e. 'the axiom of non-contradiction' discussed in *Chapter Six*):

Hegel's ... doctrine ... is that ... contradiction enters into all our notions and ideas, even those that are most securely founded and in most constant use, that it also enters all things in the world, that is the moving soul of scientific method ... Hegel further emphasizes that he is not talking of "contradiction" in some half-hearted or equivocal manner; he is not saying that X is A in one sense but not in another, that it is A in so far as it is X but not in so far as it is something else. All these devices are explicitly disowned by Hegel ... Hegel makes it as plain as possible that it is not some watered down, equivocal brand of contradiction, that he believes to exist in thought and the world, and to be an ineliminable component in self-conscious spiritual reality.¹

Findlay's next words, with which I agree, would seem effectively to cancel the above claim that Hegel "is not saying that X is A in one sense, but not A in another" or offering "some ... equivocal brand of contradiction", but soon I will examine Hegel's own words so we can test this for ourselves:

... it is plain that he cannot be using it in the self-cancelling manner that might at first seem plausible. By the presence of "contradiction" in thought or reality, Hegel plainly means the presence of the opposed, anti-thetical tendencies, tendencies which work in contrary directions, which each aim at dominating the whole field and worsting their opponents, but which each also require these opponents in order to be what they are, and to have something to struggle with. Hegel's doctrine of contradiction as present in all our concepts does not mean that such contradiction will impede their working in ordinary contexts, or in the well drilled precision of deductive systems. Hegel is no philosophical (p.79)₂ anarchist concerned to disrupt orderly processions by hurling dialectical bombs ...

Findlay does not refer directly to any of Hegel's texts on this issue yet when these are examined we see that they need not be read to support his assertions. Far from denying the axiom of non-contradiction, Hegel's own words can be interpreted instead as attempting to correct various modern uses or reformulations of Aristotle's "laws of contradiction and excluded middle".³ He seems to be explaining how their merely formal and isolated applications cannot be sustained within philosophy. He argues that the philosophical examination of these "laws" shows them to be a part of the complex system of "contrarities" of which Reason is composed. For example, in his larger *Science of Logic*, he is concerned to discuss "ordinary abstractive thinking's ... so called",

- 1) "law of identity" which in its "negative form" is "the law of contradiction";⁴ i.e. "A cannot be at the same time A and not-A;
- 2) the "law" of "diversity", i.e. "All things are different"⁵ and;
- 3) "the law of the excluded middle", i.e. "Something is either A or not-A, there is no third" classification.

Hegel implies that, while abstractive thinking uncritically assumes that these three "laws" are separately valid and are indifferent to one another, they all could be derived from any one of them when they are "transformed" or considered within his own "theory" (*Satz*) of "contrariety" (*Widerspruch*) which is summarized by the following "proposition" (*Satz*): All things are themselves inherently contrary.⁶

Two pages later, Hegel's examples make it entirely clear that these words are not intended to violate the axiom of non-contradiction. There, he implies that "the father" is in one sense identical with "the son" (e.g. their common biological link), in another sense they are different (e.g. one must be born before the other), and in a third sense, one must either be the father or not of a given boy. The clarity of Hegel's position so far has admittedly been enhanced by the free translation above of *Satz*, first as "law" and then as "proposition" and "theory", and of *Widerspruch*, first as "contradiction" and then as "contrariety". In spite of this clarity, it is possible to see why Hegel's intervening discussions might easily have been read in isolation by Findlay "plainly" to reject the axiom of non-contradiction. These intervening words analyse how both physical "movement" and human "impulse" exemplify this all pervading contrariety within the empirical world.

- (1) Ibid., pp. 76-77. The emphases are mine.
- (2) Ibid., pp.77-79.
- (3) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, translated by John Warrington, London 1966, p.123.
- (4) *der Satz des Widerspruchs*, *Logic II*, S.45, P.416.
- (5) Ibid., S.52, p.422.
- (6) Ibid., *widersprechend*, S.74, p.439.

In the extract translated below, the first bold segment (i.e. "... it is at one and the same instant here and not here, or ... in this place it is and is not at the same"), could easily have fostered Findlay's 'harsh' interpretation.¹ Similarly, the later bold phrase (translated as "... any positive impulse is at the same time the negative of itself"), could be more readily translated as "...something ... is the negative of itself in one and the same respect or sense" (Rucksicht). Again, out of context, Findlay might have seen this as evidence of Hegel's "plain" denial of the axiom of non-contradiction.

Logic II, S.75-76 (p.440):

The common experience of physical motion itself enunciates that at least there exists in the empirical world a multitude of contrary things, contrary arrangements, etc. This experience demonstrates that contrariety is not just outside such motion, occurring merely within the reflexions of observers ... This contrariety is the negative in its essential specification. This is to say, that contrariety is the principle of all self-movement. Within physical motion, self-movement has established itself no further than to display itself empirically. Sensuous motion is the unmediated and definite existence (*Dasein*) of this principle. Definite existence moves itself in this way only, not in the sense that it is here in this instant and in another instant there, that is only a definition of motion, but in the sense that it is at one and the same instant here and not here, or in the sense that in this place it is and is not at the same time Movement is itself a definite existence of contrariety. Similarly, is not the distinctively inner self-movement of an impulse ..., e.g. the impulse to eat, nothing other than something which contains within itself a deficiency? This is to say, that any positive something is both self-contained and a deficiency, e.g. any positive impulse is at one and the same time the negative of itself. An impulse is a dependence on a something which is not this impulse, e.g. hunger is impossible without food. The abstract identity of $A = A$ by itself has as yet no life, but a definitely existing positive something which has negativity immanent within itself must go out of itself into the world which alters it, e.g. hunger drives an animal to move and to shape and be shaped by the other beings in the world. Therefore, something is living only in so far as it can embrace negativity within itself, in so far as it has the strength to seize and sustain contrariety within itself Without this strength it perishes rather than lives by its contrariety. Speculative thinking or philosophy resides in thinking by thinking this contrariety and holding it fast within thought ...

The first bold segment is not taken to require that we read Hegel here to be denying the axiom of non-contradiction. He need *not* be interpreted as saying that, at exactly the same time and in exactly the same sense, every definitely existing being is both here and not here. Instead, I understand him to mean that an existent being as such is within an existent world, i.e. within a complex and dynamic system of contrarily defined beings. So placed, it is pushed and pulled this way and that. The definitely existing world as a complex of somewhat differently defined beings must have the property of motion. As a whole it must have self-movement even though merely physical "motion" is not yet the full actualization of self-movement, but all motion is inherent in the contrarieties which must define the "place" of every existing being with reference to its environment. Thus, with respect to a given existing being, while at one "instant" it is "here", at the same instant its definition includes the contrary beings in its environment which are "there". It is "in this place" now, but it is true that "at one and the same time", it is residing within a world of contrarieties which make it subject to being removed from "this place". At one and the same time, it is actually "here" and potentially "not here". It is this gloss which led me to *add* the above clarifying phrase: 'that is only a definition of motion'.

It may be helpful to note that this reading is assisted by an awareness of the literal meaning of *Dasein*: "being-there", e.g. existing in a specific way within a world bound by time and space. This meaning is reinforced on Hegel's next page which talks about the world of "above and below, right and left", i.e. a world which is itself all the conditions for the contrariety of motion. Having all the conditions for motion means that, as a whole, this world is "self-moving".

(1) The opposite of a 'lenient' interpretation.

If Hegel's own acceptance of the axiom of non-contradiction needed any further proof, it should finally be recalled that he took care to say, that, while a "cause" precedes its "effect" and is also "the cause of itself", it is not both cause and effect in the same "connection".¹

Returning to Findlay's account of Hegel, he seems to offer in "mitigation" an *improving* interpretation of his own which agrees entirely with my own lenient readings:

Ordinary thought steers clear of contradiction by refusing to apply its concepts in unwanted cases, and a deductive system avoids them by the sheer precision of its abstractions, in which all factors that might lead to hesitation or conflict have been deliberately excluded. Contradiction will not arise as long as one remains resolutely at a single level of discourse, which one does not seek to connect, nor to see in relation, with other forms of discourse. It arises only when one tires of the deadness and sheer senselessness of such one-level discourse, and tries to pass on to something deeper; its point of emergence is not within smoothly functioning patterns of discourse, so much as between them. Hence the hesitation, the conflict it involves does not lead to the demoralizing paralysis it would engender were it injected into a well-oiled conceptual system, but provides the spur to that deepening of our conceptual grasp which is the essence of philosophy. The contradictions in ordinary concepts are, in fact, only contradictions [i.e. contrarieties] to those concerned to see the facts completely and from every conceptual angle ...²

Another modification of the much used epigram will serve to recall the findings of this section: "What is rational must embrace all of what is contrary within itself, and some of what is contrary but not contradictory is rational".

This chapter has argued that Hegel's "inner necessity" can be construed as another name for 'philosophical necessity'. It sought also to elucidate the necessity of the "contrarieties" which together are Reason's life. This argument and elucidation should help the next two chapters to explain the necessity and contrariety contained both in Hegel's social theory and in the three "functions" and "organs" of his constitution.

(1) *Beziehung*, *Enz.* I, PP153Z. For confirmation, also see *Enz.* I, PP1An.2, PP67An, PP115A., PP119An PP24Z.2&3; *Philosophie* I, S.528 (p.459) and S.531 (p.461).

(2) *Op. cit.*, p. 79.



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Chapter Ten: HEGEL'S SOCIAL THEORY

The previous three chapters have examined some of the foundations which should help us to assess the extent to which democratic monarchy is or is not based on Hegel's own arguments. These chapters have addressed themselves to the wider issues of Hegel's system, prescription, and necessity. This chapter will examine what might be broadly called the social basis of Hegel's constitutional conclusions. More exactly, it offers an interpretation of how his conception of the "rational state" in the *Philosophy of Right* is the highest objective synthesis (*Rechts* PP257) of the many "affirmative"¹ yet subordinate elements which have emerged in social history. However, before proceeding with this account, it should again be made clear that it would be unrealistic to expect that all will find the interpretations here to be *obviously* 'correct'. The complexities and obscurities of Hegel's formulations too easily invite conflicting yet plausible readings. For example, some may want to question the suggestion that, by the application of Keynesian or Marxian methods, Hegel's state could solve the problem of poverty which he claims a market society tends to produce. Of course, all of the possible, real and imagined, objections to such an observation could not explicitly be met here in advance even if one had unlimited space. This problem is aggravated, for this chapter, however, by its greater relative brevity. The *political* focus of this book requires that less time be spent on economic and social issues. Still, this chapter endeavours to face the most important arguments and it is hoped that its suggestions would at least provide part of an agenda for any more extended disputations. In line with the method of seeking 'lenient interpretations' mentioned in *Chapter Six*, the search for those constructions of Hegel's text which make his argument as strong as possible is continued.

We shall begin with Hegel's account of the social foundations of constitutional monarchy. It was suggested earlier that Hegel sees his rational state as the highest objective synthesis of the varied "affirmative" elements which have emerged in human history, i.e. "elements of Reason as the human spirit". Alternatively expressed, Hegel's implicit plan in *The Philosophy of Right* was to outline the human conditions for a rational state. Correctly, he makes a distinction between the "subjective" and the "objective" conditions. Some are *subjective* in the sense that they reside in the developing feelings and thoughts of human individuals and groups. Others are *objective* in the sense that the relevant generation finds them already there in its empirical world as shaping forces (e.g. natural, crafted or manufactured "things"² and certain social habits, customs, traditions and institutions). They are already there before they could have come to the reflective consciousness of the generation concerned. Of course, this does not deny that some of these objective conditions were partly the result of the subjective thoughts and wills of individuals and groups in previous generations. The *Introduction*³ to *The Philosophy of Right* explains how the human individual's ability over time to develop from "sense" consciousness and willing, to "reflective" consciousness and willing, and finally, to "rational" consciousness and willing provides a fundamental subjective condition for a rational state.⁴ People would need to be able to grow in this way before a state with a rational constitution would be possible.

(1) PP258Z, cf. "positive aspects", *Geschichte*, S.53, mentioned in *Chapter Eight*.

(2) *Sache, Rechts*, PP42.

(3) *Rechts*, PP1 - PP33.

(4) *Rechts*, PP19, PP20, PP21An., PP24An., PP26An., PP31An.

Abstract Right¹

The first of the three parts of *The Philosophy of Right*, "Abstract Right",² considers the quite obvious *objective* condition of the rational state that "persons" must relate to the non-human world, to the range of "things" mentioned earlier. People must use their power to possess, control, use, and transform certain items of that world. They must not only eat food, build houses, make tools, etc., but by so doing, they will be educating themselves about their own free wills as powers over "things" which do not have independent wills. This relation helps each person to arrive at an adequate theoretical awareness of himself. For Hegel, the appropriate relations of persons to things are regularized in "property" rights. The relations between persons and other persons concerning property are formalized by "contracts". Possible violations of these "abstract rights" give rise to distinct categories of "wrongs". These, in turn, require different "punishments". This part of *The Philosophy of Right* is interpreted here as summarizing what Hegel takes to be the "affirmative" ways (the most rational ways), that humans in history have found to regularize both their relations to things and their relations to each other when "things" are concerned. While a person initially might need to have only sense consciousness in his encounter with things and other persons, the ordered, complex and repeated character of these relations when established, encourages each new generation to develop a reflective consciousness which is concerned with these substantive entities and relations, these objective conditions of rational political life. At the same time, the reflections of different people from somewhat different circumstances also tend to produce contending views, e.g. about the meaning of "wrong". Such controversy, in turn, fosters "rational consciousness", i.e. the subjective search for rational solutions to such conflicts. This search marks an advance in the level of subjective thinking but at first yields only what Hegel calls "moral consciousness" (Moralität). This is the concern of Part II of *The Philosophy of Right*.
Moral Consciousness³

Hegel argues that moral consciousness provides another subjective condition of the rational state. Nevertheless, he sees it as insufficient because at its highest point of development it still fails to get beyond formal "conscience"⁴ and an abstract representation of "the Good",⁵ a stage of subjective consciousness which Hegel thought Kant had clarified and formulated in his conception of the "categorical imperative".⁶ Hegel argues that this moral consciousness is inadequate because it is, on its own, unable to reach beyond its own merely subjective reflections about the objective world, a world which is only considered abstractly and not concretely. Moral consciousness as such does not go on to grasp any of the detailed contents of the objective "Good". Hegel argues that many of these contents were, in a sense, already present in human history, that many of the objective conditions for rational human living already existed (i.e. "the rational is actual"). He thought that these contents were capable of being brought explicitly to theoretical consciousness by an analysis of the long and varied history of human life and relations on this planet. Such an analysis of history would have to be a philosophical examination which would seek to discover examples and intimations of practices, institutions and attitudes which could be judged to provide some of the detailed conditions for the rational state. *The Philosophy of Right* is seen here to be a summary of the results of such an investigation on Hegel's part. He correctly selected as "affirmative" elements only those historically existent contents which also passed the test of moral consciousness (i.e. those that conformed to the "categorical imperative").⁷ The range of such contents is what Hegel calls "ethical practice(s)" (Sittlichkeit). This is also the title for Part III of *The Philosophy of Right*.
Ethical Practice⁸

"Ethical practices" are a synthesis of the elements previously discussed under the headings of "abstract right" and "moral consciousness". These earlier factors are thus seen both as conditions for, and as elements of, the ethical practices which together help to make up Hegel's rational state. In this third part, Hegel explains how living, *firstly*, in families issuing from monogamous marriage and, *secondly*, in post feudal market societies ("civil society"), provide some of the additional complex layers of conditions for the emergence of rational states.

- (1) *Rechts*, PP34 - PP104. (2) *Abstrakt Recht*.
- (3) *Rechts*, PP105 - PP141. (4) *Gewissen*, *Ibid.*, PP136.
- (5) *das Gute*, *Ibid.*, PP129. (6) *Ibid.*, PP135An.
- (7) Compare *Chapter Four*. It may be recalled that the earlier formulation of my own prime prescription (which I take to be an equivalent of this one) implies that each such element selected must be seen as the best one available for the promotion of 'free, rational living'.
- (8) PP142 - PP360.

Family¹

Briefly interpreted, Hegel argues that monogamous love between two people and the resulting family tends best to provide members with their first direct and intense experience of a *felt* "unity"² between persons. Thus, each tends to widen his circle of caring beyond himself or herself. One comes to see that not only isolated individuals but families can have property. Family life based on "love" fosters a sense of *sharing*, e.g. in the family's wealth. Also, the intimate relations and experience of others within a family when young help to give each member a realistic and concrete content to his or her developing moral consciousness. Hegel argues that the ethical practices of family life help to give substantive meaning to the moral imperatives which might otherwise be unable to reach beyond abstract consciousness. Being a member of a family gives us a pre-intellectual understanding of human nature which later can be widened and refined in more philosophical formulations. Consequently, the "rational being" which tends to be discovered comes not to be seen merely as an isolated computing or judging power. Instead, a human being's "rationality" is seen only as the highest of his faculties, the distinct power which must recognize and seek to reconcile the multiplicity of different stimuli, emotions, reflections, etc., which are also part of the being of any real and rational person's living in the world with other people. Thus, even if rationality is appropriately seen as the final subjective arbiter, it will also tend to be appreciated that it depends, up to a point, on certain biological, environmental, sensuous and emotional conditions for its development in each person. This does not deny but complements *Chapter Seven's* point that, for Hegel, these conditions for subjective reason are themselves made possible only as elements of "Reason". Subjective reason relies on them to provide the concrete problems and applications which enable one's moral reflections to have more than just a cerebral field of operation. The felt unity which tends to be experienced in families provides a pre-theoretical basis for any later moral and ethical consciousness, e.g. it generates a foundation for the later development of "patriotism",³ i.e. the emotional or intellectual solidarity which each citizen can develop with their rational state. My own theory of the family largely agrees with Hegel's but mine rejects the male chauvinist and overly simple sexual types which he understandably yet unfortunately outlined.⁴

Civil Society⁵

In one sense, "civil society" (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) is seen by Hegel as fostering the very antithesis of the felt unity and ethical practices which are rooted in family life. This is because it initially engenders a focus upon "particular"⁶ interests, "division"⁷ and "self-seeking".⁸ In civil society, the felt *inner* unity of family life tends initially to be replaced by a sense of competition of each against all and all against each. The dominance of this view that the interests of each person are mutually *external* to the interests of others seems to have led Hegel also to characterize civil society as "the external state".⁹ This "creation which belongs to the modern world",¹⁰ is largely what Marx later called "capitalist society", a market society, a "social formation" in which most of the labouring hours of its population are bought in a competitive labour market from those who do not own the means of production by those who do. This labour is employed to produce goods and services for exchange in a competitive market. In this way, Hegel's civil society is fundamentally different from feudal society. In feudal society, the *distribution* both of most of the labouring hours and the goods and services produced were largely predetermined by fixed formulae which were passed down to the progeny of each family from one generation to the next. Hegel saw civil society as marking an advance in human history for reasons which will be detailed more fully later but the thrust of his claim is that market society greatly expands the scope for individual liberation. Presumably, this new society was called "civil" (*bürgerliche*) and was seen as offering this extra field for "subjective freedom"¹¹ principally because of the sort of economy and classes which grew in the *towns* and *cities* in feudal society and which by Hegel's time, had expanded to the point where they were removing the dominance of feudal relations outside the towns. This *urban* (*bürgerliche*) economy tended to make each view himself as one in competition with all others. In these towns, contracts of many kinds became subject to many renegotiations in a life time. This tended to generate a greatly expanded urban population which had to live by its wits and skills. This fostered the development of an

(1) PP158 - PP181. (2) PP157. (3) PP257 and PP268. (4) PP166.

(5) PP182 - PP256. (6) PP250. (7) PP256An. (8) PP199, PP236An and PP253An.

(9) *äusserliche Staat*, *Enz.* III, PP523, *Rechts*, PP157, PP183.

(10) *Rechts* PP182Z. (11) PP204Z, PP258An. PP350An., PP262Z, and PP301.

increasing variety of enterprising occupations and professions "or urban skill".¹ Hegel called the resulting population of urban producers, "the classes motivated by skill" or "the section of skill".² While Hegel presumably also included doctors, lawyers and other professionals within this "skilled section" of post feudal society, he explicitly only listed three subsections:³

- A) "the craft section" (Handwerkstand),
- B) "the manufacturers section" (Fabrikantenstand), and
- C) "the trading section (Handelstand).

In spite of the seeming limitations of this list, it would appear that Hegel intended this category to include all those who, in contrast to the rural population with its largely feudal outlook and life style, rely for their subsistence on their own shrewd resourcefulness, talent, "work, reflection and understanding mediated by the wants and work of others".⁴ Thus, Hegel also called this class the "reflective section".⁵ However, the following three segments of the urban population seem not to have been included in this category by Hegel:

- 1) the "class" of workers which were "tied"⁶ to the growing number of mindless jobs within the expanding processes of "mechanized"⁷ mass production,
- 2) the "day-wage earners",⁸ and
- 3) the unemployed.

Later, the significance of these probable omissions will be considered. Hegel was aware that the material or cultural deprivation of these segments of the population might lead them to develop into a disaffected and hostile "rabble"⁹ which could threaten the very existence of a civil society. First, however, the natures of the other two "orders" (Stände) of which civil society is composed, namely,

- a) "the *agricultural* section,¹⁰ and

b) the official or "general section",¹¹ i.e. the *public servants* of the "general interest",¹² must clearly be differentiated from that of the skilled or "reflective section" of the population. In contrast to the skilled class, Hegel's "agricultural section" of civil society seems very much to be a remnant of feudal society.¹³ More than the reflective urban producers of market goods and services, the rural population tends to be confined to its family orientations and to its dependence on the processes and gifts of nature. Because its subsistence does not depend so crucially on its own creative intelligence and adaptability to new circumstances, because it "owes comparatively little to reflection and its own will",¹⁴ it is less inclined to develop beyond feeling or sense consciousness. Indeed, to call it the '*feeling class*' in order to contrast it to the urban *reflective* population, would seem to accord with Hegel's analysis and with the other names which he uses more frequently for the "agricultural section": "the *substantial* or unmediated section".¹⁵ As a result of the fact that rural life tends to be more "patriarchal", a "member of this class accepts unreflectively what is given to him and takes what he gets, thanking God for it and living in faith and confidence that this goodness will continue".¹⁶ Hegel implies that this "simple attitude of mind" in the agricultural section inclines it to accept almost any state authority. This is in contrast to members of the "classes motivated by skill" who are reflectively inclined *initially* to view all established authorities (even those in objectively rational states) as "external". Unlike the rural population, therefore, they need to be "brought back to and welded into unity in the constitution of the [rational] state".¹⁷

Shortly, Hegel's analysis of how this process of re-integration tends to take place through the organization of "corporations" will be examined. These are the associations which the reflective producers of goods and services will tend to form in order to protect their various interests. First, however, we must see how Hegel's *public service* or "general" section of the population is to be distinguished from the above agricultural and skilled sections. The *general* section is that part of civil society which is made up of the public servants or career officials who serve in the government's courts and bureaucracies according to merit,¹⁸ i.e. judges and civil servants. Hegel says that this class tends more than the other two to develop *rational*¹⁹ consciousness, i.e. it tends "explicitly to have the general [interest] as its ground and as the aim of its activity".²⁰

- (1) *des bürgerliche Gewerbes*, PP256An.
- (2) *der gewerbetreibenden Klassen*, PP253An., *der Stand des Gewerbes*, PP204, translated as "the business class" by Knox.
- (3) PP204. (4) PP204. (5) *der reflektierende ... Stand*, PP202. (6) PP243. (7) PP253An.
- (8) *Tagelöhner*, PP252An. (9) *Pöbel*, PP24OZ, PP244, PP253An, PP301An.
- (10) *der ackerbauende Stand*, PP250. (11) *der allgemeine Stand*, PP202.
- (12) PP205. (13) PP203Z. (14) PP203. (15) PP202, PP203, PP307. (16) PP203Z.
- (17) P157. (18) PP308An. (19) PP301An. (20) PP250.

By contrast, the agricultural class tends more to have the "general [interest] within itself" so to speak, namely, in an unreflective or "unmediated" way in the "substantiality of its family and natural life".¹ On the other hand, the skilled urban class tends initially to lose sight of the general interest altogether as each of its members becomes absorbed by the challenge of carving out their own "particular"² interests in the face of the competitive market. My own preferred names for Hegel's three sections of civil society, the sorts of *consciousness* by which each tends to be distinguished, and the primary content of their *concerns* are summarized in the following table:

NAME OF SECTION	CONSCIOUSNESS	CONCERNS
agricultural	sense	the general interest as felt
skilled	reflective	initially: particular interests as reflected and willed
public servant	rational	the general interest as thought and willed

Having completed the broad outline of Hegel's analysis of the three sections of the population in civil society, we can now turn to his account of how the skilled class will tend also to be "brought back ... into unity"³ with the general interest as formulated and willed by a rational state. We can now consider more carefully the section of the population which gives "civil society" its name, i.e. the *urban* producers of goods and services in a market economy.

What has already been said about "the classes motivated by skill" in a civil society provides the basis for an understanding of Hegel's account of how a *typical* individual's consciousness in a market society tends to develop from the felt unity of the family of his childhood to a reflective "division" as he first encounters market life as a young adult. Thus, he first tends to be driven beyond feeling to *reflection* by the contrasting experiences of the loving membership of his family and of the atomistic "externality" of the competitive economy. Here estrangement fosters education. At the same time, the market pressures encourage him to sustain an ever greater development of his reflective skills in order resourcefully to identify and to exploit any new market opportunities which may present themselves. They foster "the passion for gain" which "involves risk, industry" and the embracing of the "element of flux, danger and destruction".⁴

If this tendency to generate such clever self-seeking in its population were the only feature of civil society noticed by Hegel, he would have continued to see this "external state" as a retrograde step in human history. However, in *The Philosophy of Right* he came to heralded it as an advance, as a "creation which belongs to the modern world"⁵ and which indeed allows greater scope to "subjective freedom". Hegel does this because he sees how the inherent dynamic of this society also tends to educate this subjective reflection so that it comes in the end freely to subordinate itself within the order of general freedom which is the rational state. He argues that the very "system of wants" and the "system of work"⁶ in a market economy tends to encourage such modifications to reflective wills. First, it does this by generating an evolving series of distinct yet related "branches"⁷ of production and distribution. Each such branch inherently has its own set of interests and concerns. It is these which provide the objective conditions for each member of society who finds himself earning his livelihood within one of these conglomerations to come consciously to identify with its set of concerns. Thus, when enough individuals within a given branch arrive at this appreciation, the subjective as well as the objective conditions are present for them to shape a formal organization to protect its common interests. Hegel calls such a voluntary association a "corporation".⁸ He argues that these, in themselves, offer a partial home grown antidote within civil society to the degree of selfishness and isolating estrangement which the market economy also continues to foster in many young adults. He holds that participation in a corporation allows a person a field for "ethical"⁹ activity which was previously absent from his life with the loss of the dominant influence of the family of his birth as he became an adult.

(1) PP250. (2) PP250. (3) PP157. (4) PP247. (5) PP182Z.

(6) *System der Bedürfnisse*, PP188; *Arbeitswesen*, PP251.

(7) *Zweige*, PP251.

(8) See "sections" in the *Glossary* for references. (9) PP255Z.

This is a partial antidote which takes effect as person matures through his working in one sphere of civil society or another.

Hegel argues that corporations lead subjective freedom away from merely reflective egoism and thus help everyone to appreciate how the interests of these "relative unions"¹ are dependent on the general interest which is best formulated and protected by the still wider union which is the rational state. This recognition is additionally fostered by Hegel's later provision for the corporations to be represented directly within the constitution of a rational state. The acquisition of this subjective consciousness by those living in civil societies is both reflected and fostered by a rational state's "representative assembly".² In Hegel's constitutional monarchy, all of the larger associations in civil society are "summoned"³ to elect deputies to such a deliberative assembly in order to "augment"⁴ and to test the opinions, insights and knowledge of the government ministers and of their civil servants concerning the general interest. This assembly, therefore, helps to guarantee that the laws and policies decided upon will be seen, at least by the many voluntary associations which are represented, as either positively supporting their respective interests or as restricting them but in ways which they have come to understand as "right".

Hegel's characterises civil society as an "external" state because the individuals, families, and associations, of which it is composed initially view themselves as "self-dependent"⁵ and others as *outside* their concern. Any existing judicial courts and other departments of government tend to be viewed only as either serving or as frustrating their respective *particular* interests. Therefore, these institutions of government initially are seen as impinging on these interests from *outside*. However, the apparent externality of government fades as individuals, families and associations came consciously to appreciate the full extent of their mutual dependence, as well as the "general"⁶ interest which actually unites them and which is best formulated and cared for within a rational state, a state organized as a constitutional monarchy, a state in which they can directly and indirectly participate. Accordingly, subjective consciousness through the experience of corporations and their representation comes to see the governing agencies *not* as *external*. Individuals and associations come to see the government and the whole organization of the rational state as *their own*. "Patriotism" or the subjective side of the rational state becomes actual.⁷ While life in early civil societies tends to be the ethical antithesis of life within families, Hegel argued that both would find their appropriate and subordinate places within rational states.

Before going on to examine some of the additional problems and deficiencies in Hegel's analysis, the thrust of Hegel's correct view concerning the historical relation between civil society and the rational state should be summarized. He says that civil society must exist before the fully rational state because this society generates some of the essential subjective and objective conditions for constitutional monarchy (e.g. a greater expansion of sophisticated reflective consciousness and the growth of corporations). Using Marx's terminology, the prior existence of the "capitalist mode of production" was a condition for the rise of the "bourgeois state". Thus, while early civil societies tended to be ruled by "external" governments, later civil societies and governments will tend to be incorporated into rational states. This does not deny Hegel's other point on a different level that "the rational state" as an "eternal"⁸ element of Reason, is *logically* prior to every historically existent state: patriarchal, despotic, ancient, feudal, external, or rational. This is because the actuality of a rational state entails the concept of its potentiality. Every actuality must be conceived to have been a potentiality.

Problems

We are now in a position to examine some problems in Hegel's social theory. We have already explained how *externality* tends to characterize early civil society. Individuals, families and associations in market society are initially inclined to view the private interests of others as well as the operations of any governmental agency or "public power"⁹ as outside their own private

(1) PP229. (2) See *Glossary* for references. (3) P308. (4) PP301An. (5) PP157. (6) PP249.

(7) PP257 and PP268. (8) PP258An.

(9) *Öffentliche Macht*, PP234Z, PP252. I take the following references to be interchangeable with "the public power": "the police" (Polizei, PP230, PP256), "the securing power of the general [interest]" (die sichernde Macht des Allgemeinen, PP231), "the general caring and directing [agency]" (allgemeine Vorsorge und Leitung, PP2365), "the general power" (allgemeine Macht, PP241) and "the policing caring [agency]" (polizeiliche Vorsorge, PP249).

concerns. Their *feeling* for the general interest awakened in early family life has got lost in the egoistic *reflections* of young adulthood. Thus, the public powers are perceived as "external ordering and managing"¹ agencies. Because each executive or judicial agency is encountered one by one, each is at first *subjectively* seen as a separate entity whether or not it is *objectively* organized as a department of one government. Each is seen as one of a series of uncoordinated and *ad hoc* institutions. This would initially tend to be the case whether a government is in a republic or in a monarchy (feudal, absolute, or constitutional). Thus, members of civil society may view a government as "external" even when it acts to defend the very principles upon which market society rests, i.e. "abstract rights" or "the general [interest] which is immanent in the interests of particularity"²

Whether perceived as external or not, Hegel implies that "abstract right" places a rational obligation upon government also to perform certain other *functions* for civil society. He does not examine these systematically but starting with the two already discussed he mentions the following:

- 1) judicial,
- 2) policing,
- 3) to undertake "the regulation of ... the large branches of industry"³ and to supervise the corporations in order to act when necessary "to moderate the convulsions" which may result from the "collisions of interest" between them,⁴
- 4) to regulate the market, e.g. by fixing the prices for the basic necessities and by inspecting food,⁵
- 5) to superintend a public education system (e.g. requiring parents to send their children),⁶
- 6) to provide "subsistence"⁷ and health services to those living in civil society when individuals and corporations fail to do so themselves,⁸ and
- 7) to attempt to reduce the growth of "poverty",⁹ both by the use of the above measures and,
 - a) by supervising the welfare schemes which corporations may provide for their own members,
 - b) by facilitating trade with "other peoples",¹⁰ and
 - c) by directing plans for the systematic colonization of other lands.¹¹

An examination of Hegel's discussion concerning the obligation to reduce poverty seems to reveal a *contradiction* in his analysis. To begin with, his recognition of the problem followed from his relatively simple, classical¹² economic account which nevertheless contained some remarkable anticipations of Marx's analysis.

Hegel recognized the inherent tendency in a market economy to generate both the accumulation of "excessive wealth" in fewer hands and a "growth of poverty" at the other end of the social scale.¹³ He also recognized that such poverty provided one of the conditions for the development of a "rabble",¹⁴ a section of the population which potentially constitutes a disruptive force within civil society. A person becomes a part of a rabble when, in addition to being poor, he has lost "a sense of right and wrong, of honesty and ... of self respect which makes a man insist on maintaining himself".¹⁵ Another condition for the growth of a rabble is "a disposition of mind, an inner indignation against the rich, society, government, etc.", i.e. when poverty is seen as "a wrong done to one class (Klasse) by another".¹⁶ Although Hegel does not say so explicitly, at one point he might be read to imply that the "working class"¹⁷ might also become part of the

- (1) "aussere Ordnung und Versanstellung, PP231, PP249.
- (2) PP249. (3) PP236. (4) PP236An. (5) PP236. (6) PP239.
- (7) I take this obligation to act as the "trustee" (PP240) of such subsistence as following from Hegel's earlier recognition of "the right of distress" (PP127An.).
- (8) PP240, PP241, PP242An. PP245An, PP253An.
- (9) *Armut* PP244Z.
- (10) PP246. (11) PP248 and Z, PP249.
- (12) Raymond Plant discusses the influences which Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith had upon Hegel's analysis in his *Hegel*, Allen & Unwin, London 1973, pp.22 and 113.
- (13) PP244, PP245. (14) Pöbel, PP240Z, PP244, PP253An. (15) PP244. (16) PP244Z.
- (17) As early as 1801 Hegel displayed an acute awareness of the "misery" (Elend) of *die arbeitende Klasse* which was abandoned to the "mechanical labour of factory work" (Fabrikarbeit), *Schriften Zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie*, S.495, S.496 & S.498. (quote by Schlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, pp.96 & 100.

rabble. He observes that the "class" of workers who are "tied" to the "subdivided and restricted jobs" ¹ which increasingly characterize the "mechanized" ² processes of mass production are "unable to feel and enjoy the broader freedoms and especially the intellectual benefits of civil society".³ If a large portion of the population were to become a rabble, this would pose a threat to the property rights which are seen by Hegel as an essential basis for civil society. The removal of this danger is presumably one of the main reasons why Hegel charges the government with the task of solving or reducing the problem of poverty.

While his preference is clear on this question within the above references, his analysis suffers from confusion and ambiguity elsewhere. At one point, he seems to undercut the government's obligation to reduce poverty by claiming that civil society does not have the capacity to do it. Still later, this revised view *might* be changed back again when he expresses his confidence that a combination of world trade, systematic colonization and corporate welfare may solve the related problems of poverty and of the rabble. If these views prove not be bald contradictions of one another, at least they suggest an *incompleteness* or *confusion* in Hegel's analysis which must be eliminated from the model's social theory. Whether or not Hegel mistakenly thought trade, colonization and corporations could dispel the otherwise inherent tendency of a market economy to propagate a rabble, it will be argued that Hegel could have tacitly assumed that his rational state would provide the best organization of sovereignty to solve this problem with these or perhaps with other measures. In any case, this is the claim made for the model constitution.

It was reported that Hegel suggests that civil society cannot solve the problem of poverty. He writes that the question of "how poverty is to be abolished is one of the most important problems which agitates modern society".⁴ Immediately after this, in the next paragraph, he rejects two different strategies for its elimination and concludes that civil society does not have "the capacity (Vermogen) to check poverty and the growth of the rabble".⁵ The *first* proposal was that the "richer classes" ⁶ or public "foundations" like "hospitals" or "monasteries" should provide the poor with subsistence, without requiring them to work for it. He rejects this because it inherently "violates the principle of civil society" which is built on the attitude that each must earn his own way. Such free gifts would thus tend to undermine the sense of "self-respect" (Ehre) which is itself a barrier to the "condition of mind" that inclines one to fall into the rabble. Thus, Hegel plausibly argued that such assistance would help cause, rather than help cure the problem. The *second* proposal which he rejected was that the unemployed be given paid work by the government. Hegel's mistaken conclusion rests on his correct assumption that market economies with the growth of mass production and with other advances in technology will be able to produce an over "abundance" ⁷ of goods and services. It is this increase in productivity which tends to generate first unemployment, then poverty, and finally, a rabble. However, Hegel incorrectly claims that giving the unemployed paid work would necessarily increase rather than reduce the problem of over production. While he seems appropriately to grant the advantage of this proposal that such *public* sector work would help to sustain the "self-respect" of those formerly unemployed, he seems to overlook the possibility that the government could plan this sector so that it would produce different goods and services in order to complement rather than to compound the abundance already generated in the *private* sector. Moreover, the additional income received by these public sector workers could enhance the effective demand for the presumed excess of products in the private sector. This would especially be possible if this excess largely resulted, as it might well do, not from a lack of *desire* in the populace to take advantage of such goods and services but from their lack of sufficient *money* to pay for them. In effect, this is a Keynesian ⁸ argument which either refutes or casts into doubt Hegel's claim that such public sector work would only worsen the "evil ... of the lack of a fitting proportion of productive consumers".⁹

These rejections on Hegel's part, of the wisdom of providing for the unemployed by either supplying them gifts or work present us with the dilemma of making sense of his earlier claim that the government has the obligation maximally to overcome poverty. This is the clear

(1) PP243. (2) PP253An. (3) PP243An. (4) PP244Z. (5) PP245.

(6) *der reicheren Klasse*, PP245. (7) *Überfluss* PP245.

(8) Raymond Plant makes a similar point in his "Economic and Social Integration in Hegel's Political Philosophy", a paper published in the proceedings of the 1976 meeting of the Hegel Society of America, D.P. Verene (ed.), *Social and Political Thought: The Philosophy of Objective Spirit*, Humanities Press, 1980, p. 86.

(9) PP245.

implication of the combination of the following passages:

- 1) "... the possibility of sharing in the general wealth ... is assured by the public power ... (even though) this assurance must remain incomplete ... ;¹
- 2) "The general power takes the place of the family where the poor are concerned in respect not only of *their immediate wants* but also of laziness of disposition, malignity, and other vices which arise out of their plight and their sense of wrong";²
- 3) "... society struggles to make [moral or subjective aid] less necessary by discovering the general causes of penury (Notdurft), the general means for its relief, and by *organizing* relief accordingly ... [i.e.] general regulations and ordinances which are *obligatory*. Public conditions are ... to be regarded as *all the more perfect* the less (in comparison with what is arranged publicly) is left for individual [charity] to do";³ and
- 4) "Since civil society is responsible for feeding its members it also has the right to press them to provide for their own livelihood".⁴

Hegel's rejection of the two strategies for removing poverty even makes one wonder if he meant to imply his own approval of the contemporary policy in Scotland when he reported it without comment. Apparently, this policy was to "leave the poor to their fate, and to instruct them to beg in the streets".⁵

It is difficult to see how he could have thought begging would be more likely to produce "self-respect" in the poor than gifts. Perhaps he did not believe this but his words face us with the question of what other policy would be left if the provision of gifts and jobs is denied? Again, if the poor are to be forced to "beg in the streets", this would conflict with Hegel's earlier argument that "society" through its government should "struggle" to discover "the general causes of penury, the general means for its relief" and *organize assistance* accordingly. More specifically, it would conflict with the examples of such "general means of relief" which he listed, e.g. "public almshouses, hospitals ..." ⁶ Be this as it may, Hegel's rejections of the two remedies seem to imply that he had become resigned to the insolubility of the problem of poverty which he admitted may grow to afflict a "mass" ⁷ of the population. His conclusions *seem* further to be confused, however, by his going on later to *imply* that these problems might either wholly or partly be alleviated by a combination of world trade, "systematic colonization" ^B and a system of welfare self-administered by the corporations.⁹

Hegel did not make it clear whether or not he expected that such trade, colonization and corporate welfare would fully solve the problem of the rabble. It could be argued, however, that the most that international trade and colonization could do is to provide a *temporary* remedy. After all, these measures would only tend eventually to make the whole world into a competitive market. If so, the same tendency to produce the extremes of wealth and poverty which Hegel had noticed within a "particular civil society" ¹⁰ would again re-assert itself in a world civil society. Therefore, *if* Hegel saw world trade and colonization as offering an adequate long term solution for the "distress" ¹¹ of the class tied to mass productive work, to the problems of poverty and of the growth of a rabble, he was mistaken. This inadequacy in Hegel's analysis requires Keynesian, Marxian, or other remedies to be attempted by the model social theory.

To some extent, Hegel also hopes that each corporation could be organized to provide a more direct, sensitive, and efficient means of securing the welfare and self-respect of its members than could the more distant government in civil society. He says,

- 1) that a corporation can become a "second family" which can better serve an individual's precise, general and particular needs than could the more remote "public power" ¹² on its own;
- 2) that under the "supervision of the public power, the corporation has the right ... to protect its members against particular contingencies" ¹³ -- presumably, this means to guard them as well as it can against the destructive effects of unemployment, illness and old age; and

- (1) PP241. I see the translations which appear in this chapter as being sufficiently 'literal' so as not to warrant their repetition in the *Appendix*.
- (2) PP242. (3) PP242.
- (4) PP24OZ. This last passage, could be interpreted as a crude way of expressing the famous principle which Marx adopted as the one which would distinguish an "advanced communist society" from all previous epoch: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs", "Critique of the Gotha Programme", in *The First International and After*, op. cit., P.347.
- (5) PP245An. (Knox.) Bernard Cullen reads Hegel to support this policy, *Hegel's Social and Political Thought: An Introduction*, Gill & Macmillan, 1979, P.88
- (6) PP242An. (7) PP245. (8) PP246 and PP249. (9) PP252 to PP253An. (10) PP246.
- (11) PP243. (12) PP252. (13) *Ibid*.

3) that "in the corporation, the family has its subsistence better assured".¹

Presumably, it was on the understanding that the very emergence of a corporation presupposes that its members have acquired and continue to maintain mutual respect and a sense of responsibility for each other's welfare, that Hegel made the following claim which otherwise would seem very doubtful:

4) "Within the corporation the help which poverty receives loses its accidental character and the humiliation wrongfully associated with it. The wealthy perform their duties to their fellow associates and thus riches cease to inspire either pride or envy, pride in their owners, envy in others".²

Perhaps, Hegel had in mind that each corporation, as an "authorized"³ association by law, would be required to levy a graduated income tax on its own members in order to produce sufficient revenue to enable it to administer its own health, unemployment, and retirement insurance schemes. Thus, every corporation would also have to be this sort of comprehensive 'friendly society', 'a welfare authority' within the "rational state". If this is what Hegel had in mind, the health and welfare functions which he may still require of the central government would only *directly* apply to the members of civil society who were not members of such corporations.

Comparisons

We have now reached the point where some of the possible similarities between Hegel's and the model's social theory can be outlined. If his earlier ambiguous suggestions concerning world trade and colonization can be interpreted only to claim that these could temporarily inhibit the growth of a rabble; and if his relatively incomplete and obscure words about the welfare which should be administered by corporations, can be elaborated upon as has been suggested; then, there would seem to be no obstacle to accepting these elements into the model's social theory. We would find it difficult to criticise a conception of a society which was largely made up of self-managing, voluntary associations within a legal framework; a society whose elected assembly represented the corporations of the time; and a society which by such deliberative procedures and with working majority support could decide in the face of any remaining or re-emerging poverty and estrangement in its population to experiment with Keynesian, Marxian or other solutions in an attempt to solve these problems. Such a society would not only nicely complement democratic monarchy but might plausibly be interpreted to be a *lenient* elaboration of Hegel's own social theory. The way this society generates some of the necessary conditions and elements of both Hegel's and the model's somewhat different constitutional monarchies is obscurely referred to when Hegel asserts that "civil society passes over into the [rational] state".⁴

Of course, it is not claimed that Hegel explicitly contemplated the sort of Keynesian remedies suggested, nor that he anticipated the sort of Marxian plans outlined in *Chapter Five*. Instead, what is being claimed is that Hegel's own rational state would be well organized to experiment with such remedies for unemployment and alienation. It could attempt these, as it *should*, to the extent that they proved pragmatically necessary in order maximally to guarantee to each person an equal opportunity to enjoy both the just fruits of his or her labour, and the cultural benefits of society. It should adopt any policy which has the prospect of increasing the quality and quantity of free, rational living. A lenient interpretation of Hegel's constitutional monarchy provides such a framework for a society's deliberations. However, the claim for democratic monarchy is greater. It would be even more able to face and cope with these problems. In order to explain more exactly why this should be so, first, we must compare and contrast Hegel's definition of "corporation" with that of the model's 'electoral association'. Second, we must return to examine the flaw claimed earlier that Hegel failed explicitly to recognize the possibility that factory workers, day-wage earners and the unemployed could form their own electoral corporations and thus become recognized subsections of the 'reflective' class of civil society. Other advantages of the model will be spelled out in later chapters.

Hegel's chapter on civil society explicitly mentions "corporations" whose respective common interests relate to their different material concerns, each with a distinct "branch" of craft production, manufacturing production, and trade.⁵ It is because these corporations are rooted in a market society that continually some branches rise and others fall. Consequently, he referred to the elected chamber made up of deputies from these corporations as representing the "fluctuating"⁶ element in civil society. While Hegel's words are not entirely clear on this point, they could easily be interpreted as antagonistic to one of the features of the model constitution. They could

(1) PP253. (2) PP253, Knox. (3) *berechtigten*, PP253An.
 (4) PP256. (5) PP204. (6) PP308.

exclude deputies from being elected by the less fluctuating elements in civil society, e.g. the agricultural or public servant sections. Democratic monarchy, with its A.P.R. provision, would not exclude deputies from any such voluntary association as long as it had sufficient numbers of members registering their preference to be so represented. The dispersed locations of agricultural workers or farmers might make it too difficult for them to organize to form an electoral association. Also, while public servants could more easily organize, they might well judge it to be unwise *openly* to engage in the party political fights and alliances into which they would tend to be drawn if they were directly represented in the chamber which produces the government, i.e. their cabinet supervisors. However, if a farmers' or a farm workers' union, or if a union of public servants wished to be directly represented, democratic monarchy would allow this. At the same time, its A.P.R. system would equally allow these groups or their individual members instead to choose to channel their votes through either their geographical constituency or through any other electoral association, e.g. one of the political parties.

This raises another difference between Hegel's and the model's constitution. The latter's acceptance of *mass political parties receives no explicit support* from Hegel's words. Later chapters will return to the details of this issue but the greatest support for the model's electoral arrangements which can be claimed from Hegel's words are that,

- 1) he explicitly favoured parliamentary "parties",¹
- 2) *may* have included municipal or "community",² "professional",³ and "religious"⁴ corporations among the list to be represented in addition to the craft, manufacturer, and trade corporations, and
- 3) explicitly declared his preference for the as yet atomized "multitude"⁵ to be organized so they could share power.

It is argued here that A.P.R. satisfies or complements all of Hegel's arguments but it explicitly goes beyond them. While similar, an 'electoral association' may still differ from Hegel's conception of an "authorized" association (i.e. a "corporation") because the model openly invites all adults to secure a voting participation in the constitution by registering with any of a wider range of electoral associations. Perhaps more importantly, however, it would openly encourage the unemployed, the day-wage earners, and the mass production workers either to join existing associations or to organize their own "corporations". Again, perhaps a little implicit support for this provision from Hegel's own words might be claimed when he said that the "multitude" must become "organized". However, this need not necessarily be taken to imply that they should form themselves into electoral associations. Nevertheless, the thrust of his whole argument that the "difference"⁶ and "division"⁷ generated by market society has to be "brought back" to the articulated "unity"⁸ of a rational state, when combined with his desire to inhibit the growth of a rabble, could plausibly be read to give broad support for the representation of all segments of the population. Arguably, all groups should be represented, according to Hegel, as long as they had *reflectively* developed sufficient solidarity with a sizable enough portion of their fellows to have enabled them to organize and sustain an 'electoral association'.⁹ I see no reason to doubt that the stresses of being unemployed or of doing factory or casual work would stimulate the development of "reflection" in some just as Hegel saw the required levels of sophisticated reflection being fostered by life within other "branches" of market society. Thus, when day-wage workers, industrial workers, or the unemployed reflect on their respective common problems, they may well be able to form "corporations" like those formed by others in "the system of work".

If so, these electoral associations, like the other organized parts of civil society, could play a constructive role in the deliberations in the elected chamber. While Hegel does not *explicitly* support corporations for workers and the unemployed, neither does he explicitly rule them out. *Leniently* interpreted, his formulations might suggest that he had just not yet come to see how these segments of the population could acquire the necessary reflective solidarity with others

(1) See *Glossary*. (2) *Gemeinden*, PP288. (3) *Gewerbe*, PP288.

(4) PP270An. (5) PP290Z. (6) PP182Z. (7) PP256An. (8) PP157.

(9) I.e., an association which also functions between general elections to promote and protect its common interests, whatever they might be - an association with a "wider posture" (PP308) than the collection of votes at election time.

which would enable them to form corporations. *Harshly* interpreted, he might be said either to be a proponent or a victim of the dominant "bourgeois ideology" which endeavoured to minimize the power of the working class to resist the exploitative conditions of capitalist society.

Market Society vs. Communist Society

One last issue remains to be faced in this chapter. It might easily be supposed that the broad acceptance of Hegel's market society within the model social and political theory conflicts with the similar acceptance in *Chapter Five* of Marx's communist society. However, there is no logical contradiction here because democratic monarchy provides the most rational decision-making framework for either society. It complements and thus could be supported by either society. It also could help either deliberately to decide to modify itself into the other. Thus, it is argued that Hegel's and the model's justification of private "property" rights could be equally satisfied either in a market or in a Marxian communist society. Marx recognized the appropriateness of "personal" property even if he rejected "private" and "bourgeois" property for communist society. He argued that when most of the means of production are collectively and democratically controlled, the remaining "personal property" would lose its "class character".¹ Similarly, it is argued that life within communist society could be at least as conducive to the generation of the required level of sophisticated reflective consciousness which is a condition of a maximally rational society, constitution, and state.

To the extent that the stimulation of reflection may be uniquely dependent on people's participation in a market economy as Hegel might easily be read to argue, no reason as yet is seen here why a restricted market economy should not be retained for the production of 'luxuries' within a communist society. *Luxuries* are all the goods and services which are not deemed to be basic for all humans to 'live', i.e. what are not seen (by the democratic deliberations of the hierarchy of communal assemblies) to provide the necessary conditions which give genuinely equal opportunity to all. In contrast, for the production of these basic necessities (e.g. food, shelter, education, recreation, health services), the means of production would have to be collectively owned, controlled, and worked. All would be expected to contribute his or her equal share, within the limits of administrative possibility, of the labour required for this production. Fairness might also counsel the rotation of both the unpopular and the popular jobs within the sphere according to a plan agreed to by the elected assembly. Alternatively or additionally, such a plan might require an agreed system of differential rewards for the performance of some functions: more reward per hour for the unpopular and less for the popular jobs. If all had the *right* to share in the consumption of these necessities according to their assessed needs, then each would be in a position freely to choose or not to choose to participate in the production and consumption of luxuries. Such a market economy within a communist society when combined with the other objective features (principally its provision for genuine equal opportunity), could arguably foster at least as much sophisticated reflection as might tend to be generated within Hegel's own civil society.

Apart from my rejection of Hegel's male chauvinism, this chapter has tried to show how the model's social theory may be seen as compatible with Hegel's even though it does clearly go beyond his own formulations at certain points. The model theory explicitly widens Hegel's definitions of "corporation" and of the "reflective section". Also, while Hegel seems understandably to have assumed that only a dominantly market society could be complemented by his rational state, the model constitution could equally provide the sovereign organization for a dominantly communistic society. The next chapter will expound the three moment structure of Hegel's conception of the state while the last chapter will compare Hegel's own constitutional monarchy with democratic monarchy.

(1) Op. cit., p.81. Similarly, Marx seems to want "individual property", op. cit., "The Civil War in France", p.213

C h a p t e r E l e v e n :
T h e T h r e e M o m e n t S t r u c t u r e
O f H e g e l ' s S t a t e A n d S y s t e m

Just as the previous chapters have helped to explain the way in which democratic monarchy largely rests on Hegel's Reason, necessity, and social theory; this chapter will outline the three moment structure which shapes both his constitution and the model. Thus, here I will continue to sketch the argument that could be made for seeing democratic monarchy *logically* as an integral element of a comprehensive theory. This common foundation for Hegel's and the model's constitutional monarchies will help the next chapter to elaborate the differences between the two. One superficial difference, however, should be noted immediately. While both refer to "the law-giving function", Hegel more usually names the other two functions as the "governing", and as the "monarchical" or "finalising" functions, respectively. The model's two different labels (the 'particularizing' and 'unifying' functions), offer clarifying interpretations of Hegel's own argument. Both constitutions agree that the three functions of the ideal organization of the state are manifestations of the wider three moment (Moment) structure which also characterizes the many other elements of Hegel's system. According to Hegel, all the specific categories and actualities of Reason have the moments of "generality", "particularity", and "singularity".¹ "Reason", "the conception of Reason", all of the other "specific elements of Reason", and all of their corresponding "specific conceptions", are each composed of these three "moments".

Generality, Particularity, and Singularity

Hegel uses *Moment* more widely to signify a distinguishable feature or aspect which is an inseparable constituent of a larger totality. Thus, while he does use it to refer to generality, particularity and singularity, he also uses it to name what has thus far been translated as "element". This use of "element" and the later uses of "function" and "organ" as some of the translations of *Moment*, seek to make the exposition of the model more precise than Hegel's own. The following passage confirms the reading that, for Hegel, Reason and each specific element of Reason have the three "moments" of generality, particularity and singularity:

Rechts, PP272An.:

How the *conception* of a specific element of Reason (Idee) and thus how, in a more concrete way, the specific elements of Reason themselves immanently define themselves, and therewith how their moments of generality, particularity and singularity are abstractly established is discovered in the philosophy of logic.²

Previous chapters have silently recorded this reading of Hegel by dividing the circles in the various FIGURES into three arcs, each arc representing one of these three moments. Shortly, I will explain, for example, why the arcs in FIGURE 3 labelled "Reason-as-logic", "Reason-as-nature" and 'Reason-as-the-human spirit', respectively, are called Reason's moments of generality, particularity and singularity. The meaning of these terms will be made clearer if their formal association with 'all', 'some' and 'one' are recalled. A truly universal or *general* statement applies to *all* the cases without exception defined by that statement. The list of these cases is that statement's *particularity*, i.e. each such case is a *particular* instance or is a *particularization* of that general statement. Any list of particularizations could include only *some* not all experiences. Moreover, it could not include any irrelevant experiences or cases. A general statement, one of its particular cases, or their consistent union, can be said to have *singularity* because each is *one*. To summarize, a statement has *generality* if it applies to *all* such cases. *Some* finite number of such

(1) *Allgemeinheit, Besonderheit, Einzelheit*.

(2) Also see *Enz. I*, PP163, PP164 and An., and *Logik II*, S.263-301 (pp. 600-622).

cases constitutes its *particularity*. The fact that either or both can be contained in *one* statement constitutes its *singularity*. The way Hegel sometimes uses these terms also makes them signposts for moving within his system. As a "system", Hegel's philosophy is a reflexive *hierarchy* of *general* statements or conceptions. "Reason" is at the top of this hierarchy because it is the general conception which organizes and includes all others. It is the general of generals and together they seek to outline the truth of all experience. Each of the elements within this hierarchy of generality refers to a distinct aspect of experience, some being more limited in scope than others. Occasionally, Hegel refers to the *generality* of a given element and at other times speaks either of the *particularity* or the *singularity* of the same element. In such contexts, "generality" directs us to move *up* the hierarchy in order to recall that this element is part of a wider system which seeks to outline *all* experience. Similarly, its "particularity" is a signpost directing us to move *down* the hierarchy by recalling that this element itself contains *some* more limited elements. Its "singularity" is a signpost directing us to *stop* for an instant within the hierarchy to notice that this element is *one*, is one element of the whole or is one integration of more limited elements. Recalling again the formal association of the three moments with *all*, *some* and *one*, the same "element" can be said to be a *general* conception (i.e. that it refers to *all* defined cases), a *particularization* of Reason (i.e. is one of the *finite* number or a particular element within the hierarchy of generality), and a *single* point within that hierarchy. In different senses, this same hierarchy could be called a hierarchy of particularity, of singularity, or of generality. The articulated identity of these three moments is asserted by Hegel in the following brief but difficult passage:

Logik II, §.298 (p.620):

Because it is only a specific and *general* conception, a particular conception is on the same basis a *singular* conception. And conversely, because a singular conception is a specific and general conception, it is as much a particular conception.

We are now in a position to explain why the three arcs in *Chapter Seven's* FIGURE 3 labelled "Reason-as-logic", "Reason-as-nature" and "Reason-as-the-[human]-spirit", are respectively called Reason's moments of generality, particularity and singularity. When it is said that the philosophy of logic expounds Reason's moment of generality, what is being claimed is not that the categories which are the objects of the philosophies of nature and of human living do not also have generality but that the specific elements within the conception of logic are more obviously at the top of the hierarchy of generality. The ready implications of thinking about thinking are wider than the implications of thinking about either plants or political constitutions, for example. Equally, the identification of "Reason-as-logic" with generality does not deny the truth that it is both composed of *single* or specific elements of Reason which are the logical *particularizations* of Reason, nor that, as a whole, it forms a complex totality, a unity, a *singularity*.

Similarly, while "Reason-as-nature" is said to be the moment of particularity, this only means that the single actualities which are the *general* objects of the philosophy of nature are less general in scope and thus are less obviously within, let alone at the top of the hierarchy of generality. They are more obviously near the bottom of the hierarchy of generality. They less obviously form a *single* whole. Also, while "Reason-as-the-[human]-spirit" is the moment of singularity, this does not deny that the actualities which compose it are equally *general particularizations* of Reason but only marks the relative transparency with which they display "Reason" to be *one*, complex, reflexive system of logical, natural and human realities, i.e. a unity. Of course, this display is most clearly achieved within Reason-as-the-human-spirit by philosophy when it thinks through "the conception of Reason".

Essential Particularity Versus Inessential Particularity

At this juncture, it will be helpful to distinguish another way in which Hegel uses "particularity". Its use as a signpost to move down the hierarchy of generality and as signifying the finite number of categories or actualities which are particularizations of a more general conception have already been noted. Sometimes, however, Hegel seems to use "the particular" or "particularity" to refer to items of reality which are, so to speak, below the bottom of the hierarchy of generality. In such cases, he is referring to the indefinite multiplicity of past, present, or future manifestations of, and deviations from, the "actualities" of which the "genuine Infinity" is composed. These entities are "below the bottom of the hierarchy" because they are thought to be wholly reducible to these actualities and thus to the finite circle of the reflexive hierarchy which these help to make up. Such "particularity" relates to items for which we need proper nouns and names in addition to the terms already defined within Reason's hierarchy of generality in order to give them a fully adequate account. FIGURE 6, in *Chapter Eight*, called this

indefinite multiplicity the "spurious infinity" or "inessential appearance". Following this lead, these two uses of "particularity" will be distinguished by naming the latter one, '*inessential* particularity'; and the former one, '*essential* particularity'. Later in this chapter, this distinction will help us to make sense of *Rechts*, PP259 and Z, which outlines the three moments of "Reason-as-the-state".

The Hierarchy Which Joins the Monarchical Organ To Reason

FIGURE 9 seeks to summarize the way in which the foregoing discussions relate to the special concern of this book. It displays the hierarchical chain of derivations or "elucidations" which link "Reason-as-the-monarchical-organ" to "Reason". This FIGURE could be said to put the 'absent arc' in FIGURE 4 (*Chapter Seven*) under the microscope. Because "Reason" is at the very top of the hierarchy of generality, it is represented by the largest circle. The scope and thus the size of each of the connecting elements of Reason gradually decreases until the most limited is reached. This is to say, that while "Reason" claims to be the essence of all logical, natural, and human realities, "Reason-as-the-monarchical-organ" claims only to define the essence of all past, present and, perhaps, future heads of state. Thus, this smallest circle would seem to be at the very bottom of the hierarchy of generality because beyond it, nothing else can be said of *general* significance about heads of state. All additional talk could only describe and evaluate the indefinite multiplicity of historically existent heads of state with the additional aid of the relevant proper nouns such as the local titles for the office. Remembering the thoroughly evaluative character of Hegel's system (*Chapter Eight*), the eight circles, from the smallest to the largest, also represent eight prescriptive *models*, each relating to the following different but overlapping areas of experience:

- 1) heads of state ('Reason as the monarchical organ')
- 2) the finalising or uniting of state decisions ('Reason as the finalising function')
- 3) constitutions ('Reason as the constitution')
- 4) politics ('Reason as the state')
- 5) ethical practices ('Reason as ethical practice')
- 6) empirical relations between people ('Reason as the objective human spirit')
- 7) humankind ('Reason as the human spirit'), and
- 8) all experience ("Reason").

As in previous FIGURES, each of the eight circles drawn in FIGURE 9 is divided into three arcs, each arc representing one of the three moments of the specific element of Reason whose name appears in the centre of the relevant circle. As previously, the arc now labelled 'g' for generality is represented by the arc between 12 o'clock and 4 o'clock, 'p' for particularity is between 4 o'clock and 8 o'clock, and 's' for singularity is between 8 o'clock and 12 o'clock.

In FIGURE 9, each smaller circle is meant to be a magnified version of one of the arcs in the next larger circle, i.e. each arc, so to speak, is seen as itself another complete circle when looked at under a microscope. The arrows relate each smaller circle to the arc in the next larger circle of which the smaller circle is a magnification. In each case, the next larger circle represents the next higher specific actuality in the hierarchy of generality. In this way, the arrows direct us toward Reason, i.e. "toward higher and the highest genus".¹ FIGURE 9 portrays only one of the several possible exact ways in which the arcs of these eight circles might be labelled² and the connecting arrows drawn. While the smallest four circles are explicitly expounded by Hegel in *The Philosophy of Right* through a discussion of each of their three moments (generality, particularity and singularity), the largest four circles are only rarely or obliquely elucidated in this way. Thus, with regard to the largest circles, Hegel's use of "unmediated" has been read to be an indirect reference to "particular". The relevant paragraphs for the smallest four circles are translated and discussed later, while the relevant passages which suggest the drawing of each of the largest four circles are listed in the *Glossary* under its appropriate name, e.g. 'Reason-as-the-human-spirit'.

(1) *Logik* II, S.296, p. 619.

(2) For example, while I have drawn the 'Reason as ethical practice' circle on the basis of *Enz.* III, PP517, two other paragraphs might easily be read to suggest a different labelling (*Rechts*, PP157 and PP263).




FIGURE 9: the chain of eight circles from Reason to the monarch.

An 'A to Z' Map Of Reason

The map of the hierarchy in FIGURE 9 provides a pattern which might allow the production of a complete and precise pictorial representation of the hierarchical relations between the many hundreds of specific elements which compose Reason.¹ This would be a sort of 'A to Z' book composed of as many pages as there are specific elements of Reason. On each page there would be one circle divided into three arcs with the name of the specific element of Reason in the centre and with the name of each of its three moments written on the convex side of each arc, the concave side of each arc being marked with a 'g', 'p', or 's' as described above. The number in the centre by the name of the circle's name would refer back to the earlier page upon which it had first appeared as one of three arcs on a 'larger' circle, while each of the three numbers on the three arcs would refer to the later pages upon which these arcs would be themselves magnified and thus appear as complete circles.

On the very first page would appear the circle of Reason (i.e. FIGURE 3) and thus on pages 2, 3 and 4, respectively, would appear the circles of 'Reason-as-logic', "Reason-as-nature" and 'Reason-as-the-human-spirit'. This guide book and summary would be divided at least into eight sections corresponding to the eight levels of generality portrayed in FIGURE 9. More sections would be required if in some cases more than six circles linked elements at the bottom of the hierarchy of generality with the top (i.e. with Reason). However, if six and only six were always required, then the numbers of pages and circles in each of the eight sections would be as follows:


Section One:	1 page
Section Two:	3 pages
Section Three:	9 pages
Section Four:	27 pages
Section Five:	81 pages
Section Six:	243 pages
Section Seven:	729 pages
Section Eight:	2,187 pages
Total	3,280 pages

This map is suggested in order to emphasize the three moment structure of Reason. Its plan is offered in spite of the fact that I have not yet fully worked out whether every part of Hegel's system could equally be summarized in this way, e.g. the relations between "being", "naught" and "becoming". Another questionable implication would seem to be that Hegel's philosophy when systematically and efficiently expounded in this way, would always have to take the form of *triads*. While it is clear that Hegel's own practice in the *Encyclopaedia* did not always do this, it remains an open question whether his exposition could appropriately be recast so as to directly provide the terrain for such an A to Z book.

FIGURE 10 pictorially represents the three moment structure of both Hegel's and the model constitutions. It does this by again depicting the three smallest circles of FIGURE 9, but draws the additional requisite circles so that all the arcs which constitute them are made visible. Because the rational need for the organs must be given in terms of the required state functions, each organ is defined by the way it jointly performs these functions. Thus, FIGURE 10 shows that the three sets of three arcs which constitute each of the three "organs" refer to the same three "functions" of the constitution which are already pictured as larger circles. This sort of *reference back* to specific elements of Reason which are at a higher level of generality in the hierarchy illustrates just how there can be a *bottom* to the hierarchy. It is assumed that such a *looping back* always occurs at some level of generality so as eventually to *terminate* every hierarchical chain of derivations throughout the system. This is another example of the 'reflexiveness' which is a pre-condition for our conceiving of "Reason" as a closed circle of a finite size.

(1) Michael Kosok offers an alternative notational system for Hegel's system. While mine might be said to be 'geometric', his might be said to be 'algebraic'. Also, while offering many interesting suggestions for interpreting the dialectical structure of Hegel's philosophy, he mistakenly assumes that Hegel's system could not be complete: Hegel's "logic has an indenumerably infinite number of 'truth' values (p.247), and that "this process cannot be completed at any single stage for new indeterminacies always appear" (p.249). "The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic", in Alasdair MacIntyre (ed.) *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Anchor Books, 1972, pp. 237-289.

FIGURE 10: the three sets of moments, functions and organs of Reason-as-the-constitution.



With respect to some of the other perspectives developed in earlier chapters, this A to Z map would chart the layered character of all of the "great number of circles ... on the periphery"¹ of Reason's circle. Such a map would attempt to include all and only the terms which have a *general* significance for the understanding of all experience. It would exclude, except perhaps for the purposes of illustration, all proper names and all the other additional terms which one needs in order to give a fully adequate empirically accurate account of any entities within the indefinite multiplicity of beings which existed or exist in nature or in history and which would appropriately be plotted in the area outside of the circumference of the circle drawn in FIGURES 5 and 6. FIGURE 10 shows how each of the three functions or organs is derivable from the conception of the constitution, and conversely, how this conception can be derived from any one of the functions or organs. It illustrates how throughout Hegel's system the three moments of generality, particularity and singularity are both distinguishable and inseparable. This also makes the following two statements by Hegel more easily intelligible:

Logik II, S.273 (p.600):

Each of these three ... moments is as much the whole specific conception of which it is a moment as a specific conception itself. As such, it is one specification of the conception of Reason.

Logik II, S.295 (p.618):

The specifications of generality, particularity and singularity are specific conceptions which are themselves essentially the totality of all specification.

Before elucidating further the third smallest circle in FIGURE 9 (i.e. Reason-as-the-constitution), the next section will discuss and then translate the paragraph which suggested the drawing of the fourth smallest circle: Reason-as-the-state.

The Singularity, Particularity, And Generality Of Reason-As-The-State

In line with the previous discussion of the signpost meanings of the three moments, the phrase, 'the *generality* of the state', could be interpreted in either of two ways. *Firstly*, it could be referring us to one of the elements of Reason higher in the hierarchy of generality, (e.g. Reason-as-the-objective-human-spirit) for which Reason-as-the-state is one of nine essential constituents. *Secondly* it could be recalling the fact that Reason-as-the-state is more general or higher in the hierarchy than the more particular elements or entities which it integrates into itself, e.g. 'Reason-as-abstract-right'. Paradoxically, the phrase, 'the *particularity* of the state' could be read to express the same two sets of relationships between elements in the hierarchy but from a different direction. Thus, this phrase could be read to say either, that Reason-as-the-state is more particular (i.e. less general) than Reason-as-the-objective-human-spirit, or to refer us to the many less general (i.e. more particular) elements which it integrates. Both phrases could also have a *third* meaning. The distinction will be recalled between '*essential* particularity' and '*inessential* particularity'. With this in mind, 'the generality of the state' could be reminding us that Reason-as-the-state is the specific element of Reason which purports to reduce to itself all of the indefinite multiplicity of historically existent or inessential particular states, i.e. 'the particularity of the state' could be referring us to the inessential particularity of the state - the indefinite multiplicity of states which Reason-as-the-state reduces to itself. The phrase, 'the *singularity* of the state' could similarly have three meanings:

- 1) Reason-as-the-state is *one* among the many hundreds of specific elements within the circular hierarchy of generality which constitutes Reason.
- 2) As such, it is the *one* which reduces to itself all of the indefinite multiplicity of historically existent states.
- 3) To be actual, Reason-as-the-state must be present within at least *one* historically existent state. As historically existent, such a state must continually integrate the multitude of essential and inessential particular entities which comprise it into *one* complex whole, into a unity.

With regard to this third meaning, it will be shown how Hegel argues that the organization by which a state can best continue to achieve this living integration is "the rational constitution", i.e. 'Reason-as-the-constitution'. Thus, the next section will return to a consideration of the functions and organs which this singularity of the state has interpreted to require a rational state to integrate within itself.

In effect, the previous chapter suggested how the rational constitution would integrate some of the other 'essential particulars' listed in FIGURE 9, i.e. Reason as abstract right, as moral consciousness, as family living, and as civil society. Of course, there is also an indefinite

(1) *Philosophie I*, S.46, P.27.

multiplicity of 'inessential particulars' which must be knitted within its fabric ranging from the specification of which language is to be used on official occasions to determining whether firemen will wear green or blue uniforms. While at one or another time Hegel seems to use these three phrases and their derivative terms in all of the above nine ways, the paragraph which forms the basis for the drawing of the fourth smallest circle ('Reason as the state') in FIGURE 9 employs only three of these nine. Accordingly, *Rechts*, PP259, shortly to be translated, is divided into three sections. Section (a) briefly speaks of 'the singularity of the state' in the sense of the above third meaning. This is to say, that as actual, Reason-as-the-state must in some measure be present within "every *single* historically existent state" and this requires each to a degree to be a "self-relating organism" or to have a "constitution". Section (b) asserts that Reason-as-the-state must include "interstate relations" because the indefinite multiplicity of 'inessential *particular*' states which Reason-as-the-state reduces to itself, at the same time marks at least the potential, and the probable empirical truth, that every state must live, fight or die among other historically existent states. Section (c) recalls that the rational state is a model, an "effective genus" towards which all particular states incline, or by which, they are judged. It is one element of the ultimate teleological end of the natural and human worlds which is to achieve and to live according to "the conception of Reason". This is to say, that section (c) says that Reason-as-the-state is one 'essential particular' within the ultimate aim of "the process of world history". One could not live in full accordance with "the conception of Reason" unless one lived within a rational state. Thus, section (c) also directs us to move *up* the hierarchy of *generality* by seeing that Reason-as-the-state is an essential part of the highest possible human life as defined by the conception of Reason at the very top of that hierarchy. A reading of the 'literal' translation in the *Appendix* of the following paragraph and of the comparable paragraph in *Enz. III*¹ will show that more liberties than usual were taken in order to make the following free translation more readily intelligible than the relatively brief and obscure original.

Rechts, PP259:

Reason-as-the-state,

- a) has at least intellectually unmediated actuality in every *single* historically existent state because of each state's self-relating organism, i.e. because of its *constitution* or internal state law;
- b) has *interstate relations* and law because each historically existent state has been and always will be, at least potentially, only one among an indefinite multiplicity of such inessential *particular* states; and
- c) has an absolute power over such individual states in the sense that it is their teleological end (i.e. it is the *general* element of Reason, it is the *genus* or it is the specific element of Reason-as-the-human-spirit which gives itself actuality in states in the process of *world history*).

Rechts, PP259Z:

To be actual, Reason-as-the-state must be present in at least one *single* historically existent state and an historically existent state is by definition, moreover, an inessential particular state. This *singularity* is to be distinguished from this *particularity*. Singularity is an essential moment of Reason-as-the-state while inessential particularity belongs to history.² The inessential particular states are independent from each other and, thus, their *relations* can only be externally mutual. In this context, the third principle which we must see as binding them together is their common teleological end which is Reason-as-the-state, the political element of the human spirit which gives itself actuality in *world history* and which constitutes their absolute arbiter.

Indeed it is possible that several states by forming a confederation may be able to establish a jurisdiction over other states. It is possible that combinations of states can arise, as, for example, the Holy Alliance, but these are always only relative and limited, as is also so-called "perpetual peace".

The only absolute arbiter which ultimately makes itself good, either because or in spite of inessential particular states, is the rational state (i.e. the element of the in-and-for-itself human spirit which has being, that which establishes itself within history as the *general* principle, the *effective genus*).

The Generality, Particularity, And Singularity Of Reason-As-The-Constitution

The paragraph which suggested the three smallest circles in FIGURE 9 and which also prompted the whole of FIGURE 10, is *Recht*, PP273. This paragraph lists the three essential functions of the rational constitution (law-giving, governing or particularizing, and finalising or uniting) each

(1) PP536. (2) Also see *Appendix B's Rechts*, PP258An.

"articulating" the moments of generality, particularity and singularity as now understood.

Rechts, PP273:

Reason-as-the- constitution appropriately tends to articulate itself within actuality into the following three substantial functions:

- a) the function of defining and firmly fixing the laws to have *general* application, i.e. *the law-giving function*;
- b) the function of subsuming the *particular* spheres of interests and singular cases under these general laws, i.e. *the governing* or *particularizing function*; and
- c) the function of subjectivity (i.e. the human ability willingly to finalise both the above general and particular decisions into one coherent package), i.e. *the monarchical* or *finalising function*. In the performance of this *finalising function*, the three differentiated *organs* of the rational constitution are held together in a *single unity*. The finalising function should thus be seen as the pinnacle and the beginning of the whole which is *constitutional monarchy*.

Section (a) says that "law-giving" is the constitution's *general* function. Laws seek to embrace and to integrate *all* of the current and foreseen interests into general statements of principle. These formulations seek to promote and to protect the ways of human life which either are themselves rational or which provide some of the conditions for the citizenry to live rationally. This is to say, that rational law (i.e. *Recht*) fosters rational living through the formulation and following of *general* principles. Law-giving is the most general of the three functions because it cannot be performed without the legislators rising in thought to the relatively abstract categories which allow clear principles to be formulated without the use of proper nouns. In contrast, a great deal of particularizing and finalising can be done in existent states on a purely *ad hoc* basis. Inherently, laws result from intellectual "mediation". Law-giving is the factor in political living which most pointedly directs the consciousness of citizens to move *up* the hierarchy of generality toward the conception of Reason.

The characterisation of the "governing function" of *section (b)* as the 'particularising function' probably needs no explanation both in the light of previous discussions and of the partial textual basis for this translation. A people rationally needs not only to formulate the *general* principles upon which it will seek to integrate and to reconcile the changing inessential particulars of its collective life, it must also actively apply these in practice to the indefinite multiplicity of cases and disputes which arise daily in the changing life of a state. The "finalising function" of *section (c)* as referring both to the 'royal assent' which must be given to every bill before it becomes law, and to the form which requires every governmental decision (executive or judicial) to be taken in the name of the monarch. The model calls it the 'uniting function'. It helps to ensure that the many laws and their many more applications will avoid self-contradiction and will continue to form *one* dynamic package of principles and particularizations over time. When this section says that,

In the performance of this finalising function, the three differentiated *organs* of the rational constitution are held together in a *single unity*,

this is illustrated by the second smallest circle in the top left hand corner of FIGURE 10. The monarchical organ helps maximally to guarantee that this uniting function, which should be jointly exercised by all three organs, will be consistently performed. That the other two functions are also to be jointly exercised is perhaps only obliquely suggested by this paragraph. The truth that, like the three moments, the three functions are conceptually connected as well as being conceptually distinct is perhaps clear from our recollection that every *general* law if actual has both been finalised at least for the time being and is being applied to the existing particular cases which are its concern. Similarly, every decision on a *particular* question both marks a momentary finalisation and is an application or particularization of at least some implicit general principle. Again, every *finalisation* at least implicitly begs some general principle which relates to an indefinite number of particular cases.

In spite of these points, however, Hegel regrettably varied his terminology sometimes and this confuses somewhat the sharp distinction between a "function" and an "organ" which the six smallest circles in FIGURE 10 graphically record. In any case, this distinction must be made if we are to make sense of Hegel's exposition. The *Glossary* lists the various other German terms which Hegel uses and which are freely translated here only as either "function" or "organ".

In effect, previous chapters have developed this book's understanding of these functions and organs. However, the following table summarizes the connections between the moments, functions, and organs and thus helps prepare the way for the next chapter's comparison of the model constitution with Hegel's own formulations. Both sets of arrangements might be said to associate

the performance of each function *mainly* with one of the three organs as follows:

	MOMENT	FUNCTION	ORGAN
(a)	generality	law-giving	representative assembly
(b)	particularity	governing (particularizing)	government
(c)	singularity	finalising (uniting)	monarch

This association is inherently determined by the character of each organ. Thus, each is inclined to spend most of its time on one function. Hegel's position is not so clear on this point and thus the model's is again the result of a lenient interpretation of his ambiguity. Perhaps I have only read my own conception,

- 1) into the fact that each organ is mainly discussed by Hegel under the sub-title of its respective function, and
- 2) into his own confusion of "functions" and "organs" as suggested by his usually calling them both, "powers" (Gewalten).

It has also already been explained how the internal structure of each organ peculiarly suits it to perform the function for which it is mainly responsible. This understanding can be briefly restated using some of Hegel's terms:

- 1) The "assembly" as "representative" ¹ of *all* interests should be best placed to formulate the *general* principles which will apply to all "sections" of the citizenry.
- 2) The government or "cabinet" as a smaller body can more efficiently act to apply the law to the indefinite multiplicity of essential and inessential *particulars* which arise daily and to formulate and execute policies both within the state and with regard to "interstate relations".
- 3) The "monarch", being *one* hereditary human "subject", is best placed to help "guarantee" the complex unity or *singularity* of the state through his or her performance of the finalising (uniting) function while performing either the figurehead or caretaking roles.

Constitutional Monarchy Is Rational

The justification for democratic monarchy largely follows the interpretation of why Hegel claimed that constitutional monarchy offers the most "rational" set of arrangements. In political life, it best encourages the reconciliation of "self-conscious reason with the Reason which has being".² Reason-as-the-constitution both as an institution and as a conception is itself part of this "reconciliation" because its *three organs* are tangible demonstrations of Reason's *three moments*: generality, particularity and singularity. The three organs help "reason" to recognize the philosophical necessity of the three less tangible yet distinct and certainly essential *functions*. On the other hand, the way the three organs jointly exercise the three functions empirically demonstrates their conceptual inseparability, their unity or their singularity. It demonstrates that each organ "must build itself into a whole and contain in itself the other moments".³ This is most simply personified by the uniting activity of the monarchical organ. Constitutional monarchy is the most rational organization of the state because it tends best to ensure that the three vital functions will be consistently performed within the empirically real world. If they are performed, this in turn maximizes the empirical chances that the cultural, social, economic and political activities of a people will also become a self-conscious part of a life of Reason. These institutions are better than any others in helping the citizenry both to *act* and *think rationally*. He says, for example, that they raise "particular self-consciousness to its generality".⁴

This chapter has attempted to elucidate the way Reason's three moments also characterize the rational state and its constitution. The next chapter will examine the extent to which democratic monarchy is a reconstruction of Hegel's words.

- (1) See *Glossary*.
- (2) *Enz. I*, PP6.
- (3) *Rechts*, PP272Z.
- (4) *Rechts*, PP258.

Chapter Twelve:

From Hegel's Constitutional Monarchy To The Prescriptive Ideal

Previous chapters have elaborated democratic monarchy as the prescriptive ideal, defended it against republican attacks, and sketched how it might logically claim to be rooted in Hegel's wider system. This chapter will examine the extent to which this model conforms to Hegel's own constitution. It is argued that no conflict *need* be read into the differences between his and the model's formulations *except* at two points in *The Philosophy of Right*. These arise from Hegel's paragraphs, to be translated shortly, in which his monarch is given the "unconfined discretion" to appoint ministers and the right, "directly and solely" to conduct "interstate relations". With the exception of these two passages, Hegel's paragraphs are either plain enough or equivocal enough to allow us leniently to interpret him largely in support of the model. In addition to the previous chapter's showing of how PP273 can be read to provide the three function and three organ structure of democratic monarchy, this chapter will discuss how other paragraphs can be read either clearly or leniently to agree with the prescriptive ideal proposed here. It is not denied that Hegel's ambiguity may easily lead others to draw different conclusions in the first instance. Nor do I deny that democratic monarchy, as an institution for working majority rule, clearly *goes beyond* Hegel's words. Sometimes, his words are either too brief or too equivocal for us to say whether he would or would not support it. The features which seem to fall into this category are the following:

- 1) associational proportional representation (A.P.R.),
- 2) the procedure for constitutional change,
- 3) universal adult suffrage,
- 4) the procedure for recalling deputies,
- 5) no legislative veto for the non-elected chamber,
- 6) the 'figurehead' and 'caretaking' roles,
- 7) the 'state prerogative council',
- 8) some 'life peers' in the non-elected chamber,
- 9) the 'constructive vote of no confidence' provision, and
- 10) the procedure for impeaching and replacing a monarch.

This chapter will not discuss the last four items because nothing has been found in Hegel's words of direct relevance to them. The very last item, however, should be seen as quite obviously connected to the rejection of Hegel's two phrases discussed below. Both that rejection and this procedure follow necessarily from the principle of working majority rule.

In relation to the first six items, many of Hegel's ambiguous passages which might be read as concerning them will be examined. His words relating to the first two provisions will be assessed shortly, together with the discussion of Hegel's arguments concerning the *quantitative* and *majoritarian* features of the model. First, however, the two phrases which the model rejects will be studied. These are the passages which have required a *reconstruction* of Hegel's constitution in order to formulate democratic monarchy. It will be recalled that the model provides, whenever possible, for the monarch's will to be subordinated to the will of the 'working majority' and its elected officials. This requires the monarch to perform only the figurehead role as long as such a majority is in existence. Accordingly, he or she would be bound to appoint the leader of that majority as prime minister. Also, for example, the conduct of foreign affairs would be left *mainly* to the foreign minister and "cabinet". The monarch's role would be purely *formal* in these and all other matters provided that a working majority was present.

In sharp contrast, Hegel's words concerning these two cases do not make the monarch subordinate in this way. Instead, they give him unrestricted priority. While my monarch's discretion would be *confined* by that of such a majority, in PP283, Hegel grants his monarch the right to appoint his ministers at his own "unconfined discretion".

Rechts, PP283

[While the paragraphs starting with PP275 have discussed the prime, singularizing responsibility of the monarchical organ, i.e. the function of "finally deciding", the second function of the monarchical organ is to particularize, i.e. to subsume the empirically exact details of its state's life under the general, constitutional and statutory law. The monarch's "cabinet" or council of the highest counselling positions forms this moment of the constitution's *particularity* in so far as it exists as an organ which is separate from the monarchical organ. The cabinet brings its *advice* concerning the changing affairs of state, including any proposed modifications to current statutory provisions, before the monarch for his finalising decision. This advice should be presented objectively, i.e. with a clear statement of the relevant empirical facts, and of the legal, circumstantial and other grounds for deciding one way or the other. Because these highest advisors or governmental ministers deal directly with the person of the monarch, their appointment and removal falls within the monarch's *unconfined discretion*.

Not only is this "unconfined discretion" incompatible with the model, it would also seem to conflict with Hegel's own earlier claim, contained in the passage next to be translated, that because "the monarch only has to do with the *formal* pinnacle of decision", the "personal attributes of the monarch's character" are not "significant".

Rechts, PP280Z:

Men often say against monarchy that it is through such an institution that a state becomes unnecessarily dependent upon contingency. For example, it may be alleged that a monarch is improperly educated or perhaps that he is not worthy of standing at the very pinnacle of the state's decision taking and that it is indeed *irrational* that such arrangements exist. When such arguments are used against monarchy, they can be clearly refuted by pointing out that their assumption is *nugatory* which sees the *personal attributes* of the monarch's character as *significant*. Within a rational constitution or completed organization of the state, the monarch only has to do with the *formal* pinnacle of decision ... Wrongly, therefore, do men demand objective qualities like education and skill of the monarch. Usually, he need only be a quite ordinary human being in order to say, "yes", and to place the dot on the "i" of the advice given by the representative assembly and the government of the day. The structure of the *finalising pinnacle* of state decisions should be such that the personal attributes of the monarch's character are not significant. This specification for the monarch is *rational* because it accords with the conception of the constitution.

This same account of the monarch as only having to "say, 'yes', and ... place the dot on the 'i' of ... advice given" would also seem to conflict with the second passage which the model rejects. Hegel says that the "conduct" of the rational state's relations with "other states falls ... *directly and solely* to the monarch".

Rechts, PP329:

The state has an orientation towards the world outside just because it is an individual subject. For that reason, its relation to other states falls to the monarchical organ. This is to say, therefore, that the conduct of these relations, *directly and solely*, accrues to the monarch to command the armed might of the state, to maintain the relations with the other states through envoys, to conduct war, to conclude peace and other treaties, etc.

The same unacceptable point is made by Hegel in his *Encyclopaedia*.

Enz. III, PP544:

Broadly speaking, the representative assembly is concerned to take part in all that belongs to civil society. As the representative of private persons, it is concerned to shape the operation of the particularizing function especially by the giving of laws, i.e. by defining the generality of interests (which do *not* have the character of conducting and handling the state as an individual, e.g. war and peace, and thus *not* with what belongs to the monarchical organ *exclusively*).

These passages might also easily lead one to suppose that Hegel granted his monarch the power to decide between the organs of the state when they found themselves in any unresolved disagreements. In fact, Hegel never made his own plan for this contingency clear. Of course, the model gives clear priority to the working majority in such cases, when it exists, and to the 'state prerogative council' headed by the monarch, when it does not exist. This provision fills an important gap in Hegel's constitutional theory. The model's provision helps maximally to guarantee the "unity" of the state which Hegel so highly valued.

(1) The parts of these free translations marked by bold print are quite different from Knox's. See Glossary under "Knox" for a summary of the main differences between his and my translations.

The rest of this chapter examines Hegel's passages which either clearly or equivocally support democratic monarchy. It will be recalled that the explicit value behind the model is that of maximizing the *quality* and *quantity* of free, rational living. Especially the 'quantitative' part of this formulation is seen to carry a democratic implication. Hegel can be leniently read to support both this value and this implication in a number of his phrases, e.g.

- a) the three organ constitution is "rational";
- b) the rational state helps to raise "particular consciousness to its generality";¹
- c) "self-conscious reason" or "subjective freedom"² tends to be raised by the higher quality and publication of the debates in the representative assembly,³ and by the fact that "the assembly has the character of appropriately being a living, mutually teaching, convincing and collectively advising assembly";⁴
- d) this publication "is the greatest means of education concerning state interests" by which "public opinion first approaches true thoughts and insights into the conditions and the conception of the state, ... approaches an ability to judge more *rationally* about state affairs";⁵ and
- e) he also sees the deliberations of the representative assembly as tending to "augment" the civil service's "insight"⁶ into state interests and thus to assist "the state" in its "aim" of "knowing ... the theorized, objective truth of Reason (Vernünftigkeit)".⁷

That this "knowing" in Hegel's view best follows an energetic debate or *dialogue* between sophisticated points of view is marked by his referring to the representative assembly as "a great assembly where one intelligent position devours another".⁸ All this can be true even if we admit as Hegel does that most people have not yet fully attained "the conception of Reason". The knowledge of "the will of Reason", is 'currently' not "possessed by the people":

Rechts, PP301An. (S.469):

... the in-and-for-itself Will which has being, i.e. the will of Reason, is the fruit of a deeper knowing and insight which is plainly not currently possessed by the people as a whole.

However, as *Chapter Six* argued, to the extent that the model's democratic institutions engender an extension of the quantity of rational thought and action, the more deliberative participation in communal decision-making would conform to the criteria of philosophical necessity. The state's policies would be more likely to result from a *comprehensive* theory which had integrated within itself the full range of available *experiences* and *competing* views. On the other hand, the more people might be arbitrarily excluded from a state's collective deliberations, the greater would be the *prima facie* case for seeing their procedures and conclusions as less than fully rational. In this way, a greater *quantity* of rational living would also tend to enhance the *quality* of thought and action. Rational quality and quantity tend to complement one another.

Previous chapters have derived the argument for majority rule from the philosopher's assumption that others may also be, or have the potential to become, rational beings. However, the above argument also accounts for the rational preference for majority rule over minority rule. The sheer existence of an enduring, working majority is evidence that *more* deliberative reconciliation of conflicts has taken place within this majority than has been achieved by any opposing voting block. Of course, as empirical, such evidence could not give conclusive proof that such rational unity had been attained. For example, the unity might instead be based on the anti-rational charisma of a fascist leader. However, a model constitution can only be constructed on the basis of such *empirical* presumptions. No constitution can protect a community absolutely from the possible emergence of anti-rational majorities or minorities. The model can only claim to minimize these risks. Therefore, when a working majority exists, it has the constitutional right to rule, because empirically or *quantitatively* speaking, it is presumed to be the most rational.

For readers so inclined, some of Hegel's own passages might be interpreted to show his interest in such wider popular 'participation'⁹ and popular sovereignty. For example, he equivocally expresses his interest in popular participation by referring to the citizens' vote as "a high political right" and as "one of the most important political functions".¹⁰ Hegel also observes that,

Rechts, PP317Z:

The principle of the modern world demands that what *everyone* should acknowledge must prove itself to be justified ... *everyone* wishes to have a share in discussing and advising ...

That it is of "the highest importance" for as *many* citizens as possible to "organize" themselves into the sorts of 'associations' which could be represented in the elected chamber could clearly be

(1) *Rechts*, PP258. (2) PP316Z. (3) PP315. (4) PP309. (5) PP315.

(6) PP301An. (7) PP270An. (S.426). (8) PP315.

(9) See *Glossary*. (10) *Wurt.*, S.482 and 483 (p.273 and 263).

the prescriptive implication of the next quotation:

Rechts, PP290Z (S.460):

... The lower part of society or the multitude has clearly been left more or less unorganized. Yet it is of the *highest importance* that it become organized because only then can it become politically strong and powerful. Otherwise it will continue to be only a crowd, a multitude split into atoms.

The next two passages might lend Hegel's support to popular participation by referring to the greater "liveliness" of the "people" and to the "representative assembly" as the "empirical generality" of "the many":

Rechts, PP315Z:

... The publication of the proceedings of the representative assembly is the greatest means of education concerning the wider state interests. Within a *people* where this takes place, they display a wholly other *liveliness* in connection with the state than where the representative assembly is absent or is not public. Only through this familiarity do the representative chambers keep in tune with the changes in public opinion at each and every step ...

Rechts, PP301:

... Within the representative assembly ... public consciousness as an *empirical generality* of the views and thoughts of the *many* comes into existence ...

Of course, there is a sense in which democratic monarchy claims to be an articulation of the optimal constitutional conditions for "the sovereignty of the people".¹ In *Rechts*, PP279An., Hegel himself makes it clear that he is only opposed to the "superficial notions" of "the people" and its "sovereignty" which speak of it as if it were necessarily opposed to the sovereignty articulated in constitutional monarchy. Following this lead, his pejorative use of the term, "democratic",² is not taken to require the rejection of the model's representative, parliamentary, constitutional and monarchical 'democracy' but only the direct, mass, institutionless, lawless, mob-rule, or formless "democracy" which many of his conservative and liberal contemporaries also feared. Some of the other passages which are critical of "public opinion", and of "the people" and their assemblies can be *leniently* read to deny only, for example, that such a people or its assembly *without an already existing constitution* could "make" a constitution from scratch.³ While *Rechts*, PP273An. and Z, allow only for the "indirect" or unintentional and gradual "modification" of the constitution, the model even recommends 'constitutional change' when this is seen to help move an existing constitution closer to the model. *Chapter Eight* showed that this view could be held to agree with Hegel's own practice when he supported constitutional changes for the less well organized states of Wurttemberg and Britain. At the same time, there are several points, where Hegel charges the electorate with apathy, inconsistency and "ignorance".⁴ These charges do not have the effect of denying rationality to democratic monarchy, however, because its electoral and representative system does not share the apathy making features of 'the first past the post' electoral systems which he had in mind when he offered this sort of observation. The model would make such inconsistency less likely. Its operation would tend to minimize such ignorance and would best foster the public "education" for which Hegel has already been quoted in support.

Before discussing the passages in which Hegel might be read by some as rejecting the maximization of the numbers of citizens participating, it should be noted in passing that Hegel supported many of the other provisions which are appropriately assumed to be both conditions and features of a genuine liberal democracy in operation, e.g. "freedom of speech"⁵ and the freedoms of the press, association, movement and occupation. At one point, he explicitly declared his support for a proposed "bill of rights" which he said "are simply the organic provisions which speak for themselves and make up the rational and basic principles of a constitutional condition".⁶ The criticism of the limitations which Hegel nevertheless placed upon speech and the press will not be developed here.⁷ Suffice it to suggest that these limitations could not be philosophically sustained against J.S Mill's eloquent case for the freedoms of speech, press, and lifestyle in *On Liberty*. "Liberty" is seen here as a condition for the maximization of the *quality* of everyone's "self-conscious reason".

(1) See *Glossary*. (2) See *Glossary*.

(3) See 'constitutional change' in the *Glossary*.

(4) Apathy: *Wurt.* S.484 (P.264), *Eng.* S.1114 (p.319), *Enz.* III, PP544An. (S.343) and *Rechts*, PP311An. (S.481); inconsistency: *Eng.*, S.84 (p.295); and "ignorance": *Eng.* S.90 (p.300).

(5) *Rechts*, PP317Z. (6) *Wurt.*, S.491 (p.270). (7) *Rechts*, PP319An. (S.488).

In spite of the implicit value placed on the *quantity* of rational living which might be read into the above Hegelian encouragements to popular participation and sovereignty, at several points, Hegel's tone toward "numbers" is dismissive to say the least. This is exemplified by his above mentioned discussions of electoral apathy. In these, he makes the point that apathy tends to be induced in large electoral districts when each voter can easily calculate his own negligibility. Read in isolation, such comments could imply that the quantitative features of *democratic* monarchy are not compatible with Hegel's own words. Another example of Hegel's ambiguity on this question of *numbers* is provided by the next extract. In isolation, some might see its reference to the "externality" of "great numbers" to mean that the differences between the numbers of members of each 'electoral association' should be ignored. This could suggest a 'one association, one vote' system within the elected chamber of Hegel's representative assembly. In contrast, this passage is leniently read here as making two points: that the great numbers could not be directly involved at the highest levels and that numbers *alone* are not important. Instead, numbers must be constitutionally recognized within a system which invites "associations" to be represented "essentially" because voluntary associations constitute "the very character ... specificity and structure" of "civil society". This construction does not exclude the *lenient* addition of *proportional* voting to the elected chamber.

Rechts, PP308:

The fluctuating side of civil society falls within the elected chamber of the representative assembly. It can enter this chamber only through representatives *essentially* because of the very character of civil society's specificity and structure and *externally* because of the great number of its members ...

Similarly, using and without violating some of the quantitative terms which Hegel defines in a broader context within his philosophy of logic, it can be argued that the way specific quantities of citizens are recognized by the model through their associational representatives does not introduce "sheer quantity"¹ into the proposed political arrangements but "qualitative quantity."² Each electoral association within the model is seen, as Hegel *might*, to be a "qualitative structure of number."³ This recognition of "numbers" within structures would not seem to "exaggerate quantity's radius of validity"⁴ and, in fact, might be seen as one possible implication of Hegel's claim that "quantity must also come into its right in the objective world, as much in the natural as in the human world."⁵ A.P.R.'s recognition, therefore, of the differences between the numbers of voting members within each electoral association might also be seen to be in line with the broad assertion that "philosophy is the very discipline which equally strives to distinguish both that which according to conceptual thinking and according to experience is differentiated."⁶ It is in this sense that the highest prescriptive goal and thus the model constitution seeks to foster 'the maximization of both the *quality* and *quantity* of free, rational living'.

At the same time, it might be supposed that Hegel had a fully developed theory about what "corporations" are and about which ones should be "authorized" to send deputies to the elected chamber. In fact, Hegel says very little about these questions. *Chapter Ten* has already outlined Hegel's view that corporations tend to grow out of the pressures and divisions in civil society. Those individuals with common interests will be inclined to band together in order officially to promote these interest. Without sufficient elaboration, he also said that each corporation would be a "coherent group"⁷ and that the number of its members would depend on the "character"⁸ and intensity of the common interests which spurred its formation. Presumably, the numbers would have to fall within a certain "range."⁹ Its numbers would have to be great enough to enable it to act effectively within society at large and yet each must be small enough so that it would not lose its sense of identity and become a "multitude, split of atoms."¹⁰ Hegel did not say what the objective "measure"¹¹ of this "coherence" and "number" might be. He only specified that an electoral association would have to have a "wider posture"¹² than simply to meet every election

(1) *Enz.* I PP99 and Z. (2) *Enz.* I, PP106Z (S.224). (3) *Enz.* I, PP102An. (S.215).
 (4) *Enz.* I, PP99An. (S.210). (5) *Enz.* I, PP99An. (S.211). (6) *Enz.* I, PP103Z (S.217).
 (7) *Rechts*, PP252. (8) *Ibid.* (9) *Enz.* I, PP106Z. (10) *Rechts*, PP290Z.
 (11) *Enz.* I, PP106Z (S.224 & PP108Z (S.22)). (12) *Rechts*, PP308.

time to cast and collect ballots.¹ A.P.R. fills this gap left by Hegel. Its recognition of the comparative "strengths"² of the corporations by giving them weighted votes could even be seen as an example of what Hegel called a "qualitative ratio".³ Without such an objective measure, Hegel's few words might easily lead to the harsh interpretation that he intended the choice of corporations and their representatives to be left to the arbitrary will of the monarch. Hegel says that "each particular great section (Zweig) of society, e.g ... commerce, ... industries, etc. ... has an *equal* right to become represented ...".⁴ He also says that he agrees with the traditional European view that all "the various great interests of the nation should be represented in the nation's great assembly".⁵ One implication of the above quotations is that the small interests need not be or could not be represented directly, but how is it to be decided which are "great" enough to be "summoned"? We are simply left to guess whether Hegel might not have accepted that these "great interests" should be represented in *proportion* to their greatness (i.e. "equal" in proportion to their respective voting memberships) rather than "equal" in the sense of 'one association, one vote' within the elected chamber.

The *lenient* interpretation that he could support 'proportional equality' might also be read into several other points which Hegel makes:

- 1) He suggested, in his *Constitution of Germany*, that some districts might be summoned to send representatives to the "Imperial Representative Assembly" (Reichstag) in proportion to their inhabitants. These representatives were to be elected from the territorial and population subdivisions of the Empire which would have already been established for the military convenience of the armed forces. These representatives were to vote within the existing "Cities Bench" of the assembly, at least for the purposes of levying taxes for the support of the Empire's armed forces: "... representatives could be elected from the sub-divisions *according to the numbers* of their inhabitants".⁶
- 2) Shortly after offering that suggestion, Hegel expressed his dismay at the existing constitution's allowing "the *smallest* Imperial city" a vote while *whole* provinces such as "Bohemia" and "Saxony" were excluded.
- 3) Hegel's criticism of the pre-1831 "inequalities" between the English parliamentary constituencies, and his complaint that one "section" plays "an *overbearing* part in state operations".⁷
- 4) Less relevantly, we might note that Hegel did accept a principle of proportionality in the payment of taxes: "... public taxes proportionately equal for all".⁸

In the face of these ambiguities, however, we are left plainly to assert for the model, that the principle of 'maximizing the quality and quantity of free, rational living' prescribes 'proportional equality' for the 'associations'. It must be stressed that the above uses of Hegel's own terms are not regarded here as proof that he would necessarily agree with A.P.R. Nevertheless, they exclude the charge that a democratic, associational, proportional, representative, majority-rule constitution is *obviously* incompatible with his wider conceptions of "quality" and "quantity".

So far, we have studied some of the respects in which the model constitution goes beyond Hegel's. The suggestion that the value of the *quantity* as well as the *quality* of rational living might be read into Hegel's words prepared the way, first, for the further elaboration of the defence of the principle of majority rule. This, in turn, provided the settings both for discussions of constitutional change and of A.P.R. The model's procedure for changing a constitution was seen

- (1) It will be recalled that in *Chapter Ten*, it was made clear that the model explicitly invites trade unions as well as mass political parties to register as 'electoral associations'. Hegel's words and phrases already listed are vague enough to allow these additions. They do not seem to require us to agree with Knox's assurance that Hegel "is *of course* not thinking of what we know as Trade Unions *since* his *Korporationen* are only societies of which both *employers are employed* are members" (note 83 to *Rechts*, PP229). Given that not many trade unions existed when Hegel was writing, it may well be that he did not have them in mind as possible examples of "associations", there is no Hegelian or philosophical reason to exclude them and, in fact, they could be seen as precisely the means by which the "lower part of society or the multitude" (*Rechts*, PP290Z) might become "organized" as we saw Hegel prescribing earlier. While, both Hegel's and the model's electoral associations could well include some "relative unions" of employers and employed, no Hegelian or other reasons are seen to limit them to associations of this sort.
- (2) *Rechts*, PP255Z. (3) *Enz.* I, PP105 and Z. (4) *Rechts*, PP311An. (S.480).
- (5) *Eng.* S.106 (p.313). (6) *G.Cons.*, S.578 (p.239).
- (7) *Eng.* S.85 (p.296), *Enz.* III, PP544An. (S.342); *Wurt.*, S.575 (p.293).
- (8) *Wurt.*, S.467 (p.251) and S.491 (p.270).

as probably conflicting with one of Hegel's paragraphs but as perhaps implicitly supported by some of his own prescriptive practices. We also saw how the A.P.R. system might be read into Hegel's brief discussions of the principles which should govern both the formation and representation of "corporations". Therefore, of the ten provisions which were listed as going beyond Hegel's own constitution, the following are yet to be discussed:

- 3) universal adult *suffrage*,
- 4) *recall* of deputies,
- 5) no *legislative veto* for the non-elected chamber, and
- 6) the *figurehead* and *caretaking* roles.

After these remaining points have been compared with Hegel's words, some additional passages which might be read either to support or to undermine the *ultimate* control over the three functions which democratic monarchy gives to the 'working majority' will be considered. Finally, the most obscure terms and phrases which Hegel uses within his most difficult paragraphs dealing with his monarch will be elucidated.

(3) Universal Adult Suffrage

To say the least, Hegel's words give us no reason to think that he favours the inclusion of women in his electorate.¹ Nor is it even clear that he included all adult men. His few comments neither categorically affirm nor reject it. They are critical of the contemporary theories which were proposing universal suffrage but his objections may not have been based on a preference for a smaller electorate as such. Rather, he may have opposed these theories only because they were grounded on superficial notions of "the sovereignty of the people", i.e. they ignored the actual, rich and organizationally structured will of the people which was already articulated through the "associations" in society. Hegel says also that age and property qualifications for voting are only "negative ... and ... merely presumptive" and do not provide a "positive guarantee" of electoral rationality. He says that such qualifications *might* be valid only if they are additions to the essential qualification which is that a subject be a member of one of the associations which has been "summoned" to send representatives to the elected chamber of the representative assembly.² The model's electoral system also accepts Hegel's suggestion that each new candidate for election to the representative assembly should have already had the experience of being an official of his or her association, or perhaps alternatively, of being a state civil servant.³

(4) Recall Of Deputies

The scheme which would allow voters in an electoral association to inaugurate a new election for their deputy(s) has no explicit support or opposition within Hegel's own words. However, two phrases in *Rechts*, PP309Z might be read to pull against each other on this question. Near the beginning, Hegel speaks of the deputies as "plenipotentiaries" (*Bevollmachtigte*) whose offices are based on "trust". However, later he says that the electors require a "guarantee" that their deputy will promote the general interest. If all deputies could be *trusted* completely there would be no need for a guarantee. It is because there is need for such *guarantees* that the model's 'recall scheme' provides one. In the middle of the same passage, a sentence appears which might seem to create another unbridgeable gulf between Hegel's and the model's constitution. Read in isolation, it might easily be interpreted to reject the principle of "majority voting" as such: "Hence *majority voting* runs counter to the principle that I should be personally present in anything which is to be obligatory on me". In its context, however, this can be leniently read only to mean that obligations are better formulated and negotiated by trusted deputies than determined without deliberation by the counting of citizen's heads. Laws would be more rationally found by a deliberative, representative assembly than by plebiscites.

(5) No Legislative Veto For the Non-Elected Chamber

Disregarding the fact that the model's "upper house" is partly composed of 'life peers' while Hegel wrote only of hereditary members, he said very little about this chamber. He gave it the tasks of "mediation",⁴ of ensuring the "ripeness of decision"⁵ or it helps to secure the state against the destructive effects of being ruled by "momentary majorities".⁶ These words are vague enough to be compatible either with the view that the upper house should have a veto power or that it should not. It will be recalled that the model's non-elected chamber can at the most require the elected chamber to vote again. Perhaps Hegel's own support for this kind of

(1) See, for example, *Rechts*, PP171.

(2) *Rechts*, PP308An. (S.477), PP310An. (S.479), and PP311An. (S.480); *Wurt.*, S.482(p.262), S.483 (p.263) and S.484 (p.264).

(3) *Rechts*, PP310; *Wurt.*, S.485 (p.265). (4) *Rechts*, PP312.

(5) PP313. (6) *Ibid.*

subordination of the hereditary to the elected chamber could be *read into* his broad approval for the King of Wurttemberg's proposed constitution which included a one chamber assembly in which the elected members were to outnumber the hereditary members, 73 to 59.¹ This implication is less certain, however, because in the next several sentences, without making his own preferences explicit, he contrasts this proposal with other constitutions which either grant the hereditary numbers "one more vote" than the elected members or arrange them into separate chambers.

(6) The Figurehead And Caretaking Roles

While these two roles for the head of state are certainly not explicit in Hegel's words, some of the apparent contradictions in his formulations could be removed by this distinction. Two passages quoted near the beginning of this chapter are examples of this. If the "unconfined discretion" of PP283 could be taken only as referring to the caretaking role, it would not have had to be rejected. When he said, in PP280Z, that the monarch "need ... only ... say, 'yes' and place the dot on the 'i' of ... advice", this could easily be read as a characterisation of the figurehead role.

Both roles might be similarly read into some later sentences from the same *Zusatz*:

Rechts, PP280Z:

Indeed, there can be circumstances in which the personal attributes alone of a monarch come to the fore, but then the state is not yet fully formed or not well designed. In a well ordered monarchy, only the objective side of his and of the state's personality becomes constitutionally operative, i.e. only the concrete "advice" formulated by the other two organs becomes the law of the land. In a rational state, the monarch only has to add his subjective "I will" to this advice.

The figurehead role may be implicit in the following extract in which the monarch's royal assent or "I will" added to the "law-giving and particularizing initiatives taken by others" is seen by Hegel as symbolic of "the attainment of general human decisiveness":

Rechts, PP279Z:

... when the rational constitution is secure, the monarch often has nothing more to do than to sign his name to the law-giving and particularizing initiatives taken by others. This *name*, however, is important. It is the pinnacle beyond which collective decision making cannot go. One might say that an organic constitutional structure was definitely present within the beautiful democracy of Athens. However, we see at the same time that the Greeks had to extract their final decisions from wholly external appearance, from the oracles, from the entrails of sacrificial animals and from the flight of birds. Also, we see that the Greeks took their relation to nature to be that as to a force which acts through these appearances to promulgate and express what is good for humankind. In that time, self-consciousness had not yet come to the abstraction of subjectivity which experiences its self-relating negativity. Nor had it yet come beyond that self-consciousness to the attainment of *general human decisiveness*, to the attainment of an "I will" which must become proclaimed by humankind itself. This "I will" constitutes the great difference between the ancient and modern world and so it must have its own distinctive existence within the great structure of the modern state.

Again, the caretaking role might be seen as suggested by PP320 which characterizes the "subjectivity" of the monarch as an objective guarantee against the haphazard and destructive subjectivities which can threaten to dominate the citizenry from time to time:

Recht, PP320:

Subjectivity has its most external appearance in the isolated individuals and groups which tend to exist in civil society. This subjectivity is characterized by the haphazard wants, and the self-destructive beliefs and analyses which tend to disintegrate a state's life. Paradoxically, this sort of subjectivity has its enduring, objective guarantee in its opposite, in the uniting subjectivity of the monarch. The monarchical organ's subjectivity is identical with Reason's substantial will when it is conceived as the final, united, self-knowing structure or as an "ideality" of the whole state.

The previous chapters associated each of the three organs *mainly* with one of the functions. Yet, both Hegel and the model see that the three functions should be jointly performed. The monarch, for example, by finalising all general and particular decisions, is seen as *formally* performing the uniting function. In order for the model to be democratic, *ultimate* control over all three functions regarding legislative and executive decisions had to be given to the assembly's working majority between general elections. That this ultimate authority must be given to one of the organs, is one implication of Hegel's discussion of "internal sovereignty":

Rechts, PP278:

The internal sovereignty of the state is secured by the two provisions that,
1) the particular functions and organs of the state are not to be rigidly isolated, and
2) the wills of state officials are not to be made entirely self-dependent.

(1) *Wurt.*, S.472 (p.254).

Both are implemented by requiring the organs and the officials to have their root within the *formal* will of the monarch. This organization of internal sovereignty constitutes their single self.

One plausible reading of this paragraph would simply locate this sovereignty with the monarch. However, the equally possible and preferable interpretation is that the "*formal* will of the monarch" refers only to the figurehead role.

The next three sections will consider some other of Hegel's words which might either confirm or deny the model's majoritarian sovereignty over the three functions.

The Law-Giving Function

While Hegel's conception of "sovereignty" might logically demand that ultimate control be vested in one of the organs, Hegel fails himself plainly to specify which organ. The model clearly gives it to the elected chamber when it has a working majority and to the monarch in the context of the 'state prerogative council' when it does not. However, Hegel's words are vague enough at different points perhaps to suggest that he gives this sovereignty either to the monarch or to the government instead. One example of this is provided by the next free translation. If *endlich* were rendered as "last", meaning last in importance, rather than as "third", meaning the third organ to be mentioned but without attaching any special significance to the order, this would reverse the priority the model gives to the elected chamber of the "representative assembly":

Rechts, PP300:

Three organs are active within the law-giving function as a totality: *firstly*, the monarchical organ to which *formally* the highest finalising decision belongs; *secondly*, the governing organ which both has a concrete acquaintance with, and oversight of the whole state in its many sidedness (The governing organ oversees the whole both according to the fundamental principles which are already established by the constitution and by the law, and according to its acquaintance with the requirements of state power. This acquaintance especially characterizes the advising part of the governing organ, i.e. the cabinet.); and *thirdly (endlich)*, the representative assembly organ.

Hegel's above reference to the "monarchical organ" literally reads, "to which the highest decision belongs". These words when read in isolation or read together just with similar phrases like the ones following could easily suggest that Hegel sees the monarch in all cases not only as the formal but effective, *ultimate* authority in his constitution:

Rechts, PP284, PP279, PP292 and PP286An., respectively:

- 1) "...the monarch as the finally deciding subjectivity which is ... raised above all accountability ..., is
- 2) "the absolute ... deciding" and
- 3) "sovereign organ", i.e.
- 4) "the absolute pinnacle ...".¹

Such phrases could easily *mislead* us to think that plainly for Hegel, the monarch's "finalising function" includes the constitutional right absolutely to *veto* any item passed by a working majority. This impression would again tend to be encouraged,

- a) by Hegel's broad support for the King of Wurtemberg's proposals which included a final veto for the monarch, requiring him only to give his reasons after he had refused for the third time to sign his name to a measure,²
- b) by Hegel's expression of regret that the power of the British monarchs had long since become "more illusory than real",³
- c) by the before mentioned monarch's appointment of his ministers at his own "unconfined discretion",⁴ and
- d) by the before mentioned references to the monarch as having the "direct" and "exclusive" right to conduct "interstate relations".

However, one passage tends to support the model and thus dramatically to reverse these strong impressions that Hegel intended the monarch's finalising function with regard to legislation to be substantive rather than formal. This passage was the one translated earlier and which asserted that,

Within ... a completed organization of the state, the monarch only has to do with the *formal* pinnacle of decision ..., he need only be a quite ordinary human being in order to say "yes" and to place the dot on the "I".⁵

The model removes these equivocal voices of Hegel by clearly 'confining' the monarch to symbolic or

(1) Also see *Rechts*, PP275. (2) *Wurt*, S.470 (p.253).

(3) *Eng.*, S.117 (p.322). Also see S.90 (p.300), S.101 (p.309) S.103 (p.311), S.118 (p.322), S.123 (p.326) and S.128 (p.330).

(4) *Rechts*, PP283. (5) *Rechts*, PP28OZ.

formal functions as long as a working majority exists. Accordingly, the above "highest", "finally" and "absolute" phrases are glossed as referring to the monarch's *main* responsibility *formally* to finalise the general and particular decisions which effectively have already been taken by the working majority and its elected council of ministers, *not* as referring to the monarch's *ultimate* substantive authority over the other two organs. Similarly, Hegel's support for the King of Wurtemberg's veto and his regret at the weakness of the British monarch are construed both as only referring to states which had not yet attained a fully representative constitution or did not yet have a "completed organization" and thus could not yet afford the monarch to be 'confined' to "the pinnacle of *formal* decision". As already mentioned, some of Hegel's other ambiguous words if read in isolation might suggest that he gives the governing organ more authority in cases of conflict than he does to the 'working majority'. These are considered in the next section.

The Particularizing Function

If working majority *rule* is also to mean that it controls particularising, this requires the elected chamber ultimately to have constitutional power over the governing organ. In the last resort, this demands that the majority in the chamber be able effectively to replace government ministers (and judges) who refuse to particularize in accordance with its will. It has already been argued that the monarch's "discretion" to appoint his ministers would have to be 'confined' rather than "unconfined". Similarly, his "conduct" of foreign affairs would have to be seen only as "accruing" to him *formally*, to the foreign minister and the cabinet *mainly*, and to the 'working majority' indirectly but *ultimately*. Both of these 'improving' changes would have to be made before working majority control over the particularizing function could be read into Hegel's other words. Hegel does not explicitly inform us whether he is assuming that the monarch will usually appoint civil servants or members of the representative assembly to be his "ministers". From *Rechts*, PP315Z, we know that ministers are *speaking* members of the assembly but in which of its chambers Hegel does not say. Neither does he explicitly say whether they would be *voting* members of either chamber. At the same time, perhaps we could *read into* some other of Hegel's words the view that the representative assembly should control the appointment of ministers:

- 1) He speaks with approval of the "opposite party" in the British Parliament seeking to replace the government of the day with its own leaders. Hegel clearly implies here the general prescription that 'a loyal opposition *should* attempt to replace the government with its own men' by saying that this "struggle ... is precisely its *greatest justification*".¹
- 2) He speaks of the "accountability"² of the governing organ as opposed to the monarch's unaccountability which *might* also imply the *replaceability* of ministers if they are *accountable* to the will of the representative assembly.
- 3) He speaks of the members of the elected chamber as being preoccupied with "the seeking of higher state office"³ which might mean cabinet posts.

Equivocal passages which might be read as asserting the government's priority in any conflict with the elected chamber, are construed here instead as asserting the government's *main* responsibility and not as excluding the *ultimate*, if indirect, authority of the working majority in these and in all other areas of particularizing, e.g.

- a) Hegel speaks of the "budget" as being "a governmental concern" in "a cultured state";⁴ and
- b) of "the representative assembly's government" as being "superior" to the assembly in its "influence over war and peace and over external politics".⁵

Still another passage⁶ says that the elected chamber could be "strengthened" while "directly confronting the government" by the agreement of the hereditary chamber. Such "strengthening" could also occur and would be welcomed within the model constitution, but it makes it clear as Hegel does not, that the majority in the elected assembly can insist that such a government be replaced by its own elected leaders, with or without the agreement of the hereditary chamber, of the reigning monarch, let alone of the government being "confronted". Finally, when Hegel says that the representative assembly does not need "a means of coercing" the government, this is construed not to exclude the assembly's ultimate constitutional right to coerce the government. It is read only to report that this is rarely needed in a rational state, either because the two usually voluntarily cooperate or because the threat of such coercion in the background is enough to secure the government's compliance.

(1) *Wurt.*, S.476 (p.258). (2) *Rechts*, PP284. (3) *Enz.* III, PP544An. S.343
 (4) *Enz.* III, PP544An. (S.43). (5) *Wurt.*, S.489. (6) *Rechts*, PP313.

The Uniting Or Finalising Function

The most relevant passages concerning the majority's ultimate control over the uniting function have already been discussed. It has been explained why his "unconfined discretion" and "directly and solely" phrases have been rejected. His "place the dot on the 'i' ..." *Zusatz* was leniently interpreted to allow the working majority constitutionally to be the *ultimate*, if not the *formal*, finaliser and uniter.

Difficult Paragraphs

What remains to be done is to sketch how Hegel's difficult paragraphs in *The Philosophy of Right* concerning the monarch are interpreted in order to elaborate the model's monarchy. The following is a list of summarizing and simplifying, interpretive titles for each of these paragraphs and parts of paragraphs. The *Appendix* offers *literal* translates of these paragraphs in full. Refer to these if any obscurities remain in spite of the attempts following this list of titles to elucidate what are taken to be the most problematic terms and phrases contained in these paragraphs.

- PP273: The rational constitution has three *functions* (law-giving, governing or particularizing, and finalising or uniting). The monarch's finalising function helps to hold the three *organs* together.
- PP275Z: The sovereignty of the state is best guaranteed *formally* by the single, human self of the monarch.
- PP276: Sovereignty is the basic, united, self-knowing structure of Reason-as-the-constitution, a single unity of the state's functions and organs.
- PP278: Internal sovereignty is the single self of the whole in which all of the functions, organs and officials are rooted.
- PP278An: Sovereignty both in regard to internal and external affairs is a united, self-knowing structure whose actuality is fostered by governmental activity in times of peace, but especially in times of crisis. The human will's self-relating negativity is the absolute foundation of this singularity called sovereignty.
- PP279: Sovereignty or collective subjectivity is best secured by a constitution in which formal finality of decision rests with the subjectivity of one human individual, the monarch. Subjectivity is the groundless self-determining capacity of the human will which is certain of itself.
- PP279An: Sovereignty is best secured by the monarch's personality and by his or her formal, final "I will".
- PP279An: The rational state does not leave the function of *formally finalising* decisions to a corporate or "moral person".
- PP279An: While purely analytical understanding may see the monarch as deduced, monarchy is that which originates out of itself.
- PP279An: It is a confusion to oppose the sovereignty of the people to the sovereignty of the rational state.
- PP279An: Even in non-rational but enduring states, there must be a singularizing pinnacle of decision which tends to arise in the person of a chance leader.
- PP279An: If such pinnacles of self-determination are blunted, the requisite unequivocal and clear final decisions can still appear to come from oracles or from other sources outside the circle of human freedom.
- PP279Z: The model constitution organizes the state as a great architectonic structure which is a hieroglyph of Reason.
- PP279Z: The "I will" of the monarch is not permitted to be capricious. When the rational state is secure, the monarch often has nothing to do other than to sign his name.
- PP280: Since monarchy is "raised over all ... agreement", in the sense that hereditary succession does not depend on the prior intellectual or political mediation of others but "originates out of itself", monarchy tends to guarantee that a state will at least enjoy natural or "unmediated singularity".
- PP280An: Like the so-called ontological proof of the definite being of God, the derivation of why the formal finalising function should be left to the unmediated naturalness of a monarch can only be appreciated from the speculative perspective of the philosophy of logic.
- PP280Z: Because within a completed organization of the state, the monarch is only the formal pinnacle of state decisions, he or she need only be quite ordinary to say, "yes", and to place the dot on the "i" of the objective "advice" given by the representative assembly and the government of the day. Therefore, the personal attributes of the monarch, say, his education or

his worthiness, are not significant.

PP281An: A truly philosophical treatment grasps how the monarch's legitimacy is grounded in birth and the right of descent. In contrast, purely analytical thinking abolishes this in-and-for-itself character of the monarch's majesty.

PP281An: There is an inherent flaw in the practice of electing a head of state.

PP281Z: Monarchy cannot be firmly justified either by pure theology or by arguments based on sheer utility or positive law.

PP282An. & Z: The state's ability to offer pardons, reprieves or amnesties to criminals is rooted in the strength of the human spirit to forgive and forget. A pardon is an example of a particularization which the monarchical organ *formally finalises*.

PP283: The monarch's particularizing function is exercised through his cabinet, the council of his highest advisors. The monarch appoints and removes these ministers at his own "unconfined discretion". [These appointments by the model's monarch are 'confined'.]

PP284: Not the monarch but his ministers are accountable to the representative assembly for governmental actions.

PP285: The third constitutional function of the monarchical organ is to help maintain the general actuality of its state.

PP286 & An: The "objective guarantee" of each of the three organs is the rational structure of the constitution.

PP286An: Objective guarantees of rational living are those offered by "institutions" and it is these alone which the conception of the rational constitution seeks to define. Such subjective guarantees as a people's patriotism and the personal characters of the monarch and of the other state office holders, therefore, are not relevant to an exposition of the model constitution.

PP320 & Z: The subjectivity of the monarch is an objective guarantee against the haphazard and destructive subjectivity which can characterize the citizenry from time to time.

PP321: As a mediated singularity, a state is an individual among other states. In a rational state's monarch (or sovereign), singularity appears as an actual, unmediated individual.

PP322An: A self-dependent collectivity with its own self-determining centre does not aspire to join with another to make up a larger collectivity with a different centre. This self-dependence was first shaped by the force of a self-dependent leader at the pinnacle, a patriarch, a chief, etc.

PP329: The state, as an individual subject in relation to other states, requires the conduct of interstate relations to accrue, "directly and solely to the monarchical organ". [The model's improving modification to this paragraph says that, in a rational state, it should fall *mainly* to his foreign minister and cabinet, *ultimately* to the elected chamber, and only *formally* to the monarch.]

PP329Z: The many and delicate relations with other states can only be handled from out of the pinnacle. Monarchs and cabinets are not subject to the passions of war any more than are peoples and their elected assemblies.

Elucidations

First, the relations between Hegel's "singularity", "sovereignty" and "subjectivity" will be discussed. In PP279, it is made quite clear that *subjectivity* is one of Hegel's names for that general, individual and collective, human capacity to shape the many distinct details of human sensuous and non-sensuous experience into *one* self-conscious life, i.e. into one coherent system or totality however complex and dynamic that *unity* might be. Subjectivity names the human capacity, individually or collectively to achieve a *singularity* both in theory and in practice. *Sovereignty* is understood to be the special name given to the self-knowing, constitutional capacity of a people to achieve a collective singularity both in relation to internal and external affairs. It is Hegel's and the model's conclusion that an hereditary head of state supports sovereignty by helping maximally to guarantee the capacity of a collectivity repeatedly to achieve a complex unity over time. Hegel and the model also claim that the constitutional finalising function of the monarch rests most basically on his or her own "natural" capacity for subjectivity. Thus, the monarch's subjectivity helps to guarantee the collective's subjectivity and therefore its unity. The individual subjectivity of the monarch is seen as one factor within the system of constitutional "guarantees" which defines sovereignty. However, PP278An. might unfortunately be read to go so far as authorizing the monarch to use his subjectivity to become a dictator in an emergency. Hegel writes that in "a crisis, ... it is to sovereignty that the saving of the state is entrusted", requiring as this does, "the subordination or sacrifices of the otherwise authorized particular

concerns and associations". Knox's translation of this passage's *Souveränität* as "sovereign", rather than as "sovereignty", leads the English reader to jump to this more authoritarian interpretation even more readily. It is true that elsewhere, Hegel sometimes referred to the monarch as "the sovereign",¹ but this passage is leniently taken here simply to be saying that the sacrifice of private interests is sometimes necessary. Because Hegel clearly sees the monarch only as an organ of the whole constitutional system of sovereignty,² he is not implying here, as might be thought, that both the representative assembly and the government should be dissolved in a crisis leaving the monarch to deal with the emergency as a benevolent despot. Instead, the gloss followed here understands Hegel simply as asserting that many of the "particular associations and their concerns" within civil society must be subordinated to "the aim of the whole" as defined *jointly* by the office holders in the *three* organs of the constitution. Thus, these private interests of civil society may be subordinated by the *three* organs of "the organism" of Reason-as-the-state, not by an absolute monarch.

Subjectivity

In PP279, Hegel recalls some of the characteristics of the human will's *subjectivity* which he had explored earlier in PP4-PP7 of the Introduction to *The Philosophy of Right*. He says that subjectivity is "the abstract, and to that extent, the *groundless* self-determining of the human will". Hegel's use of "groundless" here recalls his argument in the Introduction and elsewhere, that when the will discovers its capacity for "self-relating negativity"³ (i.e. when it discovers its capacity for consciously dwelling at least for an instant within its "I = I"),⁴ it discovers an "absolute" limit to the extent to which it can empty its consciousness. Within this maximally but not quite empty consciousness, the will discovers that it can no longer be naive about its choices. Each new "content" (Inhalt) that might be willed cannot now be willed on the basis of "grounds", i.e. *externally* given foundations whose validity is unconsciously taken for granted. In the "I = I", one has emptied one consciousness of all presuppositions, e.g. no *externally given* moral axioms are left from which to *deduce* the way of life which one should follow. From now on, these will have to be generated from within, if at all.

When Hegel says that willing within such a context is *groundless*, he means that it is 'presuppositionless'. This is not to say that the content willed in this way is necessarily incapable of receiving rational justifications as one might supposed from his unfortunate choice of the word "groundless". On the contrary, for example, the constitutional will of the monarch is in this ordinary sense 'grounded' in "the infinite, within itself *grounding* Reason".⁵ The same interpretation applies to the paragraph which refers to the "majesty" of the monarch as "characterized" by "*groundless* unmediatedness".⁶ Because this content is presuppositionless, pure *deduction* is not sufficient. Dialectical reason sees no self-evident, *externally* given first principles which would allow us by deduction responsibly to will additional content. All *externally* given principles have been cast into doubt by such reason. Because this context is the result of our own thinking which now sees that *if* your or my "I" is to be anything more than the simple "I" contained in the 'I am I', then you and I have to draw additional contents out of this maximally empty context itself. We cannot draw them out of any *unquestionably* grounded and externally based premises. Our questioning has driven us to this maximally empty juncture and our "self-conscious reason"⁷ sees that *if* we are to get beyond the 'I am I', *then* any additions will be deliberately willed either arbitrarily or by 'reason'. It is to this context that PP278An. refers when it speaks of the "abstract conception of the human will", i.e. of the conception of the will as purely "I = I". The experience of the "I = I" is a result of the "will's self-relating negativity", the human capacity to negate or reject any content immediately found within our consciousness, i.e. the human ability "to put into question ... all particularity and determinateness" (e.g. any presuppositions, assumption, axioms, practices or habits). It is through such an abstracting process that we discover that we ourselves may be able deliberately to transform all unmediated and mediated "particularity and determinateness" into a unity consciously willed by us. This is the human will's "self-determining generality moving toward a singularity".

Subjectivity in general and the subjectivity of the monarch in particular is *absolutely grounded* in "the will's self-relating negativity" and "self-determining generality", and it need *not* be *grounded* in externally given principles or presuppositions. Rational subjectivity is internally *grounded* but externally *groundless*. It is grounded in the will's "negativity" and "generality".

(1) PP321 (2) PP279An. (3) PP278An.

(4) *Enz.* I, PP86An. and Z; *Enz.* III, PP424 and Z, PP425 and Z, and PP426Z.

(5) *Idee, Rechts*, PP281An. (6) *Ibid.* (7) *Enz.* I, PP6.

Paradoxically stated, 'the grounded is groundless'. The will's 'grounding' in the "I = I" is taken here to be "absolute" in the Cartesian sense that I cannot sustain the doubt that 'I am', or that 'I am in some sense'. Thus, the 'I am I' or the "I = I" seems to provide us with a philosophically necessary internal foundation for our subjectivity, "the pinnacle beyond which ... decision making cannot go".¹ In the context of its "negativity" and "generality", subjectivity discovers that it has the *option* either,

- 1) of remaining frozen within the abstraction which is the simple "I = I", i.e. each has the option of remaining purely within the attitude of seeing oneself as being able to will anything but not willing anything in particular (i.e. not defining one's "I" other than by saying that it equals "I"), or
- 2) of willing to add to the contents or specifications of one's "I", i.e. the option of willing to be a more complex and definite unity when social, political and other opportunities present themselves, e.g. to become married, a teacher, an artist, a supporter of a particular political party with a specific ideology, etc.

The willing of such additional contents in this context can either be entirely the result of a rational thought process or it can be somewhat "arbitrary". To the extent that it is rational, it issues from deliberations which assess each alternative by the tests of 'philosophical necessity'. *Rational* willing would seek to actualize the contents and specifications which tend to maximize the quality and quantity of free, rational living. *Arbitrary* willing can proceed from an ignorance of this rational aim or by deliberately disregarding it. Hegel's and my more precise adjective for the second sort of willing is "evil". However, *unavoidable* arbitrariness arises when reason requires a decision to be made before reason has found an exact means for determining the answer by reason, or when reason concludes that more than one answer would always seem to be available. For example, Hegel correctly explained, in his earlier discussion of "punishment", that reason alone could not specify the exact fine that would be appropriate for any given crime (e.g. £100 or £101), yet reason sees that some fine is necessary. Also, reason alone could not determine whether policemen should be given blue or green uniforms, yet some uniform is necessary. While pure reason can determine that there should be three constitutional organs, it cannot decide whether there should be 500 or 501 members in the elected assembly, or that the income tax should be fixed at 29% or at 30%. In spite of such limitation of reason, reason sees that we can and must decide such questions if we are to survive and thrive.

Both Hegel and the model take the monarch's arbitrary origins² as helping to symbolize the above truth that some questions demand arbitrary but human answers. The hereditary succession to the throne helps to remind all concerned, that if they fail to generate a working majority with a united package of general and particular decisions (including as it must, some arbitrary components), then they will be ruled by the wholly or partly arbitrary will of the *one* or of the *few*. Such a monarch also represents the truth that whether one recognizes it or not, no content in principle is entirely beyond the scope of human shaping power. Each "human singularity", e.g. each individual, each community, each association, or each state has this subjectivity, the capacity to will either a fixed or a changing unity for itself over time. Accordingly, a state in order to remain a state must continue to actualize this capacity to will its own unity. Hegel argues as does the model that the distinctive subjectivity of the monarch helps maximally to guarantee the actualization of this self-knowing unity of the collectivity over time.

On a personal level, I have found it philosophically necessary to follow Hegel's own implicit choice to will the maximization of rationality in the world *if* I am not simply to remain at the 'I am I', and *if* I am to avoid either the ignorant or evil sorts of arbitrary willing. This means seeking both to know Reason's specifications and to live accordingly. With this in mind, Hegel's exposition of his system within the *Encyclopaedia* is seen as a report of the attempt of his own "self-conscious reason" to extract all the essential additional contents from the maximally empty context of the 'I am I'. Accordingly, it starts with a close examination of the meaning and implications of the 'am' within the 'I am I', i.e. it starts with "being".³ At the same time, I have resolved to test this attempt of Hegel's with my own "self-conscious reason", i.e. against the four criteria of philosophical necessity. Here, his constitutional monarchy has been found not to be entirely adequate.

(1) *Rechts*, PP279Z.

(2) Heredity is 'arbitrary' in the sense of being non-rational. The procreative process need not depend on any self-conscious philosophical mediation.

(3) *das Sein*, Enz. I, PP86.

The point served by Hegel's recollection of subjectivity's capacity to will one unity rather than another, even in the maximally empty context in which there are no externally given *grounds* for doing so, is to help secure his view that *if* a people is to achieve a collective "singularity" over time, it will be achieved intentional or not, by *human* willing. Neither gods nor priests nor oracles ultimately offer us any guidance other than that which humans consciously or unconsciously allow. These vehicles are properly seen by Hegel as only various forms of human willing. It follows from this that, *if* an externally "groundless" yet internally grounded unity of the collectivity is to be maximally secured by us, *if* sovereignty is to be secured, *then* we must develop procedures for making binding decisions about any questions which may come into dispute. By definition, a rational constitution does this by authorizing the use of coercion as a last resort while providing all of the possible legal supports for deliberative resolutions of conflicts. Therefore, it maximally assists a people effectively, collectively, and repeatedly to will its own sovereignty, i.e. freely to live and to will rationally. Accordingly, the subjectivity of a monarch is a necessary part of a rational constitution and PP279 is taken to record Hegel's view that "the finality of deciding", when it is guaranteed by the monarch's subjectivity, helps maximally to secure the repeated capacity of a people to will its sovereignty.

If this claim proves to be successfully defended against all known criticisms, then we will have come to agree that such a role for a hereditary head of state is rational, i.e. satisfies the criteria demanded by our search for philosophical necessity. It should again be made clear that neither Hegel nor I are expecting, let alone requiring the monarch personally to be conscious of his or her own "self-relating negativity" and "self-determining generality". The rational constitution does not require a philosopher to stand at its finalising pinnacle. The model constitution can function well with a monarch who only has the quite ordinary subjectivity¹ which all normal humans have potentially by nature and which has been developed in almost all adults by the ordinary formal and informal educational processes of modern societies. This quite ordinary "subjectivity" is still "certain of itself".²

Hegel frequently assumes and asserts that the head of a rational state must be hereditary but only explicitly and in piecemeal fashion develops his arguments for this conclusion.³ His central argument is that the institution of hereditary succession, better than any other arrangement, both

(1) displays, and

(2) secures

the collective, single subjectivity of the rational state. As head, he is *mainly* charged with the task of helping to guarantee the *singularity* discussed above. He or she unites all by performing the finalising function. That the single subjectivity of a state is best guaranteed by the head being *one person* rather than a council (i.e. a corporate or "moral person")⁴ is quite clear, but, that this one person should be "hereditary", Hegel admits is difficult for "purely analytical understanding" to see. In PP28An., he says that it can only be grasped from the "speculative" perspective of the philosophy of logic. Again, a monarch best *displays* and *secures* a single subjectivity for a state. These are not unconnected. Hereditary succession best displays the sort of single subjectivity which a head of a model state should exercise in the following way. His constitutional subjectivity should not be more than a formal "I will" which he adds to the formulations of "advice" given to him by the representative assembly and the government of the day. The model says that this should be the case *unless* such majoritarian mediations are absent. In this absence, however, the monarch is required to rule at his own "unconfined discretion" in the context of the 'state prerogative council'. In this case, his personal subjectivity must speak for the divided or ambivalent whole of his subjects. The relatively unmediated or natural subjectivity of the monarch should rule only when majoritarian mediation has failed to achieve its own single subjectivity.

When an hereditary head rules directly as caretaker, this graphically points out to his subjects their own failure to achieve a mediated, collective unity. This lack is most strikingly brought home by the rule of the one person who by his hereditary succession best personifies "inner and outer unmediatedness",⁵ "unmediated singularity",⁶ and "unmediated naturalness",⁷ i.e. by "the organ of naturalness".⁸ As hereditary, his or her rule, most transparently suggests that his or her single subjectivity is only like that natural subjectivity granted to all adults by their birth. Thus, when

(1) Both Hegel's and the model's constitution "requires ... only a human being", PP28Oz. (2) PP279.

(3) In PP280 and An., PP281 and An. and Z., PP286 and An., and PP320. (4) PP279An.

(5) PP281. (6) PP280An. (7) PP280. (8) PP280.

his or her personality has "come to the fore",¹ it broadcasts the inescapable fact that in the absence of majoritarian mediation within a state, either unmediated (or less mediated) rule or the disintegration of this state must follow. Rule by a natural or unmediated, single subjectivity is, therefore, a necessary part of the best fail-safe, constitutional arrangement. This is to say, that, while majoritarian, mediated, uniting subjectivity is better because it involves *more* rational living, the unmediated, single subjectivity of the monarch is better than anarchy because it tends most both to preserve and to create the public conditions which foster either the initial or subsequent re-development of majoritarian unity. Hereditary rule is the clearest demonstration and personification of the non-rational threats to democracy. In this way, the caretaking role of the monarch has the best chance of assisting a majoritarian recovery. Hereditary rule will best engender another chance that the requisite changes in the attitudes of the citizenry and its representatives will take place. This role challenges the other two organs constitutionally to build or to reconstruct majority rule in which the hereditary head will again be confined simply to saying "yes"² to whatever mediated and majoritarian singularity which may be "advised" by the representative assembly and its government.

The monarch's hereditary character also best *displays* that the state's singularity is purely human. The rational state does not depend on "oracles" or on any other sources "outside the circle of human freedom".³ Equally, monarchy fosters best the public understanding that the subjectivity given to all normal adults by their *birth* enables all to will their own unity, individual or collective. They can do this well or badly and with or without yet having philosophically experienced their own "self-relating negativity and ... self-determining generality",⁴ and thus, with or without yet discovering their own subjectivity as a capacity "groundlessly" to will their own unity, either ignorantly, evilly or rationally. Hegel's phrase, the monarch's "inner unmediatedness", is taken to express this natural subjectivity or "finalising, groundless self" of every person, which is institutionalized in the person of the monarchy. In contrast, the monarch's "outer unmediatedness" or his "groundless existence" refers to the hereditary position of the monarch within the rational constitution. The fact that he at least has natural subjectivity or inner unmediatedness, like an elected head of state, makes it possible for the monarch to give his finalising "I will" to state decisions.

Hegel says that the monarch's "inner and outer unmediatedness" constitutes the two sides of the monarch's "majesty",⁴ i.e. the ability to inspire a sense of *awe* and *security* in others. According to his definition, an elected head of state could not have as much majesty because he or she does not have the "outer unmediatedness" or "groundless existence" of monarchy which "originates out of itself".⁶ Instead, he or she only displays 'outer mediatedness' or a purely 'constitutional groundedness'. This mediatedness has two flaws. Firstly, it tends to *obscure* rather than to display the last resort character of his or her "I will" as the head of state. Secondly, his or her mediated selection tends more to encourage a constitutionally elected head to compete with or to replace the single, mediated subjectivity which best issues through the working majority's prime minister and is best guaranteed in the first instance, if the 'working majority' breaks down, by the 'governor general' previously elected by a 2/3rds majority. This obscuring of the best structuring arrangement for securing collective singularity, which sees the head's will only to be purely formal unless majoritarian mediation fails, when added to such built-in conflicts within a presidential republic, makes it less possible for an elected head to inspire the same sense of awe and security as does the majesty of the monarch.

The monarch's "inner and outer unmediatedness" means that both the monarch's *inner*, personal subjectivity and his *outer*, hereditary position are "groundless" in the sense that each "originates out of itself". The unity or singularity issuing from a person's subjectivity need not rest on any externally given assumptions or presuppositions. Similarly, monarchy originally arose as an objective institution out of itself, i.e. out of the will and action of an outstanding progenitor.⁷ The hereditary succession of his heirs enshrines this truth that monarchy arose and can arise again without needing the prior intellectual, political or constitutional mediations of others. This is what the "outer unmediatedness" and the "groundless existence of the monarchical organ"⁸ signifies. The phrase, "inner unmediatedness" also suggests that a monarch might arise and reign in spite of his own lack of intellectual mediation. He might easily rule without philosophical theorizing or even without consciously making deductive calculations from defined presuppositions. His birth, rise and reign might issue purely from one or a combination of the following: instincts,

(1) PP280Z. (2) PP28Oz. (3) PP279An. (4) PP278An. (5) PP281. (6) PP279An. (7) PP322An. (8) PP281.

impulses, pride, or unreflected traditions or customs. Historically and biographically, the intellectually unmediated always comes before and provides the soil in which intellectual mediation can grow.

Constitutional monarchy tends to give a people a greater sense of *security* than does any other set of political arrangements. It fosters best the public awareness that there will always tend to be both,

- 1) a clear and public statement of what the operative law is and how it applies to the particular circumstances which may be in the minds of those concerned, and
- 2) a clear public knowledge of the persons who are officially and actually responsible for the formulation and particularization of such laws.

Also, constitutional monarchy has the advantage over republics in that the state's power to decide and to act does not depend to the same extent on the contingent achievement of a working majority. In the absence of this majority and even in the possible absence of a majority to elect a president, the monarch may be able, both legally and effectively, to speak and act for the whole state. In a monarchy, it is more likely that there will always be a nameable person who can be held "responsible" for any decision currently operative, e.g. the leader of the working majority, or one of the monarch's counsellors (e.g. a minister or the prime minister), or the monarch himself. In a republic, no law might have been formulated, no executive action taken, or no responsible official elected because of the failure to achieve the requisite majorities. Thus, Hegel's argument for a constitutional monarch is that he or she best symbolizes the relation between humankind and nature. His or her natural unmediatedness displays and, in the last resort helps to secure, a collective *unity* or *singularity*. This is a condition for the maximization of the quality and quantity of free, rational living.

This chapter has compared democratic monarchy with Hegel's constitutional monarchy as outlined in some of his most difficult paragraphs. It has been discovered that, while the model requires the rejection of two of Hegel's own phrases, the rest of his formulations are either plain enough or ambiguous enough to allow them to be read as elaborations of my own prescriptive ideal.



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S u m m a r y

'Democratic monarchy' was seen,

- 1) to be superior to republican arrangements of either the 'parliamentary' or 'congressional' type;
- 2) to repair the flaw in Plato's political theory left by his unwarranted assumptions about the expected reliability and numbers of philosopher rulers; largely
- 3) to be present in a 'lenient interpretation' of Kant's republicanism and wider philosophy;
- 4) to provide the best contingency plan for Marx's classless society; and
- 5) to formulate the model which would seem to be more firmly rooted in Hegel's wider system than his own constitutional monarchy.

However, in contrast to Hegel's own political philosophy, the model openly affirms rather than denies its own prescriptive import. In spite of Hegel's claim that the essence of his monarchy is its "rationality", democratic monarchy claims to be *more* rational. It claims more clearly and completely to guarantee the deliberative unity which Hegel himself can be leniently read to value most. The broad three *function* and three *organ* structure of the model follows Hegel's lead, but his two phrases which denied *ultimate* sovereignty to the 'working majority' in the elected chamber were rejected.

In order to complete the reconstruction of Hegel's state, the model *added* ten provisions which explicitly *go beyond* his own formulations:

- 1) A.P.R.
- 2) the procedure for constitutional change,
- 3) universal adult suffrage,
- 4) the procedure for recalling deputies,
- 5) no legislative veto for the non-elected chamber,
- 6) the 'figurehead' and 'caretaking' roles,
- 7) the 'state prerogative council',
- 8) some 'life peers' in the non-elected chamber,
- 9) the 'constructive vote of no confidence', and
- 10) the procedure for impeaching and replacing a monarch.

The *first six* of these were argued in varying degrees to have followed from 'lenient interpretations' of Hegel's brief or equivocal words but in some case required some 'lenient additions' to be made. Provisions *seven, eight, and nine* were simply 'lenient additions', while *ten* was logically demanded by the 'improving changes' which were made to the two phrases in which Hegel gave his monarch "unconfined discretion" in the appointment of ministers and "exclusive" control" over foreign affairs.

The *Introduction* reported some of the charges which commentators have made against Hegel's monarchy. They suggested that it was unnecessary, "smuggled in", "obscure and implausible", "irrational" and "nauseating". While it is understandable how some of Hegel's equivocal, and abstruse passages invited such readings, it has been shown that these harsh yet plausible observations can be avoided. In any case, none of these criticisms could be sustained against the monarchy in the model.

The most rational constitution was sought and 'democratic monarchy' was found. This model's claim to be an integral element of a *comprehensive* theory was sketched and it was not found to be faulted by any of the *experiential*, *logical*, or *comparative* tests examined. No empirical evidence about constitutions, no contradictions in its formulation, and no competing political theories were found to require us to retain any 'specific doubts' about this ideal. In short, no obstacles were discovered which would prevent us from granting to it the status of having 'philosophical necessity'.

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A p p e n d i x : L i t e r a l T r a n s l a t i o n s

This list of literal translations for each text is arranged in page or paragraph number order. The texts are arranged in page and in alphabetical order according to the abbreviations used for each work listed in the *Bibliography*. In these translations, I have written my own interpretive additions between single 'inverted commas', while the explanatory additions which quite easily follow directly from Hegel's own wider context are written between [square brackets].

Eng., S.86:

Now when also the aristocratic element in England when compared with the democratic element is the most significant force (macht),...[and when] it finds its security and stability in the submerging of the people it rules in their collective sensuality and in their ethical depravity, ... it is to be recognized as a good sign of the reawakening of the moral sense within the English people, that there is a feeling of the need for reform which involves the repugnance with regard to that depravity (Verderbheit). One (Mann) comes at the same time to recognize that the correct way should have become established that the seeking of the improvement is no more merely by the moral means of notions (Vorstellungen), [by] admonitions, or [by] a uniting of isolated individuals in order not to be beholden to and in order to work against the system of corruption, but is by the alteration (Veränderung) of institutions [.] The usual prejudice of laziness always to cling to the old faith in the goodness of an institution even when it hangs upon a wholly depraved circumstance, has in this manner finally given way. A thoroughgoing reform has thus become all the more demanded ...

Eng. S.89:

In England the features (die Momente) have been lacking (mangelten) hitherto which have an important share in those [above mentioned] so glorious and fortunate advances. Under these features stands highest the scientific codification (Bearbeitung) of the law (Rechts) ...

Enz. I, PP6:

... it is equally important to understand that the content (Inhalt) of philosophy is none other than the domain of the living spirit (Geist) which originally has been brought forth and which continues to bring itself forth to the world, i.e. its content is actuality (Wirklichkeit). The initial consciousness of this content we call experience (Erfahrung). Even a sensuous study (sinnige Betrachtung) of the world distinguishes, from within the wide realm of outer and inner definite existence (Dasein), between what is only appearance (Erscheinung), transitory and insignificant, and what inherently (in sich) and genuinely deserves the name, actuality. In this respect (Indem), philosophy is distinguished from the other modes of coming to be conscious (anderem Bewusstwerden) only in form, [i.e. they have] one and the same contents (Gehalt). Therefore (so), [a] philosophy's (ihr) compatibility (Übereinstimmung) with actuality and experience is necessary (notwendig). Indeed, this compatibility can become seen to be at least one external test (äusseren Prüfstein) of the truth of a philosophy. Similarly (so wie), it is seen to be the highest and ultimate aim (höchsten Endzweck) of science to bring forth to us (hervorzubringen) the reconciling of the self-conscious reason (selbstbewussten Vernunft) with the Reason which has being (seienden Vernunft), with the actuality, through the knowledge (Erkenntnis) of this compatibility.

Enz. I, PP6An.:

In the Preface to my *Philosophy of Right* can be found the propositions: 'Some of' what is rational, that is actual; and 'all of' what is actual, that is rational. These simple propositions have conspicuously occasioned much and suffered hostility, and indeed, this same (selbst) from such one is not allowed to speak of being without the possession of philosophy and especially

(wohl) without religion. It is unnecessary (unnötig) to cite religion in this connection, there its doctrines about the divine world government too specifically express these propositions. However, what is the concern with regard to [the] philosophical meaning [of these expressions] is that [we] presuppose so much of the cultural foundation (Bildung), that one (man) knows not only that God is actual, that He is the most actual, that He alone is true actuality, but also, in the sight of the formal [questions], that, broadly speaking (überhaupt) the definite existence (Dasein) is in part appearance and only in part actuality.

In common life we perhaps call every incident an actuality, even a mistake (Irrtum), an evil and whatever belongs to this side [of things]. Thus (sowie), each existence (Existenz), however stunted (noch so verkümmerte) and transitory, gets called an actuality in a casual way. Nevertheless, a fortuitous existence (Existenz) has not come to merit the emphatic name of an actual entity (eines Wirklichen) even within customary sensibility (gewöhnlichen Gefühl). The fortuitous [entity] is an existence (Existenz) which has no greater value (Wert) than an 'imaginable' possibility, 'i.e. its existence is a matter of indifference to Reason'. However, when I spoke of actuality, so would it be by itself [appropriate] to think upon it, in which sense I used this expression, [i.e.] that [sense (da)] in which actuality in a full-length logic is treated, not only [as distinct] from contingent [definite being] which also has existence, but [which also offers] a closer [treatment] of definite being (Dasein), [i.e.] existence and other specifications also being precisely distinguished.

The actuality of the rational [definite being] itself indeed stands opposed to the notion (Vorstellung), equally either that the 'specific' Ideas '(i.e. specific elements of Reason)' or ideals are nothing more than chimeras and philosophy is a system of such fancies, or conversely, that the 'specific' Ideas and ideals are something much too superior (Vortreffliches) to have actuality, or equally something too important as to procure itself. However, the separation of actuality from the Idea is particularly loved by the 'abstractive' understanding, that which holds for something genuine both the illusions of its abstractions and [with regard to (auf)] the ought, the [ought] which the 'abstractive' understanding (er) happily and proudly prescribes, especially within the political fields, as if the world has waited for such understanding (auf ihn), in order to hear (um zu erfahren) what it ought to be but is not [.]. Were the world (sie) as it ought to be, what would become of (wo bliebe) the precociousness of its ought? When 'abstractive' [understanding] turns the ought (Sollen) against the trivial, external (äusserliche) and transitory objects (Gegenstände), arrangements (Einrichtungen), circumstances (Zustände), etc., which also, perhaps, have a great relative importance for a certain time or for a particular (besondere) circle, then understanding (er) may indeed rightly find in such cases, much which does not accord with generally correct specifications (Bestimmungen). Who is not acute enough to see much of his 'social and political' environment (Umgebung) which, in fact, is not as it ought to be? But this acuteness has mistakenly (unrecht) imagined that such objects (Gegenstände) and that which they ought to be (deren Sollen) are themselves to be found within the interests of a philosophical science. Philosophy (Diese) has only to do with the Idea and therefore with an actuality. The Idea (welche) is not so impotent that it only ought to be but is not actual. [Thus philosophy is concerned with] an actuality, in relation to which, those objects (Gegenstände), arrangements, circumstances, etc., are only the superficial exterior.

Enz. I, PP7:

... *philosophy* ... is concerned with (beschäftigt) the knowledge (Erkenntnis) of the permanent measure and the general within the sea of empirical details (Einzelheiten) and of the necessary [aspect, i.e.], the laws (Gesetze), within the seeming disordered, endless mass of contingent [details] and with that at the same time, philosophy's (seinen) content has been taken from our own considering and observing (eigenen Anschauen und Wahrnehmen) of the external and inner [world] (des Ausseren und Inneren), [i.e.] out of the presented (präsenten) nature as out of the presented spirit and presented breast of humankind.

Enz. I, PP7An.:

The principle of experience (Erfahrung) contains the infinitely important condition (Bestimmung), that in order for the accepting and for the holding to be true of a content, humankind must itself be in contact with it (dass für Annehmen und Fürwahrhalten eines Inhalts der Mensch selbst dabei sein müsse), more specifically we (er) [must] find such a content united in agreement (in Einigkeit) with the certainty of our own selves ... We call those sciences which have been named philosophy, empirical sciences, because of the starting point which they take. However, the essential [goals] which they ring for and at which they aim (Aber das Wesentliche, das sei bezwecken und herforschaffen), are laws (Gesetze), general propositions, a theory; [i.e.]

the thoughts of what is present-to-hand (die Gedanken des Vorhandenen).

Enz. I, PP13:

The most recent (Die der Zeit nach letzte) philosophy [provided it is philosophy] is the result of all previous philosophies and must, therefore, contain the principles of all [these philosophies]. The most recent philosophy (sie), provided it is philosophy, consequently, is the most developed (entfaltete), the most rich, and the most concrete.

Enz. I, PP209Z:

Reason is as cunning as it is strong (mächtig). In the main, cunning resides in the mediating activity in which the objects (Objekte), '(e.g. individual men and women)' influence (einwirken) and wear each other down (sich aneinander abarbeiten). The objects '(e.g. people)' are left to follow their own natures. [Reason, which is the "power of these processes" (PP 209)] does not directly interfere with this process (ohne sich unmittelbar ... einzumischen). Nevertheless, only Reason's aim (nur ihren Zweck) is brought forth (zur Ausführung bringt). One can in this sense say, that divine Providence, as absolute cunning, retains itself behind (gegenüber) the world and its process. God [or Reason] has left human beings (menschen) with their particular passions and interests to continue (lässt ... gewähren) [to shape events] and what thereby comes to pass (was dadurch zustande kommt), is the fulfilment of His intentions. [What comes to pass] is other than that which was at first (zunächst zu tun war) [intended by the people involved].

Enz. I, PP234Z, S.387

... dass der Endzweck der Welt ebenso vollbracht ist als er sich ewig vollbringt ...

Enz. III, PP536:

The state is a) at first (zunächst) its inner formation (Gestaltung) as the state's self-relating development (als sich auf sich beziehende Entwicklung), i.e. the *internal state law or the constitution* [.] The state (er) is b) a particular individual and so is within the relation to other particular individuals [i.e. states.] 'This requires Reason-as-the-state to include' *interstate law*. c) However, these particular 'national' spirits are only 'inessential' moments within the developing of the general Idea-as-the 'objective'-spirit within spirit's (seiner) actuality[. This development is] **world history**.

Enz. III, PP544:

Broadly speaking, the representative assembly is concerned to take part in all that belongs to civil society and ... in the particularizing function (an der Regierungsgewalt), and especially in the giving of laws, i.e. (nämlich) in the *generalness* (Allgemeinen) of interests which do not concern the conduct and business (das Auftreten und Handeln) of the state as an individual (i.e. war and peace) and therefore not exclusively of the character (Natur) of belonging to the *monarchical organ*.

Enz. III, PP552:

The spirit of the nation (Volksgeist) includes natural 'or external' necessity (Naturnotwendigkeit) and [thus] stands within external definite existence (in äusserlichen Dasein). The inherently (in sich) infinite ethical substance [of a nation] considered by itself (für sich) is a particular (Besondere) and limited [substance]. Infected with contingency, this substance's (ihre) subjective side, [which is partially] unconscious ethical practice (bewusstlos Sitte), and [partially] a consciousness of its content (Inhalt) as a temporarily present entity (eines zeitlich Vorhandenen), [finds itself in] a juxtaposed relation (im Verhältnis gegen) to an external nature and [to the] world. However, [because the essentiality of the spirit is to rise toward a knowing of itself], it is the thinking spirit (denkende Geist) within ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which immanently overcomes (in sich aufhebt) [these limits] by rising toward a knowing (sich zum Wissen) of its essentiality within its essentiality.¹ [Spirit can do this in spite of] its finitude as the spirit of a nation. [This finitude is marked by the spirit (er) being the] spirit of a [particular nation and] state which has temporary interest within [its particular] system of statutes and ethical practices. [Thus finitude marks this spirit's knowing of its essentiality. This knowing] still has [the] restrictedness of the spirit of a nation (Volksgeist). In contrast, the thinking spirit (denkende Geist) of world history, at the same time 'philosophically' stripes off every restrictedness of the particular spirits of nations (der besonderen Volksgeister) and the spirit's own worldliness (seine eigene Weltlichkeit), 'i.e. philosophy's empirical foundation and focus', to grasp its own concrete generality and 'thus'

(1) The phrase, "knowing of its essentiality within its essentiality", I take to be an alternative way of noting that 'the concept of Reason' is within "Reason", i.e. it is at 12 o'clock on the circle in FIGURE 1.

raises itself toward [a] knowing of 'Reason-as-'the-absolute-spirit (Geist). [This knowing sees the absolute spirit (Geist)] as the eternal actual truth in which knowing Reason is free for itself (frei für sich), 'i.e. self-consciously free'. [This same knowing sees] nature and [human] history, [i.e. the realms which include natural or external] necessity, as subordinate (dienend) to the absolute spirit's (seiner) revelation 'within the conception of Reason' and to be vessels of [this spirit's] splendour (Ehre).

Geschichte, S.49:

It is not the universal Idea 'or Reason' which is exposed to danger in the opposition and struggle [in history]. The Idea (sie) holds itself in the background, untouched and undamaged. This may be called the cunning of Reason. Reason (sie) lets [human] passions work for it. [They are what through the Idea (sie) has been set into existence (Existenz) [and it is they] which suffer loss and injury. Because [this struggle takes place (ist) in the world of our empirical experience (die Erscheinung)], one part is transitory (nichtig) and one part is affirmative, 'i.e. has greater durability because it positively contributes to the rational progress of Reason'. The particular (Partikuläre) [people and passions involved] are for the most part (meistens) negligible when compared with the general [interests which are also present]. Individuals (Individuen) are 'frequently' sacrificed and abandoned.

Geschichte, S.49:

While we may allow that [most] individualities (Individualitäten) and their aims and their satisfaction are sacrificed because their happiness in the main, 'unavoidably' belongs to the realm of chance; [a view which accepts that] individuals (Individuen) in the main (überhaupt) are to be seen as abandoned [by Reason] and to be considered under the category of means (Mittel) [or tools of Reason]; yet there is one side 'or one possible implication' of this viewpoint that we [must] oppose (Anstand nehmen). [That is to say, that] this viewpoint [must not] be taken (in diesem Gesichtspunkte zu fassen) to separate [individuals in every respect] from the Highest (gegen das Höchste) 'or from Reason'. Immanent within individuals (in ihnen), there is an eternal [or] divine quality which is in no way subordinate [to Reason] (ein schlechthin nicht Untergeordnetes). This [quality] is found for example, in people's *moral, ethical and religious lives* (moralität, Sittlichkeit, Religiosität) ... (50) When we speak of a means (Mittel) [to an aim] we at first (zunächst) imagine (stellen ... vor) that it stands outside the aim (Zweck), [or] has no share in that aim. In fact, even natural things speaking broadly must have a characteristic (Beschaffenheit) within them which accords (entsprechen) with the [rational] aim (Zweck), something which is common between them and it. Humans behave less [than other creatures] according to that wholly external meaning (jenem ganz äusserlichen Sinne) [of means] ... Humans are not satisfied with this (diesem) [merely external relation] even though it provides them with the opportunity to satisfy personal aims which [may] be different from the aim of Reason (von ihm). Humans have a share in that aim of Reason (Vernunftzweck) and for that every reason (eben dadurch) they are aims in themselves (Selbstzwecke). Humans are not [purely] formal [aims in themselves] as are [other] living things (das Lebendige), broadly speaking ... whose properties (Gehalte) are indeed correctly (mit Recht) subordinated to human life and used as means (mittel). In contrast, humans are aims in themselves (Selbstzweck) [in the sense that they form] the content of the [rational] aim (Zweck). In this context (In dies Bestimmung) [we must say that the contents of our moral, ethical, and religious living (Moralität, Sittlichkeit, Religiosität) require us to remove humans from the category of sheer [bloss]] means (Mittel). It is only because divinity is in humans (Mensch) that they can be an aim in themselves (Zweck in ihm selbst). [This property] from the outset is 'self-conscious' reason and in so far as it is active and self-determining, it is called Freedom (Freiheit) ... 'This property partially' raises humans above the [realm of] external necessity and chance (äussere Notwendigkeit und Zufälligkeit). However, it must 'also' be said that to the extent that individuals (Individuen) appropriately (anheimgegeben sind) can claim freedom, [to that same extent] they are responsible (Schuld) for ethical and religious corruption and for the weakening of ethical practices and of religion (Sittlichkeit und Religion). This is the mark of the absolute and high specific characteristic of human kind (das Siegel der absoluten hohen Bestimmung des Menschen). A human being [can] know what is good and what is evil (er wisse, was gut und was böse ist), [51] and this specific characteristic (sie) is 'logically' the very willing of either good or evil. In one word, humans can have the responsibility for ... all ... the good and evil [in the world]. Only animals are genuinely without responsibility ...

What makes people, 'e.g. the utopian idealists', morally unsatisfied is that they find the aims which they hold to be right and good (especially, nowadays, ideals of political arrangements (Ideale von Staatseinrichtungen), do not accord with the present [state of affairs]. They set their **ought** (Sollen) over against the law of the events (das Recht der Sache) within present definite existence (Dasein) ... [52] In order to assess such a feeling and such views we would have [to take note of] their displayed demands and of their highly assertive opinions within our investigation. At no time previous to our own, have more general propositions and thoughts with greater pretension been laid down. If history has indeed seemed to present itself as a struggle of passions, in our time, while passions are not absent, the struggle between thoughts with authoritative [pretensions] have been predominant. Some of these high authorities are essentially titles under which passions and subjective interests contend. These [propositions] which pretend to be derivations (Bestimmungen) of reason pass for justified demands (Rechtsforderungen), even as absolute aims, equal to [the demands of] religion, ethical life, morality.

Nothing is more common now ... than the complaint that ideals (Ideale), which phantasy (Phantasie) has produced, are not realized - that these glorious dreams are destroyed by cold actuality. These ideals which have been stepped to the ground in the journey of life upon the rocks of hard actuality, could initially belong only to the subjective [imagination] of a most lofty and most clever idiosyncratic individual (Individualität des Einzelnen). These qualities, however, are not pertinent (Die gehören eigentlich nicht hierher), because what the individual (Individuum) spins out for himself in his isolation (Einzelheit) cannot be 'expected to be' the law (Gesetz) for general actuality. Equally, the world's law (Weltgesetz) is not for isolated individuals alone (einzelnen Individuen allein).

Thus the dreams of individuals can fall too short, (die dabei sehr zu kurz kommen können), [i.e.] an ideal (Ideal) of reason, of the good, [or] of the truth as commonly understood (Man versteht) [falls too short]. Poets like Schiller have thus written very touchingly and with great sensitivity, in feeling and deep sorrow, that it is not possible to find the actualization of such ideals. In contrast, we say that general Reason is accomplishing itself ... [53] In the above ways (So ware denn), many faults are found within the isolated details (Einzelheiten) of 'the empirical world of appearance (Erscheinung). [To offer] these subjective criticisms, which only have the singular case and its deficiency before its gaze (nur das Einzelne und seinen Mangel vorsich hat), without knowing (erkennen) the general Reason within [these cases], is easy

...

Geschichte, S.53 (page 76):

It is easier to see the deficiencies within individuals (Individuen), within states, and within the progress of the world (Weltleitung) than it is to discover (einzusehen) their genuine value (wahrhaften Gehalt). [While engaged] in this negative fault finding, with a noticeable countenance, one (man) stands over events without grasping that these events themselves are shot through and through (in sei eingedrungen zu sein), with a [predominantly] positive [aspect] (ihr Positives) ...

Now, in contrast to those simple (blosse) ideals, the insight to which philosophy should lead (führen soll), is that the actual world (wirkliche Welt) is as it should be, i.e. that the genuine Good, the universal and divine Reason also is the power to bring itself to completion (auch die Macht ist, sich selbst zu vollbringen). The most concrete image notion (Vorstellung), 'i.e. not the fully rational theory which is the conception' of this Good or of this Reason is God. God governs the world. The content of His governing, [i.e.] His plan, is world history. Philosophy wishes to grasp this plan because only that which is carried out according to this plan is actuality (Wirklichkeit). What is not in accordance with this plan (was ihm nicht gemäss) is only foul existence (faule Existenz). [Those who have those simple ideals seem to view] the world as if it were [only] an appearance of mad or foolish happenings. This appearance fades before the pure light of 'Reason or before' this divine Idea (and the Idea is no mere ideal (die kein blosses Idea ist)). Philosophy wishes to know (erkennen) the content [of these happenings, i.e. to know] the actuality of the divine Idea. [Thus,] philosophy wishes to justify the actuality which is despised [by the above mentioned utopians]. In this way, 'self-conscious' reason 'or philosophy' is the comprehension (das Vornehmen) of the divine work ...

...[54] Broadly speaking, this can be held firmly, that, there is also a higher claim than what is authorized in the world as honourable and glorious. The claim (Recht) of the world Spirit (Weltgeist), '(i.e. of Reason), which can be known philosophically', takes precedence over (geht über) all particular (besonderen) [or transitory (vergänglich)] authorities ...

This may be enough about the means (Mittel) which the world Spirit (Weltgeist) 'or Reason' uses in realizing its 'own' conception (seines Begriffes). Put simply and abstractly, [this realization results from] the activity of subjects (Subjekt) in which Reason is present as their immanent and substantial essence. At first, Reason (ihr) is still obscure (zunächst noch dunkler), [though it is] their hidden foundation (Grund). [55] ... When we take individuals (Individuen) ... with their specific religious and ethical contents (mit bestimmteren Inhalt ihrer Religion und Sittlichkeit), characteristics (Bestimmungen) which share in Reason and by which they also have their absolute justification (Berechtigung) ... the relation of [human kind as being] sheer means (blossen Mittels) to the [rational] aim (Zweck) falls away ...

Logik II, S.75:

The common experience (Erfahrung) 'of physical motion' itself enunciates that at least there exists 'in the empirical world' a multitude of contrary things, contrary arrangements, etc. [This experience demonstrates that this contrariety] is not outside such motion [or occurring purely] within the reflexions of the observer ... [This contrariety] is the negative in its essential specification, [i.e. it is] the principle of all self-movement which in [sensuous motion] has established itself no further than to display itself 'empirically'. [This is to say, that] the external, sensuous motion is its unmediated, definite existence. [Definite existence] moves itself in this way only (etwas nur), not in the sense (nicht indem) that it is here in this instant (Jetzt) and in another instant there, but in the sense that it is at one and the same instant here and not here, or in the sense, that in this here it is and is not at the same time ... Movement is itself the definite existence of contrariety.

Similarly, is not the distinctively inner self-movement of the impulse ... [e.g. the impulse to eat], nothing other than something which contains within itself a deficiency? [This is to say, that any positive impulse (Etwas) is at one and the same time (in einer und derselben Rücksicht)] the negative of itself. An impulse depends on something which is not this impulse, 'e.g. hunger would be impossible without food'. 'The abstract identity of A = A by itself has as yet no life', [but a definitely existing something which has negativity immanent within itself must go out of itself 'into the world which alters it, (e.g. hunger drives an animal to move, to shape, and to be shaped by the other beings in the world)'] [Therefore, something is living only in so far as it can embrace negativity within itself, i.e. in so far as it has the strength to seize and to sustain contrariety within itself ... Without this strength, it perishes rather than lives because of its contrariety.] Speculative thinking 'or philosophy' resides solely by thinking this contrariety and holding it fast within thought ...

Logik II, S.273:

[Each of these three] moments is as much the whole 'specific' conception 'of which it is a moment' as a specific conception 'itself' and as one specification of the conception 'of Reason'.

Logik II, S.295:

The specifications 'of generality, particularity and singularity' are specific conceptions [which] are themselves essentially the totality of all specification.

Logik II, S.298:

Because it is only [a] general [conception, a] particular [conception] is on the same basis (Das Besondere ist aus demselben Grunde) also a singular [conception.] And conversely, because [a] singular [conception] is [a specific [and] general [conception]] it is as much a particular [conception].

Philosophie I, S.13-14:

The courage (mut) [to search for] the truth, [i.e.] the belief (Glaube) in the power (Macht) of the [human] spirit (Geist), is the first condition for [the pursuit of] philosophy. Humankind (Mensch), because it is spirit (Geist), can and should respect itself (darf und soll sich selbst) as worthy of the highest. [We humans] cannot think too highly (nicht gross genug) of the greatness and power of our spirit (Geist). With this conviction (Glauben), nothing will be so coy or difficult that it will not reveal (eröffnete) itself to us. The essence of the universe which at first is hidden and locked away has no strength to resist the courage of 'our attempting' to know [it] (dem Mute des Erkennens). This essence must (es muss) lay out its wealth and depth before the eyes of the searcher (ihm) for his enjoyment.

Philosophie I, S.46:

This movement is concrete as one sequence of developments (Entwicklungen) which must not be represented as a straight line [extending] into the abstract infinity (Unendliche hinaus) but as

a circle, as a [line] turning back into itself. This circle has at [its] periphery a great crowd of circles; the whole is one great, within itself bending back series of elucidations (Entwicklungen).

Philosophie I, S.55:

... the length of time which the world Spirit (Geist) 'or Reason' requires to achieve (zu erarbeiten) philosophy ... can ... surely [strike our] ... first reflection ... [as something as astonishing (etwas Auffallendes) as] the immensity of the space of which astronomy has come to speak ... [We must recognize, however (so ist zu bedenken)], that the world Spirit (Weltgeist) is not in a hurry ... It has time enough ... just because it is itself outside of time, 'i.e. not confined to anyone time span' because it is eternal. Exhausted, ephemeral beings (Die übernachtigen Ephemeren) ... do not have enough time. Who does not die before he has finished with [many (viel) of] his aims. [However,] it is not time alone which is used for the acquisition of a conception (Begriff), it costs much else. Accordingly, it does not matter, that 'Reason or' the world Spirit (er) has spent many races and generations in its labour to come to be conscious (an diese Arbeiten seines Bewusstwerdens wendet), [i.e.] that the world Spirit (er) has made a huge display (Aufwand) of rising up and passing away. The world Spirit (er) is rich enough for such a display. It has produced (triebt) its work (Werk) on a large scale (im Grossen). It has nations and individuals enough to exempt [some from having to contribute to this achievement] (er hat Nationen und Individuen genug zu dispensieren).¹ It is a trivial proposition, that nature comes by the shortest path to its goal. This is correct, but the path of the 'human' spirit (Geist) 'in history' is [one of] mediation, [and therefore appears to be] indirect (Umweg). Considerations [relating to] finite living such as time, inconvenience (muhe) and expense, do not belong here.

Philosophie I, S.96:

The essence of my spirit (Geist) is my essential being (wesentliches Sein), my very substance (mine Substanz selbst) without which I would not be actual (mine Substanz (sonst bin ich wesenlos)). This essence is, so to speak, the combustible material which can become kindled and illuminated by the universal Essence as such, [which is the object of philosophical study (als gegenständlichem)]. Only in so far as this phosphorus is in humankind (im Menschen) is the comprehending (das Erfassen), the kindling and the illuminating possible. Only thus is the feeling (Gefühl), intuiting (Ahnung), and knowing (Wissen) of God in humankind [at all]. Also, without this essence (dies), the divine Spirit could not be the in-and-for-itself universal 'Reason'.

Philosophie I, S.74:

This is the position of philosophy under the 'historical, spiritual or social' formations (Gestaltungen [of its time]). One implication of this relation (davon) is that philosophy is wholly (ganz) identical with its time. Philosophy does not stand above its time. Philosophy (sie) is the knowing (Wissen) of the substantial 'or actual aspect' of its time. Even less does an individual (Individuum), as a son of his time, stand above his time. The substantial 'or actual aspect' of his time is his own essence. A son (er) is only a manifestation [of the time] in individual form (seiner Form). No one can genuinely stand beyond (Über ... hinaus) his time any more (sowenig) than out of his skin. Yet, on the other hand, philosophy does stand above its time in (nach) form. In this respect, philosophy, as thinking about the time (indem sie als das Denken dessen). [i.e. thinking about] what the substantial 'or actual' spirit (Geist) of the time is, makes itself an object (Gegenstand). In so far as philosophy (sie) is within the 'cultural' spirit (Geist) of its time, that spirit (er) 'as human life' is philosophy's (ihr) specific worldly content (bestimmter weltlicher Inhalt). At the same time, philosophy, as knowing (Wissen), is also above and beyond [the social formations which are manifestations of the human life of the time, i.e. in this respect] Spirit (sich)-'as-philosophical-consciousness' stands opposite itself (stellt ihn sich gegenüber) [i.e. opposite the human actualities of which it is a party]. However, this is only formal because philosophy (sie) has no genuine content other [than that provided by its time]. This knowing (Wissen) is itself, indeed, the actuality of the spirit (Geist) [of the time], the self-knowing of 'Reason-as-'the-spirit (Geist).

Therefore the formal distinction is also a real and actual distinction (so ist der formell Unterschied auch ein realer, wirklicher Unterschied). This knowing (Wissen) is what a new form of development [or a new formation] has brought forth. New forms 'or new social and political formations' are only an indication [for the] knowing [process] (nur Weisen des Wissens). Through

(1) Reading *dispensieren* (sic) as *dispensieren*.

the knowing [process], Spirit 'as human philosophical consciousness' has established (setzt) a distinction between the knowing [process] and what is. The knowing process again contains [at least] one new distinction and so a new philosophy comes forward (kommt ... vor). Also, philosophy is yet a more advanced character [of the time] (ein weitere Charakter des Geistes). Philosophy sie is the inner birth place (Geburtsstätte) of the Spirit (Geist)-'as-human-history', of the Spirit (der) 'as social, political and cultural structures which' will come later to actual formation (der später zu wirklicher Gestaltung). That [process of becoming] concrete will be expanded for us [below] (Das Konkret heirvon werden wir weiter haben). Accordingly, we will see, that what Greek philosophy had become, entered into the actuality of the Christian world.

Philosophie II, S.19:

However, [subjective] theorizing (das Theoretische) does not meet (reicht ... nicht hin) [the requirements] of a constitution (Verfassung). It is not [isolated] individuals (Individuen) which make a constitution. It is [something] divine and human (ein Gottliches, Geistiges) which makes itself through history. This something (es) is so strong that the thought of one individual (Individuum) when compared with (gegen) this power of 'Reason-as-'the-world-spirit (diese Macht des Weltgeistes) is not significant. When these thoughts have some significance, [i.e.] can become realized, they are 'themselves' none other than the product of this power of the universal Spirit (Geist).

Philosophie II, S.112-113:

It can, therefore, certainly not be said that a true constitution (eine wahrhafte Konstitution) suites any and every people (Volk) ... This is because each nation falls within the historical process (Denn das Volk fällt in die Geschichte). Just as individual people (einzelne Mensch) are raised by their education within [their] states from having a perspective of singularity (Einzelheit) [their] states from having a perspective of singularity (Einzelheit) to [one of] generality (Allgemeinheit), so each people is 'or tends to be' educated [over time]. Each nation as a child, i.e. in its barbarian stage (Zustand), 'tends to' move over to a 'more' rational situation (einen vernünftigen Zustand). Peoples do not remain where they are but alter (Veränderungen) over time. The same is true of a people's constitution, and it is in this context that we can ask the question of what is the true [constitution] towards which each people (das Volk) must (muss) move. This true constitution [once discovered could be said to stand] in front of each historical nation as that towards which it moves. With the passage of time, each nation must (muss) alter its existing (vorhanden) constitution so that it is continually brought nearer to the true [constitution] ... The constitution of a nation [should truly] express a people's consciousness of its own spirit (Geist), what it is implicitly (was er ansich ist). It [should] give these immanent structures the form of truth, i.e. a people's constitution should enshrine that people's knowledge of itself (des Wissens vonsich). If a people can no longer accept as implicitly true what its [existing] constitution expresses to it as true, i.e. if its consciousness or theory of itself (Begriff) and its reality are different, this, by definition, marks a division in the very body (Zerrissengeteiltes Wesen) and living spirit of that people (Volksgeist). [In this case], two things may occur. First, the nation may either by a violent internal eruption smash that law (Recht) which still has [a degree of] acceptance (das noch gelten soll) or it may alter the 'relevant' law quietly and gradually, which no longer expresses that truth of its ethical practice (Sitte). A people may do this when its spirit (Geist) has moved beyond [some of the existing elements of its constitution]. Second, a people may not have the understanding (Verstand) or strength (Kraft) either quickly or slowly to remove these elements. In this case, the people will either retain its inferior law (dem niedrigeren Gesetze) or it will become subordinated (unterliegen) to a superior people (ein vortrefflicheres Volk) which has reached a higher constitution. In this context, we can see why it is essential to know (zu wissen) what the true constitution is. What may stand against it cannot endure because such an element has no truth. Such an appearance (es) has a temporary existence which it can not sustain. It has been valued but this valuing (gelten) will not be perpetual. That it must (muss) be repealed or abolished lies in the very Idea 'or is Reason-as-'the-constitution. This insight can only be reached by philosophy. A non-violent political revolution can occur when the insight is general (algemeinen) ... A government should (muss) recognize (wissen) when the time for [such change] has come. If it does not (unwissend), it [may be because it] is tied (Knüpft) to these temporary and inessential institutions, taking them to be its defence. In this case, in fact, it sets its inessential against the truly essential [institutions] i.e. against that which is contained within the Idea 'or within Reason'. The

pressure of this spirit (Geist) 'of Reason' may overthrow this government and with the dissolution of the government comes the dissolution of the people. [As a result], a new government [may become established. On the other hand, the [existing] government and the inessential[institutions] may retain the upper hand.

Rechts, S.15 Zusatz:

There are two kinds of laws (Gesetze), laws of nature and [human] laws [accepted by people as] right (Recht). The laws of nature simply are and are thus accepted (sind schlechthin und gelten so). They are not subject to curtailment although man can violate them (sich) in isolated cases (in einzelnen Fällen). Concerning the process of our coming to know (um zu wissen) what the law of nature is, we must familiarize ourselves with nature (müssen wir dieselbe kennenlernen) because these laws are correct, only our views of them may be false. The measure of these laws is outside us, and our knowing (Erkennen) them neither affects nor adds to their operation (tut nichts zu ihnen hinzu, befördert sie nicht). Only our knowledge (Erkenntnis) about these laws can be extended ... Being acquainted (Kenntnis) with right is in one way the same and in another not (einseits ebenso, anderseits nicht). We become acquainted with [both sorts of] laws as simply those which are there. Thus the citizen (Bürger) more or less, and the positive [law] jurist stand and remains no less 'than the natural scientist' by what is given. However, the difference is that the 'human' spirit of [critical] study is aroused by the laws [which are widely accepted as] right (Rechtsgesetze), and indeed, the variety of [such] laws 'as between peoples and times' calls our attention [to the fact] that these laws are not absolute. The laws [accepted to be] right are man made a (von Menschen Herkommendes). Necessarily with these laws, there enters [the possibility either of] a clash [between] one of these laws (Mit diesem) and [our] inner voice or of their agreement. Humankind does not remain [satisfied] with what [only] has definite existence (Dasein), but it claims to have the standard of what is right within itself. [While] humankind (er) can [have a sense of] being subjected to the 'external' necessity and external authority 'say, of the oppressive government under which one may be living', in no case (aber niemals) can we feel the same way (wie) in relation to the necessity of nature because an inner [voice] says what the [human laws] should be and within itself humankind finds the proof or the disproof (Bewahrung oder Nichtsbewahrung) of what is to be accepted ... Here, therefore (also) is the possibility of a conflict between what is and what ought to be. [That is to say, there is a possible conflict between] the right which has being in and for itself (an und für sich seienden Rechts) which remains unaltered, and a human law (dessen) which [has been] determined arbitrarily (Willkürlichkeit der Bestimmung) over what should be accepted as right ... (S.17). Humankind must meet its [own] reason within [the laws it accepts as] right. Humankind must, therefore, consider the rationality of the [laws which pass for] right, and this is the subject matter (die Sache) of our science [of the state, i.e. the philosophy of right] in contrast to the simple study of positive law (im Gegensatz der positiven Jurisprudenz) which often only has to do with contradiction. The present world ... has a pressing need (for this science, because the dominant) culture (Bildung) of the time ... has placed thought (Gedanke) at the summit of all which should be valued. Theories have placed themselves over against the definitely existing [human laws] (Daseienden) and [each wishes] to appear as in-and-for-itself correct and necessary ...

Rechts, S.26:

This book, in so far as it contains a science of the state (Staatswissenschaft), seeks nothing else but to conceive and present (zu begreifen und darzustellen) the state as an inherently rational [entity] (ein in sich Vernünftiges). As a philosophical work, it must be as far as possible from the attempt to construct a state as it ought to be. The teaching (Belehrung) which may be within this book (in ihr) cannot extend to instructing the state about what it ought to be. Far more, it [teaches] how the state (wie er), the ethical universe, should become [philosophically] known (erkannt) ... Because 'some of' what is, is Reason (denn das was ist, ist die Vernunft), the task of philosophy is to conceive what is (Das was ist begreifen). As for the individual, every one is a son of his time anyway and therefore philosophy also is its time grasped (erfasst) in thoughts (Gedanken). It is ... foolish to imagine that anyone philosophy could go over and beyond its contemporary world ... If, in fact, a theory goes over there and behind [the world as it is] to build a world as it ought to be, then that world exists (existiert), indeed, but only in an individual's (seinem) intentions - a fluid area (einem weichen Element) in which an individual (sich) is left (lass) to build anything (alles) [that he might] fancy (Beliebige).

Rechts, S.27:

One word more remains to be said about the teaching of how the world ought to be. Philosophy always (*immer*) comes too late to give it anyway (*kommt dazu ohnehin*). As the thought of the world, philosophy (*sie*) first appears in time after actuality's structuring process has been completed and has made itself ready (*Bildungsprozess vollendet und sich fertig gemacht hat*) 'to be conceived in thought by philosophy'. The ideal [world] 'or the *actual* model discovered by philosophy' as distinct from the real, 'empirically concrete, existent world' (*das Ideale dem Realen gegenüber erscheint*) first (*erst*) appears within the ripeness of the 'relevant' actuality. The above (*Dies*) is a teaching of the conception (*Begriff*), 'i.e. a teaching of philosophy' and history equally shows it to be necessary. This ideal itself grasps this same world (*jenes sich dieselbe Welt ... erfasst*) in its substance. This ideal builds up this world into the shape (*in Gestalt*) of an intellectual realm. [Thus], when philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of living become old, and with [this] grey in grey, that shape (*sie*) is not able to rejuvenate itself (*lasst sie sich nicht verjüngen*), but only (*nur*) to know (*erkennen*) itself: The owl of Minerva first begins its flight with the falling of the dusk (*beginnt erst mit der einbrechenden Dämmerung*).

Rechts, PP258An.:

[Speaking broadly, the question of] what is or was the historical origin of the state or much more [the question of the origin] of each particular state, 'e.g. the Prussian or French state of 1820', [the question] of its laws [which it accepts as right (*Rechte*)] and [of its] institutions (*Bestimmungen*); [the question of] whether the state (*er*) at first arose (*hervorgegangen*) out of patriarchal relationships, [or] out of fear or trust, [or] out of corporations, etc.; and [the question of] how and upon what have such laws (*Rechts*), being grounded (*gründen*) within [the] consciousness 'of a state's citizens' as divine [or] positive law (*Recht*), or [as] contract, custom, etc., been apprehended (*gefasst*) and fortified (*befestigt*) 'by statesmen or political theorists' [all these questions are] not the [special] concern of [our study of] the Idea 'or of Reason'-as-the-state[.] On the contrary (*sondern*), with regard to (*im Rucksicht*) the scientific knowing [of the state] which is here the only [concern of our] discourse, [all the above questions are seen only to relate to the mere] appearance [of things, an appearance which provides] the subject matter for historical [rather than philosophical discourse] (*als die Erscheinung eine historische Sache*)[. Such historical study] to the extent that it includes a concern with the grounds of authority in one actual (*wirklichen*) state, 'only' extracts (*genommen*) these grounds (*diese*) from the forms of accepted law (*des ... gültigen Rechts*) within that state (*in ihm*).

The philosophical consideration [of the state] only has to do with the inwardness (*dem Inwendigen*) of all this [law, i.e. it only has to do with its] theorized conception (*dem gedachten Begriffe*), 'i.e. with the conception of the law which is immanent within all historically existing bodies of law'.

Rechts, PP259:

The Idea 'or Reason-as-'the-state has:

- a) unmediated actuality and is the individual state as the state's self-relating (*sich auf sich beziehender*) organism, i.e. it has a **constitution** or an **internal state law**;
- b) [as] going over into the relation of the single state to other states, it [has] **interstate law**;
- c) [as] the general Idea as genus and [as] an absolute power (*macht*) over (*gegen*) the individual states, it is the Spirit which gives itself its actuality within the process of world history.

Rechts, PP259Z:

The state as actual is essentially [a] an individual state and still beyond [that] a particular state, 'i.e. it is a state which also must include an indefinite multiplicity of inessential particulars'. This (*Die*) individuality is to be distinguished from this (*von der*) particularity [.] This individuality (*sie*) is a moment of the Idea 'or of Reason'-as-the-state itself, while 'inessential' particularity belongs to history. The [particular] states as such are independent from each other, and the relation [between them] can thus only be an external [one] so that there must be a third uniting 'principle' of these states (*so dass ein drittes Verbindendes über ihnen sein muss*). This third 'principle' is thus 'Reason-as-the-objective-human'-spirit (*Geist*), [i.e.] that which gives itself actuality in world history and that which constitutes the absolute arbiter (*Richter*) over these states (*sie*). It is indeed possible that several states as a confederation (*Bund*) can form (*bilden*) a jurisdiction over others [.] It is possible that combinations of states (*Staatsverbindungen*) can arise (*können ... eintreten*), as for example, the Holy Alliance, but these are always (*immer*) only relative and limited, like the 'so called' perpetual peace (*wie der ewige Frieden*). The only absolute arbiter which always and against the

'inessential', particular [states] makes itself good is the in-and-for-itself Spirit (Geist) which has being, 'i.e. Reason-as-the-objective-human-spirit' [or] that which establishes itself there within world history as the general 'principle' and as the effective genus.

Rechts, PP272An.:

How the conception 'of a specific element of Reason' and thus [how] in a more concrete way, the 'specific elements or' Ideas themselves immanently (an ihnen) define (bestimmen) themselves, and therewith [how] their moments of generality, particularity and singularity are abstractly established (abstrakt ... setzen) is discovered in 'the philosophy of' logic (auf der Logik ... zu erkennen).

Rechts, PP273:

The political state, 'i.e. Reason-as-the-constitution', accordingly articulates itself (dirimiert sich somit) into the [following three] substantial functions (Unterschiede):

- a) The function to specify and firmly to fix the general (die Gewalt, das Allgemeine zu bestimmen und festzusetzen) 'i.e. to specify the standards of behaviour to be required of all citizens and institutions within the state' [i.e. the statute or] law-giving function (die gesetzgebende Gewalt),
- b) the [function of] subsuming the particular spheres, 'e.g. the associations within civil society' and singular cases under [these] general laws (die Subsumtion der besonderen Sphären und einzelnen Fälle unter das Allgemeine), [i.e.] the governing function, 'i.e. the particularizing function',
- c) [the functions of] subjectivity as 'the human ability' willingly to finalise decisions (die Subjectivität als die letzte Willensentscheidung) [i.e.] the monarchical function (die fürstliche Gewalt) 'i.e. the finalising function'. Within this finalising function (in der), the [three] distinguishable organs are held together within an individual unity [.]. The finalising function (die) is accordingly the pinnacle and the beginning of the whole of constitutional monarchy.

Rechts, PP273An. (S.439):

If the question presupposes an already present constitution, then the making only signifies a modification (Veränderung) [.]. Also, the presupposing of a constitution itself directly (unmittelbare) entails (enthalt) that the modification can occur only in a constitutional way. For the most part (Überhaupt), however, it is completely (schlechthin) essential that the constitution, although it has arisen within time, to be looked upon not as a made [structure]. This is because (denn) it is far more the completely in-and-for-itself being (Seiende) which is therefore to be considered as the divine and solid 'structure' and as above the sphere which becomes made.

Rechts, PP275:

The monarchical organ includes within itself the three functions (momente) of the totality (PP272), 'i.e. the totality which is Reason-as-the-constitution'. [The three moments are 1)] the generality of the constitution and laws], 'i.e. the law-giving function', [2] the deliberating which connects 'each' particular [case] to the general constitution and laws, 'i.e. particularizing' (die Beratung als Beziehung des Besonderen auf das Allgemeine), and [3] the moment of finally deciding, 'i.e. the finalising function' (und das Moment der letzten Entscheidung als ...)]. This last moment is the function which most has the character of being (als)] self-determining (als der Selbstbestimmung) [.]. It is into the exercise of this function (... in welche ...) that all else (alles Übrige) '(e.g. the other two functions)' returns[. It is also] from the exercise of this function (wovon) that all else takes the beginning of its actuality. This [function of the state,] absolutely to determine itself (Dieses absolute Selbstbestimmen) '(i.e. the finalising function)', constitutes the distinctive principle of the monarchical organ as such[. It is this principle] which is to be developed first (... welches zuerst zu entwickeln ist).

Rechts, PP275Z:

We begin with the monarchical organ, that is to say, the moment of singularity, because it holds within itself the three moments of 'Reason-as-'the-state's constitution. That is to say (nämlich), [that a living human self, i.e. an] "I", is at the same time the most singular and the most general [being]. At first sight (zunächst), a singular [being] also stands within nature, but reality, [i.e.] that which has no ideality (die Nicht-Idealität), [i.e.] the one-outside-another [singularity] (das Äussereinander), is not the existing-with-itself (dan Beisichseiende) 'singularity which characterizes human life', but the various singularities 'in nature just' stand next to one another. In contrast [to these singularities,] human (Im Geistes) 'singularities tend to live' only 'within Reason or' within the Idea 'and thus' as one 'self-knowing' unity (... alles

Verschiedene nur als Ideelles und als eine Einheit). 'Reason-as-'the-state, as 'an element of Reason-as-the-human-'spirit (als Geistiges) is therefore an exhibition of all its moments, but at the same time, singularity is [its] very soul and [its] animating principle, [i.e.] sovereignty [is the principle which] contains all the differentiations within 'Reason-as-'the state (die Seelenhaftigkeit and das belebende Prinzip, die Souveränität, die alle Unterschiede in sich enthält)

Rechts, PP276:

The basic characteristic (Grundbestimmung) of 'the constitution or of Reason-as-'the-political-state is [its] substantial unity as the ideality of its moments, 'i.e. its organs and functions'. [Within this ideality] the particular organs and functions (Gewalten und Geschäfte) are as much peeled off (aufgelöst) 'from this unity' as retained (erhalten) 'within this unity'. They are retained only in such a way that they have no independence, excepting only the sort of 'constitutional' authority [which] goes as far as is specified within 'Reason or' the Idea-[as]-the-whole-'constitution'. From the whole's strength (von seiner Macht) [they] emanate (ausgehen) and are [its] ready organs (flüssige Glieder) in such a way (als) that it is their single (einfachen) self ...

Rechts, PP278:

These two provisions (Bestimmungen) 'of Reason-as-the-constitution' that neither the particular functions and organs (die besonderen Geschäfte und Gewalten) of the state are [firmly] to be isolated (für sich) nor are the wills of state officials (Individuen, see PP277) firmly to be standing by themselves (weder ... noch ... selbständig und fest sind), make up the [internal] sovereignty of the state. This is to say that the provisions which require the functions, organs and officials to have their finalising (letzte) root, [i.e.] their single self within the unity of the state, [these provisions] make up the [internal] sovereignty of the state 'i.e. the individual state as a self-relating organism'.

Rechts, PP278An.:

This system of provisions (Dies) 'tends' to make up (ist) the sovereignty with regard to [the] internal (nach innen) [concerns and operations of the state (See PP277: "Die ... Geschäfte und Wirksamkeiten des Staats ...")]. However, sovereignty (sie) has another side, [i.e.] the sovereignty with regard to the external [concerns and operations of the state (die nach aussen)].

Within the former feudal monarchy, the state was indeed [sovereign] in relation to external [affairs.] However, in relation to internal [affairs,] not only was the monarch usually (etwa) not [sovereign] but the state [was] not sovereign. 'This absence of internal sovereignty resulted' partly 'from the fact that' the particular functions and powers (die besonderen Geschäfte und Gewalten) of the state and of civil society were arranged into independent corporations and communities (Gemeinden), the whole was accordingly more an aggregate than an organism [.] 'This lack of internal sovereignty also resulted' partly 'from the fact that' the functions and powers (sie) were the private property of individuals and with that it followed (damit) that what those same individuals were obliged to do (getan werden sollte) in regard to the whole [state] rested within their opinion and option (in deren Meinung und Belieben gestellt).

The idealism [or ideality] which constitutes sovereignty is that same characteristic according to which, in relation to an animal organism, the so called parts (Teile) are not parts, but organs (Glieder), i.e. organic moments, whose isolation and resting by themselves constitute disease (deren Isolieren und Für-sich-Bestehen die Krankheit ist) (see *Enz. II, PP371*)[. This is the] same principle which within the abstract conception of the will (see *Rechts, PP279An.*) came before [us earlier] (*Rechts, PP7* as the will's self-relating negativity (sich auf sich beziehende Negativität) and with that the [will's] self-determining generality moving towards a singularity, [i.e. a singularity] in which all 'fixed' particularity and determinateness (Bestimmtheit) is transformed (aufgehobene)[.] 'The will's capacity for self-relating negativity and thus its capacity to transform both its essential and inessential characteristics (Bestimmungen) into one integrated whole, i.e. this capacity to will singularity, is the' absolute self-determining ground of the will [.] In order to grasp this singularity (um sie zu fassen), one must possess more widely (Überhaupt ... innehaben) the conception of 'Reason-as-'the-will (dessen)[.] 'Reason-as-the-will' is the substance and the genuine subjectivity of 'Reason-as-the-conception (of Reason'.

Because sovereignty is 'defined to be' the ideality of all particular authority (aller besonderen Berechtigung), so the misunderstanding lies nearby (so liegt der Missverstand nahe) which is also very common, that sovereignty (sie) is to be taken for mere force and bare arbitrariness [i.e. that] sovereignty is taken to have the same meaning as despotism

(Souveränität für gleichbedeutend mit Despotismus zu nehmen). However, [the term] despotism designates the condition of lawlessness, where the particular will as such, whether it be [the particular will] of a monarch or of a people (ochlocracy), stands as if it were by law (als Gesetz) or more exactly (vielmehr) takes the place of law [.] On the contrary, it is precisely within legal, constitutional conditions that sovereignty constitutes the moment of ideality [for] the particular spheres and concerns (Geschäfte), 'e.g. for the associations within civil society'. That is to say, that [when sovereignty is an active presence, it makes] each (eine) such sphere [so that it is] not independent in its aims and ways of working, [standing] by itself and absorbed only within itself (dass nämlich eine solche Sphäre nicht ein Unabhängiges, in ihren Zwecken und Wirkungsweisen Selbständiges und sich nur in sich Vertiefendes)[.] On the contrary, [the operation of sovereignty tends to make] these aims and ways of working to be shaped (bestimmt) by and dependent upon the aim of the whole (upon that which some people have called the **welfare of the state**, a broad and imprecise expression) den man im allgemeinen mit einem unbestimmten Ausdrucke des Wohl des Staats genannt hat). This ideality makes its appearance in a two fold manner [i.e. both in times of peace and in times of emergency].

In peaceful circumstances, the particular spheres and concerns (die besonderen Sphären und Geschäfte) 'within civil society usually' continue along the path of satisfying their particular concerns (Geschäfte) and aims, and it is only partly by (nach) means of the unconscious necessity of the case, 'i.e. by the force of the market' [that] self]-seeking is 'objectively' turned into (umschlagt) mutual support and [into] the support of the whole (see PP183)[.] Partly, however, it is by the direct influence from above (see governing organ, PP289) that they are as much continually lead back to the aim of the whole and accordingly limited[. By this influence from above, they are (als)] constrained to support this [aim of the whole] by making direct payments, 'e.g. the payment of taxes'.

In a situation of emergency (im Zustande der Not), however, whether it be internal or external, it is sovereignty, within whose simple conception the organism, [which in peaceful circumstances (dort)] exists in its particularities, 'i.e. exists as separate spheres and concerns', [which] comes together and [it] is to sovereignty [that] the saving of the state is entrusted (welcher ... anvertraut ist) [requiring as this does (mit) the sacrifice 'or the subordination' (Aufopferung) of the organism's otherwise authorized [particular spheres and concerns] (dieses sonst Berechtigten)[. For it is in the situation of danger that] that idealism [or that ideality] comes to its characteristic actuality (see below, PP321).

Rechts, PP279:

Sovereignty, to begin with (zunächst) 'has been discussed in PP276 to PP278' only [as] the general thought (der allgemeine Gedanke) of this ideality, but [it] exists only as the of-itself-certain subjectivity 'i.e. as the actual subjectivity of the whole organism as maximally guaranteed by the subjectivity of the monarch'.

Rechts, PP279:

[This subjectivity is] the abstract, and to that extent, the groundless self-determining 'capacity' of the will[. It is within this abstract and groundless capacity for self-determination (in welcher)] that the finality of deciding lies. This finality (Es) is thus the individual [moment] of the state as such, 'i.e. of Reason-as-the-constitution'. The state (der) is itself one only in that [finality of deciding]. However, subjectivity is only as [a] subject in its truth, 'i.e. subjectivity is only actual as a subject', personality 'is actual' only as [a] person, and within a constitution which is growing towards real (reellen) rationality 'i.e. towards actuality', each of the three moments of the conception has singled out its 'own' self-consciously actual formation (Gestaltung) 'or organ'. This absolute deciding moment of the whole for that reason is not broadly speaking (überhaupt) 'just' the individuality 'of the people' but is maximally guaranteed by the 'singularity of' one individual, the monarch.

Rechts, PP279An.:

The immanent development of a science, the derivation (Ableitung) of its whole content out from the single (einfachen) conception 'of that science's specific element of Reason' (a science otherwise [derived] would surely not deserve (verdient ... wenigstens nicht) the name of a philosophical science) displays, however, the peculiarity that the one and the same conception, here [the conception of] the will which at first is abstract because it is the beginning, itself supports (sich erhält) its derivations (Bestimmungen). Also, a specific conception indeed equally through itself alone and in this manner concentrates and obtains a concrete content (und zwar ebenso nur durch sich selbst, verdichtet and auf diese Weise einen konkreten Inhalt gewinnt). Accordingly for example (so), it is the fundamental moment (Grundmoment) of personality which at

first [was studied] within unmediated right, 'i.e. within Abstract Right' [and] which has been progressively studied through its various forms of subjectivity and [which is] now 'seen' within absolute right, 'i.e. right defined from' within the state, 'i.e. from' within the completely concrete objectivity of 'Reason-as-the-human-will' [i.e.] this finalising [capacity] which transforms (aufhebt) all particularity within its single (einfachen) self, 'can' break off the weighing of the arguments for and against some proposal, 'e.g. the sort of' arguments which allow for perpetual oscillation between over there and over here (das Abwägen der Gründe und Gegenstände, zwischen denen sich immer herüber und hinüber schwanken lässt, abbricht) [.] 'The personality of Reason-as-the-state through the monarch' [can break off such oscillation (sie)] and by the "I will" decide (beschliesst) 'the question at issue' and start all activity and actuality.

Rechts, PP279An.:

Furthermore, broadly speaking, however, personality and subjectivity plainly only have truth 'i.e. have actuality', as a 'genuinely' infinite [being] relating itself to itself. This being] indeed has its best approximate unmediated truth, 'i.e. actuality', as a person, [i.e. as] a discretely existing subject, 'i.e. as the monarch'. Just so plainly is the discretely existing [subject] one [being] (Die Persönlichkeit und die Subjectivität überhaupt hat aber ferner, als unendliches sich auf sich Besiehendes, schlechthin nur Wahrheit, und zwar seine nächste unmittelbare Wahrheit als Person, für sich seiendes Subjekt, und das für sich Seiende ist ebenso schlechthin Eines .

The personality of the state is only actual as one person, [or as] the monarch, 'i.e. is only maximally guaranteed with the monarch'. Personality is an expression of the conception as such, 'i.e. of the conception of Reason-as-the-state'. At the same time, the the person [of the monarch] contains the actuality of the same [conception], and the conception is only with this organ (Bestimmung) [the conception] 'of Reason or' of the Idea 'as-the-state', [i.e.] the truth.

A so-called 'purely' moral person; [e.g.] a society, an association, a family; however concrete it might be within itself, 'i.e. however precisely defined its decision making procedures might be', only has personality as a moment [which is] abstract with it[.] In such a moral person, personality (sie) has not come to the truth of its existence 'i.e. has not yet attained its full actuality'. In contrast, the 'rational' state is precisely (eben) this totality in which the moments of the conception 'of Reason-as-the-constitution' have reached the actuality appropriate to their own truth (nach ihrer eigentümlichen Wahrheit gelangen).

All these organs (Bestimmungen) 'i.e. the monarch, the government and the representative assembly, are indeed expounded (sind schon ... erörtert) within the whole course of this treatise [both] separately, 'i.e. theoretically', and in their formations, 'i.e. concretely' (für sich und in ihren Gestaltungen) [.] But [this exposition is] repeated here because, while, to be sure, most people (man) easily concede these organs in their 'historically' particular formations 'organs', [they] certainly do not in turn know and grasp these formations philosophically (aber das sie gerade nicht wieder erkennt und auffasst) in their true position 'within the conception of Reason'. It should not be conceded that these formations 'or organs' are isolated (nicht vereinzelt)[.] On the contrary, in accord with (sondern nach their truth, [they] are found to be (als) moments of 'Reason or of' the Idea.

That is why the conception of the monarch is the most difficult conception for ratiocination, i.e. for [one] considering 'the issue, merely by purely analytical or' reflective understanding (für das Rasonnement, d.h. für die reflektierende Verstandesbetrachtung)[.] [The conception of the monarch is the most difficult for ratiocination] because it remains standing within those isolated definitions (Bestimmungen) and with that therefore [it remains standing] also only [with] grounds, [i.e.] with finite points of view and it is [therefore only] acquainted with deduction. Accordingly, therefore, ratiocination (es), 'if at all', presents the office (Würde) of the monarch as something deduced (Abgeleitetes), not only its form but its character (Bestimmung) [. On the contrary (vielmehr), the monarch's (sein) conception is not [to be presented as] something deduced but [as] that which simply originates out of itself (nicht ein Abgeleitetes, sondern das schlechthin aus sich Anfangende). [These claims hold true when applied, therefore, to the similar notion (Am nächsten trifft daher hiermit die Vorstellung zu)] that the right of the monarch is to be treated as grounded (gegründet) in (auf divine authority, [believing that] that notion, therefore, contains the unconditionality of that same right (denn darin ist das Unbedingte desselben enthalten). However, it is acknowledged, what misunderstandings have been connected with that notion (sich hieran geknüpft haben), and the task of the philosophical mediation (betrachtung) is 'to remove these misunderstandings and' exactly to conceive this divinity (eben dies Göttliche zu begreifen).

[We] can [appropriately] come to speak of the sovereignty of the people (Volksouveränität) in the sense that a people is broadly a self-dependent [entity] (ein Selbständiges sei) towards other states (nach aussen) and makes up its own state like the people of Great Britain [.] The people of England or Scotland, [or] Ireland, or of Venice, Genoa, Ceylon, etc. are no longer (kein ... mehr sei) sovereign peoples ever since they ceased to have their own discrete (eigene ... für sich) monarchs or supreme governments (Fürsten oder oberste Regierungen).

One can also [appropriately] speak of sovereignty towards internal [affairs]. Broadly, one can say] that sovereignty (dass sie) resides within a people only when one speaks of the 'constitutional' whole, which has already been shown (PP277, PP278[.] That sovereignty belongs to 'Reason-as-'the-state. On the other hand (Aber), the usual sense in which the sovereignty of the people is taken is as in opposition to the sovereignty existing in a monarch[.] Recently, some people (man in neueren Zeiten) have begun to speak 'of the sovereignty of the people which opposes constitutional monarchy'. In this opposition, the sovereignty of the people belongs to the tangled thoughts whose ground is laid (zugrunde liegt) [by] an uncultivated notion of the people. The people taken without their monarch and plainly thus necessarily and immediately [taken without] the 'constitutional' articulation (Gliederung) of 'Reason-as-'the-whole-'state' which hangs together [with the monarch], is the formless mass which is no longer (kein ... mehr) 'Reason-as-' the state [. Moreover, to this absence of the state belongs an absence (und der keine ... mehr zukommt)] of the institutions (der Bestimmungen) which are present only with the within-itself-formed 'constitutional' whole, [e.g.] sovereignty, government, courts, authorities, associations (Stände) and [the other organs of the whole (und was es sei)]. That such [institutions] step forth into (auf) one organization, [into] the state's life [as] self-relating moments within one people, with that, this indefinite (unbestimmte) abstraction ceases (hört es auf) which the people signifies within the merely broad 'or vague' notion (in der bloss allgemeinen Vorstellung heisst).

If by sovereignty of the people is understood the 'constitutional' form of the republic (Wird unter der Volksouveränität die Form der Republik) and indeed more specifically the the [constitutional form] of democracy (because under republic one commonly includes various other (begrift man sonstige) empirical mixtures which do not belong within a philosophical treatise), then what must 'be said in criticism of such sovereignty and of democracy already' has been said in part above (PP273) (so teils oben ... das Nötige gesagt). In part, 'however, it is now clear that' in opposition to 'Reason-as-'the-developed 'constitution, i.e. as constitutional monarchy, any' speaking 'in favour' of such an [indefinite] notion [of the people] is no longer 'possible' (nicht mehr von solcher Vorstellung die Rede sein).

Within a people, which is presented neither as a patriarchal clan nor [as] within the undeveloped condition in which the form of democracy or aristocracy is possible, nor [as] in another capricious and unorganized condition but [which] has become thought [to be] a within-itself-developed, genuinely organized totality, [within that people] sovereignty is as the personality of the whole 'constitution' and this personality [is] within the reality which is appropriate to personality's conception (diese in der ihrem Begriffe gemässen Realität) as the person of the monarch 'i.e. constitutional monarchy is the reality which is appropriate to the conception of singularity'.

At the before mentioned state [PP273An.], at which the classification of constitutions is made into democracy, aristocracy and monarchy, [i.e.] at the standpoint 'on the part of the members of such constitutions which naively assumes the security' of the as yet, within-itself-remaining [and] substantial unity 'of a people so organised', [i.e. at the stage which] has not yet come to its 'genuinely' infinite differentiation and deepening within itself (die noch nicht zu ihrer unendlichen Unterscheidung und Vertiefung in sich gekommen ist), [at this stage] the moment of the self, finally, itself determining voluntary decisions as an immanent organic moment of the state, 'i.e. of Reason-as-the-state's constitution' has not yet stepped out into its own discrete actuality (tritt das Moment der letzten sich selbst bestimmenden Willensentscheidung nicht als immanentes organisches Moment des Staates für sich in eigentümliche Wirklichkeit heraus). It is always true that 'within every historically existing constitution if it is to endure', there must be a singularizing pinnacle (Immer muss zwar ... individuelle Spitze) even within those uncultivated formations of the state[.] This is] present either [as a pinnacle so recognized (für sich)] as within the above harkened monarchies or as with aristocracies, but especially with in democracies [this pinnacle] raises itself within statesmen [or] generals according to chance and to the particular requirements of the circumstances[.] 'There is this tendency' because all action and actuality have their beginning and their completion within the deciding

(entschiedenen) unity of a leader (eines Anführers). However, closed into the simple enduring union of the functions (Aber eingeschlossen in die gediegen bleibende Vereinigung der Gewalten), such subjectivity of 'collective' decision must partly (teils) [and] accordingly originate and emerge contingently[.] In some cases (teils), 'this singularity is' for the most part (Überhaupt) subordinated 'to indecision and to relative disunity'. In such cases,] therefore, the unambiguous [and] pure decision making (das unvermischte, reine Entscheiden) can only lie nowhere else than on the other side of, 'i.e. beyond the decisions of' such limited pinnacles [i.e. leaders] (nicht anders wo daher als jenseits solcher bedingten Spitzen konnte ... liegen), [i.e.] a determining fate comes from outside (ein von aussen her bestimmendes Fatum). As a moment of the Idea 'or Reason-as-the-state', unambiguous decision taking (es) had to step (musste ... treten) into existence although rooted outside of human freedom and [outside] freedom's (ihres) circle, the circle (den) with which 'Reason-as-the-state is occupied (befasst).

Here lies the source of the need to seek the finalising decision on the great affairs and for the important moments of state from oracles, [from] a supernatural being (dem Dämon) (for Socrates), out [from] the entrails of animals, [from] the feeding and flight of birds, etc.[.] Such a [finalising] decision (eine Entscheidung) [was sought because] humans had not yet laid hold of the depth of self-consciousness, 'i.e. of "the will's infinite negativity", its relating itself to itself', the experience of the "I = I". Humans had not yet come out of the stability (Gediegenheit) of substantial unity to this being-for-itself (Fürsichsein) 'found in "the depth of self-consciousness"'. Humans had not yet seen the strength inside of the human being.

Within the supernatural being of Socrates (compare above, PP138) we can see the beginning of the will which had only before transposed itself to the beyond (jenseits) shifting itself into itself, [into (und)] its will knowing its inward self, [i.e.] the beginning of self-knowing and with that [the beginning of] genuine freedom (dass der sich vorher nur jenseits seiner selbst versetzende Wille sich in sich verlegte und sich innerhalb seiner erkannte - der Anfang der sich wissenden und damit wahrhaften Freiheit). This real (reelle) freedom of 'Reason or' the Idea is precisely there [when] each of the moments of Rationality-'as-the-state' has been given its own, now present (gegenwärtige) self-conscious actuality[.] Accordingly, it is [the freedom] which itself makes up the finally determining certainty of itself, [the freedom] which makes up the [deciding] pinnacle within the conception of the will, [the freedom] supplied [within] the functioning of a consciousness (der Funktion eines Bewusstseins zuteilt). However, this final self-determining can fall into the sphere of human freedom only in so far as it has the location of having been raised to a discrete (für sich) pinnacle [which has been] separated and raised over all particularizing and [over all] conditions (als sie die Stellung der für sich abgesonderten, über alle Besonderung und Bedingung erhebenen Spitze hat).

Rechts, PP279Z:

With respect (Bei) to the organization of the state, that means with respect to constitutional monarchy, we must have nothing before us other than the within-itself necessity of the Idea 'or of Reason-as-the-constitution': all other points of view must vanish. The state must be treated as a great architectonic structure (Gebäude) as a hieroglyph of Reason which places itself there within actuality. Consequently, all that relates itself to sheer expediency (Nützlichkeit) [or to sheer] externality, etc. is excluded from the philosophical treatment. Now, [merely analytical and deductive thinking (die Vorstellung)] easily conceives of the state to be the self-determining and [self] completing will, [i.e.] to be 'the capacity for' final self-resolution (das letzte Sich-Entschliessen ist). The greater difficulty 'for such abstractive thinking' is that this "I will!" must become grasped as [a] person. This (Hiermit) should not be [taken] to say that the monarch is permitted to act capriciously[.] It is far truer (vielmehr) [to say that] he is bound to the concrete content of the items of advice (der Beratungen) 'as offered by the representative assembly and by the government of the day'. [As a result (und)], when the constitution (Konstitution) is secure (fest), the monarch (er) often has nothing more to do than to sign his name 'to the law-making and particularizing initiatives coming from the assembly and government of the day'. However, this name is important: it is the pinnacle beyond which 'collective decision making' cannot go. one might say that an organic 'constitutional' structure (Gliederung) was already definitely present within the beautiful democracy of Athens, but we see at the same time that the Greeks had to extract [their] final decision from wholly external appearances, [i.e. from] the oracles, [from] the entrails of sacrificial animals, [and] from the flight of birds[. We see] that the Greeks [took their relation] to nature [to be that] as to a force which acts (und dass sie sich zur Natur als zu einer Macht verhalten haben) [through

these appearances (da)] to promulgate (verkündet) and express what is good for humankind (dan Menschen). Self-consciousness within that time had not yet come to the abstraction of subjectivity 'i.e. the intellectual isolation of human subjectivity, e.g. the experience of its "self-relating negativity and ... universality"', nor had it yet come (noch nicht dazu) beyond that self-consciousness (Über das) to 'the attainment of' decisiveness (zu Entscheidende), 'i.e. to the attainment of the human finality of decision', [i.e. to the attainment of] an "I will" which must become proclaimed by humankind itself. This "I will" constitutes the great difference [between] the ancient and modern world and so it must have its own distinctive (eigentümliche) existence within the great structure (Gebäude) of the [modern] state. Unfortunately, however, this 'finalising' function (Bestimmung) has become seen only as irrelevant or optional (als äussere und beliebige).

Rechts, PP280:

This final self of 'Reason-as'-the-state's willing (Dieses letzte Selbst des Staatswillens) is simple (einfach) within this its abstraction and is therefore **unmediated** singularity[.] Therefore, within the conception of the state's willing itself (in seinem Begriffe selbst) lies the organ (Bestimmung) of **naturalness**[.] Accordingly, the monarch is essentially appointed (bestimmt) as **this** individual, abstracted from all other content, 'i.e. this or that individual is designated as monarch irrespective of his personal characteristics other than that given by his very birth'. This individual is designated for the office of monarch in an 'intellectually' unmediated way, [i.e.] through natural birth.

Rechts, PP280An.:

This going-over (Übergang) from the conception of the pure self-determining (der reinen Selbstbestimmung) 'capacity of the will' into the 'intellectually' unmediatedness of being and with that into naturalness is of a purely 'philosophical or' speculative character (Natur), [i.e.] its knowledge (Erkenntnis) therefore belongs to logical philosophy 'i.e. to the conception of Reason-as-logic'. Moreover, on the whole it is the same familiar going-over disposition (natur) of the will more widely (überhaupt) which is the process of translating a content out of subjectivity (e.g. an envisaged aim (als vorgestellten Zweck) into definite existence (in das Dasein) (PP8). However, the peculiar (eigentümliche) form of the Idea 'or of Reason' and [of] the going-over which is being considered here is the 'intellectually' **unmediated conversion** (Umschlagen) of the pure self-determining 'capacity' of the will into one 'specific being (Dieses), i.e. into the monarch'. This conversion into a definite and natural existent (und natürliches Dasein) [does not require (ohne)] the 'intellectual' mediation of a particular 'conscious' content, [e.g.] of a 'conscious' aim within 'the history of' behaviour (einen Zweck im Handeln)

Within the so-called **ontological proof** of the definite being (Dasein) of God it is the same conversion of the absolute conception, 'i.e. of the conception of Reason', into being (Sein)[. This conversion (was] has come to constitute the 'intellectual' depth within modern times (in der neueren Zeit), but within more recent times [this conversion] has become posed as the **inconceivable** (was aber in der neuesten Zeit für das Unbegreifliche ausgegeben worden ist)[.] In consequence of that, men (wodurch man denn) have carried out a resignation (Verzicht geleistet hat) from the knowledge (Erkennen) of the **truth** because the truth is only the unity of the conception 'of Reason' and of definite existence (des Daseins) (PP23). Within that resignation (Indem), the consciousness of the 'purely abstractive ratiocination or of sheer' understanding does not have this unity within itself [. This consciousness (und)] remains standing by the **separation** of both moments of the truth [.] With regard to this subject-matter, 'i.e. with regard to this definite existence, this consciousness' may still allow for a **faith** in that unity 'between this subject-matter and itself' (gibt es etwa bei diesem Gegenstande noch einen Glauben an jene Einheit zu). However, within this consciousness (indem), the notion of the monarch becomes seen as falling entirely within ordinary consciousness (als dem gewöhnlichen Bewusstsein) [.] Therefore, 'sheer' understanding 'tends to' remain standing so much the more (um so mehr) by its (seiner) separation 'of itself from definite existence, i.e. by its belief in the separation of the two moments of the truth'. It also [remains standing] by the conclusions which flow out from its ratiocinative cleverness (und den daraus fließenden Ergebnissen seiner rätionalen Gescheitheit) and [which] then deny that the moment of finalising decision within the state **in and for itself** (i.e. within the conception of Reason (d.i. im Vernunftbegriff)) must be connected (verbunden sei) with the unmediated naturalness 'of the monarch'. Out of this denial (woraus), the **contingency** of this combination immediately follows next (zunächst die Zufälligkeit dieser Verbindung) and further, [because] within 'the sheer abstractive

understanding' the absolute discrepancy [between both] those moments [of the truth] becomes claimed to be the rational view (indem die absolute Verschiedenheit jener Momente als das Vernünftige behauptet wird), the irrationality of such a combination [follows next.] It is in this way that the other unhinging conclusions tie themselves to the 'ordinary notions about the state', notions which tend to conceal the Idea 'or Reason'-as-the-state (so dass hieran sich die anderen, die Idee des Staats zerrüttenden Konsequenzen knüpfen).

Rechts, PP280Z:

Men often affirm against the monarch, that it is through him that dependency on contingency within the state is approached (dass es durch ihn von der Zufälligkeit abhängt, wie es im Staate zugeht)[. It may be alleged that (da)] the monarch could be improperly (übel) educated, [or that] perhaps he will not be worthy to stand at the pinnacle itself, and that it is indeed against sense (widersinnig sei) that such a situation rather than a rational [situation] should exist[. If such are affirmed against the monarch (Wenn ..., so)], clearly the assumption here is nugatory that the particularity of the [monarch's] character matters. Within a completed organisation [of the state] it only has to do with (Es ist ... nur um ... zu tun) the pinnacle of formal decision, and one (man) requires in a monarch only a human being (einen Menschen) 'with quite ordinary subjectivity' to say "yes" and to place the dot on the "I", for the pinnacle should be such (so) that the particularity of the [monarch's] character is not the significant [matter].¹ What the monarch has over and above (noch über) this 'capacity' finally to decide (diese letzte Entscheidung) is something which falls to the 'monarch's personal' particularity (Partikularität) which must not be regarded as important (auf die es nicht ankommen darf). Indeed there can be given circumstances in which this particularity alone comes forward, but then the state is not yet fully formed (ausgebildeter) or not well designed (konstruierter). In a well-ordered monarchy, only the objective side 'of human life' comes to the law, 'i.e. formulates and applies the law (i.e. within such a monarchy all law-giving and particularizing decisions are effectively taken by the representative assembly and by the government in accordance with constitutional procedures)' (kommt dem Gesetz allein die objektive Seite zu)[.] The monarch only has the subjective "I will" to add to the law (welchem).

Rechts, PP281:

Both moments within their undivided unity, [i.e. 1] the finalising, groundless self 'to be associated with the finalising function', and with that, [2] the equally groundless existence [of the monarchical organ] constitute the majesty of the monarch. This groundless existence [is the organ left to nature (als der Natur anheimgestellte Bestimmung)[.] [Both moments constitute] this Reason (Idee)-as-the-majesty of the monarch, 'i.e. Reason-as-'the not-to-be-moved (des ... Unbewegten). 'The monarch is less likely to be moved' by the arbitrariness (von der Willkür) 'which may be associated with one or all of the contending factions within a political system'. Within this unity lies the actual unity of 'Reason-as-'the state, 'i.e. the monarch's unity helps maximally to guarantee the unity of the state'. [This is to say, that] the unity of the state (welche 'is maximally' removed from (entnommen ist) the possibility of becoming pulled down into the sphere of particularity only through the monarch's inner and outer unmediatedness (durch diese ihre innere und äussere Unmittelbarkeit) [.] 'This is to say, that the monarch helps maximally to remove the unity of the state from being pulled down into the sphere associated with' arbitrary actions (deren Willkür), aims and opinions, [with] the struggle of factions against factions around the throne, and [with] the weakening and splitting (Zertrümmung) of the state's power (Staatsgewalt).

Rechts, PP281An.:

Birth and the right of descent constitute the ground of the 'monarch's' legitimacy[. This ground is not (als Grund nicht) purely one of positive law but [is] at the same time within the Idea-[Reason]-'as-the-state'. That through the fixed specification of the throne's continuation

- (1) The second edition reads: "Within a completed organization of the state, it only has to do with the pinnacle of formal decision and with a natural solidity against the 'possibly destructive' passion 'of a people'. Wrongly, therefore (daher mit Unrecht) do men (man) demand objective qualities of the monarch: he only has "yes" to say and to place the dot on the "I", thus the pinnacle should be such that the particularity of the [monarch's] character is not the significant [matter]. This specification (Bestimmung) for the monarch is rational for it is in accordance with the conception 'of Reason-as-the-constitution'. However, because this specification (sie) is difficult to grasp, it often happens that the rationality of the monarch, 'i.e. of the monarchical organ' is not perceived. The monarch must be secure within himself, and what the monarch ..."

(festbestimmte Thronfolge), i.e. [through] the natural succession, the winding up of the throne by the factions is prevented, is one side which with right has long been urged in support of the hereditary character of the throne. This side is nevertheless only a result and to make it into a **foundation** (zum Grunde) is to pull the majesty 'of the monarch' down into the sphere of ratiocination[. This side] gives majesty's (ihr) [character], whose (deren) character is this groundless unmediatedness and [is] this final within-itself-being 'of Reason-as-the-state', not its [character of being] the immanent the Idee-[Reason]-as-the-state[.] Rather, [this side gives majesty's character to be] something **outside** majesty's [character] (sondern etwas ausser ihr), [i.e.] a [character] of majesty [which has] miscellaneous notions (einen von ihr verschiedenen Gedanken) at its foundation, e.g. the welfare of the state or of the people (etwa das Wohl des Staates oder Volkes zu ihrer Begründung). Indeed, the hereditary character [of the throne] can become traced out from such a notion through **secondary premises** (Aus solcher Bestimmung kann wohl die Erblichkeit durch *medios terminos*)[.] However, [such a] notion (sie) also allows other **secondary premises** and with that other conclusions beside (andere Konsequenzen zu), and it is only too familiar which conclusions have been drawn out of this welfare of the people (*salut du peuple*). That is why **only** philosophy may thoughtfully consider this majesty, for every other method of investigating than the speculative [method] of the 'genuinely' infinite, within itself grounding (begründeten) Reason (Idee) suspends (hebt ... auf) the in-and-for-itself character (natur) of the 'monarch's' majesty.

The election 'by the whole' realm (Das Wahlreich) 'or the selection of the monarch by a general election' easily seems to be the most natural notion, i.e. this notion (sie) lies closest to the superficiality of thought[. Such thought may say that] because it is the concern and the interest of the people which the monarch has to attend to, so must it also remain left to the election of the people [to decide] who the people(es) desire to commission (beauftragen wolle) with the attending to (mit der Besorgung) of its welfare, and only out of this commissioning arises the right to the governing [official] (und nur aus dieser Beauftragung entstehe das Recht zur Regierung). This view, like the notions of the monarch as the highest state official (als oberstem Staatsbeamten) [or like the notions] of a contractual relation between the monarch (demselben) and the people, etc., comes from 'the notion of the will of the people which assumes that this will is indistinguishable from' the will as [the] pleasure, [the] opinion and [the] arbitrary action of the many[.] In relation to this disposition (einer Bestimmung), which (die) was considered long ago 'within this book' as prevailing (als erste gilt) within civil society, or rather wishes only to put itself forward [within civil society, this disposition] is neither the principle of the family nor [even] less [is it the principle] of 'Reason-as-the state, but broadly stands opposed to the Idea-[Reason]-as-ethical practice (Sittlichkeit).

That the election 'of the head of state by the whole' realm is the worst (schlechtste) of institutions shows itself already for ratiocination [to see] from the results[.] However, these results (die) appear to ratiocination (für dasselbe) only as something possible and probable, but in fact [they] lie essentially within this institution. That is to say, that through the relation [between the elected head of state and the people] within an electoral system (in einem Wahlreich) which makes the particular (partikulare) will, 'i.e. the factional or minority will' into the finally deciding [will of the state] (zum letzten Entscheidenden), the constitution becomes an elective capitulation (einer Wahlkapitulation), i.e. becomes (zu) a surrendering of the state's power (Staatsgewalt) to the destruction of the particular will, 'i.e. the minority factional will'[.] Out of this comes forth the transformation of the particular state functions (der besonderen Staatsgewalten) into private property, 'i.e. into minority, factional property'[. Out of this comes forth] the weakening and the loss of the sovereignty of the state and with that [comes] the inner disintegration and the external destruction (Zertümmern) [of the state].

Rechts, PP281Z:

If we (man) wish to grasp Reason the Idea-[Reason]-as-the-monarch, then we cannot be content with saying that God has instituted the kings, for God has made everything, also the worst [of institutions]. Nor (Auch ... nicht) can we get far by the viewpoint of utility, because it [also] permits us again and again (und es lassen immer wieder) to point out disadvantages 'to any existing or proposed constitutional arrangement'. It is even of less help if we look upon (betrachtet) the monarchs as like (als) a positive right. That I [should] have property is 'philosophically' necessary, but [that I have] this particular possession is contingent[.] Accordingly, the right that one 'specific human being' must stand at the pinnacle 'of an existent constitution' [appears to be contingent] if we look at (betrachtet) it as abstract and positive. However, this right is [both] as a felt requirement (Bedürfnis) and as a requirement of the

case, [i.e. it is] in-and-for-itself present. Monarchs frankly do not distinguish themselves through bodily strength or through intellect (Geist), and yet millions [of people] allow themselves to be ruled over by them. If one (man) now says, [that] human beings allow themselves (liessen sich) to be governed against their interests, aims, [and] intentions, then this is absurd (ungereimt) for human beings are not so stupid[.] It is their requirement[.] It is the inner force (macht) of the Idee-‘Reason-as-the-monarch working within them’. [This] force (die) urges (nötigt) [millions of] human beings (sie) to [be ruled over by monarchs (dazu)] and maintains [them] within this relation ‘even when it is’ against their own apparent consciousness. If in this way (Wenn so) the monarch steps forward as pinnacle and organ (Teil) of the constitution, then we must say that a conquered people is not ‘in the same way’ identical with the monarch (mit dem Fürsten). In war, if within a conquered province an insurrection (Aufstand) occurs, accordingly, this [insurrection] is something other than a rebellion (Empörung) within a well organized state. The conquered [people] are not in revolt (im Aufstande) against *their* monarch (Fürsten), they commit no treason (Staatsverbrechen), for they are not with the commander (mit dem Herrn) in the ‘same’ community (im Zusammenhang) of the Idea-‘Reason-as-the-state’. ‘That is to say, that they do not yet consciously or intuitively live within the same state and are thus’ not within the inner necessity of the ‘same’ constitution. ‘At most’, it is only a contract, not a political union (Staatsverband) [which is here] present. Napoleon replied to the Erfurt envoys, “I am not your prince. I am your master”.

Rechts, PP282:

Out of the sovereignty of the monarch flows the right to pardon (das Begnadigungsrecht) criminals, for only to sovereignty (ihr) comes the actualization of the strength (Macht) of the ‘human’ spirit (des Geists) to make undone what happens (das Geschehene ungeschehen zu machen) and to annual the crime by (im) the ‘human’ forgiving and forgetting.

Rechts, PP282An.:

The right to pardon is one of the highest recognitions of the majesty of the ‘human’ spirit (Geist). By the way, this right belongs to, ‘i.e. is an example of one of’ the applications or reflections of specifications of the higher sphere ‘of the state, i.e. of sovereignty in this case’, onto a previous [sphere, i.e. onto a sphere outlined earlier within this book (in this case, crime, which was expounded within the sphere of abstract right).] However, such applications belong to [each] particular science which has to treat its subject-matter (Gegenstand) within that subject-matter’s (seinem) empirical compass (Umgange) (cf. PP270An.Fn.).

The injuries of the state in general or of the sovereignty [of the state, or of the] majesty and personality of the monarch (des Fürsten) [are examples of such applications and are thus] (Zu solche Anwendungen gehört auch, dass ...) subsumed under the conception of crime which came before [us] earlier (PP95 - PP102)[. These injuries] indeed become defined (bestimmt werden) as the highest crimes, [requiring] procedures of a particular sort (die besondere Verfahrensart), etc.

Rechts, PP282Z:

Pardoning is the reducing of the punishment which does not repeal (aufhebt) the rightful law (das Recht). Rather, this [law] remains, and the pardonee (der Begnadigte) is after as before a criminal[.] Clemency does not express that the pardonee (er) had committed no crime. This removal of punishment can itself proceed through religion, for the event of the ‘human’ spirit can become undone by (im) the Spirit. To the extent that this [undoing] is to be performed within the world, it has its place only within the majesty ‘of the monarch’ and can only be fit the groundless deciding ‘capacity of the monarch’.

Rechts, PP283:

The second inclusion (Enthaltene) ‘(i.e. function)’ within the monarchical organ is the moment of particularity, i.e. (oder) [the moment] of ‘empirically’ exact content (des bestimmten Inhalt) and the subsumption of this exact content (desselben) under the general ‘constitutional and rational statutory law’. In so far as the moment (es) [of particularity] maintains a ‘separate’ particular existence, ‘the cabinet or’ the highest counselling positions (oberste beratende Stellen) and individuals are it[.] They (die) bring before the monarch for ‘final’ decision [either] the content of the ongoing affairs of state (den Inhalt der vorkommenden Staatsangelegenheiten) or [the content of] the changing statutory provisions required by the needs at hand (oder der aus vorhandenen Bedürfnissen nötig werdenden gesetzlichen Bestimmungen)[. These affairs and these provisions are appropriately brought before the monarch] with their objective side, ‘i.e. with a statement of the relevant empirical facts, with a statement of’ the grounds for deciding (den Entscheidungsgründen), (i.e. (daraus sich) the covering statutes, circumstances, etc.). The choice

of the individuals to [perform] this function (Die Erwählung der Individuen zu diesem Geschäfte) like their (deren) removal falls within the monarch's unconfined discretion (seine unbeschränkte Willkür) because they have dealings with the unmediated person of the monarch (da sie es mit der unmittelbaren Person des Monarchen zu tun haben) 'i.e. because they do not deal with the monarch through others but directly'.

Rechts, PP284:

[Not the monarch but these counselling positions and individuals alone are subject to accountability.] To the extent that the objective [side] of deciding, [i.e.] the acquaintance with the 'empirical' content and with the [relevant] circumstances, i.e. the statutory and other determining grounds, these advisory officials alone are accountable. This] objectivity is capable of proof, and therefore [in so far as it is] advice which can be distinguished from the 'purely' personal will of the monarch as such, [to that extent] these positions or individuals alone are subject to accountability (Insofern das Objektive der Entscheidung, die Kenntnis des Inhalts und der Umstände, die gesetzlichen und andere Bestimmungsgründe, allein der Verantwortung, d.i. des Beweises der Objektivität fähig ist und daher einer von dem persönlichen Willen des Monarchen als solchem unterschiedenen Beratung zukommen kann, sind diese beratenden Stellen oder Individuen allein der Verantwortung unterworfen) [.] However, the distinctive (eigentümliche) majesty of the monarch as the finally deciding subjectivity is raised above all accountability for the governmental actions.

Rechts, PP285:

The third moment, '(i.e. the third constitutional function)' of the monarchical organ (der fürstlichen Gewalt) pertains to the in-and-for-itself generality 'of Reason-as-the-constitution' (das an und für sich Allgemeine)[.] This generality (welches) subsists in a subjective way (Rücksicht) within the conscience of the monarch, [and] in an objective way within the whole of the constitution and within the laws (Gesetzen)[.] Accordingly, the monarchical organ (die fürstliche Gewalt) presupposes the other organs (Moments) [just] as each of them presupposes it.

Recht, PP286:

The objective guarantee of the monarchical organ, [i.e.] the justified (rechtlichen) succession according to the hereditary character of the throne, etc., lies within [the above mentioned mutually presupposing organs (liegt darin).] According to that presupposing, just as (dass, wie ... ebenso) this sphere '(i.e. the monarchical organ)' has a separated out (ausgeschiedene) actuality, [i.e. separated out] from the other specific organs (Momenten) [which are also] 'consciously or unconsciously' [separated out] through Reason, so do the other [organs] taken separately (für sich) have the characteristic (eigentümlichen) rights and obligations of their organ (Bestimmung)[.] Each organ (Glieder) 'both' maintains itself separately (für sich) within itself (indem) [and] is maintained within [the] rational organism, 'i.e. within Reason-as-the-constitution'. Equally, therefore, the other [organs are maintained] in their 'constitutional' characteristicness (Eigentümlichkeit).

Rechts, PP286An.:

According to primogeniture, the monarchical constitution has been hewn out (herausgearbeitet zu haben) with an hereditary, firmly determined succession to the throne[.] Thus, [the monarchical constitution has been hewn out] in such a way that it (so dass sie hiermit) has been led back to the patriarchal principle, the principle from which (von dem) it historically emanated[.] However, [within constitutional monarchy, the patriarchal principle is] in the higher specification as the absolute '(i.e. as the finalising)' pinnacle of an organically developed state[.] This monarchical constitution] is one of the later results of history, a result which (das) is of the greatest importance for public freedom and [for the] rational constitution[.] As remarked before, [this is so in spite of the fact that] although this result (es) is already respected, [it] still has become [one result which] is frequently conceived '(i.e. theorized)' least 'adequately' (obgleich es, sie vorhin bemerkt, wenn schon respektiert, doch häufig am wenigsten begriffen wird). That is why the former merely feudal monarchies as well as the despotisms in history show that alternation of rebellion, violent acts of monarchs (Gewaltentaten der Fürsten), internal wars, the fall of individual princes (fürstlicher Individuen) and dynasties[.] Out of that alternation (daraus) [history shows] the resulting (hervorgehende) internal and external general devastation and decay [.] History shows these resulted] in such circumstances because of the segmentation (teilung) of state business (des Staatsgeschäfts) in such a way that (indem) its segments were delegated (übertragen sind) to vassals, pashas, etc.[.] This is only a mechanical [differentiation], not a differentiation of function (Bestimmung) and form but only a differentiation of greater or less power (Gewalt). So within this circumstance (So ... indem),

each segment is supported and made[.] Each segment (er) supports itself [but] only itself and therefore (darin) does not at the same time [bear] forth the other [segments]. Each segment] has become independently self-dependent, every moment 'or segment has become' complete in itself (und hat zur unabhängigen Selbständigkeit alle Moments vollständig an ihm selbst). Within an organic situation (Verhältnisse) organs (Glieder), not segments, hold themselves in relation to one another (sich zueinander verhalten), each organ maintains the other while it fulfils its own sphere[.] Within each is a substantial aim and product of maintaining its own self [and equally of] maintaining the other organs (jedem ist für die eigens Selbsterhaltung ebenso die Erhaltung der anderen Glieder substantieller Zweck und Produkt). The guarantees about which [we] ask, be they for the stability (es sei für die Festigkeit) of the succession to the throne, broadly of the monarchical organ (der fürstlichen Gewalt überhaupt), for justice, public freedom, etc., are protections (Sicherungen) through institutions. As subjective guarantees, affection of the people, [the] 'personal' character 'of the monarch, of the monarch, of the public functionaries, or of the people', oaths 'of allegiance', force (Gewalt), etc., can be looked at, but as soon as [we] speak about a constitution, the discussion (Rede) is about objective guarantees alone ([i.e. about] the institutions), i.e. [about] the organically interlaced and self-limiting moments 'or organs'. These institutions are such that (So sind sich) public freedom in general and the hereditary character of the throne are mutual guarantees and stand in complete interrelation (im absoluten Zusammenhang)[. This is because public freedom is the rational constitution and [because,] as demonstrated 'already', the hereditary character of the monarchical organ [is] a moment lying within the rational constitution's conception (und die Erblichkeit der fürstlichen Gewalt das, wie gezeigt, in ihrem Begriffe liegende Moment).

Rechts, PP290Z (S.460):

... The lower [part of society], the multitude (das Massenhafte) of the whole, has clearly (leicht) been left more or less unorganized and yet it is of the highest importance that it become organized for only so is it mighty (Macht), is it powerful (Gewalt), otherwise it is only a crowd, a multitude (Menge) split into atoms.

Rechts, PP292:

[The appointment of civil servants from the longer lists of equally qualified individuals appropriately] belongs to the monarchical [organ] as the deciding and sovereign organ of the state's power (Staatsgewalt).

Rechts, PP293:

The particular state functions (Staatsgeschäfte) which the monarchy gives over to the ministries (Behörden) constitute a part of the objective side of the sovereignty living within the monarch

...
Rechts, PP298::

The law-giving 'or representative assembly' organ concerns the statutes (die Gesetze) as such, insofar as they require further [and] continuous specification[.] Also, [it is] accordingly [concerned] with their content, [i.e.] the wholly general internal affairs 'of the state'. This organ is itself one part (Teil) of the constitution, [and] the constitution (welche) is presupposed by this organ (ihr) and to that extend in-and-for-itself lies beyond (ausser) this organ's (deren) direct 'or unmediated' specification[.] However, the constitution's (ihre) further development is fostered (erhält) within the progressive elaboration of the statutes and within the ongoing character of the 'comprehensive or' general 'character of governmental affairs.

Rechts, PP298Z:

The constitution must in-and-for-itself be the secure valued ground (Boden), upon which the law-giving or 'representative assembly' organ stands and, therefore, the constitution (sie) must not first become made. The constitution accordingly is[.] However, it equally essentially becomes. This is to say that it progresses within 'its own' structure (Bildung). The progressing is a modifying (Veränderung) which is imperceptible (unscheinbar) and [which does] not have the form of modification ... Thus, the progressive elaboration of a condition (eines Zustandes) is an apparently tranquil and unnoticed [elaboration]. After a long time, in this way, a constitution comes to a wholly other condition than before.

Rechts, PP300:

Within the law-giving function (Gewalt) as a totality are active, to begin with, the two other organs (momente) [i.e. the two organs other than the organ most prominently associated with the execution of the law-giving function], 'i.e. the representative assembly' [. These two organs are 1,] the monarchical [organ] as the organ (dem) to which the highest 'or the finalising' decision belongs, [and 2,] the governing organ (die Regierungsgewalt) as that [organ] with the concrete

acquaintance [with] and over sight of the whole 'state' in its many sidedness[. The governing organ oversees this whole according to] the fundamental principles 'as formulated in the established rational constitution and laws which' have firmly become actual (und den darin festgewordenen wirklichen Grundsätzen)[.] As well as [this, the governing organ oversees this whole] with the acquaintance of the requirements of the state's power (Staatsgewalt)[. This acquaintance] especially [characterizes] the advising moment [of the governing organ, i.e. "the cabinet" (PP329Z).] Finally (endlich) [3], the third organ which is active within the law-giving function is] the representative assembly organ (das ständische Element).

Rechts, PP300Z:

... The unity of the state ... is that which is to be sought before all else (vor allem zu verlangen).

Rechts, PP301:

[In] the representative assembly, ... the public consciousness as an empirical generality of views and thoughts of the many therefore comes into existence.

Rechts, PP301An.:

... it is far more the case that the people, insofar as with this word [it is] one part of the members of a state which is signified, it expresses the part which does not know what it wills. To know (wissen) what one (man) wills, and even more, [to know] what is the in-and-for-itself Will which has being (seiende Wille), [i.e.] the will [of] Reason, is the fruit of a deeper knowing (Erkenntnis) and insight which is plainly not the subject-matter (die Sache) [possessed by] the people.

Rechts, PP308:

The fluctuating side of civil society falls within the 'elected chamber' of the representative assembly (In den andern Teil des ständischen Elements), which side, externally because of the great number (menge) of its members, but essentially because of the character (natur) of its specificity (Bestimmung) and structure (Beschäftigung), can only enter [the assembly] through representatives (Abgeordnete).

Rechts, PP309:

... 'Reason-as-'the-assembly (Zusammenkunft) has the character (Bestimmung) to be a living, mutually teaching, convincing and collectively advising 'representative' assembly (Versammlung).

Rechts, PP314:

Above all ... public acquaintance (der allgemeinen Kenntnis) provides its extensions through the publication of the representative assembly's proceedings.

Rechts, PP315:

The opening of this opportunity for 'such public' acquaintance has the general side 'or character' that in this way (so) public opinion first approaches (erst zu ... kommt) true thoughts and insight into the condition (Zustand) and [the] conception of the state[.] With that 'acquaintance', public opinion first approaches an ability to judge more rationally about state affairs (dessen Angelegenheiten und damit erst zu einer Fähigkeit, darüber vernünftiger zu urteilen)[.] Then also [in this way, public opinion] becomes acquainted with and learns to respect the operations (Geschäfte), the talents, [the] virtues and [the] skills of the state authorities and servants. Equally, by such publication, these talents are provided an opportunity for developing and [for providing] a show-place of higher distinction[.] In this way (so) again, 'this' publicity (sie) is the antidote to the self-conceit of isolated individuals (Einzelnen) and of the multitude and [is] a means of education for these and, indeed, one of the greatest [means].

Rechts, PP315Z:

The publicity of the representative assemblies is supremely (vorzüglich) a great cultivating drama for the citizens[.] Thereby, for the most part, the people learn to become acquainted with the genuine [character] of its interest. As a rule, the notion (Vorstellung) prevails that all which is good for the state is already known (wissen) and that it only comes to be spoken within the representative assembly[.] However, in fact, [we] find the talents and the skills develop themselves which come to serve as a model [for the citizens (die zu Mustern zu dienen haben)]. Of course, such assemblies are troublesome for the ministers who must put on wit and eloquence in order to meet the criticisms which here become directed against them[.] Nevertheless, broadly speaking this publicity is the greatest means of education concerning (für) state interests. Within a people where this takes place, they display a wholly other liveliness in connection with the state than where the representative assembly is absent or is not public. Only through this familiarity do the 'representative' chambers hang together at each and every

step (eines jeden ihrer Schritte hängen) with the changes (mit dem Weiteren) in **public opinion**[.] Also [thereby,] it displays itself, that it is one thing what every man imagines at home with his wife or his friends and quite another thing what happens in a great assembly where one intelligent [position] (Gescheitheit) devours another.

Rechts, PP316Z:

At all times public opinion is a great force (Macht) and it is particularly in our time where the principle of subjective freedom has this importance. What now is valued should no more be made good through force (Gewalt) [nor even] less through habit and custom but indeed through 'intellectual' insight and grounds.

Rechts, PP317:

Therefore, public opinion holds within itself the eternal substantial principles of justice, [i.e.] broadly speaking, holds the genuine content and the result of the whole constitution, [of] law-giving and of the general situation (Zustandes) in the form of common sense (des gesunden Menschenverstandes), [i.e.] the wholesome human understanding which (der) in the shape of prejudices through all 'people' penetrates ethical principles as much as the genuine needs and correct tendencies of 'social' actuality ...

Rechts, PP317Z:

The principle of the modern world demands that what everyone (jeder) should acknowledge [must] display itself as justified (als ein Berechtigtes zeige), 'i.e. must display itself to be rational'. However, still apart from that, everyone wishes to have a share in discussing and advising ... freedom of speech ...

Rechts, PP320:

'The subjectivity of isolated individuals and groups within civil society, i.e.' the **subjectivity** which has its most external appearance within the wanted and equally self-destructive believing and ratiocinating [which] fosters state life's haphazardness, [i.e. subjectivity] as a disintegrator of the established state life,¹ this subjectivity] has its genuine actuality within its opposite [. This is to say, that this subjectivity] 'is objectively guaranteed' within the subjectivity which is (als) identical with the substantial will '(i.e. with the singular will of Reason-as-the-state)' which constitutes the conception of the monarchical organ and which as an **ideality of the whole** [constitution] has not yet come to its right and definite existence (Dasein) within the foregoing (in dem Bisherigen).

Rechts, PP320Z:

Once already we have treated subjectivity as the pinnacle [feature] within the monarch. The other side of subjectivity (sic) is its arbitrary display within public opinion as the most external appearance. The subjectivity of the monarch is by itself abstract but it should be a concrete [subjectivity] and as such [it should be] the ideality which spreads itself over the whole. The state of peace is the state (der) where all branches (Zweige) of civil life become established (bestehen) but this establishing (Bestehen) of the [branches] next to and outside of one another has arisen (hervorgehend) out of the Idea-[Reason]-as-the-whole-[state]. 'The dependence of this arising 'from within the whole' must also come to 'its' appearance [i.e. (als)] the ideality 'or united, self-knowing structure' of the whole 'should become actual'.

Rechts, PP321:

II. *The sovereignty towards external [states]* ²

The **sovereignty with regard to internal** [affairs] (PP278) is this 'very' ideality 'of the whole constitution (PP320)' in so far as the moments of the 'human' spirit (des Geistes) and its actuality, [i.e.] the [state's] 'constitution', are unfurled in their 'inner' necessity and exist (bestehen) as organs (Glieder) of [the state's constitution (desselben)]. However, the 'human' spirit [or the state] as an **infinitely negative relating to itself within the freedom 'of Reason'** is essentially thus a discretely existent being which has taken up the existing differentiations '(e.g. the organs)' **within itself** and with that separates 'itself from other states'.³ The-[rational]-state within this specification has an **individuality** 'or a *singularity*' which as an

- (1) Die Subjectivität, welche als Anflösung des bestehenden Staatslebens in dem seine Zufälligkeit geltend machen wollenden und sich ebenso zerstörenden Meinen und Rasonieren ihre äusserlichste Erscheinung hat ...
- (2) Die Souveränität gegen aussen. Aussen could just as easily be read to refer to "external" [sovereignities], [states], [affairs] or operations and concerns *Rechts*, PP277 and PP278An.].
- (3) Aber der Geist, als in der Freiheit unendlich negativ Beziehung auf sich, ist ebenso wesentlich Für-sich-sein, das den bestehenden Unterschied in sich aufgenommen hat und damit ausschliessend ist.

individual [state among other states] and [which] within the sovereign 'or monarch' is as an actual, unmediated individual (PP279).¹

Rechts, PP322:

The individuality 'of Reason-as-the-state', as a separate discrete being appears as a relation to other states. Each of these states is self-dependent vis-as-vis the others (Die Individualität, als ausschliessendes Für-sich-sein, erscheint als Verhältnis zu anderen Staate, deren jeder selbständig gegen die anderen ist). Within this self-dependence, the discretely existent being of the actual 'human' spirit (Geist) 'or of Reason-as-the-state' has its definite existence (Dasein), because this self-dependence (sie) is the prime freedom and the highest distinction (Ehre) of a people.

Rechts, PP322An.:

Those people (Diejenigen), who speak of aspirations of a collectivity (einer Gesamtheit) which makes up a more or less self-dependent state and [which] has its own centre (Zentrum), [i.e. those who speak] of aspirations to give up this central point (Mittelpunkt) and this point's (seine) self-dependence in order to (um) make up a whole with another central point, know little of the character (Natur) of a collectivity and the sense of self (Selbstgefühl) which a people has in its independence.

For that reason, broadly speaking, the first force (Gewalt) with (in) which states historically come forward is this self-dependence even if the self-dependence (sie) is wholly abstract '(e.g. is a collective aim rather than an achievement)' and [even if the self-dependence] has no further internal development '(i.e. does not have a rational constitution)'. That is why it belongs to this original appearance [of the state], that an individual stands at its pinnacle, a patriarch, a chief, etc.

Rechts, PP329:

The state has its orientation (Seine Richtung) towards external [states] because of this 'truth' that (darin, dass) the state (er) is an individual subject. Its relation to other [states], for that reason, falls to the monarchical organ[. This is to say,] therefore, that [its relation to other states (es)] directly and solely accrues to the monarchical organ (der), [e.g.] to command the armed might, to maintain the relations with the other states through envoys, etc., to conclude war and peace and other treaties.

Rechts, PP329Z:

In nearly all European countries the individual pinnacle is the monarchical organ (die fürstliche Gewalt) which has to attend to the relations toward external [countries]. Where there are representative assembly (ständische) constitutions, the question may arise whether war and peace should not come to be concluded by the representative assembly (von der Ständen), and in any case, the assembly (sie) retains its influence particularly in respect to financial means. For example, in England no unpopular war can be conducted. However, if some people (man) believe that monarchs and cabinets (Fürsten und Kabinette) are more subject to passion than 'are representative' chambers, and for that reason, [a role to play must be put (zu spielen sucht)] in the hands of the chambers in the deciding over war and peace, then it must be said, that often whole nations may become still more enthused than their monarchs and [more] steeped (gesetzt) in passion. Several times in England, the whole people have pressed for war and, to a certain degree, [have] compelled the ministers to conduct it. The popularity of Pitt came for this reason, that he knew [how] to fall in with what the nation wanted at that time. Here, only later did the cooling [of the enthusiasm] bring [it] to (hervorgebracht) consciousness, that the war was neither requisite nor profitable (unnütz und unnötig) and [that the war] had been started without [the] calculation of the means (ohne Berechnung der Mittel). Beyond this, the Idea-[Reason]-as'-the-states not only in the relation with one other [state] but with many, and the intricacies of the relations become so delicate, that they can only be handled from out of the pinnacle (nur von der Spitze aus behandelt werden können).

(1) Der Staat hat in dieser Bestimmung Individualität, welche wesentlich als Individuum Souverän als wirkliches, unmittelbares Individuum ist.

Wurt., S.492:

It is an infinitely important step forward of the culture (der Bildung) 'of a state' that it has forged ahead to the knowledge (Erkenntnis) of the simple fundamental principles (Grundlagen) of state arrangements and has grasped them in **simple propositions** as an elementary catechism ... hung on placards in the churches, made a standing article of school and church teaching ... such principles (Grundsätze) being publicly acknowledged by the government and [being] 'items' [of] public acquaintance (der allgemeinen Kenntnis) ...

Wurt., S.530:

Just as it is given by experience, so it is equally easily perceived also according to the 'very' nature of the case, that no one can have less skill to make a constitution than that which we (man) may call the people, or than an assembly [representing] the people's (seine) sections, even if we wish not to consider 'the fact', that the 'very' existence of a people and a representative assembly already presupposes 'the existence of' a constitution, an organic condition, an ordered life of the people.

G l o s s a r y

This glossary and index lists my special terms in 'single inverted commas', Hegel's in "double inverted commas" and some key German terms in round brackets, e.g. (Allgemeinheit).

"absolute"

'absolute theory'

"abstractive understanding"

(Verstand *Enz.* I, PP356Z, PP80 and Z). i.e. "analytical understanding" or "understanding".

"accountability"

(Verantwortung, *Rechts*, PP284).

'actual ideal',

see *Philosophie* II, S.110, for a similar use of "actual" and "ideal".

"actualities",

see 'human actualities' and 'natural actualities'.

"actuality"

(Wirklichkeit, *Enz.* I, PP6 and An., PP147). "Actuality" is the "rational" aspect of the sort of "definite being" which Hegel calls "existence", "reality" or "the present-to-hand". Thus, "actuality" is not to be confused with the "present-to-hand", i.e. with that which is simply "grasped with the hand and immediately observed" (...mit dem Handgreiflichen und unmittelbar Wahrnehmbaren ..., *Enz.* I, PP142Z). The following is another textual confirmation that Hegel's "actuality" is not to be simply equated with empirical reality: "The eternal world ... is actuality (Wirklichkeit), not over there, not on the other side, but the present actual (gegenwärtige wirkliche) world considered in its truth, not as it appears to the hearer, the seer, etc., or as it falls into the sense." (*Philosophie*, II, S.III (p.96)). This explains why Hegel sometimes calls "actuality", "true reality" (wahrhafte Realität, *Rechts*, PP270Z (S.429)). Contrast with "inessential appearance".

"actuality's structuring process",

(*Rechts*, S.27).

(Allgemeine, das),

usually translated as "the general", but see "Universal" (*Philosophie* I, S. 96) and "universal" *Geschichte*, S.52).

(Allgemeinheit),

"generality".

"analytical understanding",

i.e. "abstractive understanding".

"appearance"

(Erscheinung). See "experience".

'arc',

i.e. the pictorial representation of a "specific element of Reason" or of a "specific conception".

Aristotle,

See "inner necessity".

'association',

i.e. a formal organization of one of the interests listed under "sections(s)".

"associations",

(Genossenschaften, *Rechts*, PP308; *Wurt.*, S.483 (p. 263)). *Rechts*, PP290Z, says that "the distinctive strength of the rational state lies within the associations". See "section(s)". In *Rechts*, PP288, Hegel suggests that the appointment of elected association officials would appropriately be subject to "higher confirmation and appointment", presumably, by the government acting in the name of the monarch. In fact, Hegel might be read to have the equally objectionable proposal in mind, that not only would elected association officials be subject to such "confirmation and appointment", but that the candidates for representing each association within the elected chamber should be similarly screened. His discussion of "boards of examiners" in *Eng.*, S.104 (p. 311), perhaps implies this.

"augment",

Rechts, PP301An. (S.470) and PP314.

'axiom of non-contradiction',

i.e. "the law of contradiction".

(Begriff)

i.e. "conception", not "notion" nor "Notion".

"cabinet"

(Kabinett, *Rechts*, PP329Z, *Eng.*, S.117 (p.321) and S.125 (p.328). Possible equivalents: "the council of ministers" (*Eng.* S.124 (p. 3272)), "state council" (Staatsrat, *Wurt.*, S.473 (p. 256)), "the supreme governing organ" (*Rechts*, PP290), "the organized governmental organ" (*Rechts*, PP302), and "...the representatives (Abgeordnete) of the governing organ '(i.e. the members both of the elected chamber and of the government)' ... i.e. the higher counselling [representatives flow together (zusammenlaufen)] ... within the supreme, [i.e.] within the monarch touching pinnacles, i.e. within the councils of ministers which have personal contact with the monarch in a well ordered states" (in den obersten, den Monarchen berührenden Spitzen," *Rechts*, PP289. This paragraph is explicitly referred to by Hegel in PP278An., as concerned with the "governing organ").

"child of his times",

(*Rechts*, S.26) Also see *Philosophie* II, S. 111 (p.96): "... no man can spring over his time, the spirit of his time is also his spirit".

"citizen",

Hegel's usual term for citizen is *der Burger*, i.e. "townsman", "commoner", "freeman" or "civilian" (*Rechts*, PP261An. (S.409, PP271Z); but the following are some of the other related terms he uses: "state citizen" (*der Staatsbürger*, *Wurt.*, S.484 (p. 264)), "fellow citizen" (*der Mitbürger*, *Wurt.*, S.485 (p. 265)), "the citizenry" (*der Bürgerstand*, *Wurt.*, S.480 (p.261)), "subjects" (*die Untertanen*, *Wurt.*, S.468 (p.251), *Rechts*, PP261An. S.409) and *die Subjekten*, *Rechts*, PP274), "the governed" (*die Regierten*, *Rechts*, PP295, *Enz.* III, PP539An. (S. 332)), "the members of the state" (*die Mitglieder des Staats*, *Rechts*, PP258), "those who belong to the state" (*die Staatsangehörigen*, *Enz.* III PP486An. (S. 305), "the electors" (*die Abordnenden*, *Rechts*, PP309), "the voters" (*die Wahlmänner*, *Wurt.*, S.476 (p. 258); *die Wählenden* (*Rechts*, PP309Z and PP310An. (S. 479)), and "the electorate" or "the electoral assemblies" (*die Wahlversammlungen*, *Wurt.*, S. 482 (p. 262)).

"conception",

(*Begriff*, *Enz.* I, PP156Z). Translated by Knox as "concept" and by most others as "Notion". I take the following to be interchangeable expressions: "reason" (*Enz.* I, PP6, *Geschichte*, S.53), "specific knowing" (*bestimmten Wissen*, *Rechts*, PP318), "rational consideration" (*Die vernünftige Betrachtung*, *Rechts*, PP308An.). See "conception of Reason" and "specific conception".

"conception of Reason, the"

(*der Begriff der Idea*, *Enz.* I, PP162, PP236). I take the following terms and phrases to be equivalents in Hegel's usage for "the concept of Reason" but to be either too vague, misleading, or superfluous: "the conception" when unqualified (*Logik* II, S.252 (p.582), S. 271 (p.597) *Rechts*, PP278An.; "a speculative, genuinely infinite conception" (*Logik* II, S.261 (p. 590)); "the whole conception" (*Logik* II, S.299 (p.621)); "the conception itself" (*der Begriff selbst*, *Enz.* I, PP17); "the conception of the conception" (*der Begriff selbst des Begriffes*, *Logik* II, S.290 (p. 596)); "the adequate conception" (*Logik* II, S.271 (p. 597)); "the true and rational conception" (*der wahre und vernünftige Begriff*, *Enz.* I, PP182Z); "the broad conception" (*der Begriff überhaupt*, *Enz.* I, PP193An.); "the general conception" (*Logik* II, S. 273 (p. 600)); "the absolute conception" (*der absolute Begriff*, *Rechts*, PP30), "the real (reelle) conception" (*Logik* II, S. 271 (p. 597)); "the realized conception" (*der realisierte Begriff*, *Enz.* I, PP242); "the pure conception which itself as conception has come into existence" (... *Dasein*, *Logik* II, S.253 (p. 583)); "the

- established concept" (der gezezte Begriff, *Enz. I*, PP172An.); "the philosophical Idea" (die philosophische Idee, *Rechts*, S.27); "Reason as philosophy" (die Idee der Philosophie, *Enz. III*, PP577); "Reason (Idee) ... as ... absolute spirit" (*Enz. III*, PP577); "the consciousness of Reason (das Bewusstsein der Idee, *Rechts*, PP308An.); "the speculative or absolute Idee (die spekulative oder absolute Idee, *Enz. I*, PP235 "the in-and-for-itself General" (das an und für sich Allgemeine, *Philosophie*, I, S.96)) "the in-and-for-itself Generality which has being" (an und für sich seinde Allgemeinheit, *Rechts*, PP341), "the genuinely infinite General (*Logik II*, S. 279 (p. 605); "the in-and-for-itself, rational Will" (der an und für sich allgemeine vernünftige Wille, *Enz. III*, PP513); "the in-and-for-itself-free Will" (der an und für sich freie Wille, *Rechts*, PP33), "the in-and-for-itself Will which has being" *Rechts*, PP301An. , "the truth (die Wahrheit, *Enz.I*, PP213An.), "the absolute truth" (die absolute Wahrheit, *Enz. I*, PP24Z3, PP162, PP244), "exact knowledge" (die exakte Erkenntnis, *Enz. I*, PP99Z), "rational knowledge (die vernünftige Erkenntnis, *Enz. I*, PP234Z); "reason" *Logik II*, S.271 (p. 597); "thinking knowledge" (das denkende Erkenntnis, *Enz. I*, PP213Z) "conceptual knowing" (das begreifende Erkennen, *Enz. I*, PP160Z), "philosophical knowing" (das philosophische Erkennen, *Enz. I*, PP231An.).
- "conception of the state"
(*Rechts*, PP3165), i.e. the "science of the state".
- 'congressional'
"constitution",
(die Verfassung, der Konstitution). See "rational constitutional". I take the following to be equivalent terms: "the political state" (*Rechts* PP273; "internal state law" (*Rechts*, PP272); "the organism of the state, the genuinely political state" (... eigentlich politische Staat, *Rechts*, PP267); and 'model constitution'.
- "constitutional change",
(Veränderung). See *Eng.* S.86 (p. 297); *Philosophie II*, S.19 (p. 8); *Rechts*, PP273An. (S.439), PP298 and Z, PP301An. (S.469); *Wurt.*, S.530.
- "constitutional monarchy",
(*Rechts*, PP273, PP297Z).
- "contradiction",
(Widerspruch, *Logik II*, S.45). Also see "contrariety".
- "contrariety",
(Widerspruch, *Logik II*, S. 75). Also "contradiction".
- "contrary",
(widersprechend, *Logik II*, S.74).
- "cunning of Reason, the"
(*Geschichte*, S.49 (p.70) and (*Enz. I*, PP209 and Z (p. 78)), i.e. "the cunning of the conception" (*Logik I*, S.398 (p.336).
- "definite being"
(das Dasein, *Enz. I*, PP88An.). See "definite existence" and "actuality".
- "definite existence",
(das Dasein). Referring to "definite beings" which exist, i.e. are bound by space and time.
- "deliberating",
(die Beratung, *Rechts*, PP275).
- 'deliberative reason'.
- 'democracy',
majority rule within a "rational constitution".
- "democracy".
See "sovereignty of the people" and the following for derogatory comments about "democracy": "democratic formlessness" (*Wurt.*, S.485 (p. 265)); "democratic abstractions" (*Wurt.*, S.472 (p.254)); "democratic element" (*Rechts*, PP308An. (S.477)); "democratic or even anarchic" (*Wurt.*, S. 482 (p.263)). Also see *Eng.*, S.84 (p. 296).
- 'determinism',
i.e. 'total, external determinism'. See "cunning of Reason" and the following references: *Philosophie II*, S.19 (p.8); "God governs the world" (*Geschichte*), S.53); "ultimate aim ... completed" (*Enz. I*, 234Z).
- "development",
(Entwicklung), (*Philosophie I*, S.46). Also see "elucidation".

"differentiations",

(die Unterschiede, *Rechts*, PP275Z).

'dialogue'

"dialectical",

(*Enz. I*, PP161Z, PP239 and An.). Referring,

- 1) to the pursuit of the "true" by a question and answer discussion by examining competing "definitions", "theories", etc. (Plato);
- 2) to the dynamic "totality" of somewhat opposing elements which are seen as essentially characterising all reality, e.g. the empirically existent world (Plato, Hegel and Marx);
- 3) to the scientific and philosophical processes of discovery (Plato, Hegel and Marx); or
- 4) to the structure of all such theories once achieved (Hegel and Marx).

"elected chamber",

see "representative assembly organ".

"electorate",

see "citizen".

"elucidation",

(Entwicklung), *Philosophie I*, S.46). Also see "development".

"empirical generality",

see "generality".

'epistemology'.

'essential particularity',

contrast with 'inessential particularity'.

"ethical practice",

(Sittlichkeit), i.e. 'Reason as ethical practice'.

"existence",

(Existenz). See "definite existence" and "actuality".

"experience",

(Erfahrung, *Enz. I*, PP6). Assumed to be interchangeable with "appearance" (Erscheinung). My distinction between 'sensuous' and 'non-sensuous experience' might also be read into the following quotation: "an absolute specification of the Essence must find itself in all experience, in all aspects of actuality (in allem Wirklichen) as in every conception" (*Logik II*, S.75 (p.440)).

"External",

referring to realities which are both beyond our control and not yet reconciled with our "self-conscious reason" (*Enz.I*, PP6). Also see *Rechts*, PP320.

external necessity",

(äusserliche (or "aussere") Notwendigkeit, *Enz. I*, PP232; *Geschichte*, S.50; *Logik II*, S.283 (p.608), S.284, *Rechts*, PP261, PP301An.). I read the context of Hegel's following uses of "necessity" to suggest that he is referring to "external necessity": *Enz. I*, PP12; PP147An.; PP147Z: "... fate (Schicksal) ... [i.e.] the unrevealed necessity ... as thoroughly impersonal [and] ... blind ...", PP147Z: "... [external necessity as immanently the concept 'of Reason', PP149, PP150, PP151, PP152: "... the first form of necessity ... the relation of causality (Kausalitätsverhältnis), PP153, PP153Z: "... the relation of causality [is] ...only one side within the process of necessity ...", PP157: "... necessity as such ...", PP158Z: "... the unmediated or abstract necessity ... We have seen how the process of necessity [is] of the sort to overcome the rigid externality which was present-to-hand at first (dass durch denselben die zunächst vorhandene starre Äusserlichkeit Überwunden), *Enz. I*, PP159 An.; *Enz.III*, PP484, "conceptionless necessity"; paradoxically, "merely an inner necessity" [i.e. still locked within external nature] (*Logik II*, S.251 (p.581), S.397 (p.700), S.270 (p.596)); *Rechts*, PP29Z (S.381), PP236 (S.385), PP265, PP266, PP267, PP267, PP267Z, PP278An. (S.444): "unconscious necessity", PP301Z and PP306Z. Contrast with "inner necessity".

"finalising function",

"the princely function" (die fürstliche Gewalt, *Rechts*, PP273).

'formally',

contrast with 'primarily' and 'ultimately'.

"freedom",

(Freiheit). See "rational freedom".

"function",

Usually a translation of *Gewalt* (i.e. contrasted with "organ"): *Enz.* III, PP542 and An., PP543, PP544An. (S.343); *Rechts*, PP272, PP300, PP303. However, "function" occasionally seems also to be the best translation of the following German terms: *die Funktion* (*Enz.* I, PP80Z (S.171), *Enz.* III, PP538, *Rechts*, PP278, PP279An. (S.449), PP303An.), *die Geschäfte* ("concern", *Enz.* III, PP543, *Rechts*, PP276, PP277), *die Staatsgeschäfte* ("the state functions", *Rechts*, PP277, PP286An.), *der Macht* ("power" - *Eng.*, S.125), *der Moment* (*Enz.* III, PP542An., *Rechts*, PP275), *die Seite* ("side", *Rechts*, PP269), *der Teil* ("part", *Rechts*, PP298), *der Unterschied* ("differentiation" or "distinction", *Enz.* III, PP541An., *Rechts*, PP271, PP275Z), and *die Wirksamkeit* ("operation" or "activity", *Rechts*, PP270, PP272Z, PP277). See *Gewalt*.

(Geist),

i.e. "human spirit". Neither "spirit" nor "mind" offer a fully satisfactory translation of *Geist*. "Spirit" seems to be almost exclusively associated with ghosts or merely religious matters, while "mind" seems merely to suggest the internal brain states of an individual. This is why such translations as "the *mind* of a nation" (*Volksgeist*) seem strange to English ears. In this example, "the *spirit* of a nation" would be better, but "spirit" does not always convey the import of *Geist* which seems to refer us to that distinctively human ability to strive, both collectively and individually, to attain full scientific or philosophical knowledge of ourselves and of our world. In addition to this human striving for knowledge, *Geist* seems also to include all those *internal* (i.e. subjective) human qualities and relations which consciously or unconsciously provide some of the conditions for the eventual development of this striving and this knowledge. This *internal* area is what Hegel calls Reason-as-"the-subjective-'human'-spirit". The *external* (i.e. objective) and non-human conditions for this development constitute "Reason-as-nature" while the external human conditions (e.g. historical, social, political conditions) for this development are called Reason-as-"the-objective-'human'-spirit". The relatively higher level of human productions and beliefs which, according to Hegel, have directly fostered the successful achievement of this philosophical knowledge together constitute Reason-as-"art", Reason-as-"religion", and Reason-as-"philosophy", the last being capable of achieving 'Reason-as-the-conception of Reason'.

I have interpreted *Geist* to refer to the wide area covered by "spirit" and "mind" when taken together, i.e. to refer to all the individual and collective human experiences; which directly or indirectly contribute to our eventual achievement of the conception of Reason. It refers, for example, to the following wide range of human qualities, practices and structures: psychic, social, political, aesthetic, religious and philosophical. In short, I take the "object" (*Gegenstand*) of "the philosophy of the human spirit" to be human history and life in its widest sense.

It would seem that this human history and life is seen by Hegel to be distinguished from "Reason-as-nature" by the feature that only humans have demonstrated an ability to be *geistig*. Thus, Hegel divides Reason-as-the-world into the two 'arcs': Reason-as-nature (all the beings and relations which provide all the non-human conditions for the evolution and development of humankind); and Reason-as-the-human-"spirit" (the life and history of the species which has the demonstrated ability to be *geistig*).

It is because "spirit" is not an entirely satisfactory translation, though it is usually the best, that we have followed the practice of freely translating *Geist* as 'human spirit'. However, to have translated *geistig* as "spiritual" would have been too misleading. Therefore, I have rendered *geistig* as "human", "intellectual", "conscious" or "mental". Sometimes, one would be tempted to translate *Geist* as 'humankind', as 'humanity', as 'mankind' or as 'human living'.

"generality",

(*Allgemeinheit*, *Enz.* I, PP163), e.g. "abstract generality" (*Enz.* I, PP171An.), "relative generality" (*Enz.* I, PP173), and "empirical generality" (*Rechts*, PP301).

"genuine Infinity",

(*die wahrhafte Unendlichkeit*, *Enz.* I, PP95).

(Gewalt)

Usually translated either as "organ" or as "function" depending on the context. However, at the following points, *Gewalt* seems equally capable of being translated either by "organ" or by "function": *Enz.* III, PP542An., PP544An. (S.344); *Rechts*, PP270Z, PP272An., PP275, PP276Z, PP277, PP300Z. Also, at some places, *Gewalt* seems to mean "power" not in the sense of a constitutional "function" or of a constitutional "organ" but in the sense of "a governmental department" or "ministry", or of an associational or a corporate "authority" within civil society (*Enz.* III,

- PP541An., PP543; *Rechts*, PP271Z, PP276 and Z, PP287, PP295); in the sense of constitutional "authority" or "institution" (*Enz.* III, PP541An.; *Rechts*, PP295, PP301An.); or in the sense of unconstitutional "force" (*Enz.* III, PP544An., PP545, *Rechts*, PP286An., PP322An. This ambiguity seems to correspond to that of the English word which is its most ready equivalent, i.e. "power". For example, an institution's constitutional power can mean for us the *roles* which the constitution gives to that institution, i.e. that institution's constitutional *function(s)*. Also, I frequently refer to an institution so described as itself being a constitutional power, as being one of the powers of the constitution, i.e. as being one of the *organs* of the constitution. These multiple uses of *Gewalt* tend to obscure the clear distinction which should nevertheless be made between the tree "organs" of the constitution (i.e. the representative assembly, the government, and the monarch) on the one hand, and the three constitutional "functions" which they jointly exercise on the other hand (i.e. the law-giving function, the particularizing function, and the finalising function). My translations correspond exactly to Hegel's own use in *Enz.* I, PP80Z (S. 171): "... und wenn die dem Begriffe nach verschiedenen politischen und obrigkeitlichen *Funktionen* noch nicht in derselben Weise zu besonderen *Organen* herausgebildet sind ...". One way of distinguishing the organs from the functions is to note that the organs are made up of nameable persons and are more empirically encounterable while the functions are first appreciated only by intellectual abstraction. This is not to deny that the natures of the organs are *fully* appreciated only by intellectual abstraction, i.e. within the conception of Reason-as-the-constitution. It is hoped that my consistent translation of *Gewalt* and all the other relevant terms either as "function" or as "organ" makes Hegel's position clearer than does his own German.
- "governing organ",
(die Regierungsgewalt, die Regierung), i.e. the "government".
- "government",
(Regierung). See "cabinet". Occasionally, Hegel uses other terms for "the government": "state government" (Staatsregierung, *Wurt.*, S.489 (p. 268)), "the executive organ" (*Rechts*, PP272An. (S.434)), and "the practical organ" (ausübende Gewalt) which also here is said to include both the "governing or administrative organ" (Regierungs-oder administrative Gewalt) and "the judicial organ" (richterliche Gewalt, *Enz.* III, PP541An. (S.337)). See "governing organ", "cabinet", "ministers", and "prime minister".
- "ground",
or "foundation" (Grund *Enz.* I, PP238, *Rechts*, PP268An. (S.414) and Z, PP270Z (S.431), PP278An., PP281An. (S.452), PP283, PP284 and PP316Z).
- "grounding",
Rechts, PP281An.
- "groundless",
(grundlose, *Rechts*, PP279, PP281 and An., PP282Z).
- "head of state",
Staatsoberhaupt, *Wurt.*, S. 478 (p. 251)).
- "historical necessity",
i.e. one sort or "external necessity" resulting from my interpretations of such texts as the following: *Enz.* III, PP544An., *Rechts*, S.24 (p. 9), PP269, PP270 and PP279Z.
- "human actualities",
See "specific elements of Reason".
- "human spirit",
(Geist, *Enz.* I, PP187Z), i.e. "human life or living", "humankind", "human history" or 'Reason-as-the-human-spirit'.
- "Idea, the",
(die Idee, *Enz.* I, PP162). See "Reason" and "conception of Reason, the".
- "idealism",
see "idealism" and "reality".
- "ideality",
i.e. "idealism" (Idealität, Idealismus), *Rechts*, 275Z, i.e. 'a united, self-knowing structure'. (*Idee, die*),
"the Idea" (*Enz.* I, PP162), i.e. "Reason"
- "individuality",
(Individualität), see "singularity".

"inessential appearance",

(wesenlos Erscheinung, *Rechts*, PP1An.). Broadly speaking, I take the following to be interchangeable terms: "transitory definite being, external contingency, untruth, illusion" (vorübergehendes Dasein; äusserliche Zufälligkeit ... Unwahrheit und Täuschung, *Rechts*, PP1An.); "trivial, alien (äusserliche) and transitory objects (Gegenstände), and transitory and insignificant appearance" (*Enz.* I, PP6An.). I see the following as examples of various sorts of "inessential appearances": "mere concepts (blosse Begriffe), i.e. "notions" or "image thoughts" (Vorstellungen) and "opinion" (*Meinung*, *Rechts*, PP1An.); "a mistake, an evil ... stunted ... existence" (*Enz.* I, PP6An.) and "foul existence" (*Geschichte*, S.53). Compare with "spurious infinity" and 'inessential particularity'. Contrast with "actuality".

'inessential particularity',

Compare "inessential appearance" and "spurious infinity". Contrast with 'essential particularity'.

"inner necessity",

(die innere Notwendigkeit, *Rechts*, PP268Z, PP281Z, PP301An.), i.e. 'philosophical necessity'. Contrast with "external necessity". While Aristotle lists five meanings for "necessity" (*Metaphysics*, Chapter V, p. 10), all five can be seen as suitably modified and integrated into Hegel's "inner necessity". Hegel lists three of Aristotle's five meanings in *Philosophie*, II, S.162. I read the contexts of the following uses of "necessity" to be examples of his references to "inner necessity": "inherent necessity" (in sich Notwendigkeit, *Philosophie* I, S.55 (p. 36), *Rechts*, 270Z (S.429); "actual necessity" (*Rechts*, PP261An. (S.408)); "immanent necessity" (*Logik* II, S.249 (p. 580)), "ethical necessity" (*Rechts*, PP148An.); *Enz.* I, PP1: "Philosophy can thus indeed ... advance toward a thinking, knowing and conceiving (zum denkenden Erkennen und Begreifen) [of its objects (Gegenstände)]. However, within this very thinking consideration (Betrachten), the demand that it show that it has locked within itself the *necessity* [i.e. PP9: "broad necessity" (die Notwendigkeit überhaupt) (PP1)] of its content (Inhalt), 'i.e. the system of specific elements of Reason', is soon recognized (gibt's sich bald kund)"; *Enz.* I, PP10: "The claim needs to become justified that this thinking of philosophical knowledge (Erkenntnis) is both to be seized in its necessity and is capable of knowing (zu erkennen) the absolute objects (Gegenstände), 'i.e. the specific elements of Reason'; *Enz.* I, PP12: "... free in the sense of fundamental thinking only according to the necessity of the case itself" (des ursprünglichen Denkens nur nach der Notwendigkeit der Sache selbst); *Enz.* I, PP42An., PP88An. 1: "... when generally the whole course of philosophizing is methodical, [i.e.] necessary ..."; *Enz.* I, PP99Z, *Enz.* I, PP162An., PP176Z: "judgement (Urteil) of necessity" PP158Z: "The ethical human being (Mensch) is himself conscious of his conduct as a necessary [practice, i.e.] in-and-for-itself binding"; *Enz.* I, PP191: "conclusion (Schluss) of necessity"; *Enz.* I, PP229Z, PP231An.: "... the necessity of the conception's specifications (Begriffsbestimmungen)"; *Enz.* I, PP232Z: "The necessity to which knowing (Erkennen) has reached through proof is contrary to that [external] *necessity* (dasselbe) which formed its starting point. In its starting point, knowing has a given and contingent content; however, at the conclusion of its movement, 'i.e. in Reason-as-the-conception of Reason', it knows (weiss) the content as a necessary [content], and this necessity is mediated through the subjective activity 'of reason in people and more especially through the subjective activity of philosophers"; *Enz.* III, PP549An.: "... that Reason generally is in history, must become settled (ausmachen werden) by philosophy alone (für sich selbst philosophisch) and thus as in-and-for-itself-necessary (an und für sich notwendig)"; *Rechts*, S.17 *Zusatz*: "... [theory] to appear correct and necessary in-and-for-itself"; *Philosophie* I, S.55 (p. 36): "... the whole within itself necessary history of philosophy ... Just as the development of the conception of Reason within philosophy is necessary, so also is its development in history"; *Logik* II, S. 255 (p.585), S.271 (p. 597), S.285 (p. 610).

'intersubjective',**"intuited or unmediated Reason",**

(*Enz.* I, PP244).

"knowing and willing",

(*Geschichte* S.49).

Knox:

In summary, my 'free translations' are consistently different from Knox's translation of *The Philosophy of Right* in the following respects:

- 1) he refers to my "law-giving function" and "representative assembly" as the "Legislature";
- 2) he refers to my "particularizing function" and "government" as the "Executive";

- 3) he refers to my "finalising function" and "monarch" as the "Crown";
- 4) he renders *Gewalt* as "power" rather than making my distinction between "function" and "organ"; and
- 5) he translates,
- die Idee* as "the Idea" rather than as "Reason",
 - Vorstellung* as "idea" rather than as "notion",
 - Einzelheit* as "individuality" rather than as "singularity",
 - Allgemeinheit* as "universality" rather than as "generality",
 - Begriff* as "concept" rather than as "conception",
 - Geist* as "mind" rather than as "human spirit",
 - Selbstständigkeit* as "independency" or "autonomy" rather than as "self-dependence", and
 - Verstand* as the "Understanding" rather than as "abstractive" or "analytical understanding".
- "law",
(Satz, *Logik* II, S.45).
- "law-giving function, the",
(*die gesetzgebende Gewalt, Rechts*, PP273), i.e. 'Reason-as-the-law-giving-fuction'.
- "liveliness",
(*Leblichkeit, Rechts*, PP314). See "rational living".
- "logical categories",
see "specific elements of Reason".
- "logical Idea",
(*Enz. I*, PP187Z) or 'Reason-as-logic'.
- "majority",
(*Majorität, Rechts*, PP309Z, *Enz. III*, PP542, *Eng.*, S.83 (p.295) and S.124 (p.327)), and (*die Mehrzahl der Stimmen, Wurt.*, S.476 (p.258)). *G.Cons.*, S.579 (p.240), comes the closest to offering us explicit textual support for 'majority rule' by possibly recommending a change in the existing Imperial constitution. Hegel might be read to suggest here, that "a majority" (*Mehrheit*) of "the Cities Bench", some of whose members were to be elected in proportion to the populations which they represented, could bind the other two benches of "the Imperial Representative Assembly" (*Reichstag*), especially, or at least, when levying taxes for the support of the Empire's armed forces.
- "methodical",
(*Enz. I*, PP24Z, PP42An., PP88An.)
- 'methodological'.
- "ministers",
i.e. members of the "cabinet" (*Minister, Rechts*, PP300Z and PP315Z, *Wurt.*, S.468 (p.251) and S.470 (p.253)). Possible equivalents: "highest counselling positions and individuals" (*Rechts*, PP283), "representatives of the governing organ" (*Rechts*, PP289), "state councillors" (*Staatsräten, Wurt.*, S.473 (p.256)), "principal state officials" (*Staatsvorstehen, Eng.*, S.85 (p.297)), "members of the government" (*Rechts*, PP297 and PP300Z), "the higher state positions" (*die höheren Staatsstellen, Rechts*, PP302, "state authorities" (*Staatsbehörden, Rechts*, PP315, and *Wurt.*, s.471 (p.253), "governmental authorities" (*Regierungsbehörden, Enz. III*, PP544An. (S.343)), and "authorities" (*Behörden, Rechts*, PP295 and PP319An. (S.488)). See "government" and "prime minister".
- 'model',
'a general prescriptive goal', a "rational ideal" (*Rechts*, S.27, page 72), "... an intellectual realm" (*Rechts*, Preface, S.27).
- 'model constitution'.
"rational constitution".
- "model",
(... zu Mustern zu dienen, *Rechts*, PP315Z).
- "moment",
(*Moment, Enz. I*, PP163). See "function", "organ" and "specific element of Reason".
- "monarch",
i.e. the "monarchical organ".
- "monarchical organ",
(*die fürstliche Gewalt, Enz. III*, PP544An., *Rechts*, PP286An.), i.e. 'Reason as the monarchical organ'. Contrast with the "finalising function" (*die fürstliche Gewalt, Rechts*, PP273).

- "moral consciousness",
(Moralität).
- 'natural actualities'.
See "specific elements of Reason".
- 'natural necessity',
cf. "external necessity" and 'human necessity'.
- "necessity",
(Notwendigkeit). See "inner necessity" and "external necessity". Compare 'historical necessity' and 'natural necessity'. Also see "the relatively necessary connection" (*Rechts*, PP306Z).
- 'non-sensuous experience',
"Experience" which is not reducible to our five senses, e.g. some dreams, emotions, thoughts and "conceptions".
- "notion",
(Vorstellung, *Geschichte*, S.53 (p. 36). An 'image' or 'vague thought' as opposed to a philosophically exact thought or "conception". See "inessential appearance".
- "object",
(Objekt, Gegenstand).
- "objective guarantee",
(*Rechts*, PP286 and An.).
- "organ",
(Organ, *Enz.* I, PP80Z (S.171), *Rechts*, PP302). Usually one translation of *Gewalt* (compare "function"), *Enz.* III, PP544An. (S.344), *Rechts*, PP269, PP270, PP272An. and Z, PP276, PP277 and PP300Z. The following terms are also translated as "organ": "element" (Element, *Rechts*, PP300, PP301, PP302An., PP304, PP313), "differentiation" (Unterschied, *Rechts*, PP269Z, PP270An. (S.418), PP321), "branch" or "organ" or "member" (Glieder, *Enz.* III, PP539, *Rechts*, PP69Z, PP276, PP286 and An., PP321; Zweig, *Enz.* III, pp539, PP544An. (S.343), *Eng.* S.124 (p. 328)), "body" (Körper, *Rechts*, PP300Z), "the state institutions" (die Staats institutionen, *Rechts*, PP301An. (S.470), "institutions" (Institutionen, *Rechts*, PP286; Staatseinrichtungen, *Rechts*, PP270An. (S.420); Bestimmungen, *Enz.* III, PP539, *Rechts*, PP260Z, PP270Z (S.430), PP279An., PP280, PP281, PP286, PP286An.), "formations" or "structures" (Gestaltungen, *Enz.* III, PP544, *Rechts*, PP261An., PP279 (S.444) and An. (S.446)), "moment" (Moment, *Enz.* III, PP542, *Rechts*, PP261An. (S.470)) and "sides" (Seiten, *Rechts*, PP269 and Z).
- "ought",
(Sollen), i.e. "should".
- "owl of Minerva" paragraph,
(*Rechts*, S.27).
- 'parliamentary'.
- 'participation',
See *Rechts*, PP314. See "sovereignty of the people" and "democracy".
- "particularity",
(Besonderheit, *Enz.* I, PP163). See 'essential' v. 'inessential particularity'.
- "parties",
i.e. political parties within the elected chamber are occasionally mentioned approvingly (e.g. *Wurt.*, S.476 (p. 258)), and *Eng.* S.123 (p. 326). They are also mentioned in *Enz.* III, PP544An. (S.344 and S.345) and in *Rechts*, PP302An.
- "particularizing function",
"the governing function", (die Regierungsgewalt, *Rechts*, PP273), i.e. 'Reason-as-the-particularizing-function'.
- 'philosophical necessity',
The status which I would grant a theory which seemed both to be 'comprehensive' and to have passed all of our 'experiential', 'logical' and 'comparative' tests.
- "positive aspect",
Geschichte, S.53.
- "prescribe",
(war an geordnet, *Eng.*, S.113 (p. 319), vorschreiben, *Enz.* I, PP6An.
- 'prescription',
Chapter Eight quotes and discusses the "owl of Minerva" paragraph's clearly implied denial that philosophy can offer 'prescriptions' as well as discussing many other ambiguous denials. It also

'prescription', (continued):

quotes and discusses many of the passages which reveal Hegel as clearly or implicitly offering prescriptions. This section of the *Glossary* seeks further to support the argument for making some modifications to Hegel's position on the question of prescription,

- 1) by alphabetically listing Hegel's *evaluative* terms and phrases which provide a basis for making general prescriptions, and
- 2) by alphabetically listing terms and phrases in which Hegel is more clearly *prescribing* actions.

EVALUATIVE:

- "*Actuality* is not an irrational being" (*Rechts*, PP270Z (S.429)),
 "argument",
 "*appropriately*" (*Rechts*, PP309),
 "this happens *best* through philosophical insight" (*Rechts*, PP270Z S.430),
 "*complete* (vollendeten) state" (*Rechts*, PP270Z),
 "in-and-for-itself *correct* and necessary" (*Rechts*, S.15),
 "a *cultured* state" (*Enz.* III, PP544An.),
 "an organically *developed* state" (*Rechts*, PP286An.),
 "only *deserve* the name 'constitution' if ... what *should* happen, happens" (*Wurt.*, S.486),
 "*education*" (*Rechts*, PP315),
 "has an *equal right*" (*Rechts*, PP311An.),
 "it is *essential*" (*Philosophie* II, S.112-113),
 "An *Evaluation* (Beurteilung) of the proceedings ..." (*Wurt.*, S.462),
 "a *false* notion (Vorstellung) of the state" (*Rechts*, PP300Z),
 "*foul* existence" (*Geschichte*, S.53),
 "*freedom*" (*Rechts*, PP270An.),
 "*genuine* Infinity",
 "*glorious* and fortunate advances" (*Eng.*, S.89),
 "*good* ... *moral* sense" (*Eng.*, S.86),
 "a *high* political right" (*Wurt.*, S.482),
 "*inessential* appearance",
 "*inferior* ... a *superior* people ... *higher* constitution" (*Philosophie* II, S.112-113),
 "*inner* necessity",
 "an infinitely *important* step forward of *culture*" (*Wurt.*, S.492 (p. 270)),
 "*irrational* ... and *wrong*" (*Enz.* III, PP529An.),
 "*is* concerned" (*Enz.* III, PP544),
 "all other constitutions belong to *lower* stages of the development and realization of Reason",
 (*Enz.* III, PP542 (S.339)),
 "Germany ... *must* organize itself anew into a state" (*G.Cons.*, S.577 (p. 238)),
 "the constitution ... *progresses* ..." (*Rechts*, PP298Z),
 "*rational*",
 "*rational* constitution",
 "*rational* state",
 "to judge more *rationally*" (*Rechts*, PP315),
 "*Reason*",
 "*responsible*" (*Geschichte*, S.49),
 "*right*",
 "a *rotten* (schlechter) state" (*Rechts*; PP270An. (S.429)),
 "a *superior* people" (*Philosophie* I, S.112-113),
 "*true* constitution" (*Philosophie* II, S.112-113),
 "*true* significance" (*Rechts*, PP301Z (S.471)),
 "*truth*" (Wahrheit, *Philosophie* II, S.112-113),
 "*undeveloped* ... institutions" (*Rechts*, PP295An.),
 "*unfortunate*" (*Rechts*, PP301Z (S.471)),
 "the genuine *value* ... a positive aspect" (*Geschichte*, S.53), and
 "a *well* organized state" (*Rechts*, PP281Z).

PRESCRIPTIVE

- "must recognize and accept with the highest *approval*" (*Wurt.*, S.471),
 "is *best* guaranteed" (*Rechts*, PP279),
 "cannot be" (*Rechts*, PP277),

- "the *correct* way to seek improvement is ... by the alteration of institutions ... scientific remodelling" (*Eng.*, S.86, S91),
 "desirable" (*Rechts*, PP306Z),
 "is ... its greatest *justification*" (*Wurt.*, S.476),
 "required and *justified*" (*Rechts*, PP295An.),
 "*justify*" (*Wurt.*, S.473 (p. 255)),
 "It is against all sense and against *honour* ..." (*Domestic Affairs*, S.270 (p. 244)),
 "multitude ... highest *importance* that it become organized" (*Rechts*, PP290Z),
 "the unity of the state is ... before all else to be *longed for* (zu verlangen, *Rechts*, PP300Z),
 "*must* (muss), *Philosophie* II, S.112-113; *Eng.*, p. 313; *Enz.* I, PP99An.),
 "Humankind *must* find its own reason within the human law" (*Rechts*, S.15),
 "Religion *must not* be the governing principle" (*Enz.* III, PP468Z),
 "*ought*" (*Rechts*, S.15, S.27),
 "*rightly* subordinated to human life" (*Geschichte*, S.50),
 "*should* (*Rechts*, PP280Z and PP320Z, PP300Z, PP306Z, and PP316Z),
 "what everyone *should* acknowledge must prove itself to be justified" (*Rechts*, PP317Z),
 "all the greatest interests *should* be represented ... but it is a *defect* (Mangel) of a constitution that it leaves to chance what is necessary" (*Eng.* S.107 (p. 313)),
 "the state ... *should* [both] rest on and arise out of Reason" (*Rechts*, PP270Z),
 "*should* be equal before the law" (*Enz.* III, PP539An. (S.333)),
 "conditions for freedom ... *should*" (*Enz.* III, PP486),
 "*should* be consulted" (*Eng.* S.107 (p. 314)),
 "the gradual abolition of slavery is more *suitable*" (*Geschichte*, S.129 (p. 99)),
 "the *necessity* ... to support the poor ... so strongly *demanded* by justice" (*Eng.*, S.93 (p. 303)),
 "...with right urged in *support* of the hereditary character of the throne" (*Rechts*, PP381An., and "the courage which *wills* ... justice ... the *honesty* to will it and not merely to pretend" (*Domestic Affairs*, S.270).
- "present-to-hand",
 (das Vorhanden, *Enz.* I, PP7An.). See "actuality".
- 'primarily',
 Contrast with 'ultimately' and 'formally'.
- "prime minister",
 (Premierminister, *Rechts*, PP290Z). Equivalents: "president of the council of ministers" (*Eng.*, S.117 (p. 321)), and "state chancellor" (Staatskanzler, *Rechts*, PP290Z).
- 'proportionality',
- "proposition",
 (Satz)
- "quantity",
 (Quantität). E.g."quantity must also come into its right in the objective world, as much in the natural as in the human world", (*Enz.* I, PP99An.)Also, see 'to maximize the quality and quantity of free, rational living'.
- "rational",
 (vernünftig, *Enz.* I, PP6An., *Rechts*, 270An. (S.419 and S.422)).
- "rational constitution",
 (*Rechts*, PP274An., PP286An.) i.e. "Reason-as-the-constitution" (die Idee der Konstitution, *Philosophie* II, S.113 (p.97)). We take the following to be equivalents: "constitutional monarchy" (*Rechts*, PP273), "rational organism" (*Rechts*, PP286), "true constitution" (*Philosophie* II, S.112), "rational state law" (*Wurt.*, S.470 (p. 254)), "the rational definite existence of political arrangements" (Staatseinrichtungen, *Rechts*, 270An. (S.419)), "the fundamental rational principles of a constitutional (Staatsrechtlichen) condition" (*Wurt.*, S.491 (p. 270)).
- "rational freedom",
 (*Rechts*, PP301An.).
- "rational institutions",
 (*Enz.* III, PP539 (S.332)).
- "rational living",
 (vernünftige Leben, *Rechts*, PP270An. (S.422)).

"rational state",

i.e. "an organically developed state" (*Rechts*, PP286An.), "a well organized state" (*Rechts*, 281Z),

"a cultured state" (*Enz.* III, PP544An. (S.343), "completed (vollendeten) state" (*Rechts*, PP270Z).

"rationality",

(Vernünftigkeit, *Enz.* III, PP539 (S.332) and An. (S.333); *Rechts*, PP270An. (S.419), PP273Z (S.440), PP274An. and Z, and PP360; *Wurt.*, S.472 (p. 254)).

"rationally",

(*Rechts*, PP315).

"reality",

(Realität). See "actuality".

"reason",

i.e. "self-conscious reason" or "conception".

"Reason",

(Vernunft, *Enz.* III, PP542 (S.339), PP549An.; *Eng.* S.89; *Rechts*, PP270An. (S.419), PP273Z (S.440), PP286, and PP301An.). For the drawing of this circle in FIGURE 9, see *Enz.* I, PP18, PP24Z2 (S.84) and PP187Z (also see the reference for the second largest circle in FIGURE 9, i.e. 'Reason-as-

the-human-spirit'. I take "Reason" to be central organizing principle of Hegel's philosophy.

Also, given the superfluity of his exposition, the following are examples of the other terms which are replaceable by "Reason" (Of course, the references which follow each term do not begin to offer a complete list of the texts in which the relevant term is used in this way, let alone

of the instances in which the term seems not to be replaceable by "Reason"): "the Reason which has being" (die seiende Vernunft, *Enz.* I, PP6); "the Idea" (Idee, *Rechts*, PP308An.); "the conception in its objectivity" (*Logik* II, S.271 (p. 597)); "God" (Gott, *Enz.* I, PP12, *Geschichte*, S.52 (p. 36));

"the Absolute" (das Absolut, *Logik* II, S.80 (p.443); *Enz.* I, PP12, PP86Z2); "the genuine Good" (das wahrhafte Gute, *Geschichte*, S.52 (p. 36)); "the Rational" (*Rechts*, PP274Z (S.440)); Rationality

(*Rechts*, PP270An.), Substance, the Eternal (die Vernünftigkeit, die Substanz. das Ewige, *Rechts*, S.25 (p. 10)); sometimes, "the Spirit" (der Geist, *Rechts*, PP259); "the world Spirit" (der Weltgeist, *Rechts*, PP30An.); "the Spirit of the world" (der Geist der Welt, *Rechts*, 273An.); "the universal Spirit" (der allgemeine Geist, *Rechts*, PP340); "the General" (das Allgemeine, *Rechts*,

PP259Z); "the universal Essence as such" (das allgemeines Wesen als solches, *Philosophie*, I, S.96 (p. 75)); "the Idea of the universal Essence" of appearance (in der Idee des allgemeinen Wesens dieser Erscheinungen, *Enz.* I, PP12); "the absolute Contrariety within itself" (der absolute

Widerspruch in sich, *Logik* II, S.78 (p. 442).

Widerspruch in sich, *Logik* II, S.78 (p. 442).

Widerspruch in sich, *Logik* II, S.78 (p. 442).

'Reason as civil society',

i.e. "civil society" (die bürgerliche Gesellschaft).

'Reason as the conception of Reason',

i.e. "the conception of Reason".

"Reason as ethical practice",

(Sittlichkeit). I take my drawing of the fourth largest circle in FIGURE 9 to be based on *Enz.* III PP517.

'Reason as family living',

(die Familie).

'Reason as interstate relations',

(das Verhältnis des einzelnen Staates zu anderen Staaten, *Rechts*, PP259).

"Reason as logic",

(die logische Idee, *Enz.* I, PP187Z, PP236).

'Reason as moral consciousness',

(Moralität).

"Reason as nature",

(die ... Idee ... als Nature, *Enz.* I, PP187Z, PP244).

'Reason as the absolute human spirit',

(der absolute Geist).

"Reason as the constitution",

See "constitution".

'Reason as the finalising function',

i.e. "the finalising function".

"Reason as the governing organ",

i.e. "government" or "governing organ" (die Regierungsgewalt, *Rechts*, PP273An.).

'Reason as the human spirit',

See the following reference for this circle in FIGURE 9: *Enz. I*, PP187Z, *Enz. III*, PP474An. (S.297), PP385 and Z, PP483, and PP486; i.e. "spirit", "human spirit", "world spirit"; or 'humanity', 'humankind' or 'human history and life'.

'Reason as the law-giving function',

i.e. the "law-giving function".

"Reason as the monarch",

i.e. 'Reason as the monarchical organ'.

'Reason as the monarchical organ',

i.e. "monarchical organ".

'Reason as the objective human spirit',

i.e. "objective human spirit" (objektiven Geist, *Enz. III* 539 (S.333)). Sometimes expounded under the following fully equivalent names: Reason as "free will" (*Enz. III*, PP483 and PP487), Reason as "rational will" (*Enz. III*, PP485), and Reason as "right" (see the last part of *Enz. III*, PP487, which is not translated by A.V. Miller). These are the three replacement names which dominate the exposition in *The Philosophy of Right*. In a different connection, Hegel calls Reason as "objective spirit" (Geist), "the empirical generality" of Reason-as-the-human-spirit. I take the above references to warrant my drawing of the third largest circle in FIGURE 9.

'Reason as right',

i.e. "right" or 'Reason as the objective human spirit'.

'Reason as the particularizing function',

i.e. the "particularizing function".

'Reason as the representative assembly organ',

i.e. the "representative assembly".

"Reason as the state",

(die Idee des Staates, *Rechts*, PP258An.).

"Reason as willing",

(die Idee des Wollens, *Enz. I*, PP232).

'Reason as world history',

i.e. "world history" (Weltgeschichte).

"Reason which has being, the",

(die seiende Vernunft, *Enz. I*, PP6) i.e. "Reason".

"reconciliation",

(*Enz. I*, PP6).

'reduction'**"reduction",**

(Reduktion, *Logik II*, 259 (p. 588)), "lead back to the simple thought determinations" (Gedankenbestimmungen, *Enz. I*, PP25An., *Logik II*, 263 (p. 591)).

'reflexive'.**(Regierung, die,)**

Usually means "government" but at the following points it seems to refer to the whole organization of "state power" (Staatsmacht, *Enz. III*, PP539), i.e. where "government" has its common American meaning; "... the government as the organized totality which contains 1) ... the *monarchical* governing organ" (*Enz. III*, PP542), i.e. 'the monarchical organ', "2) ... the *particular* governmental organ" (PP543), i.e. 'the governing organ', and "3) the representative assembly" (PP544). Also see PP539An., and PP541.

"representation",

(Repräsentation, *Rechts*, PP309Z).

"representative assembly",

i.e. 'Reason as the representative assembly organ' (die gesetzgebende Gewalt, *Rechts*, PP272Z, PP273An.). See *Gewalt*. To simplify, I have translated the following terms and phrases by the single phrase, "the representative assembly": "the sectional element" (das ständische Element, *Rechts*, PP300, PP301, PP302An., PP313) of the law-giving function, "the politically [organized] sectional element" (des politisch-ständische Element, *Rechts*, PP304), "the sectional assembly(s)" (Ständeversammlung(en), *Wurt.*, S.472 (p. 255), *Enz. III*, PP544An., *Rechts*, PP315Z), "the sectional authority" (die ständische Behörde, *Enz. III*, PP544), "the assembly(s)" (Versammlung(en), *Rechts*, PP315Z), "the gathering or convention" (Zusammenkunft, *Rechts*, PP309), "the country's estates"

(Landstände, *Wurt.*, S.462 (p. 246)), "the country's legislature" (der Landtag, *Wurt.*, S.477 (p. 258)), "the national assembly" (die Nationalversammlung, *Eng.*, S.113 (p.319), "the nation in its great council" (der Nation in ihrem grossen Rate, *Eng.*, S.106 (p. 313) and S.119 (p.323)), "the law-giving assembly" (die gesetzgebende Versammlung, *Eng.*, S.108 (p.314)), "the law-giving body" (der gesetzgebenden Körpern, *Rechts*, PP300Z "the chambers" (Kammern, *Wurt.*, S.472 (p.255), *Rechts*, PP312, PP315Z, PP329Z). Hegel mentions or discusses several historically existent "representative assemblies" by name, e.g. "the feudal German Imperial Diet" (Reichstag, *G.Cons.* S.578 (p. 239), *Eng.*, S.106 (p.313)), the French "Chamber of Deputies" (*Wurt.*, S.476 (p. 258) and *Eng.*, S.118 (p.323)), "the English Parliament" (das englische Parlament, *Eng.*, S.83 (p.295)), and "the Congress of the U.S.A" (der nordamerikanische Kongress, *Rechts*, PP270An. (S.421)). While "the representative assembly" within Hegel's Reason-as-the-constitution is most easily read to be divided into two chambers, he did occasionally speak with a degree of approval for unicameral assemblies, e.g. 1) the feudal German Imperial Diet with its three "benches" ("the Cities Bench" (die Städtebank, *G.Cons.*, S.578 (p.239)), or with its "three Colleges ... [i.e.] the Electors [College] ... the Princes College ... and the Cities College" (drei Kollegien ... das Kurfürsten und das Fürstenkollegium ... und das Städtekollegium, *G.Cons.*, S.579 (p. 240)), and 2) the unicameral assembly which was proposed by the King of Wurttemberg in 1815 in which 73 elected deputies and 50 non-elected members were to vote (*Wurt.*, S.472 (p.254)). In his article, *About the English Reform Bill*, Hegel spoke both of the "upper house" and of the "lower house" (*Eng.*, S.108 (p.314)). *The Philosophy of Right* speaks of "the representative assembly accordingly dividing itself into two chambers" (die ständische Versammlung wir sich somit in zwei Kammern teilen, PP312). While *The Philosophy of Right's* constitution requires "two chambers", the argument there does not necessarily exclude the appropriateness of "the two parts" being organized into two "benches", into two "colleges", or into two "houses" in different circumstances. In contrast, what is essential is that while one part must be elected, the other part must be hereditary and tied to a number of legally defined landed estates. I have referred to the first part as the "non-elected" or the "hereditary chamber" (i.e. "the substantial section" (*Rechts*, PP307), "the first part" (PP310) and "the mediating Moment" (PP313)), and to the second part as the "elected chamber" (i.e. "the moving side" (die bewegliche Seite, *Rechts*, PP308), "the second part" (PP310) and "the second section" (PP313)) of the "representative assembly". Hegel sees both these chambers and their members as representative of the various "sections" of civil society.

"representative assembly organ",
i.e. "representative assembly".

"representatives",

For simplicity, I have translated all of the various terms which Hegel uses for the members of his "representative assembly" as "representatives": "members" (die Mitglieder der Stände, *Rechts*, PP301An.), "the elected representatives ... the elected deputies" (die gewählten Repräsentanten ... gewählten Deputierten, *Wurt.*, S.470 (p. 253), and "the delegates" (der Abgeordneten, *Rechts*, PP301An.). I agree with Hegel's view, as expressed in *Rechts*, PP309Z, that the position of a "representative" should be such that he can become a mediator and a voice of the interest of the whole community and not only a spokesperson for his own association.

"responsible",

See 'prescription'.

"right",

(*Rechts*). "Right is ... the definite being of all the conditions of freedom" (*Enz.* III, PP486), i.e. all the sorts of human relations and activities which have the approval of 'philosophical necessity' or "inner necessity". Especially see the following confirming passages: *Rechts*, S.15 (p.24), *Enz.* III, PP486, and see "Reason as the objective human spirit".

(Satz),

i.e. "law", "theory", or "proposition".

"science",

(Wissenschaft).

"science of the state",

(*Rechts*, S.26), i.e. "the conception of the state".

"section(s)",

(Stände, *Rechts*, PP311An. (S.480)) of civil society, i.e. those varied groupings which may become organized "associations" of common interests. The following "sections" could become the bases for the "associations" to be represented within the "elected chamber": "classes" (Klassen, *Wurt.*, S.468 (p.251), S.576 (p.293), S.489 (p.268), *Eng.*, S.83 (p.295)), "orders" or "ranks" (Stände, *Eng.*,

- S.107 (p. 314), *Rechts*, PP276Z, PP288, PP308), "districts" (Bezirken, *Wurt.*, S.473 (p. 255), "counties" a (Grafschaften, *Eng.*, S.84 (p.297)), "municipalities" or "communities" (Gemeinden oder Gemeinschaften, *Wurt.*, S.400 (p.261), S.481 (p.261) *Eng.*, S.84 (p.296), *Rechts*, PP270An., PP288, PP290Z, PP308), Gemeinwesen, *Wurt.*, S.483 (p.263), *Rechts*, PP303An.). "communes" (Kommunen, *Rechts*, PP290Z), "corporations" (Korporationen, *Wurt.*, S.483 (p.263), *Rechts*, PP229 and Z, PP251, PP263, PP270An., PP276Z, PP288, PP308), "interests" (*Rechts*, PP309An., PP311An., *Eng.*, S.106 (p.313)), "circles" (Kreise, *G. Cons.*, S.578 (p.239), *Rechts*, PP290Z, PP297Z, PP303An.), "cities" (Städte, *G.Cons.*, S.578, (p.239), "fractions" (Fraktionen, *Eng.*, S.83 (p.265)), "parties" (Parteien, *Enz.* III, PP544An. (S.344 and S.345). *Wurt.*, S.476 (p.258), *Eng.*, S.123, "guilds" (Zunft, *Wurt.*, S.483 (p.263), S.485 (p.264), "branch" (Zweig, *Rechts*, PP311An., PP320Z), "the particular spheres" (die besondere Sphären, *Rechts*, PP288, PP290Z, PP302), "trades", "crafts" and "professions" (Gewerbe, *Rechts*, PP288), "associations" (Genossenschaften, *Wurt.*, S.483 (p.263), *Rechts*, PP308). See "associations".
- Selbständigkeit**,
 "self-dependence".
- "self-conscious reason",
 (*Enz.* I, PP6), i.e. "reason".
- "self-dependence",
 (Selbstständigkeit, *Enz.* I, PP157, *Rechts*, PP322).
- "self-determining",
 (*Rechts*, PP278An.).
- "self-relating negativity and ... self-determining generality",
 (*Rechts*, PP278An.).
- 'sensuous experience',
 The "experience of the five senses", cf. 'non-sensuous experience'.
- "should",
 (Sollen), i.e. "ought".
- "singularity",
 (Einzelheit, *Enz.* I, PP163).
- "Some of what is rational is actual, and all of what is actual (or only part of what exists) is rational",
 (*Enz.* I, PP6An., *Rechts*, S.24. See the references and modifications of the more literal translation under "What is rational ...".
- 'Some of what is philosophically necessary is rational living, and all of what is rational living is philosophically necessary'.
- "sovereignty of the people",
 (Volksouveränität). See relevant discussions in *Rechts*, PP279An. (S.447), and see "the principle of the many and of the multitude" (*Enz.* III, PP544An. (S.343)), "the citizens ... and the electoral assemblies" (*Wurt.*, S.482 (p. 262), "the public voice (die öffentliche Stimme) ... not infrequently ... has proven ... to be impractical or ... fatal ... and [changeable]" (*Eng.*, S.84 (p. 295)), and "the ignorance of the multitude" (*Eng.*, S.90 (p.300)). Also see *Rechts*, PP310An. (S.479), and *Eng.*, S.103 (p.310).
- "specific conception",
 (bestimmter Begriff, *Logik* II, S.253 (p.583), S.264, 270, 282, 288, 292, 299; *Enz.* I, PP162An., PP171An., PP213An., PP214An.). Terms taken to have the same meaning:
 "a specification of the conception" or 'of Reason', or "a particular conception" (besonder), (*Logik* II, S.273-274 (p.600-607)); "each conception" (*Logik* II, S.282 "particularizing of the conception" (*Enz.* I, PP166Z). I take the following terms usually to be equivalent: "categories", "differentiations" or "distinctions", "specifications", "moments", and "the general types" (der allgemeine Typus, *Enz.* I, PP230Z) and "relations" (Verhältnissen).
- "specifications",
 (Bestimmungen).
- "specific elements of Reason",
 i.e. "specific Ideas" (bestimmten Ideen, *Enz.* I, PP213An.), "Ideas" (Ideen), or "a specification of Reason" (eine Vernunftbestimmung, *Enz.* III, PP539An. (s.333)). I take this phrase to name the "logical categories", the 'natural actualities' and 'human actualities' as possible "objects" of knowledge.
- "spirit",
 (Geist, *Enz.*I, PP187Z). See "human spirit".

- "Spirit",
i.e. "Reason".
- "spurious infinity",
(die schlechte Unendlichkeit, *Enz. I*, PP94, PP111Z). The boring or diverting endless, or indefinite multiplicity. See "inessential appearance".
- "structuring process",
(*Rechts*, S.27).
- "subject",
(das Subjekt, *Enz. I*, PP163An.).
- "subjectivist moralizing",
- "subjectivity",
(Subjectivität, *Enz. I*, PP147Z).
- "teleological aim",
(Zweckbeziehung ... teleologische Verhältnis, *Enz. I*, PP194Z).
- "theory of the state",
(*Enz. I*, PP163Z), i.e. "conception of the state".
- 'to maximize both the quality and quantity of free, rational living',
- 'total, external determinism',
The claim that all empirical effects result either from unknowable (e.g. spontaneous or divine) causes, i.e. fatalism or predestination; or from a humanly knowable chain of causes and effects. Both versions deny that we can have any genuinely 'free will', i.e. a will which is in any measure free of external determining forces. See "determinism".
- "totality",
(Totalität, *Enz. I*, PP214An.).
- "true constitution",
see "constitution".
- (überhaupt),
"broadly", "broadly speaking", "in the main", "by and large", "largely", "on the whole", or "for the most part".
- 'ultimately'.
Contrast with 'formally' and 'primarily'.
- "unconfined discretion",
(*Rechts*, PP283).
- "understanding",
i.e. "abstractive understanding".
- "universal",
(allgemeine (*Geschichte*, S.52)).
- "Universal",
(Allgemeine, *Philosophie I*, S.96).
- 'universal adult suffrage',
- "voter",
see "citizen".
- "voting qualifications",
- "What is rational, that is what is actual; and what is actual, that is what is rational",
(Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig, *Rechts*, S.24 (p.10)). This conclusion is repeated and more fully discussed in *Enz. I*, PP6An., and it reappears in various forms elsewhere, e.g. *Philosophie*, II, S.110 (II p. 95); II, S.111; (III, p. 23); *Rechts*, S.26. See "Some of what ...".
- 'What is rational must embrace what is contrary within itself, all what is contrary but not contradictory is rational'.
- "world Spirit",
(Weltgeist), i.e. "Reason". "World Spirit" has "nations and individuals enough to exempt some", (*Philosophie I*, S.55).
- "world spirit",
i.e. 'Reason as the world spirit'.

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Introduction

For the greater part of this century the philosophical writings of Hegel have been either badly misunderstood or totally neglected. But during the past twenty years there has been a tremendous revival of interest in Hegel, which is partly due to interests in Marxism and Continental philosophy and partly a reaction against what was perceived as the dullness of the linguistic and analytic philosophy which has dominated English-speaking philosophy. Many who turned to Hegel saw him as a challenge; both difficult to comprehend but impossible to ignore Hegel seemed to have something to say about almost every branch of philosophical inquiry. The flood of exegesimal texts and English translations has continued since the 1960s, and the setting up of the Hegel Society of Great Britain in 1979 was an acknowledgement of the fact that Hegelianism is to have a prominent position in philosophy for many years to come. But what is of great significance in the Hegel revival is the actual diversity of research interests which led scholars to Hegel's philosophy. It is certainly impossible to single out one strand of his work as being accountable for this growing interest. For some philosophers it is his social and political philosophy that explains the attraction, others seek insights in his metaphysics, his philosophy of nature, philosophy of religion, or philosophy of history.

It is this very diversity of interests which underlies the selection of papers included in this volume. No attempt has been made to show that contemporary Hegelians belong to a school or have anything in common beyond the fact that an interest in Hegel is reflected in their current philosophical research. The reader who expects a final and definitive statement about Hegel's philosophy will not find it in this collection. For the purpose in bringing together this wealth of current research has not been to present a detailed exegesis of a philosopher who has been long dead, but rather to demonstrate the life and vitality of an Hegelian tradition and its influence upon those who are grappling with some of the issues that dominate contemporary philosophy.

Thus in the first paper Bernard Cullen argues that contemporary social philosophy is enriched with an appreciation of Hegel's insights in *The phenomenology of spirit*, and maintains that 'our attempts to understand the complexities of human society and

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culture today can hope to succeed only within the framework bequeathed to us by Hegel'. Susan Easton, in the second paper, approaches recent issues in feminist social and political philosophy from an Hegelian standpoint. Rejecting some of the standard feminist criticism of Hegel's analysis of the family (namely his alleged endorsement of the public-private distinction, and alleged reductionism and functionalism) she explores the possibility of an Hegelian understanding of women's potential freedom.

In the paper by Anthony Manser, attention focuses on Hegel's logic. As Manser points out Hegel's *Science of logic* represents a radical attempt to change the very nature of philosophy but, whilst many commentators have written about the initial dialectic of being, nothing, and becoming, none have taken Hegel's remarks about becoming seriously enough and have consequently misunderstood one of the most essential features of his attempt to replace traditional metaphysics with dialectical logic. There have been other attempts to transform the nature of philosophy. One of the more recent attempts has been attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein whose radical approach to problems of language and meaning is compared with Hegel's philosophy in the following paper by David Lamb.

In a detailed examination of Hegel's socio-economic philosophy Christopher J. Arthur looks at the role of political economy in Hegel's *Philosophy of right* and argues that Hegel's emphasis on social forms is highly relevant to the contemporary attempt to develop economics as a social science.

The three papers by Michael George, Sean Sayers and Joseph McCarney indicate the extent to which an understanding of the relationship between Hegelianism and Marxism is relevant today. Michael George interprets Marxism as a construction upon foundations laid by Hegel and consequently takes issue with commentators who have attempted to rewrite Marxism without reference to its Hegelian heritage. According to Sean Sayers both Hegel and Marx were advocates of a scientific and realistic method, but it was only by means of a rejection of Hegel's conservative system that Marx was able to develop a method which was both scientific and critical. Joseph McCarney raises the question of how the social sciences can be conceived of as being dialectical and argues that progress in this direction can be achieved only through an appreciation of Marx's methodological debt to Hegel.

Hegel's contribution to the philosophy of religion is an

Introduction

important feature in the revival of Hegelian philosophy, and the relationship between his views on philosophy and his views on religion has been a subject of considerable debate. Pitting himself against those philosophers who separate the religious elements from Hegel's epistemology and metaphysics, John Walker provides a convincing case that 'Hegel's view of philosophy as itself a religious activity is of crucial relevance to his philosophy as a whole' and that 'far from being an anachronism' the religious character is one of the main reasons why that philosophy continues to be relevant.

Whilst Hegel's contribution to the philosophy of religion has been recognised and progress continues in the application of his method to the social sciences, the significance of his philosophy of nature for contemporary philosophy of science has, until very recently, been virtually ignored. Wolfgang Neuser's examination of how Hegel saw the role of mathematics in the natural sciences therefore marks a significant step in the recognition of benefits to be derived from an Hegelian approach to the philosophy of science.

The appendix to this collection is a translation of Hegel's *Habilitationsthesen* together with an introduction and annotated bibliography by Norbert Waszek.

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Hegel's Historical Phenomenology and Social Analysis

Bernard Cullen

FOR FRITHJOF BERGMANN

The present world and the present form and self-consciousness of spirit contain within them all the stages that appear to have occurred earlier in history . . . What spirit is now, it has always been; the only difference is that it now possesses a richer consciousness and a more fully elaborated concept of its own nature . . . Those moments that spirit appears to have outgrown still belong to it in the depths of its present.

Hegel, Introduction to *Lectures on the philosophy of world history* (1830)¹

In the first part of this essay, I propose to offer a reading of Hegel's *Phenomenology of spirit*. This does not pretend to be the only legitimate reading; especially with a text as tantalising and as rich and complex as the *Phenomenology*, I am always suspicious of commentators who claim to have discovered 'what Hegel really meant' (or any other philosopher, for that matter). I hope, all the same, that mine is what Werner Marx calls an 'immanent' rather than an 'assimilative' account:² I have not attributed to Hegel what is not in the text, and I have no particular philosophical axe to grind, except to articulate my own conviction that our attempts to understand the complexities of human society and culture today can hope to succeed only within the philosophical framework bequeathed to us by Hegel. Not, of course, that Hegel had all the answers. However, while the Hegelian synthesis — of subjectivity and objectivity, humanity and nature, finiteness and infinity — has been fruitfully supplemented by subsequent thinkers, it has not, in my view, been superseded. In part II, I

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shall indicate some of the ways in which contemporary social analysis can learn from Hegel's insights.

Because of its short compass, my account is partial, and much of considerable significance is, inevitably, omitted. Nevertheless, I hope to present a coherent synopsis of a very long and often baffling book, and to highlight a unifying thread that runs through it.³ The central theme of the *Phenomenology* is that human reason *can* attain knowledge of the spirit that permeates all of reality; but this can only be achieved through a philosophical consideration of all the forms that spirit has assumed throughout history. To look at it from a slightly different perspective, the *Phenomenology* is an account of the history of self-consciousness — i.e. of the ways in which people have understood themselves and their relations to other people, to nature and to the divine — culminating in the 'absolute' knowledge that is attainable today.

I have argued elsewhere that Hegel's primary motivation to write an all-encompassing system of philosophy was his anguish in the face of the social and political fragmentation around him.⁴ This ubiquitous bifurcation (*Entzweiung*) was paralleled by a growing estrangement of human beings from the ground of their being in nature. When the instrumental reason of the Enlightenment introduced a radical cleavage between human society and nature, society was left suspended as if in mid-air. In his solution to this problem, Rousseau assumed the universal possibility of a social reciprocity that has its juridical equivalent in the idea of a social contract: according to this understanding, all dissymmetry and inequality in status, functions and powers is abolished, so that each member of the community is recognised as a homogeneous unit, with equal access to the realm of the rights and duties that are presupposed by all forms of collective life.

Hegel took Rousseau to task for the formalism of his social contract theory (see *PG* 316–23, *PS* 355–63, on absolute freedom and terror)⁵ and for his failure to recognise (as Montesquieu and Herder had done) the concrete reality of the spirit of a people expressing itself in its art, its religion, its political and economic institutions. According to Hegel, an underlying unity can be rediscovered beneath this manifold of spiritual/cultural universes. Each time the philosopher enters in thought into another historical period, it becomes self-sufficient and excludes the other forms of life that have preceded it or will succeed it: India, Greece, Rome, the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment are so many worlds, the richness and originality of which must be acknow-

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ledged. There can, therefore, be no lapidary affirmation valid for the whole range of human societies that might permit any thinker to overcome their heterogeneity. For Hegel, concepts such as freedom, nature, the will are themselves the products of a certain stage in the development of what he calls spirit (*Geist*); and they certainly may not be accepted unquestioningly when one's thought is confronted with the vast sweep of world history.

Hegel's overriding aim is to examine in thought the being of this spirit, and to grasp the process through which modern society strives to become adequate to it. Spirit, actualised in different ways in different societies, has not heretofore been accessible to thought; but it is because spirit has now *explicitly* become what it has always been implicitly that philosophical science is finally able to achieve adequate knowledge of its object.⁶ The inadequacy or the bias of earlier philosophical doctrines was due not so much to blindness or intellectual laziness, but to the incompleteness of spirit itself; and it is because of the maturing of spirit that we can now embark upon the transcendence of the division between knowledge (phenomena) and faith (noumena) instituted by Kantian Criticism, that still characterises the modern world. This 'ripening' process is not the product of mere reflection. It involves the whole unfolding of universal history; and it is in this fundamental connection between the ultimate success of philosophical discourse and the becoming of spirit that the radical novelty of Hegelianism is evident: a single reading of the facts of experience is only now conceivable because spirit has deepened its own content, since the totality of its virtualities could only be developed with the passage of time. Hegel elaborates on this theme in the final chapter of the *Phenomenology of spirit*, entitled 'Absolute Knowledge (*Das absolute Wissen*)'. In it he discusses the relation between his *Science of logic* (finally published in 1812–16), which is adumbrated in this final chapter, and the phenomenological dialectic described in the preceding chapters. He underlines the interpenetration and mutual modification of philosophical science and the historical and natural reality out of which it was developed. According to Hegel, the philosopher can know and know absolutely; but it has become possible, at a specific point in history, for a particular person (Hegel himself) to come to know and to write down the content of the *Science of logic* only because of the unfolding of the course of human history, that is, the effective development of spirit. For a better understanding of how Hegel

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arrived at this conclusion, we should refer back to the Preface (written in early 1807, and a summary of Hegel's philosophical project in its own right), in which he defines the purpose of the *Phenomenology*.

I

Hegel insists that human reality is fundamentally historical: 'Spirit is never at rest but is engaged in constantly progressive movement (*in immer fortschreitender Bewegung*), (PG 14, PS 6). He describes the transition from one form⁷ of spirit to another: spirit matures (*reift*) slowly and quietly into its new shape, like a child in the womb, and then 'there is a qualitative leap (*ein qualitativer Sprung*), and the child is born' (PG 14, PS 6). Although spirit dissolves almost imperceptibly the structure of its previous world, 'this gradual crumbling that left unaltered the face of the whole is cut short by the sunrise which, in a flash, all at once reveals the features of the new world' (PG 15, PS 7). The Roman world succeeded the Greek city-state, and was itself in turn replaced by the medieval Christian world: the becoming (or the 'maturing' or 'ripening') of spirit can best be understood as a long succession of incomplete forms that gave rise to each other, negated each other, or sometimes co-existed on the basis of different principles, while the meaning of the totality of the process was never fully grasped.

But the emergence of a new form of spirit takes on today a significance quite different from any it could possibly have had in previous epochs:

Our time (*Zeit*) is a time of birth and transition to a new epoch (*Periode*). Spirit has broken with what was hitherto the world of its existence and imagination (*Daseins und Vorstellens*), and is about to submerge it in the past, and in the work of its own transformation. (PG 14, PS 6)

Our era is different, because for the first time this meaning underlying everything that has existed can be recognised as genuine knowledge, the very object of science. Of course Hegel does not prove this thesis in the Preface (nor can I), since such a demonstration is only available in the *Phenomenology* as a whole.

The ultimate aim of the work, however, is defined quite unambiguously: 'To lead the individual from his uneducated (*ungebildeten*) standpoint to knowledge' (PG 24, PS 16).

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And this is to be accomplished by examining 'the universal individual (*das allgemeine Individuum*), the world spirit, in its formative education (*Bildung*)' (PG 24, PS 16).⁸ While 'the universal (or general) individual' is humankind in general, the individual to whom Hegel is directing the *Phenomenology* is you or me. In the course of our own experience, we will have integrated into our existence all the moments of the development of spirit; which means that we will be in a position, using Hegel's terminology, to apprehend the true not as an objective *substance* but as a *subject*.

This formula involves both phenomenology and ontology: individuals must dissolve the exteriority of the thing-like object, must abolish the rigidity of substance and recognise in what is other than themselves their own handiwork. The *Phenomenology* is an account of this abolition of exteriority. By the end of the seventh chapter (that is, just before the eighth and final chapter on 'absolute knowledge'), we have arrived at the content of the absolute, albeit in an inadequate form, that of the Christian religion. And in the final chapter, Hegel abolishes all duality between the thing-like object — in this extreme case, God — and human self-consciousness. But this overcoming of all dualism is possible only because the disparity between being and thought is only one moment (or aspect) of a history, the one true subject of which is spirit.

This is not simply a modification of classical metaphysics governed by the traditional definition of truth. Whether one claims that knowledge must conform to the objects (empiricism), or, on the contrary, that the objects must be governed by our knowledge (rationalism/idealism), one is still assuming the duality and mutual indifference of being and knowing. But the object that presents itself to the individual as an immutable and unchangeable 'nature', out there, is so only because it has not yet been grasped in a properly scientific way. But this delay is not a simple accident due to contingent factors. According to Hegel, the delay exists only because the object itself has not reached its full development. And furthermore, if an object has now become an object of scientific knowledge, it is because it is moving towards its completed form, the sign of that completion being the knowledge itself.

The complexity of such a dialectic obviously transforms the very notion of error. The definition of truth as the adequation of the intellect to the thing is a proposition empty of meaning when

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non-truth refers to the non-fulfilment of being. Not that speaking of error is a meaningless act; but in this case, it has a purely technical meaning, internal to a discourse that has already been constituted. A judgement is recognised to be false when it is revealed that the content to which it refers does not exist. Presence, therefore, is the only norm against which what is stated can be measured. But what is presence apart from that discourse in which it is contained? Being is not the fixed and immutable entity that reflection alone can decompose or dissociate (in the chemistry sense); being is what discourse brings into existence *and* what has enabled that discourse to be held in the first place.

Reality articulates itself in discourse, but only to take over discourse itself. Discourse — that is, the totality of its manifestations — is a moment (or aspect) of being itself. The word is not external to what exists; it is the supreme incarnation of it. The dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity postulated by all traditional theories of knowledge is seen, ultimately, to be illusory. The two histories, the history of the object and the history of the subject, coincide in their mutual transformation. Any effort, therefore, to describe the real as an objective given is necessarily inadequate; it is not a question of objectifying but of receiving and reintegrating. We are not to affirm a particular philosophical theory and reject all the others but, for the first time in the course of universal history, we are to confront all the discourses, all the philosophical theories, that the human mind has produced.

If the incompleteness of knowledge always refers back to the incompleteness of that historical reality of which it is knowledge, the notion of a completed science prompts two questions. In what form does it lead that which exists to fulfilment? And what is it in being that permitted it to come into existence? These questions help to elucidate the development of the *Phenomenology of spirit* on three levels. The object is appropriated and transformed into a subject according to three quite distinct processes. And the *Phenomenology* itself has three main stages:

- a. The first five chapters (more than half the book) survey the emergence and development of subjective spirit (i.e. of particular forms of subjectivity or individual consciousness), which goes beyond the realm of individuality and opens up to the world of spirit.
- b. Chapter VI (which corresponds to the stage of objective

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spirit) presents a survey and analysis of the various forms or shapes of spirit, the successive cultural formations in history: the Greek city-state, the Roman world, feudal society, the French Revolution, which has heralded the rational (*vernünftig*) modern state. These are so many moments that have brought spirit to the fullness of its development. However, these earlier forms of consciousness are only what Hegel calls 'Abstractionen' (PG 239, PS 264). c. Finally, Chapters VII and VIII deal with absolute spirit: that is, the forms of discourse that people have adopted and through which the totality of being has been expressed: art, religion, and philosophy. Science proper only becomes possible, the content of knowledge can only be adequately expressed, after the completion of this triple movement. And each one of these processes calls forth the process that succeeds it.

Subjective spirit

The first five chapters of the *Phenomenology of spirit* describe the slow progress of individual consciousness leading from the appearances that are initially given to it to the very heart of Hegelian 'spirit'.⁹ Since the world that the individual confronts is only the totality of the manifestations of his own activity, knowledge of the object is, therefore, just as much its suppression. Accordingly, this dialectic has first and foremost a negative signification: it is perceived by the subject as the brutal destruction of its own certainties. It appears to have no rigour and indeed seems quite chaotic. The object of experience is not given as the necessary product of the development of self-consciousness but as a content that one just stumbles upon, that appears out of the blue. It is in this respect that Hegelian description has often been compared to the essential character of psychoanalytic experience: what appears to be revealed at the end of the process as the ultimate law of consciousness has the same kind of strangeness as that which subjects can say about themselves in analysis. No intentional design can exhaust what comes into existence. It thus becomes apparent that individuals are nothing outside of an order of which they are part.

They can indeed affirm their own (partial) independence by abandoning one attitude for another; but they will depend just as

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much as ever on what is outside of them, which continues to elude them. Through the plurality of possible attitudes can be discerned an order that determines the vantage points from which those attitudes become intelligible. But consciousness does not recognise itself in this truth and submits to it as to a strange and archaic law. It hangs on then to what it is or what it thinks it is; it is unsure of its whole world; its inadequacy to the universal reality of which it is part is unveiled.

Natural consciousness will show itself to be only the concept (*Begriff*) of knowledge, or in other words, not to be real knowledge. But since it directly takes itself to be real knowledge, this path has a negative significance for it, and what is in fact the realization of the concept counts for it rather as the loss of its own self (*Verlust seiner selbst*); for it does lose its truth on this path. The road can therefore be regarded as the pathway of doubt (*des Zweifels*), or more precisely as the way of despair (*der Verzweiflung*). (PG 56, PS 49)

This tragic phenomenon appears on a number of levels. In one sense, spirit has developed through innumerable individual dramas that are like the foam on the surface of its movement. Stoicism became dominant in the heyday of the Roman world; the unhappy consciousness (*das unglückliche Bewußtsein*) depends upon the institutionalisation of the duality endemic to the Christian world-view. The tragedy, then, is a real tragedy, insoluble in itself, since individual alienation is only the micro-cosmic reproduction of a more all-embracing alienation, the alienation of an incomplete form of spirit. The incompleteness of self-consciousness refers back to its base, the incompleteness of history.

The modern individual, who lives in a world in the process of completion, may of course fail to recognise this, and adopt Stoicism, scepticism or Christianity; but these forms are by now out of phase with what exists, since the work of universal history serves as their substructure and sooner or later makes it impossible to maintain them. These same forms of spirit, understood in their original form, appear as examples of the tragedy of the individual consciousness, unable to forge a world in accordance with its desires and unable to overcome the alienation of spirit. But spirit was not reduced to any one of its

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phases. Through the multiplicity of plans and individual tragedies, spirit cleared a path for itself; and the discourse of the philosopher now recognises and proclaims that the history of spirit is approaching the end and that individuals can now recognise in what is initially given to them externally the guiding law of their own evolution.

In this sense, the alienation of modern individuality is ready to be reabsorbed and to be reduced to the level of a moment that has been superseded. Furthermore, the cultural forms that emerge from the past and to which I can now refer are no longer rooted in the soil that produced and nurtured them: they are now items in the cultural memory. In an extremely important text, Hegel articulates the being of the modern world as a manifestation of spirit that is more advanced than other, earlier, ones; and specifies the relation between the modern individual and earlier cultural formations:

In the universal individual every moment displays itself as it gains concrete form and a shape of its own. The particular individual (*das besondere Individuum*) is incomplete spirit, a concrete form in whose existence (*Dasein*) one determination (*Bestimmtheit*) predominates, while the others are present only in blurred outlines (*in verwischten Zügen*). In the spirit that is on a higher level than another, the lower concrete existence has been reduced to an inconspicuous moment; what used to be important (*die Sache selbst*) is now but a trace; its form is shrouded and becomes a mere shading (*Schattirung*). The individual whose substance is the more advanced spirit (*der höher stehende Geist*) runs through this past just as one who takes up a higher science goes through the preparatory data (*Vorbereitungskennnisse*) he has long since absorbed, in order to bring their content to mind; he recalls these memories to the inward eye, but has no lasting interest in them for their own sake. The individual must also pass through the formative stages (*Bildungsstufen*) of universal spirit so far as their content is concerned, but as forms that spirit has already left behind, as stages on a way that has been prepared and levelled . . . In this respect, formative education (*Bildung*), considered from the point of view of the individual, consists in his acquiring what thus lies at hand, devouring his organic nature, and taking possession of it for himself. But, considered from the side of

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universal spirit as substance, this is nothing but its own acquisition of self-consciousness, the bringing about of its own becoming (*Werden*) and reflection into itself. (*PG* 24–25, *PS* 16–17)

When we adopt the role of the Stoic or the sceptic or ‘the unhappy consciousness’ of Christendom (see *PG* 116–131, *PS* 119–138), we are not, despite appearances, guided solely by the content of those forms of spirit. If it were concretely possible today to transform a particular stage in the history of consciousness into a self-subsistent moment, if it were even conceivable that the imaginary level on which self-consciousness can live could be permanently cut off from the becoming of spirit, then the individual would only have to make a choice from among several possible attitudes. But this is by definition not the case: individuals are not as they see themselves, but are always more than they themselves can articulate. The level upon which the old worlds are evoked is an indication that spirit has definitively left them behind, even though the individual subject may not yet realise it.

Consciousness is explicitly the concept (*Begriff*) of itself. This means that consciousness goes beyond the limits, and since these limits belong to itself, it goes beyond itself. For the particular individual, the beyond (*das Jenseits*) is also established for consciousness. (*PG* 57, *PS* 51)

This ‘beyond’ is, from the outset, the real driving power of the dialectic of self-consciousness. Even when they recognise themselves in Greek or Roman or medieval Christian forms of spirit, modern individuals remain part of the totality of contemporary society. Even though they fail to recognise the essence of that society, they are always driven beyond this misreading of their own world, towards what is implied by the totality. The object experienced by consciousness is not isolated, but presents itself in relation to a norm that is both outside the object and within self-consciousness. This is why Hegel says that both the object and its yardstick lie within self-consciousness.

Consciousness seems incapable, as it were, of getting behind the object to examine it not as it exists for consciousness, but as it is in itself; and so also cannot test its

own knowledge by that criterion. But the distinction between the in-itself and knowledge exists already in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all . . . Should comparison between these two moments show that they do not correspond to each other, it would seem that consciousness must modify its knowledge to make it conform to the object. But in the modification of the knowledge, the object itself modifies itself for it also, for the knowledge that was present was essentially a knowledge of the object. As the knowledge changes so also does the object, since the object essentially belonged to this knowledge. So for consciousness, that which it previously took to be the in-itself is not an in-itself, or it was only an in-itself for it (i.e. for consciousness). Since consciousness thus finds that its knowledge of an object does not correspond to its object, the object itself does not stand up to the test either; in other words, the yardstick for testing (*der Maßstab der Prüfung*) is modified when that for which it was to have been the yardstick fails to pass the test; and the testing is not just a testing of knowledge, but also a testing of the yardstick of knowledge. (*PG* 59–60, *PS* 54–55)

The duality between spirit and what is known by spirit (a duality essentially present in the phenomenological dialectic, as in all kinds of knowledge) *can* be overcome in so far as the object of knowledge is no more than the externalised form of spirit: this modification of knowledge as it adjusts to an outside reality also involves the transformation of that reality as it (the reality) progresses towards full knowledge of itself. Phenomenological critique consists in highlighting the gap between how a given situation is described and the actual being of spirit. This gap is opened up each time that a particular modern individual identifies himself or herself with one or other of the forms of spirit that has been superseded: the self-identification of a particular individual today as, for example, a Platonist or a Christian can only be understood on the 'ideological' level. Since these earlier forms of spirit do not fully account for the reality of the individual subject, the subject withdraws from that reality; and the principle that really governs it (i.e. the 'maturing' of spirit through history) is not yet apparent to the subject. The substance (i.e. the object of consciousness) is thus perceived as the polar opposite to subjectivity, and takes on the appearance of a fixed natural given,

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although it continues to live within the same reality as the active individual subject. The individual can appropriate the whole range of spiritual or cultural worlds that human activity has brought into existence, but this involves not just knowing but also retrieving. The human subject is not yet fully aware of all that humanity has accomplished, but just because it has been accomplished, subjects will never be able to reduce themselves simply to the sum of what they know. Gradually, with the development of its knowledge and learning, consciousness comes to a full understanding of the historical dimension that ultimately governs it.

Objective spirit

The second stage of the *Phenomenology* (Chapter VI, 'Spirit') presupposes the acceptance of such a historical dimension; and also that history can become an object of knowledge. Individual subjects have come to recognise themselves in the substance of the objective world. They are now able to read there the work of human negativity, and the stages of their past evolution are now going to be described on a higher level. In the earlier sections of the book, only that in the movement of spirit which was apparent to consciousness was described, but the transformation from one form of spirit into another, as described, was unreal: subjectivity was depicted as deceptively fluid, while the work of history is in fact slow and difficult. The upshot is that there can be no simple one-to-one correspondence between the two levels: the unhappy consciousness is not Christianity, but merely one of the forms of the internalisation of the Christian world. In the same way, the dialectic of the lord (*Herr*) and the bondsman (*Knecht*) (see *PG* 109–116, *PS* 111–19) does not capture the reality of the clashes between lords and bondsmen that have occurred throughout history. In this latter case, oppressors and oppressed, aristocratic consciousnesses and dependent consciousnesses demonstrate certain social and cultural characteristics, and certain common features gradually come to light through the consideration of conflicts between them: the initial confrontation between two self-consciousnesses, the demand for recognition that emerges from such a confrontation, the acceptance of the ultimate risk (of death) in the course of the struggle, and the differentiation into lord and bondsman. But these characteristics must not be

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thought of as necessary moments in the genesis of human society. The *Phenomenology* is not intended to be an anthropology, in that sense. Hegel's insistence that spirit is a primary entity with respect to all the individual specifications that might intervene rules out the possibility of any chronological or logical anteriority between the descriptions in the first section and those in the second.

Particular consciousness is now in a position to derive, from consideration of the historical material available, the significance of its own existence, only because spirit has attained a certain stage of development:

Spirit is herewith self-supporting, absolute, real being. All previous forms of consciousness are abstractions (*Abstractionen*) of it. They are so because spirit analyzed itself, distinguished its own moments, and dwelt a while on each of them. This isolating of these moments presupposes spirit itself and subsists therein; in other words, the isolation of moments exists only in spirit, which is existence itself (*die Existenz*). Thus isolated, the moments have the appearance of really existing as such; but that they are only moments or vanishing quantities (*Größen*) is shown by their advance and retreat into their ground and essence; and this essence is just this movement and resolution (*Auflösung*) of these moments. (PG 239, PS 264)

The completion of the itinerary of consciousness (as depicted in the first five chapters) does not signal the birth of spirit, or real society, but the possibility of coming to know spirit. The attitudes that have made this possible are so many 'models' or 'paradigms' by means of which consciousness can understand in thought its relation to the outside world. Each of these attitudes in turn demonstrates that the divergence between the inside world (of consciousness) and the outside world has not been fully bridged. But this duality is eventually overcome, and the unity of being-in-itself and being-for-itself is revealed.

The phenomenological dialectic implies an overlap of the different levels. It begins with the cleavage between subject and object, between the individual and the outside world, between consciousness and the object of consciousness, between thought and what is thought. This cleavage should first of all be understood as a historical phenomenon. Although it has existed,

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to all intents and purposes, since the beginning of time, modern culture (to wit, bourgeois society) has brought this opposition to a peak. But if our society has exacerbated the rupture, the form it has taken depends on the very nature of what is thus divided into its subjective side and its objective side, namely spirit.

The dialectic proceeds, therefore, on several levels. Before their ultimate identity is revealed, the relation between subjectivity and its object can be on three levels: (i) where the object is primary with respect to the subject; (ii) where the simple otherness of subject and object is transformed into a simple correlate of self-consciousness, thus bringing about, at this level, the identity of knowledge and the object of knowledge; (iii) finally, the simultaneous maintenance of the two realities and their difference (i.e. the identity of identity and difference). To this threefold relation corresponds the division in the *Phenomenology* into consciousness, self-consciousness and reason (*Vernunft*). This covers the entire range of logical possibilities.

The content of the external object has two essential characteristics: it is multiple and heterogeneous and it presents itself both explicitly and implicitly. The multiplicity of objective reality corresponds to the formalism exercised by the subject who analyses objective reality down into its component parts: in this way, everything (a stone, a table, a living thing, a person, a work of art) is treated as an object that is felt, perceived, thought. But the multiplicity corresponds also to the plurality of the orders of reality that enable different levels to be distinguished: there is a succession of metaphysical levels rising from inanimate nature to the animate world and to culture. The fusion of these levels defines the very life of spirit. As the external objective world presents itself to consciousness, therefore, a range of relations becomes possible. But at the same time, each time subjectivity strives to think the object that is in the outside world, it is compelled to go back to the object; because, without even fully articulating it, subjectivity derives from the substantial universe within which it lives the concepts, the experiences, the theories that enable it to consider in thought what is initially foreign to it. This process brings to light the equivalence of the two realms (subject and object) hitherto considered antithetical.

In the *Phenomenology*, the objects of experience follow one another according to a particular sequence, so that the other person and cultural relations do not appear until Chapter IV. But while the type of relation to the objective world depicted in

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each successive form of spirit can be carried along and can also apply in any succeeding form, the inverse is not the case. This is why Hegel's work depicts phenomenological progress.

This eventual identity of the objective world and the means of understanding it in thought accounts for the final synthesis of subject and object. This synthesis is only possible when everything that formerly presented itself as ungraspable inertia is newly animated by a primordial dynamism that defines it as its own self-becoming. The history of spirit itself can now be retraced; and thus Chapter VI leads us from the Athenian city-state to the French Revolution, the Terror, and the Napoleonic state, through successive manifestations of spirit in history, or objective spirit.

This is not, of course, a complete history of humanity; nor even a full history of these epochs. Hegel singles out for attention only those particular aspects that are directly relevant to the matter under consideration. In the immense variety of forms deposited and sedimented by time, self-consciousness has come to recognise the work of spirit's self-actualisation, as the latter developed the full range of its potentialities. In going back again over the stages of this development, self-consciousness is reconstituting its own reality. But why could spirit not hitherto be known, since it has always existed? Because, writes Hegel, the acorn is not the oak; or in his own terminology, the concept is not the whole:

Its first appearance is only its immediacy (*Unmittelbarkeit*) or its concept (*Begriff*). Just as a building is not finished when its foundation has been laid, the achieved concept of the whole is not the whole (*das Ganze*) itself. When we wish to see an oak with its powerful trunk and its spreading branches and foliage, we are not content to be shown in its place an acorn. Thus science (*Wissenschaft*), the crown of a world of spirit, is not complete in its beginnings. (PG 15, PS 7)

The potentialities of spirit have only been actualised in a haphazard way; this resulted in profound dissymmetries that have distorted the true nature of reality:

But the actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) of this simple whole [that is, spirit] consists of those various forms that have become its moments, and that will now develop and give themselves

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shape anew, but in their new element, in their newly acquired meaning. (PG 15, PS 7)

The 'new element' to which Hegel refers is his own philosophical system; 'their newly acquired meaning' is their place in that system. Spirit can now be known, after many centuries when it could not be known, because a universal state (or a fully rational state) is currently in course of actualisation: that is, a state the institutions of which demonstrate the very being of spirit and in which spirit becomes self-conscious. Not only can the modern state now be known, in a way in which, for example, feudal society could not be known by its members; but we now have the benefit of a relatively full understanding of earlier societies or cultural formations, because they can now be seen in the context of the development of spirit overall.

Hegel then proceeds to examine each of the historical periods mentioned, as an articulation of a particular kind of dominant dissonance or contradiction. Thus, for example, the Greek *polis* is presented as the first attempt at the universalisation of a human community which, striving to wrench itself from the immediacy of natural life, tried to make its social rules conform to laws of reason. This attempt did not succeed because the new concept of political organisation could not become a reality. This was so because the nascent state conflicted with the institution of the family (or the clan) out of which the new state had painfully emerged. This institution of the family is the concrete manifestation of the principle of subjectivity, which remains outside the realm of political activity and constitutes its permanent limit. Hegel illustrates this conflict with a thinly veiled analysis of the *Antigone* of Sophocles, which underlies most of Chapter VIA on 'True spirit, the ethical order (*die Sittlichkeit*)'. He interprets the emergence of the Greek city-state as the passage from the primacy of the divine law to the primacy of human law, from customary law to written law, from actions based upon ties of kinship to those derived from the abstract criteria of political organisation. (This is also the principal theme of the *Orestes* of Aeschylus, with which Hegel was familiar.) In the *Antigone*, the full might of state authority is ultimately powerless against a young girl's refusal to accept the dictates of *realpolitik* as the supreme values.

The play demonstrates that the old archaic order still retains its power and that no recourse to 'reasons of state' (however

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justified) can overcome it. The conflict between Creon (who represents the state) and Antigone (who represents the family, not the individual as in the modern play by Anouilh) revolves around the depth of meaning bestowed upon death. In one sense, the death of any citizen is a contingent event that could happen to anyone, especially anyone involved in political or social struggles; it remains external to that struggle and does not modify its content significantly. But in another sense, as a moment in the life of a family, such a death is a fundamentally significant and necessary milestone, which is accepted and which becomes a link in a non-temporal chain against which the demands of history and politics fall on deaf ears. Thus people can be model citizens, can work for the good of the city, can risk their lives in defending the state; but deep down (especially when death intervenes), they do not belong to this public, civic world at all. The appearances, the accidental aspects of their existence may be devoted to public life; but when death strikes, their spiritual home is with their family, who will receive their body and will strip their death of all its inessentials — death in some cause or another, in one manner or another, against this or that enemy — and return them directly into that ontological continuity maintained by the religion of their ancestors. It matters little to Antigone that Eteocles was struck down while defending the city and that Polynices, his brother, was a traitor to the city. As far as she is concerned, they are both her brothers, and they are both entitled to a proper funeral, in accordance with tradition.

Creon, of course, sees Antigone first and foremost as a threat to public order. But Hegel does not come down on one side or the other. When a conflict such as this appears in the course of the development of spirit, it cannot be resolved simply by accepting one side of the conflict and rejecting the other. The potentially disastrous conflict between the two principles will only be overcome (*aufgehoben*) following great upheavals in the world of society and culture. In a fundamentally important way, however, the conflict is never negated, but the two poles are retained, in suspension, in higher (and historically later) forms of society.¹⁰

Absolute spirit

And so, spirit proceeds, from one formation to another, towards full consciousness of its own being. Absolute knowledge is

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knowledge of all those forms assumed by spirit in the course of its development up until now. This ultimate knowledge is attained in the third and final section of the *Phenomenology* (Chapters VII and VIII), devoted to the various forms of discourse people have adopted to characterise the human condition: art, religion, and philosophy.¹¹ Hegel considers the similarities and the differences among these forms of discourse, each with its own means of expression; but he emphasises that, beneath the diversity of languages, spirit is present in its entirety in each; and this can now be known. But for this to come about, everything that was implicit in spirit when it first emerged had to be actualised in history; and spirit has gathered into itself all that it has been, with none of its earlier forms left external to it.

Thus the dialectic, in which the individual has been caught up as both active subject and quarry, had to run through the long line of cultural formations in history. The Hegelian philosophical structure implies that whatever emerges henceforth will only be comprehensible by using the categories of which the structure is composed. Not that individual subjects are no longer free to think: they may wish to dwell in specific moments of the phenomenological genesis of spirit; they may wish to reformulate their relation to substance in a new language. However, any new formations will have the same logical texture as the formations already recounted. Philosophy is essentially historical, because what being is is inseparable from how being has expressed itself. In the preface to his *Science of logic*, Hegel expresses the relation of his phenomenology of spirit to his mature philosophical system thus:

This spiritual movement . . . is the absolute method of knowing, as well as the immanent soul of the content itself. I contend that only this self-construing method will enable philosophy to be an objective, demonstrated science. It is in this way that I have tried to depict consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Consciousness is spirit as concrete knowledge, involved in external appearance (*in der Äußerlichkeit befangenes*); but the progress (*die Fortbewegung*) of this object, like the development (*die Entwicklung*) of all natural and spiritual life, rests solely on the nature of the pure essentialities (*Wesenheiten*) that constitute the content of logic. Consciousness, as spirit in its appearance (*der erscheinende Geist*) [i.e. as phenomena], which in its progress

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frees itself from its immediacy (*Unmittelbarkeit*) and its external concrete form (*Konkretion*), attains to the pure knowledge which takes as its object those same pure essentialities as they are in and for themselves. They are pure thoughts, spirit thinking its own essence (*der sein Wesen denkende Geist*). Their self movement is their spiritual life and is that through which scientific philosophy (*die Wissenschaft*) constitutes itself and of which it is the exposition.¹²

However, the full content of spirit can only be grasped in thought and become the object of knowledge when all the possibilities have become actualised realities. And this poses the problem of the relation between scientific philosophy (*Wissenschaft*) and history (or between necessity and contingency), which Hegel confronts in the concluding pages of the *Phenomenology*. Absolute knowledge has been made possible by the prodigious work of universal history, to which it is inseparably linked. But despite these profound links, a gap still persists between the two levels. Hegel was clearly aware of this gap, and this accounts for the tragic tone of the last few pages of the *Phenomenology*, and the sudden appearance of the notion of sacrifice:

This sacrifice (*Aufopferung*) is the externalization (*Entäußerung*) in which spirit displays its process of becoming spirit in the form of free contingent happening, intuiting its pure self as time outside of it, and equally its being as space. (PG 433, PS 492)

For I shall never be able to actualise in my own existence the totality of the moments of spirit's becoming. I am a member of a specific society, I participate in a specific culture. My contingent incarnation is the very condition of philosophical knowledge: this is why Hegel writes that although history is the externalisation of being in time, it is also the overcoming of that externalisation. The return to the immediacy of existence (*Dasein*) is a necessary step in the growth of philosophical knowledge; but it is a step that can never be successfully undertaken, since this world towards which the philosopher returns is necessarily limited, particular and contingent. The philosopher recognises in each of the many pre-Hegelian forms of discourse an essential truth, because genuine philosophical reflection is at a level on which the totality of human discourses can be articulated. But between what the

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philosopher knows and what the philosopher is there intervenes a definitive and irreducible gap. Absolute knowledge involves not presence, but recollection of what has been internalised. (The word Hegel uses, *Erinnerung*, which commonly means memory or recollection, also has the etymological connotation of 'internalisation'.) Spirit comes to know itself as spirit by remembering itself; but this recollection of the past is knowledge and not life. Even though I may recall the ancient Greek or Roman citizen, I realise that I am neither one nor the other: I can never recapture, for example, that immersion in the world of nature that was typical of the early Greeks. Spirit knows itself completely, but it can only *exist* in one particular guise; and it recognises the gap between the necessity of knowledge and the contingency of history. Hegel concludes the *Phenomenology* thus:

The goal, absolute knowledge, or spirit that knows itself as spirit, has for its path the recollection (*Erinnerung*) of the spirits as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their realm. Their preservation, from the point of view of their free existence (*Dasein*) appearing in the form of contingency (*Zufälligkeit*), is history, but from the point of view of their philosophically comprehended organization (*ihrer begriffnen Organisation*), it is the science of the knowledge of appearances (*die Wissenschaft des erscheinenden Wissens*) [phenomenology]. The two together, comprehended history, form the recollection (*Erinnerung*) and the Golgotha (*Schädelstätte*) of absolute spirit, the actuality, truth and certainty of its throne, without which it would be lifeless and solitary. Only —

from the chalice of this realm of spirits
foams forth to him his infinitude

(PG 433–4, PS 493)

II

I now propose to sketch, in the most schematic fashion, just some of the most important implications for social analysis of Hegel's historical phenomenology. These can be considered under two headings: what to look for; and how to proceed.

The most striking characteristic of Hegel's philosophy, a simple affirmation that underpins his whole system, is his

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insistence that 'The true is the whole (*Das Wahre ist das Ganze*)' (PG 19, PS 11). This entails not only that all the different aspects of contemporary culture and society (for example, art, economic life, political institutions, religion, political mythology, philosophy) are essentially interrelated, but also that there is continuing interplay among the different levels of self-consciousness that have been sedimented as human experience has become more differentiated through history.

My introductory quotation expresses perfectly Hegel's conception of the cumulative manner in which spirit has matured through history: 'Those moments that spirit appears to have outgrown still belong to it in the depths of its present.' One of the best illustrations of this point is his account of the conflict between Antigone and Creon. This moment in the history of European self-consciousness illustrates the conflict between the old customary practices that grew out of the communal soil and the edicts devised by the abstract reason of the ruler. As history moved on and the latter gained the upper hand, the former were not extirpated, but *aufgehoben*, that is, superseded but conserved in a subordinate, or even repressed, role: 'In the spirit that is on a higher level than another [in this case, more sophisticated political societies, and eventually our own bourgeois society], the lower concrete existence [that is, customary practice] has been reduced to an inconspicuous moment; what used to be important is now but a trace' (PG 24, PS 16).

Antigone represents the most basic form of 'natural *Sittlichkeit*', that is, the set of rules, customs (*Sitten*) and practices that are grounded in the traditions of a community. Hegel illustrates the status of these primitive rules by quoting from the play of Sophocles:

The distinctions in essence itself [namely, the rules and practices] . . . are, and nothing more . . . Thus, the *Antigone* of Sophocles acknowledges them as the unwritten and infallible (*untrügliches*) law of the gods:

'They are not of today or yesterday, but everlasting,
And no one knows from whence they came.'

(PG 235-6, PS 261)¹³

For Hegel, natural *Sittlichkeit* emerges from a community as unreflective spirit. It is not itself rationally grounded, but it is this

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Sittlichkeit that reason then proceeds to work on and to differentiate into higher forms of *Sittlichkeit*: for example, civil society and the fully actualised modern state.¹⁴ But the structures and demands of a society based upon ties of kinship persist within the more advanced, more centralised state run by the pragmatic Creon. Hegel does not portray this as the heroic martyrdom of good and right by the tyranny of evil and wrong. He quite correctly sees the tragedy as a struggle between two passionately held principles, each of them good and right in its own way; and he does not betray his own sympathies. The important element, for our present discussion, is Antigone's determination to honour her brother with appropriate burial rites (thereby protecting his soul), despite the acknowledged fact that he was a traitor who tried to overthrow the government, and despite the fact that she is betrothed to Creon's son. The earlier form of self-consciousness has not been left behind in the development of spirit into a 'higher' form of social organisation.

Even this most basic 'natural *Sittlichkeit*' is present today at the heart of what is still, in effect, bourgeois society. The general principle that emerges from Hegel's description is that human beings — be they individuals, groups, or whole communities — operate on different levels at any one time. Each one of us has several different levels of response to any situation; and different levels advance and recede depending on the circumstances. In our sophisticated, technologically advanced society, dominated by the analytical and instrumental rationality of the Enlightenment¹⁵ (what Hegel calls *Verstand*, or understanding), the pre-rational or sub-rational level often comes to the fore. Hegel's conception of reason as *Vernunft* — which encompasses these different levels of human response to situations — points to a kind of social depth psychology. The rationalism of analysis is impotent (and certainly unimpressive in its results) when faced by the bomb placed by terrorists in a crowded restaurant, the emotional power of the demonstrations at the Greenham Common cruise missile base, the jingoism that was rampant in Britain at the time of the Falklands/Malvinas adventure, or the nexus of motivations of those prepared to starve themselves to death for a cause, and the extraordinary depth and breadth of the public response.

Such situations typically appear utterly irrational to those outside the community within which they occur. To grasp their meaning, we have to look not just at the persistence of powerful

family and kinship ties and the atavistic importance bestowed upon death rites, but at other non-rational factors such as shame, pride, the satisfaction of honour, the need for recognition, the sense of belonging to a place:¹⁶ in short, everything that comes into the category of the symbolic and the mythic. Hegel discusses the significance of symbols in the section of his chapter on objective spirit entitled 'the struggle of Enlightenment with superstition'. In many ways (especially in the conduct of the social sciences) we are still under the spell of the Enlightenment. But Enlightenment thinking cannot possibly grasp the significance of, for example, seemingly irrational behaviour motivated by racial prejudice or religious conviction, or even a slap that symbolises an insult.¹⁷

At one time, our behaviour and our discourse were almost entirely symbolic; in some societies they still are. And although the development of a scientific method based on mathematics signalled a steady erosion of the symbolic, parallel to the sublimation of *Sittlichkeit* in general, the symbolic often rises to the surface: not just in political contexts, such as the response to hunger-striking prisoners, but in the everyday decision to buy a particular model of car or a jacuzzi (as a status symbol). Even the very example Hegel gives — the primeval compulsion to give the dead (no matter whom) a proper burial in holy ground — is bursting with political significance in many parts of the world today.

It is important to note that to emphasise the significance of the symbolic, the mythic, the bonds of kinship, and so on, is not to glorify them. Myths and symbols are often enriching, but just as often destructive (and one person's enrichment is often another person's destruction); families (especially in the husband-wife relation that Hegel does appear to glorify) are often oppressive and cruel to each other. But they are there, they are integral components of *Dasein*, and they are deeply significant. Many (especially Marxists) have tried to change the world. Perhaps they have failed because they have not really understood it. To be effective, political action must be informed by a deep appreciation of the many factors that motivate people to do the baffling things they do; and Hegel's model, of forms of self-consciousness that have been surpassed but not obliterated, provides clues as to some of the things we should be looking for when analysing a complex social situation.

Once a wide range of potentially significant factors has been

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identified, how are we to go about investigating social phenomena? Perhaps Hegel's most important lesson in this respect is that social research must never be reductionist: since social situations are essentially multi-dimensional, it is unlikely that human behaviour could ever be explained by reference to a single causal factor. This is the chief inadequacy of orthodox Marxism: Marx was correct to highlight the importance of economic factors, but there is no convincing reason to claim that 'the economic' or 'the material' is universally basic. Hegel included these factors in a nexus of explanatory factors (both ideal and material), all manifestations of the *Zeitgeist* (the spirit of the age). Hegel and Marx should be seen as complementary, not as rivals. What *should* be analysed is the dialectical interaction between one's self-conceptualisation and one's economic and social relations.

This dialectical analysis of social and political life can never be carried out by the quantitative method of positivist analysis that came to prominence in the seventeenth century and continues to dominate the social sciences.¹⁸ Hegel was already underlining the inadequacies of this method in 1807:

The scientific regime bequeathed by mathematics — with its explanations (*Erklärungen*), divisions, axioms, sets of theorems, its proofs, principles, deductions, and conclusions from them — is already seen by current opinion to be rather old-fashioned . . . Truth is its own self-movement, whereas the method described above is the mode of cognition that remains external to its material. (*PG* 35, *PS* 28)

At most, 'the tabulating understanding (*der tabellarische Verstand*)' can offer a table of contents, but no content: 'Scientific cognition, on the contrary, demands surrender to the life of the object, or, what amounts to the same thing, confronting and expressing its inner necessity' (*PG* 39, *PS* 32). The whole *Phenomenology* is the story of the dichotomy between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. The barriers between subject and object are eventually broken down as the subject is seen to be part of the objective world and the objective world becomes known as living subject. Dialectical analysis, therefore, must enter into the life of the situation under investigation, must become immersed in it. Furthermore, Hegel's whole account of the struggle of self-consciousness for recognition rejects the notion that the individual is the basic ontological entity: individuals, therefore, cannot be the

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unit of social investigation, but can be understood only in the context of their social situation, which they themselves have helped to create.¹⁹ Human interaction cannot be studied as we would observe water freezing in a laboratory bottle: in other words, there can be no physics of social life.

Finally, I should like to dispose of the old canard that Hegel's theory of absolute knowledge meant that Hegel thought he knew everything. Hegel, of course, believed no such thing. It must be remembered that Hegel's main quarry in the *Phenomenology* was Kant, who had insisted that genuine knowledge of the 'things-in-themselves' (the noumena) is unattainable. Hegel claimed to show, in his *Phenomenology*, that the 'things-in-themselves' could indeed be known; in other words, that 'absolute knowledge' (and not just phenomenal knowledge, or partial knowledge) can be attained. So Hegel's notion of the 'absolute knowledge' in which the *Phenomenology of spirit* culminates is not an embarrassing flourish which we can discreetly jettison. As a recent commentator has put it, 'the "absolute" is not an optional extra'.²⁰

Absolute knowledge is the goal towards which the whole *Phenomenology* is moving: 'Of the absolute [*von dem Absoluten*, that is, an adjective used as a noun] it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, to be the actual (*Wirkliches*), the subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself' (*PG* 19, *PS* 11). So the dialectic of self-conscious spirit of the earlier analysis is unconvincing when cut off from its *telos*; and the last chapter read on its own makes little sense without the preceding book, which is its content. But to say that human life can be known is not to say that it is transparent. On the contrary, it is certainly opaque and ambiguous. In the last chapter of his book, Hegel himself is certainly aware of the tragic gap between the ambition of absolute knowledge and its realisation. And in our day, just as we think our increasing knowledge will afford us complete dominance over nature, non-human nature hits back at us with a powerful vengeance, and threatens a complete withdrawal of co-operation with us. We are, after all, only human. Although the 'things-in-themselves' are, in principle, knowable, the goal of absolute knowledge is probably asymptotic, a goal towards which we may (and should) strive, but which none of us is likely to reach.

Hegel's *Phenomenology* is the story of the peregrination of the human spirit through history *and* a description of the multi-

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layered human self-consciousness that has resulted. One of its most important lessons is that *everything* is important in trying to understand the human condition, and that we do not often behave in accordance with the dictates of Enlightenment rationality. The holistic framework that Hegel bequeathed has been modified and strengthened by the insights of thinkers as diverse as Marx, Freud, Heidegger, Sartre, Lévi-Strauss, Gadamer, Habermas and Ricoeur. Quite a shopping-list; but even those that appear to be quite opposed to Hegel have important contributions to make to the overall enterprise: a historical structuralism, for example, is not necessarily contradictory. In the meantime, there's nothing wrong with being unashamedly eclectic. The task of synthesising the thought of these writers (and others) in a new neo-Hegelian social theory is a job for another day.

Notes

An earlier version of this article was read to the Political Thought Conference at New College, Oxford in January 1983. I am grateful to the participants for some incisive comments. My thanks also go to Terry Sullivan, and to John Gruchala. I owe a special debt to my teacher Frithjof Bergmann, whose infectious enthusiasm first excited my fascination with Hegel's *Phenomenology*.

1. *Lectures on the philosophy of world history, Introduction: Reason in history*, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 150–1.

Other recent analyses of the *Phenomenology* include C. Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 127–221; R. Norman, *Hegel's phenomenology* (Brighton, 1976); M. Westphal, *History and truth in Hegel's 'Phenomenology'* (Atlantic Heights, N.J. and Brighton, 1978); R.C. Solomon, *In the spirit of Hegel* (New York and Oxford, 1983). Recent German scholarship is represented by O. Pöggeler, 'Zur Deutung der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*', and other articles in *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Freiburg, 1973); W. Marx, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A commentary on the Preface and Introduction* (New York, 1975); H.-G. Gadamer, *Hegel's dialectic* (New Haven and London, 1976), pp. 35–74. The classic French analyses are by J. Hyppolite, *Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit de Hegel* (Paris, 1946); and A. Kojève, *Introduction to the reading of Hegel* (New York, 1969, an abridged trans. of the 1947 French edition). One of the most influential of all, of course, has been Karl Marx's critical analysis of Hegel's dialectic, especially of the final chapter of the *Phenomenology* (Paris manuscript, 1844), in *Early Writings*, ed. and trans. T. Bottomore (London, 1963), pp. 195–219.

2. W. Marx, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. xii–xiv.

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3. W. Kaufmann documents Hegel's frenetic scramble to complete the book in 1806, against a background of social and personal chaos, in his *Hegel* (Garden City, N.Y. and London, 1965), pp. 110–14, 315–19.

4. *Hegel's social and political thought* (Dublin and New York, 1979), pp. 1–55, esp. 49.

5. For quotations from the *Phenomenology*, I have used the historical-critical edition by W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede, *Gesammelte Werke*, Band 9 (Hamburg, 1980); the preferred English version is by A.V. Miller, *Phenomenology of spirit* (Oxford, 1977). These are cited in the text as *PG* and *PS* respectively, with page references. Although, for the most part, my translations are based on Miller's version, I have altered it freely, to give a more literal rendering of the original German; I have also found helpful the translation of the Preface by W. Kaufmann, in his *Hegel*, pp. 363–459.

6. Hegel usually refers to his own philosophical system as science (*Wissenschaft*), which has a much wider reference than the English word 'science'.

7. Hegel seems to have used the words *Gestalt*, *Gestaltung* and *Form* quite interchangeably, and I have rendered them equally interchangeably as 'form', 'formation' or 'shape'.

8. *Bildung* is almost impossible to translate. It does mean 'education', but not just what goes on in schools and colleges. I have tried to suggest its wider connotation of growing maturity with expressions such as 'cultural formation'. Similarly, *ungebildet* means 'uneducated', but also 'uncivilised' or (in this case) 'naïve'. *Selbstbewußtsein* means 'self-consciousness' as knowledge of self, with none of the connotation of embarrassment that the English word carries. Incidentally, Charles Taylor seriously distorts Hegel's position by systematically personalising spirit (*Geist*) as 'he', and by identifying *Geist* with God. Hegel's *Geist* is certainly greater than humankind, since it encompasses nature as well: to this extent, Taylor is correct to refer to *Geist* as 'cosmic spirit'. But humankind ('the universal individual') is *self-conscious* spirit, since nature cannot be self-conscious, and Hegel's *Geist* has little affinity with the transcendent God of Christianity.

9. Hegel does not really offer an epistemology, or theory of knowledge, in the sense familiar in philosophy since Descartes and Locke. In fact, his introduction and first three chapters — on sense-certainty (*die sinnliche Gewißheit*), perception (*die Wahrnehmung*), and force and understanding (*Kraft und Verstand*), respectively — constitute a devastating critique of the whole epistemological project since Descartes. Richard Norman is very good on this, especially his chapter on 'The Dilemma of Epistemology', in *Hegel's phenomenology*, pp. 9–27. He also quotes, in this connection, Hegel's favourite philosophical joke, from the *Lesser logic* (§ 10): 'To seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim.'

10. Indeed, Hegel reworks this section of the *Phenomenology* in his *Philosophy of right* (1820), where the conflict represented by Antigone and Creon reappears as an analysis of the place and significance of kinship in the modern rational state. Merold Westphal analyses this section of the

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Philosophy of right (§ 158–61) in 'Hegel's radical idealism: family and state as ethical communities', in Z.A. Pelczynski (ed.), *The state and civil society* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 77–92.

11. The charge has often been brought — and not just by his detractors — that Hegel contended that the history of philosophy (if not the world) was brought to a close by him. Hegel's pretensions to completeness notwithstanding, it is important to repeat his remarks towards the end of his lectures on the history of philosophy: 'This is the standpoint of the present time (*der jetzigen Zeit*), and the series of spiritual formations is for the present (*für jetzt*) concluded with this. At this point I bring this history of philosophy (*diese Geschichte*) to a close' (Haldane and Simson trans., vol. III, p. 552). This clearly reveals Hegel's open mind with respect to the forms of spirit that might appear after him.

12. *Wissenschaft der Logik*, ed. G. Lasson (Leipzig, 1932) vol. I, p. 7; *Science of logic*, trans. A.V. Miller (London and New York, 1969), p. 28.

13. Hegel goes on to confuse the demands of the 'infallible law of the gods' with sisterly affection. We can safely draw an embarrassed veil over his gratuitous and often offensive discussion of the peculiar ontological status of sisters, and womankind in general.

14. Cf. Aristotle, *Nic. Ethics* II, i: 'Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit (*ethos*).'

An outstanding contemporary reappraisal of this Aristotelian concept of moral practices is Alasdair MacIntyre's *After virtue*, 2nd edn (London and Notre Dame, 1984): 'By a "practice" I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity' (p. 187). Would it be impertinent to suggest that the profound pessimism that emanates from this book could well be mitigated by grounding virtue, in the contemporary world, within the Hegelian framework here proposed?

15. According to Enlightenment rationality, says Hegel, 'everything is useful' (PG 304, PS 342); or, as Marx put it, everything (including another person) is a commodity.

16. For an excellent discussion of 'honour offended' and the resulting 'duel to the death' between lord and bondsman, see H.-G. Gadamer, *Hegel's dialectic*, pp. 64–71.

17. See PG 309, PS 347–8, for Hegel's discussion of the symbolism of fasting.

18. This tendency approaches its apotheosis (and tips over into the absurd) with the development of computerised data banks and statistical analysis. See, for example, the voluminous work of J.D. Singer, such as his 'Variables, indicators, and data in macro-political research', in K. Deutsch (ed.), *Methods of political behavior research* (New York, 1980), which concludes with the clarion-call to colleagues to take on 'the important and challenging work in indicator construction and data generation [sic] that will hasten the day when 'we will begin to turn out what the discipline and the world need most: the complete social scientist'.

19. For an interesting account of the Hegelian contribution to what he

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calls 'the interpretive approach to social analysis', see P.J. Steinberger, 'Hegel as a Social Scientist', in *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 71 (1977), pp. 95–110.

20. Gillian Rose, in *Hegel contra sociology* (London, 1981), p. 42. The author presents her impressive book as an 'attempt to retrieve Hegelian speculative experience for social theory' (p. 1).

2

Hegel and Feminism

Susan M. Easton

Introduction

A timely aspect of the revival of Hegel's work has been the examination of his ideas by feminists identifying the masculinist assumptions underpinning the history of political thought. However, the initial reaction of feminism to Hegel's writings has been to align him with other major figures in Western political thought, including Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Rousseau and Mill in a biological, reductionist tradition. This feminist response to Hegel will be critically examined. We shall begin by outlining feminist objections to Hegel's analysis of women and the family, which centre on the public-private distinction, and then move on to an appraisal of evidence of anti-reductionism in his writings. It will be argued that even with the *Philosophy of right* — the object of sustained feminist critiques¹ — Hegel challenges rather than endorses reductionism. Finally the possibility of an Hegelian understanding of women's potential freedom will be explored.

Political philosophy, according to Moller Okin in *Women in Western political thought*, consists of 'writings by men, for men, and about men'.² Although the frequent references to the generic term 'mankind' by political philosophers might suggest a concern with 'the human race as a whole', she argues that 'we do not need to look far into their writings to realise that such an assumption is unfounded'.³ Instead a sharp distinction is drawn between men and women with women's destiny being perceived as biologically determined which leads to 'the prescription of a code of morality and conception of rights for women distinctly different from those that have been prescribed for men'.⁴ This distinction, she claims, underpins the history of political thought: 'Philosophers who, in

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laying the foundations for their political theories, have asked "What are men like?" "What is man's potential?" have frequently, in turning to the female sex, asked "What are women for?"⁵ In answering this question, they have seen biological differences between men and women as 'entailing all the other, conventional and institutional differences in sex role which the family, especially in its most patriarchal forms, has required'.⁶

Hegel's commitment to such a 'functionalist' or reductionist view of the family as a necessary and natural institution, argues Moller Okin, is expressed in his treatment of the male head of the family as its only political representative and the fact that he 'disposed of the female half of the human race'.⁷ Women are denied any distinct identity in his political thought and are cut off from public life. Moreover, his view of marriage as resulting from 'the free surrender by both sexes of their personality' is over-optimistic, she notes, since the surrender of the man's personality is 'more symbolic than real'.⁸ The significance and pervasiveness of the reductionist view should not be underestimated, she concludes, since 'the continuing oppression of women is ideologically supported by the survival of functionalist modes of thought'.⁹

A similar interpretation of Hegel is offered by Elshtain in *Public man, private woman*, where she points out that 'like the inhabitants of Orwell's *Animal farm*, . . . the inhabitants of Hegel's conceptual universe are ethically significant but some are more significant than others'.¹⁰ Excluded from the public sphere, women are 'defined by the family: the family is a woman's beginning and her end'. For the man, 'the family is that ethical relationship which serves as the basis of all others including citizenship'¹¹ and he alone can become a real citizen. For Hegel, women are confined to the level of the household while the public world remains the 'locus of human action':

Although there is no public-private split in Hegel's account in the sense of a radical separation of one sphere from the other, the public and the private *are* differentiated and ordered as higher and lower . . . The reciprocal, if asymmetrical, relationship between spheres requires connecting links or mediations. These are provided by males in their roles as brothers, husbands, fathers and property-owners.¹²

Hegel's political theory is rooted in teleological assumptions

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regarding male and female nature, which he distinguishes in terms of 'the analogue of form and matter whereby the male provides the human form during mating and the female serves as a vessel within which the male-created *homunculus* incubates'.¹³ She concedes that 'within the constraints of his presumptions on male and female natures, Hegel positions women as near to the universal as his perspective allows',¹⁴ but inevitably, given this starting-point, he denies women any *intrinsic* value or significance within the family, in contrast to the value placed on the lives of men as citizens. Without their slender connection to the universal through males, they would possess no ethical significance. Elshtain is critical of Hegel not simply for excluding women from the universal but also because he is indifferent to 'the realities of economic power and the manner in which a predatory civil society vitiates the possibilities for a just public order'.¹⁵

Elshtain's dissatisfaction with Hegel's treatment of women extends to the work of Simone de Beauvoir who employs Hegelian concepts in analysing women's oppression. Pointing to similarities between the work of de Beauvoir and Shulamith Firestone, Elshtain notes that women, for de Beauvoir, can achieve transcendence only by rejecting their female identities. Similarly, Genevieve Lloyd in her critique of de Beauvoir argues that we should 'expect some oddities in any attempt to apply the relations of recognition between Hegelian selves and others to understanding the condition of women. And some of the puzzling features of de Beauvoir's analysis . . . do seem to derive from the underlying maleness of the original Hegelian confrontation of consciousnesses'.¹⁶

Hegel's remarks in the *Philosophy of right* on the fundamental differences between men and women have attracted criticism because he appears to contrast men and women in terms of a distinction between rationality and feeling, which he uses to exclude women from the public domain. Hegel's work has therefore been seen by a number of commentators tracing the origins of patriarchal attitudes and practices, as committed to the biological reductionism characteristic of Western political thought in so far as he confines women to the private sphere on the basis of assumed natural characteristics.¹⁷ Certainly, Hegel's analysis of the differences between men and women in the *Philosophy of right* does provide grounds for this interpretation. Men, he argues, are 'powerful and active', characterised by the 'self-consciousness of conceptual thought' while women are 'passive and subjective',

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their knowledge and volition taking the form of 'concrete individuality and feeling'.¹⁸ Contrasting the rationality of men with the feelings and opinions of women, Hegel likens women to plants:

The difference between men and women is like that between animals and plants. Men correspond to animals, while women correspond to plants because their development is more placid and the principle that underlies it is the rather vague unity of feeling. When women hold the helm of government, the state is at once in jeopardy, because women regulate their actions not by the demands of universality but by arbitrary inclinations and opinions. Women are educated — who knows how? — as it were by breathing in ideas, by living rather than by acquiring knowledge. The status of manhood, on the other hand, is attained only by the stress of thought and much technical exertion.¹⁹

Women, he continues, 'are not made for activities which demand a universal faculty such as the more advanced sciences, philosophy, and certain forms of artistic production', but instead have 'happy ideas, taste and elegance'.²⁰

Hegel infers from this that 'man has his actual substantive life in the state, in learning, and so forth, as well as in labour and struggle with the external world and with himself so that it is only out of his diremption that he fights his way to self-subsistent unity with himself' while woman, in contrast, 'has her substantive destiny in the family'.²¹ While men do engage in family life at the level of feeling, this forms only part of their existence, whereas for women it represents the limits of their self-realisation. A woman 'surrendering her body' before or outside marriage therefore loses her honour while for a man this would not follow.²² However, the family does constitute a sphere of ethical activity for women, one in which their sexuality is contained and which is complete only with the arrival of children. Hegel argues firmly for monogamous marriage and for its indissolubility. Divorce should not be granted on 'the mere whims of hostile disposition or the accident of a purely passing mood' but only when 'the estrangement is total'.²³

Clearly, Hegel's arguments here render him an unpromising candidate for inclusion within feminist theory. His view that

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women's sexuality needs to be controlled and that their destiny is primarily reproductive would seem to suggest a commitment to biological reductionism. But does Hegel's account of the family in the *Philosophy of right* provide unqualified support for a reductionist interpretation? Or are there grounds for a feminist reading of the *Philosophy of right* and of Hegel's work as a whole? Can his work contribute to an understanding of the oppression of women in advanced industrial societies? In answering these questions it will be necessary to consider his formulation of the public-private distinction in the *Philosophy of right*, his analyses of tragedy and of slavery in *The phenomenology of mind* and his historical studies in his *Lectures on the philosophy of world history*.

Anti-reductionism

Anti-reductionism I: Philosophy of right

A closer examination of the *Philosophy of right* reveals a tension between Hegel's conservative reductionism and a more progressive anti-reductionist standpoint. Unlike the reductionist political theorists with whom he is often identified, Hegel distances his account of marriage and the family from approaches which focus on biological needs, which reduce the relationship between men and women to a natural biological basis. For Hegel the family provides a means of escape from the subjectivism of the state of nature through an institutional commitment to an ethical universal. Instead of grounding his conception of the family in the biological dimensions of human existence, he describes the family as an institution which offers a means of transcending them. Marriage constitutes a partnership between men and women, the ethical aspect of which is irreducible to either the biological necessity of precreation or the sexual passions of the individuals. The ethical bond of marriage has a universality which surpasses the sexual relationship contained by it. It is this emphasis on the ethical dimension, rather than the appeal to biological needs, which underpins his arguments for monogamy and for diversity in the selection of marriage partners.

For Hegel, the value of marriage is precisely that it compels its members to transcend their individuality, in a relationship whose ethical aspects constrain the contingency of physical impulse. As he notes in the *Philosophy of right*, in marriage 'the sensuous

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moment, the one proper to physical life, is put into its ethical place as something only consequential and accidental'.²⁴ In this way the sexual union is transformed into a union at the level of mind or self-consciousness: in renouncing their individuality, the partners attain self-consciousness. Unlike his predecessors, Hegel is not concerned to drive a wedge between passion and reason but to designate the limits of passion within an objective ethical framework. Contrasting the 'ethico-legal' love, on which he believes marriage should be based, with 'the transient, fickle and purely subjective aspects of love,'²⁵ he is highly critical of those who focus solely on passion:

But those works of modern art, dramatic and other, in which the love of the sexes is the main interest, are pervaded by a chill despite the heat of passion they portray, for they associate the passion with accident throughout and represent the entire dramatic interest as if it rested solely on the characters as *these individuals*: what rests on them may indeed be of infinite importance to *them*, but is of none whatever in itself.²⁶

This contingency can only be transcended, as he comments in his *Philosophy of mind*, when the 'bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment'.²⁷ Hegel's attempt to draw together passion and reason lies in marked contrast to de Beauvoir's radical distinction between immanence and transcendence. As Lloyd points out, transcendence for de Beauvoir and Sartre entails a denial of women's biological lives: 'It is as if the female body is an intrinsic obstacle to transcendence, making woman "a prey of the species"'.²⁸

Hegel also challenges the Kantian view of marriage which sees it as a contract between two individual atoms: 'In this view,' says Hegel, 'the parties are bound by a contract of mutual caprice, and marriage is thus degraded to the level of a contract for reciprocal use.'²⁹ Although marriage may begin at the level of contract, it moves beyond this, for in a contractual relationship the parties are related to each other as individual atoms, while in a genuinely ethical bond, this particularity is transcended. Any attempt to subordinate marriage to some other end, whether contract or sexuality, is ruled out by Hegel. He objects to arranged marriages which indicate 'scant respect' for women and marriages based on wealth or political gain. For Hegel, the

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distinguishing feature of the family is that it lies outside the realm of possessive individualism and thus provides a counter to the fragmenting forces of civil society as it forces individuals to move beyond subjectivity. The family, says Hegel, is 'the first precondition of the state'³⁰ and it is only within the state that we find 'the *self-conscious* ethical substance, the unification of the family principle with that of civil society':³¹ 'The same unity, which is in the family as a feeling of love, is its essence, receiving however, at the same time, through the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the *form* of conscious universality.'³²

Hegel's critique of possessive individualism in relation to the family may also be seen as part of the general anti-reductionist direction which he takes in the *Philosophy of right*. To the extent that Hegel rejects possessive individualist ideas of 'natural' self-interest, greed and avarice, and portrays marriage as a means of transcending these dispositions, he moves further away from biological reductionism than the other figures in Western political thought with whom he is identified by the orthodox feminist interpretation. His conception of the family as excluded from the realm of self-interest and standing opposed to it is paralleled by his concern with the poverty and class conflict arising from the individualism of the emerging bourgeois society.³³ Families constitute, for Hegel, a living refutation of the state of nature in the sense that marriage introduces an ethical universal which supersedes individual desires. This is not to devalue women's biological existence but to subvert it from its prime position as the principal determinant of their social and political lives.

Emphasis on the family as a means of superseding nature is also evident in *The phenomenology of mind* where he argues that women transcend the particularism of a specific relation to one individual and to his immediate needs within the family: 'the woman's relationships are not based on a reference to this particular husband, this particular child but to a husband, to children *in general* — not to feeling, but to the universal.'³⁴ Her ethical life 'has always a directly universal significance for her, and is quite alien to the impulsive condition of mere particular desire'.³⁵

In this text, Hegel clearly defines the family in terms of the universality of the ethical bond:

in order that this relationship may be ethical, neither the

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individual who does an act nor he to whom the act refers must show any trace of contingency such as obtains in rendering some particular help or service. The content of the ethical act must be substantial in character, or must be entire and universal . . .³⁶

Anti-reductionism II: Antigone

A challenge to the reductionist interpretation of Hegel and grounds for a feminist reading of his work may also be found in Hegel's analysis of *Antigone*. Although Hegel sees Antigone as guided by love, this does not mean, for Hegel, that she is governed by subjective emotions, but rather that she rationally analyses the consequences of her actions in relation to ethical principles and acts in full knowledge of those consequences. In doing so, she moves beyond contingency towards the universal. The hallmark of tragedy for Hegel is precisely this quality of self-reflection. It is important that the ethical consciousness recognises its guilt: 'Because of our sufferings we acknowledge we have erred'³⁷ says Antigone, and for Hegel this acknowledgment signifies 'the return to the ethical frame of mind, which knows that nothing counts but right.'³⁸ The only ethical decision Antigone can take is to disobey Creon and bury her brother, yet her actions are marked not by subjectivity but by a highly rational appreciation of the effects of her action. Hegel points out that the 'ethical consciousness is more complete, its guilt purer, if it knows beforehand the law and the power which it opposes, if it takes them to be sheer violence and wrong, to be a contingency in the ethical life, and wittingly, like Antigone, commits the crime'.³⁹ It is significant that when Hegel defines tragedy he focuses on tragic heroines with the capacity and desire for self-reflection. Instead of reducing woman's nature to mere particularism, as the reductionist interpretation suggests, he stresses the way in which she moves beyond contingency. What we find in tragedy 'are *self-conscious* human beings, who know their own rights and purposes, the power and the will belonging to their specific nature, and who know how to state them'.⁴⁰ They do not express merely the external aspects of their lives but 'make the very inner being external, they prove the righteousness of their action, and the "pathos" controlling them is soberly asserted and definitely expressed in its universal individuality, free from all accident of

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circumstance, and the particular peculiarities of personalities'.⁴¹ Love, as represented by Antigone, is not devalued to subjectivity but rather signifies its opposite for Hegel: love constitutes redemption, redemption from the subjectivity of individualism of the self and of the society. In the *Phenomenology* he argues that in returning to 'the ethical frame of mind', the agent 'surrenders his character and the reality of his self . . . His being lies in belonging to his ethical law, as his substance'.⁴² The ethical bonds of love incorporate individuals into the wider unity of the family and destroy their individuality. They also protect the individuals from the contingency and inevitability of death: death in the natural world is lonely and finite but the network of ethical duties and generalised responsibilities within the family ensure the transcendence of the particularity of existence. In his discussion of Hegel's work on tragedy, Bradley refers to the 'strange double impression which is produced by the hero's death. He dies, and our hearts die with him; and yet his death matters nothing to us, or we even exult. He is dead; and he has no more to do with death than the power which killed him and with which he is one'.⁴³ But this is not so strange when we recall that for Hegel the 'blood-relationship . . . supplements the abstract natural process by adding to it the process of consciousness, by interrupting the work of nature, and rescuing the blood-relation from destruction'.⁴⁴ He adds:

The family keeps away from the dead this dishonouring of him by the desires of unconscious organic agencies and by abstract elements, puts its own action in place of theirs, and weds the relative to the bosom of the earth, the elemental individuality that passes not away. Thereby the family makes the dead a member of a community which prevails over and holds under control the particular material elements and the lower living creatures, which sought to have their way with the dead and destroy him.⁴⁵

This is epitomised for Hegel by Antigone who, in burying her brother, protects him from death and dishonour and rescues him from subjectivity. Hegel finds *Antigone* particularly compelling as he sees the relationship between brother and sister as the purest ethical relationship, being based on common blood but marked by an absence of sexual desire.

Love is also redemptive in shielding the individual from the

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positivity of society. In his early theological writings, Hegel had defended Mary Magdalene for refusing to succumb to the expectations of her society but 'through sin' experiencing love and developing consciousness. He poses the question:

Would anyone say it had been better for Mary to have yielded to the fate of the Jewish life, to have passed away as an automaton of her time, righteous and ordinary, without sin and without love? Without sin, because the era of her people was one of those in which the beautiful heart could not live without sin, but in this as in any era, could return through love to the most beautiful consciousness.⁴⁶

Hegel saw love in his early work, as Lukács notes, as 'the highest point of existence; it alone can overcome all that is dead and positive in the world.'⁴⁷ When analysing *Antigone*, Hegel can therefore perceive the justification for Creon's desire to maintain the authority of the state, but at the same time he recognises the ethical superiority of Antigone and the way of life she upholds. The tragedy can be understood, as Lukács says, in terms of a conflict between tribal society, represented by Antigone, and the emerging forces which would lead to its demise:

What is striking about Hegel's view of the *Antigone* is the way in which the two poles of the contradiction are maintained in a tense unity: on the one hand, there is the recognition that tribal society stands higher morally and humanly than the class societies that succeed it; and that the collapse of tribal society was brought about by the release of base and evil human impulses. On the other hand, there is the equally powerful conviction that this collapse was inevitable and that it signified a definite historical advance.⁴⁸

In Hegel's essay on *Natural law*, for example, tragedy is analysed in terms of the conflict between man and citizen, 'a collision of spirit with itself'.⁴⁹ Hegel recognises that 'the beautiful solution achieved by the civilisation of antiquity had to perish'⁵⁰ and that this is compensated to some extent by the progressive nature of the gestating new order. But he also realises, as Lukács points out, that:

the type of man produced by this material advance in and

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through capitalism is the practical negation of everything great, significant and sublime that humanity had created in the course of its history up to then. The contradiction of two necessarily connected phenomena, the indissoluble bond between progress and the debasement of mankind, the purchase of progress at the cost of that debasement — that is the heart of the ‘tragedy in the realm of the ethical’.⁵¹

Consequently, Hegel sees tragedy disappearing with the development of modern society predicated on individualism, being replaced by romantic art concerned with the ‘boundless subjectivity’ of passion rather than the clash of ethical principles. His sympathy for the protagonists in *Antigone* had rested on the fact that both Antigone and Creon, in following one ethical principle, brought about the destruction of another, and for Hegel, as Bradley observes, ‘the more nearly the contending forces approach each other in goodness, the more tragic is the conflict’.⁵²

We can see, then, that while Antigone’s choices are governed by love, Hegel does not perceive love as mere subjectivity but rather sees subjectivity as alien to tragedy. His focus on the ethical bonds of love in *Antigone* does not suggest a reductionist view of women: drawing attention to the ‘feminine’ quality of love does not in itself entail a reductionist position provided it is clear that this quality is not biologically based. It is significant that in defying the patriarchal authority of the state, Antigone’s actions are determined by an authentic relation of love rather than sexual or economic motives or by blind obedience to authority.

Anti-reductionism III: Hegel’s historical studies

Hegel’s historical studies reveal an awareness of the cultural mediation of gender roles which presents a challenge to reductionist theories. In his *Lectures on the philosophy of world history*, for example, he identifies a range of patterns of behaviour, including a state of women in the Congo ruled over by a woman who renounced the love of her son, pounding him in a mortar and smearing herself with his blood.⁵³ The women survived by plundering and eating human flesh. Prisoners of war were used as slaves or husbands, and male offspring were murdered, often together with their fathers. Hegel’s aversion to these women, however, seems to be due less to a fear of women in control, than

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to the lack of respect for humanity which he sees as characteristic of these societies. Lying between the full participation of women in public life in the Congo, and the privatisation of Western cultures, is the tribe in Dahomey which Hegel describes as engaging in a communal way of life. Here, he observes, women fight alongside the king and children are brought up communally, distributed among the villages at birth and sold by the king when of marriageable age. Each man has to take the woman he is given and when presenting himself for marriage, the suitor is first given a mother to maintain, and only subsequently, if his behaviour is satisfactory, is he given a wife. While Hegel's discussion of these examples may rely more on travellers' tales than scientific research, none the less his awareness of these variations does highlight the difficulty of attributing to him a reductionist standpoint.

The treatment of women in different cultures and its effects is also considered by Hegel in his historical writings. The repression of women's imagination in the medieval period and its consequences in 'the ghastliness of witchcraft',⁵⁴ for example, is contrasted with the Bacchanalian festivities in which Greek women were able to give full expression to their imagination:

On the one hand witches, on the other maenads; in the one case the object of phantasy is a devilish grimace (*Frazze*), in the other a beautiful vine-bedecked God; in the one socialized satisfaction of envy, of the desire for revenge and hate, in the other nothing but purposeless pleasure often verging on raging madness; in the one progress from individual attacks of insanity to total and enduring derangement of the mind; in the other withdrawal into ordinary life; in the first case the age did not consider this displaced madness as an illness but a blasphemous outrage which could be atoned only with the funeral pyre, in the second the need of many female phantasies and temperaments was something holy, the outbreak of which gave (occasion for) holidays, something which was sanctioned by the state and thereby given the possibility of being innocuous.⁵⁵

Hegel also draws attention to the links between particular family types and the forms of the state. Monogamy, for example, he sees as a corollary of Christian states, 'since this is the only form in which both partners can receive their full rights',⁵⁶

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although he points out that the relationship between children and parents can include slavery and allow children free property ownership. The patriarchal family, where the 'head of the family . . . is the will of the whole; he acts in the interests of the common purposes, cares for the individuals, directs their activity towards the common end, educates them, and ensures that they remain in harmony with the universal end',⁵⁷ is seen as characteristic of Oriental cultures. Tracing the uneven development of individualism through ancient society, he shows how the state gradually takes on an abstract existence, apart from the head of the family. Attitudes towards sexuality in different cultures are also contrasted.⁵⁸ In Jewish culture, for example, he notes that sex is spoken of freely, while in Oriental cultures, women are seen as separate from society. They cannot be likened to objects, so there cannot be a relation of lordship and bondage between men and women but only one of seclusion. Their physical separation embodies this image and consequently it constitutes a dishonour to talk of women. Hegel's historicisation of gender roles is therefore difficult to reconcile with the reductionist interpretation of his work.

Slavery and freedom

In seeking to explain and transcend the subordination of women in advanced industrial societies, Hegel's *Phenomenology* is arguably the most significant text, offering a rich harvest of concepts for feminist theory.⁵⁹ Its analysis of the dynamics of domination and subordination in the master-slave dialectic raises issues which lie at the heart of the feminist critique of patriarchy. In so far as he construes the move from slavery to freedom in terms of a movement away from nature or biological constraints, towards self-consciousness — a conception of freedom which is also central to certain strands of contemporary feminist thought — Hegel's work on slavery offers insights into the supersession of women's subordination and provides further affirmation of an anti-reductionist stance. Consciousness and labour as the pre-conditions of the transformation of oppressive social relationships play a central role in Hegel's political thought but are equally essential dimensions of feminist political theory. He also sheds light on the power of ideologies by pointing to the extent to which the slave may accept his or her slavery.

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Hegel postulates a distinction between two modes of consciousness: 'The one is independent, and its essential nature is to be for itself; the other is dependent, and its essence is life or existence for another. The former is the Master, or Lord, the latter the Bondsman'.⁶⁰ For Hegel, self-consciousness exists only to the extent that it is acknowledged or recognised by another, but here emphasises that the master's recognition is dependent upon the consciousness of the bondsman: 'for, just where the master has effectively achieved lordship, he really finds that something has come about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an independent, but rather a dependent consciousness that he has achieved'.⁶¹ The master, relying on the slave, becomes dependent, while the slave, in working for the master, achieves independence through the acquisition of knowledge in productive labour. For Hegel the master represents a purely transient stage in the history of spirit while the significant movement in human development springs from the consciousness of the servant, because the servant meets the two preconditions of freedom, namely fear and service. Fear of the master is significant insofar as it imposes discipline and thus constitutes 'the beginning of wisdom'.⁶² Without this initial fear of the master, freedom is impossible.

The slave has the possibility of confronting freedom through fear and service, while the master's relation to the world is mediated by, and contained in, the desire for the object, but this satisfaction of desire is seen by Hegel as evanescent. The master remains trapped within his own egotism: experiencing neither fear nor labour, he perceives in the slave only his immediate will and receives from him the formal recognition of an unfree consciousness. But for the slave, the experience of fear according to Hegel is the first moment of freedom. Fear, combined with service or labour, constitutes the necessary precondition for the development of self-consciousness: 'Without the formative activity shaping the thing, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not become objective for itself'.⁶³ In serving the master, the slave loses his 'individual self-will' and goes beyond the immediacy of appetite. His divestment of self and 'fear of the lord' mark, for Hegel, the beginning of knowledge and the movement to universal self-consciousness. Freedom is attained 'solely by risking life'⁶⁴ when consciousness, which has 'tottered and shaken', is combined with struggle. The fear and service of slavery contain, for Hegel, the possibility of freedom beyond

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subjectivity. Self-consciousness passes through the slave rather than the master, dependent on the slave for recognition and trapped by desires which lack substance and objectivity.

The importance of work for Hegel is that in labour the worker moves beyond immediate instinctual life, flees the darkness of nature and becomes truly human. Hegel does not idealise the labour-process — in contrast to many of his contemporaries — but rather acknowledges the drudgery of mechanistic labour. However, he does characterise the labour-process as a means of enhancing self-consciousness and says that in working upon an object the worker externalises his self-consciousness and makes it permanent: ‘precisely in labour where there seemed to be merely some outsider’s mind and ideas involved, the bondsman becomes aware through this re-discovery of himself by himself, of having and being a “mind of his own”.’⁶⁵ In fashioning the object the worker ‘makes himself into a thing’ by expressing the objective laws of work as independent of individual desires. By placing labour between his desires and their fulfilment, he moves away from nature towards sociality.

The slave’s proximity to freedom thus rests on his engagement in purposive rational labour, whereas the master remains limited by his desire for the object. While the master’s desire is ephemeral, the slave’s labour fosters the development of self-consciousness. His desires embrace those of the master as well as his own, forcing him to move beyond the immediacy of his own will. For Hegel the feeling of the worthlessness of egotism and the ‘habit of obedience’ of the slave is a necessary stage in the growth of self-consciousness. In satisfying the needs of others, the slave moves beyond nature towards a genuinely human existence, as he enters into relations with others and becomes part of the division of labour.

It is precisely this dimension of slavery as *potential* consciousness which eats away at the heart of the master-slave relation and the system of slavery arising from it, ultimately leading to its destruction. But in stressing potential rather than actual consciousness, Hegel attributes a degree of responsibility for slavery to the slave rather than the master; ‘To adhere to man’s absolute freedom’, he says, ‘is *eo ipso* to condemn slavery. Yet if a man is a slave, his own will is responsible for his slavery, just as it is its will which is responsible if a people is subjugated’.⁶⁶ Unless the slave struggles to win his freedom, he deserves his servitude, since slavery demands its own negation. A slave is subject to an ethical

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imperative to free himself. Hegel applies this argument specifically to the history of nations but his account of the responsibility for slavery could also be seen as relevant to the history of women's exploitation. There is no 'absolute injustice' in slaves remaining slaves, argues Hegel, for if they do not risk their lives to gain freedom, their slavery is deserved: 'he who has not the courage to risk his life to win freedom, that man deserves to be a slave'.⁶⁷ Slavery, as a system of social relationships, cannot survive unless the slave accepts and is at home in his slavery.

A further justification of slavery for Hegel lies in the fact that slavery may be appropriate to a particular phase of social development and in that sense 'just': 'Slavery and tyranny,' he says, 'are, therefore in the history of nations a necessary stage and hence *relatively* justified'.⁶⁸ Referring to the slaves' hostility to the efforts of English reformers to abolish slavery, he argues that slavery is accepted as natural by the slaves. While slavery is seen as an absolute injustice by Western reformers, it is the typical legal relationship of a society in which a low value is placed on human life and this evaluation of human life is internalised by the slaves themselves. It is entirely consistent, for Hegel, with the state of nature characteristic of primitive societies. If a man can sell his wife, parents and children into slavery, this demonstrates a contempt for life in general as well as his own and signifies an absence of morality. Taking a broader historical perspective, Hegel sees slavery as part of the transition from the state of nature to a genuinely ethical existence. It arises in a world where 'a wrong is still right',⁶⁹ where wrong has some validity and constitutes a necessary moment in the progression towards a higher stage of development. Only when a society reaches maturity may it realise its freedom and eliminate slavery. Where a society is undeveloped we should expect to find slavery, says Hegel. Even in Greece this 'relative injustice' may be found, since in that culture freedom was not based on the idea of a rational self-consciousness.⁷⁰ Only if self-consciousness apprehends itself, through thought, as human does it free itself from contingency and move into the realm of morality and ethical life. Rational reflection is what distinguishes the slave's unfreedom from freedom, and thus it was the Greek slaves resisting their slavery, and not the citizens, who grasped this and sought to attain their 'eternal human rights'.⁷¹

If we consider the implications of Hegel's analysis of slavery for an understanding of social change, and, specifically, changes in

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the position of women, his standpoint may seem at first sight to be rather pessimistic. He attributes responsibility for slavery to the slave and seems to suggest that the slave enjoys his slavery. He also treats slavery as appropriate to particular forms of life, as a necessary stage in social development and therefore inevitable. Both arguments may appear to be antithetical to the likelihood of a radical change in women's lives, yet precisely because Hegel attributes slavery to the will of an individual or people, he opens up the possibility of a dramatic change in social relationships through the power of rational reflection. Recent work within feminism has examined the ways in which women may embrace patriarchal ideas or ideologies of domesticity and resist change.⁷² Attention has also been paid to the low self-esteem in which many women hold themselves, placing a low value on their own needs and on their lives generally. Yet in neither case does this preclude the possibility of change. Furthermore, Hegel's account of slavery is an historical account which presupposes the potentiality for changes in relationships of domination and subordination, given certain changes in the way of life in which these relationships are grounded.

Hegel's acknowledgement of the slave's identification with his slavery is combined with an awareness of the tensions inherent in any relation of oppression. The dominance of the master over the slave and the slave's acquiescence are neither stable nor eternal. Rather, the relation is one of constant struggle in which the master's authority, from the beginning, may be negated. This may be illustrated by Hegel's observations on slavery in certain African cultures in his *Lectures on the philosophy of world history*. A system of despotism based on force, patriarchal authority and an arbitrary will is inherently weak, says Hegel, for the despot is always in danger of being challenged by his subjects: 'thus even such despotism as this is not completely blind; the peoples of Africa are not just slaves but assert their own will too'.⁷³ Slavery, as a system of social relations, can never be secure for 'the sword really hangs above the despot's head day and night' and, like his subjects, the despot is vulnerable to the lack of respect for human life.⁷⁴

The movement towards self-consciousness is built into the master-slave relation and incorporates the possibility of freedom for the master as well as the slave. The emancipation of the slave furthers the interest of the master since, as Hegel notes in the *Phenomenology*, only when the slave realises his freedom does the

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master move beyond immediacy. This idea is applied to colonial relations in the *Philosophy of right* where he points out that 'Colonial independence proves to be of the greatest advantage to the mother country, just as the emancipation of the slaves turns out to the greatest advantage of the owners'.⁷⁵ Hegel's arguments concerning responsibility for slavery and its appropriateness do not therefore entail a static model of the master-slave relation. Rather, he offers a dynamic model which sees that relationship as characterised by a fundamental tension which may ultimately tear it apart. Applying Hegel's analysis to the position of women, we find that the acceptance of patriarchal ideologies is matched by examples of women's resistance to their exploitation. In struggling against their subordination women at the same time precipitate a qualitative improvement in social relations for men who are also constrained by those ideologies.

Furthermore, Hegel is optimistic that when the slaves begin to resist, the system of slavery will perish: 'if a nation does not merely imagine that it wants to be free but actually has the energy to will its freedom,' he says in the *Philosophy of mind*, 'then no human power can hold it back in the servitude of a merely passive obedience to authority.'⁷⁶ One can infer from this that the very fact of struggling together is as important for women as the formal freedoms thereby obtained and is inseparable from them, since collective resistance ensures the growth of consciousness. Because freedom constitutes the human essence for Hegel, he emphasises that the slave has an absolute right to free himself and essential to this transition to freedom is rational self-consciousness. While attributing slavery to the will of the slave, Hegel none the less envisages a complete reversal of the master-slave relation given the will for change and consciousness of the potential for freedom:

it is only as thinking intelligence that the will is genuinely a will and free. The slave does not know his essence, his infinity, his freedom; he does not know himself as human in essence; and he lacks this knowledge of himself because he does not think himself. This self-consciousness which apprehends itself through thinking is essentially human, and thereby frees itself from the contingent and the false, is the principle of right, morality and all ethical life.⁷⁷

He contrasts this reflective self-consciousness with appeals to

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'feeling, enthusiasm, the heart and the breast', which are absorbed in 'instinctive desire' and 'particularity'.⁷⁸ For freedom to be obtained, the slave has to move beyond his own individuality, as well as that of the master, to grasp 'the absolutely rational in its universality which is independent of the particularity of the subjects'.⁷⁹ Hegel's identification of the freedom of the slave with reflective self-consciousness, and of the need to move beyond feelings to reason, points clearly to the importance of rational reflection for women as a means of transforming their position.

Moreover, while Hegel gives an historical analysis of slavery, this does not commit him to a total relativism which would rule out criticism of particular forms of life. While attracted to the liberal ideals of the French Revolution, for example, Hegel recognised the limitations of the emerging bourgeois society as well as the shortcomings of the liberal theories used to understand and justify the new order. Like Marx and Engels, he was well aware that the progressive aspects of liberal capitalism were accompanied by greed, egotism and self-interest, which would lead to the 'creation of a rabble of paupers'.⁸⁰ He notes that 'At the same time, this brings with it, at the other end of the social scale, conditions which greatly facilitate the concentration of disproportionate wealth in a few hands'.⁸¹ Hegel did not allow his acknowledgement of the progressive aspects of liberal capitalism to become an apologia for that society. Rather, he saw poverty and class conflict as inevitable features of that mode of production. It is therefore difficult to accept Elshstain's argument that Hegel ignores the 'realities of economic power'.⁸² While Elshstain postulates that individualism 'may arguably be the *only* means available to the woman to attain an identity other than a thoroughly privatised one',⁸³ Hegel draws attention to the pathological effects of a social structure governed by the pursuit of self-interest. Although Hegel did not develop his understanding of the labour-process into an extensive critique of the division of labour of the kind Marx and Engels subsequently elaborated, none the less such a critique is implicit in his teleology. The connections he drew between freedom and necessity, consciousness and labour, constituted a significant advance on earlier theories and bequeath to feminist theory a firm foundation on which to construct an investigation into the development of the division of labour and ways of transcending it.

By showing how slavery is 'natural' or appropriate to

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particular stages of development, for example, Hegel points to the necessity of a *fundamental* change in social relationships if slavery is to be eliminated. The implication here for women is that radical improvements in their position will not be achieved by piecemeal changes. What is needed is a transformation of the social structure which generates inequalities and leads to their privatisation. Nor will these inequalities be removed by an appeal to moral principles since their subordination is linked to the needs of capital for a reserve army and its own reproduction. Hegel's comments on the 'relative justification' of slavery anticipated Marx's argument in the *Critique of the Gotha programme* that 'Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and the cultural development conditioned by it.'⁸⁴ Marx's observations on justice have led some commentators to argue that the extraction of surplus value cannot be seen as unjust since it is an essential feature of capitalism and the labourer freely exchanges his labour-power for wages.⁸⁵ 'Exploitation' is thus a 'natural' feature of capitalist society appropriate to that stage of development and should not be seen in moral terms. It follows from this that it is mistaken to see Marxism as a moral theory aimed at removing injustice: the 'injustices' it analyses are a necessary part of that mode of production and will not be dissolved by a moral critique but only by a radical change in the economic and social structure. Similarly it could be argued that the subordination of women will be overcome only by a challenge to the division of labour which forms the heart of the system of oppressive social relations and the source of slavery.

Hegel's quasi-relativist view of morality does not preclude the possibility of advancement, however, since he suggests that the move away from slavery towards freedom, although dependent on consciousness, is nevertheless inevitable and reflects the growth of reason in the world. His analysis of slavery consequently provides a rich source of concepts for feminist theory. His political thought is also of particular interest insofar as it offers an understanding of freedom and enslavement from a standpoint which transcends individualism.

A comparison may be drawn between the status of women in advanced industrial societies and slaves in ancient society in the sense that both societies are characterised by their dependence on the unpaid labour of a service class. Domestic labour for both women and slaves is unwaged, low status and unsatisfying, consisting of repetitive tasks performed for other members of the

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household. It is physically separated from other spheres of production and is seen as exclusively the responsibility of a particular group, constituting the defining role for those who perform these tasks. Many women, like slaves, live and work within the household of the oppressing social group, divorced from public life, in a relationship which is universalised. As Delphy says:

While the wage labourer depends on the market (on a theoretically unlimited number of employers), the married woman depends on one individual. While the wage labourer sells his labour power the married woman gives hers away. Exclusivity and non-payment are intimately connected. Providing unpaid labour within the framework of a universal and personal relationship (marriage) constitutes a relationship of slavery.⁸⁶

Women, like slaves, provide an indeterminate amount of domestic and personal services in return for their maintenance, but this cannot be construed as an exchange relationship since their rewards are not calculated on the basis of the amount of work completed. Fluctuations in living standards do not reflect variations in the work-load. Unlike wage-contracted labourers, wives cannot easily change their employers. At best, they can seek a wealthier husband to whom they offer the same services. The marriage contract can be seen as affording a means of extracting unlimited labour-power from wives. The relationship between husband and wife is similar to that between master and slave since, in both cases, there is an obligation to maintain the labour-power of the service class. Patriarchal exploitation, sanctioned and facilitated by this contract is, according to Delphy the 'common, specific and main expression of women'.⁸⁷ It is universal in so far as the majority of women marry at some point in their lives.

This is not to deny that there are differences between the position of women and the slaves of antiquity, both in terms of the nature of the relationship to the head of the household and the level of development of the productive forces. But while it could be argued that the marriage contract is based on reciprocal affective ties, this could be seen as exacerbating women's subordination, in binding them more tightly to an exploitative relationship and also in subjecting them to a further set of

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expectations in relation to the performance of affective roles as well as the execution of routine domestic tasks.⁸⁸ Moreover, the existence of such a service class is anomalous within the context of an advanced mode of production, governed by the cash nexus, and cannot therefore be accounted for simply in relation to the needs of capital. An explanation must be sought within the deeper structures of patriarchy.

Domestic labour poses problems for feminism which may be illuminated by Hegelian insights into the tensions implicit in the master-slave relation. Although engagement in the labour process for Hegel is the key mechanism for the growth of self-consciousness, he also recognises the limitations of a way of life marked by routine and repetition and sees acceptance of such routine as tantamount to death.⁸⁹ Domestic labour is the only sphere of employment where drudgery is combined with isolation. Taken separately these factors may inhibit the growth of consciousness; together they present a formidable obstacle to change. Where women are engaged in service occupations outside the home, the monotonous aspects of labour are counteracted by contact with others, but the atomised nature of the domestic mode of production militates against the formation of self-consciousness. Hegel also points to the extent to which the slave may accept his slavery and resist liberation. His analysis of the master-slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology* is therefore followed by a description of the modes of false consciousness attributed to the slave unwilling to resist the bonds of slavery, namely Stoicism and Scepticism. These rationalisations of unfreedom lead into Hegel's account of the Unhappy Consciousness where the slave taking refuge from the master submits to a transcendental God. This phenomenon of false consciousness confronts all liberation movements and, for this reason, feminists have begun to examine women's resistance to change, their commitment to dominant reproductive ideologies and the needs which the family may be perceived to meet. The limited aspirations of women and the marginal value they themselves place on their labour-power have also become significant areas of investigation precisely because they are as strong a barrier to freedom as the material conditions of exploitation.⁹⁰

At the same time, Hegel sees labour and subordination as essential to the development of self-consciousness. The realisation of freedom incorporates awareness of freedom and the practical accomplishments of freedom, and both are grounded in the fear

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and service of slavery. Insights into women's subordination and their potential for liberation may therefore be lost if Hegel is dismissed too readily as a biological reductionist. The orthodox feminist view which identifies Hegel's work with the public-private distinction of mainstream political thought fails to take account of the strongly anti-reductionist strand in his writing and loses the significance of his analysis of slavery for an understanding of women's oppression. Since, for Hegel, the fear and service of slavery place the slave closer to freedom than the master imprisoned by sensation and desire. Women, because of their subordination, could be seen as nearer self-consciousness than the men who depend on their labour-power and recognition. In using their biological and personal needs and desires as a means of oppression, the latter are less free than the women who are forced to move beyond the immediacy of desire into the realm of rational reflection, to confront their own subordination and exploitation through consciousness and action.

Moreover, this domination is dehumanising and limiting for both master and slave, men and women, in so far as men are confined by patriarchal modes of thought. While men stand in a relation to women governed by dependency and the gratification of physical needs alone, the growth of their own self-consciousness is truncated. They remain tied to the sensual world, using the gratification of physical needs and the control of reproduction as a means of oppression.⁹¹ Although the master receives recognition from the slave he can, within the existing power relationship, never be sure that the recognition is genuine. It is for this reason that Hegel sees the liberation of the slave as furthering the interests of the master, as Camus observes:

The master, to his detriment, is recognized in his autonomy by a consciousness which he himself does not recognize as autonomous. Therefore, he cannot be satisfied and his autonomy is only negative. Mastery is a blind alley. Since, moreover, he cannot renounce mastery and become a slave again, the eternal destiny of masters is to live unsatisfied or to be killed.⁹²

Notes

1. See, for example, S. Moller Okin, *Women in Western political thought*

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(London, Virago, 1980); G. Lloyd, 'Public reason and private passion', *Politics*, 18, 2, p. 25, 1981; 'Masters, slaves and others', *Radical Philosophy*, 34, Summer 1983; J.B. Elshtain, *Public man, private woman* (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1981); S. Harding and M.B. Hintikka, (eds), *Discovering reality, feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science* (Dordrecht, Reidel, 1983).

2. S. Moller Okin, *Women in Western political thought*, p. 5.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 341.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 293.
10. J.B. Elshtain, *Public Man*, p. 174.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 174.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 175.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
16. G. Lloyd, 'Masters, slaves and others', p. 5.
17. See S. Moller Okin, *Women in Western political thought*, pp. 6, 197, 283-4, 341; G. Lloyd, 'Public reason and private passion', pp. 31-4; J.B. Elshtain. *Public man.*, pp. 170-83.
18. G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of right (PR)* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1952), trans. T.M. Knox, § 166.
19. *Ibid.* § 166 Addition.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.* § 166.
22. *Ibid.* § 164 Addition.
23. *Ibid.* § 176.
24. *Ibid.* § 164.
25. *Ibid.* § 161 Addition.
26. *Ibid.* § 162.
27. G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of mind, (PM)* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971), trans. W. Wallace and A.V. Miller, § 519.
28. G. Lloyd, 'Masters, slaves and others', p. 8.
29. G.W.F. Hegel, *PR* § 161 Addition.
30. *Ibid.* § 201 Addition.
31. G.W.F. Hegel, *PM* § 535.
32. *Ibid.*, 535.
33. See Hegel, *PR* and L. Davidoff, 'The rationalisation of housework' in D.L. Barker and S. Allen (eds), *Dependence and exploitation in work and marriage* (London, Longman, 1976), pp. 121-51, for an analysis of the way in which the family was perceived as resisting the encroachment of the market in late eighteenth and nineteenth century England.
34. G.W.F. Hegel, *The phenomenology of mind (PG)*, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1931), trans. J. Baillie, p. 476.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 476.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 469.

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37. Sophocles, *Antigone*, 926.
38. G.W.F. Hegel, *PG*, p. 491.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 491.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 737.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 737.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 491.
43. A.C. Bradley, 'Hegel's theory of tragedy' appendix to A. (in *Oxford Lectures on Poetry*, (Indiana University Press, Indiana, 1961), pp. 69–95), and H. Paolucci, *Hegel on tragedy* (New York, Harper and Row, 1962), p. 385.
44. Hegel, *PG*, p. 471.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 472.
46. G.W.F. Hegel, *Early theological writings* (Tübingen, 1907), ed. H. Nohl, p. 293.
47. G. Lukács, *The young Hegel* (London, Merlin Press, 1975), p. 121.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 412.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 403.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 404.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 408.
52. A.C. Bradley, 'Hegel's theory of tragedy', p. 384.
53. G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the philosophy of world history (LPWH)*, Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 1975), trans. H.B. Nisbet, appendix on Africa, pp. 173–190.
54. G.W.F. Hegel, 'Fragments of historical studies', *Clio*, 1977, vol. 7, no. 1, p. 123.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
56. Hegel, *LPWH*, p. 113.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
58. G.W.F. Hegel, 'Fragments of historical studies', pp. 117–18.
59. G.W.F. Hegel, *PM*.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 234.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 236–7.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 239.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 233.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 239.
66. Hegel, *PR* § 57 Addition.
67. Hegel, *PM* § 435 Zusatz.
68. *Ibid.* § 435 Zusatz.
69. Hegel, *PR* § 57 Addition.
70. Hegel, *PM*, § 433 Zusatz.
71. *Ibid.* § 433 Zusatz.
72. See, for example, A. Dworkin, *Right-wing women, the politics of domesticated females* (London, Women's Press, 1983).
73. Hegel, *LPWH*, p. 187.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
75. Hegel, *PR* § 248 Addition.
76. Hegel, *PM* § 435 Zusatz.
77. Hegel, *PR* § 21.
78. *Ibid.* § 21.

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79. Hegel, *PM* § 435 Zusatz.
80. Hegel, *PR* § 244.
81. *Ibid.* § 244.
82. J.B. Elshtain, *Public man*, p. 179.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
84. K. Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha programme', in *Basic writings on politics and philosophy* (London, Pelican, 1963), ed. L.S. Feuer, p. 160.
85. See, for example, A. Wood, *Karl Marx*, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981); M. Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlon, (eds), *Marx, justice and history* (Princeton, University Press, 1980); S.M. Easton, *Humanist Marxism and Wittgensteinian social philosophy* (Manchester, University Press, 1983).
86. C. Delphy, *Close to home: a materialist analysis of women's oppression* (London, Hutchinson, 1984), p. 71.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
88. According to R.E. Dobash and R. Dobash, in their study of wife abuse, *Violence against wives* (New York, Free Press, 1979) these multiple expectations arising from the marriage contract constituted the significant factors in transforming women into 'legitimate' objects of violence. Jealousy and possessiveness as well as a perceived inadequate performance of domestic tasks were predominant precipitating causes of abuse in the cases they examined.
89. Hegel, *PR* § 151 Addition.
90. P. Hunt, 'Cash-transactions and household tasks: domestic behaviour in relation to industrial employment', *Sociological Review*, 26, 1978, pp. 555-71.
91. This point is illustrated by *The draughtsman's contract*.
92. A. Camus, *The rebel* (London, Peregrine, 1962), p. 110.

3

On Becoming

Anthony Manser

The opening moves of Hegel's *Science of logic* are compressed; in three short paragraphs we are faced with an argument in which being, nothing and becoming¹ are merged into each other:

Pure being and pure nothing are, then, the same; the truth is, not either being or nothing, but that being — not passes — but has passed over into nothing, and nothing into being . . . Their truth is therefore this movement, this immediate disappearance of the one into the other, in a word, becoming; a movement wherein both are distinct, but in virtue of a distinction which has immediately dissolved itself. (*SL 95*)²

Admittedly this brief introduction of the terms is followed by some twenty pages of 'Observations', but these are not formally a part of the argument, but rather glosses and attempts to forestall objections. Becoming is given two further paragraphs and a separate 'Observation' at the end of the chapter. This is preceded by a discussion of being and nothing in the previous section 'With what must science begin?', though what is said there is bracketed off by the concluding words of that section: 'This consideration is so simple that the beginning as such requires no preparation or further introduction, and this preliminary discussion was not so much intended to deduce it as to clear away all preliminary matters'. (*SL 90*) The first chapter, or rather the argument of the first chapter, concludes with an equally rapid move from becoming to determinate being: 'Becoming, then, taken as transition into the unity of being and nothing, which exists because it is, or has the form of, the one-sided immediate unity of these moments, is determinate being'. (*SL 119*)

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Many commentators seem puzzled by what Hegel says of 'becoming'; some have ignored it altogether, treating the union of being and nothing simply as determinate being. None, as far as I am aware, have seen the argument of the first chapter of the *Science of logic* as central to the whole Hegelian enterprise, as a vital element in his attempt radically to change the whole nature of philosophy. One strand in this is the substitution of logic for the old metaphysics, a point which is often mentioned but seldom taken seriously. The problem is what this means in such a context. Here I can only give a truncated answer, but one which I hope will justify my concentration on the concept of becoming in this paper. Metaphysics had been regarded as the 'Queen of the Sciences', the study which revealed the unchanging ground of the changing world of appearances, a ground which was superior because it was unchanging and permanent. This idea had its reflection in politics, e.g. in Plato's *Republic*, with the attempt to provide a blue-print for a state which would likewise be immune from change. Hegel's state certainly does not possess that characteristic; it is driven by an inner dialectic; even if he does think that something like the Prussian constitution of the early 1800s is the best so far available, he admits that it contains problems that it is incapable of solving, e.g. the problem of the creation of a pauperised rabble. Judgments about constitutions are necessarily provisional. This, I take it, is the meaning of the famous passage from the *Philosophy of right*: 'When philosophy paints its grey on grey, then is a form of life grown old, and with grey on grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood; the Owl of Minerva only begins her flight when dusk is falling.'

The substitution of dialectical logic for metaphysics is equivalent to taking history seriously, at every level of intellectual activity. It involves the replacement of a metaphysical foundation by an end, absolute mind or spirit. This, I would argue, though not in this paper, is not merely the displacement of the same kind of foundation that older philosophers had used to a position at the conclusion of the historical process. A crude teleology argues for an end which is equally the source of all that happens, albeit one that lies in the future. For Hegel, the shape of the absolute end could not be clearly discerned from the present, even though some of its logically necessary features might be discernible. There was no backward causation, and in that sense teleology in the old style was an illusion.

Such a change also alters the way philosophy is to be regarded,

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and Hegel expresses radical views on this as well. In the *Lectures on the history of philosophy* he says the view of each philosophy refuting the ones that went before looks on the History of Philosophy as: 'a battlefield covered with the bones of the dead, a kingdom not merely formed of dead and lifeless individuals, but of refuted and spiritually dead systems, since each has killed and buried the other'.³ He, on the contrary, wishes to stress that to study any philosophy is to become acquainted with Philosophy as such.⁴ This could be expressed by saying that Philosophy is not a realm of being, but of becoming.

So the failure of commentators to take 'becoming' seriously enough is not a trivial error, but a deep one. It leads inevitably to a falsification of Hegel's aims and a misunderstanding of the role which he gives to Philosophy and hence to a difficulty in understanding the form of his own philosophy, which is thought to be the ultimate system instead of a stage in the advance of the subject. The 'Owl of Minerva' passage in the *Philosophy of right* is one expression of this. Such a view deprives philosophy of its old Platonic ideals, but gives it a non-metaphysical foundation, which is constituted by the efforts of prior philosophers. From our position we can see the necessity of one system being replaced by another, but it would never have been possible to predict the next system on the basis of the one that preceded it. I am aware that these remarks are only programmatic and need to be backed by argument. I believe they can be, but now I must turn to one necessary stage of such an argument, the role of becoming in the *Science of logic*, for if this is grasped it will be easier to understand the radical transformation of philosophy that Hegel undertakes.

To begin it is perhaps best to look at how some commentators have dealt with becoming; McTaggart writes:

For these reasons I believe that the course of the dialectic would become clearer if the name of Becoming were given up, and the Synthesis of Being and Nothing were called Transition to being Determinate (Uebergang in das Dasein). This follows the precedent set by Hegel in the case of the last category of Measure . . .⁵

McTaggart's suggested change of name implies that Hegel has been careless in his nomenclature. He does not even ask why Hegel believed 'becoming' an appropriate word to use, or why he thought a stage to be necessary between being and nothing on the one hand and determinate being on the other.

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Charles Taylor, like McTaggart, also wants to eliminate 'becoming', implying in his account of the opening dialectic that it can be ignored: 'The upshot of this first dialectic of being and non-being is thus the synthesis of the two in *Dasein* or Determinate Being.'⁶ However, on the next page he does discuss becoming, though criticising its introduction as illegitimate:

But the derivation of Becoming here is not as solid as that of *Dasein*. This is the first, but not the last place in the *Logic* where Hegel will go beyond what is strictly established by his argument, because he sees in the relation of concepts a suggestion of his ontology: here the universality of movement and becoming in the relation of Being and Non-Being. But of course as probative arguments these passages are unconvincing. They fail, as strict conceptual proof, however persuasive they are as *interpretations* for those who hold Hegel's view of things on other grounds.⁷

Taylor's main argument against the validity of introducing becoming is that Hegel is dealing with Kantian categories, so that what has to be shown is that things cannot be thought in certain categories unless other categories also apply:

And this is what we do show when we establish that *Sein* (Being) can only be applied as *Dasein* (Determinate Being), whereas we have not yet shown the objective necessity of Becoming. This will come when we examine *Dasein* further and see that it is prey to contradiction and hence movement.⁸

However, he does regard becoming as essential to Hegel's ontology, since '*Geist* can only be embodied, and yet the embodiments are all inadequate, and hence disappear to give place to others.'⁹ This would seem to apply at a later stage of Hegel's argument. The question of whether Hegel's 'Concepts' are Kantian-type categories will not be discussed here, for there are other reasons to doubt Taylor's view. It seems that he is suggesting that the becoming that is the subject of the first chapter of the *Science of logic* is tantamount to the normal concept of change. If it were so, then it might legitimately be claimed that the establishment of ordinary objects was necessary before bringing it in to the picture. However, given Hegel's emphasis on

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the fact that it is the pure concepts of being and nothing that are under discussion, it is likely that it is 'pure' becoming which is here at issue. I agree that the notion is problematic, but it seems that Hegel does take care, in the 'Observations', to avoid a reading like that of Taylor. If pure being can be conceived, then, perhaps, it may not be impossible to conceive pure becoming; at least the attempt should be made before it is decided that it has no place.

M.J. Inwood, the most recent British commentator, is equally convinced that there is something wrong with the first chapter of the *Science of logic*, though his diagnosis of the error is different to that of Taylor:

To speak of the concept of being *becoming* that of nothing is to run together our thinking and the concepts about, or in terms of which, we think. Concepts may of course be closely associated with each other without being identical. The concepts of a husband and a wife, for example, are intimately linked. When we think of, or in terms of, the one we automatically think of, or in terms of, the other. But neither of these concepts becomes or passes into the other. Any movement involved is that of our thinking, following the conceptual pathways provided. It is illegitimate therefore to derive the concept of becoming from those of being and nothing, or indeed from any other two concepts, solely in virtue of the fact that there are conceptual routes from one to the other. Concepts and their interrelationships are static in a way that our thinking is not.¹⁰

The passage seems to involve a resolute refusal to contemplate what is actually going on in the first chapter of the *Science of logic*. There it is obvious that the concepts 'being' and 'nothing' are not just any connected pair, but play a special role in philosophy. In everyday thought they are not 'intimately linked' as 'husband' and 'wife' are; in their case it is impossible to define one of the pair without also defining the other; that every husband has a wife could be considered an analytic *a priori* truth. In philosophical tradition, pure being could exist, and be understood, without 'nothing', which is why Hegel has to argue for their identity. And it is obvious that he expects his argument to be resisted by commonsense and his conclusion to be found striking. He is aware that what he is doing goes against a great deal of

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philosophising. More important is the failure to grasp what Hegel is trying to do in the argument; Inwood seems to think that he 'derives' one concept from another; I will say more about this later.

Thus three distinguished Hegelian commentators, two of them contemporary, have difficulty in grasping his arguments about, and the meaning he gives to 'pure becoming'. It is also significant that their objections differ from each other; they do not agree on the nature of the mistake in the first chapter. Hence it is necessary to examine the text to see if it is possible to produce a better interpretation.

Hegel's starting-point, it seems to me, is the unsatisfactory nature of the traditional concept of 'being'. Historically it was thought of as the unchanging ground of change. But if that were the case, the problem arises of how change could come about. If there is to be a dialectic process, or even a temporal one, then being cannot be static. If dialectic essentially involves contradiction, then the starting-point must itself be 'dialectical' or suitable for the operation of dialectic. The same applies to temporality; real time cannot arise from a timeless system. If being is what it is and nothing more, there is no way in which it could change. Similarly, determinate being cannot consist of self-subsistent entities, of 'substances' which depend on nothing outside of themselves in order to exist, for then changes in them would be inexplicable; in Hegel's words:

Being would not be absolute beginning if it were in any way determined; for if it were, it would be dependent on something else, would not be immediate, would therefore not be the beginning. But if being is indeterminate and therefore the true beginning, it lacks whatever could transform it into an other . . . Parmenides, equally with Spinoza, will not admit progress from being, or the absolute substance, to the negative or finite. (*SL* 107)

There is no way in which time could get a foothold in a static realm of being. In so far as pure being and nothing are considered, there is no room for time. It is possible to make a heroic move and say that time is unreal, though that leaves still the problem of how the illusion itself could arise. It is a consequence of such thinking that one is obliged to accept a Kantian position, in which time is an order imposed by the

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human mind on appearances of timeless things-in-themselves. If we start from a position of one, or some, necessarily static entities, then time is contradictory, for what is at one moment is not at another. (This is not to deny that there are non-temporal contradictions, e.g. mathematical ones.)

Hegel's attack on metaphysics is directed against the view of it as a super-science which puts us in contact with that which lies behind the veil of appearance, for 'there is nothing behind the curtain except that which is in front of it'. Philosophy, or logic, which is the heir to the old metaphysics, has to deal with an actual world. Hegel is attempting to revolutionise the old conception of philosophy, including that of Kant, and this attempt has to be taken seriously. Here I am not claiming that he is right, only that before we can decide whether he is, we must first grasp what it is that he is claiming. It is easy to make him into just another metaphysician, and there have not been wanting philosophers, both Anglo-Saxon and European, who have done precisely this. And if he is a metaphysician, there are grounds for saying that he is a confused one.

For it does seem *prima facie* nonsense to say that becoming is the unity of being and nothing, and I have previously argued for such a position. One reason why Hegel's argument is hard to grasp is that we tend to think of becoming as a change in some pre-existing determinate entity. The bud becomes the flower; an identifiable object becomes a different one, equally identifiable without reference to its origin. And yet the flower *was* the bud. Objects in nature are constantly changing, though it may only be when the change has reached a certain magnitude that we say the original object has become something else. At this point of the discussion it is tempting to invoke Heraclitus and maintain that all things are in a state of flux. There is no doubt that Hegel, in this opening chapter, had in mind the historical move from Parmenides to Heraclitus, and I suppose it would be possible to read the chapter as advocating the views of the latter in preference to those of the former. However, Hegel could not here be asserting 'all things are in a state of flux' for that presupposes the existence of things, which are first examined in the second chapter at the level of 'Determinate being'.

Failure to grasp what is meant by 'becoming' arises from insufficient attention to Hegel's words, a failure which my earlier criticisms exemplified and which, I think, also affects the three commentators I have cited. However, there is a genuine problem.

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Though it may make sense to say 'being is', or, perhaps, 'nothing is not', it is impossible to say 'becoming is' (or 'is not') for that would make it into a static entity; the right mode of expression would seem to have to be 'becoming becomes'. It is hard to see this as meaningful, even if 'being is' is found acceptable. Indeed, it does violence to language, which is why I used to regard the discussion as nonsensical. However, it should be remembered that Hegel expressly admits that language is misused in the context of philosophy; he discusses the notion under the heading of the 'speculative proposition'. 'The paradoxical and bizarre light in which many aspects of modern philosophy appear to those unacquainted with speculative thought is frequently due to the form of the simple judgment when it is used to express speculative results.' (*SL* 103) Given the way in which simple propositions are normally understood, there is a tendency to take being or becoming as the subjects of the propositions in which they occur, and the predicate as expressing the properties which belong to them. This is a mistake when dealing with speculative propositions: 'The nature of the judgment or proposition, which involves the distinction between subject and predicate, is destroyed by the speculative proposition, and the identical proposition into which the former turns contains the counter-thrust against this relation.'¹¹ In normal discourse both the utterer and the hearer know to what the subject term refers, and give or obtain information from the predicate. In the speculative proposition this priority of the subject is overturned:

In a proposition of this kind one begins with the word God. This is by itself a senseless sound, a mere name; only the predicate says what he is and fills the name with content and meaning; the empty beginning becomes actual knowledge only in the end.¹²

These remarks must be understood if Hegel is to be. The claim is that in philosophy the problem lies not in what is said about the subject, but in its identification. Hence it is impossible to verify a philosophic proposition by inspecting the subject to see if it does possess the claimed predicate. The subject is, in any case, not the kind of entity which can be pointed to. Verification here involves providing arguments, which is why the truth in philosophy must be the whole. In everyday matters it is possible to grasp a fragment of truth, an isolated fact, because the subject can be

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identified and the predicate checked without considering any other matter. In philosophy we cannot do this.

Hence the problems which arise when we are faced with propositions like 'being is'. This looks as if it gave us information about 'being'; in Hegel's words, 'it is intended to take being . . . as that which is simply other than nothing' (*SL* 104). We, however, immediately think of concrete examples where there is a difference between being and nothing — there is a distinction between there being drink in the bottle and there being nothing in it. This, however, is a case of determinate being, in which Hegel agrees that there is an important difference, though one that is not of philosophical interest. If we talk of pure being and pure nothing, then the possibility of citing any difference has already been ruled out. In the case of pure being, because it has been a traditional concept in philosophy, we may manage to gain some idea of what Hegel is getting at.

It is not so easy to see what 'pure becoming' might mean, which is why McTaggart thought that there could not be such a concept. It may be that we have been corrupted into accepting pure being as a philosophical term, and as long as we think of it along traditional lines we will find it hard to make sense of pure becoming, which consists of both pure being and pure nothing:

Becoming is the unseparatedness of being and nothing, not the unity which abstracts from being and nothing; rather becoming as the unity of being and nothing is this determinate unity in which there *is* being as well as nothing. But each, being and nothing, in so far as it is unseparated from its other, is not. They *are*, therefore, in this unity, but only as disappearing and transcended. From the independence (which they were primarily imagined as possessing, they fall to the status of *moments*, which still are distinct, but at the same time are transcended. (*SL* 118)

The final sentence reveals that being, the ostensible subject of the chapter, has lost its traditional status and become a mere 'moment'. As such it can hardly be considered the foundation on which every existent thing rests.

The temptation then is to say that in becoming we have a new entity which itself can serve as a metaphysical foundation. There are several reasons for rejecting this suggestion. First, becoming turns out to be determinate being, not as it were an independent

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entity, and that it is permanent is denied in the following section, entitled 'Transcendence of Becoming'. Second, and perhaps more important for our purposes, this suggestion would be foreign to the whole drive of the *Science of logic*.

To take these points in order; the next section begins: 'The equipoise of arising and passing away is, first, becoming itself. But this equally collapses into static unity . . . Becoming is a baseless unrest which collapses into a static result.' (SL118–9) A static entity could hardly be 'becoming'. Hegel is here wrestling with the problem of how to express thoughts which are, we might say, radically opposed to our commonsense ideas in a language which is designed to accommodate such ideas, is indeed structured by them. A philosopher, faced with the failure of one suggested foundation, typically tries to provide another which will escape the difficulty which destroyed the former. To say all things are in a state of flux looks as if it were a better suggestion, precisely because it is founded on a criticism of the original one. Hegel's object is more radical, to show that the whole procedure is wrongly conceived.

This leads us to the second point; what is under discussion cannot become clear until the whole system has been grasped. Far from there being a fundamental proposition or set of propositions on which the rest of the system is based, it is the system as a whole which is the foundation for each of the propositions which comprise it. It is for this reason that we discover, at the end of the *Science of logic*, that the whole system is a circle, a figure which is continuous, does not start at a particular place. Applied to a system, the implication is that each proposition is determined by its relation to all the rest. In the words of the Introduction to the *Science of logic*:

But not only the scheme of philosophic method, but also the very concept of philosophy in general belongs to the content of Logic and in fact constitutes its final result; what Logic is, cannot be set out beforehand — on the contrary this knowledge of what Logic is can only be reached as the end and consummation of the whole treatment of the subject.
(SL 53)

The question then seems to be whether there is a good reason to use the word 'becoming' rather than any other. One possible answer is that Hegel uses it because historically the first

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philosophical attempt, that of Parmenides, involved the existence of being and the non-existence of nothing, a position which Heraclitus denied by making 'becoming' fundamental. Hegel says this in the *Encyclopaedia*, though it would seem unlikely that his reason is just historical. There is a philosophic point being proposed, and it is connected with the need to bring time into the picture. If the universe were fundamentally static, founded on changeless being, then time would, as I said above, seem to be an illusion. However, Hegel says in the *Lectures on the history of philosophy*:

The advance requisite and made by Heraclitus is the progression from being as the first immediate thought, to the category of becoming as the second. This is the first concrete, the absolute, as in it the unity of opposites.¹³ Thus with Heraclitus the philosophic Idea is to be met with in its speculative form; the reasoning of Parmenides and Zeno is abstract understanding. Heraclitus was thus universally esteemed a deep philosopher and even was decried as such. Here we see land; there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic.¹⁴

He also explicitly credits Heraclitus with the introduction of time into philosophy:

It is because Heraclitus did not rest at the logical expression of becoming, but gave to his principle the form of the existent, that it was necessary that time should first present itself to him as such; for in the sensuously perceptible it is the first form of becoming. Time is pure becoming as perceived, the pure Notion [concept], that which is simple, and the harmony issuing from absolute opposites; its essential nature is to be and not to be in one unity, and besides this it has no other character. It is not that time *is* or *is not*, for time *is* non-being immediately in being and being immediately in non-being: it is the transition out of being into non-being, the abstract notion, but in an objective form, i.e. in so far as it is for us. In time there is no past and future, but only the now; and this is, but is not as regards the past; and this non-being, as future, turns round into being.¹⁵

It should be noted that time is the sensuous form in which

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becoming appears to us, i.e. that becoming is more abstract and more fundamental than time, and, it would seem to follow, than change. By the same token it must be logically prior to determinate being, the realm of objects which do change.

But this does not yet enable us to grasp what becoming is. If I were to give a characterisation of it, I would be tempted to say 'It is not being that becomes but rather the becoming itself that becomes and thus constitutes what used to be thought of as being,'¹⁶ This glosses Hegel's 'being and non-being are abstractions devoid of truth . . . the first truth is to be found in becoming', though it is perhaps equally obscure. The rest of this paper will be an attempt to make this clearer.

If pure being is taken 'immediately' it is empty, and the same applies to nothing, yet what meaning each term has depends on the opposition to the other. In the *Lectures on the history of philosophy*, Hegel says:

The real fact is that each particular tone is different from another — not abstractly so from any other, but from *its* other — and thus it can also be one. Each particular only is, in so far as its opposite is implicitly contained in its notion. Subjectivity is thus the 'other' of objectivity and not of a piece of paper, which would be meaningless; since each is the 'other' of the 'other' as its 'other', we have here their identity. This is Heraclitus' great principle; it may seem obscure, but it is speculative. And this to the understanding which maintains the independence of being and non-being, the subjective and the objective, the real and the ideal, is always difficult and dim.¹⁷

This could be glossed as the claim that no word can be understood in isolation, but each must be, at the very least, defined in terms of its opposite or 'other'. However, even if this Saussurean-sounding idea is accepted, it is not obvious that this implies that the two are identical, nor is it clear why their union or identity should be 'becoming'. If this is meant to apply to every word, then it would seem to be false, for not all words are definable in terms of an opposite; some are related to a cluster of other terms, e.g. colour-words. Indeed it could be argued that the majority of words are like this rather than simple opposites. It may be that Hegel, in this quotation, is trying to explain 'Heraclitus' great principle', not the whole of language, i.e. what

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he gives us is an analogy on which we can come to grasp the identity of being and nothing in becoming.

A passage from the *Science of logic* may help here (Hegel is talking of arising and passing away):

Both are the same thing, namely becoming; and even when taken as different directions they penetrate and paralyze each other. One direction is a passing away: being passes over into nothing; but equally nothing is its own opposite, a transition to being, that is arising. This arising is the other direction: nothing passes over into being, but being equally cancels itself (*hebt sich auf*) and is rather a transition to nothing, a passing away — they do not cancel mutually, nor one the other externally; each cancels itself in itself, and in itself is its own opposite. (*SL* 118)

Being (or nothing) is the other of its other and in this sense the other of itself. To continue with the example of definition of words: it is not just that we have to define one in terms of the other, but the other is also to be defined in terms of the original, of its other. As we saw in the quotation on p. 65, unless care is taken, the result will itself be static, and hence will not perform the task required. It would seem that ‘becoming’ cannot be defined in terms of its opposite, for it is its own opposite, which is why it is harder to grasp than being or nothing.

Pure being is inadequate as a philosophic concept, both because it is empty and because it implies changelessness, indeed has normally been so taken. Hence all we can actually conceptualise are determinate beings; we only imagine we have a clear concept of being. But if we merely show the inadequacy of pure being and proceed, by a dialectical move, to determinate being, this too will be static and changeless. But no determinate beings are changeless. Therefore an extra move is required, to allow for the possibility of change and, in due course, of time. Hence becoming has to be introduced at this point. The transition from becoming to determinate being is itself problematic, but there is no space to discuss that here.

What we have in this opening chapter is the attempt to characterise the type of concepts which are required for philosophy, and this involves separating them from empirical ones. However, the claim of dialectic is that even everyday concepts are, when properly understood, similar, in that they do not denote static

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and timeless entities. This could be expressed by saying that our ordinary language is radically misleading, and, as far as traditional philosophy is concerned, this has been exemplified in a misunderstanding of the word 'being'. Philosophy has forgotten Heraclitus, who made moves which were correct in principle. Thus the argument of the *Science of logic* depends on the introduction of becoming at this early stage. However, as I said earlier, I am not here concerned to investigate the truth of the claim, only to show what Hegel argued and why it is impossible to ignore becoming in any treatment of his thought.

Notes

1. There is a problem in whether to use capital letters in the case of these three words. I have kept to lower case throughout my discussion, and have also altered all quotations from Johnston and Struthers to conform to my usage.

2. Page references are to Hegel's *The Science of logic*, (*SL*), trans. W.H. Johnston and L.G. Struthers (London 1929). I have occasionally modified their version.

3. G.W.F. Hegel *Lectures on the history of philosophy*, trans. E.S. Haldane (London, 1892), p. 17.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

5. J.M.E.M. McTaggart, *A commentary on Hegel's logic* (Cambridge, 1910), p. 20.

6. C. Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge, 1975), p. 232.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 233.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 233.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

10. M.J. Inwood, *Hegel* (London, 1983), p. 310.

11. Preface to *Phenomenology*, trans. W. Kaufman, in *Hegel* (London, 1965) p. 444.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 393–4.

13. This sentence is a literal translation of the German; I presume it should conclude with 'exists'.

14. Hegel *Lectures on the history of philosophy*, p. 279.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 286–7.

16. The sentence is adapted from G. Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (London, 1983), p. 48, though he is talking of Nietzsche's Eternal Return.

17. G.W.F. Hegel *Lectures on the history of philosophy*, p. 285.

4

Sense and Meaning in Hegel and Wittgenstein

David Lamb

The forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire
history of the world down to the present. (K. Marx¹)

Hegel and Wittgenstein

For many years it was supposed that Ludwig Wittgenstein's contribution to philosophy was an unprecedented phenomenon, exploding into the Anglo-Saxon tradition with revolutionary ideas unparalleled in the history of Western thought. Of late, however, some scholars have attempted to show that, far from being unique, Wittgenstein's contribution belongs to a current of thought that can be traced back to Kant via Schopenhauer.² But the thesis that there is a close affinity between the later Wittgensteinianism and Hegel on meaning and sense-certainty has received surprisingly little attention.³ For precisely because Wittgenstein was never a Hegelian, it would be an ironic note indeed if the philosophical revolution, through the later Wittgensteinianism, were to issue into and newly confirm the old Hegelian or neo-Hegelian tradition against which it originally defined itself. The considerable convergence of the later Wittgenstein, as commonly understood, and the Hegelian understanding of language thus deserves to be spelled out more fully. It is striking that the two philosophers argued very similarly against the sensory realist account of the relation between language and reality.

The following passage by Russell can be considered as typical of a theory of language which they repudiated:

The meaning of an object-word can only be learnt by

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hearing it frequently pronounced in the presence of the object. The association between word and object is just like any other habitual association, e.g., between sight and touch. When the association has been established, the object suggests the word, and the word suggests the object.⁴

The underlying assumption here is that the meaning of a name must be identical with the bearer of that name, which Wittgenstein attributed to a tendency to 'sublime the logic of our language' connected with the conception of naming as an 'occult process', a 'queer connection of a word with an object' caused by the philosopher's attempt to 'bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times' (*PI* 38). To free the philosopher from this picture he points out that certain things can happen to the bearer of a name which need not happen to the name itself. The bearer of the name 'NN' may die, but this does not imply that we cannot meaningfully use the name 'NN' again. Wittgenstein's point (*PI* 38–43) is that the meaning of a name is determined by the rules of usage, not by the thing it refers to. Having rejected the empiricist ontology, Wittgenstein anchored his inquiry to the concept of a 'form of life'. Hegel for his part rejected what the atomists have said about the foundation of language by showing how participation in the concrete universal (objective or intersubjective spirit) is epistemologically prior to the alleged immediate certainty of sensory particulars. 'This bare fact of certainty, however, is really and admittedly the abstractest and poorest kind of truth' (*PG* MM 82/M 149). Like Wittgenstein, Hegel draws attention to the fact that sense experience itself is dependent upon a wealth of institutionalised practices, culture and training, and to deny this is to engage in a most 'abstract' enterprise which illicitly ignores the system of relations in which a reference to sense immediacy is made. Hegel therefore opens the first chapter of *The phenomenology of spirit* with an examination of the empiricist account of language and knowledge.

The title of the first section, 'Sense-Certainty: The This and Meaning', draws attention to the kind of assumption that Wittgenstein detected in the logical atomism of Russell. This assumption, which can be called 'the proper name theory of language', is expressed by Russell as follows:

The only words that one does use as names in the logical

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sense are words like 'this' or 'that'. One can use 'this' as a name to stand for a particular with which one is acquainted at the moment . . . It is an *ambiguous* proper name, but it is really a proper name all the same, and it is almost the only thing I can think of that is used properly and logically in the sense I was talking of for a proper name.⁵

What Hegel does, however, is different in certain respects from Wittgenstein, in that Hegel actually takes this view more seriously. To understand why he does this is to understand something very important about the nature of his phenomenological method. What he does is ask us to imagine that we really do come to learn about the world in the way that Russell's atomism would require. For example, the distinction between the 'I' that experiences and the datum of sense-immediacy experienced is presented strictly as it appears in the arguments of traditional empiricism.

It is not only we who make this distinction of essential truth and particular example, of essence and instance, immediacy and mediation; we *find* it in sense-certainty itself, and it has to be taken up in the form in which it is there, not as we have just determined it . . . We have thus to consider the object, whether as a matter of fact it does exist in sense certainty itself as such an essential reality as the certainty-claims; whether its essential concept corresponds to the way it is present in that certainty. We must not, for that purpose, reflect and ponder about it, but only deal with it as sense-certainty contains it. (*PG MM* 83–4/B 150–1)

It is in this way that we can understand Hegel's claim that when embraced consistently doctrines such as Hume's empiricism or logical atomism corroborate, with equal plausibility, their dialectical opponents. This is largely because opposing schools of philosophy, by virtue of the fact that they can enter into a discourse with each other, can be seen to stand in the same metaphysical ground. This point has been well expressed by M. Clark, who says:

It is a primary lesson of Hegel's dialectic that progress by opposition is always to a complementary abstraction that remains fundamentally at the same level of inadequacy. To

deny 'categorically' an opponent's views is to affirm that one stands in the same metaphysical ground. Where the distance is too great the luxury of denial is no longer possible.⁶

Accordingly an epistemology which emphasises the object and denies the mind's contribution to the cognitive process, stands in the same metaphysical ground as the solipsism which places an equally one-sided emphasis upon the knowing mind.

Sensory realism

Hegel first considers the naïve realist standpoint according to which: 'The object . . . is the real truth . . . the essential reality, quite indifferent to whether it is known or not' (*PG MM 84/B 151*). A refutation of this position is not attempted; Hegel simply asks whether sense-certainty can fulfil its claim to provide an expression of foundational certainty. 'Sense certainty', he says, 'has thus to be asked: What is the This?' (*PG MM 84/B 141*). When Hegel asks: 'What is the This?' (*PG MM 84/B 151*), he is highlighting the problem of giving an account of language faced by those who ignore the historically conditioned social conventions built into the act of communication and concentrate solely upon ostensive definition. 'This', for Hegel, is analysed in terms of the moments 'Here' and 'Now'. Yet the expressions 'This', 'Here' and 'Now' do not refer to particular places and times but are, in fact, among the most universal of all expressions.

Hegel's approach consists in asking the following question: 'If it is in immediate experience that you find certainty, then tell me what it is that you know.' And if your reply is 'I know there is a table in front of me', you are bringing in other matters. You are making a classification, correctly applying terms in a highly complex system of language. The reply might be as follows: 'Well, language may be highly sophisticated, but what I know for certain is that object in front of me.' And so ultimately the reply is 'This', accompanied by a pointing gesture. Language may be misleading but the gesture is held to be correct since it is somehow in an immediate relationship to the object. This is supposed to be the case with words like 'Here' and 'Now', which are alleged to make an immediate and unique reference to place and time. If I say that this stapling machine is eight inches from

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my nose at ten p.m. on 18 March 1987, I have brought in a reference to the whole history of mankind.⁷ So we refine it down to a 'This' of unspecified form — the ultimate in particularity. But Hegel shows in his dialectic of the 'Now', 'Here' and 'This', that 'This' connotes the ultimate in generality.

The 'Now'

Says Hegel:

To the question what is the Now? we reply, for example, Now is night time. To test the truth of this certainty of sense a simple experiment is all we need: write the truth down. A truth cannot lose anything by being written down, and just as little by our preserving and keeping it. Yet if we look again at the truth we have written down, look at it *now*, and this *noon-time*, we shall have to say that it has turned stale and become out of date. (PG MM 84/B 151)

The position challenged by Hegel can be expressed as follows: The word 'now' stands for a particular, namely the present moment, but like pronouns it stands for an ambiguous particular because the present is always changing. The sensory realist claims to be experiencing an item of sense-certainty at a specific moment in time, so Hegel says: 'Write it down now, a truth cannot lose anything by being written down.' But the trouble is that the content of the 'Now' has gone, it is now night-time. Implicit in this request is recognition that the mere recording of a datum of experience cannot serve as an adequate reference since something, not given in sensory experience, is required. The exponent of sense immediacy who writes the word 'Now' on a piece of paper to designate the time of his experience must be prepared to explain whether his 'Now' is 'determined through and by means of the fact that something else, namely day and night, is not' (PG MM 84/B 152). Hegel's point is that with time we make a necessary reference to before or after, which is impermissible from the standpoint of sense-certainty.

The 'Here'

Hegel's next move is to ask his protagonist to specify what he is

referring to; first it is a tree, but when he turns around it is a house.

The Here is e.g. the tree. I turn about and this truth has disappeared and has changed into its opposite: the Here is not a tree, but a house. The Here itself does not disappear; it *is* and remains in the disappearance of the house, tree, and so on, and is indifferently house, tree. The This is shown once again to be *mediated simplicity*, in other words, to be *universality*. (PG MM 85/B 152–3)

The picture is of someone on a roundabout trying to indicate a specific object, but precisely in the absence of a more sophisticated conceptual apparatus his gestures express an ultimate in generality.

Can we conclude that Hegel is denying the possibility of making any intelligible unique reference to particulars on the grounds that whatever we refer to with the words 'Here' and 'Now' and 'This' cannot be isolated because sensory particulars, although they are absolute realities, are in such a state of flux that they can *never* be arrested? This conclusion is, in fact, the other side of the realist coin and is still anchored to the Russellian assumption that language is essentially a process of naming — albeit an inadequate process. This interpretation is advanced by Loewenberg, who suggests that Hegel's argument is based on the Heraclitean thesis that one cannot step twice into the same river, since time and matter are never at rest. Says Loewenberg: 'an instant intuition simply does not endure long enough to permit its datum to be directly indicated: the datum indicated is but a datum of another intuition. How point to an intuited datum without freezing the intuition entertaining it?'⁸ On this view it would follow that Hegel is saying that our ordinary concepts of 'Here' and 'Now' and 'This' are somehow inexact — a conclusion drawn by philosophical sceptics. But this is not Hegel's position at all. Like Wittgenstein he holds that language, as the form in which spirit exists, founds sense-certainty rather than being founded by it, and that 'language . . . is the more truthful' (PG MM 85/B 152).

To understand what Hegel is doing we must remember that he is thinking himself into the same frame of mind as the sensory realist who treats 'Here' as a proper name for a datum of sense and 'Now' as a proper name for a unit of time. If we take seriously

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the words 'Now' and 'Here' as proper names many oddities must follow. For example, what are we to make of: 'Do it now, boy!'

It is conceivable that one might point out that it is too late. But in a very queer sense it is always too late to comply with this order, since a portion of time has passed since the utterance of the command. Nevertheless, if one replied that it was already too late because 'Now' has passed, it would be treated as the sort of triviality one might expect from a 'smart Alec' schoolboy. 'Do it now, boy!' means 'get cracking', 'don't linger', and so on. No specific time is referred to. If the boy replied with 'which now?' his remark would be treated by his teacher as either trivially impudent or completely unintelligible.

But Hegel's point is that the question 'Which now?' or 'Which here?' has a very important philosophical significance when put to a philosopher who claims that space and time can be interpreted as a series of sensory 'Heres' and 'Nows'. It reveals that there is something odd about his conception of 'Here' and 'Now'. So while in ordinary usage 'Which Now?' or 'Which Here do you mean?' has no meaning at all, it does serve as a very important corrective to the postulates of an atomistic theory of knowledge.

The 'This'

A similar argument applies to Russell's 'This'. When a philosopher speaks of 'This' as a proper name, and maintains that pointing is logically prior to language, it is permissible, if he points to a pencil, to ask 'Which pencil?' — even if it is in immediate proximity to his finger. For if it is said that pointing and naming precede general grammatical rules and cultural conventions, the isolated act of pointing and naming should be sufficiently clear. We reveal the falsehood of the assumption by asking 'Which pencil?' feigning ignorance of all the conventions and grammatical rules involved. Hegel's argument here is echoed in Wittgenstein's attitude towards the commonsense realism of Moore.⁹ Referring to Moore's claim to know that he has a body Wittgenstein says: 'If somebody says "I have a body", he can be asked "Who is speaking here with this mouth?"' (OC 244). This is exactly what Hegel has in mind when he says: 'it is reasonable that the person making this demand should say what "this thing" or *what "this I"*, he means: but to say this is quite impossible' (PG MM 87/B 154). And:

They 'mean' this bit of paper I am writing on, or rather, *have* written on: but they do not say what they mean. If they really wanted to say this bit of paper which they 'mean', and they wanted to say so, that is impossible, because the *This* of sense, which is 'meant', cannot be reached by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e., to what is inherently universal. (*PG MM 91/B 159*)

Hegel's procedure consists of taking the sensory realist seriously showing how he cannot make a unique reference, cannot indicate what he means. Whatever he points to when he says 'This, here, now' we can always ask 'What, where, when?' This is because his words and gestures are incomplete outside of institutions which in turn presupposes a highly complex learning system. Hegel is very close here to Wittgenstein's view that words only have a meaning within the context of a system of general rules. But this is the very opposite of the claims of a consciousness to whom pointing and gestures are the grounds upon which the edifice of language is built, since it now appears that we cannot have the grounds without the language.

Having failed to find satisfaction in the objective account of the foundations of language, the inquiry now shifts to the subjective account. In this transition Hegel demonstrates how easily abstract philosophical doctrines pass into their opposites, how realism passes into subjective idealism and solipsism.

Solipsism

Hegel effects the transition from the object to the subject by means of the term '*meinen*', which has a more personal connotation than '*bedeuten*'. The object referred to is meant in the sense of 'my meaning'. The most accurate equivalent word would be the old English verb 'to opine'. Thus having failed to indicate a particular of sense-certainty Hegel's protagonist is portrayed in terms of a subjective appeal. We can imagine him saying 'Well, at least I know what I mean by this', pointing affirmatively. As Hegel says: 'the truth now rests in the object as my (*meinem*) object, or lies in what I mean (*meinen*); it is because I know it. Sense certainty is thus indeed banished from the object, but is not yet done away with; it is merely forced back into the I' (*PG MM 86/B 153*).

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Realism and solipsism have traditionally been held to stand in strict antithesis to each other. But Hegel, like Wittgenstein, held that commonsense realism cannot provide an adequate refutation of solipsism. When Wittgenstein puts into the mouth of the solipsist the words, 'It is essential that the other should not be able to understand what I really mean' (*BB* 65), he is revealing that the solipsist is operating with a logical exclusion which the realist misunderstands as a lack of information. For Wittgenstein the refutation of solipsism must consist in showing that solipsism is unthinkable. Hegel's argument is similar to Wittgenstein's, and it is clear, from the way he depicts solipsism as a development of realism, that the refutation of solipsism must also entail a refutation of realism as well.

In what sense do solipsism and realism coincide? For the realist a solipsist is one who claims that another's experience is problematic. His response is to argue that no difficulty exists since we know, by analogy with our own experience, what another person experiences. It is a matter of common sense, he would say, that other people experience what I experience. But here the realist has failed to grasp that an appeal to one's own experience does not provide us with a criterion of the identity of experiences that make it possible to ascribe them to others. In order to provide an adequate refutation of solipsism the realist must get at the roots of the solipsist's assumptions, but in doing so discovers that he adheres to them as well as his protagonist. According to Hegel they both share the assumption that the only proper names are 'This', 'Here', 'Now' and 'I'. One might think that on the question of the 'I' they are furthest apart. For example:

- a. There is no 'I' only a bundle of sensations! (Hume)
- b. You cannot be certain of anything other than your own mind. (Descartes)

Yet for Hegel these are two variations on the same theme. One can either say the mind does not exist or the world does not exist. One is simply going backward and forward in the same dialectic. We have seen how the 'Here', 'Now' and 'This' of Hume or Russell either refer to nothing or everything; so it is also with the 'I' of the solipsistic idealists. Cartesians assume that the expression 'I' has a referent, but the kind of referent it has for the solipsist is very much the same as the 'This' for the realist. What,

for example, is this 'I' that is given independent of the world's existence? Suppose we admit the possibility of knowing only one's own existence; what description could anyone offer of such an experience? Hegel puts the following words into his protagonist's mouth: 'I am directly conscious, I intuit and nothing more, I am pure intuition; I am — seeing, looking' (*PG MM* 89/B 155). In this way we arrive at the assertion of pure immediacy. But a creature in this state cannot say anything; cannot classify, compare, or individuate, but would be in a state of pure solipsism, akin to what Santayana once described as 'solipsism of the moment'.¹⁰ Such a creature would not even know what the 'I' was, since it would have no relevance.

It is interesting to compare the solipsism of the sensory realist with the tendency towards solipsism in Wittgenstein's *Notebooks*. In the *Notebooks* when Wittgenstein tells us that 'Things acquire "significance" only through their relation to my will' (*NB* 84), he is thinking of naming as an essentially *private* activity. In his later writings it is clear that Wittgenstein had detected, like Hegel, the common characteristics of solipsism and sensory realism. In the *Blue and Brown Books* Wittgenstein argues that both solipsism and realism are bound up with the phenomenon of *staring*; from a fixation with static objects: 'Thus we may be tempted to say "Only this is really seen" when we stare at unchanging surroundings, whereas we may not at all be tempted to say this when we look about us while we are walking' (*BB* 66). If we remember that the realist was snared into solipsism by trying to give a determinate account of referring, claiming that sensations were 'my own' (*meinen*) as he pointed affirmatively, we can see a connection between Hegel and Wittgenstein who both maintain that solipsism has its source in certain assumptions peculiar to the standpoint of sense-certainty, that one can 'bring out the relation between name and thing named by staring at the object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times' (*PI* 38).

Once we think of how tables, chairs, or stoves, look to oneself we are halfway towards thinking of a world that belongs to oneself alone. Once started on the search for the absolute determinacy of sense it is not long before one concludes with Russell that language is too vague to capture a precise reference, that only I know what I mean by 'This'. And so, like Hegel's protagonist, the early Wittgenstein adopted a psychological approach to the problem of correlating a name with its bearer,

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attempting to indicate what *he meant*, by pointing affirmatively and saying: *‘Ich weiss, was ich meine; ich meine eben DAS’* (NB 70).

With uncanny similarity to the sensory realist in Hegel’s example with the piece of paper, Wittgenstein imagines himself telling someone that ‘the watch is on the table’. But, given the vagueness of language, how can he make a unique reference to it?

To anyone that sees clearly it is obvious that a proposition like ‘This watch is lying on the table’ contains a lot of indefiniteness, in spite of its form’s being completely clear and simple in outward appearance. So we see that this simplicity is only constructed. (NB 69)

It is then also clear to the *uncaptive* mind that the sense [*Sinn*] of the proposition ‘The watch is lying on the table’ is more complicated than the proposition itself. (NB 69)

Wittgenstein imagines telling someone ‘The watch is lying on the table’ (NB 70), but now his interlocutor asks him what he means by ‘lying’. How can he fix the exact determination of this term? Only by saying “‘I know what I mean; I mean just THIS.” pointing to the appropriate complex with my finger’ (NB 70).

The assumption of both solipsism and sensory realism is that what is sensed is in some way private to the perceiver. By challenging the solipsist to provide a content to his experience — namely his experience of himself — Hegel is challenging the very roots of solipsism, for in the absence of a public language the solipsist cannot specify ‘what this “I” refers to’ (PG MM 87/B 154). What Hegel is trying to say is illuminated by P.T. Geach who has argued that the use of the personal pronoun is a public activity. But what of those occasions when we use the term ‘I’ in soliloquy? When used in soliloquy it is not used in order to direct one’s attention to oneself. When I say to myself ‘I am in a muddle’, I am not referring to myself; in such cases the term ‘I’ is superfluous. In soliloquy we can quite easily express our thoughts without use of the first person pronouns. As Geach puts it:

The use of ‘I’ in such soliloquies is derivative from, parasitic upon, its use in talking to others; when there are not others, ‘I’ is redundant, and has no special reference. ‘I am very puzzled at this problem’ really says no more than ‘This problem is puzzling’ (*demonstratio ad intellectum* again).¹¹

Unless we are familiar with general and interpersonal rules of

linguistic use, with what Hegel calls the 'universal', we cannot make use of the first-person personal pronoun. The cogito held by Descartes as the foundation of knowledge and certainty, is parasitic upon a mastery of language and the possession of intersubjective knowledge. Remove language and we cannot arrive at the concept of an 'I' that thinks.

In so far as knowledge and language are held to be reducible to the contents of particular experiences indicated by the 'proper names' 'This', 'Here', 'Now' and 'I', there is little distinction between sensory realists and solipsists. Both remain in the same metaphysical ground merely emphasising different aspects of an assumption which Hegel depicts as common to both of them; namely that thought and language can be reduced to reference to and denomination of particulars given in immediacy. Hegel expresses this connection by saying that both 'the "object" and the "I" are universals' (*PG MM 87/B 155*). We cannot isolate the 'I' or the 'This' and present the act of referring to and naming either of them as the foundation of language and thought. It is necessary to bring in something else. How much else, however, is a matter that cannot be settled by abstract speculations. The very attempt to isolate and refer to an ultimate particular causes it to evaporate into everything.

The adequacy of language

Hegel's protagonist has one avenue left open to him: if he is to retain the cognitive primacy of individual sense-experience over 'the universal', that is, over general grammatical rules expressing a particular life-form, he must deny the adequacy of language. So the question arises, why not condemn speech rather than sense-immediacy? The objection is that looking at language is really an all too indirect way of looking at the world. Might it be the case that language can never depict the world correctly, that language may somehow distort what is given in experience? This is how the problem appears to Loewenberg, who objects to 'Hegel's cavalier treatment of the claims for sense-certainty' which demands the 'sacrifice of experienced intimacy to descriptive propriety'.¹² 'Why disparage sense experience?', asks Loewenberg,

Why not challenge instead the hegemony of thought? He who silently enjoys the sensible qualities of things cannot be

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charged with contradiction unless he stoops to argue. And if induced to argue, and to argue absurdly, he may refuse to graft upon his intuition the equivocations attending his words.¹³

But against Loewenberg it is important to note that the onus is on Hegel's protagonist to prove the inadequacy of language. He who does not argue forfeits his ability to convince. It is clear that language cannot be criticised in words, for:

Language is the more truthful; in it we ourselves refute directly and at once our own 'meaning'; and since universality is the real truth of sense-certainty, and language merely expresses *this* truth, it is not possible at all for us even to express in words any sensuous existence which we 'mean'. (*PG MM 85/B 152*)

Hegel does not accept, as Loewenberg does, the existence of a strict dichotomy between experience and speech. Instead he draws attention to the importance of language in the acquisition of even the most elementary knowledge, and he insists that language, being general or universal, precedes and orders the individual's sense-experience, a view which is matched in Wittgenstein's: 'It is only in a language that I can mean something' (*PI* p. 18 footnote). The limits of language are the limits of human knowledge or sense experience. There is nothing about sense impressions which can be known or even meant without being expressible in language. One cannot mean something that one knows independently of language, since 'language as the universal simply expresses the knowing activity of consciousness itself' (*PG MM 91-92/B 159*). Hegel's protagonist is not prevented from saying what he means because language is inadequate, but because his meaning, as unsayable, is inadequate as meaning. Any knowledge which language is inadequate to express is itself inadequate to qualify as knowledge. Raymond Plant takes up a position similar to Loewenberg's when he writes: 'Hegel's assertion of the harmony between thought and being, despite his dialectical virtuosity in an attempt to prove the contrary, remains a presupposition which is neither rationally checkable nor disprovable.'¹⁴ Against this view James Ogilvy argues:

The very idea of a global 'check' that would compare our

logic against the real is superseded by the realization that every conceivable 'check' is and always has been *internal* to the self-developing process that links the history of knowledge with the equally historical development of what qualifies as an object of knowledge.¹⁵

In this way we find that the demand for a foundational 'check' on language falls into the logical circle of 'knowing before you know', which Hegel attributed to the Kantian critique of knowledge. For if it were true that a 'global check' were possible how could we substantiate this claim? What kind of language would do the job? Parallels can be drawn between Hegel's objection to Kant's critical method and Wittgenstein's later criticism of the *Tractatus*. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein had attempted to discover the 'general form of a proposition' but ostensibly failed to resolve the same logical circle which Hegel saw in the Kantian critique, namely, that one must use language (knowledge) in order to examine language (knowledge). The attempt to express the essence of language cannot be expressed in language. The reason why Wittgenstein eventually took it upon himself to describe the actual use of language is not unrelated to Hegel's decision, in the *Phenomenology*, to describe the actual experience of knowledge.

Another way of resolving the charge that language is inadequate is to ask whether there is an essential difference between finding out what a word means and finding out about the world. In an essay related to the present topic Stanley Cavell asks us to imagine a situation where

you are in your armchair reading a book of reminiscences and come across the word 'umiak'. You reach for your dictionary and look it up. Now what did you do? Find out what 'umiak' means, or find out what a umiak is? But how could we have discovered something about the world by hunting in a dictionary? If this seems surprising, perhaps it is because we forget that we learn language and learn the world *together*, that they become elaborated and distorted together, and in the same places.¹⁶

Mastery of language and knowledge of the world are here one and the same activity. For this reason Hegel's argument is not faulted on an alleged contradiction between sense-certainty and speech. When Hegel says that 'language as the universal simply expresses

the knowing activity of consciousness' he means that in the absence of language we could have no knowledge of our sense impressions. In this respect he shares with Wittgenstein the belief that sensations are linguistically rule-governed and are not ultimates upon which language is allegedly founded. Hegel goes to greatly exaggerated lengths to justify his conclusion that *sinnliche Gegenständen* are not the ultimate and absolute constituents of reality. In a rather bizarre example he first appeals to the classical wisdom of the Eleusian mysteries, of Ceres and Bacchus, and he concludes by invoking the behaviour of 'dumb animals, who fall upon and devour these objects,' to illustrate his claim that: 'all nature proclaims, as animals do, these open secrets, these mysteries revealed to all, which teach what the truths of the things of sense really are' (*PG MM* 91/B 159). Such examples, though seemingly ludicrous, testify to the seriousness with which Hegel combats the claim to ground the foundations of human knowledge in particular items of sense-experience.¹⁷ His seriousness can be appreciated if we remember that he is combating a tendency towards scepticism which lurks within the sense-certainty. Referring to his contemporaries, Hegel says: 'Of a metaphysics prevalent today which maintains that we cannot know things because they are absolutely shut to us, it might be said that not even the animals are so stupid as these metaphysicians; for they go after things, seize and consume them' (*Enz.* 246).

Language games

There is a very close connection between Hegel's sensory realist and Wittgenstein's famous example of the builders in the *Investigations*. In both cases a faulty account of language and reality is exposed. Wittgenstein's imaginary builders in fact cannot be speaking a language, for a 'language' confined only to the occupational aspect of their total life is not really a language at all.¹⁸ Wittgenstein's builders, his 'imaginary' languages consisting only of orders and so on, like Hegel's exposition of sense-certainty, are designed to show that the existence of language and society are necessary preconditions for any particular language-game. The words 'Slab', 'Block' and 'Beam' of Wittgenstein's builders and Hegel's 'Here', 'Now' and 'This' are not ultimates of language to which we add 'Please bring me a Slab, here now.' Instead, they depend upon an entire system of human language and culture.

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To disregard human culture, as Hegel and Wittgenstein encourage their respective protagonists to do, is to commit oneself to solipsistic silence. For this reason a language game is given sense by virtue of the possible use of its expressions in other (albeit different) language games. This is essentially Wittgenstein's point when he says 'I want to say: it is essential to mathematics that its signs should also be used in civil life' (*RFM* IV.2). Unless the conclusions we draw in a piece of mathematical reasoning (or any other discipline) can have some bearing on other aspects of our lives, it cannot be called a meaningful piece of reasoning. That the component expressions can be used elsewhere gives them a point in mathematics. There is a parallel between the way in which mathematics depends upon an external use of its expressions and the way in which the language of the builders, or Hegel's exponent of sense-certainty, depends on an external use of their expressions; and sense-certainty's naming game of 'This', 'Here' and 'Now' cannot get started unless the expressions used within it already have meaning outside of it. For both Wittgenstein and Hegel there are no foundations for language and no foundational language games.

Their alternative to a reductionistic foundational approach is to describe the uses of language as it is employed within a given system of knowledge. This is what is done in Hegel's *Phenomenology* and in Wittgenstein's later writings: 'it is important to emphasize . . . that knowledge is only real and can only be set forth in the form of science, in the form of a system' (*PG* MM 27/B 885). But this bears comparison with the position Wittgenstein took when he gave up the foundational approach of the *Tractatus*. By *On Certainty* his position had converged with Hegel's own: 'When we first believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole)' (*OC* 141). And matching Hegel's 'the truth is only realized in the form of a system' (*PG* MM 28/B 85) is Wittgenstein's assertion that 'it is not the single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is the system in which the consequences and premises give one another *mutual* support', (*OC* 142. See also 143, 144, 410). An understanding of the truths expressed by language is not dependent upon there being a realm of foundational certainty, but upon a wealth of knowledge about human life-forms. Here Wittgenstein and Hegel are in agreement. But Hegel claimed to show that what Wittgenstein called 'life-forms' have histories and pre-histories. A *deeper* understanding of

language may depend on a wealth of knowledge about human history.

Taking perception seriously

In the chapter on perception Hegel turns to a more sophisticated version of realism, which he characterises as 'Perception'. The title of this chapter signifies a typical Hegelian pun: *Wahrnehmung*, which literally means 'to take truly', implies taking truly that which is given in sense experience. In an even deeper sense it reflects one of the guiding principles of Hegel's phenomenological method: to take truly, or seriously, the presuppositions which underpin philosophical standpoints — until they collapse under the weight of their inner contradictions.

Among the traditional problems about perception are the following: should we regard the Perceiver as playing a major or minor part in the activity of perception? Should we analyse perception in terms of the subject or the object of perception? Does the object's being depend on it being perceived? Or does it exist independently of a system of mediations? The tension Hegel uncovers, when he depicts perception as the 'taking truly of the sensuously given', is between perception-as-passive-reception and perception-as-an-act-of-knowledge.

From the standpoint of sense-certainty the choice was between self-contradiction and solipsistic silence but the domain of *Wahrnehmung* is a public one. Unlike sense data, percepts are describable in terms of perceivably determinate properties. Perceiving, herein depicted, is characterised in terms of a relationship between a subject that passively receives and an object that is perceived. From this standpoint the truth lies in the object; it matters little whether it is perceived, the act of perceiving being what Hegel depicts as a 'non-essential moment'.

So what, asks Hegel, is this object confronting the Perceiver? According to the assumptions of commonsense realism the Perceiver 'takes truly' what is perceived and passively receives what is given in experience. Hegel's approach consists in asking the Perceiver-philosopher to demonstrate the ability to passively record the given object — in this case a cube of salt — as a thing endowed with determinate properties since, according to the Perceiver, 'the object shows itself by so doing to be a *thing with many properties*' (PG MM 94/B 162). What is seen is sense-

dependent, but what the senses reveal are universally recognisable properties.

The sense element is in this way itself still present, but not in the form of some particular that is 'meant' — as had to be in the case of immediate certainty — but as a universal, as that which will have the character of a *property*. (PG MM 94/B 163)

But, asks Hegel, given that we perceive universal properties and not particular unrelated sense-impressions, are we any better off than the standpoint of sense-certainty? Unless we know something over and above these properties we could not understand which properties belong to the object and which do not; we would lack a principle of classification. These universal properties, then, being 'self-related, are indifferent to each other, each is by itself free from the rest . . . they interpenetrate without affecting one another' (PG MM 94–5/B 164). As such, the universal qualities perceived are themselves abstractions, which Hegel characterises as 'Thinghood' (*Dingheit*), and are 'nothing else than the Here and Now as This on analysis turned out to be, viz., a simple togetherness of many Heres and Nows' (PG MM 95/B 164).

Hegel's treatment of the perceiving standpoint is similar to his treatment of sense-certainty. He says to the Perceiver: 'Here is a piece of salt, but you cannot call it a piece of salt since, according to you, it is merely a collection of universal qualities which, as you say, "do not affect each other in their interpenetration". There before you are the properties of whiteness, tartness of taste, and cubical shape. But you, who recognise these universal properties, must tell me what principle you employ to unite these manifold distinct properties in one object. Moreover, if as you say, the "many determinate properties are utterly indifferent to each other, and are entirely related to themselves alone, they would not be determinate; for they are so, merely in so far as they are *distinguished* and related to others as opposites"' (PG MM 95/B 165). In other words, we cannot learn of properties in isolation from other items of knowledge. To recognise a property involves, amongst other things, knowing how to recognise what it is not. This is essentially the point that post-Wittgensteinian philosophers have made when they argue that knowing the concept 'red' is bound up with knowing what is not red; that

there is not another realm of negative facts — as Russell and the naïve realists thought — which can be learnt in addition to the ‘facts’ standing in immediate relationship to the senses. As Geach says: ‘Surely what I exercise in using the term “not red” is simply the concept *red*; knowing what *is* red and knowing what *is not* red are inseparable — *eadem est scientia oppositorum*.’¹⁹

If someone claims to have knowledge of an object by virtue of its properties something should be known about the properties it does not have. But these properties are not given in the immediacy of perception and are external to the simple consciousness depicted in the present phenomenal standpoint. Yet for a percept to possess determinate properties in its own right it must possess properties which are not given in passive perception, since only in the possession of them can it enjoy independence. This is the paradox of the Perceiver’s standpoint. But Hegel, who takes seriously the standpoint of the Perceiver, must assume that knowledge of a thing and its properties is exactly as the Perceiver claims.

Given Hegel’s method, what is the criterion for deciding whether the reported perceptions are correct? If the object, on this view, is ‘true and universal’ then might it not be the case that ‘consciousness apprehends the object wrongly and deceives itself? (*PG MM 97/B 167*) Hegel allows the Perceiver to be aware of this possibility, but points out that the only possible criterion could be ‘self-sameness’, and that as the data before him is diverse the procedure will consist of ‘relating the diverse moments of his apprehension to one another’ in a simple one to one correlation (*PG MM 97/B 167*). However, we should note that because this standpoint assumes the object to be true and independent of a system of mediations the responsibility for the failure to match two experiences together would lie with the Perceiver and not the object. It is in this way that the area of interest in Hegel’s example falls upon the subject rather than the object of perception.

Hegel asks the Perceiver ‘what sort of experience does consciousness form in the course of its actual perception?’ (*PG MM 97/B 167*) What kind of experience is this passive reception of sensory qualities? ‘The object, which is apprehended, presents itself as purely “one” and single’, replies the Perceiver. ‘Moreover I am aware of the “property” (*Eigenschaft*) in it, a property which is universal, thereby transcending the particularity of the object. The first form of being, in which the objective reality has the

sense of a “one”, and thus was not its true being; and since the *object* is the true fact here, the untruth falls on my side, and the apprehension was not correct. According to my account of the universality of the property I am therefore required to take the objective entity as a community (*Gemeinschaft*) of properties’ (PG MM 97/B 167). This is the contradictory standpoint of the perceiving consciousness; the object is perceived as both one and many.

So the questions now put to the Perceiver are ‘Is the object perceived one or many?’ Is it to be considered as a community of properties or as one thing? What is the principle employed to unite these properties into one object? If these properties are universal and could belong to any object how do we know that they belong to this object — this cube of salt — before us? How do we know that the tartness of taste, cubical shape, and whiteness before us belong to one object and to nothing else? Normally of course, these questions would be irrelevant, but it does make sense to ask them of a philosopher who maintains that the activity of perception involves nothing more than the passive awareness of properties sensuously given. One might think that the One-Many argument that Hegel is employing is not a satisfactory refutation of the Perceiver’s standpoint. It is obviously not, but then Hegel’s method is to present the problems as they occur within the standpoint he is depicting. For this reason Hegel’s employment of a sceptical argument of this nature is justified as a short-term measure. The Perceiver’s dilemma is: whether to say the thing is one and deny the universality of its properties, holding that they can only belong to this cube of salt, or to assert the universality of its properties and deny that the thing is one? According to Hegel the Perceiver reacts to this dilemma by falling back on the claim that all we see are atomic properties; that the given object is experienced as a plurality of properties. But this position abandons the perceptual standpoint, for now the Perceiver cannot maintain his claim to perceive a concrete object before him, experiencing only a set of disconnected properties. The position forced on him is that of sense-certainty.

Critical realism

Should the Perceiver return to the standpoint of sense-certainty or revise the standpoint of Perception? A return to sense-certainty is ruled out since there is no point in maintaining a discussion

with one who retreats to a position already refuted. On the strength of this dilemma the dialectic moves forward, although it should not be forgotten that we are still dealing with the basic assumptions of an object-receptor theory of knowledge.


Seeing the above-mentioned dilemma from the standpoint of the Perceiver, it appears that the latter is aware that he does perceive one object, but the 'evidence of his senses' supports the assertion that what is seen is a community of properties. He therefore resorts to a subjective appeal, a 'return back into consciousness', saying: 'I am aware of the thing as a one, but, if in the course of my perceiving something crops up contradicting that then I must take it to be due to my reflection' (*PG MM 99/B 169*). That is to say, perceiving the object as a many is due to the diversity of the sense-organs; this solitary cube of salt is in point of fact, 'merely white to our eyes, also tart to our tongue, and also cubical to our feeling, and so on' (*PG MM 99/B 170*). With this line of reasoning we can conclude that the object's diversity comes not from the thing, but from the sense organs. The distinctness of the sense organs entails that the perception of the object will be of its diverse properties. So whilst the Perceiver 'knows' the thing to be one, sense-experience is of its many properties. Hence: 'We are consequently, the universal medium where such elements get disassociated, and exist each by itself' (*PG MM 99/B 170*). On the other hand the one-ness of the object is determined by the unifying process of the mind: 'Putting these properties into a "one" belongs solely to consciousness', says the Perceiver (*PG MM 101/B 171*). It is the transference of the many properties of the thing to the unifying mind which re-establishes the thing's unity and 'self-sameness'. The unifying mind supercedes the disparate sensory properties. What is wrong with this account? In the first place it is held that the salt is objective because its qualities are objective, but the activity of the mind in the uniting of these qualities into a single entity is subjective. There is no criterion for determining whether the object is one; all that has been argued so far is that consciousness holds the properties together. But given that the mind unites them, why should the salt, in itself, be a unity any more than a plurality? Which is more important? And what is the criterion according to which the mind determines the unity or plurality of phenomena? The mind can either unite or separate them with equal plausibility. By what principle does the mind unite the qualities of whiteness, tartness, etc., into a single cube of salt?

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Now being of equal plausibility these two alternatives entail a third possibility; if the operation of the mind can reveal divergent results the thing must be capable of adapting itself to antithetical categories. For instance: 'Now I see it as a many, now I see it as a one', just as we can say with duck-rabbit pictures, 'Now I see it as a duck, now a rabbit'. From the standpoint of *Wahrnehmung* if the senses reveal antithetical categories then the object must possess antithetical properties and is capable of changing from a one to a many. Apparently the object exhibits two contradictory modes of being. Otherwise an explanation of how the thing appears independently of actual perception would be required and that would supersede the standpoint of perception. The position which the Perceiver is obliged to accept is that: 'Consciousness thus finds through this comparison that not only *its* way of taking the truth contains the diverse moments of apprehension and return upon itself, but that the truth itself, the thing, manifests itself in this twofold moment' (*PG MM 101/B 172*). If the object is given in this twofold manner the Perceiver must abandon the idea that the mind is the source of the object's unity or plurality. In this way the experiment with critical realism returns once more to the naïve realism of sense-certainty.

The claim to alternate between seeing the object as one or a many has certain affinities with the point expressed in Wittgenstein's example of the duck-rabbit in the *Investigations* II.xi. When considering the report 'Now it is a duck, now it is a rabbit' it is possible to draw two conclusions. We may (i) think that we are interpreting the same data differently, or (ii) think that the object must be changing. But Wittgenstein argues 'seeing as' involves (i) no difference of interpretation, and (ii) no change in the properties of the object, but merely seeing under a different aspect. This, of course, involves a more active consciousness than the perceiving consciousness. The same argument can be applied to the Perceiver's account of the object's plurality and singularity.

Figure 4.1



'Now I see it as a one, now I see it as a many' does not involve any change in the object or the perceptual apparatus.

Wittgenstein's point is that seeing implies a grammar and a considerable exercise of the imagination. For example to see the triangle as an object that has fallen over, says Wittgenstein, 'demands imagination' (*PG* II.xi). Similarly he asks, 'Doesn't it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme? And yet one is perceiving something in so hearing it' (*PI* II.xi). Wittgenstein's argument here can shed light upon Hegel's treatment of the perceiving consciousness. Both Hegel and Wittgenstein stress the internal link between seeing and thinking. Says Wittgenstein: 'Is it a question of both seeing *and* thinking? or an amalgam of the two, as I should almost like to say?' (*PI* II.xi). And 'It is almost as if "seeing the sign in this context" were an echo of thought. "The echo of a thought in sight" — one would like to say' (*PI* II.xi). The point is that there is more to perception than the exercise of the relevant sense organs. Wittgenstein, like Hegel, draws attention to the internal relation between the present, the past and other objects with the object of perception. For example: 'I meet someone whom I have not seen for years; I see him clearly, but fail to know him. Suddenly I know him, I see the old face in the altered one' (*PI* II.xi). In this example the 'dawning of an aspect' does not involve any change in the visual data; instead a connection is made between the present experience and previous ones. This is why Wittgenstein says that 'what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is . . . an internal relation between it (the object) and other objects' (*PI* II.xi). But according to the Perceiver there is no employment or contribution of knowledge to the act of perception. The Perceiver claims to receive sense-impressions which are assembled into a plurality or a singularity without any contribution other than the senses and the unifying operation of the mind. For that reason, when faced with contradictory accounts of an experience, or changing aspects, he must assert that either the structure of the object is changeable or the senses are deceptive. It is clear that a more sophisticated version of the perceiving standpoint is required.

**Sophisticated commonsense:
the sophistry of 'in so far as'**

This new position attempts to have it both ways; to maintain the advantages of naïve realism from one point of view and the

advantages of critical realism from another. In Hegel's terms, the object of this consciousness 'is now the entire process which was previously shared between the object and consciousness' (PG MM 101/B 172). The Perceiver, however, becomes a prey for sophistry, betraying himself with a reliance upon the qualifying expression 'in so far as'. The thing is held to be one 'in so far as it is for itself' and not 'for another'. The object is whatever it becomes by virtue of its various relations. For example, 'in so far as it is influenced by this . . . it will exhibit qualities differing from those when it is taken by itself'. Crucial here is the fatuous qualification 'It all depends on . . .'. A thing is held to have no fixed status; what is perceived is relative to different points of view. The cube of salt would have one set of qualities in so far as it is seen from this aspect, and another set of qualities in so far as it is seen from another aspect.

The standpoint of 'Sophisticated Commonsense' might be expressed thus: unity and diversity belong to the thing perceived, but in no absolute fashion. A thing is one in so far as I focus my attention on it, but in so far as I shift my gaze to its many properties I alter my perspective and view it as a medium of disparate universals. The sophistry of 'in so far as' seeks, in this way, to render the contradiction between the one and the many innocuous. For example:

The thing is, thus, doubtless as it stands (*an und für sich*) selfsame, but this unity with itself is disturbed by other things. In this way the unity of the thing is preserved, and, at the same time, the otherness is preserved outside the thing as well as outside consciousness. (PG MM 102/B 173)

Of course this position does express a certain truth, but grasping what is true involves considerable knowledge and informed discrimination, not the sensation-based opinion of the Perceiver. To see something as either a duck or a rabbit or a fallen triangle in a drawing requires a little knowledge and imagination, but the question Hegel raises is not swept aside with references to the imagination's ability to see something *as* something. One might, with the aid of the imagination, see the duck-rabbit as either a duck or a rabbit, but this is not similar to seeing a cube of salt as either a solitary cube or a manifold of unrelated properties. We do not, for example, speak of seeing something as either a cube of salt (with the possible exception of a discussion about artistic

representation) or a manifold of unrelated properties. Seeing a cube of salt is not a mere exercise of the imagination on a par with the ability to see either a duck or a rabbit in a picture. This indicates the limitations on Wittgenstein's model of 'seeing as', which is why it should only be employed as an initial step towards breaking the hold of the theory-observation distinction. For if someone speaks of seeing something as something it is always possible to ask 'What is it that is seen as something?' To see something *as* something actually presupposes a neutral fact, the 'thing' independently of how we see it. The duck-rabbit sketch, is such a neutral thing; it is a standard example in psychology, a drawing intended to be seen this way or that according to one's *gestalt*. Similarly the example of the fallen triangle is a drawing on a page which can be seen this way or that. There is something objective on the page to which we can switch our *gestalts*. But these types of *gestalt* switches do not take place with regard to real objects. If we are confronted with a fallen tree across the road we do not see it *as* a fallen tree, we *see* a fallen tree. What else could we see it as? Drawing attention to *gestalt* switches is only helpful in making an inroad into the theory-observation distinction. Kuhn, for example, recognises both the limitations and the value of *gestalt* switch models. Speaking of 'paradigm' switches he remarks how:

Others who have noted this aspect of scientific advance have emphasised its similarity to a change in visual *gestalt*: the marks on paper that were first seen as a bird are now seen as an antelope and vice-versa. That parallel can be misleading. Scientists do not see something *as* something else; instead they simply see it . . . Nevertheless, the switch of *gestalt*, in particular because it is today so familiar, is a useful elementary prototype for what occurs in full-scale paradigm shift.²⁰

Whilst an exchange of conceptual frameworks, or in Hegel's terms a transition from one shape (*gestalt*) of consciousness to another, resembles the prototype of 'seeing as', in neither science nor everyday life is it possible to switch backwards and forwards from one to another. No scientist would conceive of switching backwards and forwards from phlogiston theory to oxygen theory. Similarly with the conceptual switch accompanying the Copernican revolution. Says Kuhn:

Looking at the moon, the convert to Copernicanism does not say, 'I used to see a planet, but now I see a satellite'. That locution would imply a sense in which the Ptolemaic system had once been correct. Instead, a convert to the new astronomy says, 'I once took the moon to be (or saw the moon as) a planet, but I was mistaken'. That sort of statement does recur in the aftermath of scientific revolutions.²¹

A change of paradigms involves a commitment to a different conceptual framework which is hard to reverse.

Lavoisier . . . saw oxygen where Priestley had seen dephlogisticated air and where others had seen nothing at all. In learning to see oxygen, however, Lavoisier also had to change his view on many other more familiar substances . . . as a result of discovering oxygen, Lavoisier saw nature differently . . . after discovering oxygen Lavoisier worked in a different world.²²

Having made the switch it is not possible to return to the previous position without rejecting that very commitment to the new paradigm that made the initial switch possible.

Returning to Hegel's example of the cube of salt, it is now apparent why we cannot switch from seeing it as a cube to seeing it as a manifold of properties. In order to see a manifold of properties it would be necessary to belong to a different way of life, to live, as Kuhn suggests, in a different world. Such a world would then exist in which different visual experiences would present themselves to someone confronted with what in our world is a cube of salt. This world would be radically different from the present and the adoption of its practices would not be a reversible choice: it would be a commitment to a set of practices radically different to those known at present. To be able to alternate between seeing something as a cube of salt and seeing it as a manifold of properties, one would need to live in a world where this difference was relatively unimportant. Only under such circumstances could we speak of *seeing it as* a cube of salt, since the possibility of conflicting accounts would make sense. But in the present world the claim to see it as a cube of salt must be countered with the question 'What else could it possibly be?' What is the point of classifying it as something else? Such a new set of conventions for classifying the world cannot be adopted

without committing ourselves to a full-scale rejection of existing practices.

However, the perceiving consciousness has no concern with paradigms, *gestalts*, or conceptual frameworks; he is simply trying to describe the properties before him in so far as he chooses to see this or that aspect. In accord with Hegel's advice we (the phenomenological observers) must make no contribution and, refraining from all talk of paradigms and conceptual frameworks, immerse ourselves in the standpoint of the Perceiver. Hegel therefore asks: if it is merely a question of how one chooses to see the cube of salt then suppose we decide to see it as a unity and therefore ignore its manifold relationships, what then? Suppose one isolates, for exclusive notice, a single object disregarding its relationships; how can one speak of its perceived unity? A thing can enjoy distinction only when it is differentiated from other things. But things cannot be differentiated apart from their properties, and since properties are universal, the lack of a criterion for their unification reappears to plague the assumption of a perceived unity. The Perceiver must therefore introduce a qualification into the account. Hegel depicts him introducing a distinction between 'essential and inessential properties'. The recognition of the former, it is claimed, serves as a criterion for the perception of the object's unity. In this way the 'determinate characteristic, which constitutes the essential character of the thing and distinguishes it from all others, is now so defined that thereby the thing stands in opposition to others, but must therein preserve itself for itself (*für sich*)' (PG MM 103/B 174).

This qualification, however, exposes further anomalies in the Perceiver's standpoint. If we attempt to focus attention upon the object's essential property, ignoring all others, how do we then decide what this essential property is? Does this activity render all other properties inessential? Consider the Perceiver's position. He has attempted to isolate a thing by virtue of its essential nature, but the very act of picking out the essential property implicitly reveals that attention has been focused upon other properties outside the immediate field of sensory experience. For example, if the salt's whiteness is singled out it would invoke a grammar of colour concepts. But these are excluded. The attempt to perceive the true nature of a thing by focusing on the perception of its essential nature is ultimately doomed for the very reason that a thing can be essentially itself only if it can be explicitly distinguished from other things.

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But what if singularity itself appears to be the essentially determinate property? Hegel is prepared for this objection since he has already argued that exclusiveness is entirely dependent upon otherness. There can be no perception of a thing in its absolute independence:

It is, however, a thing, a self-existent 'one', only so far as it does not stand in relation to others. For in this relation, the connection with another is rather the point emphasised, and connection with another means giving up self-existence, means ceasing to have a being on its own account. It is precisely through the absolute character and its opposition that the thing relates itself to others, and is essentially this process of relation, and only this. The relation, however, is the negation of its independence, and the thing collapses through its own essential property. (*PG MM 102/B 174*)

For Hegel logical relations have priority over sensory perception. We can bring this out with reference to Wittgenstein's remarks on logical relations. 'If I know an object, I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs. (Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.) A new possibility cannot be discovered later' (*TLP 2.0123*). To know the nature of an object is to know its internal properties, those properties which an object must possess, and which it is unthinkable that it should not possess. Says Wittgenstein: 'A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it' (*TLP 4.123*). 'If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all its internal properties' (*TLP 2.01231*). An internal property of a pencil would be its dimension, whereas an external property of a pencil would be its specific colour. If we did not know its internal properties we could not be said to know the object in any sense, whereas a knowledge of its external properties is inessential. Knowledge of an object's internal properties is a conceptual matter. There are properties, for example, that one cannot conceive of a pencil possessing, such as honesty, kindness, intelligence, and so on. Both Hegel and Wittgenstein would find themselves in agreement with the view that unless some conceptual knowledge precedes experience we cannot make a primary identification of the object, since we would lack a knowledge of the relevant properties that one identifies it with. A knowledge of an object's internal (conceptual)

properties is necessary for any meaningful perceptual experience. One may acquire a knowledge of its external properties, such as colour, by looking, but a knowledge of the internal properties is logically prior to sense-experience. One does not look at a pencil to see whether it has a size or a colour, as one does to determine the exactitude of its size or colour.

From the epistemological standpoint of the Perceiver there is no conceptual difference between internal and external properties, since the former are assumed to be more properties of the same kind. Like Wittgenstein, Hegel maintains this distinction and recognises that the perceiving consciousness does not. This is why the latter cannot meet Hegel's challenge to individuate a cube of salt from a multiplicity of perceptual sensations. Hegel stresses that there is more to seeing than mere looking, than the mere exercise of the senses, when he says that: 'sensible singleness thus disappears in the dialectical process of immediate certainty and becomes universality', but merely sensuous universality, since the role of the intelligence in the act of perception has not yet been introduced (PG MM 104/B 176).

Hegel concludes the dialogue with the Perceiver with a timely polemic against the appeal to commonsense, which was responsible for the tension between unity and plurality which bedevilled the Perceiver's standpoint. In order to avoid the contradictions built into the assumption of perception-as-reception the Perceiver sought refuge behind a cloak of sophistry. The object was held to be one in so far as it was seen as one, but many in so far as it was seen as many. When this failed to provide an adequate account of the object an equally fatuous attempt was made to identify the object in terms of its essential property. But the ultimate irony Hegel sees in the standpoint of commonsense is that on examination the objects of sense are as equally vacuous as the alleged abstract objects of thought which are held to occupy the philosopher's mind in moments of speculative excursion. How, for instance, do we consider the objects of sense without some recourse to conceptual activity? This is the challenge commonsense has failed to answer. Hence:

These empty abstractions of 'singleness' and its antithetic 'universality' and also of 'essence', that is attended with a 'non-essential' element which is all the same 'necessary', are powers the interplay of which constitutes perceptual understanding, often called 'sound commonsense' (*Menschen-*

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verstand) which takes itself to be the solid substantial type of conscious life, is, in its process of perception, merely the sport of these abstractions; it is always poorest where it means to be richest. In that it is tossed about by these unreal entities, bandied from one to the other, and by its sophistry endeavours to affirm and hold fast alternatively now one, then the exact opposite, it sets itself against the truth, and imagines philosophy has merely to do with 'things of the intellect' (*Gedankendinge*), merely manipulates 'ideas'. (*PG MM 105–6/B 176–7*)

The appeal to commonsense, far from being the antidote to the abstractions of philosophy, actually involves an even deeper commitment to metaphysical abstractions. Commonsense is no refuge from philosophy; it is only bad philosophy. The main difference between the two camps, says Hegel, is that the philosopher is at least aware that he is dealing with *Gedankendingen* and is therefore 'master of them' (*PG MM 106/B 177*). But the commonsense realist, says Hegel, 'takes them for the real truth, and is led by them from one mistake to another' (*PG MM 106/B 177*). In this way Hegel draws attention to the language employed by those philosophers who appeal to commonsense in order to debunk metaphysics. For in the texts of those who assert the primacy of commonsense one finds a surprising dependence upon philosophical terminology.

Referring to the abstract language of commonsense, Hegel asks us to consider what experience is being described by the expressions 'universality and singleness', and what is this 'essentiality' which is necessarily connected with 'inessentiality'? For in this jargon, says Hegel, lurks a tendency to deceive us about the very nature of experience.

When understanding tries to give them truth by at one time taking the untruth upon itself, while at another it calls their deceptiveness a mere appearance due to the uncertainty and unreliability of things, and separates the essential from an element which is necessary to them, and yet is to be inessential, holding the former to their truth against the latter: when understanding takes this line, it does not secure them *their* truth, but convicts itself of untruth. (*PG MM 107/B 178*)

Because there is more to the activity of perception than the exer-

cise of the senses, the appeal to *Sinnliche Gegenstanden* belongs to the same ghostly realm as their allegedly antithetical *Gedankendingen*.

Notes

1. K. Marx, *Economic and philosophical manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow, Progress, 1959), p. 108. References to Hegel's texts are to *Werke* volumes I–XX edited by E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1970), hereafter indicated by the initials MM. As an additional guide each reference to the German text of the *Phenomenology* will be accompanied with a reference to the standard English text and the translator's initial. Abbreviations are as follows: *PG*, *Phenomenology of mind*, the English text being the J. Baillie edition (London, 1942); *Enz.*, *The encyclopaedia of the sciences*. References to Wittgenstein's texts will be to paragraph numbers unless otherwise stated. They are abbreviated as follows: *PI*, *Philosophical investigations*; *BB*, *Blue and Brown books*; *TLP* *Tractatus logico philosophicus*; *NB*, *Notebooks 1916*; *OC*, *On certainty*; *RFM*, *Remarks on the foundations of mathematics*.

2. See A. Janik and S. Toulmin, *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, (London, 1973).

3. Charles Taylor, 'The opening arguments of the *Phenomenology*', in *Hegel*, ed. Alasdair MacIntyre (New York, Doubleday, 1972).

4. B. Russell, *An inquiry into meaning and truth*, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1940), p. 64.

5. B. Russell, *Logic and knowledge 1901–1950*, ed. R.C. Marsh (London, Allen and Unwin, 1956), p. 201.

6. M. Clark, *Logic and system*, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 35.

7. In this respect Marx's criticism of Feuerbach reveals a striking affinity with Hegel's account of sense-certainty: 'He [Feuerbach] does not see how the sensuous world around him is not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; and, indeed, in the sense that it is a historical product, the result of the activity of the whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse, modifying its social system according to changed needs. Even the objects of the simplest "sensuous certainty" are only given him through social development, industry and commercial intercourse. The cherry tree, like almost all fruit trees, was, as is well known, only a few centuries ago transplanted by commerce into our zone, and therefore only by the actions of a definite society in a definite age it has become "sensuous certainty" for Feuerbach.' (*German ideology* (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p. 61.

8. Jacob Loewenberg, *Hegel's phenomenology: dialogues on the life of mind*, (Illinois, Open Court, 1965), p. 35.

9. See also Wittgenstein's case of a pupil whose reactions to the teaching of arithmetic differ from our own, which he compares with a person who naturally reacts to the gesture of pointing with the finger outstretched by looking in the direction of a line from the finger tip to the

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wrist (*PI* 185). For a more definite account of the social nature of gestures one should turn to G.H. Mead, who argues that 'every gesture comes within a given social group or community to stand for a particular act or response, namely the act or response which it calls forth explicitly in the individual to whom it is addressed, and implicitly in the individual who makes it; and this particular act or response for which it stands is its meaning as a significant symbol'. *Mind, self and society* (Chicago, 1963), p. 47.

10. G. Santayana, *Scepticism and animal faith*, (London, Constable, 1923), p. 15.

11. P.T. Geach, *Mental acts* (London, Routledge, 1957), p. 120.

12. Loewenberg, *Hegel's phenomenology*, p. 39.

13. *Ibid.*

14. R. Plant, *Hegel*, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1973), p. 105.

15. James A. Ogilvy, 'Reflections on the absolute', *Review of Metaphysics*, vol. xxviii, no. 3 (March 1975), p. 521.

16. S. Cavell, *Must we mean what we say?* (New York, Scribner, 1969), pp. 19–20.

17. Hegel's example may not appear so bizarre if we consider that many twentieth-century biologists also reject the primacy of sense-certainty in animals. For example: 'One should hesitate, although some do not, to apply such words as "consciousness" or "perception" to an amoeba, for instance, but it is perfectly obvious from the reaction of the amoeba that something in its organization performs acts of generalisation, it does not react to each bit of food, say, as a unique object, but in some way, in some sense of the word, it *classifies* innumerable different objects all within the class of foodstuffs. Such generalisation, such classification in that sense, is an absolute minimal requirement of being or staying alive' (G.G. Simpson, *Principles of animal taxonomy* (New York, Columbia University, 1961), p. 3.

18. Unless we interpret the builders analogy as an attempt to show the impossibility of foundational language games it is difficult to see what light this sheds on the nature of language. Imagine a group of builders only having the expressions 'slab', 'beam' and so on. What sort of building site is this? It is an interesting but scarcely observed fact that on a real building site in the United Kingdom expressions like 'Bricks', 'Sand', 'Mortar', when uttered in isolation, signify moments of tension. They are uttered to make public the fact that someone has failed to maintain a supply of materials. They signify a convention for revealing that someone is not 'up to the job', an informal means of telling the management to dismiss him. It is clear that far from being elementary expressions, in actual usage, 'Bricks', 'Mortar', etc., are permeated with economic and political concepts.

19. Geach, *Mental acts*, p. 25.

20. T.S. Kuhn, *The structure of scientific revolutions*, (Chicago, University of Chicago, 1971), p. 85.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 115.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

5

Hegel on Political Economy

Christopher J. Arthur

In Hegel's main work of political theory, his *Philosophy of right* of 1821, the achievements of the political economists are mentioned with approval. Smith, Say and Ricardo, are cited in this connection. As a matter of fact, Hegel's interest in the subject goes back a long way. We know that, early on, he wrote a manuscript on Steuart, since lost. In the case of Smith we have a passage in a manuscript known as Hegel's *First philosophy of spirit*, of 1803/4, in which he makes reference to Smith's discussion of the division of labour in a pin factory. This is referred to the Basle edition of the English text of *The wealth of nations*, published in 1791. We know that Hegel had such a copy in his library, presumably acquired while he was a tutor in Berne from 1793–97.¹

It is noticeable that in Hegel's early works the system of needs and labour is given some ontological weight in the foundation of spirit; whereas in the *Philosophy of right* the emphasis is on free-will as socially constitutive, beginning with the positing of property. Another difference is that in the *First philosophy of spirit* we get a terrifying picture of market movements as 'a self-propelling life of the dead',² but in the *Philosophy of right* the market appears as a fundamentally rational structure, albeit prey to problems that cannot be solved within it. However, I shall not enter here on a discussion of Hegel's development.³ I shall be concerned largely with the role of political economy in his mature system, especially in the *Philosophy of right* (cited as *PR* with paragraph numbers).

I

Hegel's political philosophy presents an account of the necessary

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articulation of the system of right in its developed form. The modern state is to realise this idea in its fullness.

While Hegel understood the appeal of the ancient *polis* in which all the activities of citizens were bound up with the whole ethical life of the state, he recognises equally that there is no going back to this immediate unity of the individual with the political community. History has moved on (*PR* § 185). The right of the individual to be himself as such, and to pursue his own interests, must be respected, even if this moment appears immediately as a negation of the unity of the whole. Hegel calls this sphere of *particularity* the realm of 'civil society' (as distinct from the state proper). He claims that 'the principle of the modern state has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity' of the whole (*PR* § 260).

The sphere of civil society is, in dialectical terms, the moment of 'difference', while in the exercise of political sovereignty the state achieves its 'identity'.

In the modern world it is within the sphere of civil society that provision for the needs of the people is made. The structure of civil society is primarily economic. Hegel says that political economy 'is one of the sciences which have arisen out of the conditions of the modern world' (*PR* § 189), because only in the modern world has 'the system of needs and labour' differentiated itself from family provision on the one hand, and political relationships and processes, on the other. Needs are met largely through the network of relationships established by private persons holding various goods as private property and contracting with one another to exchange them. As Hegel points out, the bulk of these goods require human labour to produce them (*PR* § 196).

Hegel remarks that in the sphere of civil society as a whole we are dealing with *bourgeois* relations (using the French term itself); but when we deal more specifically with the system of needs the presupposition is simply that of human beings as such, he adds (*PR* § 190).⁴

It is in the context of the discussion of 'the system of needs' that Hegel remarks on the achievements of political economy. He says: 'Political economy is the science which starts from this view of needs and labour but then has the task of explaining mass-relationships and mass-movements in their complexity and their qualitative and quantitative character.' This science is interesting

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because it extracts from the endless mass of detail 'the simple principles of the thing' (*PR* § 189).

In order to grasp the achievements (and limitations) of the science of political economy as understood by Hegel, we must attend to the nature of its object and its relation to it. We must see if *its* logic is the logic proper to the *object*.

It is germane here to notice that Hegel says of political economy that it shows 'the Understanding effective in the thing and directing it' (*PR* § 189). The standpoint of Understanding is not the standpoint of philosophical Reason; it is the faculty of analysis rather than synthesis; it works with an explanatory framework constituted in terms of binary oppositions rather than dialectical identities. As Hegel is always at pains to stress, real results are obtainable with this approach, e.g. Newtonian science, and all further progress is built upon it. But for him it is only an aspect of the full power of thought, and the full realisation of Reason in the world.

As Knox points out,⁵ the explanatory categories of the doctrine of essence in Hegel's *Logic* are those relevant to it, notably those of appearance and essence. In civil society there is precisely a situation in which the appearance of things presents a domain of particularity obscuring any underlying essence. Universal and particular, form and content, fall apart in this sphere. The effort of Understanding is to bring them back into connection, to demonstrate that the universal is at work even in the contingencies of individual transactions guided only by the perception of private interest on the part of those concerned. As Hegel puts it in his lectures: 'to discover this necessary element here is the object of political economy, a science which is a credit to thought because it finds laws for a mass of accidents'. As he comments, it is remarkable that there are such laws 'because at first sight everything seems to be given over to the arbitrariness of the individual'. Significantly, as we shall see, he also observes a parallel in natural science: the solar system 'displays to the eye only irregular movements, though its laws may none the less be ascertained'.⁶

So political economy is a credit to thought because it shows how apparently arbitrary events in its domain are linked together systematically. None the less, there are limits to this totalisation. This is not only because the Understanding is inherently a dualistic form of thought, distinguishing and relating things in terms of the categories of essence, but not synthesising them in a

self-identical whole through philosophical conceptualisation. It is also because civil society *itself*, the object of study, forms only 'a relative totality' as Hegel puts it in an illuminating paragraph. Civil society is characterised as the stage of *division* in the articulation of the ethical order: 'to particularity it gives the right to develop and launch forth in all directions; and to universality the right to prove itself not only the ground and necessary form of particularity but also the power standing over it . . . ' Here the unity of the ethical order 'is present only as a relative totality and as the inner necessity behind this outward appearance' of opposed extremes (*PR* § 184).

In his *Encyclopaedia* Hegel actually *defines* civil society in this way — as 'the relative totality of the ties relating independent persons to one another in a formal universality'⁷ (*Enz.* § 517). In a relative totality the moments of the whole, e.g. form and content, are merely *related* to one another, not *integrated* in an organic unity.

That Hegel can compare this social structure with that of the solar system shows that the nature of the object itself has a merely mechanical order of regulation — not a self-determining one. Indeed, Hegel in his *Encyclopaedia* calls civil society an 'atomistic' system (*Enz.* § 523). He had already mentioned there that, 'the atomic theory' in political science considers 'the will of the individuals as such is the creative principle of the state' because it believes 'the attractive force is the special wants and inclinations of individuals'. Here the universality of the state is reduced to the relatedness of a social contract (*Enz.* § 98).

In trying to grasp Hegel's attitude to 'the atomic theory' in political science, we have to remember that, though we are not dealing here with atoms but with political animals whose very individuatedness has socio-historical determinants, it is nevertheless the case that in their dealings with one another *in civil society* they *take themselves* to be self-subsistent units, and their relations with others as external to their essence.

In commenting on 'the atomic theory' in political science Marx will later note that 'the egoistic individual in civil society may inflate himself into an *atom*', but nevertheless need directs these egoistic individuals into material intercourse with one another.⁸

Both Hegel and Marx grasp very well that the deficiency of 'the atomic theory' is that it absolutises the standpoint of the individual in civil society without grasping the fact that it is the *social* relations that create such forms of individuality rather than

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the other way round. A Stock Exchange speculator may be a paradigm of egoism but he is 'a rational man' only according to the standards of a social order that makes the fulfilment of need dependent on such mediations as a Stock Market.

The difficult point philosophically in evaluating the logic proper to the system is to do justice both to the 'objective validity' (Marx) of the categories of political economy, and to its conditionality as the system's own self-presentation.

When Hegel says obscurely that 'the Understanding is effective in the object' he might mean that the categories of political economy are logically continuous with those of the agents themselves. But, while human self-understandings must of course be explained by social theory, the explanations offered may require a different order of knowledge. In truth, Hegel knows this very well. In contrast to the unexamined concept of need, or preference, used by political economy, Hegel refers it to the development of the social formation itself, in other words a dialectical evolution. (*PR* 190–5)

The problem in understanding Hegel's dialectical development of the polity is this: if the achievements of political economy are limited to its appropriation in thought through the tools of the Understanding of the moments of the system of needs, and if, therefore, it can give no adequate account of the normative foundation of the economic order in property right, never mind those aspects of the ethico-political order beyond its purview, then in pushing the dialectic to a higher stage which, to put it simply, takes account of explicitly ethical aspects of social integration, as well as individual need and private interest, are we, in this movement of transcendence of the standpoint of political economy presenting it as a stage to be negated in the philosophical appropriation of the object, or are we presenting it as the logic of a *real sphere* of social life whose objective contradictions are to be shown as mediated in further institutional arrangements standing over it?

The logic of the Understanding seeks to explain phenomena by rendering them determinate through identifying them with fixed categories and definitions. It arrives at these through a two-fold process of abstraction, first by separating a given domain of inquiry from other domains and second by grouping items with many differences into abstract commonalities whose identity is established by perhaps only a single parameter.

But is political economy not in the right in employing this

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logic? For is it not *really* the case that the economy in modern times operates independently of any substantive normative regulation worth talking about, requiring only an administration of justice to enforce contracts and fair dealing?

It is true that civil society is not a *bellum omnia contra omnes* because it functions on the basis of right, and alienation occurs not through forcible expropriation but through free transfer of entitlement.

None the less, these structures are purely formal, actualising abstract universals; the concrete content of these rights and prohibitions is simply that of egoistic interest and private purposes; the predominant moment is particularity. Furthermore, in commodity exchange the individuals establish a domain of market value abstracted from the material differences in the objects concerned.

Is there not then a space for political economy and an object appropriate by it? Certainly Hegel seems to think so. Hence his praise of political economy. He does not, therefore, criticise political economy for abstracting from the determinations of the ethical order as a whole, because the system of needs and labour *is*, really, partly thus abstracted. Marx will later defend Ricardo against those who charged him with abstracting from ethics, by saying that Ricardo allows political economy to speak its own language, and, if it does not speak ethically, this is not Ricardo's fault, but is a consequence of the real estrangement of these domains.⁹

A more telling case than that of Ricardo would be Adam Smith, because Smith actually wrote a book of moral philosophy whose principal figure was 'sympathy': yet his *Wealth of nations* starts from the proposition that 'it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest'.¹⁰ In other words, Smith finds himself compelled to abstract from his own ethics!

In spite of its 'atomistic' character, civil society forms a unity, but it is not consciously organised as such, it arises from the relatedness of individuals within a formal universality. Because of this, Hegel says, 'unity is present here not as freedom but as necessity, since it is by compulsion that the particular rises to the form of universality, and . . . gains stability in that form' (*PR* 186). But there are no resources within dull economic compulsion to enable the individuals concerned to recognise one another as more than individual centres of rights. No genuine community of

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citizenship is present here. The state enforcing right appears in civil society as 'the external state, the state based on need, the state as the Understanding envisages it' (*PR* § 183).

It has been argued, notably by Marx, that Hegel's solutions to the problems of civil society are useless, and indeed that the modern state itself is powerless to produce any genuine community of citizenship. However, as far as political economy is concerned, the problem is not its abstractedness in itself, for that models a reality, but that it is uncritical of its object and inclined to absolutise its methodological orientations.

Raymond Plant puts it this way: 'Throughout his description of the system of needs as the object of political economy, Hegel presupposed two things. First, that the phenomena so constituted, the system of needs, is an abstraction. Secondly, that the explanation of this from the standpoint of political economy is itself abstract and capable of transcendence.'¹¹

Although political economy correlates masses of data within the forms of the system of needs it does not adequately ground these relations in the *social* formation. Rather, it more or less covertly appeals to *naturalistic* presuppositions about the givenness of need and interest. It is at home with quantitative questions such as the magnitude of exchange values but does not investigate the conditions of possibility of the form of value itself. Hegel understands these limits very well. Thus his praise of political economy cannot stretch to the derivation from it of an ethical theory (utilitarianism) or a political theory (liberalism). For Hegel, the spheres of family relations and of the state, stand outside civil society and the system of needs, representing other essential moments of the social system.

To round off this half of the paper I would like to mention briefly a striking interpretation of Hegel's views put forward by R.D. Winfield.¹² Winfield says that there are two common accounts of economic relationships firmly rejected by Hegel. One considers economic activity on the model of a natural function. The object of study is taken to be the metabolism between man and nature. This is an immutable condition, giving rise to a sphere of necessity lying outside all normative considerations. The second he characterises as 'monological', because it determines economic relations through some function of the self, a self which takes itself to be dealing with external objects, even if these include other economic agents, thus again excluding questions of social justice.

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Winfield then defines the object of economic science as a sphere of normative social relations. This he believes to be Hegel's approach, and this sounds not unreasonable. However, there follows a non-sequitur. Having objected to the exclusion of the social he then proposes to *exclude the natural and the monological*. But the whole interest of the subject lies in the *interplay* between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, and in the contradictory way the rationality of the system of needs and labour constructs the individual of civil society as a monological subject who at the same time is supposed to play fair by his fellows and respect their rights.

II

In the second half of this paper, I want to raise a question about Hegel's theory of value. Given Hegel's unqualified praise for the achievements of political economy, and his specific mention of Smith and Ricardo in this context, one might have expected him to adhere to the labour theory of value. But we find nothing of the kind.¹³ Why not? — one wonders.

In truth there is a gesture in this direction in a very early text. In a manuscript of around 1802/3 called *System of ethical life* there is the following striking passage:

The universality of labour or the indifference of all labour is posited as a middle term with which all labour is compared and into which each single piece of labour can be directly converted; this middle term, posited as something real, is *money*.¹⁴

This remarkable analysis (anticipating Marx's category of 'abstract labour' rather than recalling Smith's 'labour commanded') is not taken up later on, unfortunately.

It is worth noting in passing also another passage from the young Hegel — this time from the *First philosophy of spirit* (1803/4). In this Hegel mentions the importance of the tool as universal mediator of desires and objects, and he notes that in the 'common work' of society labour 'becomes here a universal' because, although carried on by an individual, in its content it is 'a universal labour for the needs of all, so as to be appropriate for the satisfaction of all his needs; in other words it has a value'.¹⁵ At

first it seems this is a good thing as knowledge of discoveries and skills spreads. But then, in some unexplained way, with the *machine*, nature ‘takes its revenge upon him’ and ‘the more he subdues it, the lower he sinks himself’; indeed ‘the labouring that remains to man becomes itself more machine-like’; labour diminishes ‘only for the whole, not for the single’ labourer; ‘for him it is increased rather; for the more machine-like labour becomes, the less it is worth, and the more one must work in that mode.’¹⁶

All this occurs because, through the division of labour, man subjects nature to himself but in a ‘formal, and false, way’ such that ‘the individual only increases his dependence on it’. Moreover, ‘the labour becomes that much deader, it becomes machine work, the skill of the labourer is infinitely limited, and the consciousness of the factory labourer is impoverished to the last degree of dullness’.¹⁷ This passage remarkably anticipates Marx’s description of alienated labour¹⁸ — but the *Philosophy of right* is much less critical. In the treatment there of civil society, a couple of cursory references to value in exchange occur. However, Hegel’s thematisation of value is not carried out in that section at all, but much earlier, in the treatment of private property and contract. This, it seems, is because the system of needs and labour is presupposed to be structured through exchange, and the juridical categories give this its *form*. Let us take note in advance, then, of the interesting fact that Hegel chooses to thematise value within the *forms presupposed* in commodity exchange rather than on the ground of the *content regulated* by exchange.

Let us now rehearse Hegel’s argument. Hegel introduces the notion of value in the course of his discussion of the uses of property (*PR* § 63). He starts by saying that useful things have a certain quality, different in each case, which relates to specific needs, and at the same time they come in definite amounts: thus, a dozen eggs, a pair of shoes, a litre of wine.¹⁹ Hegel’s argument is that in so far as the useful articles satisfy various needs they can be compared as instances of a universal determinable, and hence, he says, commensurable. Although Hegel does not give this universal a special name, distinguishing it from the utility the objects have as they meet certain needs, what he is addressing is exchange value, the equivalent exchangeability of two commodities. For there would be no point in developing this idea of consciousness comparing and commensurating them if this does not lead to the possibility of exchange; certainly that is the

context of most subsequent discussion of value in the *Philosophy of right*.²⁰

Because consciousness imposes this concept of universal value on the things, by *abstracting* from the specific qualities of the things, it is a purely quantitative relation. In his lectures he gives a mathematical analogy to illustrate his point. A circle, an ellipse, and a parabola are very different curves, but, in spite of this, the distinction between each of them can be erased in their algebraic expressions, in so far as it reduces to a question of the magnitudes of coefficients.²¹

In the *Encyclopaedia* much the same definition appears: value refers to the quantitative terms in which heterogeneous things are made comparable when commodities are treated as abstract general equivalents. (*Enz.* § 494) While value is a pure quantity abstracted from quality, Hegel points out that in order to serve as a *measure* of the different things value needs a *quantum*, and, in so far as the use-values themselves provide this, their qualitative aspect is preserved, as well as superseded, in value.²² We do not only need to say shoes and sealing wax are both valuable but that they become commensurable quantities when their relationship is determined such that, for instance, one pair of shoes is worth a hundred kilos of wax.

In his marginal notes to this paragraph in his own copy of his *Philosophy of right* Hegel anticipates Marx by explaining that what makes up the value of the one commodity is a determinate amount of *another*; thus that value when expressed in money terms is thereby presented 'for itself' as he puts it; and, conversely, money cannot be of utility *immediately* but must therefore first be transformed into specific use-values.²³ (Incidentally, if use-values are thus able to provide value with a *quantum* because they themselves have a quantitative dimension, this is not perfectly so. Thus certain shops will sell you half a loaf, but they will not accept half a tie in exchange. It is an important feature of the money commodity that 'small change' be possible.)

Money, therefore, expresses the value of things in the *abstract*. Hegel is perfectly clear that the specific quality of the money commodity, whether gold or paper, is thus unimportant because, as he puts it, money is a symbol. Considered as a value a thing counts not as itself but as what it is worth, he says. Money has the specific function of symbolising the measure of this value.²⁴ Money is thus not a *particular* type of wealth but the *type itself*, the universal given an external embodiment so that it can be taken as

an object of the will and a vehicle of social action (*PR* § 299). All this recalls Marx's treatment of the value forms in *Capital*, as does Hegel's distinction between contracts involving the simple exchange of a *specific* use-value for another (different) one,²⁵ and contracts involving exchange of a specific thing for one 'characterized as universal, one which counts as value alone and which lacks the other specific determination, utility — i.e. for money' (*PR* § 80).

Hegel insists that, in contrast to the specificity of use-value, value as such is a universal (*PR* § 63,77). It is now time to ask some hard questions about the *reality* of this universal. For example, because Aristotle could not see a substance of value inherent in the goods themselves and thus providing a common measure, he assumed that money price does not express a real universal but is merely a makeshift for practical purposes.²⁶ Hegel takes a contrary position. He claims that it is precisely in value that the genuine substantiality of the thing 'becomes determinate and an object of consciousness' (*PR* § 63). Knox glosses this extraordinary claim by explaining that this is because value is a concept existing for thought not sensation, and rightly tying this to Hegel's idealism.²⁷

It can now be understood why in this discussion of value there is no reference to a labour theory of value of the kind advanced by Smith and Ricardo. There is a clear sense that value could not express such a content because it is a form *imposed by the activity of consciousness* on the things concerned when they are made the subjects of contracts. In this, consciousness does not reflect some attribute of the things themselves, such as the labour embodied in them; nor is it heteronomously determined in its activity by psychological determinants such as utility maximisation. When it creates value as an abstract universal it freely posits this form without such determinations imposing themselves on it. Things are not exchangeable because they have the property of value as single items. They have value because they are posited by their owners as equivalents of one another. Value is a pure form which does not express any pre-existing substance of the things themselves. Marx distinguishes the external measure (money) of value and its immanent measure (socially necessary labour time).²⁸ For Hegel money is the *only* measure of value.

But, given that Hegel clearly omits any reference to labour, the question still arises whether or not he adheres to a utility theory of the substance of value. After all, he develops the category in the

section on the uses of property. Is there not some kind of subsumption, however weak, of particular needs under a general category of utility that would serve as a content and even a measure of the value posited in the form of exchange? This question is hard to settle definitively but I think the answer is in the negative. It is true that exchange is only of use-values but Hegel stresses the heterogeneity of these goods and the need to abstract from their specific useful qualities if they are to be treated as identical in value. It is surely significant that, although Hegel speaks of need in general, he makes no attempt to derive a *measure* of value from utility. Nor does he speak of any necessity for value in exchange to be determined by it. Rather, when he says use-values are comparable as such he simply means that only use-values are exchangeable; he does not derive any rules of proportionality from this characteristic. The crucial problem is the precise sense to be attached to the process of *abstraction* that Hegel marks out as the key feature in the positing of value. Just as it is helpful to think of the structure of civil society in terms of the logic of Hegel's doctrine of essence, so it is helpful to look at the more abstract opening section, on private property, in terms of the categories of the doctrine of being, notably those of quantity and quality. Hegel accomplishes the transition from quality to quantity by arguing that being considered as 'being for itself' distinguishes itself from other such beings as indifferently other than them, as a One. But the negative attitude of the many Ones to one another is just as essentially 'a connective reference of them to each other' (*Enz.* § 98). This reference actualises itself as Quantity. The important thing about Quantity is that Hegel defines it as no longer immediately identical with Being, but posited as indifferent and external to it (*Enz.* § 99). (We may remark also in passing that in his lectures Hegel explicitly assails the influence of the mathematical category of magnitude in social science. There is a real danger, he says, in uncritically exaggerating the range of validity of such a category, and in considering as exact sciences only those the objects of which can be submitted to mathematical calculation.²⁹)

Returning to the main point on Quantity, it seems clear that Hegel has established a *pure* category, in Quantity the specificity of Being is superseded. Unfortunately the matter becomes slightly clouded when he endeavours to shed further light on the question of the relative priority of Quality here by saying:

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We observe things, first of all, with an eye to their quality — which we take to be the character identical with the being of the thing. If we proceed to consider their quantity, we get the conception of an indifferent and external character or mode, of such a kind that a thing remains what it is, though its quantity is altered, and the thing becomes greater or less.³⁰

To give an example: the shapes of squares or similar triangles remain the same whatever size they are, and it is the shape that defines them.³¹ Or, to mention Hegel's own mundane example, by an increase in size a house does not necessarily cease to be a house (*Enz.* § 99).

The point to which I wish to draw attention is that it is one thing to specify a quantitative relation completely indifferent to quality *as such*, and another enterprise simply to talk about the *same* quality varying in magnitude. The relevance of this distinction to our present problem may be grasped when we look at Eugen von Boehm-Bawerk's defence of the marginal utility theory of value against Marx. In his search for the substance of value Marx dismisses utility because in an exchange we are dealing with qualitatively different use-values and hence in making them equivalents we must be abstracting from these use-values. Boehm-Bawerk complains that we must not confuse abstraction from the genus altogether with abstraction from the specific forms in which the genus manifests itself.³² Thus, if we have to disregard the special forms under which the value in use of commodities may appear, whether they serve for food, shelter, clothing, etc., we certainly cannot disregard utility in general. After all, if the goods did not have some use to somebody they would not be exchangeable and hence be of no value. So the value-substance, according to Boehm-Bawerk, is utility. Of course, there remains the problem of determining its magnitude; and here the theory has to take a subjectivist turn, get into marginalism, personal preference schedules and so forth. This does not concern us here.

What I do want to say is that Hegel does not get into such a discussion. In my view his procedure has something in common with the original derivation of Quantity in the *Logic*, namely that value is *indifferent* to the utility of the objects rather than a measure of their *general* utility. (In this respect Hegel's example of the reduction of curves to algebraic variables is instructively more

radical than comparison of the sizes of similar triangles.) I am arguing that in his derivation of value Hegel undertakes the more radical abstraction. That is, Hegel does not have an alternative theory of value to the labour theory of value, he simply does not see it as the form of a pre-given substance at all. The form is an abstract universal arising from the activity of social subjects. There is no suggestion that this abstract universal, although it necessarily has a measure, actually represents a predetermined quantity of something. Rather the thing counts as an instantiation of the value posited by consciousness, and imposed on the qualitatively different use-values as 'indifferent and external to them' (to use the words of the *Logic*). This prioritisation of form over content, and inversion of the abstractly universal and concretely particular, is typical of idealism of course. Given this, it is not strange that Hegel does not adhere to a labour theory of value of the traditional kind, but it is strange that he failed to criticise this theory as it appears in Smith and Ricardo.

Returning once again to Richard Winfield's provocative paper, he argues that Hegel recognises that value is 'neither intrinsic to the natural qualities of the exchanged commodities, nor rooted in a psychological estimation of them, nor determined by anything preceding the mutually agreed exchange act setting them in their actual relation of equivalence'.³³ From the purity of this form he concludes that there is no material determination of the rates of exchange arrived at. Rather, values are established from the free choices of the agents themselves, unconstrained by any external factors, such as socially necessary labour times, nor conforming to any stipulated model of economic rationality.

To postulate such total contingency seems to be an exaggeration. It is not clear that Hegel held this position, because, at the same time as he stresses the apparently arbitrary *form* of the choices made, he refers, in his discussion of the system of needs and labour, to the '*compulsion*' exercised on the particular by the system standing over against him (*PR* § 184, 186). In this way the needs of society are met: in other words he adheres to the same kind of dialectic as Adam Smith's analysis of 'the hidden hand'³⁴ (*PR* § 199).

At all events, however freedom and necessity are supposed to interpenetrate, I would like to observe that, even if the economic agents impose this social form on the contents of need and labour, this does not preclude the possibility that the content regulated by this form none the less impresses itself somehow on the value

magnitudes in law-like fashion. Marx's own labour theory of value may still be re-interpreted in such a light. In this enterprise it would be important to distinguish (as Marx does but Winfield does not) between the oscillations of market price and real underlying values. Finally, we must observe that Hegel's intentions are manifestly apologetic. In spite of his awareness of the grave problems arising from the structure of civil society and market phenomena, he endorses these forms as moments in the realisation of the idea of freedom. When Marx covered the same ground he approached it in more critical fashion.

In one of his first notebooks, on James Mill, he says that 'value is an alienated designation of the product itself, different from its immediate existence, external to its specific nature, a merely *relative* mode of existence of this'.³⁵ The terms used here, especially the idea of a 'merely relative mode' recall Hegel's discussion, but what Hegel endorses as the emergence of a higher universal, even if it is abstractly opposed to the particular, Marx condemns as estranging.³⁶ In *Capital* Marx has a section on commodity fetishism analysing the peculiar way in which this universal value is taken to be inherent in the body of the commodity itself, as if it were one of its naturally given properties, which then expresses itself in exchange ratios rather as the furriness of a coat expresses itself in keeping us warm. Hegel understands very well that value is not a natural property of the object but a social form acquired by it; but then he declares this social form *itself* to be the substantial actuality of the thing, thus fetishising the commodity-*form*, if not the commodity-*body*.

At the same time, it should be recognised that the peculiarities of the form of value find their way into Hegel from *reality*. This means that he picks up the question of *form* in a way the political economists had not. It is, indeed, surprising, in view of his anti-naturalistic tendencies, that he praises political economy without explicitly dissenting from its labour theory of value.

In conclusion, it may be said that Hegel's emphasis on social forms makes his discussion of continuing interest today to those trying to develop economics as a *social* science.

Notes

1. It has been proved that Hegel cites the English text, not the German translation. Hegel learnt his English in Berne, and bought most

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of his English books then, according to Norbert Waszek: 'The origins of Hegel's knowledge of English' (with a list of English books in Hegel's library extracted from the auction catalogue), *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*, 7, 1983.

2. Jena Systementwürfe I, *Gesammelte Werke* 6 (Hamburg, 1975), p. 324.

3. For Hegel's development see Georg Lukács *The young Hegel: studies in the relation between dialectics and economics*, trans. R. Livingstone (London, 1975); Manfred Riedel *Between tradition and revolution*, trans. W. Wright (Cambridge, 1984). Also see Raymond Plant 'Hegel and political economy' *New Left Review*, 103-4, 1977, for remarks on Smith and Stewart.

4. Marx supplies this reference to support his claim that in civil society 'a general or a banker plays a great part but man as such plays a very mean part' *Capital* vol. I (Harmondsworth, 1976), p. 135. (Unfortunately the editor, in supplying the quotation itself, garbles it.)

5. Hegel's *Philosophy of right*, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford, 1952), p. 353.

6. *Ibid.*, § 189 Addition, p. 268.

7. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830)*, Hamburg, 1969. Paragraphs from this are given in the text with their numbers distinguished from the *Philosophy of right* references by the prefix *Enz.*

8. Marx-Engels *Collected works* vol. 4 (London, 1975), p. 120.

9. Marx-Engels *Collected works* vol. 3 (London, 1975), p. 310-11.

10. Adam Smith, *The wealth of nations* (Chicago, 1976), p. 18.

11. *New Left Review*, 103, p. 91. Compare A.S. Walton 'Economy, utility and community in Hegel's theory of civil society', in *The state and society* ed. Z.A. Pelczynski (Cambridge, 1984).

12. R.D. Winfield, 'Hegel's challenge to the modern economy' in *History and system: Hegel's philosophy of history*, ed. R.L. Perkins, (Albany, 1984).

13. When Hegel discusses labour in the civil society section, he mentions that it 'confers value' on things 'and gives them their utility, and hence man in what he consumes is mainly concerned with the products of men' (*PR* 196). But it is perfectly clear that this passage refers to value in use, not value in exchange, although, of course, the latter presupposes the former.

14. *System of ethical life and first philosophy of spirit*, trans. H.S. Harris and T.M. Knox (Albany, 1979) p. 154.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 230, 242-7.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 247.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 248.

18. K. Marx, 'Economic and philosophical manuscripts of 1844', *Collected works* vol. 3, pp. 270-82. Marx himself did not know of these Hegel manuscripts, of course.

19. Marx's *Capital* begins by making the same point, p. 125-6.

20. But see *PR* 214 in the section on the administration of justice, in which application of the law to a single case is said to enter into the 'sphere of the quantitative as such, of the quantitative as that which determines the relative value in exchange of *qualia*'. In trying to fix

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quantitatively the punishment merited by a particular offence 'vacillation' occurs. 'This vacillation must be terminated, however, in the interest of getting something done . . . ' observes Hegel.

21. *Philosophy of Right*, Addition to § 63, trans. Knox, p. 240.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Randbemerkungen* ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1955), p. 344.

24. *PR*, Addition to § 63, trans. Knox p. 240.

25. Knox (and Hegel) is a bit awkward here: 'exchange of one *specific* thing for another of the same kind' — Hegel's stress — he does not mean two things of the same species, but two things that are both *specific* (but different) use-values.

26. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1133.

27. *PR*, trans. Knox, p. 325–6.

28. *Theories of surplus value*, Part Three (London, 1972), p. 163.

29. *Hegel's Logic (being Part One of the 'Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences' 1830)*, § 99 *Zusatz*, trans. W. Wallace (Oxford, 1975), p. 146.

30. *Ibid.*, § 98 *Zusatz*.

31. This is the case in Euclidean geometry. In other (more dialectical?) geometries size and shape are functionally related.

32. *Karl Marx and the close of his system*, ed. P.M. Sweezy, (London, 1975), p. 74.

33. Winfield, 'Hegel's Challenge to the Modern Economy', p. 233.

34. However, the peculiar emptiness of his category of value makes this aspect of his theory reminiscent more of Austria than Chicago.

35. *Collected works* vol. 3, p. 219.

36. For more on the Hegel-Marx relationship see C.J. Arthur *Dialectics of labour* (Oxford, 1986). Also G. Hunt 'Hegel and Economic Science' (a reply to Winfield) in *Hegel today*, ed. B. Cullen, (Gower Press, forthcoming).

6

Marx's Hegelianism: An Exposition

Michael George

The relationship between Marx and Hegel is one of the as yet unresolved problems in Marxist scholarship. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the relationship between the two afresh. Unfortunately the subject is too extensive to be fully treated in an article of this length and so I shall restrict myself to a consideration of the question from the point of view of key ideas alone. I shall make only such reference to the writings of Marx and Hegel as are required to justify my assertions. A closer textual analysis of Marx's writings, with its much needed reinterpretation and retranslation, must be left to a future time.

It will be my contention that Marx was, in essence, an Hegelian and that his (Marx's) distinctive philosophical position should be seen not as a rejection of Hegelianism but rather as inherently dependent upon Hegel's philosophy for its foundation. I shall attempt to demonstrate that Marxism, for all its seeming radical shift of emphasis, is nothing more than a continuation and logical extension of Hegel's ideas. But I shall also argue that though Marx's 'extension' of Hegelianism was constructed upon a foundation that had already been laid by Hegel it was a foundation whose radical implications were never fully understood or developed by Hegel himself.

It has been fashionable in certain Marxist circles to play down, or even to discount altogether, the influence of Hegel's philosophical system upon Marx. Henri Lefèbvre's short work *Le Matérialisme dialectique*, published in the late 1930s, set the tone for much of the subsequent, and continuing, attempt by continental Marxists to rewrite Marxism without reference to its Hegelian heritage. But though Lefèbvre ultimately rejects the Hegelianism of Marx his attempt to found Marxism upon 'materialistic' premisses is

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suggestive, paradoxical as it may appear, of the way in which Hegelianism was, in its turn, *aufgehoben* by Marx and thus preserved, in a transposed form, at the very core of Marx's own world view. Lefèbvre states:

The Hegelian universe therefore is nothing more than the world of the metaphysician Hegel, the creature of his own speculative ambition. It is not the world of men, in all its dynamic reality.¹

And again:

The form to which thought raises the content must be seen as fluid and capable of improvement. Thought must accept the contradictions and conflicts in the content, it must determine their transcending and their solution in accordance with the movement of that content, and not impose *a priori* and systematic forms upon it.²

I shall seek to demonstrate that these quotes from Lefèbvre are substantially correct and contain precisely the reason why no Marxist scholar can afford to *ignore* the influence upon Marx of that old sage of Berlin, Hegel.

***Aufheben* and the transcendence of the material world**

The term *aufheben* is central to Hegel's philosophical system for it is the operative term of the dialectic as such. Its rendering into English has remained problematical but it is worth noting at this juncture that Edward Aveling's rendering of *aufheben* in his translations of Marx is wholly incorrect. Aveling's less than sensitive translation of Marx may indeed be the primary cause of the distorted way in which Marx's thinking has been received in the Anglo-Saxon world. Aveling habitually translates *aufheben* as 'abolition' or as 'overcoming'. The latter term is always to be preferred to the former but neither will really do. Aveling failed to appreciate that though *aufheben* does mean, in common German parlance, 'abolition' or 'doing away with something', or even 'leaving something aside for future use', Hegel's and Marx's use of the term is very much more technical and precise. The English words 'sublation' and 'reintegration', though archaic, connote

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something of the philosophical significance of *aufheben*. 'Sublation' means to resolve into a higher unity and 'redintegration' has the meaning of bringing again into a wholeness that which is fragmentary. However, the only real advantage to the use of either term in translations is that they alert the reader to the place where *aufheben* is employed by Hegel and Marx in the original German texts. The more cumbersome compound 'to transcend-and-preserve' is perhaps nearer an adequate rendering of the meaning of *aufheben*, but even this has too mechanical a connotation to convey the subtler aspects of the German. I shall consider further the meaning of *aufheben* below but before doing so it is necessary to make clear certain presuppositions of Hegel's idea of logic.

Hegel's philosophy adopted and extended the distinction common in German thinking of the eighteenth century, and also manifested in Kantianism, between what was termed the *Understanding*, whose function it was to establish the abstract identity of concepts or ideas, and the realm of *Reason*, which sought to connect or unify that which the 'Understanding' had divided. For the 'Understanding' each thing, concept or idea is possessed of an individual identity which must be analytically determined and, moreover, is something which is capable of being determined analytically, in isolation from all other such concepts and ideas. 'Reason', on the other hand, holds fast to the fact that the attempts of the 'Understanding' to define 'in isolation' constitutes only and solely a process of *abstraction*: that is to say a process of 'drawing out from a given context'. The function of 'Reason' is thus to make manifest the *concrete* relation in which an idea, concept or thing subsists. 'Concrete' is here to be understood in its literal meaning of a 'throwing together' and thus refers to the implicative contextual connectedness in which concepts, ideas and even objects subsist. Kant believed that the capacity of 'Reason' to perform such a task was limited. Hegel, however, regarded 'Reason' as the indispensable corrective to the deficiencies of the 'Understanding'. It was Hegel's purpose in his philosophical system to demonstrate both the method by which, and the extent to which, 'Reason', understood dialectically, could be just such a corrective. To demonstrate how Hegel achieves this task we must first consider more closely the role of *abstraction* and *concretion* in Hegel's system.

As has been stated 'Abstraction' removes a concept or idea from its context in order that it might examine it in isolation and thereby establish the *distinctive* attribute pertaining to it. The

word has the literal meaning 'to draw away from', and this 'drawing away' can be observed in the two functions of 'Abstraction'. On the one hand it draws an object or idea away from its context in order for it to be considered 'in itself', i.e. as what it is as distinct from other concepts. At the same time, and by the same process, 'Abstraction' draws out one common feature from different objects in order to create universals. Indeed in the creation of universal concepts or ideas we make use of both aspects of 'Abstraction'. It is by fixing our attention upon *one* distinct quality that is shared by a series of particular objects that we are able to remove, or 'draw out' the common element within each instance from the 'context' in which it is bound in our perception. We may then attend only to that quality in itself as possessive of a distinct attribute. The concept, for example, of a 'family' is just such a universal idea. It entails the 'Abstraction' of one quality from a series of different individuals: namely the social relationships in which they stand one to another. The concept 'family' thus treats of a group of individuals as if they manifested one attribute and one attribute only: their relationship to one another. It ignores all other attributes which may, with equal justification, be predicated of these same individuals. Conversely, in order to ascribe an identity to someone or something it is necessary to reverse the process and to limit a subject to a simple identity with the predicate that is being predicated of it. Thus the statement 'the cat is black' postulates an identity relation between the subject 'cat' and the predicate 'black'. In this relation there is admitted no other aspect or quality of either 'cat' or 'black' and for this reason it is not possible, Hegel argues, to deal with the full meaning and significance of the 'catness' and 'blackness' within such restrictive predication.

It is, however, the purpose of 'Reason' to go beyond such restrictive limitations. For the dialectic, as Hegel states in the *Science of logic*, it is the 'non-identity' between a subject and a predicate that is of concern.³ The concepts 'family' and 'black' are, within the dialectic, treated not as isolated concepts but rather as standing in an intimate and dependent relation with other like concepts. In the case of the 'family' it is concepts such as Citizenship, the State and Civil Society that form the conceptual contextual background. In the case of 'black' it is the entire colour spectrum, and for the 'cat' it is the animal kingdom. Thus, for Hegel, related concepts form a nexus of ideas that reciprocally 'limit', and thus define, one another. It is this

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intimate connectedness between concepts and ideas that forms what Hegel terms the *concrete* nature of thought. Whereas analytical abstractive thinking restricts itself to a consideration of concepts etc. in isolation, concrete reasoning must make clear the means by which, and the reasons for which, such concepts do in fact form a nexus of mutual interdependency. The definition of any concept, so far as Hegel is concerned, therefore entails a 'positive moment', which is the explication of what that idea is 'in-itself' and also a 'negative moment' in which, *at one and the same time*, each concept or idea is connected with others and is *delineated* by just this relation. For Hegel this process of delineation is the process of inscribing a logical 'boundary' or 'horizon' or 'limit' around a concept. It is this 'limit', formed from the relationship of ideas one to another, that must be 'passed beyond' in thought and that forms the basis of the Hegelian dialectic.

As has been already stated, the verb *aufheben* is the central idea of the dialectic. It may be seen as manifesting three distinct logical moments. First it has the moment of 'transcendence', in which it goes beyond a 'limit' or 'boundary'; secondly it is the 'negation' of this first negation, this 'limit', in which it is, 'overcome' or removed; and thirdly it is the moment of 'preservation', in which what has been 'gone beyond' or transcended is brought again into a new relation. But though these 'moments' of *aufheben* may be regarded as distinct from the point of view of *abstract* exposition they should not be thought of as a mechanical process taking place in time. Rather they form a unitary process of logic which is differentiated into its various components only for the purposes of aiding an 'understanding' of the process itself. The very process by which an idea 'passes beyond itself' and points to another idea to which it is intimately related is, at one and the same logical moment, the process by which it 'transcends' its limited abstract self-identity, 'negates' that solipsistical identity and emerges into a connected unity or nexus; in which context it is preserved as an intrinsic part of some greater whole.

An example of this process may serve to engender greater clarity on the part of the reader than an extended exposition. The relationship between correlative pairs of concepts, such as Whole and Part, manifests the workings of the dialectic. Indeed the reason that correlatives are correlatives is, so far as Hegel is concerned, because they are founded upon a dialectical relation. A Whole, Hegel would argue, is only a Whole in so far as it is a

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Whole of Parts and so the idea of a Whole cannot be fully comprehended in isolation from its implied correlative term Part. The dialectical relation can also be reversed. In the same way the idea of a Part entails that of a Whole precisely because the idea of a Part 'points beyond itself' and implies a Whole of which it is a part. The concept Whole is thus the logical implicative of Part and Part the logical implicative of Whole. The two ideas stand in an *inseparable* connection in which each finds its completion in the other. The dialectical process of *aufheben* is thus the way in which a concept, seen from the perspective of 'Abstraction' must transcend its limited analytical and isolated definition and become embedded in a wider nexus of concepts.

The triadic relation 'thesis', 'antithesis', 'synthesis', which is of Fichtean origin, is not the form of the dialectic to which either Hegel or Marx subscribed. The Fichtean and the Hegelian dialectics are effectively opposites. The Fichtean triadic view of the dialectic requires the idea of a necessary and direct opposition between two *distinct, pre-existing and complete* concepts with each reciprocally 'negating' or 'limiting' the other and also requires the subsequent creation of a third concept, the 'synthesis', whose function it is to 'unify' these pre-existing, independent, and self-defining, opposites. But as Hegel demonstrates the logical distinction between correlative concepts is merely a matter of 'Abstraction' from a given and pre-existent 'unity' or, what is a better term, a pre-existent 'inseparability'. It is not that we, qua Fichte, start out with two ideas such as Whole and Part and then attempt to produce some third unifying term but rather that we separate, by a process of 'Abstraction', what are intrinsically conjoined ideas or concepts into their distinctive components. In the *Science of logic* Hegel explicitly rejects the process of *synthesis* as the basis of his dialectic.⁴ The word 'synthesis' means literally 'a together placing' and implies thereby a setting together of what was originally separate. It is for this same reason that the two terms 'sublation' and 'redintegration' will not serve to render *aufheben* into English — for they imply an original state of separatedness followed by a conjoining *in thought*. But, according to Hegel, what we find on closer examination is that we have separated into distinct component concepts that which cannot stand in isolation. It is this 'concrete' aspect of such ideas that is the real basis of our understanding. It is the purpose of dialectical reason to make this clear. For Hegel therefore what he terms the 'Being' of the concept, or what it is in-itself, must always be

supplemented by what it is 'Not' but in which it stands, nevertheless, in an intimate implicative order. Whereas the traditional interpretations of the dialectic have entailed a placing together, in some newly created third synthetic concept, two antagonistic, opposed original concepts, Hegel's dialectic in fact requires that we commence with a 'synthesis', which is the original unity of our ideas and concepts, and 'abstract' them from this 'concrete' unity into two distinct and supposedly independent concepts.

On this model the Whole/Part relation can be thought of in the following way: in thinking about the concept Whole, the concept Part would remain as an implied 'background' concept and vice versa in the case of Whole — which would always entail its complementary concept Part to complete it as an idea. To employ the language of Phenomenology, one of this binary pair of concepts would form the 'foreground', the other the 'background' and between them there would subsist an 'horizon'. Whilst of course such visual imagery and allusion is of use in conceptualising Hegel's meaning it should always be remembered that the dialectic is first and foremost a 'logical' relation. Thus, for Hegel, the consideration, in abstraction, of any one concept implies a correlation not only with the immediate correlative concept but also with all the other concepts of the Logic; for the whole forms, via the various dialectical relations that are established, an entire implicative web or nexus wherein each concept finds its place in relation one with another.

Lenin, in a letter to Berthold Aürbach, presents his own view of the dialectic: a view which I would argue is radically in error. He says:

The identity of opposites (more accurately, perhaps, their 'unity', although the difference between the expressions 'identity' and 'unity' is not very essential here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the *mutually exclusive* and opposed tendencies in all the phenomena and processes of nature (including spirit and society).⁵

Lenin's assertion that the difference between the expressions 'identity' and 'unity' is not an essential one implies that the dialectic is concerned with 'identity' relations between pre-existent opposites. His assertion that the dialectic is concerned with '*mutually exclusive*' opposites is further evidence for this. In

fact, as was noted above, Hegel's dialectic is concerned with 'mutually inclusive' opposites; if by 'inclusion' we understand 'a closing in' of two concepts into one inseparable unity and by 'exclusion' we understand 'a shutting out' of two concepts into a merely antagonistic opposition. If we begin with the idea of 'identity' then we can see more clearly why this is the case. The word 'identity' has the literal meaning of 'a state of being the same' and entails thereby the idea of two concepts or ideas being possessed of the same attributes. But if we admit of the dialectic that it is founded upon such a concept then nothing follows from the assertion. The mere identity of two things or ideas gives rise to no third thing, for it is simply a matter of stasis that two things X and Y are identical. Nor can it be argued that the dialectical transitions within Hegel's *Logic* between 'identical' concepts, for in such a case the term 'transition' would be meaningless. Hegel in fact explicitly equates such a 'system of identity' with the pantheism of Schelling.⁶

Lenin is therefore quite correct if he wishes to claim that the essence of the dialectic lies in the fact that what, hitherto, have been regarded as distinct and separate ideas are, if correctly examined and understood, interdependent and interconnected. But if he wishes to hold that two ideas are 'opposites', and also that they 'mutually exclude' each other, then we are left either with a sheer tension of opposition or else are obliged to seek some third 'synthesis' by which to overcome or remove such opposition in order to produce a real union of these distinct and independent ideas. The dialectic understood in this manner seems to suggest that the relationship which obtains between paired concepts is merely one of 'exclusion' or 'incompatibility'. But, as we have seen, the whole thrust of the dialectic is towards the recognition that the relationship which actually obtains between concepts is not one of 'exclusion' but is rather one of intimate dependency or 'inclusion'. Thus the ideas of Whole and Part stand in a relation which may be characterised, in a loose sense, as one of 'opposition' but it is an 'opposition' which must be understood in the strict latin sense of the term, i.e. as an *ob postumum*, or a 'setting against', and not as necessarily implying contradiction. The German term *Gegensatz* also has the same connotation, meaning literally as it does 'an against positing' and it, not contradiction (*Widerspruch*), is the basis of Hegel's dialectic.

It may seem strange to philosophers brought up in the English tradition to think of correlative terms as manifesting dialectical

logic — for indeed correlative pairs of terms have long been accepted in Anglo-Saxon thought — but it is precisely the reason why correlatives are correlative that concerned Hegel and this is in fact the essence of the dialectic. Hegel, however, wishes to claim that it is not only the correlatives with which we are familiar that demonstrate this inseparability and mutual dependency but that, in a very strong sense, *all* our logical concepts form a chain or nexus of just such a correlation, and for Hegel this inseparable unity of all our concepts is itself ultimately derived from the very nature of the Ego. Lenin, I suggest, has fully recognised what may be termed the ‘unity’ thesis of opposites in Hegel but has failed to recognise that it is precisely *because* concepts such as Whole and Part and Essence and Appearance form paired correlates that these ideas form a series of mutually *inclusive*, rather than *exclusive*, terms.

If, therefore, we understand Hegel’s *Logic* as a gradual explication and development of the ‘connectedness’ or ‘linkedness’ of the categories of thought, with each category taking its place in an implicative order, then the dialectic is to be understood as the explication of a series of logical relations pertaining between such categories or concepts. But such a ‘dialectical nexus’ of ideas and concepts is not itself sufficient to account for our knowledge of the world. It must confront a world which is given. That is to say it must have a relation to the objective world of matter into which man daily finds himself thrown. Hegel recognised this and states, at the end of his *Geschichtsphilosophie*, in a passage noted by Marx, that he (Hegel) ‘has considered the progress of the *concept* only’.⁷ Hegel well recognises that the reintegration of man and his world that he (Hegel) has made possible through his *Logic* is a reintegration at the level of ideas alone and is thus, in Marx’s sense of the term, an idealistic reintegration.


It is in the *Phenomenology of mind* that Hegel first outlines the three means by which the external material world may be *aufgehoben* by man or, what is the same thing, can be removed from its given state as something ‘other’ to man and made into something which exists ‘for’ him as a world in which he can find and make his home. The three means that Hegel postulates by which man dialectically transcends the alien externality of the world are Will, Thought and Activity, or, to translate these terms into Marx’s language, Will and Mental and Physical Labour.

For Hegel, as for Marx, man is obliged to go out beyond himself and lay hold of, or seize upon, a world that at first

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confronts him as something distinct from himself and without any purpose or significance for him. Man is *forced* to do so, for his condition of existence in this world leaves him no choice but to relate to the world as it is and make use of its various parts to satisfy his innate needs. And, whether he wishes it or not, man must first make use of his Will in this enforced confrontation with the material world. In so doing he 'grasps' a part of that world and utilises it to service some need. Thus, for example, a hungry man plucks an apple from a tree and eats it. In so doing he has 'overcome' the world, but in a way which preserves its own nature. In grasping the apple he has made it something 'for him', something which has a significance and which is now to be distinguished from all other objects in the world, for this object, this apple, is 'his'. Yet he in no way destroys the materiality of the apple; indeed it is precisely the material element of it which will eventually satisfy his hunger. In this elemental action of grasping something, man has transformed the external world from what Hegel understands by the category *Gegenstand* into the category *Objekt*. The merely material and unincorporated external world is at first a mere *Gegenstand*, in the literal meaning of the German word, an 'against standing' or that which stands opposed to us, and to which Hegel ascribes the term the 'other'. In so far as man's action, be it through his Will, Thought or Activity, 'transcends' this externality then the world ceases to be an 'other' and becomes an Object for us the Subject. It still embodies and manifests its original materiality but it is now a materiality that has come to embody something derived from a Subject. This relation can be diagrammatically represented as in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1



The Subject and Object form a correlative pair whereas

Materiality is something unincorporated and not yet something for the Subject. In order for the material world therefore to become correlated to a Subject it is necessary for man to perform a Mental or a Physical act in respect of the given thing, or make an expression of Will. Thus I may make a judgement about what it is that I am presented with via my senses and thereby make this thing into something with mental as well as physical properties. Or I may perform some labour upon it and transform it by doing so into a tool or implement for me etc. Or I may exercise my Will and establish a *property* claim to this part of the world as something now intimately connected with me.

To consider the exercise of Will first. In its most primitive form, for example in the life of early man, this 'staking a claim' via an expression of Will might be nothing more than the occupation of a cave for shelter. But in so far as this early man comes to regard this cave as 'his' cave, that is to say in so far as he ceases to be nomadic and settles in one place for a period of time, the cave becomes endowed with a special significance for him. The cave is no longer regarded as a mere geological feature of a landscape dissociated from man's needs and desires, it becomes now an 'Object' for a 'Subject' and stands distinct from all other caves.

In the same way as the exercise of the Will makes something that was originally merely external now something of significance for man, so too does the exercise of his mental and physical capacities 'overcome' the world as a something detached from man himself. Through the use of Thought, or Reason, man comes to understand, classify and name his world.

In his practical Activity, man literally *forms* the base matter of the world to suit his purposes and needs.

The Object becomes the carrier of something *from* a Subject but yet also retains its original material component. In making of this given material world an Objective reality man thus makes it something for himself as *Subject*. The material world no longer stands opposed to the human subject but becomes something to which the subject has an intimate connection or relatedness and which will be the basis for any development of the Subject as an individual and social entity. As we have already noted, Marx adopts this Hegelian threefold dialectical 'transcendence' of the external alien world. But though he took his cue directly from Hegel's *Phenomenology of mind* Marx was to draw radically different conclusions from it than those of Hegel.

Master and Servant

In the *Phenomenology of mind* Hegel postulates that man first seeks to *aufgehoben* the material world through the exercise of his Will. Until the Will has become active the subject must remain passive before the objective world. In the Master/Slave dialectic Hegel demonstrates what are the social consequences for mankind of his attempt to construct his own sense of Self, his need for recognition by another human being, upon the basis of an exercise of his Will. There is an immediate conflict of Wills with each party attempting to exact from the other an enforced 'recognition'. This conflict is only resolved when one of the parties, under the threat of death from the other, yields his Will and grants a forced recognition of the other. In this moment one becomes the dominant party the other subservient and there is created the realm of the Master and Servant, the classic Robinson Crusoe, Man Friday situation. But as a result of the conflict of Wills there is also created something more than this mere domination of one man by another. As Hegel appreciates that the resolution of this conflict has produced, on the one hand, an enforced recognition and, on the other, a sense of unease. The Servant only acknowledges the Master because he is obliged to do so. The Master can never know that the Servant would have so recognised him out of the exercise of his, the Servant's, own free Will. The recognition that the Master receives is but his own Will reflected back to him via the Will of his Servant, which Will is now exercised only at the dictate of the Master. The Will of the Servant is nothing more than the Will of the Master and therefore the Master in effect merely recognises himself, which is no recognition at all.


The Servant on the other hand, having been granted no recognition, has been forcibly obliged to exercise what remains of his own Will upon the physical material world. He thereby begins the task of 'overcoming' the otherness of the material world through his labour and the development of the skills entailed therein. Hegel understands that the outcome of the struggle between Wills for recognition is the creation of an unstable situation, a Master who is not confirmed in his mastery and a Servant who labours for another without the recognition of himself as a Self. It is precisely at this point that Marx begins his transformation, or rather logical extension, of Hegelianism. Marx sees that the outcome of the Master/Servant dialectic is the

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creation of two separate realms in which the other means of worldly *aufheben* are to come about. The Master becomes the exerciser of Mental Labour and the Servant the bearer of Physical Labour, and, as Marx rightly notes, the distinction between Mental and Physical Labour is the first Division of Labour.⁸ Not surprisingly Marx sees this first division of labour as the condition of the two antagonistic classes of Bourgeoisie and Proletariat, the former commanding the world and having a mentalistic approach to it, inhabiting as it does the realm of ideas, and the latter developing a practical and active transformative relationship with the world but with no understanding of why it labours or to what end.

As Marx states in *The German ideology*, '[the] division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labour appears'. And further, 'because the *division of labour* implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual and material activity . . . devolve in different individuals, . . . the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labour'.⁹ The relationship between Will, and Mental and Physical labour can for Marx be represented as in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2



This division between the mental and the physical means of transcendence of the world's materiality results in a divorce between the conceptual and the actual. It is this divorce which is at the foundation of ideology. As Marx states, again in *The German ideology*:

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From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something without representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and proceed to the formation of 'pure' theory, theology, ethics etc.¹⁰

And it is this point that Lefèbvre expresses so well in the first quotation from *Le Matérialisme dialectique* above. Hegel has confused the logical and the actual, the conceptual relations for the real, immediate ones established by human interaction and sociality.

It is this fact that is the most central and important advance made by Marx over Hegel for its implications are fundamental. Marx recognises that beneath the mediated dialectical relations that Hegel establishes between social concepts there lie real or immediate material relations. Hegel is quite correct to argue that in respect of Logic and those areas of knowledge about the world which man has as an external and detached being — for example the hard sciences — the establishing of conceptual relations at the level of concepts is vitally necessary. In the case of Logic it is only possible to interconnect such concepts according to an innate dialectical logic as was demonstrated above with the Whole/Part relation. However, when it comes to interconnecting the concepts of Family, Civil Society and State, this must be done according to the real dialectic of immediate human relationships and not according to some Aristotelian syllogistic scheme. Hegel in effect has ignored the fact that through the Master/Slave dialectic his dialectical scheme has become something more than logical. What Marx is postulating is nothing less than the fact that within the dialectic of Hegel there is another dialectic, the dialectic of head and hand, mind and body, mediate relations and immediate relations. It is after all only the Slave who achieves a real mastery over the world. It is he who must exercise both immediate skill and mental judgement as he seeks to form the world to humanity's needs.

Reification of the world and fetishism of commodities

Marx's critique of Hegelianism thus revolves around the fact

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that, for Marx, Hegel has remained at a bourgeois 'mentalist' level in the way in which he has related social concepts one to another. For Marx, Hegel therefore makes the Civil Service the Universal or the major premise, Civil Society the Particular or minor premise and the social individual or citizen the conclusion of these two logical moments. Real human relationships have thus been determined *a priori* according to Aristotelian logic. Marx on the other hand states that social concepts must be understood as having their own *real* content, a content that is to be derived from the real social relations which subsist between individuals and classes in society.

It was the purpose of Marx's PhD thesis on the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus to establish what he means by such a 'material' content. In his PhD Marx provides a clear account of what that content is and how it is to be understood. He states: 'when I relate myself to myself as something which is directly an other, then my relationship is a material one'.¹¹

Marx's meaning is, I think, clear. When I relate myself to the world via Reason I do so in a mediated manner, that is to say via concepts and ideas. If I understand myself as a rational animal and relate myself to myself via my capacity to understand what reason and intellect are, then my relationship to myself is an ideal or intellectual one. On the other hand when I relate to the world as to a mere material entity, as a *gegenstand*, then my relationship is an 'immediate' one. In the same way I can relate to myself on a material basis as a being with passions, instinct, drives and bodily needs. Thus when I relate myself to myself as towards an immediate other my relationship to myself is as a being with innate needs and desires. I relate therefore to what Kant would term my 'lower appetites'. It is the satisfaction of these 'lower appetites' that for Marx is the primary condition and the first motivational force for men in the world. In so far as I recognise myself as a being with material needs and immediate drives and wants I stand in a 'material' relationship with myself and similarly with my relationship to other men where that relationship is concerned with the satisfaction, either individually or mutually, of the most basic human bodily requirements.

This however, is not to deny the need for a realm of ideas. Many misunderstandings of Marx have been engendered by the failure to recognise that for Marx the realm of Thought, of ideas, is an independent realm with its own intrinsic value and purpose. As Marx notes, again in his PhD, it is the purpose of Thought or

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Logic to create the universal categories, ideas and concepts which provide the forms under which we may subsume the content of the various particularities of the perceptual material world. Marx declares:

abstract individuality can make its concept, its form-determination, the pure being-for-self, the independence from immediate being, the transcendence and preservation of all relativity, effective only by *abstracting from the being that confronts it*; for in order truly to overcome it, abstract individuality had to idealise it, a thing only universality can accomplish.¹²

Marx's passage in *The German ideology* where he states, "The hazy [or confused] constructs (*Nebelbildungen*) formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their (men's) material life-process . . ." ¹³ should also be understood in a similar vein. Marx is not arguing for some Skinnerian ontologically materialist thesis of ideas or human reasoning. Rather Marx means that it is the most immediate conditions of men, the satisfaction of their material wants and needs, that forms the basis for their intellectual constructs. Thus when we consider the ideas and concepts that men use to describe their situation we should recognise that these are but the manifestation, transposed into a higher and distinct form, of both those needs themselves and the means by which men seek to satisfy them.

But the failure to return again to the physical world having once accomplished this task of abstraction in order to formulate universal ideas leads to pure idealism, the dwelling only in the realm of abstract ideas which are then taken to have an independent subsistent validity of their own. Hegel's failure, so far as Marx is concerned, is that having achieved the formulation in thought of the ideas and concepts necessary to describe reality Hegel fails to descend once again from the heavens and interconnect these concepts according to their manifested *real* content, as opposed to their logically *ideal* one. He who remains at the level of abstract ideas alone can never use those ideas as the basis for an understanding or transformation of the world. Thought thus becomes divorced from Activity and the latter is left directionless. It is upon this problem that Marx was to found two other of his notable ideas, that of Reification and the Fetishism of commodities. Because the bourgeois does not test his

ideas in the world he is condemned to transpose for the real world the world of his ideas. He thus achieves a mentalist approach to reality which ideas he regards as reflective of the world but which in reality, because of their detached nature, become the source of self-delusion, of ideology. On the other hand the proletarian is obliged to labour in the material world but has no knowledge of why he labours, nor even does he understand the full process of which his labour is but a part. Neither the bourgeois in his mental isolation nor the proletarian in his daily confrontation with the brute matter of the world, can appreciate the purpose for which they labour in their different ways. What the worker produces becomes for the bourgeois a 'commodity' i.e. something abstract which can only be understood in terms of the most abstract idea of economics, the idea of money value. The 'commodities' which the capitalist therefore possesses at the end of a day's production become for him merely so many artifacts of indifferent utility which only have the significance that they can, at a future time, be transformed again into money. The proletarian on the other hand comes to see his labour process as something which does not belong to him, and his product as something which remains a *gegenstand*, i.e. as something standing over against him and opposed to him. What he produces he can only reappropriate as a consumer, a buyer of commodities. Yet even when he has 'reappropriated' the world as a consumer his 'appropriation' of that world remains defective. It is a reappropriation that remains at the level of the Will only; it is a grasping of something which remains exterior in its intrinsic nature and use from the grasper. Because, therefore, neither the bourgeois nor the proletarian stand in a *human* relationship one with another, but are merely Master and Servant, that which they produce with capital and labour is not understood in its true significance by either of them.

Alienation, heaven and earth and the standing of Hegel on his head

Upon the same base that he constructed his theory of Reification and Fetishism Marx also constructed his so-called idea of Alienation. His theory in fact makes use of three distinct ideas or terms, those of *Entfremdung*, (Estrangement), *Entäußerung*, (Externalisation) and *Veräußerung*, (Commercial Relations).

As we have seen it is the condition of man in this world that he

must 'go out beyond himself' to confront a given material reality. But that 'reality' is one which requires an integrated form of 'transcendence' that makes use of all man's powers, his Will, his Reason and his Labour. But the need for man to 'externalise' himself and make of the *Gegenstand* a world for himself is precisely the process that is frustrated by the division of society into two classes and the concomitant division of man's labour into the dissociated realms of the Mental and Physical. For Marx mankind can never, under the conditions prevailing within capitalist society, make of this material world his own social and human world. The proletarian is condemned to exercise his practical skills without knowing what he is making, nor for whose benefit he is making it, nor what purpose it serves. What he produces at the end of a day's labour remains a thing that still stands 'over against him' as an unincorporated materiality, as a fetish in the literal sense of something which he regards with an *irrational* reverence. It is a 'commodity' which belongs to another, the capitalist, and which he (the labourer) can only reappropriate via a Commercial Relation as a consumer. Yet even at this level, as we have noted, he acts towards the world of material things as a fragmented individual, for it is his Will alone which is the means of this 'reappropriation'. Because of this both the bourgeois and the proletarian are equally precluded from achieving, either individually or collectively, that wholistic and integrated 'transcendence' of the 'otherness' of the world which alone can transform the brute otherness of material reality into something *for* man. Both classes are condemned to remain 'estranged' from material reality and from each other. It is precisely the 'collective' effort required to produce a human world that is inhibited by the social relationships that lie at the base of capitalist society. Hegel was unable to see this because he still made use of the old classification of society into Estates and Guilds. In the Guild the Master, or Mental realm, and the Servant, or Physical realm, were united in the task of production. Though head and hand were not united in each individual neither were they as totally divorced, on the immediate and the human level, as they were to become in the factory system. In capitalism Marx saw around him the process of industrial manufacture rending apart what remained of this unity in the old Guild system. Marx's own adoption of the idea of classes enabled him to recognise that the divorce between head and hand was becoming more pronounced. Whereas Hegel's theory of Estates and Guilds preserved some

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vertical interconnection between Master and Servant, the new capitalist era was divided horizontally into two antagonistic classes whose relationships to the world were totally separated.

Because man fails to produce a truly human world he remains estranged in one other important aspect for Marx; he remains estranged from his own 'species-essence'. Man's human 'essence' remains to him as something that is external and unincorporated into his daily life. It, his essence, is preserved in that final relationship that it is the duty and destiny of man, for Marx, to 'transcend', that is, man's relationship to God. In perhaps Marx's most famous passage upon religion we can detect the cry of the oppressed.

The suffering of religion is at once the expression of actual suffering and at once the protestation against that actual suffering. Religion is the sigh of the afflicted creature, the heart of a heartless world, as it is the soul of a soulless condition. It is the Opium of the people.¹⁴

Religion remains the sole source of succour for those afflicted by the inhumanity of the new industrial era. The idea of man, qua Feuerbach, subsists still, but in an abstract form divorced from the real lives of men. Projected into heaven it becomes the image of God and man's relationship to his own essence becomes then a matter for religion and not his actual social life. It is for this reason that Marx's reaction to religion is ambiguous. On the one hand religion is the manifestation of the gap between human potentiality and human actuality and on the other hand, in its imagery and message of hope, it is the only form of relief from the misery of the world. The atheism of Marx is thus social rather than metaphysical and his demand for the overcoming of religion is the demand of those religious humanists such as Lessing, Kant and Hegel, for the creation of heaven upon earth. Only when man himself becomes a fully integrated and harmonious individual will the need to hold man's essences as something external to him be ended. Heaven and earth will be united. It is this hope which is expressed in another famous and oft-quoted sentence from Marx's *Economic and philosophical manuscripts*: 'The transcendence of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their actual happiness.'¹⁵ That is to say that it is not the mere abolition of religion which is being called for but rather its earthly realisation. Religion is a constant reminder of the gap between

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human earthly social reality and the potential essence of mankind. As such the concept of God presents to man, albeit in an ideal and heavenly form, that very goal of humanity towards which mankind must strive.

Conclusion

I have attempted in this paper to give an indication of the relationship between Marx and Hegel and to demonstrate how the philosophical predisposition of Marx is built upon the foundations already laid by Hegel. If a short account of this relationship was to be given it would be as follows. The dialectic, for Marx as well as for Hegel, is based upon the relationship between ideas, between, that is to say, those essential concepts which man must use in order to be able to come to 'know' the world and to achieve that transcendence over it which is the special characteristic or essence of the human species. To begin this process man must first create himself as something distinct from that world, he must raise himself to the level of rationality, to the level at which he is an abstracted individuality no longer bound to or governed by the mere immediate and instinctual relationship that he has to the world as a mere animal. This abstraction of man from the world entails, of necessity, an abstraction, or a drawing away from, the immediate in the human condition, the passionate and instinctive side of man. It was upon this process that Kant founded his theoretical view of human nature, distinguishing between the realm of the 'higher appetites' and the realm of the 'lower appetites', between mind as intellective and rational or mind as 'emotive' and 'instinctual'. Man becomes free for Kant only when he raises his will from the lower to the higher realm, that is to say when he allows his will to be governed only by the dictates of reason. But this essential and unavoidable first step has the undesirable consequence that man becomes dissociated from the immediate material world in which he has, also of necessity, to find his home and to satisfy his biological needs as a material entity amongst material entities. Whereas Kant limited enquiry into the *a priori* conditions of the human intellect and to the establishment of those categories and concepts needed to present to human consciousness a stable perceptual manifold of experience, Hegel, with his conception of Reason and dialectic, sought to provide an explication of *all* of the

category required by man to make sense of the whole world of his experience and not merely its perceptual element. Hegel thus employs his dialectical method to demonstrate that the discrete concepts and categories of Kant's Logic actually form a unified nexus of interdependent ideas. Having provided an elucidation of this schema in his Logic, Hegel goes on to demonstrate how his logic is applied in our understanding of the world, but he does so from the side of logic itself. The entire thrust of Hegel's philosophy and view of man's transcendence of the material world is thus from a position that Marx comes to term the idealistic, or intellectualist. It is because Hegel remains at the level of ideas and the mental that, in seeking to integrate his concepts solely according to an innate logic of those ideas, he is driven to connect them at a logical level only. Hegel thus falls into the error of thinking that whatever relationship he is able to establish between concepts in the realm of ideas is also established in the realm of material reality. Marx, on the other hand, recognises that this human condition requires that man confront a given world, and once having confronted it needs to produce from it a social and political world in which he will have his being. The means by which man seeks to satisfy the most basic requirements for his continued existence in the world are not neutral in their import for the social and political life which he subsequently establishes. Indeed in the very processes by which man seeks to transcend the immediate material realm and to produce those material goods necessary to sustain him, man, though he does not realise it, also produces the social and political relations which become the form of his social and political existence.

Hegel postulates that the condition of man's coming to be at home in the world is dependent upon his innate powers and capacities; that he is endowed with a free will, with intellect and with physical capacity and learned skills. In making of the externally given world of matter a world which is his, man must make use of these powers. In so doing man transforms brute matter and thus comes both to know and understand as well as to make his world. The world becomes Objective for him and its immediacy is incorporated into the mediate world of his social life. But Hegel restricts himself in his account of how man comes to be at home in the world to the level of intellect or Reason. In so doing Hegel explains, he transcends the world at the level of the rational Ego. But to so do is to make of *aufheben* a mentalistic or

idealistic endeavour only. Man must first abstract himself from the world as given in order to be able, from a detached perspective, to know it in a mediated, rational manner. In taking no heed of the needs of man as a bodily animal it ignores the immediate transcendence which is so fundamental for Marx. Indeed because the Master/Slave relation is the first condition of human existence the forms of transcendence, mental and physical, become the domain and preserves of different classes. It is the ruling class that establishes the ruling ideas of the age precisely because it is this class alone that is privileged to inhabit the realm of ideas. It is in this sense that Marx's assertion that 'it is not the consciousness of men that determine their existence, but their existence that determines their consciousness'¹⁶ should be read. Marx means the German term for 'consciousness' to be understood in its fully German etymology. *Bewusstseins* has the literal meaning of 'an awareness of being'. Because of the outcome of the Master/Slave dialectic, each class finds itself with a different relation to and awareness of the being of the world. The bourgeois adopts a mentalistic, idealistic and detached awareness and the Proletarian becomes aware of the brute 'otherness', the immediate materiality, of the world.

The consequence of this for Marx is that the intellect in Hegelianism is left to confront the world in the same manner as it is in Kantianism, as something detached from the body in which it resides. But man confronts the material world not merely in the form of the 'other', the given stuff of existence, but also in the form of his own 'lower' self, or instincts, needs and drives. If man is to be a whole individual he must reconcile himself with the world as body as well as mind, as 'lower' as well as 'higher' mind. Marx's advance upon Hegel was to recognise that beneath the mediated, mentalistic relation that man has to the world and to himself there is an immediate and material relation also. And it is this immediate relationship to himself as body and passion that Marx realises holds the key to the way in which man creates for himself a social and political world. It is only in so far as man enters into a relationship of mutual recognition with his fellow man, and enjoins upon himself the respect for others that this entails, that man is able to achieve both a mediated and an immediate *aufheben* of the world.

In so far as I come to satisfy the most immediate needs and desires of myself and others through my labour I am reinforced not merely in their respect but also in their love. That rational

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respect for others that is enjoined upon us by the Moral Law is supplemented by an immediate love and concern for our fellow man. Reason and emotion thus stand in unison. It is for this reason that Marx believes that Hegel's rationalistic, or idealist reconciliation of man with his world is only a partial reconciliation. In the manner of Schiller, Marx believes that it is necessary to bring about a harmony of the rational and passionate in man, and in so doing create, for the first time, a truly human being. This desire of Marx leads to what may be described as his most 'utopian' aspect: namely his belief that such a harmonisation of the human being will produce a transformation of man's innate disposition to the world and towards his fellow man. Under the reign of such a transformed humanity the Kingdom of Ends, which is a rational construct, will be complemented by such a reconstruction of man's passions that each will be confirmed in their love for others at the most immediate level. It is for this same reason that Marx has no need of a State, for the State, at its best, is the guardian of the universal interest. That interest has now become inseparable from the particular interests of each, their being no difference between the good of one and the good of the all. For this reason Hegel's divorce between the Universal Will and the Particular Will is transcended and the two aspects of the Will are made one inseparable unity. This radical belief in the capacity of man to make of himself what he will as both a rational and as an emotive being is the foundation of the greatest danger in Marxism: for that which makes of Marxism so profound and sublime a humanism can also make of it the foundation for the most cruel totalitarianism.

Notes

1. *Dialectical materialism*, Henri Lefèbvre, trans. John Sturrock (Jonathan Cape, London, 1968), p. 58.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
3. *Hegel's science of logic*, trans. A.V. Miller (Allen and Unwin, London, 1969), p. 91.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
5. Letter to Berthold Aürbach, 2 Sept., 1841, M. Hess, *Briefwechsel*, E. Silberner (ed.) (Gravenhage, 1959).
6. *Logic*, p. 84.
7. *The German ideology*, Student Edn, C.J. Arthur (ed.) (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1985), pp. 51-2.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

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9. Ibid., pp. 51–2.
10. Ibid., p. 52.
11. *MEGA* vol. 1, 1, p. 39.
12. The German ideology, pp. 51–2.
13. Ibid., p. 51.
14. Introduction to the 'Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*' in *Karl Marx Early Writings*, Introd., Lucio Colletti, trans. R. Livingstone and G. Berton, (Penguin, London, 1975), p. 244.
15. Ibid., p. 244.
16. Preface to *A contribution to the critique of political economy* (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971), pp. 20–1.

7

The Actual and the Rational

Sean Sayers

What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational. On this conviction the plain man like the philosopher takes his stand, and from it philosophy starts its study of the universe of mind as well as the universe of nature.

(Hegel, *Philosophy of right*, p. 10)

I

These words, from the Preface to Hegel's *Philosophy of right*, are among his most notorious and controversial. Ever since their first publication, they have been attacked, ridiculed and dismissed as implying an extravagant idealism and an uncritical sanctification of the *status quo*. Hegel himself was surprised by the outraged response to what he calls 'these simple statements' (*Logic* § 6, p. 9), which he took to be stating views shared by 'the plain man' and 'the philosopher'. For the most part, he thought the opposition to be based upon simple confusions and misunderstandings of his meaning; and sympathetic commentators have, by and large, agreed. Thus Hegel is at pains to insist that he distinguishes mere 'existence' from what is 'actual', and that he is not justifying all that *exists* as rational. Nor is his philosophy to be equated with any simple sort of subjective idealism. With these points many commentators have also rested content.¹

There has been a tendency, then, to greet Hegel's doctrine either with uncomprehending outrage or with uncritical sympathy. Neither response, I shall argue, is adequate. The reactions of outrage are not without their basis; for Hegel's words most certainly have conservative implications, which he welcomed and

emphasised; and they also express the extreme idealism of his philosophy. Equally, however, there are profound and important ideas involved in these assertions, which are still of great relevance. It is these upon which I will be focusing. My concern is not primarily with Hegelian scholarship, but with the issues that his philosophy raises. I will be approaching this in the critical fashion that is necessary to all those who are prepared to 'avow themselves the pupils of that mighty thinker', and seeking to discern and distinguish the 'rational kernel' from the 'mystical shell' of Hegel's thought.²

II

When Hegel talks of the rationality of the actual, his first and most general purpose is to specify what he takes to be the scientific attitude, and this is a basic and important element of the rational kernel of his thought. Hegel is saying that actuality — which, for the moment I shall take to refer to the world in all its aspects — is orderly in its forms and law-like in its behaviour. It is rational in the sense of being regular, coherent and comprehensible — explicable in rational and scientific terms.

Hegel is a strong defender of the realism implicit in the scientific approach. He rejects the Kantian idea that order and necessity are merely our 'way of seeing things', mere subjective forms, which we impose on the world through our use of the 'categories'. On the contrary, Hegel argues, species and kinds, laws and necessities, are objective features of reality which science seeks to discover and to understand.³

Hegel's philosophy is so widely regarded as an extreme form of speculative, *a priori* — even mystical — metaphysics, that it may come as a surprise to find it praised for being scientific and realistic. Of course, there are strong speculative and unscientific aspects to Hegel's thought; but scientific and realistic themes are equally present, though less often perceived or appreciated. In particular, philosophy, Hegel insists, should study actuality. The content of Hegel's work is thoroughly realistic: to a remarkable and unique degree for a modern philosopher. It covers a truly encyclopedic range of topics, treated in a thoroughly concrete and empirically detailed manner.

Moreover, Hegel extends this realistic and scientific approach to the study of society; and his work contains a notable defence of

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the idea of a social science. He rejects entirely the Kantian idea that the social world cannot be grasped in scientific terms, but must rather be approached morally and 'critically'. Philosophy, he insists:

must be poles apart from an attempt to construct a state as it ought to be . . . it can only show how the state, the ethical universe, is to be understood . . . To comprehend what is, this is the task of philosophy. (*PR*, p. 11)

By the time Hegel was writing, the scientific attitude had largely prevailed in the study of the natural world; but there was, he observed, a great resistance to regarding the social world in this manner. Despite the immense growth of the social sciences since then, this is still true today. The social and the natural realms, it is argued, are fundamentally distinct and different. The laws of nature are objective, they operate independently of us; and, for this reason, they must be accepted as they are and viewed in a scientific and objective manner. Social laws, by contrast, have a subjective aspect: they are *our* product, the creations of human consciousness, will and reason. To look upon the human world in purely objective terms, it is argued, is, therefore, inappropriate and wrong: it is to be passive and acquiescent when an active and *critical* approach is required. For reason, in relation to the human world, has not only a theoretical but also a practical role. It can guide action and show us what ought and ought not to be.

Hegel takes direct issue with these Kantian views. It is true, of course, that the human world differs from the natural world, and that in it consciousness, will and reason can play a constitutive role. Hegel does not deny this (and nor does Marx, for that matter). However, Hegel rejects the idea that reason is a transcendent and absolute quality which distinguishes mankind from the rest of nature. He rejects the idea of an absolute gulf and divide between these two realms.

When Hegel talks of the unity of the actual and the rational, however, it is also vital to see that he is not merely reducing the actual to the rational or vice versa. The relation between these opposites is conceived as a concrete and dialectical one. And, at least in the more rational parts of his work, Hegel is aware of the conflict as well as of the harmony of these opposites. It was Hegel's great achievement to see human consciousness, will and

reason in concrete and dialectical, social, historical and developmental terms. Practical — moral and political — ideals, he insists, are not the product of transcendent reason operating *a priori*, nor are they purely subjective. On the contrary, they are historical products and arise out of and reflect ‘the ethical world’ (that is to say, social institutions and relations). He rejects the dualism which is presupposed by the Kantian philosophy. ‘Reason is in the world’, says Hegel, it is a social product, and does not need to be brought from outside by the ‘critical’ philosopher.

This is not to say that the scientific approach is necessarily ‘uncritical’. However, there is a clear sense in which the scientific attitude involves a measure of acquiescence to reality or, in Hegel’s words, ‘reconciliation’ with it. For being scientific implies that we accept objective conditions and adjust our ideas to them, so that our views correctly reflect these conditions, rather than imposing our ideas and ideals upon the world. This is the inherent nature of the theoretical and scientific attitude. However, it does not at all imply a passive or acquiescent attitude to the world when it comes to practice. On the contrary. A scientific and true understanding of the world and of its necessities is the essential basis for effective action upon it. To be sure, will and commitment are also necessary for action, but alone they are not sufficient to ensure success. For this the will must be guided by thought, by reason. We must understand the situation in which we act, and what is and is not really possible within it. Conversely, ignorance is the recipe for idle dreaming and for the construction of sterile utopias. The less a person knows, as Hegel says, ‘the greater is his tendency to launch out into all sorts of empty possibilities’ (*Logic* § 143z, p. 204).

Hegel is not denying that utopian and critical ideas have played a valuable and important role in social and political thought. He does insist, however, that if such ideas are to be more than mere wishful dreams, they must reflect and be disciplined by reality. For example, Hegel argues that Plato’s *Republic* — the greatest of utopian works — is misunderstood if it is regarded simply as an ideal vision of how society ought to be organised. The *Republic* is rather Plato’s attempt to understand the conditions, the developments and the problems of the society of his day. It is the attempt to grasp actuality in rational terms; for:

Philosophy is . . . the apprehension of the present and

actual, not the erection of a beyond . . . Even Plato's *Republic*, which passes proverbially as an empty ideal, is in essence nothing but an interpretation of the nature of Greek ethical life. (*PR*, p. 10)

III

Hegel, then, like Marx, advocates a realistic and scientific approach, and his account of society is historically concrete and dialectical. He rejects the utopian and merely 'critical' attitude as a basis for political thought and action. These are important elements of the rational kernel of his notorious principle. And yet Hegel's philosophy taken as a whole is far from being scientific or realistic. Its detailed contents are set within a philosophical system which purports not merely to understand and explain the world in a scientific fashion, but to rationalise and justify it. It is this which constitutes the mystical shell and which gives rise to the accusations of mysticism and conservatism.

These accusations are fully justified. Hegel is quite explicit — at times almost brutally so — about the conservative and idealising implications of his philosophy.⁴ The recognition of reason in the world, he says, 'is the rational insight which reconciles us to the actual, the reconciliation which philosophy affords' (*PR*, p. 12). Philosophy gives not criticism but 'consolation' (*Logic* § 147z, p. 209f); it teaches us to give up the restless desire to condemn and repudiate the existing order.

Thus when Hegel talks of philosophy 'reconciling' us to the world, he means not only that we should approach the world scientifically and discipline our ideas to reality. He means that we should regard the world as rational in the sense of 'ideal'. The world, Hegel insists, is as it ought to be. The desire to criticise and to change it is the error of 'youth' which imagines 'that the world is utterly sunk in wickedness and that the first thing needful is a thorough transformation' (*Logic* § 234z, p. 291). The maturer and wiser view — the view, needless to say, embodied in Hegel's philosophy — is that 'actuality is not so bad and irrational, as purblind or wrong-headed and muddle-brained would-be reformers imagine' (*Logic* § 142z, p. 201). 'The Good is radically and really achieved' (*Logic* § 235, p. 291), and our discontents are groundless: 'all unsatisfied endeavour ceases, when we recognise that the final purpose of the world is

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accomplished no less than ever accomplishing itself (*Logic* § 234z, p. 291).

For Hegel, then, not only is actuality rational, but rationality is actual, in the sense that it is actualising itself in the world.

The actual world is as it ought to be . . . the truly good, the universal divine Reason is the power capable of actualising itself . . . God governs the world. The actual working out of His government, the carrying out of His plan is the history of the world. (*Reason in history*, p. 47)

World history is governed by Divine Providence — it is the realisation of God's will on earth. The study of history and politics must take the form of a justification of God, of a 'theodicy' (*Reason in history*, p. 18). There is no place here for criticism — no need for it. For evil, from this perspective, is a mere subordinate and vanishing moment, and our reconciliation with it is achieved 'through the recognition of the positive elements in which that negative element disappears as something subordinate and vanquished . . . The true ultimate [rational and divine] purpose has been actualised in the world and . . . evil cannot ultimately prevail beside it' (*Reason in history*, p. 18).

Here is the 'mystical shell' of Hegel's philosophy in full measure: that aspect of it which seeks, in Marx's words, to 'transfigure and glorify the existing state of things' (*Capital*, vol. I, p. 20). It leads to the grotesquely idealised and unrecognisable account of social life which Hegel gives in his political philosophy. The state is pictured as 'inherently rational' and as the 'realisation of freedom', marriage as a harmonious union based on love, etc. It is tempting to try to disregard these themes as loose exaggeration and rhetoric on Hegel's part.⁵ Unfortunately, this is not possible. These views are, on the contrary, an essential ingredient of his philosophy and of his idealism, constantly reiterated as the ultimate and deepest significance of his thought. As such, they have been taken up and repeated ever since by 'old' and conservatively-minded Hegelians, who have wanted to legitimate and rationalise the *status quo*.⁶

IV

It is a common view that the conservative and idealising aspect of

Hegel's thought is an inevitable and inescapable outcome of his identification of the actual and the rational. But this is not so. As Hegel himself insisted, and as the Young Hegelians were quick to point out, the unity of actuality and reason is a *dialectical* one, which includes within it conflict as well as harmony. Although Hegel often tends to take the side of conservatism and reconciliation in his later writings, his philosophy is more complex, more confused and contradictory — and also more profound and interesting — in its practical implications than this suggests. In the *Encyclopaedia Logic* (3rd edn, 1830), indeed, Hegel repudiated the accusation that he was seeking merely to justify the existing order and to rule out any criticism of it. 'Who is not acute enough', he asks, 'to see a great deal in his own surroundings which is really far from being as it ought to be?' (*Logic* § 6, p. 10)

The claim that the 'actual is rational' does not, he insists, mean that whatever *exists* is rational. 'Actuality' and 'existence' are both technical terms in his logical system. Of the two, existence is the lower grade of being. There are things which exist and yet which lack 'actuality' in Hegel's sense, for actuality is 'the unity of essence and existence, inward and outward' (*Logic*, § 142, p. 200). An existing thing is actual only when its existence is in harmony with its essence; when its existence corresponds with its proper notion, function or idea. On the other hand, 'when this unity is not present, a thing is not actual even though it may have acquired existence. A bad state is one which merely exists; a sick body exists too, but it has no genuine reality' (*PR*, p. 283).

Hegel's idea of actuality is closely associated with his account of truth, and usefully understood in relation to it. Truth is commonly regarded as a quality of propositions or ideas, which they possess when they correspond to their objects. For Hegel, however, this is merely the concept of 'correctness', and he distinguishes from it a deeper, 'philosophical' sense of truth, which refers to the correspondence of an object with its 'Notion', 'Concept' or 'Idea'.⁷

Truth in the deeper sense consists in the identity between objectivity and the notion. It is in this deeper sense of truth that we speak of a true state, or a true work of art. These objects are true if they are as they ought to be; i.e. if their reality corresponds to their notion. When thus viewed, the untrue is much the same as to be bad. A bad man is an untrue man. (*Logic* § 213z, p. 276)

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This may sound strange and unfamiliar, but, as Hegel points out, there are examples of this usage in ordinary language: 'thus we speak of a true friend: by which we mean a friend whose manner of conduct accords with the notion of friendship' (*Logic* § 24z, p. 41).

To be rational, actual and true, the objectivity of a thing must, thus, correspond with its notion, its existence with its essence: it must be a harmonious whole, not infected with contradiction. To be untrue, not fully actual, not fully rational, on the other hand, means 'to be bad, self-discordant' (*Logic* § 24z, p. 41). But the bad, to repeat the crucial point, although it lacks actuality, may none the less exist.

This distinction between actuality and existence puts the Hegelian view that the actual is rational in an entirely new light. Indeed, if 'actuality' is taken to refer only to fully rational existence, then Hegel's principle becomes true by definition. This is, no doubt, part of the reason why Hegel and his followers have tended to brush aside objections to this principle. Once we grasp what Hegel means by 'actuality', we cannot but agree that the actual is rational, for this is simply a tautology.

The problem, however, has only been shifted elsewhere. Although the actual may be rational, by no means all that *exists* is rational and actual. The question remains of how far this tautological notion of rational actuality is applicable to the existent world around us. On this crucial issue Hegel is ambiguous and unclear.

In his political and historical writings, as we have seen, Hegel often tends to suggest that the state and society, as they have developed and as they in fact exist, are rational and actual. This is the basis of Hegel's conservatism, and it is in these terms that he attacks would-be critics of society:

Reason is not so impotent as to bring about only the ideal, the ought, which supposedly exists in some unknown region beyond reality (or, as is more likely, only as a particular idea in the heads of a few individuals)⁸ (*Reason in history*, p. 11).

In more metaphysical and logical contexts, however, we are told that nothing finite is fully actual or rational. Indeed, Hegel says that

God alone is the thorough harmony of notion and reality.

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All finite things involve an untruth: they have a notion and an existence, but their existence does not meet the requirements of the notion. For this reason they must perish. (*Logic* § 24z, p. 41)

All 'finite' things, therefore, are contradictory and to that extent irrational. They can be criticised for their 'untruth'. Indeed, because of their contradictoriness — their irrationality and untruth — all finite things are destined to 'criticise' themselves in a practical fashion. They are ultimately doomed to change and to pass away. 'Finite things are changeable and transient . . ., existence is associated with them for a season only . . . the association is neither eternal nor inseparable' (*Logic* § 193, p. 259).

This is the dialectical side of Hegel's thought. It was seized upon by the Young Hegelians, who saw in it the seeds of a radical and critical philosophy. For, if nothing but God is fully actual, fully rational — if everything finite is animated by contradiction and in the process of change — then what in fact exists is *never* ideal. One must equally say 'what is actual is *irrational*'. And so, for the Young Hegelians, the realisation of reason is not an established fact, but rather a goal and a task. The world as it is, the existing state of things, must be criticised and transformed: reason must be *realised*, it must be *made* actual.

Engels, in his excellent discussion of these issues, credits Heine with being among the first to appreciate the critical and revolutionary significance of Hegel's philosophy.⁹ Heine expresses this charmingly in an imaginary dialogue between himself and Hegel, who goes under the title of 'the King of Philosophy'.

Once when I was put out by the saying: 'all that exists is rational' he smiled in a peculiar way and observed: 'it could also mean: all that is rational *must* exist.' He looked around hastily but soon calmed down, for only Heinrich Beer heard what he said.¹⁰

I do not know who Heinrich Beer is, but it is clear that Heine's meaning is that Hegel was himself aware of the ambiguity and of the possibly revolutionary significance of his philosophy, but that he was afraid to speak it. I doubt that this is a correct account of Hegel's intentions; but whether it is so or not is unimportant

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here. For what is undoubted is that Hegel's philosophy contains strands and themes which, whether he intended them so or not, have a critical and revolutionary significance. It is these that were emphasised and developed by the Young Hegelians and by the young Marx.

Indeed, one of the clearest statements of this 'critical' interpretation of the Hegelian philosophy is given by Marx, in a letter to Ruge of September, 1843.

Reason has always existed, but not always in a rational form. The critic can therefore start out from any form of theoretical and practical consciousness and from the forms *peculiar* to existing reality develop the true reality as its obligation and its final goal. As far as real life is concerned it is precisely the *political state* . . . which, even where it is not yet consciously imbued with socialist demands, contains the demands of reason. And the political state does not stop there. Everywhere it assumes that reason has been realised. But precisely because of that it everywhere becomes involved in the contradiction between its ideal function and its real prerequisites. (*Collected works*, vol. 3, p. 143)

This is pure Young Hegelianism. In the existing political state, Marx is saying, we can discern a contradiction between its 'ideal function' and its existing form: there is a discrepancy between its notion and its objective existence. To that extent, the state is irrational and untrue, and may be criticised as such.

Moreover, such criticism, the Young Hegelians insisted, does not involve bringing either Kantian *a priori* or merely subjective ideals and values to bear on reality from outside. The ideals according to which the existing state is to be criticised, on the contrary, are supposed, in Hegelian fashion, to be the *notion* of the state: something which is intrinsic to the state — its very essence.¹¹ Again Marx puts it memorably: 'We do not confront the world in a doctrinaire fashion with a new principle: Here is the truth, kneel down before it! We develop new principles for the world out of the world's own principles' (*Collected works*, vol. 3, p. 144).

V

This is the Young Hegelian, critical, approach. Like Old

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Hegelian conservatism, it derives from themes which are central and essential to Hegel's philosophy; and initially, at least, it seems to offer an attractive alternative. Ultimately, however, it, too, conflicts with the rational — the scientific and realistic — side of Hegel's thought, and cannot provide a satisfactory basis for the study of politics or society. Indeed, this critical approach represents precisely the sort of utopian and subjective wishful thinking against which Hegel directs his polemics. The existing order is regarded as the imperfect and partial embodiment of the Notion or Ideal, which is its real essence, truth and ultimate destiny. The established order is measured against this Ideal and found wanting. The scientific attitude of studying what is, is abandoned, and the world is judged and criticised in the light of how it ought to be.

I will illustrate these points with some recent examples; for the Young Hegelian approach has not been confined to Hegel's disciples of the 1840s. It has had an enduring influence, and appears in some unexpected places. For example, in the Marxist tradition, and even amongst the hardest of hard-liners, who would be horrified by the thought that they had much in common with the early Marx, let alone with Hegel! It is particularly evident in the discussion of what Bahro has so usefully called 'actually existing' socialist societies, like those of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Cuba and China.¹² How often have we heard the refrain that these societies are not 'genuinely' socialist, that they are not 'true' workers states. Of course, they exist in fact; but, in true Hegelian terms, what is being said is that they are not as they ought to be, they do not embody the concept, the notion — the ideal — of socialism: they lack 'actuality' and 'rationality'.

The un-ideal character of 'actually existing' socialist states is one of the major problems for contemporary socialist thought. An all too common response on the left has been to try to evade this problem by discounting these societies as 'exceptions' in the ways described. But this is clearly not a satisfactory response. It involves abandoning altogether the scientific approach to history and adopting instead a purely moral one. There can, of course, be exceptions in history; but when history comes to be entirely composed of them they cease to be exceptions and become the stuff and actuality of history. The ideal is then revealed as unreal, utopian and subjective.

Not that this style of thought is any monopoly of the left. One of the stranger products of the American far right is a writer

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called Ayn Rand, who propounds an extreme and simplistic brand of *laissez-faire* individualism. Among her works is a book with the arresting title, *Capitalism: the unknown ideal*. However, the title is designed not simply to capture attention; it accurately reflects the theme of the book. The ideal of capitalism is 'unknown', she believes, because it has not yet been tried! The essence and the ideal of capitalism is the free market. Capitalism, as it has existed for all these centuries — 'actually existing' capitalism — has never realised this ideal. *Laissez-faire* and the free market have always been restricted and compromised, she thinks, by excessive state interference under the influence of muddled and weak humanitarian do-gooders, etc. The destructive features of capitalism — the exploitation, stagnation, alienation, oppression and misery associated with it — are all the mere aberrant and monstrous products of the mixed economy. Pure capitalism, the 'unknown ideal', would not be like this.

To write history in this way is, of course, absurd. Socialists, however, are in danger of precisely similar absurdities when they reject actually existing socialist societies as 'exceptions', and persist in thinking of socialism as an 'unknown ideal'.

It is not the job of history or of the social sciences to criticise or condemn societies according to ideal standards: rather, they should seek to understand and explain the real world as it has in fact developed. The social sciences, that is to say, must reconcile themselves to the world, and avoid what Carr calls the 'might have been school of thought'.¹³ Socialists, in particular, must confront the real world of socialism and come to terms with it, rather than dismissing it as an aberration. In saying this, I must stress, I am not suggesting that they should abandon all criticism, and simply endorse everything that has gone under the name of socialism. In the remainder of this paper, I shall try to show how Marx distinguishes what is rational from what is mystical in Hegel's principle and, on that basis, provides a method which is both scientific and critical.

VI

Old Hegelianism seeks to legitimise the existing order, whereas Young Hegelianism is dedicated to criticising it. At first sight they seem absolute opposites; but, as I have shown, they share in common the fact that they both adopt a moral rather than a

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scientific approach to the world. The basis for this moral approach, moreover, lies in the idealism which both share and which is a central feature of Hegel's metaphysics.

As we have seen, Hegel's philosophy involves an extravagant form of idealism. 'The actual is rational, he thought, because Reason, the Idea, the Ideal, is an active principle, expressing and realising itself in the world. 'Reason', says Hegel, 'is the soul of the world it inhabits, its immanent principle, its most proper and inward nature, its universal' (*Logic* § 24z, p. 37). Moreover, all this is given a theological interpretation, so that the objective world becomes God's creation and history a 'theodicy'. It is this idealism which gives rise to that paradoxically 'inverted' order so characteristic of Hegel's philosophy. For Hegel, it is reason, the idea, the ideal that comes first, and which then specifies, concretises and realises itself in its particulars. As Seth says, 'Hegel's language would justify us in believing that categories take flesh and blood and walk into the air . . . that logical abstractions can *thicken* so to speak into real existence' (*Hegelianism and personality*, p. 125).

Hegel's principle that the actual is rational is often identified as the locus and source of his idealism; and, as such, rejected in favour of the dualist alternative. (For example, this is what Seth goes on to do.) It is certainly true that Hegel expresses his idealism through this principle; but we must proceed carefully at this point if we are to disentangle what is scientific and rational from what is mystical and idealistic in it.

In particular, it is vital to see that materialism also involves the idea of the unity of actuality and reason. Human reason is nothing transcendent — it is a product of natural and social evolution. For this reason, Marx does not reject or discard Hegel's principle. Rather, as he says, he turns it 'on its feet'.

For Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea', he even transforms into an independent subject, is the *demiurgos* [creator] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea'. With me, on the contrary, the idea is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human brain, and transformed into forms of thought. (*Capital*, vol. I, p. 19)

For Marx, that is to say, nature and society are not, as with

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Hegel, the products of reason; on the contrary, reason — ideas and ideals — are the outcome and creations of natural and historical development. ‘The phantoms formed in the human brain are . . . sublimates of their material life process . . . Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence’ (*German ideology*, p. 47). Ideas and ideals have no autonomy from social life. They are the subjective aspect of actual and existing objective social relations: they are social through and through.

Marx’s materialism does not, then, involve any denial of the unity of actuality and reason; but it does, as Marx says, ‘invert’ the Hegelian and idealist interpretation of it. Instead of starting with ideas and ideals, and either criticising or justifying reality in terms of them, Marx begins with social reality and explains ideas and ideals on this basis.

In direct contrast to German philosophy, which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven . . . We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process. (*German ideology*, p. 47)

This sort of outlook has been enormously attractive and fruitful as a basis for social theory. However, it may well seem that such a straightforward kind of materialism is a reductive and crude philosophy which leaves unresolved many of the problems of the relation of reason to reality that I have been raising. In particular, it is often argued that such a philosophy is unable to do justice to the *critical* nature of thought. If reason were nothing but a product and a reflection of the established order, then, it seems, it could neither oppose existing conditions nor be critical of them. In order to acknowledge the critical power of reason, it is argued, reason must be viewed in a dualistic fashion as a force separate and distinct from the world.

Marx’s materialism, however, is not reductive. On the contrary, it is a *dialectical* form of materialism which is not vulnerable to this argument. For a crucial aspect of the rational kernel that Marx retains from Hegel’s philosophy is the dialectic. To the question: where do critical ideas come from? — Marx’s response is clear and unmistakable. *All* ideas are social and

historical products. All ideas are, in this sense, ideological. Critical ideas — just like uncritical ones — arise from and reflect social reality. In saying this, Marx does not deny that reason can oppose and criticise the established order. He does, however, insist that when it does so, that is a reflection of the fact that *existing conditions are themselves contradictory*. ‘If theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc., comes into contradiction with existing relations, this can only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with existing forces of production’ (*German ideology*, p. 52).

Criticism is not the prerogative of thought alone. Opposition, negation and contradiction are *in the world*: they are features of what is. For nothing concrete and determinate merely *is*. Nothing is simply and solely positive. Negation and opposition are essentially involved in all things. This is the first lesson of Hegel’s logic, and the most vital principle of dialectic in all its forms. Mere being is an abstract and empty category. All concrete things are a unity of being and nothing, of positive and negative aspects; and these opposites are synthesised in the process of movement and becoming. Everything concrete is contradictory. ‘We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate is rather changeable and transient’ (*Logic* § 81z, p. 150).

Marxism is a dialectical philosophy. As such, it rejects the abstract, merely positivistic conception of actuality, according to which what is, merely is.

To materialised conception existence stands in the character of something solely positive, and quietly abiding within its own limits . . . But the fact is, mutability lies in the notion of existence, and change is only the manifestation of what it implicitly is. (*Logic* § 92z, p. 174)

Thus negation, opposition and criticism do not need to be brought to the world by the thinking subject from the outside. The social world already contains negative, critical and contradictory forces within it. Nor is this criticism embodied merely in ideas or ideals. It exists first of all in *fact*. Only later is it apprehended by consciousness and reflected in thought. Thus Marx insists that ‘Communism is for us not a *state of affairs* which is to be established, an *ideal* to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the *real* movement which abolishes the present state of things’ (*German ideology*, pp. 56–7).

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Marx, then, essentially agrees with Hegel's view that

dialectic is not an activity of subjective thinking applied to some matter externally, but is rather the matter's own soul putting forth its branches and fruit organically. This development of the Idea is the proper activity of its rationality, and thinking, as something subjective, merely looks on at it without for its part adding to it any ingredient of its own. To consider a thing rationally means not to bring reason to bear on the object from the outside and so to tamper with it, but to find that the object is rational on its own account. (*PR*, § 31, pp. 34–5)

What Hegel is describing here, albeit in the alien and metaphysical language which is so much his own, is nothing other than the scientific method. This approach undoubtedly involves a measure of 'reconciliation' to reality, as we have seen. It involves, as Hegel says, not 'tampering' with the world, not imposing value and ideals upon it, but rather observing and understanding it as it is. However, in Marx's hands at least, this method by no means entails a conservative attitude or the abrogation of criticism. For Marx does not set out to judge capitalism against any pre-established moral values, nor to posit an ideal socialist state of the future. Rather, he attempts to understand and explain in scientific terms the working of existing capitalist society. As Engels says, Marx 'never based his communist demands upon this [moral principle] but upon the inevitable collapse of the capitalist mode of production, which is daily taking place before our eyes to an ever greater degree' (Preface to Marx, *Poverty of philosophy*, p. 9).

In this way — by exposing, articulating and analysing the critical and revolutionary tendencies and forces already at work in the world — Marx provides the most powerful and effective critique of capitalism: a *scientific* critique.¹⁴

Notes

1. See, e.g., S. Avineri, *Hegel's theory of the modern state*, pp. 115–31; and W. Kaufman, *Hegel: a reinterpretation*, ch. 6.

2. These phrases are, of course, from K. Marx, *Capital*, vol. I, pp. 19–20.

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3. I am here condensing an account of Hegel's critique of Kant's theory of knowledge given more fully in *Reality and Reason*, chs 2–3.

4. See, e.g., the bitter attack on Fries in Hegel's Preface to *Philosophy of right*.

5. See, e.g., W. Kaufman, *Hegel: a reinterpretation*, ch. 6.

6. For a secular version of such Hegelian conservatism, see F.H. Bradley, 'My Station and its Duties', *Ethical studies*, ch. 5; and, more recently, R. Scruton, *The meaning of conservatism*.

7. The German term that Hegel uses is 'Begriff', which is translated by Wallace as 'Notion' and by Knox as 'Concept'.

8. I have amended Hartman's translation in line with the version given by Nisbet in Hegel, *Lectures on the philosophy of world history: introduction*, p. 27.

9. F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German philosophy*, ch. 1.

10. From Heine's letter *On Germany*, quoted by Plekhanov in his *Notes to the Russian edition* (1892) of Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 104.

11. See H. Marcuse, *Reason and revolution* for an excellent account of the 'critical', Young Hegelian, reading of Hegel, which brings out this point particularly clearly.

12. R. Bahro, *The alternative in Eastern Europe*.

13. E.H. Carr, *What is history?*: p. 96. This work contains a useful and illuminating discussion of the role of reason in history.

14. I am grateful for comments and criticisms to Chris Arthur, Susan Easton, David Lamb, Joe McCarney and Gülnur Savran.

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8

Hegel, Marx and Dialectic

Joseph McCarney

This paper is an attempt to establish the significance of dialectic for social scientific inquiry. Its topic is the idea of a dialectical social science, and the question it seeks to answer is the question of how such a science is possible. Its understanding of what dialectic is comes from Hegel. This is scarcely surprising, since his writings are the source of the modern debate and treat the basic theoretical issues with unparalleled richness. A convenient starting point in them is offered by a passage from the *Philosophy of right*:

The concept's moving principle, which alike engenders and dissolves the particularizations of the universal, I call 'dialectic' . . . The . . . dialectic of the concept consists not simply in producing the determination as a contrary and a restriction, but in producing and seizing upon the positive content and outcome of the determination, because it is this which makes it solely a development and an immanent progress. Moreover, this dialectic is not an activity of subjective thinking applied to some matter externally, but is rather the matter's very soul putting forth its branches and fruit organically. This development of the Idea is the proper activity of its rationality, and thinking, as something subjective, merely looks on at it without for its part adding to it any ingredient of its own. To consider a thing rationally means not to bring reason to bear on the object from the outside and so to tamper with it, but to find that the object is rational on its own account; here it is mind in its freedom, the culmination of self-conscious reason, which gives itself actuality and engenders itself as an existing world.¹

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It is, of course, unwise to focus too hard on a single passage, but the risks are reduced in this case by the representative nature of the themes being addressed. Above all, the passage is representative of Hegel's dealings with dialectic through its placing of the category of reason at the centre of things. Much of the difficulty of the present inquiry consists in showing how this emphasis is to be conceived and justified in the context of dialectical social science. It is already clear that such a science will not qualify as rational just in virtue of employing a rational methodology: it has also to do justice to the rationality of its object. Even this will not suffice, if it is intelligible as merely 'an activity of subjective thinking applied to some matter externally'. To have a dialectical character, the science must somehow, it appears, participate in the activity of rationality it uncovers. For what is dialectical has to constitute an immanent progress, an organic development. These are demanding requirements, and likely to prove significantly more demanding for us than they were for Hegel.

If one asks how he met them, the answer suggested by the passage is, in general terms, clear enough: it is that one has to invoke his ontology. The matter in question is rational on its own account because it is the medium of existence for what is, under one aspect, identified as itself 'self-conscious reason', and under others as 'the Idea' and as 'mind' (*Geist*). A solution along these lines, however, poses a special difficulty for our project. In the usual litanies, from Croce onwards, of what is living and what is dead in Hegel, it is his ontological vision that is most readily assigned to the philosophical graveyard. The task of explaining why this is so is bound to be complex, and, fortunately, lies outside our scope. What seems undeniable is that the claims of self-conscious reason as matter and subject arouse few answering chords in the contemporary world, even among 'Hegelians'. The level of embarrassment is likely to be highest in philosophy of science, at least in so far as it is sensitive to contemporary scientific practice. The secular and reductive spirit of that practice is markedly unsympathetic to whatever it can construe as metaphysical excess. For anyone concerned for Hegel's thought as a living force, it may be instructive to accept this verdict, at least for the sake of the argument, and to explore the consequences. This would be to ask whether the dialectical character of science may be preserved without the original ontology. Is there a way other than the one Hegel took in which science may both reveal and contribute to the rationality of its object?

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If recent theory of science is agreed on anything, it is agreed that the philosophy and the history should not be kept in watertight compartments. Philosophy of science, in particular, runs a risk of sterility unless it stays in contact with some concrete practice of science. To say this is to restate what was well understood by Hegel. His excursions into the subject are marked by scorn of 'mere formalism', with its imaginary examples and lifeless schemas, and by extensive reference to the details of the science of his time.² If one tries to follow this lead here, a certain body of work forces itself on one's attention. Marx consistently claimed that his science was dialectical and that the author of its dialectic was Hegel. As a social scientific achievement under such auspices, it has no serious rival in terms of scale of conception, thoroughness of execution and historical influence. There is a more specific consideration which commends it to us. Marx is a Hegelian for our time, at least in the negative sense that what he is crucially unable to accept is the ontology. From early to late, the burden of his complaint is always the treatment of the Idea as subject.³ If one considers the details of this critique, it may well have to be admitted that it gives the ontology a somewhat simplistic reading, tending all too readily to take its subject as a transcendent being in relation to whose activity events in the ordinary world are epiphenomenal. Such a reading, it may be thought, fails to do justice to the central Hegelian claim to have rendered *aufgehoben* the traditional opposition of immanence and transcendence by virtue of a subject which is neither simply external to the finite nor wholly exhausted in it. For present purposes, however, it may suffice to work with fairly coarse-grained categories here: the radical character of Marx's break with his philosophical upbringing will be more significant than the element of caricature through which it was mediated. It is enough that he shares with our contemporaries an inability to accept the dialectic of society as a process through which reason engenders itself as an existing world, however that engendering is precisely to be conceived. In spite of this, he was to carry through a programme of social inquiry claiming the inspiration of Hegel's dialectic. Such an achievement must have considerable significance for our discussion. Hence, we may provisionally replace the original question with the more manageable one of how this claim is to be understood. In what does the dialectical status of Marx's science consist?

I

It should be said at once that rejecting the ontology is not like cutting away an excrescence that allows everything else to flourish as before. There is within Marxism a tradition, derived ultimately from Engels, of seeing the relationship with Hegel in just such facile terms. It is, on this view, a question of keeping the radical 'method' while dropping the conservative 'system'. Such a formula fails to register the way in which method and system are bound together in Hegel's thought. The point is easy to illustrate from within the range of present concerns. It is generally assumed that contradiction is a key dialectical category. Yet it is noteworthy that many commentators have failed to detect at various points in Hegel's dialectic the inner complexity which that category needs to take root.⁴ Instead, they have seen a linear sequence in which every stage follows directly from the one before without the mediation of conflict within the stages. They have concluded that contradiction is not, after all, essential to dialectical movement. What is essential to it is the striving of incomplete and finite categories towards their completion in the infinite. The heart of the matter is taken to be, not the contradictions in things which generate their restlessness but, the 'absolute unrest' which typically, though not inevitably, finds expression in contradictions. It is not necessary to decide the merits of this interpretation here. But one should at least note that it focuses on a significant feature of Hegel's presentation, and one should note also the chief response available to the friends of contradiction. It is a response that enlists the ontology directly by making its subject the bearer of one side of the oppositions. Thus, it may be granted that in some stretches of dialectic the moment of internal conflict is lacking, while insisting that there remains, at every stage short of the last, the contrast between the existing state of things and what they will become in the fulfilment of reason. The mainspring of the movement through these stretches is the tension between the way the contents are at any particular point and the way they are potentially, in their concept and in truth. Momentum is sustained not through contradictions in the real, but through contradictions between the real and the rational. Clearly, the rational cannot, for Marx, have the existential status required for a solution of this kind. The break with Hegel now appears as a break with 'method' as well as 'system', since here dialectic and ontology are inseparable.

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This conclusion may seem to have gloomy implications for our inquiry. Fortunately, however, the damage can be contained. There is, it should be remembered, a large variety of dialectical models in Hegel, a variety too large to be captured in a simple formula. In some of them, no special ontological reinforcements are needed to get the contradictions going. As a model for science, the phenomenological dialectic is the outstanding candidate among these. Consciousness, Hegel insists, is always consciousness *of* something. So a dialectic of forms of consciousness will have built into its structure a dualism that guarantees the complexity presupposed by relations of contradiction. Such relations will obtain in practice whenever the idea of the object by which the subject consciousness is possessed comes in conflict with the object as it is actually encountered in experience.⁵ Given a subject meeting minimal conditions of rationality, the conflict brings about of itself a change in the preconceptions. This is the pattern usually taken to be classically exemplified in the opening chapters of the *Phenomenology of spirit*. That this is so is at least a happy omen. The *Phenomenology* is a key text of the Hegel-Marx nexus: it is for Marx 'the true point of origin and the secret of the Hegelian philosophy'.⁶ Moreover, in its opening chapters it is forms of cognition that prove inadequate when the version of reality they project is put to the test. In the present inquiry also, it is with a form of cognition that we have to deal. It seems natural to suggest that the model for dialectical social science may be found in Hegelian phenomenology.

II

This suggestion will be developed in a schematic way at first and the details will be filled in later. In Marx's appropriation of the phenomenological theme, the subject is the social class, and so the dialectic of consciousness becomes a dialectic of class consciousness. A class may be thought of as equipped with a view of its social world which has to cope with the demands of everyday existence in that world. For a subordinate class, at least in the earlier stages of the dialectic, the essential content of this world-view is supplied by the 'ruling ideas', which, Marx tells us, are the ideas of the ruling class. In an idiom with a sharper edge to it, the class may be said to be subjected to the ruling ideology; that is, to the set of ideas and beliefs which serve the interests of

the ruling class by legitimising its rule.⁷ This ideology involves, like any other, cognitive claims. It purports to embody a correct picture of social reality. It is these claims which, according to the phenomenological model, will come in conflict with, and be refuted by, experience. Such experience is, of course, not unmediated. It is human social experience and, as such, highly conceptualised, not a registering of raw data. The dialectic of class consciousness is the process through which the way it is conceptualised comes increasingly to be informed by scientific insight. Thus, in Marx's version, the phenomenological dialectic is fuelled by the opposition of ruling ideas and comprehended experience. In the central case with which he was concerned this, it turns out, is equivalent to the opposition of bourgeois ideology and proletarian science.

This attempt to reconstruct Marx's conception of dialectic has, like any other, to face the difficulty posed by the reticence of the texts. These embody a practice, but without providing an explicit theory of it. The sketch that has been given seems, however, to offer a way of piecing together the major clues that are available. In the first place, it can show the exactness of Marx's favoured self-description of his work, evidenced by the titles or sub-titles of the major writings, as a 'critique of political economy'. In the terms of the preceding discussion, this is to say that it is a critique of the central, most formidable, version of bourgeois ideology. Marx evidently saw the significance of his life-work as bound up with the destruction of the cognitive core of that ideology. This is intelligible in the light of our scheme in so far as such a work of destruction serves to break the grip of the ruling ideas by exposing the gap between what they project and the reality. In doing so it exposes and activates the primary contradiction of the dialectic of class consciousness.

It should also be possible at this point to accommodate the more specific clues that Marx provides in moments of methodological reflection. Perhaps the most characteristic and significant of them is the insistence that his dialectic, Hegel's dialectic 'in its rational form', is 'in its very essence critical and revolutionary'.⁸ This insistence has greatly influenced later attempts to explicate his conception of his scientific work. It has been taken as confirming that its relation to its object is not to be thought of as merely explanatory or theoretical in the manner of orthodox science but as 'practical', even 'transformative', as well. In the most influential version of the idea in twentieth century Marxism,

dialectical social science has been interpreted as a 'critique' or 'critical theory' of society. Such a view of its status, although all too frequently taken for granted, is open to various objections. What concerns us here is simply its ability to preserve the dialectical character of inquiry. The notion of critique that is usually taken to be involved is the familiar one of systematically elaborated negative evaluation. Some such understanding seems required if the thesis is to perform the task of explaining how theory can be 'practical'. For a negative evaluation may be thought of as yielding reasons for doing something to change what is being evaluated, and such reasons for acting are, it may be said, practical in a primitive sense. The difficulty, however, is to see what constitutes a science of social contradictions as a negative evaluation of society, and to this the literature offers no satisfactory solution. The obvious suggestion is that the exposure of contradictions is necessarily the exposure of defects, since a contradiction is, as such, a defect in whatever it appears. But this avenue seems to be blocked by the opposition of the entire dialectical tradition, formulated most trenchantly by Hegel.⁹ Even if it could be overcome, the critique thesis is in other ways ill-equipped to meet the needs of dialectical thought, as adumbrated in the passage which was our starting point. The rationality of social critique, as usually conceived, is essentially the rationality of the critic: rationality on the side of the object is superfluous to its constitution. This is to say that the enterprise is constituted from an external point of view, and so fails to belong to the organic development of the matter. Marx is quite as unsympathetic as Hegel to any suggestion that the role of theory is to confront existing reality with a *Sollen*, an abstract vision of what it ought to be. Thus, he is scathing about attempts to find an intellectual basis for socialism in a condemnation of capitalism, a tendency he associates with utopian thought. His work must, it seems, achieve its practical significance in some more immediate and immanent way. If one considers the specific needs of a phenomenological dialectic, the critique thesis has other difficulties to face. There is, in particular, the problem of accounting for the unique categorial status of the phenomenological subject. The critique of society is most naturally taken as yielding considerations which are binding on all in so far as they are rational. Marx's science, however, is not addressed indiscriminately to the universe of rational beings: it is by its very nature internally bound to the standpoint of the proletariat, the subject of its dialectic. In the

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face of these difficulties, it is a relief to turn once again to our Hegelian model. For it then becomes clear that the critique of society thesis introduces a wholly superfluous level of mediation into the conception of dialectical science.

It will scarcely be contentious to assert that in Hegelian phenomenology transitions are not effected through negative evaluations of the successive moments.¹⁰ The source of movement is the discovery, not that these are as such undesirable or unsatisfactory, but that they involve contradictions. This discovery is, in terms of the model, immediately practical for a consciousness meeting minimal conditions of rationality. Such a consciousness cannot rest in the awareness of its own contradictions, but is driven towards their resolution. This force exerts itself in a modality which is not that of practical judgement as normally understood, but that of conceptual necessity. For its operation is the substance of the attribution of rationality to the subject consciousness in the first place. A subject who failed to meet this condition could never begin to play a part in the movement of reason which is dialectic. It is a condition which Hegel's 'natural consciousness' and Marx's class subjects can meet without difficulty. They are at least proto-rational from the earliest stages of the movement, and their rationality develops step-by-step as it proceeds. In Marx's case, the development takes the form of the dissemination and absorption of a scientific understanding of social reality. The achievement of such understanding is itself an immanent force of change, in so far as it forms and transforms the consciousness of the subjects who make history. This perspective seems to offer a hope of grasping dialectical inquiry as an element in an organic development. But it can only be a lifeless possibility until one begins to specify how it is realised. Certain conceptual matters have first to be considered by way of clearing the ground. They concern the notions of science, of contradiction, and of the subject that are being employed here.

III

It is of some importance to guard against what may be called the élitist associations of the term 'science'. In English usage, at any rate, it tends to suggest a somewhat rarefied activity that is the prerogative of a specialised group, the scientists. Such a conception will not suit the needs of a model which postulates

that scientific understanding may permeate the consciousness of class subjects. It is, moreover, foreign to Marx's style of thinking in this area. The possibility of science arises, in his view, wherever the appearances of things fail to correspond to their reality. His basic image of scientific activity is the going behind such appearances to find what they conceal. In the case of social science, the possibility of this unmasking arises for subordinate classes just in virtue of their role in social production. For the ruling ideology is never entirely successful in imposing its version of reality, or, at any rate, its success is inherently precarious. Thus, it is a persistent theme in Marx's writings from early to late that subordinate classes are in a privileged position so far as grasping the truth about their society is concerned: they are best placed to penetrate the fog of its phenomenal forms.¹¹ Hence it is that, in its heroic period, the bourgeoisie had access to important insights into the nature of the society it was seeking to dominate, and its ideology began to degenerate only after it had achieved power. This penetration of what is given is, for Marx, the epitome of all science. Thus, the insights of subordinate classes are significant as both the historical basis and the conceptual model for the further elaboration of social science. In this elaboration, Marx recognises, of course, a role for specialist intellectuals, and he thought of himself as playing such a role for the working-class movement. Such contributions are possible, however, only in so far as theorists adopt the standpoint of the epistemologically privileged class. Social scientific understanding is, in the first instance, the birthright of such classes. This view of the cognitive potential of the proletariat goes together with Marx's conception of its historical role: 'the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves'.¹² For this conquest to occur, the dissemination of forms of scientific understanding among the workers is indispensable.

The task of the self-conscious theorists is to articulate insights, that arise, as it were, spontaneously for subordinate classes, into fully-fledged scientific concepts. In the case of Marx's science the central theoretical concepts form a tightly-knit group whose function may be characterised, in general terms, as that of theorising the role of labour in commodity production. The group includes the concepts of class and class conflict, of value and surplus value and of labour power and exploitation. As Marx freely acknowledges, he had for the most part taken over ideas found in the work of bourgeois historians and economists. So far

as the main stock is concerned, he made the firmest claim for originality in the case of labour power, the understanding of the commodity status of labour which is the key to the secret of commodity production. In the work of the most advanced bourgeois thinkers such as Ricardo, the basic scheme had already served to conceptualise society as a field of class antagonism. Apart from adding some fresh elements, Marx's appropriation of it involves two related claims. The first is that the social antagonisms are treated as forms of dialectical opposition, that is, as contradictions. The second is that the entire static structure is located in history, in a process of development leading to the overcoming of class society.¹³ These claims should be examined in turn.

The idea that there are contradictions in society is often regarded as paradoxical or absurd. The chief source of such scepticism is the entirely proper conviction that contradiction is ultimately a category of logic, and that, in all its legitimate applications, this logical character has to be preserved. For present purposes, however, it should be possible to achieve it in a fairly straightforward way. The primary opposition for Marx is that of labour and capital. The substance of this opposition is a network of antagonistic class relationships which find expression in conflicts of beliefs, purposes and practices. Beliefs and purposes seem readily enough conceived of as bearers of logical relationships, and the possibility of tensions of a logical kind between them is well recognised in our everyday thinking. This tendency may be given a grounding in contemporary philosophy of logic. There, contradictions are standardly explained in terms of the notion of truth. The essential pre-condition for relations of contradiction to obtain is that the items related be bearers of truth-values. Strictly speaking, of course, contradictories necessarily have opposite truth-values. However, as we shall have to encompass the traditional notion of contrariety as well, it may be permissible to work with the weaker requirement that truth on one side of the relationship excludes the possibility of truth on the other. This requirement is easily met in the case of beliefs, which are assessable as true or false, if anything is. Moreover, recent philosophy of logic has been prepared to entertain the possibility of logical opposition between items which can support features analogous to truth, such as fulfilment or satisfaction conditions.¹⁴ This is, for instance, the crucial step towards a logic of imperatives. But purposes may be realised or unrealised, and the

achievement of some goals may rule out on logical grounds the achievement of others, as is presumably the case with, for instance, parliamentary democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat. If one is now allowed to speak of logical relations involving beliefs and purposes, it seems a short step to bring in actions as well. The step is licensed by the internal relations usually supposed to hold between these categories. It is the incorporation or expression of cognitive and volitional elements in actions that is standardly taken as distinguishing them from mere bodily movements. Thus, one may think of actions as conceptually, and at least quasi-logically, related to one another in virtue of full-strength logical relations between their corresponding ingredients of belief and purpose. If actions are brought in, there can be no difficulty, in principle, in extending the argument to include the series or complexes of actions we call activities and practices, and thence, in turn, what may be thought of as the frozen practices that comprise social institutions. None of this should prove too contentious. The idea that actions may be conceptually interrelated is both deeply grounded in Hegelian theory of action and in accordance with prominent themes in post-Wittgensteinian philosophy.¹⁵ The entire line of thought may be seen, from one point of view, as simply reflecting the fact that human social life is so saturated with language and meaning as to be a natural extension of the scope of logic, however the heartland is defined. If this is so, it must be legitimate to speak of class society as a sphere of logical opposition; that is, of contradiction.

The discussion of the internal links between belief, purpose and action is a useful preliminary to grasping the nature of the dialectical subject. A full account cannot be attempted here, but at least the general lines it must take may be sketched. The stress on action and purpose serves above all as a reminder that the subject is not pure intellect. It is a centre not just of cognition but of will and agency, a desirer and doer as well as a knower. It is a consciousness that is both theoretical and practical, and one that is necessarily embodied in the world. This latter requirement is not usually thought to present much difficulty in the case of individual human beings, where the body in question is straightforwardly included in successful identifications of the subject. Matters are more complicated when it comes to embodiment in collective subjects such as classes and nations. It is not possible now to explore the ontological problems sometimes associated

with this commitment. It will simply have to be noted as a presupposition of dialectical, as of much non-dialectical, social science. Against this background it may be thought, however, that the tendency to refer to the subject as a consciousness is misleading. The ultimate concern of dialectical social science is, after all, action which is productive of social change. It is only in the light of this preoccupation that consciousness as such becomes significant. Thus, purpose is involved in the dialectic in so far as it finds expression in, and shapes, activity. Belief is relevant as the all-pervasive medium of the formation of purpose. It may, nevertheless, still be legitimate to think of the subject as essentially a practical, embodied consciousness. For consciousness is what one most directly encounters in the dialectic as the inescapable mediator and vital element of action. Moreover, it may be permissible to continue to think of cognitive discovery as the leading edge of the movement, given that it is the discovery by the subject of what it truly wants as well as of the true character of its situation in the world. What has above all to be borne in mind is the fusion of belief, purpose and activity in the dialectical subject. With this proviso, it should not prove seriously misleading to go on speaking of a dialectic of consciousness here.

IV

The ground should now be cleared sufficiently to allow a closer look at the workings of Marx's dialectical inquiry. Its concern with social contradictions is, it was suggested, in essence a concern with relations of class opposition. At this point an important contrast has to be made explicit. However valid their title as contradictions, it is clear that those relations cannot directly provide the material of a phenomenological dialectic. The source of movement in that dialectic is the gap between what the subject posits and what it experiences. This gap finds expression through what are, in a straightforward sense, self-contradictions; contradictions arising within the unity of a single consciousness. The governing assumption is that the discovery of such contradictions is inherently transformative for subjects susceptible to reason. But the discovery that such subjects stand in relations of contradiction to one another has nothing of this dynamism. This is so even where, for instance, it is the discovery that the beliefs, goals and activities of other persons are

incompatible with one's own. There is then no conceptual obstacle to carrying on just as one did before, while the presence of such an obstacle is precisely what distinguished the self-contradiction cases. The focus of Marx's inquiry is on contradictions involving classes as distinct centres of subjectivity, on what may for convenience be called 'intersubjective' contradictions. It is plain that he regards these contradictions as comprising an intelligible process of directional change; as comprising, one has to say, a dialectic. Nothing has yet been said here to indicate how such a conception might be justified. It is clear, however, that account will have to be taken of the project of an intersubjective dialectic of class conflict, and the question must arise as to how that dialectic is related to the phenomenological, or, as it may now be called, 'subjective', dialectic of class consciousness.

To raise this issue is to approach the limits of the continuity between Hegel and Marx. It is to approach the point of rupture between a dialectical tradition for which, essentially, all contradiction is self-contradiction and one which undertakes to assimilate contradictions involving separate selves. The point may be expanded by noting how the whole problem might have been circumvented in the present discussion. It would be possible to regard contradictions between classes as having the character of self-contradictions, and, hence, as directly practical, if society itself could be treated as a single subject. Marx is, however, quite explicit on the nature of the error involved in doing so. Society is indeed a structured totality, but the tendency to treat it as itself a subject is, he insists, the characteristic weakness of a Hegelian-speculative approach.¹⁶ In taking this stance he may be said to be deliberately rejecting the possibility of guidance from Hegel on the issue under discussion here. It is indeed the case that no such guidance may be had from the *Phenomenology's* depiction of 'the path of the natural consciousness which presses forward to true knowledge'. That process is borne throughout by the internal contradictions which the consciousness encounters and surmounts on its way. There is, it must be admitted, an episode in the text which is often interpreted in a way that would make it a counter-instance to this verdict. This is the dialectic of master and slave, which, it has been maintained, provides the model for Marx's dialectic of classes.¹⁷ On a closer look, however, its claim to be an exception begins to dissolve. The position of each side in the relationship is shown by Hegel to be internally contradictory in a way that promotes the onward movement. But, as some

commentators have noted, no significant part in the story is played by contradictions between the consciousness of the master on the one hand and the slave on the other.¹⁸ This is most obviously so because the slave is not recognised either by himself or by the master as an authentic centre of purpose and initiative, and hence a proper human subject and potential bearer of an intersubjective dialectic. The master does not qualify as such a subject either, since, for somewhat different and more complex reasons, the element of recognition is inadequate on his side also. It seems that one should be wary of too readily appropriating the episode for Marxism. This is not to deny its tremendous resonance if it can be transposed into an appropriate framework. For the present, however, the discussion of it must reinforce the conclusion that the *Phenomenology* offers little help in getting to grips with an intersubjective dialectic.

In order to make some progress, one has to consider again the characterisations that have been given of Marx's science. These were that it is the theory of the contradictions of capitalism and that it is a critique of political economy. What has now to be shown is that these aspects are so related as to be but two sides of a single coin. To do this, one has to note the way in which, on Marx's view, political economy itself dealt with the contradictions of capitalism. There are two main tendencies to be observed, corresponding roughly to the distinction between 'vulgar' economy on the one hand and 'classical' economy on the other.¹⁹ The hallmark of the first approach is that the contradictions are ignored or concealed, either through simple failure of insight or as part of a programme of apologetics. In the second, their existence is acknowledged, even at times insisted on, but they are taken to be natural, eternally valid features of human society as such. The remedy in each case is supplied by a dialectical inquiry which reveals them not as timeless, static forms but as historical phenomena in transition. Hence it is that the science of social contradictions is at the same time a critique of political economy: it is by its very nature the assertion of what that ideology lives to deny. In being such a critique it works to break the grip of the ruling ideas in a crucial area of their operation. Thus, it serves as the trigger of the subjective dialectic by exposing for the class subject the fundamental contradiction of preconceptions and experience. The preconceptions posit a world of natural harmony or immutable division, while the science reveals a structure of contradictions in a movement towards resolution.

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It should now be possible to map in a preliminary way the relationship of the subjective and intersubjective dialectics. Social scientific inquiry engages directly with the intersubjective contradictions, and, by exposing them, sets in motion the primary contradiction of class consciousness. Viewing the relationship from the other end, it appears that, in Marx's scheme, the intersubjective dialectic is, in its later stages, worked out through the dialectic of the subject. In particular, the conflict of classes can only be transcended by a transition to a new age if the historical process becomes conscious for one of the participants, the proletariat. This class must achieve a high level of class consciousness and social scientific understanding in order to become in the full sense the subject of history. In this role the subjective and intersubjective dialectics come together and complete their course.

V

In sketching this historical vision we have, however, run ahead of the argument. For something vital is missing from it, as presented so far. It may be said to have redeemed the first of Marx's claims for his contribution to the legacy of bourgeois thought, the treatment of social antagonisms as unstable contradictions. Nothing has yet been done to redeem the second, the claim to have placed these contradictions within an intelligible historical development. At its crudest, the question that remains is what guarantees the overall shape of the story and, in particular, what guarantees its happy ending. To have a historical dialectic, it is not enough that there should be contradictions continually coming into view and going under. There must be an immanent, progressive logic to the sequence of changes. What is required is, not simply an indefinite sequence of randomly revolving contradictions but, an essentially directed movement. In the language of the dialectical tradition, the question is how one can speak of reason in history. Hegel's most dramatic pronouncements on the subject leave little doubt as to the general character of his answer. Thus, he describes the contribution of philosophy to historical study as follows:

the only thought which philosophy brings with it is the simple idea of *reason* — the idea that reason governs the

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world, and that world history is therefore a rational process. From the point of view of history as such, this conviction and insight is a *presupposition*. Within philosophy, however, it is not a presupposition, for it is proved in philosophy by speculative cognition that reason . . . is *substance* and *infinite power* . . . ²⁰

History, it appears, is rational because, as philosophy has shown, reason is at work in it as substance and subject. Clearly, a doctrine which presupposes rational subjectivity in this form is not available to Marx. It may also be said that a dialectic which requires such resources is not a phenomenology, at least on the austere pattern of the opening chapters of the *Phenomenology of spirit*. There the natural consciousness has to generate its own momentum, while reason as such is a later entrant on the stage. There is a mild irony in this. It is that in dispensing with substantive reason, Marx is committed to treating the historical dialectic in a manner more closely analogous to a strict phenomenology than Hegel himself attempted. It remains to be seen whether the commitment can be fulfilled.

At this point it may appear that the question with which we began has returned in a starker, more urgent form, and that the discussion has chiefly served to uncover the core of its difficulty. Marx's practice has been used as a base from which to explore the prospects for a social dialectic not requiring a Hegelian conception of reason. But the relative lack of discursive theorising around that practice has been felt with ever increasing, and, it may be thought, now decisive, sharpness. The situation is, however, by no means hopeless. There are at any rate, themes in Marx's work which may be drawn on to take matters further. It is true that they are scarcely ever related explicitly to each other by Marx, nor are they brought to bear individually in any sustained way on our problem. Nevertheless, they are a substantial presence in his thought, and, once the issue is raised, their significance for the problem can scarcely be denied. An attempt may therefore be made to fit them together into the outline of a solution. It remains the case that if such a solution can be achieved, it must have a unique exemplary value for an age which is incapable of the original Hegelian vision.

There is considerable room for debate as to the scope Marx envisaged for his theoretical work. Yet there are obvious features of the texts themselves which warrant some modest conclusions

that may suffice for present purposes. In the first place, they contain a certain amount of argument and speculation concerning the course of history as a whole. Secondly, they display a sharp sense of the limits of what they may be said to have investigated scientifically.²¹ This area is more or less co-extensive with modern capitalist society. Thus, one seems entitled to use a working distinction of a familiar kind between the social science and the philosophy of history. It is to the second of these that one now naturally turns for assistance.

The crudest, most general way in which history may be characterised, for Marx, is that it records the development of the capacity of human beings to cope with nature. The guiding thread is the growth of productive power bringing in its wake successive transformations of society. A statement usually given canonical status runs as follows:

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict (*Widerspruch*) with the existing relations of production . . . from forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.²²

In this passage, one is brought into contact with yet another domain of contradictions in progressive movement, and it seems one has, accordingly, to acknowledge another level of dialectic, a level whose terms are the forces and the relations of production. It is convenient, in spite of a rather disagreeable neatness, to refer to this as the 'objective' dialectic to distinguish it from the levels identified earlier.

Contradictions in the objective dialectic are characteristically resolved through the replacement of outworn relations of production by ones better suited to the movement of the forces. The fetters are burst asunder and succeeded by 'fresh forms of development'. This story is, for the most part, enacted in class society. The role of classes within it is as agents or representatives of tendencies within the forces, and thus as primary instruments of its enactment. This is to say, in the terms of our discussion, that transitions in the objective dialectic are accomplished through the mediation of the intersubjective dialectic of classes. The overthrow of existing relations of production will be the work of a hitherto subject class which proceeds to impose new social forms stamped in its own image. In this way, the replacement of

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feudalism by capitalism was achieved through the bourgeois revolution, and the replacement of capitalism by socialism will be achieved through the proletarian revolution. Such transformations require certain levels of consciousness on the part of the social actors. Hence, at this point, one may introduce the subjective dialectic. The final transition to socialism presupposes an advanced stage of this dialectic marked by a relatively high level of social scientific understanding. Thus, proletarian revolutionary consciousness is required for the achievement of socialism, and socialism is required for the development of the productive forces. That these forces tend to develop in history is the basic thesis of the entire structure of ideas.

In spite of the strategic importances of the thesis, it is difficult to find a fully articulated defence of it in the Marxist tradition. It comes as no surprise that Marx himself made no serious attempt to provide it. What is somewhat strange is that his successors have not done more to repair the gap in the system. Yet, although theory is relatively undeveloped in this area, many of the elements it will have to incorporate lie plainly at hand. It should be possible to make out the general shape it must assume, at least sufficiently to allow the argument concerning dialectic to go forward.²³ There is, to begin with, an obvious constraint on any solution that is proposed. It is that it should not offend our empirical sense of what happened in history. However elastic that sense may be, it will surely not accommodate any claims for the continuous and sustained development of the forces. On the contrary, there is unambiguous evidence of substantial progress only for certain episodes. Most significantly, there is the record of development under capitalism and also, perhaps, under other forms of organisation of industrial society, such as the 'actually existing socialism' of Eastern Europe. These considerations suggest that if one is to speak of a general tendency at all, it will be, at best, in the words of a recent writer, a 'weak impulse'.²⁴ Moreover, it will be one liable to be overborne by many countervailing forces and even to remain for long periods in complete suspension. This is a sobering preliminary to the discussion. Nevertheless, for present purposes, it is the prospect of being able to speak of a presumption of development, rather than the ease with which the presumption is overridden, that matters. What concerns us is not so much the frequency of exceptions, but rather the possibility of giving a theoretical account of the normal situation. A 'weak impulse' may still suffice

to ground a dialectic. For between the view that history is intelligible as the workings of a rational process, however imperfect and fractured its rationality, and the view that it presents only the blank externality of a causal series, there is, one might say, all the difference in the world. It is a qualitative difference if anything is. The problem, however, is how to conceptualise such an impulse within the framework provided by Marx.

The most promising line of thought is again one that draws on a theme he found in the *Phenomenology*. The outstanding achievement of that work, according to Marx, is that in it Hegel 'grasps the essence of *labour* and comprehends objective man — true because real man — as the outcome of man's *own labour*'.²⁵ In developing the theme, the factor that Marx emphasises is the purposive character of the labour project. Thus, what is said to distinguish the 'worst architect' from 'the best of bees' is that he 'builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax'.²⁶ Following clues of this kind, one might hope to place such projects at the centre of one's explanatory picture. The basic claim would simply be that they have some in-built tendency to foster the development of human productive powers. Labour is purposive, and labourers are capable of employing reason in the choice of means to achieve their purposes. They have a strong incentive to achieve them with a minimum of toil; that is, in a way that enhances their productive capacity. Given this starting point, the crucial task for theory is to establish the mediations that link such achievements to the movement of society. Even in the present state of things, it is not difficult to form some idea of what these factors are. A significant point to note is that whatever innovations arise in the course of the individual project will have some tendency to catch on more generally in the community. In a context allowing for communication between labourers, others will be able to grasp the point of improvements and to adapt them in their own practice. Another factor must be that in class society, the exploiting class has some interest in promoting and preserving innovations, not in order to ease the burdens of the exploited, but in order to enhance the rate of extraction of surplus value.

This is, of course, the barest sketch of the kind of theory that is required. Nevertheless, it affords some reason for supposing that the purposive character of the labour process may be, in and of itself, an impetus to the growth of the forces. It should therefore be possible to speak of a weak impulse grounded in the teleology of labour. Moreover, the sketch has the merit of suggesting that a

difficulty often associated with attempts to link the theory of history with the dialectic of class consciousness is wholly imaginary. It is supposed that there are, in Marx's thought, two distinct levels of reality, class consciousness on the one hand and the forces of production on the other, and that these are too disparate to comprise a coherent theory. It should now be clear that there is no ontological gulf here. In invoking the forces, one is not appealing to what is radically other than consciousness. The invocation has explanatory value only in so far as it is ultimately an appeal to the efficacy of human desiring and projecting. This efficacy rests on our ability to shape means to ends and to learn from one another. Instrumental rationality, as embodied in the labour process, is thus, in terms of Marx's system, a vital part of the meaning of the ascription of reason to history. Hence, it should also be noted that our sketch serves to call in question, at least in terms of fidelity to the spirit of Marx, the tendency in the later Marxist tradition both to hold such rationality cheap and to place its exercise in sharp contrast to the world of authentic human communication.²⁷

This discussion may be used to supplement the main line of argument in the following way. It bears out the claim that the forces supply the source of movement in the objective dialectic and that there is a directionality built into that movement. This formative influence may readily enough be thought of as percolating downwards to the dialectic of class conflict, given that classes are the agents of the social changes required by the forces. Moreover, it seems possible to go a step further to reach the subjective dialectic. At the very least, the changes of consciousness in that dialectic may be conceived of as occurring within a structure which exerts pressure in favour of some sorts of outcome and against others. So there may be a rational confidence that the overall movement will, in spite of lulls and regressions, have a certain determinate shape. Even if it is conceded, however, that this line of thought has some merit in general, it seems to have the unfortunate disadvantage of being least useful where it is needed most. This need arises in connection with theorising, not the main body of the dialectical transitions, but the transition which is the culmination of the entire process, the acquisition by the proletariat of a revolutionary consciousness. The question requiring an answer is what is the basis of the expectation that, at the critical moment, the proletariat will set itself in opposition to the entire existing order and seek its overthrow? This moment of

decision creates a special difficulty because it can arise only when a relatively high level of consciousness has already been achieved by the subject. But now talk of structures that discipline, and forces that incline choices has less authority than at earlier stages. The tendency of the Marxist tradition has been to insist that the final step is the outcome of decisions taken in freedom and self-consciousness. How then can there be any assurance of a particular outcome? It seems necessary to look still deeper into the resources of Marx's thought.

VI

The direction in which to look is towards the elements in it of a theory of the historical subject. This is, in effect, to recognise that questions of ontology cannot be bracketed indefinitely, and that no account of dialectic can be adequate without treating them. A well-known formulation of what is, for present purposes, the central idea runs as follows:

It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at the moment *regards* as its aim. It is a question of *what the proletariat is*, and what, in accordance with this *being (Sein)* it will historically be compelled to do.²⁸

It is with the character of this 'being' that one has now to come to terms. The discussion through which Marx prepared the ground for its introduction has an explicitly Hegelian flavour:

The class of the proletariat feels annihilation in estrangement; it sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence. It is, to use an expression of Hegel, in its abasement the *indignation* at that abasement, an indignation to which it is necessarily driven by the contradiction (*Widerspruch*) between its human *nature* and its condition of life, which is the outright, resolute and comprehensive negation of that nature.²⁹

With this contradiction, one reaches the deepest layer of dialectic in Marx. Its resolution has, he goes on to claim, a 'world-historic' importance, for the proletariat 'cannot abolish the conditions of its own life without abolishing *all* the inhuman conditions of life of society of today which are summed up in its own situation'.³⁰ The

proletariat is, to borrow another expression of Hegel, used in this connection by Marx elsewhere, the 'universal class' which bears responsibility for the interests of humanity as a whole. In later writings Marx uses a less explicitly Hegelian language to convey these themes, but the significance of the themes themselves does not alter. The concept of human nature remains central to his thought, and so, more specifically, does the sense of the contradiction between the requirements of that nature and the conditions of existing society and of the resolution of the contradiction by the proletariat as signalling universal human emancipation.³¹ The nature which the proletariat embodies should be considered in a little more detail.

The most convenient way to take up the question is by enlarging our understanding of the manner in which human beings are, for Marx, rational beings. So far, account has been taken of rationality as an impulse of overcoming inconsistency and of instrumental rationality in the labour project. What has now to be recognised is the human capacity, in virtue of human nature, for the life of reason in a richer sense. This richness is best spelled out by invoking once more an idea from the text which was our starting point, the idea of the internal connection of reason and freedom. For Marx too, freedom may be said to be the 'culmination' of reason and the substance of a rational society is nothing but the freedom of its members. In an early work we are told that 'free conscious activity is man's species-character',³² and this emphasis is sustained, again with changes of idiom, throughout his intellectual career.³³ The point may be linked with the preceding discussion by noting that since the proletariat is the universal class, its rejection of the existing system is a decision in favour of freedom for humanity in general. This decision is fully expressive of the being of the decider, and may be thought of as having a logic grounded in that being. There can be a rational expectation that revolutionary consciousness will be realised once it is objectively possible, since its realisation in that circumstance is required by the nature of the subject.

The final problem that confronted us was one of seeing how the unravelling of the contradictions of class consciousness may be the basis of a historical dialectic. The resources found for conceptualising it derived from the role in Marx's thought of two major themes, that of instrumental reason and that of human nature and its fulfilment. It is worth noting how strongly even this short discussion has suggested the need to integrate the two

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to provide a satisfactory background of theory. For there is a tradition of disjoining instrumental reason, not only from the context of authentic communication but also, from the related one of human freedom and emancipation.³⁴ That this tendency is foreign to Marx's thought is shown by a representative passage in *Capital* which conveniently brings together the ideas we have been discussing. The immediate topic is 'the sphere of actual material production':

Freedom in this field can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature . . . under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm, of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis.³⁵

Thus, a form of order incorporating the rationality of means and ends is the indispensable foundation of the kingdom of ends. In the terms of our discussion, it may be said that the instrumental rationality of the labour process is instrumental also for the life of non-instrumental reason. It would not be putting the point too strongly to say that this connection provides the basic structure of Marx's vision of society and that its elaboration is at the heart of his contribution to social theory.

VII

This paper began with the question of how social science may be conceived of as being dialectical. The discussion that followed took its theoretical bearings from Hegel and its working model of science from Marx. The model is dialectical in the obvious sense of being concerned with a dialectical reality, a reality structured by contradictions in a process of development. These are the contradictions of the 'objective' dialectic of forces and relations of production and, more immediately, of the 'intersubjective' dialectic of class opposition. A science of such contradictions might, however, be conceived of as merely explanatory and, as it were, contemplative, in regard to its object. This would not meet Marx's claims for his own work. To do so, the theory has itself to

be a force of change, an element in an immanent, historical logic. It achieves this status through its contribution to forming the subject of the dialectic of class consciousness. These various levels of dialectic are to be thought of as interacting in a complex network of mediations. The 'subjective' dialectic is the essential medium through which the others have to proceed in their later stages. The movement of history must become conscious for a class subject before it can achieve the *Aufhebung* of class society. From the opposite vantage-point in the network, the role of the objective dialectic appears as one of securing, through the mediation of the intersubjective dialectic, the directedness of the movement of consciousness, of rendering it intelligible as a rational process. Movement in the objective dialectic stems from the dynamism of the forces of production, which is itself ultimately grounded in the teleology of human labour. At the other extreme of the structure of ideas, the main problem was one of conceptualising the crucial transition to proletarian revolutionary consciousness. The solution proposed was based on the concept of the human nature of the proletariat, a nature whose realisation is a society of rational freedom. It appears that, starting from Marx's acknowledgement of his methodological debt to Hegel, one arrives at a perspective from which the whole of his system may be reconstructed. This possibility has an obvious bearing on the vexed issue of the significance of the Hegelian dimension in his thought. More important for our purposes is the fact that the attempt to realise it throws into relief, as perhaps nothing else can, the contemporary prospects for dialectical science.

It will throw those prospects into still sharper relief to note where Marx's own achievement now seems most precarious. Besides, reference was made earlier to what is dead in Hegel, and it seems a little unfair to conclude without raising the same question about his successor. A curiously parallel answer suggests itself. It is one that focuses on a point likely to be vulnerable in any historical dialectic, its identification of the subject. If the times seem unpropitious for accepting the Idea in that role, they are scarcely more kind to Marx's candidate, the proletariat of what were in his day the most advanced capitalist countries. A welter of voices insists that, in the industrialised West, the speed of the proletariat's movement away from anything resembling a revolutionary consciousness is matched only by the rate of its decline as a factor in the economy.³⁶

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Against this background it seems difficult to see how Marx's original attribution can now be maintained unrevised by people in touch with what is going on around them. His confidence on the matter may, perhaps, be regarded as the result of, quite excusably, mistaking the place of his own society in history. This is due in turn to underestimating the vitality of capital, its extraordinary capacity to renew itself in ever fresh and vigorous forms. The most important of the resources it found is, of course, that so uncannily foreseen in the *Philosophy of right*, the development of colonialism and imperialism and, thereby, the establishing of capitalism as a truly global system.³⁷ A failure of identification on Marx's part has to be acknowledged. Such a failure, however, goes nowhere near the heart of the theory, and indeed, may in the end testify to its strength by being explicable precisely in terms of it, as a failure to hold to its deeper logic. The work needed to substantiate this suggestion fully cannot be attempted here. But it seems clear that anyone concerned for the fate of the dialectical tradition should at least be prepared to try again. If they do, their perspective will need to be informed by the sense, acquired by Marx from Hegel, that social forms do not perish before all their potentialities are revealed. They should also remember what is plainly the chief lesson of the master-slave episode on a Marxist reading, that the human future belongs to the labourer who through the work of fashioning the thing 'becomes conscious of what he truly is'. Putting these points together, one might suggest that the subject of history can only be taken as comprising the most oppressed and alienated producers at the point of maximum development of the system. We have no means of telling with certainty who this subject may be, though in a general way it is surely to the workers and peasants of Third World capitalism that one must look. Neither can we be sure what stage capitalism has reached in its historical life-process. On the face of things, it seems to be far from decrepit. If this is so, the tradition of Hegelian-Marxist rationalism has yet to face the true test of history, and the future has many further adventures of the dialectic in store.

Notes

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I am grateful to all who took part in the discussion on that occasion, and, more especially, for critical comments from Chris Arthur, Susan Easton, David Lamb, Peter Osborne, Sean Sayers and Alan Spence.

1. G.W.F. Hegel, *Hegel's philosophy of right*, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford, Clarendon, 1952), pp. 34–5.
2. See David Lamb, *Hegel — from foundation to system* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), Parts 4 and 5.
3. Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of right'*, ed. Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 11; *Capital*, vol. I (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976), p. 102.
4. The clearest example of this tendency is still J.M.E. McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian dialectic* (New York, Russell and Russell, 1964).
5. For an illuminating discussion, see Gillian Rose, *Hegel contra sociology* (London, Athlone Press, 1981), pp. 45–7, 83–91, 107, 122.
6. *Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow, Progress, 1974), p. 127.
7. For a fuller account of this view of ideology, see J. McCarney, *The real world of ideology* (Brighton, Harvester, 1980).
8. *Capital*, vol. I, p. 103.
9. 'Altogether it has appeared from the consideration of the nature of Contradiction that in itself it is not, so to speak, a blemish, deficiency or fault in a thing if a contradiction can be shown in it.' *Hegel's science of logic*, vol. 2, trans. W.H. Johnston and L.G. Struthers (London, Allen and Unwin, 1929), p. 70.
10. Hegel does not condemn this. To do so would be to stop outside the phenomenology and to impose another abstract definition of what the experience should be on the will. The discrepancy between the natural will's definition and its experience, the social reality presupposed by the definition, itself transforms the inequity (Rose, *Hegel contra sociology*, p. 85).
11. To get a sense of Marx's consistency on this, compare the comments of 1844 on the Weavers' Uprising in Silesia, *Early writings* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975), p. 415, with those of 1880 in the preface to the *Enquête ouvrière*, quoted in *Karl Marx: selected writings in sociology and social philosophy*, ed. T.B. Bottomore and M. Rubel (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1963), p. 210.
12. *The First International and after*, ed. David Fernbach (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974), p. 82.
13. See, e.g., letter to J. Weydemeyer, *Marx-Engels selected correspondence* (Moscow, Foreign Languages, 1953), p. 86.
14. See, e.g., Susan Haack, *Philosophy of logics* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978), ch. 6.
15. Charles Taylor, 'Hegel and the philosophy of action', *Hegel's philosophy of action*, ed. Lawrence S. Stepelevich and David Lamb (Atlantic highlands, Humanities, 1983), pp. 1–18; Peter Winch, *The idea of a social science* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), ch. 5.
16. See, e.g. *Grundrisse* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973), p. 94.

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17. For discussion and rebuttal of this claim, see Chris Arthur, 'Hegel's master-slave dialectic and a myth of Marxology', *New Left Review*, 142, Nov.–Dec. 1983, pp. 67–75.

18. See, e.g., Jon Elster, *Logic and society. Contradiction and possible worlds* (Chichester, Wiley, 1978).

19. See discussion in Bhikhu Parekh, *Marx's theory of ideology* (London, Croom Helm, 1982), chs. 3 and 5.

20. *Lectures on the philosophy of world history: introduction*, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 27. A full discussion would have to take account of the less dramatic qualifications which Hegel immediately goes on to make. Thus, he appears to recognise another kind of proof, not derived from philosophy and brought to history as a presupposition but, lying 'in the study of world history itself', (p. 28). Moreover, he warns that the remarks quoted above are not 'to be regarded simply as prior assumptions, but . . . as the result of the ensuing enquiry', and he insists that in this enquiry 'we must be sure to take history as it is; in other words, we must proceed historically and empirically' (p. 29). For the conception of two kinds of proof here, see Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 219–20.

21. For a particularly clear statement, see letter of 1877 in *Selected correspondence*, pp. 378–9.

22. *A contribution to the critique of political economy* (Moscow, Progress, 1970), p. 21.

23. What follows is influenced by the discussion in G.A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's theory of history: a defence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 150–7, and in Erik Olin Wright, 'Giddens's critique of Marxism', *New Left Review*, 138, March–April, 1983, pp. 11–35.

24. Wright, 'Giddens's critique of Marxism', p. 28.

25. *Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844*, p. 131. It seems difficult not to acknowledge the master-slave episode as a significant element of the background to this verdict.

26. *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 284.

27. The main reference is to the work of Jürgen Habermas. For a useful summary, see David Held, *Introduction to critical theory: Horkheimer to Habermas* (London, Hutchinson, 1980), Part 2.

28. K. Marx and F. Engels, *The holy family, or critique of critical criticism* (Moscow, Progress, 1975), p. 44.

29. *The holy family*, p. 43.

30. *The holy family*, p. 44.

31. Doubts about the continuity here should have been finally dispelled by Norman Geras's polemic, *Marx and human nature: refutation of a legend* (London, Verso, 1983).

32. *Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844*, p. 68.

33. *Vide* the insistent concern in *Capital*, vol. 1, for 'the free intellectual and social activity of the individual' (p. 667) and for 'the free play of the vital forces of his body and his mind' (p. 375).

34. The main reference is to the 'Critical Theory' of the Frankfurt School. For summary, see Held, *Introduction to critical theory*, Part 1.

35. *Capital*, vol. 3 (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1974), p. 820.

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36. Representative of those voices is Andre Gorz, *Farewell to the working class* (London, Pluto, 1982).

37. *Philosophy of right*, pp. 151–2.

9

Hegel and Religion

John Walker

One of the most distinguished modern exponents of Hegel's philosophy of religion, Emil Fackenheim, has spoken of a 'legend of great longevity', according to which 'the Hegelian philosophy is not and never was to be taken seriously'.¹ There is no part of Hegel's philosophy more responsible for the birth and the persistence of this myth than Hegel's philosophy of religion; and there is no part of his philosophy which modern critics have been less willing to accept on its own terms.

Hegel is a philosopher who asserts that philosophy is the service of God;² that the proper object of philosophy as of religion is the contemplation of God.³ He declares that God is to be found in thought itself,⁴ that in philosophy religion is sanctioned and confirmed by the thinking consciousness of man.⁵ The central religious claim of his philosophy is that we cannot speak intelligently of the reality of God without at the same time speaking of the self-interrogation and self-consciousness of the human mind, nor fruitfully pursue that interrogation itself unless we conceive our activity in doing so as one sustained and made possible by God.

Must not Hegel's philosophy of religion, which not only offers to speak about the life of faith, but claims also to be itself part of that life, ignore or avoid the most fundamental distinctions between spheres of experience? Must we not conclude that such a philosophy is of necessity debarred from establishing proper standards of clarity and evidence in its own discourse? How can Hegel's philosophy do justice to the autonomy and coherence of religious experience? For is it not Hegel's intention fraudulently to annex the province of piety to the realm of philosophy? And if that really is Hegel's intention, is Hegel's philosophy really a

philosophy at all: an activity concerned with clarifying language and concepts, with making claims about the truth in such a way that they can intelligibly and publicly be discussed?

In this paper I want to argue that Hegel's view of philosophy as itself a religious activity is of crucial relevance to his philosophy as whole. The religious claim of Hegel's philosophy is no Romantic extravagance or historical anachronism which might safely be separated from Hegel's total argument on matters of epistemology and metaphysics, nor some ideological mystification which is irrelevant to the capacity of the Hegelian philosophy to give us insight into our actual experience of ourselves in human culture.⁶ Hegel's claim that philosophy itself can be religious is of central importance to the epistemological legitimation of Hegel's philosophy as a whole, and in particular to the defence of Hegel's claim to have written a philosophy of 'absolute knowledge': a mode of knowledge which is not dependent upon any source of truth or evidence external to its own systematic articulation.⁷ Hegel thinks that the systematic language which mediates the categories of philosophy with each other — the language of what he calls *Vermittlung* — is the only language which enables us to speak meaningfully of the categories which it mediates.⁸ There is not one category of Hegel's thought which has any logical identity in abstraction from the total system of meanings which is that thought. And because it is with the *relationship* between thought and being that Hegel's thought is concerned — with precisely that which Hegel, in one of his few usages of the term, calls 'experience' (*Erfahrung*)⁹ — there can in particular be no category of 'Being', referring to some source of evidence external to Hegel's own system, against which the assertions which that system leads Hegel to make could be tested.¹⁰ I will argue that this view of philosophy can be neither understood nor defended except in the light of Hegel's vision of philosophy as a religious activity. I will argue also that the religious character of Hegel's philosophy, far from being an anachronism, is one of the main reasons why that philosophy continues to be relevant.

My argument has a limited scope, although I hope a general relevance. What is usually called Hegel's *Philosophy of religion* consists in the *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, lectures which Hegel delivered at the University of Berlin from 1821 onwards, and which were published posthumously in book form by a group of Hegel's friends. It is here that Hegel deals

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philosophically with the phenomena of religious consciousness and practice, with the particular religions of mankind and with the theology of what Hegel calls the 'absolute' religion: Christianity. This paper will be concerned only incidentally with that work. My argument will be concerned less with any of Hegel's arguments or theories *about* religion than with the way in which Hegel conceives the business of philosophical thought as itself a religious undertaking. For it is in this sense that Hegel's concept of the relationship between philosophy and religion is truly original, and of major importance to contemporary concerns both in the philosophy of religion and in philosophical theology. I will argue that Hegel conceives of religion and philosophy as modes of human experience through which what Hegel conceives as the whole truth about our experience, in each case in a different way, is articulated and understood. I will try to show that, although Hegel's total vision of experience is itself a religious one, that vision is still capable of encompassing within itself an understanding of the necessary separation, as well as the necessary connection, between philosophy and religion.

The key doctrine through which Hegel expresses the religious character of his philosophy in this sense is the doctrine of Spirit and of absolute Spirit which is expounded in the third section of the *Philosophy of spirit*. This paper will focus especially upon those doctrines in an attempt to show that Hegel's claim to have written a philosophy of absolute knowledge is both an intelligible and a defensible one.

Firstly, however, I must explain my use of the term 'experience', as it has such a central significance for my argument. I use the term 'experience', as well as the terms 'mode' and 'totality' of experience, in the sense given to them by Michael Oakeshott in *Experience and its modes*. Oakeshott defines 'experience' there as follows: "'Experience" stands for the concrete whole which analysis divides into "experiencing" and "what is experienced"'.¹¹ He goes on to add: 'Experiencing and what is experienced are, taken separately, meaningless abstractions; they cannot, in fact, be separated . . . these two abstractions stand to one another in the most complete interdependence; they compose a single whole.'¹²

Oakeshott argues that it is impossible for us to describe either the ways in which we experience the world, or the world which we experience, without considering both in relation to each other: 'Perceiving, for example, involves a something perceived, willing a something willed . . . The character of what is experienced is, in

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the strictest sense, correlative to the manner in which it is experienced.¹³

What we call 'thought' or 'judgement' Oakeshott describes as itself 'the concrete whole of experience'.¹⁴ This view of the relationship between thought and experience is, in Oakeshott's terms, the very opposite of an abstract one. For by 'abstraction' Oakeshott means what happens when we try to separate 'thought' from the other ways in which we experience, or to separate our experience as a whole from the thinking mind through which we know about our experience:

All abstract and incomplete experience is a modification of what is complete, individual and concrete, and to this it must be referred if we are to ascertain its character. And thought or judgement, as I see it, is not one form of experience, but is itself the concrete whole of experience.¹⁵

But, when we try to understand our experience in thought, we find that our powers of coherence are limited; they are often not adequate to the whole scope of our experience, and we are forced to accept a coherent but limited consciousness of our experience. There is then an excess of experience over thought; and thought can only bring experience under mental control by viewing experience in a coherent but abstract way. It is then that what Oakeshott calls a 'mode of experience' arises. A mode of experience, therefore, Oakeshott defines as a 'homogenous but abstract world of ideas'.¹⁶

I will argue firstly that Hegel's doctrine of absolute knowledge is a doctrine of thought as experience in the sense which I have just outlined, that Hegel conceives of both philosophy and religion as modes of experience, and that he believes the experiential connection of philosophy to religion to be the way in which what Oakeshott calls the 'concrete purpose' of experience is satisfied:¹⁷ the way in which our thought and our experience are one. My thesis is that it is Hegel's doctrine of the connection of philosophy to religion, as modes of experience, which is the real epistemological legitimation for his doctrine of absolute knowledge. Hegel's conception of philosophy, therefore, differs in one crucial respect from that of Oakeshott. Oakeshott argues that philosophy itself is not a 'mode of experience', for philosophy is not a specific world of abstract ideas.¹⁸ But Hegel's philosophy, I shall argue, is an abstract mode of experience and knows itself to be so. It is only

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because of this knowledge and the consequences of it in experience that Hegel's claim to have written a philosophy of absolute knowledge is a serious and meaningful one.

To apply to the interpretation of Hegel the philosophical vocabulary of a modern thinker like Oakeshott, and especially to use that vocabulary in a way which differs enough from Hegel's own natural idiom as to describe philosophy as an 'experience', necessarily begs a lot of questions about what the proper standpoint of 'interpretation' should be.¹⁹ My purpose is not to argue a case about what Hegel 'meant' to say (it is arguable that that might, in any case, be in principle inaccessible to us), but to suggest a way of looking at certain key elements in Hegel's philosophy which will make the communicative power of that philosophy more apparent, in particular by dispelling certain of the confusions for which Hegel's own philosophical idiom has been responsible. Nor is my intention to defend or to attack any particular thesis of Oakeshott himself, but to use Oakeshott's terms where they seem more appropriate than Hegel's own in the defence of Hegel's philosophy against certain characteristic modern objections. My argument is intended to be heuristic and apologetic rather than formal and exegetical. I want to suggest a way of looking at Hegel which will enable the specific force of the Hegelian view of what philosophy is to be *communicated* in debate with Hegel's modern opponents. Whether or not I have been successful in this intention the reader must judge whilst reading the Hegelian texts themselves.

It is above all because Hegel considers philosophy to be itself a religious activity — and not just because Hegel is a Christian philosopher who preoccupies himself with religious matters and speaks favourably of the central tenets of Christian belief — that modern commentators on Hegel have been overwhelmingly hostile to the religious claims of Hegel's thought. The challenge to Hegel's philosophy of religion has come not only from critics hostile to Hegel's general project in philosophy, but also from writers broadly in sympathy with that project. The religious dimension in Hegel's thought has been attacked by theologians and philosophers alike; by atheists, agnostics, and orthodox Christians.

Orthodox theologians have objected to the religious ambitions of Hegel's speculative thought because that thought has seemed to them to violate the most fundamental distinctions between spheres of experience: to annex the province of piety, of humility,

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and of faith to the realm of speculative dialectic. This is an objection which is of particular significance for theologians of the Protestant tradition such as Karl Barth. This is a tradition which Hegel himself claims to adhere to,²⁰ and which plays a significant part in the cultural and historical milieu from which Hegel's thought sprang. And yet Hegel's persistent polemic against any theology which affirms the hiddenness of God,²¹ or the primacy for philosophy of religious emotion,²² appears to be at odds with the central Protestant doctrine of the supremacy of grace. As Barth writes: 'Hegel, in making the dialectical method of logic the essential nature of God, made impossible the knowledge of the actual dialectic of grace, which has its foundation in the freedom of God.'²³

The philosophers among Hegel's opponents have likewise objected to what they have seen as Hegel's unreasonable ambitions for philosophy. Karl Popper, for example, considers Hegel's philosophy to be illegitimate because Hegel gives to his own argument the kind of sanction which precludes any possibility of his theses being empirically refuted.²⁴ For Popper, the ambition of the Hegelian philosophy for a systematic and total articulation of experience is nothing other than Hegel's ambition to write a philosophy which can impose upon any possible opponent its own terms of reference. Such a philosophy, Popper objects, is prophecy if not sorcery.²⁵ Because Hegel's philosophy cannot in principle be proved wrong, it cannot contingently be shown to be right; and so it is a philosophy, Popper alleges, which disqualifies itself from philosophic debate. The 'religious' claims of Hegel's philosophy, for Popper, are merely the rhetorical clothing for this unrealisable as well as discreditable ambition.²⁶

Perhaps more importantly for our present argument, philosophers broadly in sympathy with Hegel's philosophy have held the specifically religious claims of that philosophy to be philosophically indefensible. David Lamb, for example, argues that Hegel's thesis that 'the content of both religion and philosophy is God, absolute substance, absolute Spirit', does not mean that 'his philosophy of religion is inseparable from religious knowledge'.²⁷ Michael Rosen, on the other hand, whilst arguing that we can adequately understand Hegel only if we read him as a philosopher of Revelation, claims also that, when we do that, 'the irrational kernel of Hegel's concepts becomes apparent'.²⁸

I want in this paper to argue against these interpretations: to

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argue not only that the *religious* dimension in Hegel's thought is an integral part of the particular kind of *philosophical* truth which Hegel has to offer us, but also that only in the light of his doctrine of philosophy as a religious activity can Hegel's concept of philosophical truth be defended against the charge of incoherence and indifference to experience.

I have spoken of Hegel's doctrine of the connection of philosophy to religion as a *legitimation* for his concept of absolute knowledge. Every philosophy must be concerned with the question of its own legitimation: the question of why we should be prepared to believe in the very possibility of the kind of knowledge which the philosophy in question offers to give us about the world. That is, the question of why we should be prepared to believe that the questions which a philosophy asks, let alone the answers which it gives, do not derive from some initial confusion about the relationship between the philosophical mind and our non-philosophical experience of the world, the experience which that mind proposes to talk about. But this is a question of quite *radical* significance for the philosophy of Hegel. Hegel frequently describes his philosophy as a science without presuppositions,²⁹ as a science which must constitute its own object. Hegel claims to have written a philosophy which can speak about the whole of human experience, and claims also that the way in which his philosophy talks about every particular part of experience is a necessary way, one which derives from the structure of experience as a whole.³⁰ When a philosophy of this kind wants to justify its own basic orientation in relation to experience, there is nothing in experience to which such a philosophy can appeal without at the same time bringing what it appeals to within the systematic framework of its own discourse.

Hegel's philosophy can only be defended on its own terms because the point of that philosophy is to show how and why there can be no 'other terms'. That is the central difficulty in the legitimation of Hegel's philosophy. That is the reason why that philosophy, for all its dialectical power, has so often appeared to be wholly dissociated from what we commonly call our experience: to be suspended, as it were, over a void. It is for this reason that Hegel's claim to presuppose nothing is also a claim to be justified in presupposing everything. In order to persuade us to believe in the central thesis of his philosophy Hegel has to persuade us to make the first step: to believe in the very possibility of a self-legitimizing mode of knowledge. Thereafter the particular

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resources of argument which Hegel has at his disposal might be capable of persuading us that what claims to be such a mode of knowledge is at least as intelligible, as coherent, and as rigorous as its empiricist or analytic opponents. But what Hegel's philosophy appears at first to be unable to do is precisely that which it claims to do: to legitimate its *own* kind of knowledge, and not just to expose the weaknesses, contradictions, and limitations of other kinds. To show a philosophical standpoint to be limited, or even contradictory, is not necessarily to show that it is wrong. Perhaps knowledge is necessarily limited. Perhaps the truth about the world involves certain unresolvable contradictions.

The initial legitimation for Hegel's philosophy cannot be just an argument within that philosophy — for any such argument would be internal to Hegel's vision of what philosophy is, to his conception of the relationship between philosophical thought and non-philosophical experience. But neither can the legitimation for Hegel's philosophy appeal to anything in experience outside that philosophy; for any argument which did so would be a legitimation not for Hegel's philosophy, but for another philosophy altogether. The real legitimation for Hegel's philosophy is neither a speculative philosophical argument, nor an appeal to experience, but both at once: a vision of philosophy as itself a mode of experience, a description of the kind of experience which philosophy is in relation to experience as a whole.

This description, I believe, is provided by the doctrine of Spirit and of absolute Spirit which Hegel expounds in his *Philosophy of spirit*, and in particular by Hegel's doctrine of the reciprocal relationship between philosophy and religion as modes of absolute Spirit. But before arguing this case I must first explain why I have chosen to speak of the problem of legitimation in Hegel in relation to his *Philosophy of spirit* instead of in relation to the two works in the context of which that problem has most frequently been discussed: the *Phenomenology of spirit* and the *Science of logic*.³¹

We may speak of the problem of legitimation in Hegel's philosophy — indeed Hegel himself speaks of it in this way — as the problem of 'how to begin' doing philosophy. But what has to be legitimated — the particular kind of beginning which Hegel makes — is the claim that in philosophy we cannot know how to begin before we have actually *begun*.³² This is what Hegel means to tell us when he says that 'the fear of error' is 'the fear of truth',³³ or when he says that the philosophy of his day cannot

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come 'to' the truth about itself because it is already 'with' that truth.³⁴ This is what Hegel is trying to tell us when he says that to believe we can learn, in the discipline of Logic, how to think before beginning the enterprise of speculative philosophy would be like waiting to study physiology before trying to digest.³⁵ Hence any argument which speaks in anything more than a metaphorical way about the question 'How to begin?' in relation to the philosophy of Hegel cannot provide the kind of epistemological legitimation which that philosophy requires. But we cannot avoid at least considering the problem in the terms which that question proposes. For to avoid doing that would be uncritically to accept Hegel's answer.

What we have to do is to ask the question in such a way that we do so without any presupposition about whether or not it is the right question for us to be asking. This is something which Hegel's *Science of logic* cannot do. Hegel's philosophy as a whole, because it claims to be a science without any presuppositions about the relationship of thought to experience, requires a philosophical foundation which does not depend upon the connection of thought to any particular kind of object in experience. That foundation must therefore be a kind of knowledge which is 'pure thought', thought trying to think, without any presupposition, about what thought, experience, and the relation between them are. This is indeed what Hegel conceives his *Logic* to be.³⁶ But it is just for this reason that Hegel's *Logic*, although it is the foundation of his philosophy, cannot provide a legitimation for that philosophy in relation to other alternative and incompatible philosophical views of experience. Precisely because the *Logic* is the most pure form of speculative knowledge, the central problem in the legitimation of Hegel's philosophy must apply pre-eminently to the *Logic* itself. The *Logic*, more than any other of Hegel's works, is debarred from proposing any justification for its procedure, not even a definition of terms, which is not already part of the systematic movement of its own argument.³⁷ Indeed, it is at the beginning of the *Logic* that Hegel most explicitly takes issue with and rejects the metaphor of 'beginning' as a way of speaking about the legitimation of philosophical knowledge.³⁸

The *Phenomenology of spirit*, however, is limited in its ability to legitimize Hegel's philosophy (although it may work as a propaedeutic to that philosophy) for just the opposite reason. The *Phenomenology* is a work which employs the particular tools of

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Hegelian philosophical argument, and yet temporarily and rhetorically abandons the one most central claim of Hegelian thought: that true or 'absolute' knowledge has no beginning external to itself, that there is no 'way in' to the truth which is not already part of the truth.³⁹ The *Phenomenology* is a work which tries to use 'experience' itself in order to persuade us to believe what Hegel says about experience. The *Phenomenology* tries to lead the mind, by means of a consideration of actual or 'natural' consciousness, to an acceptance of the coherence and necessity of the concept of absolute knowledge. In the *Phenomenology* we are supposed to 'watch' as the forms of the natural consciousness 'move towards' the standpoint of absolute knowledge.⁴⁰ But the fact that there could be other routes, as well as other starting points, for the journey is not relevant to the rightness or wrongness of our decision to embark upon it. (That indeed is the particular strength of the mode of argument which the *Phenomenology* employs.) Hence although Hegel in the *Phenomenology* might provide a kind of legitimation for the central theses of his philosophy, he is unable to show the necessity for the *particular* kind of legitimation which he has chosen. The *Phenomenology* cannot be said to provide a systematic legitimation for Hegel's philosophy because, in that work, Hegel's philosophy does not legitimate *itself*.

Hegel cannot, even rhetorically, legitimate his conception of philosophical thought by appealing *to* experience. He has, on the contrary, to make us believe that his thought has the right to tell us originally and independently what 'thought' and 'experience' are. We will only believe that if we also believe that Hegel can show us in his philosophy a mode of thought which *is* experience. If there is indeed such a mode of thought, then from the standpoint of that mode there will be no 'experience' which we can conceive of as absolutely separated from thought, and no thought so abstract that it is not also a kind of experience.

Because this is what Hegel conceives philosophical thought to be, his philosophy can be legitimated neither by speculative philosophical argument — such as the *Science of logic* — nor by heuristic appeal to cultural or psychological experience — such as the *Phenomenology of spirit*. Hegel has to produce a credible conception of what Oakeshott calls the 'standpoint of the totality of experience',⁴¹ and a credible conception of philosophy as a mode of experience experientially connected to that standpoint. I will now try to show how Hegel does indeed succeed in doing

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this, subtly and persuasively, in the third section of the Berlin *Encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences* which is called the *Philosophy of spirit*.

Hegel's doctrine of *Geist* or of Spirit is above all a doctrine about the relationship between thought and experience, in the sense of the term 'experience' which I outlined at the beginning of this article. 'Spirit' is the name which Hegel gives to what Oakeshott calls the 'concrete whole of experience'; and by giving the name Spirit to what whole, Hegel signals also that he considers the standpoint of the whole of experience to be also the standpoint of thought. Hegel's contention is that there is something which is not identical with the sphere of our thought, nor with the sphere of the object of our thought, which imparts an intelligible form to both those spheres. This is what Hegel means by speaking of Spirit as the mediation or middle point between the Idea (the truth in its most absolute and objective form) and Nature (the sphere of external existence which the truth is 'about'):

Every determinateness is a determinateness only counter to another determinateness; to that of Spirit in general is opposed, in the first instance, that of Nature; the former can, therefore, only be grasped simultaneously with the latter. We must designate as the distinctive determinateness of the notion of Spirit, ideality; that is, the reduction of the Idea's otherness to a *moment*, the process of returning — and the accomplished return — into itself of the Idea from its Other. The distinctive feature of the logical Idea, however, is immediate, simple being-within-self; but for nature it is the self-externality of the Idea.⁴²

By 'Spirit', then, Hegel means the kind of relationship between knowledge and being in which neither pole in the relationship has primacy. *Idea* is the term which Hegel gives to the absolute truth, when that truth is the object of pure speculative knowledge. *Nature* is the term which Hegel gives to that truth as we find it in the outward existence of the world. *Spirit*, however, is the mode of existence of the whole in which everything which is known is embodied in being; and everything which is reflected in thought. Idea and Nature are dialectical opposites; but Spirit is the dialectical relationship between them. Hence Spirit is precisely that which Oakeshott calls experience, and it is experience as thought. Spirit is experience because it is the active

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synthesis of our consciousness of the world, and what we are conscious of; and Spirit is thought because Spirit is the mental form of the *whole* of our experience. Spirit is an energy, objectively as well as subjectively real, by which our minds are empowered to transmute the fact of our existence into a coherent human world. It is a form, moreover, which is just as much given to our thought by our experience as it is imparted to our experience by our thought. Hegel gives the name 'Spirit' to the way in which our thought, prompted by our experience, makes our experience ever more coherent. It is because of his doctrine of Spirit that Hegel can use the same logical term to describe the way in which we appropriate and understand experience as he does to describe the structure of experience itself. This term is *Begriff* or *notion*:

Just as in the living organism generally, everything is already contained, in an ideal manner, in the germ and is brought forth by the germ itself, not by an alien power, so too must all the particular forms of living mind grow out of its Notion as from their germ. In so doing our thinking, which is actuated by the Notion, remains for the object, which likewise is actuated by the Notion, absolutely immanent; we merely look on, as it were, at the object's own development, not altering it by importing into it our own subjective ideas and fancies.⁴³

Hegel is saying that Spirit, through what he calls the movement of the notion, is immanent in every part of our thought and experience, however partial and limited the particular parts of our thought and experience might be. But because Spirit is thus immanent in our *actual* thought and experience, our partial and limited thoughts and experiences can know about, and be in, the absolute form of experience. That is the form which, when we think of it as absolute, we call the absolute or logical idea — and which *is* absolute Spirit or God.⁴⁴ The possibility of 'absolute' knowledge cannot adequately be described by saying that the absolute is in us, but only by saying that we are in the absolute but to say that also includes the first possibility. That is what Hegel means by the participation of philosophy in the Spirit: what he means by absolute knowledge.

But what if the word *Geist*; and even more so the words *absoluter Geist*, did not correspond to anything real in our experience at all? What if they were just words?

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And then, the next thing I must mention,
Is Metaphysics. Give it your close attention.
With thought profound take care to span
What won't fit into the brain of man.
But fit or not — 'tis small concern.
A pompous word will serve your turn.⁴⁵

Clearly the kind of argument I have just outlined presupposes the conceptual framework of Hegel's philosophy as a whole. In particular it presupposes that when we talk about a Spirit which 'embodies' or 'externalises' itself in actual existence, and of that existence as something having a development akin to the movement of our thought, then we actually mean something when we do so. The very idea of a Philosophy of Spirit, moreover, presupposes the rest of Hegel's system. In particular, it presupposes Hegel's *Logic* and *Philosophy of nature*, the 'final outcome' of which, Hegel says, is 'the proof of the necessity of the Notion of Spirit'.⁴⁶ And the arguments of these works, in relation to which Hegel says that the doctrine of Spirit has to be interpreted, themselves presuppose what I have called the one fundamental premise of Hegel's thought: that there can be a kind of knowledge which presupposes nothing external to itself.

Hegel himself would appear to be aware of this difficulty at the beginning of the *Philosophy of spirit*, where he remarks that his doctrine of Spirit is a way of looking at the world the rightness of which will only be revealed by the application of that doctrine to the whole sphere of human experience which his philosophy treats. We have, so to speak, to put the idea of Spirit into the world and see what we get out:

The Science of Spirit, on its part, has to authenticate this Notion (i.e. the Notion of Spirit) by its development and actualisation. Accordingly, what we say here assertorically about Spirit, at the beginning of our treatment of it, can only be scientifically (*wissenschaftlich*) proved by philosophy in its entirety. All we can do at the outset is to elucidate the Notion of Spirit for ordinary thinking (*Vorstellung*).⁴⁷

The objection of course is that Hegel's doctrine of Spirit is vitiated in just the same way as all of Hegel's other doctrines: that if we see the world in the light of this doctrine, the kind of world we see will automatically confirm the doctrine's truth.

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But the real reason why Hegel's doctrine of Spirit is ultimately unsatisfactory as a legitimation for his philosophy — although it is a necessary part of that legitimation — lies deeper than this. We might be able to think of the relationship between thought and experience *in terms of* Hegel's doctrine of Spirit, or *as if* Spirit really existed; and if we do so we can make a judgement about the coherence or otherwise of Hegel's philosophy without having to accept, in anything more than a formal or assertoric sense, the terms in which Hegel says that we should make that judgement. But, if we think in this way, we will understand the doctrine of Spirit in a way which — however plausible — is radically in conflict with what that doctrine actually says.

If we read the doctrine of Spirit only assertorically, then even if we find that the doctrine is confirmed by the rest of Hegel's philosophy, it will have been confirmed only *as* an assertoric doctrine: as a way of looking at the world which 'works', because it leads us to the truth about the world. Hegel's claim, however, is to describe how we can look at the world in a way which 'necessarily' leads us to the truth, because it is itself part of the truth. However Hegel's doctrine of Spirit is constructed, and however we might be able to read it, the *content* of that doctrine is an affirmation not that the world is *as if* something were true about it, but an affirmation about how the world *is*. Hegel speaks of Spirit not just as the object of his own discourse, but as an independently active principle in the world, a principle which defines the ontological status of speculative thought itself. Spirit, Hegel says, is not just something which *our* thinking shows to be true about the world; Spirit is something which shows *us* the truth.⁴⁸ Spirit has to be something like this because Hegel's doctrine of Spirit is not just the organising principle of a philosophical world view; it is the conceptual legitimation for a philosophy of absolute knowledge. If we are to believe such a philosophy, then what we have to believe is not that such a philosophy is as right, or more right, than its opponents, but that such a philosophy is *true*: true 'absolutely' because it tells us the particular kinds of truth which other philosophies possess.

If Hegel's doctrine of Spirit means what it says, then to accept it whilst regarding it only as an assertoric doctrine is a contradiction in terms. And, ultimately, even though an assertoric reading of the doctrine of Spirit might enable us to defend Hegel's conception of philosophical thought against certain of the charges which modern critics have levelled against it, such a reading

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cannot be successful in defending that conception of philosophy on its own terms. Hence it would seem that, if we are looking for a *relevant* legitimation for Hegel's conception of philosophical thought, we are back where we started.

What Hegel offers us in his doctrine of Spirit is a doctrine of philosophy as experience in Oakeshott's sense, and a doctrine of what Oakeshott calls the 'concrete whole' of experience. What he cannot give us, unless he gives us something more than his doctrine of Spirit, is the way in which those two doctrines are connected; and it is just this which we need. The problem is that Hegel is saying something more than that philosophy is experience. He is saying that philosophy knows how to talk about the whole of experience. If philosophy's talk, as Hegel says it is, is really absolutely necessary to experience as a whole, then there must be something *in experience* which connects philosophy to the whole of our experience. In his doctrine of Spirit, Hegel gives us a plausible argument about how philosophy can be seen as connected to the whole of experience, and so shows us one way in which we can know, in our philosophical thinking, about that connection. But knowing about something, even for Hegel, is not *automatically* the same as being it. We are not justified, on the basis of Hegel's doctrine of Spirit alone, in believing that the kind of connection which Hegel makes between philosophical thought and experience is anything more than the product of a plausible philosophical argument. There is no reason why we should believe that the connection is not just a heuristic fiction, but an objective reality which discloses to us what 'thought' and 'experience' are.

In order to believe that, we would have also to believe that there is nothing else in our experience except philosophy: God forbid! We cannot take refuge here in Oakeshott's disclaimer that philosophy is simply 'the standpoint of the totality of experience', and that such a standpoint is neither practically necessary nor conducive to the enhancement of life.⁴⁹ For Hegel, philosophical knowledge is nothing if it is not 'necessary'. Such knowledge, for Hegel, is 'necessary' not because everybody has it or has to have it in order to live; but because, being something more than the possession of our minds, it is implicit in our lives whether we 'have' it or not.

In order to show that 'absolute knowledge' is possible, Hegel has to show us that philosophy is connected to the whole of experience not by talk, but by experience. He has to show us that

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philosophy has the right to talk about the whole of experience, not because experience can be reduced to philosophy, but because philosophy can be enlarged to experience. He has to show us philosophy as a *mode* of experience, and he has to show us how the philosophical mode of experience is connected, by experience, to experience as a whole. And it is this which Hegel talks about when he talks, at the end of the *Philosophy of spirit*, about the connection of philosophy to religion.

In the section of the *Philosophy of spirit* entitled '*Absolute spirit*', Hegel offers two principal speculative arguments for the connection of philosophy to religion. These I will call his thesis of the *internal* connection of philosophy to religion — his thesis that philosophy is itself a religious activity; and his thesis of the *external* connection of philosophy to religion — his thesis that the mode of awareness of the world proper to philosophy is necessarily connected to the mode of awareness proper to religion. These two arguments may also be described as an argument about how philosophy is made possible by religion, and an argument about why philosophy needs religion. I will now consider each of these arguments in turn.

The internal connection of philosophy to religion

Hegel discusses, in the *Philosophy of spirit*, the three modes of absolute Spirit — art, religion, and philosophy — in turn; and says that each of these modes both is, and enables us to know about, the totality of the Spirit's life in a different way. But he also begins by describing the sphere of absolute Spirit *in general* as the sphere of religion. This description is not part of his discussion of the sphere of religion as a mode of absolute Spirit, but occurs in the section which introduces the concept of absolute Spirit itself, and follows immediately after a sentence which shows us the significance of the concept of absolute Spirit in relation to the question 'How to begin?'

The absolute Spirit, while it is self-centred identity, is always also identity returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substance it is so as a spirit, discerning itself into a self and a consciousness, for which it is as substance. *Religion*, as this supreme sphere may be in general designated, if it has on one hand to be studied as

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coming from the subject and having its home in the subject, must no less be regarded as objectively issuing from the absolute Spirit which as Spirit is in its community.

Der absolute Geist ist eben so ewig in-sich-seyende, wie in sich zurückkehrende und zurückgekehrte Identität; die Eine und allgemeine Substanz als geistige, das Urtheil *in sich* und *in ein Wissen, für welches* sie als solche ist. *Die Religion*, wie diese höchste Sphäre im Allgemeinen bezeichnet werden kann, — ist eben so sehr als vom Subjecte ausgehend und in demselben sich befindend, wie als objectiv von dem absoluten Geiste ausgehend zu betrachten, der als Geist in seiner Gemeinde ist.⁵⁰

Hegel only introduces his discussion of philosophy after a discussion of religion, a discussion in which he describes as part of religion the total movement of the absolute Spirit through which the question of the relation between knowledge and being is answered: the manifestation or *Offenbaren* of a spiritual principle in the external world, which at the same time discloses the way in which the mode of that manifestation can be known.⁵¹ To be sure, Hegel says that *one* way in which this movement can be known of is by philosophy, whose element is discursive thought, just as another way is religion, whose element is the inward integrity of piety.⁵² But the totality of what is known, and of the means by which it is known, is also described in the section entitled 'Religion'; and the very notion of *Spirit* in this discussion, the account of what Hegel calls the 'absolute self-mediation of Spirit',⁵³ is introduced in a religious context: as the third person of the Trinity or as the Holy Spirit.⁵⁴ To be sure, Spirit in this sense is described by Hegel, as it were, phenomenologically or as a category of dogma; but it is also Spirit which Hegel says is able to *talk* about the trinitarian movement of Spirit which is its precondition or *Voraussetzung*.⁵⁵ Hence Spirit can grasp the totality of the trinitarian movement of Spirit because Spirit stands within that movement.

This total movement through which finite and infinite Spirit are mediated one with the other *is* religion, although it is also the object of religion as it is of philosophy in a different mode. There is a highly significant sense, for Hegel, in which philosophy can know about this movement only because philosophy is itself inside it, and only if philosophy knows that it is inside it. The

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relation of religion to absolute Spirit is not only one of knowing; it is one of being. And if that is also true of philosophy, it is only so because the element of philosophy — freely self-mediating Spirit, which *knows* most adequately about itself and about the world in the medium of philosophy — has been prepared for in the element of religion. Indeed, Hegel says in the transitional paragraph which leads from his discussion of religion to his discussion of philosophy,⁵⁶ whatever it is that philosophy knows — even the result of the argument about the emergence of self-conscious Spirit which he has just expounded — if philosophy only *knows*, it knows nothing. If philosophy makes the movement of the Spirit in which it inheres into its own object — or even if philosophy knows why it cannot do so and makes that into its own object — philosophy's discourse, in knowing the reason why it is itself a necessary part of the truth, renders itself entirely superfluous to the truth. Philosophy, in knowing its own knowledge and its own being to belong together, but thinking itself alone responsible for this knowledge, causes knowledge and being in the world which philosophy experiences to be absolutely divorced. For in knowing that, philosophy does in fact know about the totality of things, and if philosophy is not prepared to put itself inside the totality of things there is nowhere for philosophy to go when it has finished philosophising. Philosophy, in Hegel's words, is empty and vain.⁵⁷

The external connection of philosophy to religion

Hegel describes philosophy at the close of the *Philosophy of spirit* as follows:

Such consciousness (i.e. philosophy) is thus the intelligible unity (cognised by thought) of art and religion, in which the diverse elements in the content are cognised as necessary, and this necessary as free.

Dies Wissen ist damit der denkend erkannte *Begriff* der Kunst und der Religion, in welchem das in dem Inhalte Verschiedene als nothwendig, und dies Nothwendige als frei erkannt ist.⁵⁸

The form of knowledge — or *Wissen* — belonging to philosophy is

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that of conceptual or discursive insight: the form of insight appropriate to the philosophical concept or *Begriff* through which the philosopher understands the world according to the logical form which philosophy discloses. The characteristic form of the activity of conceptual understanding or *begreifen* is to discern difference in unity, and unity in differences.⁵⁹ To understand in this way is to perceive the limits of things, and their contradictions, then in that perceiving to grasp the idea of the unity of things; and yet to know that what the mind understands as unity cannot be set beside a world of contradictions, but is in fact immanent and implicit in that world. *Begreifen* is to understand unity, and to understand difference, and to understand that the connection between unity and difference is a matter not merely of understanding, but of being.⁶⁰

It is through their connection to philosophy, Hegel says, that the two non-philosophical modes of absolute Spirit — religion and art — cease to be particular and limited modes of experience. In philosophy, Hegel says, the particular ways in which we see the world in religion and art are unified in a single apprehension of thought, and given access to the kind of insight which comes from self-conscious thought:

Philosophy not merely keeps them (i.e. religion and art) together to make a totality, but even unifies them into a simple spiritual vision and then in that raises them to self-conscious thought (. . . *in die einfache geistige Anschauung vereint und dann zum selbstbewussten Denken erhoben*).⁶¹

This self-conscious thought, Hegel says, discerns the *Begriff* or concept of religion, because it recognises that religion has an apprehension of Spirit which is different from the apprehension which belongs to philosophy, and understands that this different apprehension is *necessary* to the reality of the Spirit; and yet recognises also that this necessity does not detract from or contradict the freedom and hence the transcendence of Spirit.

Hegel is asserting that philosophy is able to understand why there is a religious mode of the Spirit which is intrinsically different from the philosophical mode, and yet discern in the religious mode of Spirit, and in the connection of that mode to philosophy, nothing other than the movement of philosophy's own thought.

This is by definition a kind of knowledge which religion, as

such, cannot have. The movement of the Spirit which Hegel calls religion is the totality of the sphere of absolute Spirit as such. Hence whatever kind of *knowledge* religion can have of that totality — the knowledge belonging to the mode of *Geist* which Hegel identifies with the Holy Spirit — must be not only formally, but really within the totality of the Spirit which is also religion. The structure of the religious sphere of absolute Spirit means that, as far as the existence or the life of that sphere is concerned, the Spirit's knowledge and the Spirit's being must coincide. But in the case of the religious sphere's knowledge of itself — as far as the Spirit's *religious* knowledge — is concerned, the Spirit's knowledge and the Spirit's being must necessarily appear to be dissociated one from the other. And both these characteristics of the religious sphere have the same origin: the immediate identity of that sphere with the totality of absolute Spirit.

In the case of philosophy, the relationship of Spirit to itself is exactly the reverse. Philosophy knows about religion — the totality of absolute Spirit — as one particular mode of absolute Spirit. Hence philosophy's knowledge must be able to put itself 'outside' the totality of absolute Spirit, and yet by so putting itself outside, not cease to know adequately of that totality. But because the totality of absolute Spirit is the totality of knowledge and of being at once, the *being* of philosophy must be connected to that totality, and yet connected in a mode other than that of philosophical knowledge. That mode is religion. Philosophy needs religion. Philosophy needs religion because, although philosophy can know about religion, and indeed know about its own connection to religion, philosophy cannot be, and hence cannot know, as religion is or as religion knows.

Philosophy, according to Hegel, is the mode of absolute Spirit most suited to the formulation of the question, and of a certain kind of answer to the question, 'How to begin?' For philosophy can grasp, can articulate in its own discourse, the total problem of the relation between knowledge and being. Hence Hegel says that philosophy is the mode in which knowledge (*Wissenschaft*) goes back to its beginnings, and that philosophy is able to establish at the conclusion of its discourse the truth of its premise — the unity of knowledge and being:

In this way the science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but as a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement, in which the notion was only

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implicit and the beginning immediate — and thus out of the appearance which it had there — it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into its proper medium.

Die Wissenschaft ist auf diese Weise in ihren Anfang zurückgegangen, und das Logische so ihr Resultat als das Geistige, dass es aus dem voraussetzenden Urtheilen, worin der Begriff nur an sich und der Anfang ein Unmittelbares war, hiemit aus der Erscheinung, die es darin an ihm hatte, in sein reines Princip, zugleich als in sein Element, sich erhoben hat.⁶²

Philosophy in this sense may be said to cause the Spirit to live in the mind,⁶³ since the thoughts of philosophy are nothing other than the pure form of the movement of absolute Spirit, which philosophy itself discloses to be the totality of what is. Philosophy is the mode of knowledge which creates its own object.⁶⁴ As philosophy begins to ask the question of how to begin, it begins to answer it — but only because philosophy knows that there is nothing outside the movement of Spirit through which philosophy itself begins. The doctrine of absolute Spirit shows us that whatever we may think about Hegel's claims for philosophy, they are ultimately claims about far more than philosophy alone; and hence not just, and not even primarily, claims about what philosophy can know. Hegel's doctrine of absolute Spirit is a doctrine about why we should be doing philosophy at all. The reason why we *are* doing philosophy, Hegel is saying, is that God causes us to do so. The reason why we *should* do philosophy, Hegel is saying, is that God wants us to. The point of philosophy lies in its experiential connection to religion.

But what kind of a *legitimation* for a philosophy is this? We have seen that the reason why Hegel has to offer us a doctrine of absolute Spirit — of philosophy as a mode of experience experientially connected to religion — is because of a necessary inadequacy in his doctrine of Spirit. His doctrine of Spirit, as long as we conceive it only as a philosophical doctrine *about* the whole of experience, can offer us only a pseudo-legitimation for Hegel's doctrine of absolute knowledge: an argument which provides a legitimation for that doctrine on terms which the doctrine itself shows to be inadequate. That is so because as long as we conceive Hegel's doctrine as one which is about something called Spirit, and about the relationship of philosophy to that something, we are justified only in making a provisional or assertoric assent to it.

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If Hegel's doctrine of absolute Spirit really is going to function as a legitimation for a philosophy of absolute knowledge, we have to be able to make something more than an assertoric assent to that doctrine. We have to believe that the doctrine expresses a substantive truth, a truth which defines the status of our thought and our experience alike. We cannot believe that unless Hegel does something more than tell us philosophically what 'experience' is — even if he tells us credibly what the whole of experience is. Hegel has to make us believe that philosophy *is* the whole of experience in a philosophical mode. He has to persuade us that we can hold such a belief without reducing our experience to philosophy. How does Hegel do that?

Philosophy, when it begins to formulate the doctrine of absolute Spirit, can begin to think only *as if* philosophy were connected to the whole of experience in the way which the doctrine of absolute Spirit describes. Philosophy knows that *if* the doctrine of absolute Spirit is true, then certain of the apparent contradictions in the way in which philosophy sees experience would be explained. But for the same reason that philosophy has been led to posit the doctrine — because of the fact that philosophy wants to see experience only in the mode of self-conscious knowledge — philosophy is unable philosophically to decide whether or not the doctrine is true.

Let us suppose, however, that we decide to think about the *whole* of the experience which we have when we find ourselves in this impasse. And let us suppose also that we try to do so whilst keeping an open mind about whether or not it is right for us to think *philosophically* or not about the experience we are having. Then there *might*, perhaps, be a way in which we could see the world — and could see the world whilst still doing philosophy — which would put us in a position to assess the truth of the doctrine of absolute Spirit. This would be a new way, although a way thoroughly connected to the way of speculative philosophy, for the philosophical mind to connect itself to experience. The philosophical mind, to be sure, would have to *decide* to connect itself to experience in this way; and yet such a decision would be made necessary by the way in which the mind is in any case connected to experience if it tries to do philosophy in the Hegelian way.

The kind of truth which philosophy gains by formulating the doctrine of absolute Spirit can only be called a hypothetical or metaphorical truth about the world — a truth which tells us that

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the world is as if certain things were true about it — if philosophy regards its own relation to experience only as a possible *object* of philosophical thought. But philosophy is *in* a relationship with experience however much philosophy thinks *about* that relationship; and it is this fact which the doctrine of absolute Spirit is itself 'about'. Hence for philosophy to think only 'about' that doctrine — to think about it as an object of philosophical discourse, without at the same time trying to think about it in any other way — would be for philosophy to make the doctrine superfluous.

When philosophy begins to think as if there were a truth in excess of the self-reflexive kind of truth about experience, and as if philosophy were necessarily connected to such a truth, then philosophy does so because it recognises that the mind which says 'as if' — the mind which is able at every point to withdraw from its own relationship to experience and to begin thinking about that relationship from the outside — is an inadequate orientation of the mind towards experience. Merely by entertaining the *possible* truth of the doctrine of absolute Spirit, philosophy has put itself into a particular kind of relationship with experience, and this act in itself means that philosophy has to do more than merely think *about* that relationship.

Philosophy has to entertain the proposition that the object of its own discourse — the relationship of the philosophical mind to experience — might have not only an objective, but also a *subjective* form; and yet a form which philosophy, by itself, does not know how to understand or control. Philosophy begins to realise that the success or otherwise of its attempt to connect itself to experience is more than its own affair. Philosophy begins to realise that its own ability to 'see through' the whole of experience, to see in experience only philosophy's own object, is not the only possible, or the only right, attitude of the mind in relation to experience. Philosophy begins to see that it might see through to nothing at all; and that its own philosophical knowledge that it is seeing nothing at all might, in relation to the totality of experience, not be knowledge at all. Philosophy begins to know that its own knowledge, which it knows can destroy the integrity of every particular mode of experience, is itself unable to become a positive form of experience — and yet that there is still experience left over. Philosophy has the experience of a *void*.

The way in which religion relates to the totality of experience is the very reverse of that of philosophy; and yet connected to the way of philosophy by a relationship of *need*. All of the philosopher's

positive experience of the world — his particular and determinate experience of the world — is on the side of his philosophical knowledge. His non-philosophical experience, if he is still a philosopher when he has it, is 'negative': it is the experience that he does not know what he is experiencing, experience of the absence and lack of the content which experience requires in order to be *our* experience: experience of need.

But, for the religious believer, it is precisely the experience of self-conscious knowledge which appears absolutely lacking in content, since that particular mode of experience is wholly eclipsed, for the believer, by what is outside and beyond the domain of merely self-reflexive knowledge, and of which the religious believer has religious knowledge.⁶⁵

In philosophy, the self-reflexive mind's experience of its own limit is that mind's need for something other than the kind of experience which it is itself able to have. In religion, that need is itself a positive form of experience: not a need for something which is absent from experience, but the reality of what is present in experience. That reality is the mind's knowledge of its own connection to its incomprehensible Ground which is God. Religion knows experientially what philosophy, when it tries to know about the totality of experience, makes manifest: that the totality of experience cannot be exhausted by the operation of the sheerly self-reflexive mind. Religion's knowledge coincides with its being, not in the mode of formal conceptual insight, but in the reverent acknowledgement of the absolute distance of the mind from its own most absolute object, the disposition of spiritual humility which is the element of piety.

Religion might well feel that awareness of the absolute distance of the spiritual energy to which it nevertheless knows itself to be connected: that anxiety or despair which is the portion also of the highest mode of philosophical knowledge.⁶⁶ But, for religion, that awareness is not incommensurate with positive knowledge of God. Religion is not, as it were, ashamed of that awareness. Indeed religion would be ashamed of not having it. Hence the religious believer may speak of being loved by a God who is at the same time incomprehensible. The infinite movement of self-reflexive thought — what Hegel calls 'the most astonishing and greatest of all powers, or rather the absolute power'⁶⁷ — is, for religion, the positive form of experience.

The reason why philosophy is able to connect itself to the whole of experience is the reason why the philosopher, if he has or

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thinks he has only philosophical experience, must know his experience to be absolutely divorced from the whole of experience which we call life. But the reason why religion is connected to the whole of experience is that religion knows that it is not itself which is doing the connecting. Philosophy's knowledge is the experience of ignorance. Religion's ignorance is the experience of knowledge. That is the interest of our experience in the connection of philosophy to religion.

But, it might be objected, this is all nothing more than a plausible and perhaps suggestive interpretation of what the doctrine of absolute Spirit means; it does not prove that Hegel's doctrine of absolute Spirit is a *legitimation* for his doctrine of absolute knowledge. To call a doctrine a legitimation surely implies it must be possible for there to be some commonly agreed criteria by which we can assess whether or not the doctrine works. How can an *experience* of the mind — an experience moreover which is claimed not to be identical with the experience of discursive thought — be *communicated*? How can it be spoken of in such a way that, when everything has been said, we commonly know what we have been talking about? And how can such an experience be checked or proven? For the very truth-content of the experience is the assertion that every one of our attempts to legitimate our talk about experience is encompassed by the movement of experience itself.

Every philosophy can be conceived as including both a paradigm⁶⁸ which defines its method of argument and evidence, its conception of what are the nature and limits of philosophical thought, and a framework of argument which flows from that paradigm. A paradigm defines, for a particular philosophy, what is the relationship between the activity of philosophical thought and experience as a whole. Only within such a paradigm can the framework of argument proceed to make statements or propose theories which can be tested 'against' experience, tested by the 'evidence' which the paradigm shows to be relevant in the assessment of such theories. The *arguments* of a philosophy, in this sense, may be spoken of as having an 'evidential' legitimation. Their legitimation depends upon the mind's being able to appeal to experience in a manner which the framework of argument of the philosophy itself shows to be intelligible and coherent. The paradigm of philosophy, however, cannot be legitimated in this sense, since it is the paradigm which shows us what words like 'intelligibility' and 'coherence' mean for that particular philo-

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sophy.⁶⁹ Our reasons for choosing one philosophical paradigm rather than another, therefore, can be neither exclusively philosophical, nor exclusively evidential in the sense which I have just outlined. They must have to do with experience in a sense of that word which has not been exclusively defined by any one philosophical view of experience. Those reasons must have to do with our estimate of the wavelength of philosophy in the spectrum of experience.

I want to argue that Hegel's doctrine of absolute Spirit is the paradigm of Hegel's philosophy in this sense. Clearly the particular view which Hegel has of philosophy in relation to the whole of human experience, whatever its force, cannot conclusively be shown to be the right one, or to be the wrong one, by any argument of Hegel's or by any identifiable empirical fact or connection of such facts. But it does not follow that we cannot engage in rational discussion about the worth or significance of Hegel's paradigm in relation to other alternative visions of what philosophy might be, not least those of our own time. We can, to use Michael Rosen's terms, 'interpret' and so assess Hegel's philosophy in relation to the philosophical discourse of our own time, without being able, or needing, to 'translate' Hegel into the language of that discourse.⁷⁰

But problems of communication, which always occur when philosophies try to talk to each other, arise when we approach Hegel not just accidentally, because of the differences in cultural and conceptual idiom between our day and Hegel's own, but intrinsically and necessarily because of the kind of things Hegel is trying to talk about and to say. Hegel's philosophy, whatever the particular things it says *about* experience, is special in being a philosophy *of* experience. In the case of Hegel's philosophy, the problem of communication arises not just when we try to compare Hegel's voice with the voices of others, but when anyone, even Hegel's contemporaries, tries to read Hegel himself. It is not without significance that almost all of Hegel's works were first delivered as lectures and to students. The truth Hegel communicates becomes real only when it is consciously and actively apprehended in the experience of another mind: when it becomes true *an und für sich*.⁷¹ Hegel's constant affirmation that his philosophy is exoteric or public⁷² does not contradict this. Hegel's philosophy is 'public' precisely because it is a philosophy of communication. But communication must, in the first place, address itself to the individual mind, and we can never be wholly

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certain that one person has apprehended exactly the same thing as another. What we have apprehended we find out by talking to other people; and, of course, we will be disposed to say different things as our culture, language, circumstances — as our *experience* changes.

There is, I believe, of necessity a difference between the way Hegel's philosophy itself communicates truth and the way in which that philosophy must be defended in philosophical debate, and so a certain necessary inarticulateness in the Hegelian standpoint. But to say this, if we interpret the doctrine of absolute Spirit in the way I have suggested, is not to say that we have to take or leave everything in Hegel. It is not to say that there is no 'way in' to Hegel's philosophy, or that there is no possibility of communication between a mind inside the Hegelian mode and one outside. It *is* to say that we can reasonably accept what I have called the paradigm of Hegel's philosophy — his doctrine of philosophy as a religious activity and a mode of absolute Spirit — without being able to justify our decision in relation to any evidence which is absolutely independent of that paradigm. The interpretation of Hegel's doctrine of absolute Spirit which I have proposed means that, if we do accept Hegel's doctrine, we must logically do so on its own terms, which are experiential and ultimately religious ones. I hope, however, also to have shown that we can accept Hegel's paradigm of absolute Spirit without having to believe that all the things which Hegel says about our experience on the basis of it are true, still less that they are true in abstraction from the evidence which we find in experience. I hope to have shown that the conceptual framework which Hegel has given us is capable of explaining, though not of explaining away, the reasons why there is necessarily a partial failure of communication between a mind which fully accepts the Hegelian viewpoint and one which is external to that viewpoint. This capacity is one of the reasons why Hegel's philosophy remains historically vital and capable of rigorous defence in philosophical debate; and it is a capacity, I suggest, which we can only understand in the context of that dimension of Hegel's work which is explicitly and necessarily religious.

To see Hegel's philosophy in this way is not to endorse the kind of Hegel interpretation which Walter Jaeschke has called 'running away from conceptual thought' (*die Flucht vor dem Begriff*).⁷³ On the contrary, to do so is to point up the relevance of the religious dimension of Hegel's thought precisely to Hegel's achievement as a speculative and systematic thinker.

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I have suggested one way in which Hegel shows us how we can conceive of philosophy as both required and empowered to speak of the *objects* of religious belief, and yet at the same time see philosophy as radically in need of the *experience* of religious faith. If Hegel's philosophy can in fact do this — or even if it makes a coherent effort to do so and only partially succeeds — then the Hegelian contribution is of relevance as much to contemporary disputes within Christian theology as it is to more formal problems within the philosophy of religion. One of the most urgent needs in contemporary theological discussion is for a mode of argument capable of connecting the necessary enquiry of the philosophy of religion into the *object* of religious belief — into questions of dogma, truth, and reference — to the kind of non-philosophical religious awareness which belongs to the believing community itself.

This is made strikingly apparent by the current dispute over the writings of Don Cupitt. Much of the critique of these writings has centred upon the claim that their theses do not correspond to the *experience* of religious people.⁷⁴ Cupitt's distinction, made in the interests of religious integrity,⁷⁵ between the claims of dogmatical realism and the ethical demands of religious practice itself, seems to ignore the fact that, for most people who claim to believe, religious practice cannot be conceived without reference to certain positive dogmatic claims about the truth — nor dogma conceived in abstraction from the religious practice in which it is embodied.

Hegel can help us here. Hegel's philosophy is not 'religious' in the abstract, even though it claims to articulate the 'concept' of religion as such. Hegel's is a Christian philosophy: a philosophy of Incarnation. For such a philosophy there can be no radical or absolute distinction between what we call our 'experience' and the truth about that experience. For a philosophy such as that of Hegel, the ultimate appeal is indeed to the autonomy of religious experience: to the experience of the Christian community or *Gemeinde* to whom his philosophy of religion is addressed.

At the close of his *Philosophy of religion* itself, it is indeed to the experience of the Christian community that Hegel appeals.⁷⁶ Hegel makes no claim that his philosophy can communicate a truth which will be religiously valid in abstraction from the experience of that community, still less that contradictions which are real in the life of the *Gemeinde* will disappear because they have been resolved by philosophical argument. In his own time,

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Hegel says, the rationalistic theology of the Enlightenment and the reaction against it has led to a 'discordant note' or *Misston*⁷⁷ between philosophical theology and evangelical piety.⁷⁸ It is a split, as Hegel says, which is 'actually present in reality' (*in der Wirklichkeit vorhanden*),⁷⁹ and the fact that it can be dissolved by philosophical argument will not do away with it in reality. How the split is to be resolved, Hegel says, is 'not the immediate practical business and concern of philosophy';⁸⁰ it is the business of 'the actual present day world' (*die zeitliche empirische Gegenwart*),⁸¹ the business of the kind of experience which we call Christian belief.

Decisively influenced by Wittgenstein's method in philosophy, which centres upon the analysis of linguistic usage and human practice, modern philosophy of religion in the English speaking world has often seen its task as the elucidation of the logic and the coherence, and so what it sees as the 'meaning', of religious utterances, practices, and codes of belief. Religion and philosophy are different 'forms of life' which give rise to different 'language games.'⁸² The task of the philosophy of religion, therefore, can only be seen as describing the grammar of the religious language game, and acquiring such understanding of the religious form of life as is necessary in order for such a description to be provided.⁸³ Philosophy 'cannot independently make any kind of substantive statement about whether or not religion communicates truth. Philosophy can, at best, elucidate what religion means by 'truth', as well as other things which religion says and does. This is the position which D.Z. Phillips, one of Wittgenstein's disciples who has been specifically concerned with the philosophy of religion, takes up. Echoing Wittgenstein's requirement that philosophy should 'leave everything as it is' when it considers our actual use of language, Phillips asserts that the only help which philosophy can be in our practical consideration of religious questions is in clearing away possible confusions about how religious language works, or about the proper boundaries between religious and philosophical discourse.'⁸⁴

But this apparently modest view of the scope and character of the philosophy of religion is, in practice, far from modest. Hence when Phillips comes to consider a real aspect of religious practice — that of prayer — he writes as follows:

The philosopher's trouble comes from the fact that he finds it difficult to give a conceptual account of a familiar

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religious activity; to make philosophically explicit what is already known in a non-philosophical, that is, in this case, religious, way.⁸⁵

But of the kind of explanation we should be seeking, Phillips writes:

One is asking him (i.e. the religious believer) for a non-religious account of a religious activity, a conceptual or philosophical account which would give some indication of the meaning of prayer to someone for whom prayer meant little, and often, he fails to provide an adequate one.⁸⁶

This is a kind of philosophy of religion which wants to have it both ways: to exclude, and yet covertly to answer, the question of religious truth. What Phillips is really denying is not that philosophy can have anything to say about whether or not there is a religious truth, but that such a truth is one relevant to philosophy: that when philosophy apprehends such a truth, philosophy's own *philosophical* way of understanding the world might be changed. The methodological standpoint which requires us 'to leave everything as it is', when we begin philosophically to consider the phenomenon of religion, is also a standpoint which gives to philosophy the right to *say* how things are in religion. It is a standpoint which denies to the religious mode the capacity independently to articulate any kind of truth which philosophy would have to acknowledge as capable of modifying the structure of philosophical knowledge.

Hegel, on the other hand, has to make substantive statements about religious truth, because he believes that truth is in experience and that religion and philosophy are necessarily connected as ways in which we experience the truth. But he does not presuppose that only philosophy is doing the talking when it talks about religion, or that religion never talks back. Hegel's philosophy respects the autonomy of religion not only as an object, but also as a subject of discourse. It does not presuppose that philosophy and religion can only talk either to themselves, or about each other. It opens up, although it does not fill, a space in which real dialogue can take place on the ground of articulate experience: experience which doesn't know, in advance of our categorical distinctions, exactly what 'philosophy' and 'religion' are, nor where the boundary runs between them.

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Karl Barth's charge against Hegel was that a philosophy with the Hegelian ambition could only know about what it claimed to know if it at the same time destroyed the object of its knowledge: if it turned the connection of the human heart to God into an object of speculative dialectic.⁸⁷ This is the major anxiety which has attended the reception of Hegel's philosophy of religion, and it is a worry which is philosophically as well as theologically well-founded. A philosophy which tries to talk about the sort of thing which Hegel talks about can, of necessity, only speak adequately if it is also silent, only know if it is also ignorant. This is indeed the problem with Hegel's philosophy; but it is also the problem of that philosophy. It is what that philosophy, at its innermost core, is about.

To talk about Hegel's philosophy as an experience is not to evade the problem; it is, on the contrary, to make it explicit. Hegel's philosophy is not, as Kierkegaard alleges, about arranging the truth of Christianity in paragraphs.⁸⁸ It is about giving to philosophy, and to much else besides, the experience that Christianity cannot so be arranged. Hegel's philosophy can only give us the kind of knowledge it claims to give because there is a permanent and irrevocable tension between the kind of knowledge which it gives us about our experience, and the kind of attitude we must have to our experience if we want that knowledge to be anything other than empty and vain. This is the contradiction, I believe, which is disclosed to us when we read Hegel's philosophy of religion, and it is the one contradiction which, Hegel is trying to tell us, we cannot reasonably want *aufgehoben*. Only in the light of that contradiction can we understand what kind of an experience Hegel's philosophy is claiming to be, and so what in our own experience can help us to decide whether or not that philosophy is true.

Notes

The following English translations of Hegel's texts have been used, with very minor alterations. They are referred to in the footnotes by the abbreviations given afterwards. The full German title is given after the abbreviation:

The phenomenology of mind, trans. J.B. Baillie (London, 1910). Abbreviation: *PG* (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*).

The science of logic, in two volumes, trans. W.H. Johnston and L.G.

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Struthers (London, 1929). Abbreviation: *SL* (*Wissenschaft der Logik*). *The philosophy of mind* (being Part Three of Hegel's Berlin *Encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences*), trans. William Wallace and A.V. Miller (Oxford, 1971). Abbreviation: *PM* (*Die Philosophie des Geistes*). *Lectures on the philosophy of religion*, in three volumes, trans. E.B. Speirs and J.B. Sanderson (London, 1895). Abbreviation: *PhR* (*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*).

I have occasionally referred to other Hegelian texts; the English edition used is given in the notes.

For reasons which will be apparent from my argument. I have consistently translated Hegel's central term *Geist* as *Spirit* rather than mind. I have amended translations and refer to the English titles of Hegel's works accordingly. In my own text, therefore, I refer to *The phenomenology of mind* as *The phenomenology of spirit*; and to *The philosophy of mind* as *The philosophy of spirit*. I often use a shortened form of the full titles of Hegel's works, e.g.: *Phenomenology of spirit* = *Phenomenology*; *Science of logic* = *Logic*; *Lectures on the philosophy of religion* = *Philosophy of religion*.

The work I refer to as *The science of logic* or *Logic* is what is usually known as Hegel's 'Greater Logic', first published in German in 1812–16 under the title *Wissenschaft der Logik*. It is *not* the first part of the Berlin *Encyclopaedia*, which is usually called the 'Lesser Logic'.

The German edition used is the edition of Hegel's collected works published by Hermann Glockner (*Hegel: Sämtlich Werke: Jubiläumsausgabe in Zwanzig Bänden*, Stuttgart, 1928). In the notes, after the reference to the relevant English edition of a work of Hegel, followed where appropriate by a volume number in roman numerals, a corresponding reference to the Glockner collected works is given with the appropriate volume number (e.g. note 2: *PhR* 1, p. 20; Glockner 15, p. 37). The work I refer to as the Berlin *Encyclopaedia* (*Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*) is also called by Glockner *System der Philosophie*. I have chosen English translations which seem to me to make clear the sense of the relevant passages of Hegel most effectively in relation to my own argument; the English does not necessarily correspond directly to the German of the Glockner edition. Where a quotation is especially important I have included a full German version in the body of the text; and I have sometimes included a German word or phrase after a particular English one where an adequate English translation seemed quite impossible.

In the translations I have used *Begriff* is usually translated as *notion*. In my own exposition I use the more common English word *concept*. The two terms should be taken as synonymous, and the meaning will, I hope, be sufficiently clear from the context. *Idee* is translated as *idea*.

1. Emil Fackenheim, *The religious dimension in Hegel's thought* (Bloomington, Indiana), p. 3.

2. *PhR* I, p. 20; Glockner 15, p. 37: 'Philosophy is itself, in fact, worship (*Die Philosophie ist in der That selbst Gottesdienst*); it is religion, for in the same way it renounces subjective notions and opinions in order to occupy itself with God.'

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3. *PhR* I, p. 19; Glockner 15, p. 37: 'The object of religion as well as of philosophy is eternal truth in its objectivity, God and nothing but God, and the explication of God.'

4. *PhR* I, p. 132; Glockner 15, p. 144: 'God exists essentially in Thought. The suspicion that He exists through thought, and only in thought, must occur to us from the mere fact that man alone has religion, not the beasts.' But n.b. also: 'Yet not only *may* a true content exist in our feeling, it *ought* to exist, and *must* exist; or, as it used to be put, we must have God in our heart.'

5. See *PhR* III, p. 148; Glockner 16, p. 353: 'In philosophy, religion gets its justification from thinking consciousness. Piety of the naive kind stands in no need of this, it receives the truth as authority, and experiences satisfaction, reconciliation by means of this truth.'

6. See Charles Taylor in *Hegel and modern society* (Cambridge, 1979), especially Chapter 1, sections 7, 8 and 9.

7. I use the term 'absolute knowledge' in this encompassing sense; and not with any specific reference to the concluding section of the *Phenomenology* which is called *Absolute knowledge*.

For a representative formulation of this conception of philosophical knowledge, see Hegel: *Lesser logic* (the first volume of the *Encyclopaedia of philosophical sciences*), trans. William Wallace (Oxford, 1873), pp. 1-2; Glockner 8, p. 41.

8. See e.g. *PhR* III, pp. 175-6 (Third lecture on the proofs of the existence of God); Glockner 16, p. 380.

9. See *PG*, p. 86; Glockner 2, p. 78.

10. Robert C. Solomon provides an illuminating description of this view of philosophy when he writes that 'for Hegel, epistemology is the "ontology" of knowledge'. See Solomon, 'Hegel's Epistemology' in Michael Inwood (ed.): *Hegel* (Oxford Readings in Philosophy, 1985), especially pp. 36-7.

11. Michael Oakshott, *Experience and its modes* (Cambridge, 1933), p. 9.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 350.

19. I use this term in the sense outlined by Michael Rosen in *Hegel's dialectic and its criticism* (Cambridge 1982), Chapter 1: 'The Interpretation of philosophy'. Cf. notes 68 and 69 below.

20. See Hegel, *Lectures on the history of philosophy*, trans. E.S. Haldane (London, 1892), Vol. 1, p. 73; Glockner 17, p. 105: 'We Lutherans — I am a Lutheran and will remain the same . . .'

21. See e.g. *PhR* I, pp. 36-7; Glockner 15, pp. 53-4: 'It no longer gives our age any concern that it knows nothing of God; on the contrary, it is regarded as a mark of the highest intelligence to hold that such knowledge is not even possible . . .'

22. See e.g. *PhR* I, p. 62; Glockner 15, p. 78: 'God is not the highest

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emotion, but the highest Thought. Although he is lowered down to popular conception (*wenn er auch in die Vorstellung herabgezogen wird*), yet the content of this conception belongs to the realm of thought.'

23. Karl Barth, *Protestant theology in the nineteenth century* (London, 1972), p. 420.

24. See e.g. Karl Popper, *Conjectures and reputations* (New York, 1963), p. 69.

25. See Popper, *Conjectures*, pp. 37–9. Cf. Popper, *The poverty of historicism* (London, 1957), Introduction, p. x: 'If there is such a thing as growing human knowledge, then we cannot anticipate today what we shall know only tomorrow.'

26. Popper, *The open society and its enemies* (London, 1945), vol. II, pp. 29–30, 45–6.

27. David Lamb, *Hegel — from foundation to system* (The Hague, 1980), p. 170.

28. Rosen, *Hegel's dialectic*, p. 178.

29. See e.g. *PhR* I, p. 89; Glockner 15, p. 103: 'It is not allowable in philosophy to make a beginning with "There is, there are", for in philosophy the object must not be presupposed.'

30. *PM*, p. 5 (§. 379); Glockner 10, p. 15:

In contrast to the empirical sciences, where the material as given by experience is taken up from outside and is ordered and brought into context in accordance with an already established general rule, speculative thinking has to demonstrate each of its objects and the explication of them, in their absolute necessity. This is effected by deriving each particular Notion from the self-originating and self-actualising universal Notion, or the logical Idea.

31. For a treatment of the *Phenomenology* in this way, see Robert C. Solomon, 'Hegel's epistemology'; for a treatment of the *Logic*, see Terry Pinkard, 'The logic of Hegel's *Logic*', both in Michael Inwood (ed.), *Hegel* (Oxford Readings in Philosophy, 1985). On the *Logic*, see also Klaus Hartmann, 'Hegel: a non-metaphysical view', in Alasdair Macintyre (ed.), *Hegel: a collection of critical essays* (Notre Dame, 1976).

32. See *SL* I, pp. 79–90 ('With what must the science begin?'); Glockner 4, pp. 69–84.

33. *PG*, p. 75; Glockner 2, p. 69.

34. See Hegel, *Lectures on the history of philosophy* (London, 1895), vol. III, pp. 428–9: 'Thus since the investigation of the faculties of knowledge is itself knowing, it cannot in Kant attain to what it aims at because it is that already — it cannot come to itself because it is already with itself.'

35. See *SL* I, p. 34; Glockner 4, p. 15.

36. See *ibid.*, p. 60; Glockner 4, p. 45.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 53; Glockner 4, p. 36.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 84; Glockner 4, p. 77:

We cannot extract any closer determination or positive content for the beginning from the fact that it is the beginning of

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philosophy. For here at the beginning, where there is yet no philosophy, philosophy is an empty word, or an idea taken at random and not justified. Pure knowledge affords only this negative determination, that the beginning must be the abstract beginning.

39. See *PG* I, pp. 23–4; Glockner 2, pp. 28–9.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 85, 88; Glockner 2, pp. 77, 79–80.
41. Oakeshott, *Experience*, p. 41.
42. *PM*, p. 9; Glockner 10, pp. 20–1.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 5; Glockner 10, pp. 15–16.
44. Cf. *PhR* I, p. 26; Glockner 15, pp. 43–44.
45. Goethe, *Faust*, Part 1, trans. Albert G. Latham (London, 1908), pp. 87–8.
46. *PM*, p. 8; Glockner 10, p. 20.
47. *Ibid.*
48. See *ibid.*, pp. 16–17; Glockner 10, pp. 33–4: ‘Hence the special mode of mental being is manifestation (*Die Bestimmtheit des Geistes ist daher die Manifestation*) . . .’
49. Oakeshott, *Experience*, p. 355: ‘Philosophy is not the enhancement of life, it is the denial of life.’
50. *PM*, p. 292; Glockner 10, p. 446; The reference to a community (*Gemeinde*), I believe, has as much the connotation of a community of religious faith as it has of the community of human discourse by which philosophical knowledge is sustained. Cf. note 76 below.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 300–301; Glockner 10, pp. 456–7.
52. *Ibid.*, § 571.
53. *Ibid.*, ([die]absolute Vermittlung des Geistes mit sich selbst).
54. Hegel does not actually use the term ‘Holy Spirit’ (*heiliger Geist*) in this discussion; but the notion of Spirit is used in the part of the section ‘Absolute Spirit’ (*Der absolute Geist*) which is entitled ‘Revealed religion’ (*Die geoffenbarte Religion*) with a clear theological reference. The total movement of absolute Spirit which is the transcendental form of experience Hegel describes in trinitarian terms — in the three modes of Creator, Son, and Spirit (*Schöpfer, Sohn, and Geist*). Cf. *PM*, pp. 181–2 (§ 441, Zusatz); Glockner 10, pp. 297–8.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 299–300 (§ 566–9); Glockner 10, pp. 455–6.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 301–2 (§ 571); Glockner 10, pp. 457–8.
57. *Ibid.*

If the result — the realised Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself — is taken in a merely formal, contentless sense, so that the Spirit is not also at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding; — then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness, knowing itself in itself as absolute — Irony. Irony, which can make every objective reality nought and vain, is itself the emptiness and vanity . . .

58. *Ibid.*, p. 302 (§ 572); Glockner 10, p. 458.

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59. See *SL* II, p. 219; Glockner 5, p. 16:

Indeed to form a notion of an object (*Das Begreifen eines Gegenstandes*) consists just in this, that the Ego (*Ich*) appropriates it, penetrates it, and reduces it into its own form, that is, universality which is immediately determinateness, or determinateness which is immediately universality . . .

60. *Ibid.*
61. *PM*, p. 302 (§ 572); Glockner 10, p. 458.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 313–14 (§ 574); Glockner 10, p. 474.
63. See Iwan Ilyin, *Die Philosophie Hegels als kontemplative Gotteslehre* (Bern, 1946), p. 53.
64. See e.g. *SL* I, pp. 79–80; Glockner 4, pp. 69–70. Cf. *PhR* I, p. 89; Glockner 15, p. 103.
65. See *PhR* I, pp. 211–12; Glockner 15, p. 222:

Since faith must be defined as the witness of the spirit to absolute Spirit, or as a certainty of the truth, it involves relation in respect of the distinction of object and subject, a mediation in fact, but a mediation within itself; for in faith as it is here defined, external mediation and that particular mode of it have already vanished.

66. Cf. Kierkegaard, *Concluding unscientific postscript*, trans. David Swenson (Princeton, 1941), pp. 202–3.

67. *PG* p. 30; Glockner 2, p. 33.

68. I take this term from T.S. Kuhn's *The structure of scientific revolutions* (Chicago, 1970). For Kuhn's definition of a paradigm in science, see Chapter 2: 'The Route to Normal Science', especially pp. 10–11. Kuhn's argument about the importance of paradigms and of paradigm change to the growth of scientific knowledge is perhaps of even greater relevance to philosophy than to science, and in particular to the problem of how we should understand and criticise the philosophical texts of the past. In philosophy, what Kuhn calls 'paradigms' define not only what *kind* of evidence is relevant and what is irrelevant in the testing of scientific theories, but also the ontological status of 'evidence' and 'proof' as such.

69. Cf. Rosen, *Hegel's dialectic*, pp. 6–7.

70. *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.

71. See *PG*, pp. 18–19, 22–3; Glockner 2, pp. 25, 27–8. This conception of the nature of philosophical argument is, I believe, common to Hegel's work as a whole and does not depend upon the particular rhetorical and apologetic standpoint adopted in the *Phenomenology*.

72. See e.g. *ibid.*, pp. 9–12; Glockner 2, pp. 17–20.

73. See Walter Jaeschke, 'Die Flucht vor dem Begriff: Ein Jahrzehnt Literatur zur Religionsphilosophie (1971–1981)', in *Hegel — Studien*, Band 18 (Bonn, 1983).

74. For a powerful and representative formulation of this critique see Stephen Clark, *From Athens to Jerusalem* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 198–203.

75. See Don Cupitt: *Taking leave of God* (London, 1980), Chapters 5

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and 6: 'Worship and Theological Realism' and 'Doctrine and Disinterestedness': especially pp. 68–9:

In religion, there is no independent being whose existence validates the practice of worship, just as in morality there is no independent being whose will validates the principles of morality. There does not need to be such an independent being, for the aim of worship is to declare one's complete and *disinterested* commitment to religious values. Belief in the God of Christian faith is experience of the impact of those values in one's life.

76. See *PhR* III, pp. 145–51; Glockner 16, pp. 350–6.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 150, Glockner 16, p. 354.
78. *Ibid.*, pp. 147–8; Glockner 16, pp. 352–3.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 150; Glockner 16, p. 354.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 151; Glockner 16, p. 356.
81. *Ibid.*
82. See Wittgenstein: *Philosophical investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford, 1968), pp., 11–12, 88; especially Remark 241 (p. 88).
83. See e.g. *ibid.*, p. 116 (Remark 373).
84. See D.Z. Phillips: *Religion without explanation* (Oxford, 1976), pp. 189–90. Cf. Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, p. 49 (Remark 124).
85. D.Z. Phillips: *The concept of prayer* (Oxford, 1981), p. 3.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
87. Cf. note 23 above.
88. Cf. Kierkegaard, *Concluding unscientific postscript*, trans. David Swenson (Princeton, 1941), p. 19.

10

The Difference Between *Begrifflicher Spekulation* and Mathematics in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature

Wolfgang Neuser

If one were to attempt to say what significance Hegel's philosophy of nature plays for contemporary natural science, one would encounter great difficulties. For almost a century research about Hegel has simply ignored his philosophy of nature. It has only been in recent years that both the historical influence of the natural sciences upon Hegel's thinking and the systematic position of natural sciences in the Hegelian philosophy of nature have been researched. However, the question as to whether or not Hegel's philosophy of nature can in any way be innovative for contemporary natural science has hardly been explored.

I

One of the acknowledged capabilities of the modern natural sciences is the ability to represent processes in nature with mathematical models. Nevertheless, it would appear that the natural sciences cannot be reduced to mathematics. Instead the natural sciences — alongside mathematics — employ forms of speculation in the understanding of nature. Within this notional frame of speculation ('notional deduction') mathematics serves as an auxiliary science. The consistency assumed in mathematical deductions means that predicates are allowed which, in turn, must be interpreted within the above mentioned notional frame. In using mathematics the natural sciences, e.g. physics, possess discriminating forms of deduction. (For the 'notional deduction' the natural sciences do not have any proven method.) They are based on general ideas, intuitions or scientific experience.¹ The intention of Hegel's philosophy of nature is to achieve a dialectical formal frame for notional conclusions. In so doing, the

dialectic should be formulated so generally that absolutely everything one can understand can be reformulated within it. In this context Hegel must discuss mathematics and its role in the natural sciences. In what follows we shall investigate the relationship between 'mathematical argumentation' and 'notional speculation' in Hegel's philosophy (of nature). This leads to the question whether or not Hegel's understanding makes it possible to explain the procedures used in the natural sciences.

Observe the role of notion and mathematics as exemplified in the situation that arises when a student shows his research results to a physics professor. A situation evolves in which the student believes he has attained a conclusion after a long process of mathematical deduction that yields results hitherto unknown. Under what criteria might the teacher judge whether or not the result is correct? Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker explains such a situation, dating from the beginning of his research. Werner Heisenberg was his teacher and saw the results without having¹ checked the mathematics involved.² Simply on the basis of the results and their interpretation he was able to conclude whether or not they were correct or whether a mistake in thinking or in calculation had been made. Apparently Heisenberg had at his disposal a theoretical framework within which he could undertake amplifications without depending on certain mathematical methods of deduction. Thus we can at this point assert a (notional) frame of reference within which mathematical deductions must be arranged — at least in theoretical physics. If used correctly mathematics should, in general, not conflict with this approach.

There is a rather strained relationship between experimental physics and theoretical physics. Theoretical physics is not strictly committed to the production of a monistic closed theory. On the contrary, a proliferation of theories are formulated to meet the requirements of special cases by different specialists. Competing theories cannot always be traced back to a common point of reference. There are schools of thought within theoretical physics. Yet there is a common consensus — hard to formulate in detail — that allows the experienced physicist to examine the validity of the results reached by specialists from other schools. Of course, agreement in experimental data also plays an important role here. One must bear in mind, however, that such data is already theory-impregnated the moment it has been abstracted from experience. This is the case whether or not the notion arrived at is adequate.

In addition to the abundance of (non-classical) theories, modern experimental physics has to contend with the difficult problem of carrying out experiments in the microscopic world with macroscopic instruments. In so doing classical theories have to be combined with non-classical theories (i.e. quantum theories and the theory of relativity) that are often disparate and incommensurable. When experimental physics attempts to explain its experimental findings by means of mathematically described theories of theoretical physics, reference is often made to classical and non-classical explanations in one and the same breath. The experimental physicist proves his skill by combining both the classical and the non-classical. Yet a demonstration of the consistency of both explanations is extremely difficult to produce. Often this consistency is not explicitly shown at all. For example, one frequently finds explanations of an interference experiment in quantum mechanics that is actually two-thirds classical. But the impression often left is that physics is representing — over a broad scope — a consistent method of explanation for one aspect of nature. Here it must be recognised that there is at least a belief in a notional frame of reference; a belief that guarantees the unity of the comprehended world beyond mathematics and the perceived.

In all cases mathematics appears as the guarantee of consistency for physics: whenever an experiment can be transformed into a theory, or whenever a classical theory is harmonised, in each case, the corresponding mathematical apparatus can be employed to interpret the results of one side as a mathematical approximation to its opponent. This consistency, however, is not to be found in mathematics itself since the interpretation of individual magnitudes in the approximation must be the same in the complete mathematical description and in the approximation. Here again, it is a notional structure that must be intuitively grasped in order to secure the unity of the physical conception of the world.

Can we extract an adequate explanation of this relationship from Hegelian philosophy? What does Hegel think of the role of mathematics from a philosophical perspective? Two questions are of special interest: what significance does Hegel give mathematics in the system of knowledge? Of what relevance is mathematical knowledge for the method of understanding?

Hegel discusses these problems at different places in his writings as exemplified by three cases: theory of numbers, calculus (explanation of the notion of the infinite) and arithmetic.

II

Hegel saw his philosophy as a form of science out of which the speculative notion could be attained. Our question here touches the problem of how mathematics and philosophy are related to each other.

Hegel stood in critical opposition to the numerous philosophical attempts to make mathematics the methodological model for philosophy (Plato, Pythagoras, Kant, Spinoza, Schelling). Whereas Schelling still believed that both mathematics and philosophy represented absolute knowledge, Hegel limited this to philosophy:

But the perversity of employing mathematical categories for the determination of what belongs to the method or content of the science of philosophy is shown chiefly by the fact that, in so far as mathematical forms signify thoughts and distinctions based on the Notion, this their meaning has indeed first to be indicated, determined and justified in philosophy.³

Whereas mathematics merely amounts to the usage of formula, truth proves itself only in the thinking of the notion.⁴ The use of mathematical structures as a symbol for thought veils and muddies the truth with the physical sensory element.⁵ It is unfitting to employ the methods of geometry and arithmetic in philosophy,⁶ because they depend upon 'constructions' and 'proofs' due to their abstractness. 'Construction stands by itself without its subjectivity of its notion' and 'proof is a subjective proceeding without objectivity'.⁷ Hegel illustrates how the deficiency of 'construction' and 'proof' as ways of explanation are to be understood by using the example of a (mathematical) theorem proved qua construction. A theorem is a relation of real determinations that have no notional relation.⁸ The theorem is proved after having related the necessity of the determinations. For this the real determinations have to be mediated. This being the prerequisite, it is not the notion that mediates; the mediating determination occurs without the notion of context;⁹ the mediating moment is taken as temporary material for the proof.¹⁰

The mathematician has accidentally found a method of proof that will thereafter only be reproduced by memory. The goal of the proof is thus never constitutively entered into the proof actually done. Hegel consistently differentiates between 'proof

(*Beweis*) and 'construction' (*Konstruktion*): whereas a proof is based on a successive sequence of deductions in which the goal of the proof is not known, in the case of a construction the starting point and the result are known — but the path is still sought that leads from the beginning to the goal.¹¹

Hence, neither the Kantian meaning of 'construction' nor Schelling's is the same as Hegel's: for Kant the 'representation of the object' is constructed '*a priori* in intuition', but Schelling interprets this as 'equating the notion with intuition', whereby in intellectual intuition the geometrist is given the archetype of his object, which is consequently reflected into the sensation by drawing.

For Hegel, however, the 'construction' is at first limited to the geometrist's incomprehensible operations with 'temporary material'. His interpretation of Schelling is such that construction is not the equation of intuition and notion, but rather the sensed reflection of an archetype.¹² It is important for Hegel that the notion of the object of construction is not explicitly thought in its inner logical structure. 'This collection of material does not make sense until the proof happens. It appears in itself to be blind and without notion.' The material or the steps of the proof — taken by themselves — are irrelevant. Only in the context of the intention of the proof do they have relevance. Here Hegel is playing with the well-known Kantian dictum that intuition without notion is blind.

Unlike Kant, Hegel maintained that construction does not follow an *a priori* rule; one must 'blindly obey' contingent and external assertions.¹³ 'On its own account, therefore, this operation is unintelligent, since the end that directs it is not yet expressed.¹⁴ Not until later, in the result, does the secret reveal itself as the proof.

In the proof we find the connections between the determinations as articulated in the theorems. This connection retrospectively appears to be a 'necessary one'.¹⁵ The proof did not occur by following the inner dynamics of the notional determination, but by subjective deed without objectivity. The object did not necessarily determine the course of the proof.¹⁶

That is to say, because the content determinations of the theorem are not at the same time posited as Notion-determinations but as given *indifferent parts* standing in various external relationships to one another, it is only the

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formal, external Notion in which the necessity manifests itself. The proof is not a *genesis* of the relationship that constitutes the content of the theorem; the necessity exists only for intelligence, and the whole proof is in the *subjective interests of cognition*.¹⁷

The construction, on the other hand, is the 'consequence of the nature of the object'. In the proof, however, this consequence is assumed to be the ground. The relationship between ground and consequence has been turned around in the construction, and the consequence results only subjectively from the ground. The ground is a 'subjective ground'. This description reproduces the logic of the argumentation of the geometrical construction, and it is obvious that a procedure (such as the construction) that is based on subjective ground cannot be sufficient for a philosophical argument. In Jena, Hegel used proof and construction as a method of philosophical comprehension.¹⁸ Nevertheless, in both terms the meaning that Hegel uses in his later works is already present: proof and construction are understood as opposing structures of argumentation that are only true when they appear in combination. Hegel later calls this appearance in combination of proof and construction the 'notional constitution' (*Begriffskonstitution*) and forgoes naming construction and proof elements of the dialectical method.

The words 'construction' and 'proof' are in Hegel's *Logic* thereafter used exclusively for the type of construction and proof that are used in the mathematical sciences.

Proof and construction as a means of understanding philosophy are the link connecting Hegel to Schelling. Thereafter the universal (*Allgemeine*) constructs itself in that it divides into parts which themselves have the nature of the whole. The proof of being oneself (*Fürsichsein*) of the parts and their relationship to each other completes the construction. Thus, the universal is the unity of the parts and of their 'negative unity' and 'negative oneness' with regard to the opposing determinations contained within it. We can recognise in these opposing argumentational structures of construction and proof an early formulation of Hegel's dialectical method.¹⁹

In Jena it was already evident to Hegel that 'only in the proof is the necessity of the construction shown'.²⁰

This first division (i.e. the construction), in itself, exists

therefore through the second (i.e. proof) — or there is nothing accidental except that which appears as necessity in the proof. It is the necessary content, the determination of the concretion such that it is constructed only in so far that it is a different unity than first appears in the proof.²¹

So far as the spirit thus recognises the infiniteness it comprehends itself, for its comprehension is this: it equates it as referred to another; it comprehends itself because it equates itself to that to which it refers that is itself as the other of itself, as infinite and thus the same as itself.²²

In the absolute spirit construction and proof are one and the same. The former part is that which presents itself in the proof as one; in the proof there exists the unity which equates itself and the infiniteness that equates itself as one, and both of these are separately also the parts of the construction. The construction itself is necessary as such, for it is itself equated with the proof. Or the spirit is in itself this that it finds itself as the spirit and that, in which it finds itself, or much more that which it finds as itself is the infiniteness.²³

It is only in this sense that this convergence of construction and proof can be seen as valid parts of the philosophical method in Hegel's later system. Construction and proof together become the method of thinking in philosophy. Taken by themselves, however, construction and proof are limited figures of argumentation, i.e. of mathematics.²⁴

From the argumentational structure of philosophy — that is from the inner structure of the speculative notion — we then learn that Kant's construction phenomenologically describes what Hegel logically thinks. The inner self-development of the notion is a concretion of thinking. Notion and intuition thereby have the same content. Schelling's construction and the mathematical proof as representations of the universal into the particular and of the particular into the universal (both of which take place in intellectual intuition and represent original knowledge — or the idea) together form the dialectical constitutive procedure for the self-determinating notion.

III

With this background we are now capable of determining the systematic position of mathematics in the Hegelian system and of describing the relationship of mathematics to the science of nature.

The location of mathematics between logic and sensation, which in Kant's philosophy becomes a mediating position between notion and intuition, has for Hegel the critical defect that it places in opposition to each other the logical 'constitutiva' of notions. This crucial shortcoming can be seen, for example, in the notion of 'number'.²⁵ From sensation number has the characteristic of an unarranged diversity.²⁶ To transfer this sensation into the notion means that we think of the notion 'being external in itself', or 'dead motionless determination'.²⁷

The unrelatedness of the diverse is taken as a basis and yet at the same time ignored in the natural sequence of numbers in as much as the isolated is understood as one number. The number contains in itself — as we may paradigmatically see for mathematics — the contradiction to be thought unrelated, but as a thought to be 'thought in relation'.²⁸ The unrelatedness of the diverse is sometimes described by Hegel as 'the dead' (*das Tote*).²⁹ It is also characteristic for notions of understanding (*Verstandesbegriffe*). Should the number be transformed into 'concrete ratios' the attempt will remain futile, 'to want to still retain it in notion'.³⁰ When Euclid intends to prove the congruence of two figures by overlapping and comparing them, this procedure is 'a roundabout way by which the method refers to sensation', rather than thought.³¹ In contrast, philosophy has to explain the relationship — including the merely postulated relationship — of the unrelated.

On the other hand mathematics does not only deal with the sensation, but by virtue of its rules and its method it is principally related to thought. Similarly a geometrist does not intend to regard a drawn triangle as a sensed one, but as an ideal one.³² The geometrist only draws a triangle because he is unable to 'express its physical being as a thought'.³³

Another reason for the fact that mathematical proofs are not based upon objective features of the things concerned is that the proof does not determine the object by its features. Only in retrospect can the result show whether the proof was correct.³⁴ This is one more difficulty, to 'think' a triangle without concrete

intuition. Whereas Schelling regards sensation in mathematics as positive,³⁵ Hegel uses 'sensation' with a clearly pejorative meaning: mathematics does not reflect on the notion of its objects which would make possible a pure thinking of those objects.³⁶

As Hegel shows, in geometry space is thought totally abstracted from the features of the bodies that constitute it. As 'space' remains in intuition in spite of abstraction, it is an 'unsensed sensation'. In this respect we find in the conception of space an analogy to the above mentioned conception of number. Space is the object of the 'separateness of sensuality'. The diverse is prerequisite in its diversity and at the same time ignored as a thought. As an unsensed sensation space is established as the intuition of the diverse abstracted from the diverse. Space is only the 'form of intuition',³⁷ and from its materiality it is 'thought' or 'abstraction'. It is 'the pure absence of notion of the sensation', the 'separateness of sensation'. But Hegel rejects reliance on this intuition as an 'advantage of science' and even rejects basing proofs on it with the remark that 'by intuition science does not emerge, but only by thinking'.³⁸ The scientific character of geometry results from its ability to abstract from objects of sense³⁹ and in particular to refer to the triangle thought of and not to the sensed one.

The fact that mathematics acts rationally and therefore does not question the use of notions is obvious in calculus.⁴⁰ The differential dx was regarded as 'infinitely small' in Hegel's time.⁴¹ Therefore the features of the differentials are not quantitative (small) but have to be thought in their quality (infinite). For the infinitely small can only mean a limit which cannot be surpassed.⁴² Infinity gives the small a new quality. Therefore calculus is in principle different from calculations with finite numbers.⁴³ In Hegel's time this difference caused much philosophical confusion. Hegel explains the notion of infinity as follows: "The quantum is truly completed to a qualitative existence".⁴⁴ This would require that mathematics rely on the philosophical notion of the infinitely small.

It is this concept which has been the target for all the attacks made on the fundamental determination of the mathematics of this infinite, i.e. of the differential and integral calculus. Failure to recognize it was the result of incorrect ideas on the part of mathematicians themselves.⁴⁵

Nevertheless it was not always a disadvantage that mathematics

did not reflect on the notions of calculus, because intuitively mathematics has usually taken the correct notions of the infinitely small. 'It is announced as a triumph of science that by means of the calculus alone, laws are found *transcending experience*, that is, propositions about existence which have no existence.⁴⁶ The reason for this success is the fact, that the infinitely small is not only a quantity but has a qualitative determination in itself (for instance the transformation of a curved parabola into a straight line by differentiation).

All of this does not mean that Hegel regards mathematics as an insufficiently developed science, lacking maturity. Instead it should be seen as Hegel's attempt to characterise the very nature of mathematical knowledge. The philosophical deficit lies in the fact that mathematics is an activity of ratio and unable to prove the trueness of its notions, because pure rational activity cannot think the notion and therefore cannot think the criteria of trueness. Nevertheless, mathematics has its merits:⁴⁷

One could go further and work out the thought of a *philosophical mathematics* apprehended through notions, instead of the assumed determinations from which the method employed by the understanding derives ordinary mathematics. It is because mathematics is the science of the finite determinations of magnitude, which are supposed to remain firmly and consistently in their finitude, and may not go beyond these determinations, that it is essentially a science of the understanding; and since it is capable of realizing this science in a perfect manner, it has the advantage over other sciences of this kind, of not being contaminated by the admixture of heterogeneous notions or empirical application.⁴⁸

For Hegel the intermediate position of mathematics, between sensation and thought, means that mathematics has purely mental objects but represents them as sensed because mathematics is unable to fix the notion of such an object. Thus we see how Hegel interprets Kant's 'construction' in mathematics in a pejorative way. Because mathematics is unable to rely on a controlled reflection of notions there arises a philosophically insufficient difference between the thought of an object and its notion.⁴⁹

So Hegel opposes Wolff, who uses a measurement to illustrate why differentials of a higher order can be neglected in the

representation of a function as a series. Wolff argues that the measurement of a mountain remains correct even if a grain of sand is blown away.⁵⁰ This argument combines empirical and analytical argumentation and therefore is not conclusive. Wolff's analogy is inadequate and inconsistent because it identifies two logically different arguments: mathematical inference and measurement. The limited accuracy of measurement is not a mathematical proof. Hegel's objection to the differential calculus of his contemporaries refers to a difference between logical argumentation (notion) and the object that remains unresolved.

Hegel's argument runs a similar course: differential calculus must think the opposed together, therefore it is in need of notion, which makes this possible.⁵¹

Hegel praises the fact that Euclid limits himself to the means of mathematics, because notional deduction was not at his disposal. Euclid did not even attempt to deduce from a rational notion of mathematics what only can be inferred from (the notion of) reason (*Vernunftbegriff*).⁵²

The axiom of parallels (which according to today's understanding constitutes a plane geometry) could be proved from the notion of parallels. This, however, is not the task of mathematics, which does not rely upon the notion (of reason). It cannot undertake the deduction of its definitions, axioms and least of all its object (space and its dimensions). Euclid's outstanding scientific achievement is precisely that he exactly appreciated both the element and the nature of his science⁵³ and recognised this.⁵⁴

Unlike Euclid, Schelling attempted to employ the methods of Euclidean geometry in his philosophy. But such an application was in Hegel's opinion unfitting,⁵⁵ because mathematics observes 'only quantitative determinations', from which the qualitative are abstracted. Mathematics

treats of the merely quantitative determination and abstracts from the qualitative, and can therefore confine itself to *formal identity*, to the unity that lacks the Notion, which is *equality* and which belongs to the external abstractive reflection. Its subject matter, the determinations of space, are already such abstract subject matter, prepared for the purpose of having a completely finite external determinateness. This science, on account of its abstract subject matter, on the one hand, has this element of the sublime about it,

that in these empty silent spaces colour is blotted out and the other sensuous properties have vanished, and further, that in it every other interest that appeals more intimately to the living individuality is silenced.⁵⁶

Hegel here addresses the fact that mathematics acts rationally.

In his later system Hegel shares Schelling's position in so far that he believes there is in mathematics an intellectual intuition that reflects into sensation.⁵⁷ Hegel calls both — reflection into sensation, and the reflection on the totality of the objective — intuition, once with the attribute 'intellectual' and once completely without any attribute.

But if by intuition we are to understand not merely the element of sense but the *objective totality*, then it is an *intellectual* intuition; that is to say, intuition has for its object not the external side of existence, but what existence holds of imperishable reality and truth — reality, only in so far as it is essentially in the Notion and *determined* by it, the Idea, whose more precise nature has to reveal itself at a later stage.⁵⁸

One of the differences between the respective positions of Hegel and Schelling is that Hegel does not accept intuition as a basis of proof. The content of intuition is the real material (*realer Stoff*), which in space and time does not exhibit the relationship of the diverse parts to each other. This relationship is a product of reason. On these terms the material of intuition is a disunity of the diverse (*Einheitslosigkeit des Mannigfaltigen*). With its adaption into intuition this material is tentatively arranged. This arrangement already points to the universal structure under which the material will be arranged in notion — as the construction appears in a theorem with the goal of the proof already given, but without an inner necessity. The universal structure, however, is not in itself explicitly thought. It is not yet the 'universal of the diverse';⁵⁹ for intuition the adapted material is still fixed in its sensed structure.

Kant regards intuition as that which appears between subject and object, because it appears not only in the notion but also remains glued to sensation. For Hegel this interpretation of intuition is insufficient, because intuition is still affected by sensation and therefore can be deceived by sensation.⁶⁰ The

concrete form of intuition may be the totality of all the characteristics one can intuitively know; intuition remains none the less sensation.⁶¹ This also pertains to Schelling's intellectual intuition, because it does not think the object in the notion. The thinking of the notion, however, effects the logical movement by the determination of the object. The deficiency of intellectual intuition does not lie in its material, unlike the case of sensed intuition, the material of which is the sensation. Intellectual intuition, however, acts in accordance with the unchanging reality and truth of the object.⁶² The object of intellectual intuition is reality, in as much as its essence is expressed in the notion, and the object is determined by notion.⁶³

There is even a relationship between the intellectual intuition and something concrete; not through perception but through reflection. It refers to the 'idea': 'The advantage which intuition as such is supposed to have over the Notion is external reality, the Notionless element, which first receives a value through the Notion.' The notion is supposed to receive the world by the lack of notion.⁶⁴ Intuition is thus the entire notion albeit as the 'dead' — without self-explication. The rational impresses upon this disunited diverse a 'fixed existence' by determining the universal — also the contents of intuition — and then applies the universal. That which is not yet impressed upon by intuition on the universal, and which is also a disunited diverse, becomes a fixed determination. The rational maintains that the intuited is none other than this. The rational also represents the 'infinite power', preparing that which is made available of the object for thinking and, on the other hand, giving spirit to the object.⁶⁵

This universal, asserted by the rational as a determination of reflection, appears in its being solidified and fixed in the form of a reflection in itself.

The determinations are thought as unchanging. Were this universal to be understood as the notion, then the notion would have the form of an 'eternal essential'. The transitoriness of material, however, cannot come into question. Such a notion would therefore have a form that would not be adequate to its content.⁶⁶ The absorption of transitoriness into form both realises and guarantees reason. This notion must contain the unity of an 'abstractly determined' and of the universal, which expresses the 'determination of the finite' and the 'inadequacy' of the universal as a fixed being.⁶⁷

Hegel takes up Schelling's position: Schelling believes the 'real'

and 'ideal' in absolute knowledge to be identical. In Hegel's opinion Schelling's 'real' corresponds to 'determination in its finiteness', whereas the 'ideal' means the fixed determination of the universal, which at the same time reflects the inadequacy of its being fixed. Schelling based his philosophy on Spinoza's model of the absolute, in which two opposing determinations are thought under the same name.⁶⁸ Hegel clarifies Spinoza's notion of the absolute in *Logic* with a mathematical example of the infinitely small.⁶⁹

Hegel shows that philosophical argumentation does not take place on the level of intuition; he shows that construction is a mere subjective proof of geometry and, on the other hand, that in philosophy form and content should be adequate in the notion: Hegel, therefore, cannot believe that mathematics can be a method of philosophy — as Schelling did. All that Hegel accepted was a notion that relativises the abstract determination of the universal. Hegel's criticism of mathematics amounts to this: mathematical sciences should not be allowed to observe the quantitative without a qualitative.

This criticism is also found in Hegel's discussion of the 'positive and negative' in arithmetic.⁷⁰ Hegel cites this in a 'Remark' in his *Logic*.⁷¹ This does not represent a philosophy of 'determination' in arithmetic, because this sort of determination is indeed not an 'immanent evolution of the notion'.⁷²

However, philosophy must be able to distinguish what is an intrinsically self-external material; the progressive determining of it by the Notion can then take place only in an external manner, and its moments, too, can be only in the form peculiar to their externality, as here, equality and inequality. It is an essential requirement when philosophizing about real objects to distinguish those spheres to which a specific form of the Notion belongs, that is, spheres in which the Notion has an actual existence; otherwise the peculiar nature of a subject matter which is external and contingent will be distorted by Ideas, and similarly these Ideas will be distorted and made into something merely formal.⁷³

The notion 'number' is a 'specific form' of the 'external'. In the notion 'number' the idea comes only partly to consciousness.

As for the supposed primary importance of number and

calculation in an *educational* regard, the truth of the matter is clearly evident from what has been said. Number is a non-sensuous object, and occupation with it and its combinations is a non-sensuous business; in it mind is held to communing with itself and to an inner abstract labour, a matter of great though one-sided importance. For, on the other hand, since the basis of number is only an external, thoughtless difference, such occupation is an unthinking, mechanical one. The effort consists mainly in holding fast what is devoid of the Notion and in combining it purely mechanically.⁷⁴

In the tradition of Vieta⁷⁵ and Schelling, Hegel juxtaposes geometry and arithmetic as analytical and synthetical methods.⁷⁶

Geometry constructs a universal into a particular and arithmetic proves by attributing a particular to a universal. Geometry synthesises universal elements into a particular figurative shape. Arithmetic analyses the particular proposition with regard to its universal validity. Geometry is only synthetic from the perspective of geometry itself. In fact the construction of the triangle precedes the notion of the triangle and fulfils only the notion of the triangle. The construction is in this respect a tautology.

Hegel, who differed from Kant and modified Schelling's concept of mathematics and philosophy, saw these disciplines as sciences, whose object, structure of proof and method, exhibit fundamental differences.

For Hegel, philosophy alone is in a position to concern itself with its own proof by thinking the self-explication of the notion. It follows that the scientific character of a discipline is not defined by its share in mathematics.⁷⁷ The external representation of mathematics does not create an advantage over philosophy.⁷⁸ On the contrary what makes a science a science is its ability to make use of thought, and it is defined by its share in notion.

What is the significance of the mathematical and empirical natural sciences for Hegel? Mathematics is a rational activity, whose rationality is founded by the act of reason in philosophy. The different methods of proof in mathematics and philosophy give rise to Hegel's important criticism of mathematical natural science. For Hegel philosophy constitutes notions by relativising the originally fixed initial notion, whereby the initial notion is identically thought with the opposed notion.

Philosophy can thus build over several levels a chain of argumentations by the development of notions. Mathematics

must reverse the succession of its apparently contingent construction, in order to recognise this construction as a proof. But in this case it is only subjective reason, because the argumentation is not determined by the object itself — as it is in the case of the development of notion.⁷⁹ In the mathematical natural sciences it is announced 'that by means of the calculus alone, laws are found transcending experience, that is, propositions about existence which have no existence.'⁸⁰ This occurs in the extrapolation of the directly and immediately observed. Hegel finds such proofs of things 'without real meaning' inadequate because no proof of existence can be found. In Hegel's opinion this is a systematic rebuttal: in notions one thinks of concrete objects; laws are ruled by notions. Should such a law be given referring to a non-existing object, then the notion will contain an unsolved contradiction and will thereby be formally untrue. Since a mathematical natural science states quantities but, on the other hand, interprets these specific qualitative procedures, e.g. natural phenomena, it can only be appropriate if it is based upon notions, which relate qualities and quantities in one unit.

Hegel discusses this type of inner notional relation in his *Logic* in the chapter 'measure'.⁸¹ 'But yet a still higher *proof* is required for these laws; nothing else, that is, than that their quantitative relations be known from the qualities or specific Notions of time and space that are correlated.'⁸² As argued in this chapter it is desirable that the ratios of the numbers found in nature are known. Kepler's and Galileo's merits are that they found such ratios.⁸³

For the mind (*Geist*) such empirical ratios are then considered natural laws containing reason.⁸⁴ Mathematics as understood in nature is therefore not merely formal or ideal, but 'real' and 'physical'.⁸⁵ Mathematical determinations have their true notions in philosophy itself.⁸⁶ Hegel recognises that nature is written with the letters of mathematics. He expresses his regret that there is no natural science in his sense, although there are already a series of works preparing the ground for such a natural science.⁸⁷ The existing form of applied mathematics is full of a 'brew of experience and reflections'.⁸⁸

The truly philosophical science of mathematics considered as the *doctrine* of quantities, would be the science of *measures*; but this already assumes the real nature and the particularity of things, which is first present in concrete nature. Because

of the external nature of quantity, this would certainly also be the most difficult of all sciences.⁸⁹

Here I have merely traced the foundations of a rational interpretation, as this must be employed in the comprehension of the mathematical and mechanical laws of nature within the free realm of measures. Specialists do not reflect upon the matter, but a time will come when the rational concept of this science will be demanded!⁹⁰

Might Hegel's philosophy of nature then be such a postulated mathematical natural science? Absolutely not: natural science has the task of stating the empirical finds, i.e. formulating its laws in intuition by attributing the diversity of the sensed experience to notions. Instead philosophy exclusively thinks the notion. Philosophy does not examine experience directly, but instead abstracts from experience by using the rational notions (*Verstandesbegriffe*), that are natural laws to natural sciences.⁹¹

Within the notion — as expressed by Hegel — the unity of form and content is always thought. Intuition contains the notion in itself, but does not think it explicitly. Intuition is not a logical category. Only logical categories contain the inner structure of notion.⁹² Therefore only (Hegel's) logic can also guarantee the apodictic characteristics of scientific (philosophical) statements.

IV

Although it is compared to the method of knowledge in philosophy,⁹³ mathematics, because it does not think notions, is real and physical.⁹⁴

As long as mathematics presents something as well-reasoned, these reasons are founded in notions. If mathematics describes an object of nature, its reasons are the essence of nature — as Hegel argues in his *Dissertatio philosophica de orbitis planetarum*.⁹⁵ When these reasons are recognised, he continues, they have become laws. Laws are abstractions from the perceived and have a status of notions.

In point of fact, however, the measure and the number of nature cannot be strangers to reason: the study and the knowledge of the laws of nature are based on nothing else

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but our belief that nature has been shaped by reason and that all the laws of nature are identical. When those who seek the laws of nature in experience and by induction happen to come across the appearance of a law, they acknowledge the identity of reason and nature and they rejoice in their discovery.⁹⁶

According to Hegel the relationship between the natural sciences, mathematics and philosophy of nature are thus represented so that the natural sciences transform laws by attributing them to mathematical ratios. These mathematical ratios are reasonable reasons (*Vernunftgründe*), to be sure, neither the methods of the natural sciences nor those of mathematics allow a demonstration for the necessity of the reasonable reasons.⁹⁷ This can only be done by philosophy in that it constitutes the notions through self-reflection. In Hegel's point of view the relationship of theoretical physics, experimental physics and mathematics could therefore be understood as follows: Experimental physics is a form of 'comprehending perception'. By using notions it attributes the singularly perceived to a law that it considers a universal. Notions are thereby not consciously used, as in the case of philosophy which constitutes from its inner logical structure. The physicist cannot make explicit the inner structure of the notion by his own means. In physics the notion acts 'behind the back of the consciousness'.

Theoretical physics examines the lawfulness and tries to grasp the logic of its notion. However, theoretical physics makes exclusive use of mathematical inferences. It does not use any method in examining the inner dialectical structure of notions — unlike philosophy. This becomes clear, for example, in the co-existence of Newton's and Einstein's notions. The completely different theorems of addition for velocity in both 'physics' are considered valid for different ranges of velocity. Newton's physics is considered an approximation to Einstein's formula for low velocities. But then there is a limit, at which Newton's physics is valid and Einstein's is not. Even if this can be solved pragmatically, it must be unsatisfactory for thinking that reality should be understood as a mixture of two theories of physics, whose notions are completely incompatible. It can only follow, that there are some notions which are still not understood in both theories of physics.

Whether or not one wants to take into consideration the

Hegelian view of these facts as a criterion of consistency for the physical point of view depends, to a large extent, on whether one is convinced by Hegel's account of the self-constitution of the notion — as intimated here — otherwise known as the 'dialectics of notion'.

This criterion of consistency — Hegel emphasises — cannot be realised with the methods of the natural sciences and mathematics. It can only be understood through philosophical thinking.⁹⁸ Only knowledge which is conscious of itself — thus reflecting upon itself — is capable of proving the necessity and consistency of its own deeds.

Notes

In the following notes Hegel's books are cited without titles from the edition G.W.F. Hegel, *Werke* in 20 Bänden, Auf der Grundlage der Werke neu edierte Ausgabe, Hrsg. E. Moldenhauer und K.M. Michel, Frankfurt/Main (Suhrkamp-Verlag), 1970/71; references are to the volume number followed by the page number. I have also used the following abbreviations: *Real.1* for G.W.F. Hegel, *Jenenser Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie*, hrsg. G. Lasson (Hamburg 1967); *PG* for G.W.F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, hrsg. J. Hofmeister (Hamburg 1952); *Gies* for G.W. F. Hegel, *Naturphilosophie*, Band I, Die Vorlesungen von 1819/20 in Verbindung mit K.H. Ilting hrsg. von M. Gies, Neapel 1982; *Habil.* for G.W.F. Hegel, *Dissertatio philosophica de orbitis planetarum*, übersetzt, eingeleitet und kommentiert von W. Neuser (Weinheim 1986). I have used A.V. Miller's translation of Hegel's *Science of logic* (New York, 1969) which is cited as *SL* followed by the page number. M.J. Petry's translation of Hegel's *Philosophy of nature* (London, 1970) is cited as *Petry* followed by the volume and page number.

1. W. Stegmüller, *Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie*, Bd. II, Stuttgart 1975, p. 531 f.

2. C.F. von Weizsäcker, *Die Einheit der Natur* (Munich 1971), p. 109 ff.

3. 5/248; *SL* 216.

4. 5/248.

5. *Ibid.*

6. 6/535, 537.

7. 6/534.

8. 6/533.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*

12. 6/286.

13. Contrary to this general tendency Hegel writes in his *Differenzschrift* (2/35, 45) that philosophy constructs something.

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14. 6/534.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *PG*, 34 ff.
17. 6/534; *SL* 812.
18. *Real.* 1/173 ff. See Hegel's polemics in 1806: 'Statt des innern Lebens und der Selbstbewegung seines Daseins wird nun eine solche einfache Bestimmtheit von der Anschauung, d.h. hier dem sinnlichen Wissen, nach einer oberflächlichen Analogie ausgesprochen und diese äußerliche und leere Anwendung der Formel die KONSTRUKTION genannt' *PG*, 42.
['Instead of expressing the inner life and motion-in-itself of its existence now there is expressed such a simple determination of intuition by superficial analogies, that means of sensual knowledge. This external and meaningless application formula is called a CONSTRUCTION.']
19. See also: 'Die Beglaubigung des bestimmten Inhalts, mit dem der Anfang gemacht wird, scheint rückwärts derselben zu liegen, in der Tat aber ist sie als Fortwärtgehen zu betrachten, wenn sie nämlich zum begreifenden Erkennen gehört' 6/554.
['The authentication of the determinate content with which the beginning is made seems to lie behind it; but in fact it is to be considered as an advance, that is if it belongs to philosophical (*begreifenden*) cognition.'] *SL* 828.
20. *Real.* 1, 175.
21. *Real.* 1, 174.
22. *Real.* 1, 181.
23. *Ibid.*
24. For correlations between mathematics and logic see B. Heimann, *System und Methode in Hegels Philosophie*, (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 444 ff.
25. See R. Baer, 'Hegel und die Mathematik', in *Verhandlungen des 2. Hegel-Kongresses* (1931), 1932, pp. 113 ff.
26. 5/246; 8/70.
27. 5/247.
28. 5/246.
29. 5/244.
30. 5/247.
31. 6/531.
32. 5/245.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *PG*, 35 ff.
35. F.W.J. Schelling (1803), *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums*, hrsg. W.E. Ehrhardt (Hamburg, 1974), p. 50.
36. 'In der Mathematik läßt man es gelten, die Definitionen sind Voraussetzungen; Punkt, Linie werden vorausgesetzt. In der Philosophie soll der Inhalt als das an und für sich Wahre erkannt werden.' 'Ein anderes ist es, ob dieser Inhalt an und für sich wahr sei. Solche Frage macht man bei geometrischen Sätzen gar nicht. Bei philosophischer Betrachtung ist dies aber die Hauptsache.' (20/172)

['In mathematics it is accepted that the definitions are prerequisites;

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points and lines are assumed as prerequisites. In philosophy the content is to be recognised as truth in itself and with itself.' 'It is quite another question whether this content is true in itself and with itself. Such questions are not asked in geometry. In philosophical reflections this is the main point.']

37. 6/535.

38. Ibid.

39. 6/536.

40. 5/279; 5/305.

41. J. Szegetti, 'Hegel und Cantor', in, *Hegel-Jahrbuch*, 1971, pp. 283–93.

42. J.O. Fleckenstein, 'Hegels Interpretation der Cavalierischen Infinitesimalrechnung', in, *Hegel-Studien-Beiheft 11*, 1974, pp. 117–24.

43. Cf. Fleckenstein (1974), p. 117.

44. 5/296. Cf. W. Neuser, 'Hegel's approach to Euclid's theorem of parallels', in, *Explorations in knowledge, III*, 1, 35–9.

45. 5/296; *SL* 253.

46. 5/111; 5/297; *SL* 272, Cf. 20/187 ff.

47. For further information on Hegel's notion of identity in mathematics and philosophy see B. Taureck, *Mathematische und transcendente Identität* (Munich, 1973).

48. 9/52 f; Petry I, 233f.

49. Alle Bildung reduziert sich auf den Unterschied der Kategorien. Alle Revolutionen in den Wissenschaften nicht weniger als in der Weltgeschichte kommen nur daher, daß der Geist jetzt zum Verstehen und Vernehmen seiner, um sich zu besitzen, seine Kategorien geändert hat, sich wahrhafter, tiefer, sich inniger und einiger mit sich erfassend. (9/20 f.) Cf. 5/296.

[All cultural change reduces itself to a difference of categories. All revolutions, whether in the science or history world, occur merely because spirit has changed its categories in order to understand and examine what belongs to it, in order to possess and grasp itself in a truer, deeper, more intimate and unified manner.] Petry I/202.

50. Wolff, *Elementa matheseos universae* (1713/15), Tom I. *Elementa analyseos mathematicae*, P. II, C. I., 5. Schol. (*Gesammelte Werke* II. Abt. Bd. 29, hrsg. J.E. Hofmannus, Hildesheim 1968):

Similiter in Astronomia diameter Telluris respectu fixarum habetur pro puncto seu infinitesima: idem enim observaretur motus primus, si tellus esset punctum individuum. Eodem etiam modo in eclipsibus lunaribus computandis terra pro sphaera perfecta, consequenter montium, multoque magis aedium ac turrium altitudines pro infinitesimis habentur: neque enim aliter nobis appareret umbra telluris super disco Lunae, si terra sphaera perfecta esset.

51. 5/296.

52. 6/529.

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53. 6/528; *SL* 808.
54. 6/528.
55. 6/535. At the end of the nineteenth century there were 'mathematical' enquiries about Hegel: G. Engel, *Die dialektische Methode und die mathematische Naturanschauung* (Berlin, 1865) and C.H. Weiße, *Grundzüge der Metaphysik*, (Hamburg, 1935).
56. 6/535; *SL* 611.
57. See E. Oeser, 'Der Gegensatz von Kepler und Newton in Hegels "absoluter Mechanik",' in, *Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie* (1969) 3, pp. 69–93.
58. 6/286; *SL* 611.
59. 6/286.
60. See 'sinnliches Bewußtsein' in Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.
61. 6/286.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.*
64. 6/287; *SL* 611.
65. 6/287.
66. 6/285.
67. 6/287.
68. 20/172, 8/383 and F.W.J. Schelling (1803), *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums*, hrsg. W.E. Ehrhardt (Hamburg, 1974) pp. 359 ff, pp. 387 ff.
69. 5/291–5.
70. 6/60 ff. Cf. M. Wolff, 'Über das Bedürfnis nach einer philosophischen Naturbetrachtung', *Dialektik*, 3 (1981) pp. 83–100.
71. 5/243.
72. *Ibid.* Critique: H. Schwarz, *Versuch einer Philosophie der Mathematik* (Halle 1853), pp. 36–59, 100–19, 170–93.
73. 5/243; *SL* 212. A. Bullinger, *Hegels Naturphilosophie in vollem Recht gegenüber ihren Kritikern* (Munich, 1903).
74. 5/243; *SL* 216 and Gies, 19.
75. Hegel refers here to Vieta's attempt to connect analytical method of arithmetic to the synthetic method of geometry.
76. For example Euclid 4/34–6, 5/234 f., 6/505, 6/530 f., 6/531–8, 5/244, Hofmeister *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung* (Stuttgart, 1936), p. 297.
77. I. Kant, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften* (Riga, 1786), A IX.
78. F.W.J. Schelling (1803), *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums*, hrsg. W.E. Ehrhardt (Hamburg, 1974), p. 50.
79. 5/318–20, 9/77, 9/248, 5/321, 6/293.
80. 5/320; *SL* 272.
81. A. von Pechmann, *Die Kategorie des Maßes in Hegels 'Wissenschaft der Logik'* (Cologne, 1980)
82. 5/407; *SL* 343.
83. 5/406 f.
84. *Habil.* 32.
85. *Habil.* 5.
86. 9/54.
87. 5/406 f.

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88. 5/321.
89. 9/54. Petry I, 235.
90. 9/106. Petry I, 281.
91. F.W.J. Schelling (1803), *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums*, hrsg. W.E. Ehrhardt (Hamburg, 1974), Vorlesung 11, 12.
92. See Goethe's criticism of mathematics in his *Farbenlehre, Polemischer Teil*.
93. 5/392:

Die Entwicklung des Maßes . . . ist eine der schwierigsten Materien; indem sie von dem unmittelbaren, äußerlichen Maße anfängt, hätte sie einerseits zu der abstrakten Fortbestimmung des Quantitativen (einer Mathematik der Natur) fortzugehen, andererseits den Zusammenhang dieser Maßbestimmungen mit den Qualitäten der natürlichen Dinge anzuzeigen, wenigstens im allgemeinen; denn die bestimmte Nachweisung des aus dem Begriffe des konkreten Gegenstandes hervorgehenden Zusammenhanges des Qualitativen und des Quantitativen gehört in die besondere Wissenschaft des Konkreten, . . . Es mag hierbei dies überhaupt bemerkt werden, daß die verschiedenen Formen, in welchen sich das Maß realisiert, auch verschiedenen Sphären der natürlichen Realität angehören.' Also 5/406.

[‘The development of measure . . . is extremely difficult. Starting from immediate, external measure it should, on the one hand, go on to develop the abstract determination of the *quantitative* aspects of natural objects (a mathematics of nature), and on the other hand, to indicate the connection between this determination of measure and the *qualities* of natural objects, at least in general; for the specific proof, derived from the Notion of the concrete object, of the *connection* between its qualitative and quantitative aspects, belongs to the special science of the concrete. Examples of this kind concerning the law of falling bodies and free, celestial motion will be found in the *Encyclop. of the Phil. Sciences*; 3rd ed., Sections 267 and 270, Remark. In this connection the general observation may be made that the different forms in which measure is realised belong also to different spheres of natural reality.’] *SL* 331

94. *Habil.* 5.
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Habil.* 32.
97. See C. Frantz, *Die Philosophie der Mathematik* (Leipzig, 1842), pp. 3–4, 46–61, 88–114.
98. For the difficulties of consistency see G. Ludwig, *Die Grundstrukturen einer physikalischen Theorie*, (Berlin-Munich-New York, 1978), pp. 248 f.

11

Hegel's *Habilitationsthesen*: A Translation with Introduction and Annotated Bibliography

Norbert Waszek

Introduction

When his father Georg Ludwig died in January 1799, the twenty-eight year old Hegel was able to pursue a career of his own choice. At least in this context, the loss of his father had positive side-effects too: on the one hand, filial piety no longer committed Hegel to the 'profession of preacher' which his parents had intended him for;¹ on the other hand, his modest inheritance (just over 3,000 Wuerttemberg Guilders) provided him with a financial basis sufficient to leave his position as private tutor and to enter what was then the risky path of philosopher and academic. Hegel's awareness of this liberating break from his previous way of life was acute, as is testified in a little poem of 1801 and the 'curriculum vitae' of 1804:

Resolution

Break then, peace with thyself, break with the work of the
world.
Strive, seek something more than today or yesterday. So
wilt thou
Better not be than the time, but still be the time at its best.²

... after my father's death I resolved to devote myself
entirely to philosophic science.³

However, Hegel did not rush into the new life thus opened up to him; he took his time and employed careful deliberation over his next move. He continued to work on various manuscripts in order to enter the new arena well prepared. Only in November 1800 did

he seek the advice of his friend Schelling who had achieved early fame as a philosophical author and subsequently received a position in the prestigious University of Jena. Writing to Schelling, Hegel still appears to be thinking of going to a quiet place, such as Bamberg, in the first instance in order to prepare himself further, before moving on to the intellectual focus of Jena.⁴ Schelling had no patience with such overcautious planning and he urged his friend to come straight to Jena. When Hegel arrived in Jena in early 1801, the intellectual life of the city was brilliant, though it could be argued that the contemporary eminence of the University of Jena, which will for ever be associated with the efforts of Goethe, had passed its peak when Fichte and the Romantics departed and had entered a period of gradual decline.

During his first year at Jena, Hegel had to bring his scholarly and literary projects and interests in line with what was necessary or helpful in terms of securing an academic post. His contemporary projects may be divided into three subject areas: a) political studies; his interest in the 'philosophy of identity' on the side of b) the philosophy of spirit as well as c) the philosophy of nature. In the early months of 1801, the political studies which had hitherto taken up much of his energy continued to hold a prominent place among his activities. However, the internal difficulties he was bound to encounter in these early efforts in political philosophy were aggravated by the hectic pace of the political events at the time, which tended to outdate his studies continually. Due to these difficulties, Hegel did not succeed in completing the political writing he had in mind. Moreover, the political studies, even completed, would not help him in gaining the recognition of the philosophical establishment at Jena, a recognition that was vital for obtaining a teaching post in the philosophy department. As H.S. Harris puts it, 'it became evident that he must now do something more philosophical to make his mark before it was too late' (Harris, 1983, p. xxv). Hegel's friend Schelling, well-known himself for the rapid pace of his publishing, was highly prudent in such matters and may well have urged Hegel to establish himself through the publication of a philosophical book. At any rate, Hegel put politics aside for the time being and used the early summer of 1801 to write his essay *Difference between the systems of Fichte and Schelling*.⁵ The publication of the essay served as Hegel's introduction to the philosophical circles of Jena, but it had the drawback of making its author

appear to be, at least in the eyes of the contemporary reading public, a mere follower of Schelling. In the hope that his essay would gain the attention of the academic community at the University of Jena, Hegel applied immediately to the Faculty for the validation of his Tübingen degree and for the granting of the '*venia legendi*', the formal permission to deliver lectures in the university. It was required — this requirement survives, to the present day, in the German and similar university systems — that the candidates undergo a procedure, called '*Habilitation*', before the '*venia legendi*' was granted. The '*Habilitation*' consists of a dissertation (then written in Latin) and a disputation (normally a defence of the written work). As he had contributed to the transcendental side of the philosophy of identity with his '*Differenzschrift*', it seemed appropriate that Hegel would choose a dissertation topic from his other field of interest, the philosophy of nature. Indeed, as soon as he had finished the '*Differenzschrift*', Hegel appears to have started on his Latin dissertation *On the Orbits of Planets*.⁶ However, the beginning of the academic year was approaching rapidly and it seemed unlikely that Hegel would be able to submit his dissertation before then. It thus became necessary that a compromise was negotiated and, since the details of the negotiations are beyond the scope of the present article,⁷ it was agreed upon to allow Hegel an early disputation based on theses and to grant him the '*venia legendi*' so that he could lecture in the autumn term on the understanding that he would submit his dissertation shortly after. The disputation was held on the 27 August and the theses Hegel presented and defended on this occasion are here presented in their original Latin and an English translation. In formal terms, the disputation resembled a debate between two teams with Hegel, seconded by Schelling's younger brother Karl who was still a student, on the defending side, and the older Schelling, Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, and another student, Thomas Schwarzott, as the opposing team.⁸

The Jena publisher Prager printed the Latin theses for the disputation in the form of a leaflet and it is to this source and the subsequent reprint by Karl Rosenkranz — as part of his biography *G.W.F. Hegels Leben* (Berlin, 1844), pp. 156-9 — that the modern editions, e.g. *TWA*, vol. II, p. 533, go back. In his edition of Hegel's early writings, Georg Lasson provided a German translation to the Latin original of the theses, and there is now a new translation by Wolfgang Neuser.⁹

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The theses are formulated paradoxically in order to provoke discussion. This characteristic makes it difficult to provide an unambiguous interpretation of the theses and the verdict of Harris on them — 'quite cryptic' (Harris, 1983, p. xxx) — is well justified. The aim of the present edition of the theses is to open up a wider discussion of them and not to pre-empt such a discussion by offering hasty conclusions about their meaning and significance. Thus, the annotated bibliography that follows the translation does not pretend to solve the problem of interpretation, rather, it should be seen as an attempt to bring together various comments on the relation of the theses to wider issues of Hegel's thought, on some parallels between the theses and Hegel's other writings, and on certain allusions to other philosophers.

Karl Rosenkranz suggested a classification of the theses according to their subject matter (Rosenkranz, 1844, p. 156). Although this classification is outdated in some respects, it may still be helpful: theses I and II are said to deal with logic; theses III, IV and V with the philosophy of nature; theses VI, VII, and VIII discuss the concept and scope of philosophy in general; finally, theses IX, X, XI, and XII contribute to the area of practical philosophy.

Notes

1. Compare Hegel's c.v. of 1804, most easily accessible in: G.W.F. Hegel, *Theorie Werkausgabe* (henceforth quoted as *TWA*). In 20 vols ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel (Frankfurt, 1969 ff), vol. II, p. 582 f.

2. Johannes Hoffmeister (ed.), *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung* (Stuttgart, 1936) p. 388. The English translation is quoted from H.S. Harris, *Hegel's development: eight thoughts* (Oxford, 1983), p. xix.

3. *TWA*, vol. II, p. 582. English translation quoted from H.S. Harris, (*Hegel's development*) p. xx.

4. Johannes Hoffmeister and Rolf Flechsig (eds), *Briefe von und an Hegel*, in 4 vols (Hamburg, 1961) vol. I, pp. 58–60.

5. G.W.F. Hegel, *Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie* (Jena, 1801). English translation, under the above title, by H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany, 1977).

6. G.W.F. Hegel, *Dissertatio Philosophica de Orbitis Planetarium* (Jena, 1801); cf. the references to Lasson (1928) and Neuser (1986) in the bibliography.

7. The documents are reproduced in Heinz Kimmerle, 'Dokumente zu Hegels Jenaer Dozententätigkeit (1801–1807)', *Hegel-Studien*, vol. 4 (Bonn, 1967) pp. 21–100.

8. Cf. the Protocol of the Faculty, in Kimmerle 'Dokumente', p. 43.

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The notes of Hegel and Schelling for the disputation have also survived: Hoffmeister (*Dokumente*) pp. 312 ff (Hegel's notes); Wolfgang Neuser (1986) pp. 142–5, 163 (Schelling's notes).

9. Lasson (1928) pp. 404 f; Neuser (1986) pp. 74–7.

Translation

I

Contradictio est regula veri, non conradictio, falsi.

Contradiction is the rule for the truth, non-contradiction for falsehood.

II

Syllogismus est principium Idealismi.

Syllogism is the principle of Idealism.

III

Quadratum est lex naturae, triangulum, mentis.

The square is a law of nature, the triangle [is a law] of the mind.

IV

In Arithmetica vera nec additioni nisi unitatis ad dyadem, nec subtractioni nisi dyadis a triade, neque triadi ut summae neque unitati ut differentiae est locus.

In true arithmetic there is no place for addition other than of unity to a dyad, nor for subtraction other than of a dyad from a triad, nor for the triad as a sum, nor for unity as a difference.

V

Ut magnes est vectis naturalis, ita gravitatio planetarum in solem, pendulum naturae.

Just as the magnet is a natural lever, so the gravitation of the planets to the sun is a pendulum of nature.

VI

Idea est synthesis infiniti et finiti, et philosophia omnis est in ideis.

An idea is the synthesis of the infinite and the finite, and philosophy exists totally [in the sphere of] ideas.

VII

Philosophia critica caret Ideis, et imperfecta est Scepticismi forma.

Critical philosophy lacks ideas and is an imperfect form of Scepticism.

VIII

Materia postulati rationis, quod philosophia critica exhibet, eam ipsam philosophiam destruit, et principium est Spinozismi.

The matter of the postulate of reason, which critical philosophy exhibits, destroys that very philosophy, and is the principle of Spinozism.

IX

Status naturae non est injustus, et eam ob causam ex illo exeundum.

The state of nature is not unjust, and that is why one must depart from it.

X

Principium scientiae moralis est reverentia fato habenda.

The principle of moral science is [the] reverence that should be observed towards fate.

XI

Virtus innocentiam tum agendi tum patiendi excludit.

Virtue excludes innocence of both action and suffering.

XII

Moralitas omnibus numeris absoluta virtuti repugnat.
Morality that is absolute in every respect conflicts with virtue.

At various stages in the preparation of my translation, I consulted the following Latinists and Hegel scholars, who kindly responded to my queries: Dr Jon Edmondson (Dulwich College, London); Prof. H.S. Harris (York University, Toronto); Dr Stephen Hinds (Girton College, Cambridge); Dr David Sedley (Christ's College, Cambridge); Dr David Simpson (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, Münster). While thanking them for their help, the five scholars are absolved from any responsibility for my shortcomings.

Annotated bibliography

Baum, Manfred, *Hegel's philosophische Methode I: Die Entstehung der Hegelschen Dialektik* (Bonn: Bouvier, to appear shortly).

Prof. Baum perceives two allusions in thesis XII: (a) to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, as transmitted by Aristotle (*Metaphysics* 985 B 29; *Magna Moralia* 1182 A 11-14), according to which virtues such as justice are defined as numbers; (b) to Shaftesbury's *Characteristicks* (as edited by J.M. Robertson. In 2 vols London, 1900; vol. I, pp. 90 ff) in which it is stated that 'the men of harmony' are inspired by their 'love of numbers, decency and proportion'. In the context of defining his ideal of balance and measurement — 'the thought of numbers and proportion in a life at large'; *ibid.* vol. I, p. 92, Shaftesbury quotes Horace approvingly: 'Et verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae' (*Epistulae* II. 2, 144). (I am grateful to Prof. Baum for making his typescript available to me prior to publication.

Düsing, Klaus, 'Spekulation und Reflexion. Zur Zusammenarbeit Schellings und Hegels in Jena', *Hegel-Studien*. vol. 5 (1969) pp. 95-128.

Prof. Düsing provides a comprehensive survey of the co-operation between Schelling and Hegel at Jena, a survey which is obviously relevant to our present purposes given the active rôle of Schelling in Hegel's 'Habilitation'.

Haering, Theodor L., *Hegel: Sein Wollen und sein Werk. Eine chronologische Entwicklungs-geschichte der Gedanken und der Sprache Hegels*. In 2 vols (Leipzig, 1929 and 1938) vol. I, pp. 759-62.

In the context of this broad survey, Prof. Haering offers a brief interpretation of the thesis which emphasises continuities with earlier manuscripts.

Theses I and II are seen as reflecting a new study of logic stimulated by Aristotle or Bardili. Theses III, IV, and V are

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described as following Schelling's keen interest in the philosophy of nature. Thesis V, in particular, is related to the mechanics of Hegel's later system (cf. Haering, vol. II, pp. 296 f). Thesis VI is regarded as echoing the 'Systemfragment' of 1800 and as criticising Kant's notion of 'synthesis' with the help of Fichte's and Schelling's discussion of 'idea'. Haering's comments on theses VII and VIII emphasise Hegel's critical perspective on Kant further. Thesis IX is considered to be critical of Hobbes' account of the state of nature, and both thesis IX and thesis XII are said to express Hegel's views on 'ethical life'. Theses X and XI are characterised as condensing principles from Hegel's 'Spirit of Christianity'.

Harris, H.S., *Hegel's Development II: Night Thoughts (Jena, 1801–1806)* (Oxford, 1983) pp. xxx, 18 n, 48 n, 49, 87–9, 125–6, 157–9, 393.

Prof. Harris' comments on the theses are easily the best-informed account of them in English. He provides a summary of the 'Habilitation' procedure (pp. xxx f), and then concentrates on theses III and V, VII and VIII, IX, and X.

Ad thesis III:

The four dimensions of the absolutely resting motion are the 'squareness' of Nature . . . The dimensions of nature are four, three spatial and one temporal; the dimensions of Spirit are but three, the three inner dimensions of time, past, present, and future. (p. 87)

Hegel's thesis about the 'laws' of nature and of mind was formulated in terms of Schelling's Spinozist parallel between thought and extension as equally complete images of the Absolute Identity. Thus each side forms its own order, the order of things and the order of ideas. But the Trinitarian theology makes intelligence more fundamental than nature. Nature was created. Translating this into Spinozist terms, there are two aspects of Nature, and they do not have the same law. The square is only the law of 'natura naturata'; 'natura naturans' is the absolute spirit of the whole, and as such it obeys the law of Spirit even while laying down its own law for the manifest world of natural phenomena. (pp. 158 f)

Cf. Kimmerle (1980) and Schneider (1973 and 1975).

Ad thesis V: Prof. Harris ascribes Hegel's effort 'to bring the mechanical conception of the pendulum under the more organic sway of the concept of magnetism' (p. 88) to the direct influence of Schelling's *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* (1801, Sect. 95, Addition 1).

Ad theses VII and VIII: Hegel's criticism of Kant is spelt out (pp. 48 f).

Ad thesis IX:

The justice of natural ethics is perfect reciprocity. The criminal must suffer what he did. His own inward consciousness of this creates a sense of guilt. Hegel's view that one who is conscious

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of guilt must go on provoking attack until his debt is paid, is one of the most interesting anticipations of modern depth psychology produced by his conception of our universal human nature as an inwardness that must utter itself.

The whole conception of nature as an external fate that is just one's own attitude to the world reflected back upon oneself was developed at Frankfurt and is unchanged here. What is new is the concentration upon the workings of individual fate, and the consequent awareness of how the fear of death dissolves all natural relationships, including the bond of guilt. It is the fact that there is a form of conscious life which does not give way before the fear of death which makes it necessary, in terms of natural justice itself, to pass over to the political condition founded upon a constitution that is publicly established, generally recognized, and impartially maintained. (pp. 125 f)

Ad thesis XII:

That is what the ultimate identity of the Metaphysics, the identity of absolute spirit with absolute matter, asserts too. When we read that 'the simple absolute self-to-self connecting Spirit is the *Aether*, or absolute Matter' [G.W.F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 7, ed. by R.-P. Horstmann and J.H. Trede (Hamburg, 1976) p. 178] we have only to remember that 'absolute Spirit' was first identified as Fichte's practical Ego, in order to see this [*ibid.*, p. 165]. (p. 393)

Hoffmeister, Johannes, *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung* (Stuttgart, 1936) pp. 312–14, 475.

Hegel's notes for the disputation are here published for the first time. These Latin notes are mainly phrases of politeness and gratitude which Hegel might have used during the disputation; they throw no light on the content of the theses. What might be gathered from these notes is the highly formal character of the disputation and its marked absence of spontaneity.

Kimmerle, Heinz, *Dokumente zu Hegels Jenaer Dozententätigkeit (1801–1807)*, *Hegel-Studien*, vol. 4 (1967) pp. 21–99.

This article provides the most extensive and most reliable edition of all surviving documents with regard to the *Habitationsvorgang*' (pp. 28–44). There is also an introduction on the contemporary situation of the University of Jena (pp. 21–7) and further sections deal with Hegel's appointment as professor (pp. 45–52), his lectures at Jena (pp. 53–65), Gabler's report on Hegel's Jena years (pp. 65–73), and Hegel's membership in learned societies (pp. 74 f).

'Hegel's Naturphilosophie in Jena', in *Hegel in Jena*, ed. by Dieter Henrich and Klaus Düsing (Bonn, 1980) pp. 207–15.

Ad thesis III: Prof. Kimmerle sees thesis III in the context of the fragments of Hegel's lecture notes of 1801/2, which will be published in the new critical edition [G.W.F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 5. Edited by M. Baum and K.R. Meist (Hamburg, to appear shortly)].

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For this early stage in Hegel's development, Prof. Kimmerle claims a priority of nature over spirit (p. 207). According to him, the 'square' (*quadratum*) consists of 1) the 'system of sky' (*dem himmlischen System*), i.e. the pure appearance of the idea in its full movement; 2) the 'mechanical' and 3) 'chemical' phenomena (*das Mechanische und das Chemische*); and 4) the 'organic' (*das Organische*) in which the idea returns to its complete structure (pp. 211 f). The 'triangle' (*triangulum*) of spirit on the other hand is said to consist of 1) 'imagination' (*Vorstellung*); 2) 'desire' (*Begierde*); and 3) 'a free people' (*ein freies Volk*).

Lasson, Georg (ed.), G.W.F. Hegel, *Erste Druckschriften* (Leipzig, 1928) pp. XLII, 404–5.

In his edition of Hegel's early writings, Lasson publishes Hegel's theses and provides the first German translation of them. In his introduction (p. XLII), he emphasises Schelling's contribution to the theses: in his view, the theses are more characteristic for the friendship and co-operation of Hegel and Schelling than for the specifically Hegelian way of thinking.

Neuser, Wolfgang (ed.), G.W.F. Hegel, *Dissertatio Philosophica de Orbitis Planetarium, Philosophische Erörterung über die Planetenbahnen*. Bilingual edition, with introduction and commentary (Weinheim, 1986) pp. 176, here pp. 1–6, 74–7, 142–5, 163, 165–76.

In his bilingual edition of Hegel's 'professorial thesis' (*Habilitationschrift*): *De Orbitis Planetarium*, Dr. Neuser also reprints Hegel's theses for the disputation and provides a new German translation of them (pp. 74–7). In his introduction (pp. 1–6), he gives a brief account of the 'Habilitation' procedure (pp. 2–3). Dr. Neuser's edition contains a facsimile, a first transcription, and his own translation of Schelling's Latin notes for the disputation (pp. 142–5). Although the transcription does not appear flawless — given their content, I am unconvinced that the notes refer to thesis VII as Dr. Neuser assumes on the basis of a doubtful reading of the figure '7' at the beginning of the manuscript — Dr. Neuser must be given credit for making this document available to the scholarly community. A brief note on Schelling's manuscript draws attention to certain parallels with Schelling's published work: 'Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie', *Zeitschrift für speculative Physik*. vol. I, No. 2 (1802) pp. 63 f. There is also a good bibliography on the relevant period of Hegel's development, the writings of his contemporaries, and Hegel's possible sources (pp. 165–76).

Pöggeler, Otto, *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Freiburg and München, 1973) pp. 141 f.

Ad theses VI and VII: Prof. Pöggeler places theses VI and VII in a developmental account of Hegel. According to his view, the last manuscript of Hegel's years at Frankfurt (G.W.F. Hegel, *Theologische Jugendschriften*, edited by Hermann Nohl (Tübingen, 1907) p. 146) does reveal the intention of transforming a theological inquiry into the relationship of the finite and infinite into a metaphysical inquiry. Soon after, Hegel is convinced that metaphysics alone can succeed in raising the finite to the infinite. Thesis VI is an expression of this

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conviction. That the reference to the 'idea' has to be seen as an acceptance of older metaphysical positions and implies a criticism of Kant can be taken from thesis VII. As further support for his view, Prof. Pöggeler quotes a passage from an early lecture of Hegel in which Hegel speaks of 'recreating the oldest old' (*das älteste Alte wiederherzustellen*) and of 'burying the non-philosophy of recent times' (*die neueren Zeiten der Unphilosophie begraben*). (The passage can be found in Karl Rosenkranz (1844) p. 192).

Rosenkranz, Karl, *G.W.F. Hegels Leben* (Berlin, 1844) pp. 156–9.

Apart from suggesting a classification of Hegel's theses (cf. Introduction), Rosenkranz provides a few notes the more important of which will now be summarised.

Ad thesis I: Rosenkranz presents Wolff's views on identity as Hegel's starting-point: every definition has to exclude the opposite of the defined object. Contrary to the apparent meaning of the thesis, according to Rosenkranz, Hegel never denied Wolff's view, but felt the need to go beyond it. The difference is as essential for the comprehension of the whole as the identity which Wolff had insisted upon. The truth cannot exist without its opposite, but it is also the negation of the opposite. The underlying principle seems to be derived from Spinoza's '*Verum est index sui et falsi*' (*Ethics*, Part II, 43). In Rosenkranz's opinion, the stimulus which induced Hegel to go with Spinoza beyond Wolff is essentially Kantian.

Ad thesis II: again, Rosenkranz regards Hegel's thesis as a consequence of Kant's philosophy — especially the threefold nature of Kant's categories — of Fichte's deduction — with its thesis, antithesis, and synthesis — and of the implicit syllogism of Schelling. Hegel's achievement is characterised as showing the necessity of syllogism.

Ad thesis III: Rosenkranz directs his readers' attention to Baader and Plato as Hegel's most probable sources. The 'square' (*quadratum*) of nature is said to consist of fire and water, earth and air. The 'triangle' of spirit is called 'truly Platonic' (*ächt Platonisch*) in so far as it echoes the threefold structure of Plato's *Republic*.

Ad thesis V: the contrast between a natural lever and a natural pendulum is drawn in order to distinguish between immanent and external movement.

Ad thesis IX: once again, Hegel is said to extend rather than to oppose the view of a predecessor, in this case Thomas Hobbes. The state of nature is only the possibility of positing 'just' and 'unjust'; the will must leave its natural character behind and thus constitute 'justice' and its 'opposite'. The thesis is then related to Hegel's later criticism of the presupposition of a state of nature. Cf. Tuschling (1987).

Rosenkranz, Karl, 'Hegels ursprüngliches System 1798–1806', *Literarhistorisches Taschenbuch*, edited by R.E. Prutz, vol. II (1844) pp. 157–64. This actually appeared in September 1843; cf. Schneider (1975, pp. 135–7). Rosenkranz' article is subsequently referred to as '1844a'.

In this article, Rosenkranz publishes a fragment which may throw light on thesis III. For details, see Schneider (1975).

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Schneider, Helmut, 'Zur Dreiecks-Symbolik bei Hegel', *Hegel-Studien*, vol. 8 (1973) pp. 55–77. 'Anfänge der Systementwicklung Hegels in Jena', *Hegel-Studien*, vol. 10 (1975) pp. 133–71.

Ad thesis III: in his 1975 article, Dr. Schneider presents and discusses Hegel's so-called 'divine triangle' fragment, a manuscript first published by Rosenkranz (1844a) and which has been lost since then. For an English translation, with notes, see: Harris (1983) pp. 184–8.

Dr. Schneider provides an analysis of the text, a survey of the relevant secondary literature, and a critical discussion of Hegel's sources with special reference to Plato (pp. 134 ff) and various modern authorities (Baader, pp. 143 f; Böhme, pp. 159 ff; Schelling, pp. 164 f; Goethe, pp. 167 f; and others). The details of this article go beyond the scope of the present inquiry, but the fragment it presents shows reflections on the triangle as '*lex mentis*' which resemble thesis III. In a more general sense — as revealing Hegel's interest in triangles and squares as representations of the philosophy of spirit and nature respectively — the same holds true for an otherwise unrelated drawing in Hegel's literary estate which is edited and annotated in Dr. Schneider's earlier article (1973).

Tuschling, Burkhard, 'Reason, Actuality, and Ethical Life', article circulated at the 1986 meeting of the HSGB (to appear in 1987). (I am grateful to Prof. Tuschling for making his article available to me prior to its publication.)

Ad thesis IX: the decisive claim of Prof. Tuschling's lucid analysis is that thesis IX documents the last step towards Hegel's concept of 'ethical life' (*Sittlichkeit*). In this context, Hegel's relations to Hobbes and Kant are carefully examined.

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PREFACE

The focus of this study is the social and political, and to a lesser extent the moral and metaphysical, thinking of an informal school of philosophy which had a clearly ascertainable and relatively well-defined impact on British academic life as well as a more diffuse influence on British public opinion, social practice and policy-making for two or three decades prior to World War I. Such recent works as Peter Clarke's Liberals and Social Democrats and Peter Gordon's and John White's Philosophers as Educational Reformers indicate an awakening of interest in the latter dimension of British Hegelianism. The present work has something to say about the "social gospel" of British Hegelianism; but it is primarily concerned with the sources of British Hegelian thinking, the lines of its development and intellectual relationships among members of the "school."

It is not a study of British Idealism, nor of neo-Hegelianism in Britain. Although the British Hegelians are sometimes referred to as neo-Hegelians, this is, strictly speaking, a misnomer. I would argue that neo-Hegelianism, like neo-Marxism, is a comparatively recent development and that both are products of the "young Marx" industry, that vast and still growing enterprise - mainly but by no means exclusively European - dedicated to exhaustive research into vormarz Germany, Left, Right and Centre Hegelians, all their antecedents, Rousseau, Sturm und Drang and Scottish Enlightenment, and of course everything that Kant, Fichte and Hegel ever wrote. In addition, this work has expanded its range of sources to include twentieth century Marxians who pioneered the move "back to Hegel," such as Gramsci and Lukacs. The present intense and widespread interest in Hegel centres on his phenomenology and his earlier writings rather than on the logic and the later writings which engaged the attention of the British Hegelians.

There are very few British Hegelians of the old school left, either writing philosophy or in positions of academic influence. G.R.G. Mure, who recently retired as Warden of Merton College, Oxford, must be one of the last. I do not know enough about the current state of affairs at Scottish, Commonwealth or American universities to comment further about any Hegelian remnant in the professoriat. But certainly the fascination with Hegelian ontology is generally considered regrettable and as remote and difficult to comprehend as the Victorian crisis of religious doubt which first occasioned it.

As for British Idealism, it has a distinct history running from the Cambridge Platonists through Coleridge to Collingwood - and beyond. This stream of thought was for a time swept along by strong Kantian and Hegelian currents before returning to its characteristically English meanderings.

Unless otherwise indicated in the text, "idealism" and "idealist" are here used to refer to philosophical idealism.

In footnotes on their first being introduced, I have provided brief biographical sketches of the principal British Hegelians and of minor figures whose labours in some way, however small, paved the way for Hegel's entry into British philosophy. Some others have received the same treatment because, even though peripheral to Hegelianism, they are important in other contexts, but their names may be unfamiliar to the general reader - if such can be found for a work of this nature.

In chapters 10 and 11 I have quoted fairly liberally from McTaggart's Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, because it is, compared to Green's Principles of Political Obligation, Bradley's Ethical Studies or Bosanquet's Philosophical Theory of the State, difficult to come by either in whole or in part.

The bibliography includes a chronologically ordered list of English translations of Hegel's writings.

This book began in 1963-64 as a doctoral dissertation at the London School of Economics and Political Science. I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Professor Elie Kedourie for his supervision and guidance of my graduate work at LSE, while entering the customary disclaimer on his behalf with respect to any errors, omissions or lapses herein, for which, of course, he bears no responsibility whatever.

After being submitted as the written requirement for a doctorate from the University of London in 1966, this work lay untouched until the summer of 1980. As a result, considerable re-thinking has occurred and extensive re-writing has been necessary. The process began with my first year of university teaching, and I thank the 1967-68 honours political science class at the University of Victoria for a profound "learning experience." In particular, I would express my appreciation to Garry Curtis for his friendship, counsel and unfailing belief that something would come of my labours on Green, Bradley, Bosanquet and the rest. Two former colleagues at the University of Victoria, Richard Powers and Mark Sproule-Jones, have continued to encourage me in this and other scholarly endeavours.

Over the years of The British Hegelians' gestation, birth, limbo and rebirth, my parents have assisted in a variety of ways. In addition to their financial aid, my mother has typed the thing at least once, and my father has given me the benefit of knowledge gained from his long and scholarly devotion to nineteenth century English literature.

Of all those who have had to put up with the "thing," the one who has borne the brunt from first to last and who deserves first prize for tolerance and good humour - and for timely prodding - is my wife, Juliet. A more than honourable mention goes to my three children.

Latterly, as publication deadlines approached and pressure mounted for the final revision, my colleagues on the staff of Hansard have suffered my abstracted air and mutterings about obscure fragments of British cultural history. Two of them, Jo-Anne Brookman and David Greer, have devoted many hours of their own time to helping me with the production of final copy.

ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been used for works cited often:

Bosanquet, Bernard	<u>The Philosophical Theory of the State</u> , 4th edition <u>The Principle of Individuality and Value</u>	<u>PTS</u> <u>PIV</u>
Bradley, F.H.	<u>Collected Essays</u> <u>Ethical Studies</u> , 2nd edition	<u>CE</u> <u>ES</u>
Green, T.H.	<u>Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation</u> , 1941 reprint <u>Prolegomena to Ethics</u> , 5th edition	<u>PPO</u> <u>PE</u>
McTaggart, J.McT.E.	<u>Studies in Hegelian Cosmology</u> <u>Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic</u>	<u>SHC</u> <u>SHD</u>



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INTRODUCTION

For the principle in system is not the simple exclusion of all that does not fit, but the perpetual re-establishment of coherence.

Oakeshott, Introduction
to Leviathan, xv

The Hegelian Enterprise

There has always been a substantial body of philosophical opinion which has felt that the coming of Hegel to Britain was like the introduction of some exotic foreign drug designed to confound native clarity and common sense. During the little more than a century of the English-speaking world's cognizance of Hegelian philosophy there has been one period, dating roughly from the 1880s to World War I, when those who felt otherwise prevailed. From shortly after World War I until very recently Hegel has been the object of Anglo-Saxon suspicion or disdain.¹ The reasons for this disfavour were not quite the same as those which operated in the middle years of the nineteenth century. Very few twentieth century philosophers have cared to condemn Hegel as irreligious, although some British Hegelians "defected" on some such ground. Neither individualist ethics nor existentialist Christianity has been aimed directly against the Hegelian version of idealism - although they have detracted from its influence. Accusations of political reaction, immorality and Greater German nationalism have all been thoroughly discredited - though not eliminated. Charges of bad logic and overweening metaphysics have had to be laid with increasing care and circumspection, and have, more often than not, completely misfired.

The basis for such charges has been, primarily, the dualist or realist view of the world. This is the metaphysical foundation which gives the positivist and empiricist opposition to idealism its force and penetration. It goes to the very core of Hegelian philosophy and it has been the most trenchant and enduring criticism of it. The opposing monism, philosophical materialism, languishes as low as does philosophical idealism. After all, the view that mind and matter, or mind and body, are two separate kinds of ultimately irreducible stuff which somehow interact is the obvious and commonsense one.

A fully and finally satisfactory explanation of mind-body interaction remains an elusive goal. C.D. Broad has distinguished 17 possible theories of the relationship between mind and matter. Some would say that a solution to this hoary problem is inherently impossible and content themselves with the dogmatic assertion that mind and body obviously do interact and that there is no more one can meaningfully say on the subject. Others would say that everyday linguistic usage talks about a dualistic world, and that that is sufficient. However, most dualists continue to seek for an explanation of interaction, usually on the basis of some

¹ In the fourteenth edition of Bertrand Russell's A History of Western Philosophy (New York, 1964) Hegel is still labelled an "enemy of analysis" (p. 744), and his unity of thought and being, in the guise of the theory of internal relations, "a mistake, and from this mistake arose the whole imposing edifice of his system." To which, characteristically, Russell adds: "This illustrates an important truth, namely, that the worse your logic, the more interesting the consequences to which it gives rise" (p. 746).

analogy which indicates the kind of thing that might occur, or which suggests a possible way of looking at instances of interaction between mind and body. Such analogies are frequently drawn from natural science, particularly from physics, in which a certain class of phenomena may require two contrary sets of explanation in order to account for all its observable behaviour - for example, the wave and corpuscular theories of light. Rarely does a contemporary philosopher attempt to reduce one of the interacting "stuffs" to the other, certainly not matter into mind. Experience would seem to guarantee the independent existence of a world of matter external to our minds. Yet it is precisely experience upon which the philosophical idealist such as Hegel has always taken his stand.

An examination of experience as a progressive development from sense-certainty to self-conscious reason shows, according to Hegel, that the external world is the product of mind, and that mind must so externalize itself. The identity of matter and mind is both the ground and the result of a continuous process of diremption and reunion. The end is implicit at the outset of any journey of experience undertaken by any consciousness, but it cannot be deduced a priori. The categories of thought are proved only in the continuing effort to order experience through them. One must reduce the flow of impressions impinging on one's consciousness - channelling, diverting, sifting and storing. This cannot be done without mental equipment. But the "forms" which mould our experience, while pre-established, are part of the flow of experience and, indeed, a late development. By themselves they are an abstraction, a skeleton without flesh or breath of life. The design of the force which draws things out and makes them manifest is not for us to posit; it is in and for us to create. Creating it is a process in space and time occupied by self-conscious human beings. There are still some things which we have not, for better or worse, created. However, nothing is inherently inexplicable, and if it can be grasped in and for itself, if its structure and principle can be understood, then it can be re-created, if only in thought. The process of re-creation was, for Hegel, contemplative, not active - for Marx, the signal failure of philosophical idealism. Hegel regarded his philosophy as the beginning of the end of the process whereby self-conscious reason brought "home" to the world the spirit of what it was and what it had done: thought would be adequate to being; mind would penetrate matter and there find forms of self-expression.

The logic of the process lies in the experience of it and only there. The Hegelian principle of identity is an identity-in-difference. In other words, it recognizes the externally related, the contingent and the accidental for what they are: real experiences. The unceasing efforts of many minds to establish non-contingent relations among the various elements of their combined experience produce results, although they also produce fresh dissonance and incoherence. The effort is always renewed and, in spite of losses, its results are cumulative. The ultimate identity of mind and its products, nature and history, is the absolute presupposition of our acquiring any grasp whatsoever of the world as we experience it.

Hegel has sometimes been said to be no philosophical idealist, because of his apparent disinterest in the problem of knowledge.² For one thing, he did not ask himself the epistemological question posed by such important predecessors as Berkeley, Hume and Kant: how can my sensations yield knowledge of whatever it is which occasions them? I am only aware of my own sensations and reflections on them, and I have no assurance that the sensations and reflections conveyed to me by others can confirm anything other than themselves, i.e. be evidence for the existence of others, because they are only further sensations of mine. A collapse into solipsism is the reductio ad absurdum of subjective idealism, and many who have followed that course have provoked an extreme reaction, even in their own thought, towards "radical publicism."³ That sort of internal dialectic - the probing of the limits of a certain

² A.C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 3rd ed. (London, 1961), ch. 2, esp. pp. 60-62.

³ J.N. Findlay, "The contemporary relevance of Hegel," Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (New York, 1972), p. 15.

line of argument by pushing it until it breaks down - was for Hegel the pursuit of truth. It is a method he made peculiarly his own in his analysis of any set of propositions about any area of experience, or thought about experience. Hegel's own starting point was the actual, living stream of experience, what the pragmatist William James called a "blooming, buzzing confusion." There is nothing outside our experience - until we start analyzing it, as we must. The problem of the existence of an external world is what we might call an academic one. No one not a lunatic behaves as if it did not exist. Theoretically, its existence is a useful hypothesis for a number of purposes, including the pursuit of natural science. But reality is to be found in the ebb and flow of experience, and in the dialectical turning of our experiences inside out and upside down. What we seek is not verification of this, that or the other thing, but an order and coherence in our experiences which will satisfy, among other things, the quest for truth.

Kant posited a transcendental schema, the synthetic unity of the manifold of apperceptions, as the ground of our knowledge of a causally related, spatially and temporally ordered phenomenal world. He retained, however, a world of things-in-themselves, inaccessible to the human mind. What the mind can know of an external, phenomenal world is the result of a degree of self-activity inconceivable to any empiricist philosopher. But Kant's philosophy is firmly dualist. The a priori conceptions apply only to sense data. They can yield no knowledge of a supersensible world; they are tied to sense-perception. The mind interacts with an external world which is an inexplicable noumenon. Essential reality, the thing-in-itself, eludes the mind because it is not adequate to the task of penetrating that reality which lies behind the phenomenal world. The pure forms of space and time are the rational, a priori framework within which the world of contingent phenomena necessarily moves, and without which we could have no experience whatsoever. They are not only the means whereby order and coherence are created in our experience. They are the sine qua non of experience. This framework, this schema is supplied by the understanding in conjunction with sense-perception. In addition, there are pure ideas - categories such as causality - which, when schematized by the infusion of empirical knowledge (i.e. knowledge given under the forms of space and time), further order our experience. These, again, only give substantive knowledge in conjunction with what is derived from sense-perception. They have a further regulative function, but in themselves they can contribute nothing to our knowledge of the external world. Even as regulative, they cannot be projected beyond experience without creating irresolvable antinomies. Only for the practical or moral reason can a pure idea have substantive status. The external world is both conception and perception, the conception empty without sense data, the perception shaped entirely by the conceptual framework.

Hegel contended that Kant's transcendental unity of apperceptions yielded merely subjective knowledge, with no guarantee of objective truth. He began with the assumption that we can know reality, that we are capable of knowing everything. The object is in thought as it is in reality, because reality is thought. This is no mere play upon words. Hegel meant that the categories of thought are those of reality. They are logically prior to reality externalized as nature and history, but knowing them is a moment of advanced self-consciousness, which is a product of that process of self-development and self-expression which the world as an idea must have gone through in order for us to have the sort of experience we, as human beings, do have. From reality being a species of self-consciousness it does not follow that truth is merely subjective or a product of introspection. On the contrary, from self-conscious reason being reflected in reality it follows that the truth about ourselves may be found in the world we have created and re-created. A journey into inner space must eventually become a journey into outer space. It begins and ends in common space, and each connection made is an intimation of cosmic necessity. In becoming aware of its own implications, the human mind explicates the whole of reality. It is a necessary presupposition of knowledge that reality is a thought process. It is equally necessary, in order that mind know itself as reality, that it externalize itself in the worlds of nature and human history.

The effort to understand the external world is mind's coming into its own. It must take in - literally comprehend - everything before it can affirm the identity of mind and matter, the underlying spirituality of the universe. The bare assertion of that identity is not sufficient; in fact, it is quite erroneous. The knowledge of physics, chemistry, engineering, animal husbandry, history - each in and for itself, each according to its own peculiar method and conforming to its own criteria of truth and adequacy - is necessary to that full self-knowledge which is the actualization of the spiritual principle of reality. One cannot evade the "patient toil of the negative."

In spite of Hegel's vehement opposition to any reduction of the universe to undifferentiated spirit, his positivist and realist critics persist in attacking him for disregarding essential distinctions, above all that between mind and an external world of matter or bodies in space and time. He certainly regarded the universe, the totality of things, as fundamentally spiritual in nature, and he did attempt to trace a progressive spiritual development in nature - with some rather absurd results from the point of view of the natural scientist. But he was certainly not purporting to construct nature a priori or deduce the whole of natural science from purely rational principles, as many of his critics have suggested. He set out to describe a fully intelligible world, one in which nothing is left out or disconnected, in which everything can be explained in terms of everything else because all is rational - there is nothing which the mind cannot penetrate and there discover a reflection of itself.

This world of Hegel's was neither an article of faith nor a mystical vision; it was the necessary outcome of finding the key to the understanding of the external world in self-consciousness. Self-consciousness was for Hegel the archetype of identity-in-difference. It was the perfect example, because the ultimate source, of the reconciliation of apparently irreconcilable contradictories.

If one were to alter the terms of the duality of mind and body and refer to them as subject and object, one would get a clue to Hegel's identification of them. The self is both the subject and the object of introspection. While one cannot jump out of one's skin and examine one's self as one would any external object, one can examine oneself objectively as if one were someone else as well as oneself. However, this does not seem at first sight to have much bearing upon the problem of the mind-body relationship. The mind, after all, is not a material object; and there are a large number of material objects without minds - and even more without self-consciousness. Hegel's approach to this problem was to point out that self-consciousness depends upon the same opposition of subject and object as does the consciousness of anything in the external world. Consciousness of self requires the objectification of self. Conversely, the consciousness of an external object requires that one somehow find oneself in that object. The object is and remains external; but in the process of coming to understand it, the mind sees it less and less as an alien object and more and more as a familiar and integral part of an expanding world of experience. At the stage of philosophy, the full spirituality of the object becomes explicit. However, the stage of sheer externality is not abolished. It is sufficient for natural science and practical life; and it is necessary for self-consciousness: the self becomes conscious of itself only in contradistinction to what is not itself, the external world of things and other selves. In the process of coming to full self-consciousness, the self brings with it the not-self, which it at first regards as something in bare opposition to itself.

The culmination of this process is a system of knowledge in which, although the sum is self-consciousness, every stage traversed in reaching it is preserved in it. Self-consciousness would not be full self-consciousness if it did not include the inevitable moments of diremption and duality. It was these moments of the self faced by an alien, irreducible other, rather than the introspective habit of standing outside oneself, that Hegel was referring to when he talked about self-objectification.

In talking about mind, Hegel was talking about any individual mind as a moment in the totality of human minds past and present. Self-consciousness is an individual thing; but even at its lowest level, that of sense-certainty, the germ of universal objective mind is at work. Self-consciousness can be consciousness of self only because the self is shared; each is a manifestation of intersubjective mind, and even the self's most individual characteristics derive from shared experience.

Our experience is neither an undifferentiated datum nor a series of data, nor is it "formed" in a synthetic a priori fashion as it is in Kant's transcendentalism. For a proper understanding of it, Hegel renovated an ancient notion which had fallen into considerable disgrace with the rise of modern science and mechanistic philosophy. This was Aristotle's theory of causation, particularly of the final cause or telos. What shapes and directs any process is its immanent or built-in purpose - its genetic code, to use a metaphor drawn from twentieth century science. It has to be remembered that this is only a metaphor, because Hegel has been all too easily made the butt of such stale anti-Aristotelian jokes as the one that the apple fell because of its inner drive, or conatus, to strike Newton on the head and initiate a chain of reasoning to produce the law of universal gravitation. The Hegelian version would be that a particular phase of the human experience was characterized by, among other things, looking at falling objects in a new light. There was a shift in intellectual vision, which was increasingly informed by an atomistic conception of matter in motion. Men of affairs as well as men of science conceived of the whole world as "push" because that afforded both an explanation which was simple yet cognitively powerful and an unprecedented degree of control over external forces. A new way of ordering experience emerged; and whatever it might have to say about physical causation, its own emergent structure was anything but fortuitous. It was the product not just of many minds, but also of many currents of thought. It was both cause and consequence of a new world view, whose most comprehensive, far-reaching and systematic expression was to be found in the philosophy of Hobbes. Like its representative philosophical expression, this confluence of ideas had its own "centripetal force" drawing into itself "numberless currents of thought, contemporary and historic."⁴

Explaining Hegel's (or any other) philosophy metaphorically can be misleading, especially in Hegel's case, because of his deliberate eschewal of the imagery of art and religion. Nevertheless, here is yet another metaphor: Hegel's history of philosophy is itself a philosophy. His account of how certain thinkers thought is part of the plan to whose unfolding those thinkers contributed. The end or final cause of all human activity is a fully self-conscious philosophy, one which knows the necessity of each particular in the implementation of the plan of the world. The plan, however, is neither a blueprint nor an oracle; it is an evolving hierarchy of being as experienced by all men. Philosophy may understand better than any other mode of experience what has happened and why, but its comprehension grows with the growth of experience as a whole. Philosophy is the most self-conscious fibre of being, but it is part of the natural history of being from rocks to religion. It is implicit in the life of each human being that he or she seek to make a distinctive contribution to the human experience of Being.⁵ The integrating element is spirit at work in the world - or in New Testament language, logos, the word of God incarnate.

⁴ Michael Oakeshott, Introduction to Hobbes' Leviathan (Oxford, 1960), p. xii.

⁵I have tried to resist the creeping capitalization of philosophical terms, if only because Hegelianism has long been the chief offender in the eyes of those who take strong exception to the use of capitals to confer undeserved grandeur upon concepts. However, in this case at least, without capitalization confusion could arise. By Dasein, Hegel meant determinate being, which is pure being in a perpetual motion of becoming what it is not. What it is, is nothing. It must continuously negate itself in order to break itself up into determinate things, to acquire properties and qualities, to be something.

It was with the world spirit that Hegel sought to overcome Kant's dualism and the unknowable reality beyond the reach of human experience and conception. World spirit signifies more in Hegel's philosophy than common reason, but it is essentially, in all its meanings, a rational principle. The Hegelian term Geist can be translated as mind or as spirit, spirit being a higher and fuller level of mind; mind has more strictly intellectual connotations. Spirit is realized in art and religion as well as philosophy. In the Hegelian system philosophy is the crown of this trinity and can conceive what the emotive and aesthetic modes of experience cannot - that is, their respective roles and relations to the rest of experience. In addition to its place in the hierarchy of being as the highest form of self-conscious intellectual activity, philosophy is also the fullest expression of that rational principle which ensures the human capacity to "grasp" the world. As we now know, the whole world, the totality of things, is only explicable as the unfolding of what is, in human terms, the rational. While great play has been made during the past 150 years of the spirit of the age and similar notions which attempt to formulate the phenomena of the collective psyche, none of it truly addresses Hegel's philosophical problem. It was conceived in psychological terms only insofar as his phenomenology offered a descriptive analysis of recognizable psychological types. But they are treated primarily as logical types, in much the same sort of way that classical theorists of the social contract treated the state of nature. Hegel's purpose was philosophical: to explain the necessary forms of human experience; not to show how this or that historical form of social consciousness, politics or artistic endeavour embodied this or that idea.

Between various prototypes of psycho-history and Marx's historical materialism, the exact nature of the Hegelian enterprise has been obscured. One of the things that historical materialists (Marxist and non-Marxist) have been doing with increasing diligence since the 1960s is reading their antecedents backwards, i.e. from Marx to Hegel. One of the things they have discovered is that there is still a lot left on the agenda of Hegel's phenomenology, and that we are still wrestling with the contradictions of what Hegel called "the unhappy consciousness." As Charles Taylor has said in response to a question first posed by Benedetto Croce in 1907 - What is living and what is dead in the philosophy of Hegel? - Hegel's ontology may be a dead letter, but his account of modern man's predicament is as vital as ever.⁶ Can we be at home in a world which is partly of our own making? Our making it is no protection against our being alienated from it - quite the contrary - and we have a collective propensity to rationalize what we have made, in the sense of finding reasons for that which has always been, or has become, bereft of any rational basis. Marx's theory of alienation and the false consciousness of capitalist society is the best-known elaboration of these ideas. Again, Hegel's distinctive purpose can be lost sight of. By inverting Hegel's conception of freedom, Marx thought he could project the final act of human emancipation onto the stage of history; the realization of rationality could become a plan of political action. For Hegel, true freedom lay in knowing that the freedom of all must be. Unfortunately for the unfree - and that includes everyone in various ways and to varying degrees - the idea of freedom cannot be imposed on events, nor can its actualization be foreseen. Anyone can now be free to the extent that he or she knows "what it's all about" and can reconcile his or her own self-realization with the general scheme of things. It's basically a question of finding one's identity and one's self-respect in the world as it is. What one finds are a lot of other individuals and groups who have sought or are seeking self-realization. To seek self-realization is to participate in the adventure of human reason, the most self-conscious moment in the spirit of the world. In quasi-religious fashion, Hegel depicts self-realization as a kind of self-abnegation. The self to be realized is always more than oneself. One finds a lot of what one is meant to be in interests and experiences which appear to be outside oneself.

It is important, in discussing Hegel on self-realization and the need for wholeness in our

⁶ See Charles Taylor, Hegel (London, 1975), esp. ch. 20.

experience, not to attach too much weight to the prescriptive aspect and religious overtones of self-realization. For one thing, Hegel's philosophy was in part a reaction against the Romantic philosophers' holy war against the prevailing rationalism and materialism of the eighteenth century Enlightenment. The campaign's chief architect was Herder, who aimed at nothing less than a new science of man in the manner of Vico, based on the conception of man as a being who created, identified and established himself in the world, within each sub-group of humanity, in a variety of unique ways. Such ways lay in and through the development of diverse forms of linguistic and artistic expression. The attack, as it gathered momentum, culminating in the leadership of Fichte, was directed as much against constricting social and political forms as it was against rationalist culture. It sought a revolution in consciousness which would both complement and control the overthrow of the ancien régime. With Fichte it went even further, positing a moral will independent of everything else, an eternal categorical imperative to make the world over - the success of which endeavour would be self-destructive. Hegel accepted the need to rediscover spirituality in nature - to, if nothing else, see nature as a medium for human self-expression - but he rejected the increasingly central role in human experience assigned by the Romantics to a schwarmerei of moral indignation and mystical communion with nature. His basic objection to the radical freedom preached by Fichtean and so-called liberal nationalists was that it claimed too much for subjectivity in opposition to the world as structured by Enlightenment philosophy, and it entailed a "bad infinity." That is to say, Romantic idealism posed a good will in endless opposition to whatever was recalcitrant to it, in the impossible - and therefore morally corrupting - pursuit of the elimination of the contingent and the conventional. The proper conception of infinity, says Hegel, is circular. Self-realization rightly conceived is a search for oneself in the world which returns to oneself. The end is in the beginning; but the fulfilment occurs in and through the joys and sorrows, the enrichment and the loss of the intervening journey. Moreover, no matter how far one might soar above them, one cannot dispense with the "cake of custom" and social routine.

It bears repeating that Hegel's basic objective was metaphysical rather than moral: to demonstrate the necessary unity in diversity of the world; to overcome division between subject and object, between man and nature, between values and facts, because the world spirit demands it. The identity of identity and non-identity cannot be merely asserted, willed or projected; it has to be rationally explicated. However, it cannot be done by the kind of reasoning which is employed in either pure or applied science. This is designed to separate the human mind, as a disembodied set of rules, from the matter which it probes and manipulates, and it is well suited to its appointed purpose. Hegel terms this mode of reasoning Verstand (understanding), and distinguishes it very carefully from Vernunft (reason). The latter is the method and the result - the one implicit in the other - of the mind in search of ultimate explanations, of that reflection on experience which mediates (overcomes without discarding) the consciousness of diremption in nature and human history.

Hegel's vision of the identity of the autonomous individual with the rational plan for the world and everything in it was both logical and historical. The logic without the history was timeless, immutable truth, but entirely abstract. In order that spirit may be fully realized, mankind must "work it out." This means experiencing all the lower and more or less distorted forms of consciousness en route to the recovery of primitive unity. Of course, there are worlds of difference between the innocence of original man and the experience of self-conscious, reflective man. Going no further back than the unself-conscious harmony of Periclean Athens:

"From the felicity of 'substantiality' ('so sind sie-so leben sie') the Western consciousness must endure its historical saeculum of 'alienation' or 'bifurcation.' However, this is the charge of freedom."⁷

⁷ G.A. Kelly, Idealism, Politics and History (Cambridge, 1969), p. 325.

The philosophical anthropology which Hegel inherited from Kant was moralistic. Kant was primarily concerned to make room for man as a free moral agent in a world of external causation. He also explored the notion that the nexus of man and his world and the way to grasp reality lay in the aesthetic sense, that the model of truth is artistic appreciation of significant and therefore satisfying form. As with the self-legislating moral will, Kant owed much of the inspiration for his ideal human character to Rousseau's various attempts to construct an "image" of the good man - the self-possessed, self-directed person. Kant sought a ratiocinative conception of that form of individual human freedom for which Goethe and Schiller provided primarily literary expressions. Rousseau's Emile, especially the first part, is devoted to the cultivation of a sensibility which is part aesthetic, part moralistic. Emile's education is designed to produce an individual immune to "the historical pattern of corruption" by inculcating "the rhythm of the human heart."⁸ The natural goodness of man - the residue of which may be found in agricultural village life - is a pleasing prospect. However, it cannot be recaptured, and sterner stuff than flights of literary fancy is required to make men moral: something both artistic and political, and therefore coercive; a quasi-divine, supernatural act of constitutional creation. Rousseau's political writings contain many strictures on fine art and the cultivation of feelings for their own sake. The crux of his objections was the classical republican commandment against poetry as a threat to civic virtue. In Kant's case, the antinomies of practical reason - the logic of the moral will - remain unresolved by the critique of judgment, so that we are left with the unconditional and unconditioned will to good as the most authentic expression of humanity. To be a true subject and not an object one must will the good, because the only intrinsically, independently good thing is the good will. The problem of autonomous, self-directed moral action, as it presented itself to Hegel, was to retain such freedom while avoiding the pitfalls of, on the one hand, amorphous feelings of goodwill - an intense sort of bonhomie - and the morality of impulse, and on the other, the impotence of a will to good which cannot achieve anything in the real world of human desires and needs without compromising its autonomy. Hegel's solution, the concept of Sittlichkeit (roughly translatable as social ethics), was a political one.

Sittlichkeit is not the set of values by which political life in the rational state can be judged. But it closely approaches that higher form of life by overcoming the inadequacy of the Kantian ethic - the highest achievement in its sphere - through an act of Hegelian mediation. It cancels and preserves the contradictions inherent in Moralität; it does not deny them. Similarly, the rational state "sublates" Sittlichkeit. The distinguishing feature of Sittlichkeit is that it is a set of internalized rules, which exist independently of the self-legislating subject. However, they have been freely internalized and are therefore not something set over against the subject. The political subject of the rational state, which expresses its rationality to a very high degree through the conduct of its citizens according to Sittlichkeit, is a subject in the sense of being a self-directed member of his community. Short of being a philosophical sort of person, a Platonic visionary, or a member of that "universal class" of higher civil servants whose function it is to understand the ethos of the community and its place in the unfolding of world spirit, the citizen of a well-governed state with good laws lives at the peak of human achievement. Furthermore, he obeys positive laws and social conventions, and not the golden rule of Jesus Christ or William Godwin. Hegel purported to find his standard of the rational state in what was actually happening around him, in the laws which were in place and in the political reforms which were in process. The underlying rationality of all that is actually happening is difficult to explain without falling into the trap of either the Whig interpretation of history or the simple-minded positivism that whatever is, is right. The conceptual device which allowed Hegel to demonstrate - to his own satisfaction at least - the historical reality of the rational was the teleological argument which Kant explored at length in his Critique of Judgment, found wanting and discarded.

⁸ Ibid., p. 45.

CHAPTER 1

Idealist Political Theory and the Victorian Frame of Mind

The idea that nature is the result of a diremption within the world spirit is an unnecessary mystification for those who do not share Hegel's preoccupation with the rational ordering of all experience. There is, however, one area of human experience which lends itself particularly well to a Hegelian explanation - the social and the political. Here we are faced with an external world which everyone must to some extent agree is a product of the human mind. Just as the world of natural phenomena is, says Hegel, an externalization necessary to full self-consciousness, so is the world of custom and law. The crucial difference is that the human spirit is more deeply involved, more self-conscious and more purposive in the life of organized political society.

At this point we need to remind ourselves of the potential for misconceiving the spirituality which Hegel discovered in the world and all its doings as a sort of gnosticism. Hegel was talking about a necessary process of self-knowledge. It is a process of self-realization in that sense, as much as it is self-fulfilment. In explicating Hegel's political thought, we should think in terms of the dialectical, teleological mode of thinking which he called Vernunft, because the state, as the apex of moral and political endeavour, is neither a transcendental deduction nor a moral ideal in Hegel's philosophical system; it is the necessary historical expression of continuing and cumulative attempts to live the good life in a collective form. Vernunft may also be interpreted as intersubjective mind, as opposed to a narrowly rationalistic cogito. In this sense, it is a collective and substantive thing, and not simply an inference from any individual experience or the rules for thinking to indubitable conclusions. Reason is self-conscious thought. But, as we have seen, it is not esoteric; it is not what we would today call a second-order activity; it is not the preserve of the professional philosopher. It is part of the "cunning of reason" that it can fool the wise. The rational state knows that it is rational, and it knows through the experience of each of its citizens. Hegel's political theory describes the rational state in terms of an immanent potential which every state seeks to actualize. The fully rational state is one in which every citizen regards himself as in a position to fulfil himself because he is a member of the state. Teleologically, every state exists because its citizens are conscious to some degree that individual potential can only be realized within the state.

The idea that the state can be the agent of moral improvement and spiritual advancement, that it is more than a common denominator or an organization of material convenience, has deep roots. Particularly in the political part of his philosophical system, Hegel was self-consciously renovating a tradition of thought which has always drawn directly from Plato and Aristotle. The climate of opinion in early nineteenth century Germany was especially receptive to such theories, because of a comparatively recent but well-developed passion for the art and thought of classical Greece. It was almost a hundred years after German hellenism burst into bloom that a similar thing occurred in England.¹ The Roman model retained its hold

¹ The philhellenism of such English Romantic poets as Keats and Byron is well known, but they were superficial in their appreciation of classical Greek culture by comparison with Schiller and Hölderlin. Behind the extensive knowledge of and penetrating insight into classical Greek culture displayed by the German Romantics lay the pioneering philological work of Winckelmann. Their passion for things Greek was so exceptional as to be called by one commentator "the

on the English mind, but in late Victorian art history and literary criticism the Greeks overtook the Romans, due in part to the transmission of German classicism by such influential scholars as Benjamin Jowett and by the British Hegelians themselves. Hegel was an enthusiastic but discriminating hellenist with an intense interest in the Greek city-state. In it he found the prototype of the completely rational state, the state whose citizens are self-consciously at one with their social and political setting. The citizens of ancient Athens had been in quite unself-conscious unity with their laws, customs and gods. There had been a natural and immediate acceptance of the moral and political order. In fact, there had been for a brief period no distinction - and consequently no conflict - between the moral and political worlds. It was inconceivable that the political life of the city could be judged by any higher moral standard. As Hegel fully appreciated, it was so judged by Sophocles' *Antigone*. It was also judged - and found wanting - in the speeches and deeds of some of its most illustrious political leaders. It was a vital, dynamic form of political identity-in-difference, albeit inherently unstable.

The relatively unself-conscious harmony of the polis was no defence against an apolitical, individualistic moral creed. First Stoicism and then Christianity offered the individual release from the formalized social and political world which succeeded the city-state. A condition of alienation - alienation of the individual from his celestial as well as from his terrestrial city - lasted until the French Revolution, when a forcible assimilation of the two cities, and of the alienated individual to this ideal brought to earth, was attempted. The attempt was unsuccessful because the resultant state of absolute liberty was an empty proclamation. It lacked the concrete content, the diversity and particularity required to realize true freedom. The rational state, prematurely proclaimed by the French Revolution, must comprehend the intermediate phase of sheer individualism. It must give the subjective element its due.

In speaking of individualism in society, Hegel was fully aware of what was happening in the industrial towns on the Continent and in the most industrialized country, England. He also studied the work of British political economists, particularly James Steuart. What Hegel called "civil society" was basically the free market economy with a strong infusion of corporativism. This very energetic area of social life was seen by Hegel as being destructive as well as creative if not mediated by the state, by the political organ of that reason which grasps the proper place in the total scheme of things of the production of goods and services and the pursuit of wealth. The rational state does not repress economic activity or attempt to reverse its course, but it does contain and control it. It cannot merely reproduce the unself-conscious and (by modern standards) static community of the classical city-state.

One of the most important things which the French revolutionaries and their German philosophical counterparts left out of account was the complexity of the societies whose political organs they so easily removed. As has been said many times with the hindsight offered by Hegel himself and de Tocqueville, the seeds of the post-revolutionary regimes were not only present in the ancien régime but had germinated and sprouted there. The attempt to impose on French society, for example, a political ideal drawn from a Roman past or an imagined future was doomed to failure. A highly articulated social order functioned within the fossilized aristocratic regime. After the ravages of the Terror it reasserted itself. Arguably, it had to, because people cannot live without functional differentiation and the social sub-groups to which they attach themselves for their various special activities and interests. They cannot live in a continuous state of collective reformation euphoria.

tyranny of Greece over the German mind."

Hegel's frequent allusion to themes from classical Greek drama is a striking feature of his work. This and other aspects of Hegel's hellenism are discussed in J.G. Gray, Hegel's Hellenic Ideal (New York, 1941).

For Hegel, the various "estates" of a modern organized society are necessary manifestations of embodied Geist. What Hegel failed to foresee was the sweep and dissolving power of the idea, not that all are free but that all must be free without distinction, rank or condition. On the other hand, he had more than an inkling of the anomie to be experienced by those who lived in homogeneous or homogenizing societies. Hegel was certainly not, like Burke, urging men to cling to their "little platoons" of habitual loyalty or extolling the prescriptive right of existing institutions. He did insist, however, upon the rationality of a society of differentiated - and unequal - parts. This was not to deny the changes, including future changes, wrought by social mobility and state action; but absolute freedom was quite impossible, and some sort of social order and articulation were indispensable.

In the rational state the individual citizen knows that he is free, and knows it in and through his participation in the rational will of the state. The rational will may be seen simply as an amplification of the general will, to the extent that Rousseau's "moi commun" is a universal "I," an element in the content of each particular consciousness which unites it with every other consciousness. Rousseau's general will was considered by some British Hegelians, notably Bernard Bosanquet, to be a prefiguring of Hegel's rational state. On Bosanquet's interpretation, Rousseau's general will is merely an area of agreement among particular individual wills; whereas Hegel's rational or objective will actually constitutes individual wills - they live entirely within it. Rousseau's state is a device to secure the private individual in the "natural liberty" which he brings with him to society. Natural liberty is the creation of bad social theory, a fiction, and the individual is an unreal abstraction apart from the society which creates and sustains him. For Hegel, the identification of the individual's moral will with the collective will of the social organism is the source and sustenance, not the denial, of personal freedom, and it is the necessary precondition for the fulfilment of individual spiritual needs and aspirations through a variety of socio-economic and cultural activities.

The notion of a social organism belongs more to the British Hegelians than to Hegel himself. It owed a great deal of its persuasiveness to the then recently developed Darwinian theory of the origin of natural species, which inspired much misguided "organic" political theory, in which the explanation of legal and other social obligations was distorted by excessive reliance upon the ideas of environmental conditioning and selective adaptation. The British Hegelians were at times led astray by the biological analogy. On the whole, however, their grounding in Aristotle - as with Hegel himself - provided them with a theory of development in which rational purpose played a large part and preserved them from the naturalistic distortions of uncritical social Darwinism. In part because of the popularity of pseudo-Darwinian theories of politics and society, in part because of their Hegelian version of naturalism, they did not simply dismiss the idea that, as a social animal, man is subject to a process of purely natural selection and that species survival can under certain, and not merely atavistic, circumstances shape our social norms and collective moral judgments. In spite of their ethical pitfalls, and the connotations of brutality, biological metaphors are almost inescapable in a discussion of the development of the individual moral will in a social context. It is less awkward - it "comes naturally" - to say "growth" rather than "development," which is itself indicative of the pervasiveness of the analogy. The so-called organic theory of society was well suited to explain the origin and nurture of the individual moral will. Most British Hegelians were also satisfied that it went a long way toward explaining the full nature of political man. In this latter respect they were misled, and Hegel's "rational state" and "rational will" are more appropriate headings. The distinctive feature of the fully rational state, says Hegel, is the self-consciousness of its members. They are not the member organs of an organism; they are capable of thinking themselves apart from society. They in fact do not exist apart from society, and cannot, but they are distinguishable, they lead individual lives, and they act for their community as opposed to merely carrying out its commands.

The analogy of organic growth was particularly congenial to the nineteenth century. It

tied in very well with its historical studies, and the nineteenth century was pre-eminently an historical age, as the seventeenth was a scientific one. The notion that any particular national group possesses an historical development unique to itself was the great solvent of abstract social and political models. It became increasingly difficult to postulate universal conditions for order and progress. Yet the desire to find an order and a purpose within historical change itself remained as strong as ever. Hegel's philosophical system is historicist or developmental, in the sense that it recognizes actual historical differences not only as necessary but also as the working out of a single, all-pervading idea. Historical change is the medium of purposive growth. The end to which each and every one of the multiplicity of historical forms contributes is spirit's full self-knowledge, the explication of the world, which would be impossible without all the diverse forms and all the intervening stages. One of the highest of these stages is the social and political life of the rational state. Hegel regarded the Prussian limited monarchy in which he lived as the historical form most expressive of social and political rationality, but as by no means its consummation. There was nothing accidental about it, nor was it simply expedient or convenient. It was something which afforded spiritual fulfilment as much as art, religion or the pursuit of knowledge. Reason required it, and its imperfections did not detract from its essential rationality.

The notion that any political community is an indispensable self-manifestation of universal reason or the world spirit struck representative Victorian minds as extremely odd, if not bizarre. Native philosophical traditions of empiricism, "psychologism" and "common sense" realism strongly reinforced the moral and political theory of utilitarianism, and vice versa.² The affinity, if not the alliance, between these two streams of thought is made quite explicit in J.S. Mill's System of Logic (a work which, incidentally, had gone through nine editions and countless printings by 1875). The basic components of our experience are discrete units of sensation. From these we induce, by psychological association and assimilation, those "tendencies" amongst phenomena which further observation and experiment (if feasible) stabilize as the "laws" of the sciences of man and nature. The method of decomposition and recomposition, using the building blocks of our sensory experience, works in the theory of political reform equally as well as it does in theories of the physical universe.³ A political community, according to classical utilitarianism, is a "fictitious body," nothing more than the individuals who compose it at any one time.⁴ Continuity is a minor consideration. The institutions, the laws, the customs and rules which relate the members of a community to one another are a temporary convenience subject to unlimited alteration.⁵ Parts are removable without reference to other parts or to the whole. The pieces of a social arrangement and the

² A closer examination of the chief theorists of utilitarianism is reserved till later. See ch. 6, pp. 50-56.

³ Mill termed the proper method the "Concrete Deductive Method." (J.S. Mill, A System of Logic, 8th ed., p. 619). The Whig historian, T.B. Macaulay, was one of the first to point out that the utilitarians' method was a thinly disguised species of a priorism, and that the historical experience of government and political life in general, as captured in the theories and reflections of others, was cheerfully ignored by the utilitarians in applying their assumed "laws."

⁴ Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. W. Harrison (Oxford, 1948), p. 126. Bentham italicized "body" and "member," presumably to indicate that they were untrustworthy metaphors of social structure.

⁵ In Hobbesian fashion, Bentham claimed that the only law worthy of the name - authoritative law - is the command of the legislator (the sovereign, in John Austin's jurisprudence). There are, of course, limits to what the legislator can achieve; but these lie in his instruments, the pleasures and pains which govern human behaviour. Bentham's contempt for custom and common law is notorious: "...he who, for the purpose just mentioned or for any other, wants an example of a complete body of law to refer to must begin with making one." (Bentham, Morals and Legislation, p. 123.)

individuals who are pieces of those pieces are like the parts of a Meccano set. They may be assembled in a variety of ways, according to the design of any intelligent individual, regardless of his experience of materials and their behaviour in the real world of social construction.

The philosophical radicals, the utilitarians of the 1820s and 1830s, whose activities revolved around and gave direction to the Westminster Review, were breezily confident in the possibilities of social reconstruction. In marked contrast to their view, redolent of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, that mankind had no history, only a long and virtually unrelieved experience of misery and error, and that the human condition might be rapidly transformed by the application of a few simple principles to the problems of ignorance and injustice, was the (broadly speaking) "Anglican" view that progress was being made, that it would continue to be made, but that it would require careful cultivation of what had been slowly and painfully achieved in the past. This latter view may be called "Anglican" because it was the view of a broad spectrum of conservative reformers who, while they did not share the extreme Burkeans' belief that the aristocratic constitution of church and state was divinely ordained, nevertheless were greatly concerned that unless something was done to civilize the mass of Britons, the pressure for radical reform, which laissez-faire liberals, middle-class democrats and Chartist agitators were exerting with increasing urgency on a variety of institutions, would explode with such force that many cultural and spiritual values would be blown away with social and political privileges. The sense of social obligation, assumed yet alert, which characterized their viewpoint made them receptive to the general thrust and tone of the social and political thought of philosophical idealism. In particular, they found in the historicist rationalism and skepticism about individual liberty conveyed by idealism a friendly sign, a welcome marker in their navigation of a middle course between Whigs and Tories on the one side and "steam intellect" Radicals on the other.

The separation of the individual from his social matrix was a corollary of the Kantian theory of moral autonomy. Kant's preoccupation with the internal aspect of morality and relative neglect of intersubjective morality - what Hegel called Sittlichkeit - made him, in a limited sense, an ally of social and political atomism. This is not to say that in some devious way Kant was a utilitarian, nor that he believed that society is freshly created by each new political generation. On the contrary, he asserted the cumulative nature of society, its institutions and its mores, and also the necessity for a customary or habitual element in morality. Moreover, like Rousseau, Kant portrayed humanity as driven to construct a society of freedom under law by what he called "unsocial sociability."⁶ Amour propre - envy and pursuit of "the bubble reputation" - is what poisons natural sympathy and necessitates the formation of a second human nature. Kant, again like Rousseau but without his despair, offers no solution to the "most difficult" problem of all: who or what will govern the governors of that best society in which all capacities are developed to the full but in which no one's freedom is inconsistent with anyone else's? The rulers, too, must be human, and therefore subject to amour propre and self-partiality. Kant was sanguine about the eventual realization of civic perfection - admittedly after "many vain attempts" - because "the history of mankind can be seen, in the large, as the realization of nature's secret plan to bring forth a perfectly constituted state."⁷

All this sounds a bit like Hegel's world spirit, and the List der Vernunft weaving its unexpected patterns in human history. However, Kant's political proposals were rationalistic projects of enlightened reform, the sort of thing which Hegel averred to be dangerously

⁶ Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, trans. L.W. Beck, in Kant on History, ed. Beck (Indianapolis, 1963), pp. 11-26. See especially theses 4, 5 and 6.

⁷ I. Kant, Universal History, p. 21.

unrealistic, an abstraction with no grip on actuality. In addition, his moral philosophy pulled him further toward the view that society is composed of self-legislating, strictly autonomous individuals. The individual cannot manufacture the content of his moral will entirely for himself; but the goodness of that will lies entirely in its self-consistency. The measure of morality is an internal one. The autonomous moral agent obeys a universal and impersonal law, paying no heed to subjective whims and inclinations or to the blandishments of mere propriety and taste. The principal defect of the good will, in Hegel's eyes, was its being unattached to time or place, to social conditions. It was an abstract universal. The moral actions of the possessor of a good will are motivated entirely by a sense of duty - duty to the moral law, which law requires that one legislate for oneself as if one were legislating for everyone. The good will is neither deflected nor reinforced by any other motive than that of acting in such a way that its action may become the basis of a universal maxim.⁸ The Kantian individual obeys a bleak and stoical law which tends to cut him off from others. He is an end in himself, living in a "kingdom of ends." Every human being in this kingdom is an end in himself; no one is to be treated as a means to some other end. As Kant himself was aware, such a kingdom of ends-in-themselves is an ideal. All any existing society can do is strive to approximate to that ideal, since a society consisting of perfectly Kantian individuals would be an anarchy, with no need for any reserve of political power to enforce their social behaviour. They would be incapable of disregarding the rightful claims of each other; they would exist in rational harmony, undisturbed by self-interest. They would share no overriding common interest, because they could no more be the means to a common end than they could to each other. A community of people living according to the Kantian ethic would not really be a community. It was abstraction from concrete social and political conditions which Hegel regarded as the major defect in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant further failed to see that a common temporal interest permits the individual to realize himself as an end in himself, that it is the peculiar nature of a community to overcome the apparent opposition between ends and means in material as well as moral concerns. What Kant called a heteronomous end, one not freely chosen, is not therefore immoral or subversive of the good will. There is nothing immoral in being compelled to meet one's bodily as well as spiritual needs.

"The fact that man is a living being, however, is not fortuitous, but in conformity with reason, and to that extent he has a right to make his needs his end. There is nothing degrading in being alive, and there is no mode of intelligent being higher than life in which existence would be possible."⁹

In a well-governed community the satisfaction of needs is a cooperative pursuit, a common endeavour. The citizen of any state - because every state approximates in some degree to the rational state - is a means to an end which includes himself. His state may be very wide of the mark, it may be excessively devoted to the pursuit of material gain for its own sake, but he cannot fulfil himself by trying to destroy it or by withdrawing from it. However imperfect, it is for him the only available vehicle for the realization of rational freedom.

Hegel attempted to contain economic, political and cultural forces released or accelerated by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars within the framework of a political dispensation which, in the event, proved constricting and ephemeral, unequal to the task. His brand of liberal constitutionalism was an interpretation of events in Prussia which took a reactionary turn even before his death; and the explosive powers of democracy and nationalism were to prove a combination beyond the capacity of Vernunft and objective mind. New social forms - in industry, communications and urban life - broke out of the confines of traditional political structures or forced them to make radical alterations. That society and not the state

⁸ "Every maxim that does not so qualify is opposed to morality." Immanuel Kant, Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. J. Ladd, in The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, ed. Ladd (Indianapolis, 1965), p. 27.

⁹ G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford, 1942), Zusatz to para. 123, p. 252.

was setting the pace of human development - and that it should do so - became the common contention of reformers and revolutionaries. That the Rechtstaat could harmonize the new forms of human endeavour, and direct their energies into purposes dictated by what Hegel called the "rational will," was either an anachronism or divination of the world spirit. What Hegel perceived most acutely was the potency of what his immediate predecessors had done to create a philosophical image of the self-possessed human being for whom nothing was impossible and whose highest standard was self-consistency. A fascination with will power was one of philosophical idealism's chief legacies.¹⁰ Only Hegel offered a logic of the will to reconcile without neutralizing self-determination and the determinateness of the world. However, there was no returning to any conception of mankind as part of the chain of being. Kant's transcendentalism made it possible to conceive of human reason as the final arbiter of the world and the individual moral will as the only absolutely and unconditionally good thing.

Kant's kingdom of ends has continued to exert a powerful political appeal, both as a utopia and as a discipline for the culture of self-mastery. Kantian ethics owed much of its original "muscle" to German Pietism (a significant factor in Kant's personal background and development), and it found an echo in the English Puritan tradition of belief in salvation by self-improvement and taking the war between good and evil to the forces of evil. Many of the British Hegelians were products of that tradition and, as imperfectly "mediated" Kantians, they ranked the good will above the good society.

The British utilitarians saw a balance of interests in society. Kant postulated a regulative ideal sustained by a universal, passionless sense of duty. For the former, society was little more than a referee, and laws and institutions exceeding the minimum required to ensure civil peace, order and fair play were a mischievous obstruction; for the latter, society was a moral cocoon, superfluous to the fully rational individual. Both the utilitarian "fact" and the Kantian ideal portray the individual as morally self-sufficient and disregard the positive moral function of society - that of providing both the source and the fulfilment of the individual's moral being. Neither Kant nor the utilitarians could conceive of the whole of society - the conflicts of interest, the articulation of functions and classes, and the body of received law and custom - as the true expression of rational freedom. This conception was Hegel's most important contribution to social and political theory. His rational state was a necessary stage in the unfolding of the world spirit; it was a logical necessity in the special Hegelian, historicist usage of "logic."

It was not until the last quarter of the nineteenth century that philosophical idealism gained sufficient purchase on British thinking to be able to provide a systematic alternative to the incoherent but influential utilitarian consensus, whose authority was such that other theories effectively accepted its terms. Without a philosophy, the doubts and reservations expressed by mainstream social critics such as J.S. Mill and Matthew Arnold could prick but not get under the skin of native insularity. It was the British Hegelians who challenged the supremacy of the dominant theories of mind and nature - for example, associationist psychology and the crude inductivism which appeared to work so well in the triumphs of British applied science. Although they could not evict what Bradley contemptuously called "the school of experience," they soon succeeded in domesticating philosophical idealism. The Marxists failed dismally in their efforts to convince any but a minuscule number of British thinkers that their philosophy was anything but an alien intrusion, although much of the empiricism and materialism of Engels' "scientific socialism" was congenial to the nineteenth century English mind. It was competition from pragmatism and logical positivism - two philosophies of partially foreign provenance - which proved most damaging to philosophical idealism. In the process of naturalizing Hegel and giving him a new home, the British Hegelians lost sight of elements in

¹⁰ It still fuels the debate between revolutionary and evolutionary Marxists, the former arguing that history can be made to fulfil its purpose by an act or acts of revolutionary will.

his thought which were subsequently re-appropriated by others, including some of his compatriots who had earlier rejected him. As part of the hardening and narrowing tendency, some minor British Hegelians propagated a somewhat preachy, Sunday-school version of Hegel, which was an easy target for critics. The main British rendition of Hegelianism, however, offered a solution to the liberal (and Liberal) dilemma - an almost subconscious, quasi-metaphysical attachment to rampaging subjectivity, combined with deep anxiety about the quality of life thus freely created - which did not involve any radical discontinuity or jettisoning of widely held values.

CHAPTER 2

The Prehistory of Hegelianism in Britain

The British Hegelians constituted an informal philosophical school whose lifespan was almost exactly fifty years, from the publication of the Green and Grose edition of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature in 1874 until the deaths of Bernard Bosanquet, F.H. Bradley and J.McT.E. McTaggart in 1923, 1924 and 1925 respectively. This school of thought must be called informal, because the British Hegelians, while all acknowledging a substantial debt to Hegel, vary considerably in the use to which they put Hegelian ideas. Bradley maintained that the "Hegelian School" existed only in "our reviews," and during the course of his philosophical career he gradually moved away from what he saw as the excessive intellectualism of Hegel's philosophy, although he never repudiated spiritual monism. The leading role which conscience plays in T.H. Green's moral and political philosophy was the result of a strong infusion of Kantian ethical principles. Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison), like Green, professed to be more Kantian than Hegelian. He and the personal idealists were alarmed by the tendency, as they saw it, of the Hegelian One to swallow up and extinguish individual personality. Some of them professed a sort of pragmatic humanism, and (ironically) attacked Bradley as the most intellectualist of the Hegelians. McTaggart's variation on the Hegelian theme was that the dialectic of categories, sound in itself, could be legitimately used to arrive at metaphysical conclusions far different than Hegel's, and that Hegel's moral and political philosophy had no necessary place in the dialectical process.¹ He shared the personal idealists' quasi-religious conviction that the most real thing, metaphysically speaking, was human personality, but not the Christian beliefs of most of them. Christianity proved one of the most stubborn obstacles to Hegel's being accepted in Britain, and the next chapter will review the theologically based resistance to Hegelianism.

Although German philosophical idealism shows a line of continuous development from Kant through Fichte and Schelling to Hegel, it did not come to Britain in easy stages, one preparing the way for the next. Certainly Kant was known of and discussed in Britain long before Hegel became an object of study, but it is a curious fact that, with the exception of Sir William Hamilton and the utilitarian, Henry Sidgwick, little serious and sustained attention was paid to Kant's philosophy until the British Hegelians launched their attack-in-depth upon empiricism and utilitarianism in the 1870s. Edward Caird's Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant, the first important study of Kant's philosophy in English, appeared in 1877.² For their attack, the British Hegelians drew upon the full armoury of German philosophical idealism. For the first time in Britain - some eighty years after part of the first Critique had been translated - Kant's thought was being thoroughly examined and assimilated.³ As in the case of Hegel, the initial period of misunderstanding was a prolonged one, although in Kant's case there was not

¹ McTaggart, in C.D. Broad's words, "pulls some intriguing rabbits out of the Hegelian hat."

² Caird's is the idealist interpretation of Kant, emphasizing his positive views, and severely critical of his negative strictures, on metaphysics. Caird regarded Kant as a precursor of Hegel, and Hegelianism as the consummation of the Critical philosophy. This interpretation was repeated in his Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1889). Hamilton's is the positivist, anti-metaphysical interpretation of Kant, an agnostic position on the nature of reality - or the Unconditioned, in Hamiltonian terminology.

³ See chapter 1 of René Wellek's Immanuel Kant in England, 1793-1838 (Princeton, 1931) for a discussion of the pioneering efforts of Nitsch and Willich to interest the British in Kant's thought, and of the Kant translations by the Scot, John Richardson.

the same degree of second-hand condemnation and moral obloquy. The failure to appreciate and understand Kant was primarily a failure to recognize the central problem of his philosophy. In spite of the fact that it had first been raised by a British philosopher, Hume, the climate of philosophical opinion in Britain during the first half and more of the nineteenth century was such that Kant's statement of the problem and his treatment of it were largely ignored. Hume's empiricist successors had put together a makeshift solution, which, although it did not come to grips with the problem, satisfied all but the most pertinaciously metaphysical philosophers. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, the British Hegelians themselves tended to either see Kant through Hegelian spectacles or retreat from philosophical idealism to such an extent that in some cases their views on knowledge and its limits resembled those of Locke or Hume.

Hegel's initial reception in Britain resembles that of Kant insofar as both philosophers underwent a lengthy period of being treated with either blank indifference or irritated perplexity - added to which in Hegel's case was the prejudicial suspicion that something atheistic was afoot. The first abortive attempts by a handful of enthusiasts to bring Kant to the reluctant attention of the British philosophical community have been described in detail by Wellek. In this chapter Hegel's equally unpromising beginnings in Britain will be recounted. The remaining chapters will concern not the early and usually superficial transpositions of Hegel's philosophy, but the growth of the richest fruit of the Hegelian seed, a distinctively British form of Hegelianism.

Hegel's name is mentioned on several occasions by British commentators during the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s, but it is seldom more than a bare mention. The first time he was noticed in a philosophical context was in Sir William Hamilton's "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," an essay written in 1829.⁴ He was a representative of the Scottish school of philosophy, which had culminated in the eighteenth century moralist Thomas Reid, whose Works Hamilton edited (1846-63). The reference to Hegel is only a passing one, and Hamilton, while familiar with and to some extent influenced by Kant, never displayed any knowledge of Hegel. The first time his name appeared in print in English, as a "figure" contributing to the study of philosophy and deserving of some consideration, however small, was in a translation of W.G. Tennemann's History of Philosophy, originally written in 1812, abridged to a "manual" in 1829, brought up to date by a Professor Wendt, and translated by Rev. A. Johnson in 1832. Wendt's chief contribution was an indiscriminating list of recent German philosophers. Hegel appears twice: first, coupled with Krause, a very minor figure, as a lapsed Schellingian, and secondly, in Wendt's appended list, as "G.W.F. Hegel (a professor at Berlin) whose system is one of Absolute Idealism." In 1852 Johnson's translation of Tennemann's Manual was revised, enlarged and continued by J.R. Morell. In his preface Morell states that in the intervening 20 years "England has become familiar with the German mind." But he affords no evidence that this familiarity was anything but superficial, or that the English mind had progressed beyond Carlyle's uneasy feeling that something of great spiritual moment had been stirred up by the German mind. Morell does attempt an evaluation, while admitting that "it is scarcely possible to do common justice to such a complicated system as Hegel's in a compendium like the present." Although he does not do justice to Hegel, at least his writing is free of that religious indignation which disfigured so much contemporary British discussion of German philosophy. He was apparently not interested in Hegel's theological shortcomings, and his brief sketch of Left Hegelianism - in the shape of David Strauss' Biblical criticism and Feuerbach's anthropomorphism - exhibits none of the virulent hostility then widely felt towards foreign philosophy and the threat it allegedly posed to native piety. His benevolence toward Hegel

⁴ This and some other early works were collected by Hamilton for his Discussions on Philosophy and Literature (London, 1853). In the Dawes Hicks Lecture on Philosophy to the British Academy for 1971, Anthony Quinton comments on Hamilton's inexplicable claim to have known several distinguished British Hegelians that Hamilton was notoriously loose about facts. (A. Quinton, Absolute Idealism, p. 20.)

himself may be attributable to his fundamental error of believing the Hegelian system to be one of subjective idealism.

One instalment of an abridged translation of Heinrich Heine's Series of Essays on German Literature and Men of Letters appeared in The Atheneum, July 6, 1833. With his mocking irony, Heine derided Hegel as a mere lackey of the Prussian church and state. Whether, even with his literary reputation, Heine carried sufficient weight with the English reading public to offset the subsequent impression that Hegel was a satanic figure is doubtful.

The earliest British mention of Hegel which is both favourable and based on some first-hand (or at least accurate second-hand) knowledge is in a review of five books on aesthetics - one of them being Hegel's Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik - which appeared in No. 25 of the British and Foreign Review for 1842.⁵ The author - G.H. Lewes - bemoans the unreflective, unphilosophical state of English art and criticism and recommends the careful reading of Hegel as an antidote. He notes that while the works of such German writers as Lessing, Winckelmann, Jean Paul, Schiller, Schelling and Novalis are talked about in England, "the masterly and comprehensive 'Lectures' of Hegel remain without even the most vague and general notice."⁶ He quotes the biographer Gans with approval, to the effect that Hegel could have no successor, "for philosophy with him accomplished its circle."⁷ Lewes' assessment is self-contradictory, however: first, he insists that the English would do well to study Hegel's philosophy of art; then he suggests that Hegel's particular artistic judgments are the chief benefit to the student and the philosophical part dispensable, whereas the point of his article is the deplorably unsystematic state of English art criticism. It makes interesting reading in the light of his later scorn for Hegel. However, Lewes was always ready to concede the value and readability of Hegel's lectures on art, history and religion, while dismissing the rest of his work as obscure and confused. In his view, the Aesthetik is a delightful and instructive gloss upon repellent first principles.

Lewes appropriated two Hegelian ideas: that of the spirit of the age, of which art is a principal manifestation; and that of the purely explanatory role of any philosophical activity, such as aesthetics. Art, religion and philosophy, he says, are different ways of approaching the same truth. The poet "makes you in love with the truth and virtue, which religion has ordained and philosophy proved."⁸ In spite of the hint of a Hegelian formula here, it would be quite wrong to suggest that this article was the seed of British Hegelianism. Lewes was rare at that time in having a sympathetic interest in any aspect of Hegel's philosophy.⁹

The first issue of The Oxford Magazine, which appeared in May 1845, contains an anonymous article on the German poet, Ludwig Tieck, in the course of which the author praises German philosophy - in particular, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Novalis - for its services to moral and religious truth. He is of the opinion that if faith is to replace calculation in English

⁵ This unsigned article is not anonymous. The Dictionary of National Biography attributes it to G.H. Lewes, the English positivist writer. George Henry Lewes (1817-1878) had little formal education, but travelled in France and Germany a great deal. He possessed a wide knowledge of European literature, especially dramatic. After a brief career as an actor he became a journalist. He wrote articles and essays on physiology as well as on psychology and philosophy. Lewes also wrote some novels and a play. But his literary achievements are extremely minor in comparison with those of his second wife, George Eliot. Their relationship began through a mutual interest in Comte and positivism.

⁶ British and Foreign Review, vol. XIII, p. 39.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., p. 26.

⁹ In a footnote Lewes claims that "the Times has quoted Hegel," which says more about the editorial style of that newspaper than about the reading public's state of knowledge.

thought and action, then "the admission of the fundamental principle of the entire system of modern German thought is and must be an indispensable condition." The article is remarkable, not only for its uncommonly favourable estimate of the moral and religious effects of German philosophy, but also for a curious reference to the allegedly wider English acquaintance with German philosophical literature. "At the beginning of this century, long passages of Hegel appeared translated in the writings of an English philosopher and there was no danger of detection." If he was referring to Coleridge - and it is hard to imagine whom else - then he was surely mistaken. Coleridge has been detected quoting Kant and Schelling without acknowledgment, but not Hegel.

J.D. Morell - unrelated to J.R. Morell - published An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century in 1846.¹⁰ His criticism of Hegel is largely theological. He saw in the Hegelian system the zenith of rationalism, and in Left Hegelians such as Strauss and Baur the inevitable disintegration of that system of thought. Hegelianism "may charm the mind that loves to rationalize upon every religious doctrine," yet "it can assuredly give but little consolation to the heart that is yearning with earnest longings after holiness and immortality."¹¹ He clearly had a generally correct appreciation of the place of religion in Hegel's philosophy: "Religion, if not destroyed by the Hegelian philosophy, is absorbed in it and as religion forever disappears."¹² Morell makes some shrewd observations upon Hegel's philosophy, remarking that the unity of contradictories is not as counter to common sense as it might appear. "As knowledge advances, differences become more and more merged into higher principles." The unity of thought and being contains a "germ of truth," because the "Universal Being" is a purely rational conception, a necessary idea which "does not come to its full reality except in the human consciousness."¹³ Complaining that Hegel's unity of thought and being destroyed God and human freedom, Morell - at this stage at least - did nothing to dispel the prevailing suspicion and hostility felt toward philosophical idealism.

In a course of lectures entitled On the Philosophical Tendencies of the Age, delivered two years later in Edinburgh and Glasgow, Morell seems to have become somewhat reconciled to Hegel and rationalistic philosophy. He now maintains that philosophy is the property of everyman, that it appeals to "the common reason of humanity at large," a phrase which recalls Hegel's aphorism about the philosopher and his ladder which he cannot pull up after himself. Perhaps the democratic spirit of 1848 elicited a positive response in Morell. By 1856 he was still more receptive to German philosophical idealism. In "Modern German Philosophy," his contribution to the first two issues of a short-lived journal called Manchester Papers, he notes a welcome change in the English attitude toward German metaphysical speculation. In his own words, "the suspicion has oozed out that there are really grains of gold and specks of diamonds amongst this immense mass of reputed rubbish."¹⁴ He is still highly critical of what he regarded as Hegel's confusion of the "formal processes of thinking and the real process of things themselves. This part of his philosophical system, to say the least, comes very near to a play upon words."¹⁵ However, Morell has clearly been impressed by some of the more striking features

¹⁰ John Daniel Morell (1816-91) studied theology at Homerton and philosophy at the Universities of Glasgow and Bonn. He was an Independent minister at Gosport from 1842 to 1845. He was appointed an inspector of schools on the strength of his Historical and Critical View, which post he held from 1848 to 1876.

¹¹ J.D. Morell, An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, vol. II, p. 154.

¹² Ibid., p. 159. Quinton commends Morell for his acuity in perceiving the threat posed by Hegelianism to revealed religion, and says that his survey provided "a fairly reasonable account of the main outlines of Hegel's system." (A. Quinton, Absolute Idealism, p. 20.)

¹³ J.D. Morell, Historical and Critical View, vol. II, p. 156.

¹⁴ J.D. Morell, Manchester Papers, vol. I, p. 6.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 105. The accusation that he punned his way out of contradictions was to become a

of Hegel's philosophy of history, which he retails in a somewhat tendentious fashion. Hegel is now the philosopher of Protestantism and representative of one of the very highest stages in the dialectic of freedom and authority - but not its culmination. This, we learn, is embodied in the Church of England. But even here the conflict has broken out afresh. Morell is confident, though, that a new synthesis of faith and reason, authority and freedom, will emerge. Morell's Philosophical Fragments were published in 1878 and a Manual of the History of Philosophy in 1884, which treats of the Left, Right and Centre Hegelians rather than of Hegel himself.

In the same year (1846) that J.D. Morell published his Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, the second series of G.H. Lewes' Biographical History of Philosophy - "from Bacon to the present day" - appeared. It is written with a heavy bias in favour of British empiricism and takes the positivist line that metaphysics is simply bad logic. Hegel is dismissed as a verbal juggler and as not substantially different from Schelling. He added only a method - which is true to the extent that Hegel's method and his results are inseparable. Together, however, they constitute a philosophical system far removed from that of Schelling, and as a critic of Hegel's "method" Lewes hardly inspires confidence. He begins his treatment of Hegel's notion of an identity underlying all contradiction by calling it "the logical law of the identity of contraries."¹⁶ Whereas contraries can exist side by side, contradictories cannot - which is the motive power of the Hegelian system. Lewes concedes that there are thoughts "to be grappled with" in Kant and Fichte; but "in Hegel the form is everything...his distinctions are only verbal."¹⁷ Verbal quibbling, however, is a defect of metaphysics per se:

"Philosophy itself, in all its highest speculations, is but a more or less ingenious playing upon words. From Thales to Hegel, verbal distinctions have always formed the ground of philosophy and must ever do so as long as we are unable to penetrate the essence of things."¹⁸

Whether Lewes thought that there could come a time when we would be able to "penetrate the essence of things" is difficult to say. Certainly Hegel's was not, for Lewes, the way to such knowledge. As for Schelling, his identification of philosophy and religion is the closing of the metaphysical circle, the inevitable debacle of German philosophical idealism.

The 1857 edition of Lewes' Biographical History of Philosophy is even more positivist in tone. Here he makes the Comtean claim that he is writing the first post-philosophical history of philosophy, that he is writing as a representative of the coming scientific age, in which it will be universally recognized that truth can be attained only through the "method of verification" and only about co-existences and successions of natural phenomena. In 1867 his survey appeared, revised and expanded, as A History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte. His estimate of Hegel remained unchanged. The 1871 edition of the expanded version contains much additional material on Hegel. Lewes had read J.H. Stirling's Secret of Hegel, and although it confirmed his view that Hegel's position was totally untenable, it forced him to take Hegel seriously - insofar as he was able to take any metaphysician seriously. He quotes both Hegel and Stirling at length, and he has a few kind words to say about Hegel's philosophy of history and philosophy of religion. The burden of his criticism is still the positivist-empiricist contention that Hegel is futilely attempting to "coerce nature." Lewes' History of Philosophy, in all its various versions, went through several editions, spanning thirty-odd years of British intellectual life. It is difficult to assess its influence precisely, but it and the cast of mind it represented were a formidable obstacle to the acceptance of philosophical idealism.

refrain of twentieth century critiques of Hegel.

¹⁶ G.H. Lewes, Biographical History of Philosophy, vol. IV, pp. 206-08. Earlier in this segment he describes Kant's forms and categories as innate ideas antecedent to experience.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 230.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 219.

In 1848 German philosophy became a topical subject. Germany did not escape the revolutionary upheavals of that year, whereas Britain did. There were many quick to draw the conclusion that Britain should increase her vigilance against subversive notions being flung out from the Continental "vortex of infidel democracy." J.D. Morell's On the Philosophical Tendencies of the Age was unusual in its sanguinity about the democratic implications of full-blooded rationalism. Among much that was written to the opposite effect, Hegel is named only once as a disseminator of subversive ideas, in an anonymous article entitled "The German Mind," in The English Review for December 1848. It professes to discuss, among other things, Strauss' Leben Jesu and a book by Gervinus on the philosophy of Hegel, as well as the works of both Lessing and Goethe. In fact, it is a political tract attacking disestablishment and universal suffrage, ideas for which the German mind was held responsible. The following passage is redolent of the prevailing cultural insularity at that time, an insularity combined with a sense of duty to the lesser breeds which was later to find its outlet further afield:

"...we regard her [Germany's] pseudo-philosophy and her false humanitarianism with Christian pity and regret.... False modesty must not stay us from reminding the fallen German race that our national intellect is clearer and more practical than theirs; and that that Christianity is to us a Divine reality which appears to them a fiction; that freedom a noble and glorious possession which they would sacrifice to democratic lawlessness!"¹⁹

The ultimate villain of the piece was Goethe, an intellectually self-indulgent man whose place in German life and letters was such that he could have prevented the subsequent "triumph of Teutonic lawlessness."

Two items were published in 1855 which show some originality in their treatment of Hegelian ideas. The first is a translation of Hegel's "Mind Subjective" by H. Sloman and J. Wallon, "revised by a graduate of Oxford, and to which are added some remarks by H.S."²⁰ Sloman's remarks on Hegel are noteworthy, principally for two things: their illustrating a mood of receptivity to philosophical idealism of all kinds; and their striking resemblance to F.H. Bradley's "bloodless categories" outburst against Hegelian panlogism in his Principles of Logic.

"Can we believe that those rich varieties by which we are surrounded - life, the soul, love, virtue and others - that these are everywhere and always the result of that one trilogical form of proceeding - thesis, antithesis, synthesis?"²¹

As for the first resemblance, the following passage is not unlike what John Grote was saying at the time and what Bradley was to say some twenty years later:

"We are not foreign to the world wherein we live. The same tide of existence that sustains it flows through us, and it is not strange that a strong sympathy should make our instinct often at once conform to what our slower reason afterwards shows us to be the truth, but in every case many faults are and must be committed; the greatest of all being, perhaps, the necessity of dividing or decomposing that which is essentially one - a whole."²²

Sloman's position on knowledge of the Absolute is that of H.L. Mansel.²³ It was an irreligious presumption on Hegel's part to assert the unity of thought and being; the human mind, without

¹⁹ The English Review, vol. X, p. 388.

²⁰ The Subjective Logic of Hegel, trans. Sloman and Wallon (London, 1855). This was the first work of Hegel's to be translated into English, in this case from a French version which appeared in 1854. J. Sibree's translation of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History appeared in 1857, with a short preface by the translator expressing approval of the work's "leading conceptions."

²¹ H. Sloman, Logic of Hegel, p. 95. Compare F.H. Bradley, Principles of Logic, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1922), pp. 590-91.

²² H. Sloman, Logic of Hegel, p. 72. See ch. 7, p. 57.

²³ See ch. 3, p. 32.

the aid of faith, is incapable of knowing God and grasping the whole truth of things.

The way to acquire philosophical knowledge is Schelling's way, the way of "spontaneous intuition." The adoption of the so-called Schellingian method "places us between the excessive modesty of Kant, on the one hand, and the lofty pretentiousness of Hegel on the other; and besides, Faith, in this method, preserves its full value."²⁴ Sloman concludes with an aphorism which serves to remove him a long way not only from Hegel but from the whole philosophical enterprise:

"Not truth alone, but Goodness is our final end and aim: the ideal of both is in us, not distinct but instinct; not as science, but as conscience!"²⁵

With the exception of phrases, chapter headings and other snatches, Hegel was not available in English until the Sloman and Wallon translation of the "Lesser Logic." Apart from a few selections in Stirling's Secret of Hegel and in the work of some of the St. Louis Hegelians in America, there were no further Hegel translations of any significance until the British Hegelians took on the task in the 1870s and after.

The second noteworthy item from 1855 is one of the contributions to a collection of essays entitled Oxford Essays. In the eighth essay, T.C. Sandars examines Hegel's Philosophy of Right.²⁶ Although only an essay - and ostensibly a summary - it was the first serious study of Hegel's political philosophy in English. Sandars had grasped the meaning of the Hegelian idea of Recht, and expressed it in a manner which was both fresh and faithful to the original:

"Prescription is not a matter of merely positive law, arranged for the advantage of the community; but it is a matter of natural right. It is the expression of the necessity which the will is under of continually exhibiting itself as external."²⁷

He praises Hegel's elevation of the universal conscience of the state over that of the individual, of objective over subjective right, while recognizing the reciprocal nature of the organic theory of the state.

"Freedom attains its highest objective expression, while at the same time the freedom of the subjective will works unimpeded, for the State is the highest method of carrying out and developing the individual."²⁸

It is not merely an ideal; it is "the sovereignty which makes the worst state still a state, like the principle of life which makes the cripple alive."²⁹

Sandars took Hegel's "deification" of the state literally, accepting it as the will of God "expressed in the present world."³⁰ This was a most unusual view to hold in mid-Victorian England. It was also an erroneous one, insofar as Hegel's "deification" of anything was intended to be purely metaphorical. God was, for Hegel, the Word made flesh, not a transcendent being who can intervene in the world at will. "The march of God in the world" was an immanent and rational process for Hegel. Sandars understood at least one aspect of this process - that Hegel did not intend an exact correlation between the historical development of right and the dialectic of its idea; he was not trying to force historical forms into a logical order, nor make the moments of reason wait upon history. His rendering of one of Hegel's shrewdest observations upon Kant's moral theory is particularly good:

"Well-being is not good without right, nor is right good without well-being. We must

²⁴ H. Sloman, Logic of Hegel, p. 96.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Thomas Collett Sandars (1825-94) was a fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, and reader of constitutional law and history to the Inns of Court, 1865-73. His edition of Justinian's Institutes appeared in 1853.

²⁷ T.C. Sandars, Oxford Essays, p. 223.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 243.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 244.

not say, Fiat justitia, pereat mundus, for we require that the world should be preserved as well as justice done."³¹

This is a point which Bradley was to drive home with great force and elegance in Ethical Studies. Sandars' study contains other evidence of an unusually acute understanding of Hegel's political philosophy. For example, he recognized that British economic life was a good illustration of Hegel's "civil society," and that Hegel's account of economic interdependence and of the dialectic of economic want and gratification owed something to British political economy.

The following year (1856) the French Hegel enthusiast, Augusto Véra, published a work in English which loosely linked the imported and the home-grown British varieties of philosophical idealism.³² He purported to see in a work such as Ferrier's Institutes (of which more in a moment) signs of a revival of British interest in metaphysics, in "true philosophy." What little he has to say about Hegel marks no critical advance upon native British commentary. There is a great deal of diatribe against the philosophy of common sense and the alleged British predilection for applying the criterion of practicality in philosophical questions. Apart from the occasional mechanical references to Hegel which continued to appear in historical surveys, there is nothing worthy of comment between the English publication of Véra's work and Stirling's Secret of Hegel (1865).

None of the first British attempts to come to grips with Hegel are as intrinsically interesting as that entirely home-grown philosophical idealism which has already been alluded to. J.F. Ferrier and John Grote were elaborating distinctive idealist philosophies of their own during the 1850s and 1860s.³³ Ferrier denied any Hegelian influence, saying: "I am no follower of Hegel. I cannot follow what I do not understand."³⁴ His not understanding Hegel did not, however, deter him from writing an article on Hegel for the Imperial Dictionary of Universal Biography.³⁵ His remarks on Hegel's thought concentrate on the difficulties of the notion of the Absolute and its identification with rational self-consciousness. He questions Kant's theory of knowledge and its preclusion of the Hegelian solution to the problem. One of Ferrier's remarks is worth quoting, because it shows that, in spite of his disclaimer, he understood at least one important feature of Hegel's philosophy:

"Schelling was of the opinion that the citadel of truth was to be carried by a

³¹ Ibid., p. 230. Compare G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford, 1942), para. 130, p. 87.

³² A. Véra, An Inquiry into Speculative and Experimental Science (London, 1856). Véra's translation of Hegel's Encyclopaedia into French appeared in 1863. His Introduction à la Philosophie de Hegel went through two editions (Paris, 1855 and 1864).

³³ James Frederick Ferrier (1808-1864), after two years' study at Edinburgh, went to Magdalen College, Oxford, where he was much influenced by Sir William Hamilton. He graduated in 1831, after which he studied German philosophy at Heidelberg in 1834. He was Professor of Civil History at Edinburgh University from 1842 to 1845 and Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy at the University of St. Andrews from 1845 to 1864.

John Grote (1813-1866) was a younger brother of George Grote, the historian. An undergraduate at Trinity College, Cambridge, he was elected a fellow in 1837. He was ordained in 1844 and moved to the college living at Trumpington in 1847. He succeeded Whewell as Knightsbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1855. The first volume of his chief work, Exploratio Philosophica, appeared in 1865, the second not until 1900.

³⁴ J.F. Ferrier, Scottish Philosophy: The Old and the New (Edinburgh, 1856), p. 22. Anthony Quinton retells J.H. Stirling's story, that he discovered Ferrier reading a work of Hegel's upside down because he couldn't make any sense out of it right way up (Absolute Idealism, p. 21).

³⁵ This was collected in his "Philosophical Remains," vol. III of The Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier (Edinburgh, 1888).

coup de main, by a genial 'intellectual intuition.' Hegel conceived that it was to be won only by slow sap and regular logical approaches."³⁶

Ferrier's magnum opus, Institutes of Metaphysics, was first published in 1854. In the tradition of British empiricism, its starting point is the problem of knowledge. Its conclusion is that mind per se and matter per se are unknowable. "Minds together with what they apprehend are the only veritable existences."³⁷ He asserts the "indissoluble unity" of subject and object - which has a distinctly Hegelian ring about it. However, by that unity he does not mean what Hegel means. For Hegel, the unity of thought and being entails an identity of identity and non-identity; reason actualizes itself in all the diversity of the natural and historical worlds. Ferrier places rational self-consciousness in opposition to sense-perception and the human passions, thus seriously impairing the full unity of thought and being. For Ferrier, this unity was not merely a necessary condition of any knowledge at all, but also a limitation upon knowledge. For all his willingness to see in Hegel the hard but sure way to philosophical truth, Ferrier did not allow for an Absolute which is anything more than an abstract universal set over against concrete particulars. It is, in effect, the Kantian thing-in-itself on Ferrier's interpretation. The ultimate reality or unreality of the external world is, in Ferrier's system, an unanswerable question. There is an external world, but only in its relation to minds. Minds cannot penetrate beyond the knower-known relationship; they are confined to the act - or state - of knowing. Ferrier's "agnology," or theory of ignorance, was an attempt, reminiscent of Kant, to delimit the range of valid metaphysical speculation. In this respect it resembles Sir William Hamilton's philosophy of the "Conditioned."³⁸ Ferrier owed little to Kant, however. His work was an original attempt to work out a solution to problems posed by sensationalist and Scottish "common sense" philosophy.

Unlike Ferrier, Grote was quite unsystematic, and deliberately so. His work is remembered primarily for its idealist aperçus. He stressed the need for the mind to be "at home" in the world of its experience. That the mind is adequate to the expression of the whole of experience in all its complexity, that there is nothing that the mind cannot penetrate and there find a reflection of itself, is the central Hegelian theme. But, as Ferrier dimly perceived, Hegel was a systematic philosopher; his results were achieved by a long, logical, step-by-step process, not by "genial intuitions."

Grote expressly made a sort of rational intuitivism the foundation of his moral philosophy. Pronouncements about virtue and duty emanating from our intuitive faculty point us in the same direction as the principles of utility and the greatest happiness. The greatest happiness of the greatest number is itself an intuited ideal. Sidgwick's utilitarian synthesis, universalistic hedonism, was in part inspired by this idea of Grote's and by his teaching at Cambridge.³⁹ Behind Grote's rational intuitivism lay an (unargued) assumption - partly religious, partly epistemological - that the moral universe is harmonious:

"The belief that law or order, as opposed to chaos and randomness, must apply...to the entire of being...seems to me to play the same part in...life or the moral universe as it does in the intellectual universe. No experience could give us this belief, but...intellectually we could not think for a moment without it."⁴⁰

Grote's intuitional ethics were an integral part of the climate of Coleridgean idealism at Cambridge, which prevailed for several decades. This line of thought owed something to Kant, but nothing to Hegel.

³⁶ J.F. Ferrier, Works, vol. III, p. 560.

³⁷ Ibid, vol. I, p. 540.

³⁸ See ch. 3, pp. 32-33, for a very brief discussion of Hamiltonian philosophy.

³⁹ See ch. 6, pp. 52-53 and 55, for Sidgwick's contribution to utilitarianism.

⁴⁰ J. Grote, A Treatise on the Moral Ideals, ed. J.B. Mayor (London, 1876), p. 373. (Cited in J.B. Schneewind, Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy, p. 120.)

CHAPTER 3

Religious Resistance to Hegel: From Coleridge to Personal Idealism

As McTaggart pointed out, not for the first time but more trenchantly than others had, Hegelianism is a dangerous ally for Christianity. Yet it came to be regarded as a possible defender of the faith by a number of British philosophers and theologians in the middle years of the nineteenth century. It made no frontal assault upon fundamental Christian dogmas such as the existence of a divine personality or the action of divine grace; but it claimed to explain them in purely conceptual terms. Whereas the Christian creed was traditionally expressed in word-pictures and visual imagery, Hegelianism claimed to be able to convey its essence - the reason implicit in Christianity - without literary or pictorial aids. This seemingly inoffensive claim of Hegelianism, to say the same thing as Christianity but in a different way, involved the further and more pretentious claim to understand the essence of Christianity directly, something of which the unphilosophical Christian was supposedly incapable. It claimed to understand Christianity better than it understood itself. Moreover, it claimed to comprehend Christianity not merely in the sense of understanding it, but also in the sense of including it within its system, thereby insinuating its spiritual superiority. A Christian apologist might reply that the supposed superiority of Hegelianism is based upon a merely intellectual and external grasp of Christian belief, but that true belief arises from an understanding which surpasses mere intellectual comprehension, and that in this sense the unphilosophical Christian knows more than the Hegelian philosopher. For the philosophically inclined Christian, Hegelianism can be deceptively attractive. An alliance with Hegelianism is expensive, however. It promises Christianity security against materialism and skepticism, but at the ruinous price of being decomposed and digested by a system of philosophy.

During the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s, the overwhelming majority of English divines and academics - who at Oxford and Cambridge were necessarily, if in certain cases only nominally, orthodox in their religious beliefs - were instinctively repelled by Hegelianism. Their knowledge of Hegel's thought was largely second-hand and extremely thin. Nevertheless, they were more truly guided by their instincts than were some of their more sophisticated successors by their enthusiasm for Hegelianism.¹

The theological animus against German philosophical idealism was particularly violent in the 1830s and 1840s, coming to a head with the revolutions of 1848. It was tied into a defence of the British constitution - for which one could usually read the political establishment - and the Church of England. As some of the citations from the previous chapter suggest, the British reader might well have been made aware of something having gone seriously awry in German culture by a veritable spate of anti-Hegelian tracts in the 1840s. They originated in Germany, were written for a German audience, and were directed more against the so-called Left Hegelians than against orthodox Hegelianism. Virtually none of them were translated, but some of this onslaught on Hegel through his epigoni could have percolated into the English bien-pensant consciousness. In Shlomo Avineri's words:

¹ F.D. Maurice, an influential Broad Church theologian and exponent of Coleridgean religious thinking (and Grote's successor as Knightsbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge in 1866), was one of those generously - and uncritically - receptive to German philosophical idealism. In his historical survey, A Treatise of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy (London, 1862), he refused to endorse the odium theologicum attached to Hegel in Britain. However, Hegelianism seems to have had as little to do with his thought as he with the course of Hegelianism in Britain.

"The vehemence of attacks from religious quarters on Hegel can perhaps be compared to the reaction in England to Darwin: few people have been so violently criticized for subverting religion and public order."²

Avineri describes well the various ironies involved in the attack on Hegel as an enemy of good order and religion. With rare exceptions - such as Jowett, who was in Germany at the time and understood German - this particular controversy had no particular impact on thoughtful Britons. However, it certainly did not facilitate the British reception of philosophical idealism. If it did anything, it must have merely strengthened the built-in resistance to such a strange and seemingly irreligious system of thought as Hegel's. For those few who could read German, the form and style of Hegelian philosophy were forbidding and, to many, repellent; and there was the hurdle of the native empirical tradition to get over, as well as the theological one.

What about the home-grown reaction to empiricism, associationist psychology and the total rejection of metaphysics? It has been claimed for Samuel Taylor Coleridge that he alone among British thinkers in the first half of the nineteenth century really understood what Kant was talking about. He was one of the very few English men of letters who read German. However, his understanding is said to have been the result of his having independently arrived at essentially the same position as Kant, chiefly through his study of the seventeenth century Cambridge Platonists.³ Therefore, it is said, what he gained from Kant was merely supplementary, reinforcing his own distinctive statement of philosophical idealism. Wellek and, more recently, Orsini have questioned this assessment, maintaining that Coleridge drew heavily upon Kant and Schelling in his struggle against atheism and hedonism, and indicating that, in his zeal to combat such grievous errors - or perhaps it was due to lack of comprehension - he failed to exercise sufficient discrimination in his borrowings.⁴ In short, Coleridge did not "get inside" the Critical philosophy. For Coleridge, reason was akin to faith and opposed to the discursive understanding. Such a view does not do justice to the intricacies of Kant's solution to the problem of accounting for knowledge of both a physical and a moral world without splitting the human intellect and divorcing pure reason from sense experience. Reason came close with Coleridge to being the source of exalted feelings and spiritual expansion, notwithstanding his adoption of Kant's theory that the truth of religious beliefs is guaranteed by practical reason and everyman's moral experience. As Wellek suggests, Coleridge stood much closer to Schelling, the leader in Germany of the Christian reaction against the ambitious intellectual claims of philosophical idealism, than he did to Kant.⁵ On all accounts, Coleridge did not bring Kant to England.

My own reading of Coleridge is that like the rest of that first group of Englishmen to come into contact with Kant - and Hegel - his intellectual frame of reference was to a great extent a theological creation. Coleridge did not enjoy the philosophical benefits of being part of a movement of ideas, of participating in the intense interchange of ideas and, in effect, professional industriousness of speculation which marks a period of intellectual development such as that which occurred in Germany between 1770 and 1820. Human reason was not its own arbiter, as it was for the German idealists. They belonged to a rationalist tradition which is not shy of pursuing a philosophical argument wherever it might lead; they observed no theological barriers to thought. All the German idealists had religious convictions of one sort or another. The original impulse of both Kant's and Hegel's thought was partly religious. In the case of Kant, it was a desire to find a place for human moral freedom and the Christian God in a world of causally determined phenomena; Hegel's mature philosophy originated in speculation about the nature of Judaism and Christianity. These men were not, however,

² S. Avineri, "Hegel revisited," Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (New York, 1972), p. 339.

³ See J.H. Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher (London, 1930), *passim*.

⁴ G.N.G. Orsini, Coleridge and German Idealism (Carbondale, Ill., 1969), esp. ch. 8 and 9.

⁵ R. Wellek, Immanuel Kant in England, p. 116.

committed, as was Coleridge, to any sectarian dogma or religious establishment.

What distinguished Coleridge from his contemporaries in Britain was his philosophical receptivity to German idealism. He shared many of their theological but few of their philosophical presuppositions. He was an enthusiastic student of Neoplatonism from Plotinus to Cudworth. Although he had been an adherent of Hartley's associationist psychology at an early stage of his philosophical development, he came to detest the "common sense" philosophy because of its seeming indifference to the moral life and its rejection of intuitive knowledge which can put man in touch with the world of Platonic Ideas. Like Herder and other German Romantics, Coleridge was looking for a philosophical explanation of the productive energy of the creative mind, revealed especially in art and the aesthetic sense or imagination. This was a highly unusual intellectual pursuit in the first two or three decades of nineteenth century Britain. Most of his contemporaries contrived to accommodate conventional religious belief with a passive acceptance of pleasure-pain ethics and a large measure of philosophical materialism. Coleridge was fighting an indigenous philosophy which was largely indifferent to man's moral and spiritual nature with whatever weapon came to hand, although many of his weapons were drawn from an indigenous store. Kant's transcendentalism and his categorical imperative were grist to Coleridge's mill rather than the bearer of fresh insight into the perennial problem of how to make a coherent whole out of experience. He had an intuitive grasp of the central problem of philosophical idealism; but, as the following passage from "The Statesman's Manual" (1816) suggests, Coleridge's overall view of that philosophical tradition was rather poetic and fuzzy as to philosophical relationships among thinkers contributing to that tradition:

"Whether ideas are regulative only, according to Aristotle and Kant; or likewise constitutive and one with the power and life of nature, according to Plato and Plotinus...is the highest problem of philosophy and not part of its nomenclature."⁶

Hegel remained for Coleridge a baffling postscript to Schelling's absolute idealism. There are some intriguing marginalia in Coleridge's own copy of Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*, which is held in the British museum.⁷ They end on page 91 of volume I and he apparently read no further, because the remaining pages were still uncut at the beginning of the present century. His verdict on the first 91 pages of the *Logik* is somewhat perfunctory: "bewilderment throughout from confusion of Terms,"⁸ and "proof of the neglect of sound Logic by the disciples of der neueste Philosophie and that the Ruckfall von Kant has avenged itself."⁹ These two accusations of verbal conjuring and bad logic have reappeared again and again over the years as the substance of British reaction to Hegel.

Another familiar charge, that of Spinozism, is levelled at Hegel by Coleridge in the course of a discussion of "Determination." He seems to have thought that Hegel's theory of differentiation through negation was no advance upon Spinoza's theory of substance and its attributes, and that it made insufficient allowance for individual differences. The suspicion that Hegelianism posed a grave threat to individuality was a recurring one, and later in the century it was primarily responsible for provoking the revolt of the personal idealists. This suspicion is, in all probability, what lies behind Coleridge's remark that "it may explain a wave; but not a Leaf or an Insect."¹⁰ The applicability of this enigmatic remark to Spinoza is doubtful enough; it is quite pointless to try in Hegel's case. One of Hegel's principal aims was to invest nature with a dynamic which would sublimate or "lift" it into the realm of self-conscious mind. At the same time he set out to defeat monistic concepts of unity without

⁶ S.T. Coleridge, *Lay Sermons*, ed. D. Coleridge (London, 1852), pp. 124-25.

⁷ These have been published in A.D. Snyder, *Coleridge on Logic and Learning* (New Haven, 1929), pp. 162-65.

⁸ From the facing pages of Coleridge's copy of Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*.

⁹ Coleridge's copy of Hegel's *Logik*, p. 54.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 65.

differentiation - the worst offender in this respect being Schelling's Absolute, with which Coleridge himself flirted. In his notebook of October 1818, Coleridge lumps Spinoza, Schelling and Hegel together as exponents of a totally unmediated unity of "Ens and Non-Ens."¹¹

Coleridge's most persistent complaint is that Hegel's system is theologically unsound. He attached undue significance to the dialectical triad, interpreting it as an attempted literal translation of the Christian trinity and thereby paving the way for his own and others' serious misunderstanding of Hegel's purpose. Hegel regarded the Incarnation and the Atonement as the religious consciousness' imaginative rendering of rational truth, the continuous process of cancellation and preservation in all things. Hegel's assertion that Being is the unity of determinateness and indeterminateness met with Coleridge's approval because, he said, it concurs with the Platonist maxim that God is the "common measure of the Infinite and the Finite." "This," says Coleridge, "is the first sensible Remark that I have met with"¹² - and apparently the last, because he then severely reprimands Hegel for saying that the Kantian thing-in-itself is none other than that Absolute which men can know nothing about. Coleridge calls the thing-in-itself the rational "Idea in God," but adds that only God can realize unity-in-difference.

Coleridge is the most notable of those who struggled without success to understand Hegel's philosophy - not that Coleridge tried particularly hard. There are several relatively obscure figures whose struggles were more intense and whose approach to "der neueste Philosophie" was more earnest, if no more enthusiastic; but the fruits of their labours were on the whole no more promising. The "secret of Hegel" remained dark and seemingly impenetrable, save for occasional glimpses, until the 1870s. One of the first to penetrate the supposed mystery was Benjamin Jowett.¹³ He published no work on Hegel and barely figures in the history of philosophy, but he has his own intrinsic interest as a transmitter of ideas. There were many more abortive attempts to understand - and more successful ones to discredit - Hegel's philosophy after Jowett began to quietly "spread the word." Jowett's role as a teacher of philosophical idealism will be discussed in a later chapter.¹⁴ Here it will suffice to say something about Jowett as an intellectually sophisticated Christian who strove to assimilate Hegelianism and then totally rejected it.

In the summer of 1844 Jowett went on a reading tour of Germany with A.P. Stanley. In Dresden, Jowett sought out Erdmann, a disciple of Hegel who was attending a philological congress there. Like many students of philosophy in England, Jowett had heard of Hegel and his German reputation; but unlike most of his fellows he was prepared to undertake the arduous task of studying Hegel in the original. He and the future Archbishop Temple collaborated on a translation of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik, but abandoned the project in 1849.

His falling out with Hegel, like that of so many of the first Englishmen to come into

¹¹ The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. K. Coburn (London, 1973), vol. III, entry 4445.

¹² Coleridge's copy of Hegel's Logik, p. 89.

¹³ Benjamin Jowett (1817-93) went up to Balliol College, Oxford, in 1836 and remained a member of the college until his death. Elected a fellow while still an undergraduate, he then became a tutor (1842-70), was ordained in 1845 and was appointed Master of Balliol in 1870, which post he held for the rest of his life. He was appointed Regius Professor of Greek in 1855 and was Vice-Chancellor of the University, 1882-6. He became a controversial figure in the mid-century religious disputes because of his liberal views on Scriptural interpretation, as put forward in his Epistles of St. Paul and in the more widely read Essays and Reviews. His theological views were thought inconsistent with his Oxford professorship and there was considerable agitation against him. Throughout his career he was active in educational and university reform.

¹⁴ See ch. 5, pp. 43, 44, 45-46 and 47.

contact with Hegel, was theologically motivated. On the other hand, like Coleridge he was philosophically receptive to many of the "leading conceptions" of German philosophical idealism. Unlike Coleridge, he put them to scholarly use. Whereas Coleridge's knowledge of Hegel was sketchy in the extreme, Jowett's was thorough, added to which he had a much better understanding of Hegel's overall purpose and his relationship to the idealist tradition in Western philosophy.

Jowett was not a Hegelian primarily for reasons of religious belief, the insurmountable barrier between Hegel and many nineteenth century English writers. These reasons became inextricably bound up with a growing distaste for the direction taken by German philosophy. In a letter to A.P. Stanley, dated August 20, 1846, he says:

"The problem of...Truth idealized and yet in action, he does not seem to me to have solved; the Gospel of St. John does. Hegel seems to me not the perfect philosophy, but the perfect self-consciousness of philosophy."¹⁵

In another letter to Stanley (1847) Jowett complained that "the German theologues get more and more drawn into the whirlpool of philosophy, and all their various harmonies are but faint echoes of Schelling and Hegel."¹⁶ He admired F.C. Baur, the doyen of the Tübingen school of theologians, for not allowing his Hegelianism to get in the way of his Biblical criticism.¹⁷ In his contribution to Essays and Reviews (1860), "On the Interpretation of Scripture," there is no trace of Hegelianism, if one excepts the ideas of progressive revelation and of applying modern scientific and historical knowledge to Biblical criticism - which ideas are not directly attributable to Hegel, although he was one of those responsible for creating the German climate of opinion in which they were developed. A digression here upon Jowett's part in Essays and Reviews, a collection of articles questioning the literal interpretation of Scripture, may throw some light on the climate of opinion in mid-Victorian England.

Jowett's reputation rests upon his classical scholarship and his Mastership of Balliol. It is usually forgotten that he was also one of the "seven against Christ," the contributors to Essays and Reviews. This book has often been coupled with Darwin's Origin of Species (1859) as marking the great turning point in Victorian life, the beginning of an age of doubt. In fact, Essays and Reviews was written by sincere Christians with no desire to undermine the faith of their readers. Most of them were ordained, including Jowett, which gave a misleading appearance of official sanction to the heterodox views which they expressed - but which they by no means originated. Their timing upset an ecclesiastical hierarchy particularly sensitive to intimations of heresy. The Church of England was at that time under intellectual pressure both from within and without, and sober criticism soberly presented was not well received. Jowett's essay, "On the Interpretation of Scripture," was a model of sobriety and judiciousness. Drawing upon his studies in German Biblical criticism, Jowett proposed that the intellectual energy expended on making Biblical texts fit current problems and preconceptions be applied to discovering "not what Scripture may be made to mean, but what it does."¹⁸ To do this required the critical tools of the philologist and the historian and the attitude of mind with which we approach a pagan text. We must make the effort to understand the minds of the Prophets and the Apostles and the circumstances in which they spoke and wrote. Above all, we must attend to the text without preconceptions. Only in this way can we hope to establish a fixed, certain and authoritative interpretation of Scripture. Scripture is, of course, sacred. It is divinely inspired. How can it, therefore, be susceptible to criticism? How can it be shaped in any way by historical accident? Jowett introduced the idea of progressive revelation to meet this problem. "The Word" corrects and expands itself. No one utterance in Scripture is sufficient

¹⁵ E. Abbott and L. Campbell, The Life and Letters of Benjamin Jowett (London, 1897), vol. I, p. 92.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 142.

¹⁷ See a letter to Stanley of 1848 in Ibid., p. 162.

¹⁸ B. Jowett, Essays and Reviews (London, 1860), p. 240.

apart from the whole, but the meaning of Scripture is there, entirely within itself, as it is in "any other book written in an age and country of which little or no other literature survives and about which we know almost nothing, except what is derived from its pages."¹⁹ This is what Jowett meant by saying: "Interpret the Scripture like any other book." These few words - which he italicized himself - appear innocent enough now; but in the middle of the nineteenth century, when for most people the Bible was not like any other book, these words were heresy.

That Jowett was discussing the interpretation of Scripture and not the evaluation of its content could easily be overlooked. He particularly distinguished between the interpretation and the adaptation and application of Scripture. Jowett's interpretative canon was actually rather puritanical and fundamentalist: no assistance from patristic or other commentary; no a priori notions about nature and origins. His avowed intention, however, was to ease the inevitable advent of full and untrammelled criticism of religious dogma and received truth, and to free the "moral power" of Scripture from theological accretion and disputation. He affirmed the religious quality of the search for truth. That the truth will be found in Scripture is, however, a question of faith. Jowett was concerned to elicit the true meaning of Scripture because he believed that it was, as no philosophical system could be, the absolute truth. He could never support the sort of claims made for human reason by Hegel.

Jowett was uneasy about the ideas of development and evolution because they threatened to undermine moral values by encouraging relativism. In his commentary on Plato's Republic, he earnestly endeavoured to reconcile his profoundest moral and religious beliefs with doubts raised by arguments drawn from the history of morals, arguments whose force he could not deny. As one might expect, he disapproved of many of Plato's political proposals, especially of those for the "guardian" class in the just society. But Jowett treated such ideas not as an expression of classical Greek culture or as a problem in Plato's thought, but as a dismaying mental aberration.²⁰ He defended the Christian scheme of values very much as if it were a timeless, immutable Platonic Idea. It is hard to resist the conclusion that Jowett was one of those who preferred philosophy to be a heritage or a legacy, a store of great thoughts, rather than a living force whose purpose is neither to reinforce religious belief nor to promote moral rectitude.²¹ Jowett's alarm at the philosophical tendencies of his age was both Platonic and anti-Platonic: the new philosophy seemed to him sophistry, but his response frequently resembled that of Polemarchus in the Republic.

Towards Hegel, Jowett's attitude changed drastically, as Hegelianism acquired increasing prestige and authority in British universities. In his 1871 introduction to the Sophist, he says: "The system of Hegel frees the mind from the dominion of abstract ideas."²² On the other hand, we must not become enslaved to Hegelianism, which has freed us to apply Hegelian criticism to itself as well as to other systems. In later editions of the same introduction, Jowett berates Hegel for the absence of a transcendent God or "beyond" in his philosophy. Some of his criticisms in his later notebooks - admittedly not published and therefore not to be read as his considered views - are bitterly anti-Hegelian. The Hegelian deduction of categories, he says, is defective because "any possible association by which he can pass from one abstraction to another is enough for him."²³ Then there is the rather intemperate remark that "Hegel did nothing at all for the elevation of German life."²⁴ Jowett's preference for poetry and religion and his distaste for systematic philosophy became increasingly pronounced

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 382.

²⁰ The Republic of Plato, trans. B. Jowett, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1908), vol. II, pp. 125-28.

²¹ "Philosophy in late ages has been to a great extent a falling away from Plato." (B. Jowett, notebook No. 25, p. 38.)

²² Dialogues of Plato, trans. B. Jowett, 4th ed. (Oxford, 1953), vol. III, p. 201.

²³ B. Jowett, notebook No. 25, p. 27.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 45.

in his last years.

H.L. Mansel is interesting for the use he made of Hamilton's interpretation of Kant's philosophy to combat the Hegelian unity of thought and being.²⁵ He was widely read as a theologian in mid-Victorian times and enjoyed a minor philosophical reputation. In what little he wrote about Hegel, Mansel used him as an awful warning to the "neophyte in Rationalism."²⁶ For Mansel, Hegel was merely the most extravagant of the German absolute idealists, the logical result of the philosophical pantheism initiated by Kant. This is a somewhat ironic outcome since, according to Mansel, it was Kant who had shown the limitations of consciousness and the inaccessibility to pure reason of absolute, unconditioned reality. But Kant had ignored the warnings of his own theoretical philosophy and, on the basis of his moral philosophy, made rash speculations about the nature of the absolute and unconditioned region beyond consciousness.

"Kant proved, though he did not accept his own conclusions, that whatever is made known by consciousness must be relative: his successors admitted the conclusion, and consistently attempted to construct a philosophy of the absolute which should be above consciousness. Kant had proved it to be impossible to bring the object within the grasp of the subject: there remained the wilder attempt to expand the subject to the immensity of the object."²⁷

Mansel saw quite correctly that in the philosophy of Hegel there is a strong suggestion that "man must himself be God."²⁸ In company with many twentieth century French commentators, Mansel held that Hegel's philosophy is one of unqualified atheism - or rather, a pantheism, which for Mansel amounted to the same thing.

His philosophical point of departure was Hamilton's philosophy of the "Conditioned." Hamilton's conversion of Kant's forms and categories into anti-metaphysical barriers afforded much-needed philosophical ammunition for the theological resistance to the "wilder attempts" of German philosophical idealism. The divergence of the Hamiltonians from Kant is clear, however. For Kant, the substantively non-existent may have a practical existence as well as a regulative function - not in the sense that it is morally useful, but that its existence is necessitated by the experience of the moral life. God, freedom and immortality are for Kant moral necessities; neither pure reason nor revelation can verify them.

Mansel's philosophically bolstered theological objections to German idealism represent the religiously motivated opposition to Hegel at its most cogent and discerning. They pivot on the contention that Hegel was guilty of the sin of intellectual pride. He presumed to show that thought is the measure of existence. In the Bampton Lectures for 1858, The Limits of Religious Thought, Mansel tried to show that thought cannot be the measure of existence, and that "...the contradictions which arise in the attempt to conceive the infinite have their origin, not in

²⁵ Henry Longueville Mansel (1820-71), an undergraduate at St. John's College, Oxford, from 1839 to 1843, was first a private tutor, then elected a "professor fellow" in 1864. He was ordained in 1845. He was a reader in moral and metaphysical philosophy at Magdalen College, and became University Professor of Ecclesiastical History, 1866-8. In the latter year he was appointed Dean of St. Paul's and left Oxford. A High Church Tory, his edition of Hamilton's Lectures (1859) was the occasion for a vitriolic dispute with J.S. Mill - see Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865).

²⁶ Mansel's Metaphysics contains a six-page (hostile) survey of Hegel's ideas, and the footnotes suggest some direct acquaintance with Hegel's Logik.

²⁷ H.L. Mansel, "Lecture on the Philosophy of Kant" (delivered at Magdalen College, May 20, 1856), pp. 37-38. Compare George Santayana's Egotism in German Philosophy for a wide-ranging and provocative presentation of the theory that German philosophy, particularly since Kant, has been a persistent attempt to transfer the whole objective world to the domain of the subjective will.

²⁸ H.L. Mansel, "Lecture on Kant," p. 38.

the nature of that which we would conceive, but in the constitution of the mind conceiving...."²⁹ Substantive knowledge of the infinite is impossible. We do, however, have valid regulative ideas about the infinite, which knowledge is revealed to us only by the grace of God. Mansel's distinction between substantive and regulative is not Kant's. For the latter, regulative ideas are aids to speculation. It can be very fruitful to regard reality as if it were purposive or as if it were a plenum, although we cannot say that reality is really purposive or a true plenum. These notions have no substantive application to the world of space and time. Mansel uses "regulative" in the ordinary sense of rules and regulations. The God of our religion commands us and we act accordingly. The Christian religion tells us how to behave; it is not supposed to satisfy our intellects. The highest principles of thought are principles of action: "...they do not tell us what things are in themselves, but how we must conduct ourselves in relation to them."³⁰

Mansel was a theologian rather than a philosopher, but his Bampton Lectures attracted considerable hostile criticism on the grounds that he had depreciated theology intellectually. We do, said his critics, have substantive knowledge of the infinite, of God. What Mansel was doing, in fact, was cordoning off an area of knowledge in which revealed religion - not theology - would be the arbiter. To accomplish this, he used philosophy against itself. Philosophy is self-limiting: when properly undertaken it delimits the area beyond which it is necessarily incompetent. It can discover the necessity of its own limitations. The Hegelian reply to such philosophical modesty is that it is false modesty - knowledge of the limit suppresses the limit. As a Christian theologian, Mansel started from a hard core of religious belief. But he attempted to beat the philosophical idealists at their own game. By using philosophical weapons to defend revealed religion, he could be accused of bringing the enemy into the sacred camp. However, there can be no doubt that Mansel's intention was to harness philosophy to the service of religion. Philosophy, he claimed, cannot make cognitively worthwhile pronouncements about the Absolute, nor can it establish a higher moral law, such as Kant's categorical imperative, by which one might judge Christian doctrine. Mansel attempted to subordinate philosophy to religion. As we shall see later, there were attempts to isolate them from each other and also attempts to find in philosophical idealism a substitute religion.

A.S. Pringle-Pattison was a pioneer of the movement which later developed into personal idealism.³¹ His first appearance in print was as a collaborator with Bernard Bosanquet, D.G. Ritchie and others in the production of a kind of philosophical manifesto, dedicated to the memory of T.H. Green.³² It was inspired by the confidence of a new generation of British philosophers in the tools made available to them by German philosophical idealism, and above all by Hegel. In his contribution, "Philosophy As Criticism of Categories," Pringle-Pattison - or Seth, as he then was - is already steering that middle course between Kant and Hegel which he held to, with considerable latitude, in all his subsequent work. He accepts the initial Hegelian assumption that we can have knowledge of reality, but with a Kantian caveat about the dangers of a priorism: "...the trustworthiness of knowledge is and must be an assumption. But

²⁹ H.L. Mansel, The Limits of Religious Thought (London, 1858), lecture II, p. 60.

³⁰ Ibid., lecture V, p. 141. Compare J.H. Newman, Grammar of Assent (London, 1870), pp. 90-91: "...man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal... Life is for action. If we insist on proofs for everything, we shall never come to action: to act you must assume, and that assumption is faith." These words were actually written in 1841.

³¹ Andrew Seth (1856-1931) changed his name to Pringle-Pattison in 1898 as one of the conditions for inheriting a family estate. From 1878 to 1880 he studied in Germany, where he imbibed a good deal of Lotze. Perhaps for reasons of ancestry, he was a lifelong proponent of the Scottish "common sense" philosophy. He also contrived to be a neo-Kantian and a Hegelian. He was Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of St. Andrews, 1887-91, and at Edinburgh, 1891-1919.

³² Essays in Philosophical Criticism, ed. Haldane and Seth (London, 1883).

this does not mean that every reasoned conclusion is true."³³ For Pringle-Pattison the chief value of the Hegelian unity of thought and being lay in its solution to the epistemological dualism of Kant's philosophy:

"From the standpoint of a theory of knowledge, it will be found that the mind and the world are in a sense convertible terms. We may talk indifferently of the one or of the other; the content of our notion remains in both cases the same."³⁴

From the moral and metaphysical standpoint, however, he became more and more dissatisfied with the Hegelian enterprise.

While T.H. Green thought the Cairds had been "overpowered by Hegel," Pringle-Pattison lumped Green together with Edward and John Caird as Hegelians who had not read their Kant well enough. They had reduced God to a bare geometric point, the abstract principle of unity which is the common centre of every rational experience. Kant had taken great pains to warn against the impropriety of hypostatizing such a purely regulative principle. In his Gifford Lectures (University of Aberdeen) for 1912-13, The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy, Pringle-Pattison takes Green, Caird and all the British Hegelians to task for their abuse of the principle of unity, "which recurs in their writings almost ad nauseam."³⁵

The trouble, in Pringle-Pattison's view, began with Hegel himself. His "Spirit" or "concrete Idea" remains abstract,

"...and unites God and man only by eviscerating the real content of both. Both disappear or are sublimated into it, but simply because it represents what is common to both, the notion of intelligence as such. They disappear not, indeed, in a pantheistic substance, but in a logical concept."³⁶

Pringle-Pattison complained that Hegel, in his union of God and man in Spirit, had not been able, as he claimed, to successfully combine two different strands of thought, the one a logical hierarchy of universals, the other an historical development through particulars. What had happened was that the Hegelian Absolute had swallowed up "both God and man as real beings...leaving us with the logical Idea itself as the sole reality."³⁷ Hegel's unity of God and man destroyed both: God became humanity or the human spirit or human civilization, and man became a generalized abstraction. In bringing God - the ideal, the Fichtean Sollen - down to earth, Hegel had overlooked the operation of transcendent ideals in human life and promoted the advent of a self-satisfied religion of humanity.

It was the "evisceration" of finite individual man which most agitated Pringle-Pattison. He maintained the "imperviousness" of the finite self in contradistinction to those British Hegelians, F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet in particular, who wrote in terms of the individual "merging" into the Absolute, and of his value lying entirely in his contribution to the whole. Bosanquet was Pringle-Pattison's principal target, because his monism was tempered by a certain "grudging" recognition of finite personality. He agreed with Bosanquet that reason is one and its unity the necessary ground of communicable human experience, that value judgments are objective, and that their objectivity is the sine qua non of the moral life. The universal inheres in every individual. Bosanquet went on to argue that the individual subject is dependent for his value upon his participation in the universal subject. For Bosanquet the fullest embodiment of the universal subject that we know is the state, the most highly organized and articulated form of political society. What Pringle-Pattison took strongest

³³ A.S. Pringle-Pattison, "Philosophy as Criticism of Categories," Essays in Philosophical Criticism, p. 38.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 13-14.

³⁵ A.S. Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy (New York, 1920), pp. 195-99.

³⁶ A.S. Pringle-Pattison, Hegelianism and Personality (Edinburgh, 1887), p. 155.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 191.

exception to was Bosanquet's "depreciation" of the finite self, his refusal to recognize the permanent value of the finite individual. The individual is the creative centre of experience. Universal reason lives in and through him: there can be no common shared experience but for his sharing it; there can be no objective morality but for his willing it. According to Pringle-Pattison, the monistic tendency in Bosanquet's thought led him "...to treat the individual, qua individual, almost as a negligible feature of the world, and in the issue, consequently...to treat the finite self as a transitory phenomenon."³⁸ The other half of philosophical idealism's organic theory of experience must be given its due. The universal realizes itself as much through individuals as they through it. Bosanquet had, in effect, destroyed individuality. The finite self was no longer a focalized unity or centre of experience, but a quality or adjective of the Absolute; and, having destroyed individuality, Bosanquet could not then assert the Absolute to be the only true individual.³⁹

Bosanquet's crypto-Spinozism was not the only alternative to pluralism, to "a doctrine of ultimately self-subsistent, independent and unrelated reals." Pringle-Pattison felt the only satisfactory alternative to unmediated pluralism was a theory of membership, hints of which had appeared in Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures. The organic analogy which Bosanquet was so fond of deploying furnishes no grounds, according to Pringle-Pattison, for inferring the dissolution of finite individuals as centres of intrinsic value and independent development. The individual members of a state, for example, are self-conscious members, and their membership develops and expands their sense of selfhood. Bosanquet did not quarrel with the notion of whole and part deriving value from each other, but he denied that ultimate value resides in the individual self-consciousness, that the end of the process of Spirit's unfolding is a world of finite individuals. The value of the individual lay, for Bosanquet, in his contribution to the common store of value. It is a distinctive contribution, but the emphasis is on the contributing, not upon the contributor.

There were many like Pringle-Pattison who, in an age of doubt, took refuge in the consolations of philosophy. They had reasons of the heart for gladly, eagerly accepting the principle that the individual can realize himself only in something larger than himself, "through absorption in objective interests and in the currents of the universal life." But they also felt that there had to be something further. "Although the individual may not make himself his own End, the world of finite individuals may well constitute the End of the Absolute."⁴⁰ Pringle-Pattison's Absolute is, as one might expect, the Christian God, "who lives in the perpetual giving of himself, who shares the life of his finite creatures...."⁴¹ Such an Absolute, realizing itself in everyday human experience, he considered the only one consistent with a unified view of the world. God, for Pringle-Pattison, was both "the fundamental structure of reality" and an infinitely suffering, infinitely sorrowing being. It is instructive in the present context to see what he had to see about the retrograde character of latter-day Hegelianism:

"The essential feature of the Christian conception of the world, in contrast to the Hellenic, may be said to be that it regards the person and the relation of persons to one another as the essence of reality, whereas Greek thought conceived of personality, however spiritual, as a restrictive characteristic of the finite - a transitory product of a life which as a whole is impersonal. Modern Absolutism seems, in this respect, to revert to the pre-Christian mode of conception and to repeat also the too exclusively intellectualistic attitude, which characterizes Greek thought in the main."⁴²

³⁸ A.S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 266.

³⁹ In Pringle-Pattison's homely metaphor, the individual is not a waterpipe through which the Absolute courses.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 401.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 291.

Pringle-Pattison's complaint about the excessive intellectualism of British Hegelianism had another dimension. He was one of those "back-to-Kanters" whose dissent from Hegel's ambitious claims for speculative reason drove them towards some form or other of dualism. The most important considerations in Pringle-Pattison's case were moral and religious. Like Kant, he was concerned to preserve God, freedom and immortality. The primacy of the moral will is a distinctive feature of his work.⁴³ He doggedly persisted in trying to make more room in the Hegelian system for individual moral action. This linked him informally with the personal idealists - Sturt, Schiller, Rashdall and others - which in turn placed him on the fringes of pragmatism. Pringle-Pattison frequently referred to himself as a "critical realist," one whose belief in the independent reality of what we know is conditioned by Kant's teaching as to what we can know.

The personal idealists were not, strictly speaking, Hegelians.⁴⁴ Although some of them regarded themselves as belonging to the "Oxford school" of philosophical idealism, their collective *raison d'être* was a reaction against what they saw to be its increasingly dominant attitude: world-weary fatalism and a smug conviction that absolute idealism was the final philosophical word. The Hegelians were, as a group, excessively intellectualist and self-satisfied, and too remote from the "real world" of moral choice. There is a certain irony in this assessment, in view of the energetic reforming activities and social casework engaged in by many British Hegelians. However, their do-gooder politics - which, in fact, irritated some other, and philosophically important, Hegelians - were somewhat *dirigiste*, and they had a tendency to talk like the apostles of a new religion of the state. The personal idealists were not unjustified in detecting signs of hardening of the arteries in the Hegelian philosophical system, and in calling it static, especially in its theory of truth. There is indeed a constant danger that a coherence theory of truth will degenerate into a process of merely excluding or explaining away what is inconvenient. The personal idealists were expressing a feeling of unease that rapid advances in various departments of human knowledge were leaving idealism behind, as well as their own conviction - symptomatic of the restlessness of the age diagnosed by cultural historians - that the human vocation was active, not contemplative, and that experience was "kinetic and dynamic."

In order to counteract what Henry Sturt castigated in *Idola Theatri* as the "Passive Fallacy," the personal idealists drew a great deal upon William James and psychological theories of the primacy of the will. In their hands idealism became an assertion of personal freedom and individual initiative, rather than an explanation of the world and experience. In their anxiety to save personality from absorption in the Hegelian Absolute, the personal idealists adopted a stance oddly reminiscent of Marx's rejection of Hegelianism and academic philosophy in his *Theses on Feuerbach* - but without the revolutionary conclusion.

"Minerva's owl, said Hegel, cannot begin its flight till the shades of evening have begun to fall. But, I think, that owl has hooted long enough. Hegel's alleged necessity of thought is nonsense. It is the duty of philosophy, I maintain, to establish theoretical principles on such matters as politics, moral conduct and education, and these principles should be valuable for the guidance of practical men."⁴⁵

In the case of at least one of them, the revolt was motivated in part by what amounted to personal animosity against F.H. Bradley, the pre-eminent metaphysician of the British Hegelians.⁴⁶ Personal idealism had American antecedents and its subsequent history in the form

⁴³ See especially *The Idea of God*, pp. 291-93.

⁴⁴ See *Personal Idealism*, ed. H.C. Sturt (London, 1902), and, for the clearest signs of pragmatism, F.C.S. Schiller's contribution.

⁴⁵ H.C. Sturt, *The Principles of Understanding* (Cambridge, 1915), p. vi.

⁴⁶ Bradley's work was "...inhuman, incompetent and impracticable intellectualism," said F.C.S. Schiller in "Axioms as Postulates," *Personal Idealism*, p. 127.

(or forms) of personalism was American and European, particularly French, rather than British. The British version easily slipped back into the loose-jointed pieties of a Christian idealism.⁴⁷

The story of personal idealism is in part the story of resurgent religious resistance to the claims of Hegelianism, in part a good illustration of the fact that British Hegelianism was never as cohesive a movement of ideas or as monolithic a body of thought as its rapid rise to academic prominence and the extent of its brief penetration of British intellectual life has led some commentators then and later to believe. The most philosophically rigorous of the personal idealists, J.McT.E. McTaggart, was not a member of this "school" at all.⁴⁸ His personal idealism was neither motivated nor occasioned by a revolt against Hegelianism; he was never interested in Hegelian ethics, political philosophy or philosophy of religion. Other than to dismiss it along with spiritualism, he was never interested in Christianity or any sort of revealed religion. His interest in Hegel was limited to the formal logic of the dialectic, but Hegel arguably had no bearing whatsoever on the construction of McTaggart's own metaphysical system.

⁴⁷ See the later writings of Hastings Rashdall and C.C.J. Webb's God and Personality (London, 1919).

⁴⁸ See ch. 10 and 11, pp. 86-90 and 93-97.

CHAPTER 4

J.H. Stirling: Kant as the "Secret" of Hegel

As indicated at the beginning of the previous chapter, some British thinkers in the middle years of the nineteenth century considered employing weapons forged by German philosophical idealism to defend revealed religion. Its seriousness about "eternal verities" appealed to the Low Church religious sensibility, whose literary personification was Herr Teufelsdröckh in Thomas Carlyle's Sartor Resartus. As the previous chapter also indicated, however, German philosophical idealism in the shape of Hegelianism came to be regarded by some commentators as a weapon either too unwieldy or too dangerous to its employer. One of those whose passion for German speculative philosophy never dimmed was J.H. Stirling.¹ Throughout a long career stretching into the twentieth century, he promoted Hegelianism as the champion of faith in God and righteousness. For this, but more for other reasons to be discussed in this chapter, his continuing reputation as the initiator of British Hegelianism cannot stand.

"The Historic Pabulum," Stirling tells us in his frenzied Carlylese, "passing from the vessel of Hume, was received into that of Kant, and thence finally into that of Hegel; but from the vessels of the two latter the generations have not yet eaten."² It was Stirling's self-appointed task to feed the multitude. Unfortunately, digested in the "vessel" of Stirling, the "Historic Pabulum" emerged in a very unappetizing condition. His enthusiasm for the "German mysteries" was greater than his skill at untangling them. The Secret of Hegel is ludicrously metaphorical in places, convoluted and tediously repetitive. He would have done well to have followed Hegel's advice - and example - and kept his preliminary intellectual struggles to himself. If he had eliminated the minute record of his own tortured progress to comprehension, frequently disguised as helping the incredulous reader, Stirling's exposition could have been briefer and yet afforded ample scope for a more extensive commentary.

Stirling's part in stimulating an intelligent British interest in Hegel has been highly overrated.³ The publication of The Secret of Hegel (1865) is conventionally regarded as the great watershed of Hegelian fortunes in Britain, the event marking the end of

¹ James Hutchison Stirling (1820-1909) received a medical degree from Edinburgh University in 1842. A competency on his father's death in 1851 allowed him to abandon his medical practice to study in France and Germany and devote the rest of his life to philosophy. He was the first Gifford Lecturer, 1888-90. The Gifford Lectures were to become a virtual preserve of the British Hegelians, and have continued to offer a forum for philosophical idealism long after Hegelianism ceased to be a force in British philosophy.

² J.H. Stirling, The Secret of Hegel, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, 1898), p. 1.

³ See especially J.H. Muirhead, "How Hegel came to England," Mind, vol. 36, October 1927, for the view that with Stirling's Secret of Hegel Hegel "arrived" in Britain. In spite of the illustrious names cited in praise of Stirling's work, we should not be misled about its nature. Even Green's endorsement is suspect because, as Jowett saw, Green exhibited a certain tendency to run Kant and Hegel together in somewhat the same way as Stirling did. Muirhead admits (p. 446) that Stirling failed to assimilate Hegel, and that his further attempts to establish Hegelianism upon the foundations of a firm grasp of the Critical philosophy were extremely badly done.

The persistence of the belief that Stirling was the first to properly explain Hegel to the English-speaking world is illustrated by G.D. Stormer, "Hegel and the secret of James Hutchison Stirling," Idealistic Studies, January 1979, pp. 33-54.

apathetic ignorance or misinformed hostility and the beginning of informed criticism. However, there is considerable indirect evidence to suggest that the work of bringing Hegel's philosophy to the attention of a small but well-prepared and receptive audience was underway before Stirling publicly divulged the "secret." Nevertheless, Stirling was the first writer in English to attempt a comprehensive exposition of the whole Hegelian system "in origin, principle, form and matter." He was the first to attempt to see the Hegelian system whole, to explain its overall meaning and to put it in its philosophical context. As well as having only German commentaries to assist him - some of which are as opaque and closely wrought as the Logik itself, which, with some assistance from the Encyclopaedia, was Stirling's Hegelian text - Stirling had the added handicap of no formal philosophical training.

Stirling continually emphasizes Hegel's peculiar brand of rationalism. There is really no excuse for failing to grasp the so-called secret of Hegel.⁴ It is the "concrete notion," the philosophical comprehension of everything as the working-out or rational explication of spirit. The form of the notion, the logical sequence which determines the course of spirit's development, Stirling maintains, was inherited from Kant; Hegel merely added the content. Stirling saw in the Kantian category of reciprocity the essence of Hegel's identity of identity and non-identity. He certainly did not deny Hegel's originality in putting flesh on the categories. He failed, however, to appreciate the full significance of what Hegel had done. Hegel did not simply put the finishing touches on the Kantian edifice. He boldly asserted the spirituality of the world and everything in it and made that most implausible point of view intellectually exciting. He gave it a rationale which is not divorced from the phenomena of consciousness and the natural world, nor from moral and political life. On the contrary, spirit achieves self-consciousness only in and through each of these.

Stirling did not grasp the full implication of the unity of thought and being. For him Hegelianism was no significant departure from Kantianism; the answer to Hegel's problem was set up for him by Kant and he had little more to do than dot the i's and cross the t's.⁵ Although there is a continuous line of philosophical development traceable from Kant through Fichte and Schelling to Hegel, Stirling's view disregards Kant's distinctive purpose, which was not to establish the rationality of the universe, but to preserve an area of human experience free from causal determinism. He was a dualist, whereas Hegel was a monist.

In the conclusion to The Secret of Hegel, Stirling examines Hegel's philosophy of religion. He makes the cardinal error of regarding Hegel's system as a vindication of traditional Christianity, and of the doctrine of personal immortality in particular. Hegel was by no means anti-Christian; but, as Stirling himself is forced to admit, he "refined" many of the "crudities" of traditional religion, and this process of refinement and rationalization did not leave Christianity as it was. For one thing, he subordinated it to the philosopher performing the rational reconstruction. Philosophy must be superior to revealed religion in explanatory power at least. Hegelianism expresses conceptually the truth which Christianity can only express in imaginative terms. It has been seen through the word-pictures to the pure unadulterated concept.

As for Hegel's political philosophy, Stirling interpreted the idea of an objective will as

⁴ The old jape, "If Mr. Stirling knew the secret of Hegel, he managed to keep it to himself," was presumably aimed at the barbarities of his style; there is no reticence about the so-called secret.

⁵ See J.H. Stirling, The Secret of Hegel, vol. I, esp. chapter 5, for the elaboration of Stirling's theory that Hegel's "concrete notion" lay complete within the Critical philosophy, and that he displayed ingratitude, even deliberate deceit, in covering his Kantian tracks. "The system of Hegel is contained all but ready formed in the system of Kant." (J.H. Stirling, The Secret of Hegel, p. 193.)

an attack upon the excessive subjectivity of laissez-faire political economy. The laissez-faire approach to political economy was particularly strong and self-confident when Stirling was writing. It often arrogated to itself the role of political philosophy proper. Nevertheless, it was highly proficient in its work of explaining economic life. Stirling seems to have looked upon political economy as merely poor political philosophy, whereas Hegel saw in it the explanation of bourgeois economic life and the means of introducing a subjective element into his theory of the rational state. Civil society is a necessary moment in the realization of the rational state, and is in itself implicitly rational. Stirling's lengthy attack upon political economy as such is, therefore, wide of the mark in an exposition of Hegel's political philosophy.

In a series of lectures on the philosophy of law delivered to the Juridical Society of Edinburgh in November 1871, Stirling explained Hegel's concrete universal in terms of free will.⁶ The discussion is confined to the Hegelian sphere of "abstract right"; whereas, strictly speaking, law, the ostensible subject of these lectures, emerges only in the sphere of "ethical life." The aspect of Hegel's political thought which Stirling emphasized was the mediation of the subjective - here analyzed, in Kantian terms, as the heteronomous - will by the objective will. This stage too belongs to a higher sphere than that of abstract right. The exposition is much more lucid than that of The Secret of Hegel, but it is vitiated by Stirling's inability to adequately distinguish Hegel from Kant, an inability which continued to impede his understanding of Hegel. In this case, he tends to confuse the theoretical moment of the will's freedom from determination by natural impulse and selfish interest with that of the concrete realization of freedom in Sittlichkeit. The first moment occurs in the transition from particular welfare to abstract good; the stage of inward-looking self-certainty or purely formal conscience intervenes before Sittlichkeit or ethical life is achieved. Stirling had a tendency to identify the objective universal with duty for duty's sake, a maxim which, according to Hegel, is an abstract characterization of the good and leads to the most extreme forms of subjectivity, all of which may be advanced as the commands of conscience. Stirling speaks of Hegel's objective spirit as "the realization of free will...in actual outward fact. That actual outward fact is the world of Right, the rational system of observances, legal, moral and political..."⁷ However, insufficient weight is given to specific determinations of the concept of freedom and to the historical necessity for societal actualization. About the reasoning from abstract right to a concrete and fully articulated "ethical life," and about the renewed activity of the dialectic of immediacy, particularity and individuality within the ethical order itself, Stirling says nothing, although it is only at the stage of Sittlichkeit that abstract right becomes embodied in law and subjectivity attains rational freedom. The cancelling and preserving of the subjective will in the objective ethical order is the chief distinguishing mark of Hegel's political philosophy, and it was in his own eyes the true fulfilment of what Kant had begun. Stirling evinced the continuity between Kant and Hegel at the expense of fundamental differences.

Stirling's was the first full-length study of Hegel to be published in English. But its success, measured in terms of a deeper and more imaginative understanding of Hegelianism, of scholarly criticism and new departures in philosophy, was negligible. Stirling did something to create a climate of opinion in which Hegel could be taken seriously, but he made no direct contribution to a sober appreciation and critical understanding of Hegelianism. His was an isolated attempt to divert the course of British philosophy - or to inject new life into it, depending on one's point of view. There was a further hiatus of ten years before the work of

⁶ J.H. Stirling, Lectures in the Philosophy of Law (London, 1873). These lectures were first published in 1872 in the Journal of Jurisprudence and Scottish Law Magazine, and subsequently in book form together with Whewell and Hegel, and Hegel and W.E. Smith: A Vindication in a Physico-Mathematical Regard.

⁷ J.H. Stirling, Lectures in the Philosophy of Law, p. 24.

assimilating Hegel got underway in a thorough and penetrating fashion.

Like the members of the St. Louis Philosophical Society in America - in particular, W.T. Harris and G.H. Howison - but without the advantage of their esprit de corps, Stirling was a zealous amateur for whom speculative philosophy or metaphysics offered a sort of religious consolation as well as an intellectual fortress in a world of materialism, skepticism and agnosticism, if not outright atheism. He ploughed a rather lonely furrow, not being part of the academically centred "Hegelian School" and, like Herbert Spencer, somewhat self-consciously not seeking popular acclaim. Unlike Spencer, his work was never popular, in spite of his long-standing reputation as the discoverer of Hegel. His genre, however, was one for which there was considerable demand from the Victorian reading public - serious-minded philosophical literature, designed partly to explain to the educated layman what was happening in the world of philosophy, partly to provide inspiration and reassurance to vaguely religious or agnostic people in the conduct of their everyday lives. Among the British Hegelians proper, only McTaggart took popularization seriously. He combined logical rigour and technical expertise with a lifelong commitment to the proposition that metaphysics is a matter of real concern to everyone and that the metaphysician is under some obligation to assist the common moral and religious consciousness in coming to terms with the cosmos. McTaggart came to doubt whether, as Stirling believed, Hegelianism could be of very much assistance in this regard.

CHAPTER 5

Hegel and Classical Scholarship at Oxford

Nothing was published between Stirling's Secret of Hegel and William Wallace's Logic of Hegel (1874) to further the cause of Hegelianism in Britain - with the possible exception of Stirling's Edinburgh lectures on the philosophy of law. During that time, however, the North British Review printed two articles by T.H. Green which were highly critical of "cultivated opinion."¹ The Anglo-Saxon mind, said Green, had not progressed beyond the sensationalism and subjective idealism of Locke and Berkeley, and had not grasped the import of Hume's skeptical conclusions. The first article, entitled "The philosophy of Aristotle," appeared in the September 1866 issue; the second, "Popular philosophy in its relation to life," appeared in that for March 1868.² Both assume the higher standpoint of the Critical philosophy and allude to the more unified Hegelian system. In the first, Aristotle is commended for implying ways of overcoming the Platonic dualism of the world and the Idea and then criticized for not pursuing these suggestions and for retaining a God who is an unmoved mover, a transcendent being and entirely passive contemplator. In this connection, Green cites the Hegelian dictum that God without the world would be no God at all - thought is nothing without its externalization.

The second essay is aimed particularly at the discrepancy between the political theory of utilitarianism and its theories of knowledge and moral judgment. Utilitarianism, says Green, is radically incoherent in that, while it bases itself on a sensationalist theory of knowledge and professes an egoistical morality, the political theory of utilitarianism assumes a common end superior to particular interests. Green argues that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is no more than an agglomeration of individual happinesses, but the greatest happiness principle is ostensibly a unifying principle and, as such, inconsistent with its atomistic construction. This internal conflict would not be irreconcilable if a unifying principle, adequate to the task of comprehending the final result in its development and in its totality, could be found. Such a solution to the problem of rationally and systematically explaining the apparent disintegration and disunity of civil society - the world of "getting on" - demands a fully self-conscious metaphysic which has "lived" everything it purports to explain; it cannot impose itself upon any aspect of experience.

In these early essays Green recommended that British moral and political philosophers pay more attention to theoretical considerations and to the work of the German philosophical idealists - which at that time had been out of fashion in Germany itself for almost a generation. The means to a fuller understanding of moral and political life lay close to hand. Not only were Kant and Hegel available - admittedly Hegel was not available in English except

¹ Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882), like Bradley and several other British Hegelians, was the son of an Evangelical clergyman. The peculiar significance of this background in the case of Green's philosophy has been well and thoroughly explained by Melvin Richter, The Politics of Conscience: T.H. Green and his Age (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), esp. ch. 1-4. He was Jowett's most distinguished student at Balliol. He was elected a fellow of Balliol in 1860 and became Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1877, which post he held until his death. He served on the Taunton commission, investigating schools in the Midlands, 1865-6; he was from 1875 a reforming Liberal on Oxford City Council; and he was active in numerous voluntary associations (local and national) in aid of various kinds of social improvement, especially working-class education and temperance. In national politics he was a John Bright radical.

² Both are collected in T.H. Green, Works, ed. R.L. Nettleship (London, 1885-8), vol. III.

for a few badly translated excerpts - but Aristotle was readily accessible and familiar, if no longer the staple intellectual diet of the universities. Aristotle's idea of potentiality and actuality is one of the principal constituents in the Hegelian idea that the world is the unfolding of a single concept from bare abstraction to full concretion. Green was one of the first to make this affiliation clear to the English reader.³

In his biography of Benjamin Jowett, Sir Geoffrey Faber claims that he was the man responsible, more than any other, for the introduction of Hegel into England.⁴ Although he never published any Hegelian translation or commentary, Jowett is supposed to have initiated British Hegelianism by word of mouth. There is clearly something in this, when one considers his length of tenure at Oxford, his influential position there and the distinguished academic careers of some of his students. He lectured on Hegel at Oxford and was tutor at Balliol to both Green and Edward Caird.

Jowett's fame was, first, as a teacher and an educational reformer, and second - but more lasting - as a classical scholar, especially as the translator of Plato's dialogues. He continually revised this work, and wrote introductions and analyses which were not superseded in some cases for decades. Jowett made use of Hegelian notions to illustrate Plato's theory of Ideas. There is an obvious danger in this of portraying Platonic philosophy as merely a stage in the development of Hegel's, as immature Hegelianism. Hegel himself maintained that earlier philosophies were partial expressions of the truth which his own system completed. This did not mean that these earlier systems were inadequate - they were necessary in their time, at their stage in the development of thought. But they are inadequate from the Hegelian vantage point afforded by their actualization. On the whole Jowett avoided the pitfall of anachronism in his explication of Plato. He repeatedly emphasized the fact that Plato was struggling, virtually at the beginning of philosophy, to clarify and refine the language of common sense and everyday experience in order to make it into a sharp, efficient philosophical tool. In I.M. Crombie's words, Plato was the "midwife's apprentice" - assisting, however, not merely at the birth of individual ideas, but at the birth of philosophy itself.⁵ As Jowett points out, Plato was far from successful at his self-appointed task: he was often the victim of those verbal confusions and ambiguities, and metaphors taken literally, which he was trying to eradicate. But he did manage to expose many linguistic muddles masquerading as philosophical problems. More important than this, he saw philosophy as the discovery of the spiritual principle in the world and as the imposing of order upon the chaos of sense experience.

Plato's reaction against the crude inductivism in which he felt the thought of his day was floundering, and against the moral relativism which he regarded as the logical result, led him to advance an extremely bold doctrine: the theory of Ideas. These transcendent entities, known a priori, are timeless and immutable, unaffected by the flux of the sensible world, although the latter owes such shape and order as it possesses to the Ideas. Jowett felt that Plato's conception of a priori knowledge tended to confuse the process of acquiring knowledge with the contemplation of absolute knowledge. Nevertheless, he upheld the Platonic vision of a real world of Ideas. In entertaining such a vision, Plato was explained and partially justified by the continuing need felt for a comprehensive system of knowledge, a need which philosophers as disparate as Descartes and Hegel had attempted to satisfy.

"Nor can we deny that in ancient times knowledge must have stood still and the human mind been deprived of the very instruments of thought if philosophy had been strictly confined to the results of experience."⁶

³ See especially T.H. Green, "The philosophy of Aristotle," Works, vol. III, pp. 75-80.

⁴ G. Faber, Jowett (London, 1957), pp. 177-83.

⁵ I.M. Crombie, Plato: The Midwife's Apprentice (London, 1964). "Plato was trying, for much of the time, to invent logical shape." (p. 26.)

⁶ B. Jowett, Dialogues of Plato, vol. II, p. 80.

Jowett was very careful not to facilely attribute Hegelian anticipations to Plato. In his introductions to the Parmenides and the Sophist (particularly the latter) he carefully weighed the arguments for and against regarding Plato's criticism of the Eleatic doctrine of the impossibility of non-being as a foreshadowing of Hegel's doctrine of the identity of being and non-being. He also considered how far Plato's theory of determination through negation anticipated that of Hegel (and that of Spinoza). He concluded that Plato had given us hints of the concept of non-being functioning as the determination of being, but that he had not explained this function in Hegelian terms - he remained unaware of development through the opposition of being and non-being. The most extreme of the Eleatics had denied the possibility of both falsehood and a sensible world as species of non-being. According to Jowett, Plato introduced the Eleatics as an illustration of transcendental speculation which has lost all contact with common sense. Further, Plato's own thought exhibited a dialectical movement from abstraction and the transcendent to concreteness and the familiar, the Laws representing the conclusion and completion of this process. Jowett owed this notion to Hegel's view of the history of Greek philosophy. At one point he links the two philosophers together through "the spirit which places the divine above the human, the spiritual above the material, the one above the many, the mind before the body."⁷ Jowett was fully aware that Hegel was not a transcendentalist, that for him the spiritual was present in the material, the one in the many. As a reflective Christian, however, Jowett could not accept the sheer immanence of the spiritual. On the other hand, he clearly could not on that account exclude Hegel from the idealist tradition. In spite of differences within that tradition, there is, he felt, the great connecting link of the repudiation of the isolation of ideas, one from another. "The Platonic unity of differences or opposites is the beginning of the modern view that all knowledge is of relations."⁸ This Platonic unity, says Jowett, is the forerunner of "the Hegelian concrete or unity of abstractions."⁹ It is not related, however, to the full Hegelian unity of thought and being, a theory of the nature of the world and experience which, in its sweepingly comprehensive monism, is much more audacious than Plato's theory of Ideas and which Jowett the theologian found repugnant.

Jowett's letters and unpublished notebooks make it clear that he came to regard Hegel as a man "drunk with metaphysics" and capable of a metaphysical fanaticism as pernicious as the more familiar religious kind. He had many harsh words for the new passion for metaphysics and the resultant neglect of "facts." Jowett was especially disappointed by Green, whom he had originally singled out to be the hammer of the philistine empiricists, such as Bain and Spencer. Unfortunately, as Jowett saw it, Green was infecting others with his own scholasticism. The revolt against the tyranny of empiricism had degenerated into "interminable disputes over abstractions." Among all the conventional strictures on Green's Hegelianism - excessive abstraction, immoral quietism, overweening intellectual pride - is the following shrewd comment:

"Like the true syncretist, he is unable to distinguish Kant and Hegel any more than the Neoplatonist was able to distinguish Plato from Aristotle. He is the servant of philosophy, not the master of it."¹⁰

In political theory, Jowett inclined toward a utilitarian rule of thumb. Although he considered utilitarianism inadequate to account for moral obligation, he maintained that "the most useful is the most holy" and was prepared to justify certain institutions by their social utility alone. Plato, he says, "did not intend to oppose the useful to some higher conception, such as the Platonic ideal, but to chance and caprice."¹¹ Generally speaking, he steered clear

⁷ B. Jowett, Dialogues of Plato, vol. I, p. 263.

⁸ B. Jowett, Dialogues of Plato, vol. III, p. 351.

⁹ Ibid., p. 353.

¹⁰ B. Jowett, notebook No. 25, entitled "Philosophy," dated August 9, 1881, p. 57.

¹¹ B. Jowett, Dialogues of Plato, vol. II, p. 212.

of the increasingly heated debate between atomist and organicist tendencies in political theory. The character of any human society, he says, is simply the balance of individual wills "limited by the condition of having to act in common." On the other hand, "we hesitate to say that the characters of nations are nothing more than the sum of the characters of the individuals who compose them; because there may be tendencies in individuals which react upon one another."¹²

Jowett argued that the search for an identity of individual and communal moral wills is indicative of a primitive type of morality which men revert to when under the influence of party or prejudice. He appears to have overlooked Hegel's injection of a subjective element into, and consequent radical alteration of, Plato's theory of the ideal state. Jowett attacked Hegel's political theory for the defects of a political theory which belonged to a period of human history when there were no individuals in the modern European sense, when there was not the same degree of individual self-consciousness. Moreover, he detected in Hegel's theory of the rational state an irrational appeal to the sort of collectivist sentiment cultivated by modern despots. In an unguarded moment he baldly stated that "political absolutism is the necessary result of philosophical idealism."¹³

On the model of his approach to the interpretation of Scripture, Jowett was at pains to distinguish - not always successfully - between Plato the Greek thinker of the fourth century B.C. and Plato the founder of that idealist tradition of which Hegel was the most notable modern representative. The Hegelian "succession of moments in the unity of the Idea" Jowett considered the nearest approach in modern philosophy to the universal science of Plato. Both philosophers "conceived the world as the correlation of abstractions...."

"There is, however, a difference between them: for whereas Hegel is thinking of all the minds of men as one mind, which develops the stages of the idea in different countries or at different times in the same country, with Plato these gradations are regarded only as an order of thought or ideas; the history of the human mind had not yet dawned upon him."¹⁴

Plato's system of knowledge was also a metaphysical system, an account of the world as it really is. The real was rational for him, as it was for Hegel. Plato's system, however, was a static hierarchy; Hegel's was an expanding movement from implicitness to explicitness. The nub of the Hegelian system is that it is developmental. The Hegelian notion of a rational spirit coming to be in the world by coming to know itself in the world is one of which Plato could not have conceived. Plato had no such conception in the back of his mind when he "confused" acquiring knowledge with the contemplation of absolute knowledge. He did not possess the idea of development, only that of change. Plato's Idea of the Good is both fully real and uninvolved in temporal change; it is eternally complete and explicit. Hegel's world spirit requires change, contingency and concrete particularity for its explication or realization.

Jowett was praised by many illustrious Oxford graduates as a great teacher and the one who made them aware of Hegelianism. By 1845 it would seem likely that Jowett was using examples drawn from German philosophical idealism in his teaching at Oxford, but the nature of his teaching is difficult to estimate. An examination of his notebooks in the Balliol library did not resolve the difficulty. His extant notes and jottings on Hegel consist of partial outlines

¹² B. Jowett, Republic of Plato, vol. II, p. 138.

¹³ B. Jowett, notebook No. 1, p. 125. It might be of some minor historical interest to establish a date for Jowett's first notebook. If the date inscribed on No. 25 - 1881 - means anything, then perhaps No. 1 reflects in part the anti-Hegelian reaction which Jowett would have been exposed to when he was in Germany. On the other hand, it's more in keeping with the testiness of his later criticism of Hegel. At any rate, it anticipates the most common assessment of Hegelian political theory in the English-speaking world in the twentieth century.

¹⁴ B. Jowett, Dialogues of Plato, vol. II, p. 159.

of the Hegelian system, subject headings which are frequently in the form of epigrammatic and enigmatic questions, and those obiter dicta which he considered the most valuable element in Hegel's own writings. His later notebooks contain a number of querulous remarks complaining of the abstraction of all metaphysics, especially Hegelian. Nevertheless, there is sufficient testimony that the teaching of Jowett at Balliol - with all his reservations about Hegel - made a significant contribution to the naturalization of Hegel. Furthermore, he taught other and more enthusiastic teachers of Hegelianism.

Edward Caird was one of those - a steady, persistent purveyor of Hegelianism for some forty years and the doyen of the British Hegelians in the 1890s.¹⁵ By 1866, Caird was teaching more or less along Hegelian lines at Glasgow.¹⁶ His Hegel, which was not published until 1883, is still a good short introduction to the study of Hegel's philosophy. His two full-length studies of Kant's philosophy were both written from a Hegelian standpoint.¹⁷

In spite of Jowett's, and Green's, teaching at Oxford, the university was extremely reluctant to give official recognition to Hegel. As for Cambridge, it was not until 1895 that the philosophy of Hegel was offered as a special subject in the moral sciences tripos. However, questions about various aspects of Kant's philosophy had been appearing periodically in the Cambridge examinations for almost forty years prior to that - which put Cambridge considerably in advance of Oxford, at least so far as official acknowledgment of German philosophy was concerned. One might detect in this the academic influence, both administrative and intellectual, of Henry Sidgwick.¹⁸ His utilitarianism was subtle and broadly based, drawing upon the ethics of "right" and intuition, as well as that of "good" and consequences. The greatest happiness of the greatest number was a moral imperative for Sidgwick, as much as it was a natural good. In expounding this view he made direct use of Kantian arguments. In addition to the weight of his intellectual reputation, Sidgwick's activity in the cause of tripos reform was instrumental in expanding and enriching the moral sciences reading list at Cambridge. Cambridge's moral sciences tripos showed a broad interest in German philosophy long before Oxford's literae humaniores did. There is no doubt, however, that Oxford was the first to make significant and original contributions to Hegelian studies; and it continued to be the source of most of the best work in philosophical idealism.

It also appears certain that the dominance of Plato and Aristotle in literae humaniores, which lasted much longer than in the Cambridge moral sciences tripos, had a lot to do with the greater Oxford interest in Hegel. The "Greats" school at Oxford, in its application of classical scholarship to the study of ancient history and philosophy, made continual reference to modern philosophical developments and to the social and political problems of contemporary England.

"The first condition of a right understanding of our institutions and ways of thinking and of a sane progress in politics and philosophy is the study of the growth of our civilization, both on the side of practice and on that of thought, from its

¹⁵ Edward Caird (1835-1908) studied classics and philosophy at Balliol under Jowett. He was a classmate of T.H. Green, his close friend, with whom he shared an enthusiasm for working-class interests and improvement. He was briefly a fellow and tutor of Merton College before being appointed Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow University, 1866-93, and then Master of Balliol to succeed Jowett, 1893-1907.

¹⁶ Evidence for this, Edinburgh and Oxbridge recognition of German philosophy (discussed in the following two paragraphs) can be found in university calendars and degree examination papers from 1855 to 1905.

¹⁷ See A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant (Glasgow, 1877) and The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (Glasgow, 1889). See also ch. 11 of the present work (pp. 92-93) for a discussion of Caird as a promoter of idealism as a sort of surrogate for religious belief.

¹⁸ See ch. 6, pp. 52-53, for a discussion of Sidgwick's brand of utilitarianism.

roots in ancient Greek life and speculation."¹⁹

As we have seen from a discussion of his Platonic scholarship and because of his prominent position in the Oxford "Greats" school, Jowett was clearly a key figure in the transmission of Hegelian ideas. His progressive disenchantment with Hegel and with metaphysics as a course of undergraduate study led him to reduce but not eliminate the Hegelian ingredient in his commentaries upon Plato. The publication of Jowett's Dialogues of Plato in 1871 - a translation accompanied by lengthy introductions and analyses - was something of a philosophical as well as a philological and literary event, and it retained its authority through many editions.

William Wallace, another student of Jowett, translated the first part of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences as The Logic of Hegel, which was published in 1874.²⁰ It marks the beginning in earnest of British Hegelianism. It was with the stream of Hegel translations, Hegelian commentaries and Hegel-inspired philosophy, which flowed strongly from the mid-1870s through to World War I, that philosophical idealism came into its own as a school of British philosophy. The major source of that stream was Oxford, especially Merton and Balliol Colleges - Jowett and Green were Balliol men; Caird, after many years at Glasgow, returned to Balliol as Master on Jowett's death; Bradley was a fellow and Wallace a fellow and tutor of Merton.²¹

As Wallace pointed out in his "prolegomena" to The Logic of Hegel, Hegel had written his Logik (the "Greater Logic") almost sixty years before and many changes had occurred in intellectual life since then, the most significant of which were the spectacular success of natural science and the widespread assumption of the inductive method as the only sure way to reliable human knowledge. One by-product of these changes was a dismissive attitude toward speculative philosophy of all kinds. Positivism and empiricism and the self-denying philosophy of the unknowable had virtually swept metaphysics away by the time Wallace published his Logic of Hegel. Wallace's grasp of Hegel's meaning and purpose was unprecedented in English commentary upon German philosophy. His "prolegomena" offers an account of Hegel's unity of thought and being - its progressive self-development, the expansion and explication of logical categories from an abstract point in being - which does not confuse the logical dialectic with its manifestations in nature and human history. At the same time, the necessity of spirit's self-externalization in nature and human history is made evident. As Wallace says, Hegel's philosophy is the intellectual grasp of "what is" and is itself an actualization of the rational. Like Stirling before him, Wallace proclaimed the Hegelian enterprise: philosophy is both the real process of the world's creation and its culmination. Unlike Stirling, however, his presentation is notably clear and succinct.

"True philosophy must show that it has got hold of what it means to discuss: it has to construct its subject matter; and it constructs it by tracing every step and movement in its construction shown in actual history. The mind is what it has been made...."²²

At one point in his "prolegomena" Wallace attacks the prevailing political theory of individualism:

"The business of the political philosopher is not to trace the limits between

¹⁹ D.G. Ritchie, Philosophical Studies, ed. R. Latta (London, 1905), p. 5 (from the biographical memoir by Latta).

²⁰ William Wallace (1844-97) came to Balliol College from the University of St. Andrews in 1864. He became a fellow of Merton College in 1867 and a tutor in 1868. He succeeded Green as Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1882, which post he held until his death.

²¹ The association of Merton with Hegel was maintained by H.H. Joachim and G.R.G. Mure, who recently retired as Warden of Merton.

²² W. Wallace, The Logic of Hegel (Oxford, 1874), p. liv.

state interference and the liberty of particular citizens, nor to play the one off against the other so as to determine their several spheres, but to see how these two fragmentary aspects unite."²³

This is a recurrent theme of British Hegelianism - the total interdependence of the state and its individual members, founded upon the unity of the individual and the collective mind. In the Gifford Lectures for 1895, Wallace put this in the context of the organic theory of society:

"That intelligence and reason, conscience and language, emerge only through social, collective or combined action is the point. Sociality is not mere juxtaposition, mere aggregation..."²⁴

In another, more political essay Wallace is unreservedly Hegelian. The state is not only logically prior to the individual and the actualization of morality in the shape of legally enforceable rights, but it is also "the mortal God, and in this world it should be ubiquitous and omnipotent."²⁵ Such a strongly worded sentiment in favour of state power sounds an ominous note to those living in the latter half of the twentieth century, and it certainly suggests something other than Hegel's carefully articulated Rechtstaat. However, the doctrines of individualism and natural rights tended to provoke an exaggerated response from the British Hegelians. Under the calm surface of late Victorian and Edwardian political life a strong current of extremism was running, and Wallace's views reflected not only a passion for Hegelian philosophy, but also the Hegelians' intense dislike of the many current theories which "claimed too much for liberty." When the Great War broke out in 1914, the United Kingdom was deeply divided on a number of issues and large-scale violence threatened on the Irish and labour fronts, to such an extent that some commentators have said that a second English civil war was in the making.

Elsewhere Wallace expressed doubts about the state's capacity to fulfil the moral end for man. Like Green and Bosanquet, Wallace recognized that the social "organism" often appears to its member "organs" as a social "mechanism," an external and inhuman constraining force rather than the embodiment of their free rational wills. The social forms may become divorced from "the inner state of affairs" and the feeling of being coerced may be justified. When "the social form...comes to possess an authority of its own independent of what it represents," when "it asserts itself as a separate structure with a life and interests of its own," then it has become a "morbid growth."²⁶ Strictly speaking, the idealist theory of the state cannot accept a representational account of "social form," according to which it represents a rather mysterious "inner state of affairs." It is the necessary external reflection and embodiment of the "inner state of affairs"; there cannot be an inner state of affairs existing independently of the institutions of society. In the same essay, Wallace goes so far as to concede a right of ultimate judgment, even of rebellion, to individual conscience in matters which belong, according to Hegel, to the determination of objective mind. The state subsumes the claims of morality - and those of religion. Any conflict between the demands of the rational state and those of morality and religion can be resolved only by further social growth - that is to say, by expansion of the rational will, not by the state simply yielding to the morality of constituent individuals and groups.

Wallace is best known as an able translator and lucid expositor of Hegelianism. In addition to the Logic of Hegel, Wallace also translated the third part of the Encyclopaedia as Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (1894). He also wrote occasional essays, such as "The Relation of Fichte and Hegel to Socialism," which expounded Hegel's philosophy in a clear, concise fashion

²³ Ibid., p. clxiii.

²⁴ W. Wallace, "The Relation of Religion to Morality," Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics, ed. E. Caird (London, 1898), p. 122.

²⁵ W. Wallace, "Our Natural Rights," Ibid., p. 263.

²⁶ W. Wallace, "The Legal, Social and Religious Sanctions of Morality," Ibid., p. 460.

and related it to topics of current British concern. He was, however, sometimes incautious in his restatements of Hegelian themes. One example is the following passage from his Gifford Lectures:

"The rule for man is not to merely accept the given, but to mould and fashion it for himself. In him nothing merely is: it is to be: it has taken on it a new law, the law of becoming, as the law which governs him and the things he deals with."²⁷

Here Wallace has taken the idea of an inwardly controlling pattern of logical development which permeates all things and projected it into the imperative. It then begins to look very much like the Promethean rule of man over his environment rather than an explanatory principle. The "law of becoming" is not quite the same thing as the Hegelian unfolding of Being. Wallace has here superimposed upon the Hegelian enclosed infinite the traditional open-ended one, the strictly endless infinite. The world, for Hegel, was not static or finished. But, while it may not have reached its end, the end is known and in that sense achieved. The end is full self-knowledge, the self-consciousness of the universe as spirit. The end is known because human reason is the vehicle of that self-consciousness.

For those reconstructions of Hegelianism which are both more original and more true to the spirit of Hegel, we must look to three of Wallace's contemporaries: F.H. Bradley, T.H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet. Before we do, something needs to be said about utilitarianism, the moral and political theory which dominated British intellectual life in mid-century and which had hardened into something like orthodoxy by the 1870s. The moral theory of self-realization and the idealist theory of the state were produced, in large measure, by way of reaction to utilitarianism, and opposition to that school of thought united the British Hegelians more than any other single factor.

²⁷ W. Wallace, "The Relation of Religion to Morality," *Ibid.*, p. 112.

CHAPTER 6

The Principle of Utility from Hume to Sidgwick

Hegelianism, as a movement in British thought, was impelled in great part by profound dissatisfaction with the utilitarian account of moral and political life. It owed its brief vigour as much to its fierce opposition to hedonism and utilitarianism as to the positive inspiration it drew from Hegel and German philosophical idealism. Utilitarianism or universalistic hedonism was the theoretical frame of reference for enlightened and progressive opinion during most of the Victorian age. Its classic formulation is usually taken to be John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism, published in Fraser's magazine in 1863.¹ It is in this work that Mill committed that logical "howler" over which generations of critics have gloated, and because of which utilitarianism is held by many to be defective at its very core. Mill moved from the supposed fact that everyone desires only his own happiness to the alleged consequence that everyone should desire the happiness of all, the greatest collective happiness. Put like this, the mistake seems fairly obvious. In Mill's words, however, the notion has a certain initial plausibility:

"No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons."²

He immediately went on to establish that happiness is the only intrinsic good and the "sole criterion of morality."

There are, to be precise, two logical errors in Mill's statement. In the first place, it does not follow from each person's happiness being a good to that person that the general happiness is a good to the aggregate of all persons. No matter how one puts each person's private happiness together with everyone else's, the result is more likely to be a chaos of conflicting happinesses than a concerted general happiness; an aggregate of personal goods is not a common good.

Mill's second error is the celebrated is-ought slip. Now it is a commonplace of moral philosophy that one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is." That is, to proceed from a statement or statements about what is the case to statements about what ought to be, or be done, is to shift one's logical ground. Statements about what is and statements about what ought to be are of radically different logical types. If one attempts to ground the latter in the former, one commits a fundamental logical error. A non-moral "ought" - as in, "If you're going out to the theatre, you ought to get ready" or "It ought to rain tomorrow" - can follow from "is" statements without vitiating the argument; whereas the moral "ought" of obligation can only be derived from statements among which there is at least one which itself contains the moral "ought." Mill maintains that the only reason the general happiness is desirable is that each person desires his own happiness.

¹ It was first collected with On Liberty and Representative Government in 1910 for the Everyman's Library edition, and together with his System of Logic they constitute the best part of the "philosophy" if not the operating principles of reforming liberals in the nineteenth century.

² J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism (Everyman ed.), pp. 32-33.

"The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it."³

Here is that frequently imperceptible shift from "is" to "ought" at its most perceptible. The error is committed in the shortest possible space and with the least possible disguise.

It is so blatant that one feels that Mill may well have been aware of it, but had reasons for believing that he had not actually committed it. He may have been equating the fact that something is desired with its desirability. Desirability, or goodness, would then be the same thing as being desired; to say that something is desirable, or good, would be to say no more than that it is desired. This is the kind of tautology which G.E. Moore had in mind when exposing the so-called naturalistic fallacy. If "desirable" just meant "desired" it would cease to be an ethical word at all. Normally "desirable" means more than having a capacity for being desired. In this sense, it is quite unlike "visible" or "audible," and Mill's analogy breaks down - unless he was abandoning usage in favour of an entirely non-ethical meaning of "desirable," which is highly unlikely. Perhaps Mill did not intend to empty "desirable" of all ethical content whatsoever, but merely to detach it from the moral "ought." In that case, "desirable" would still be a synonym for "good," but goodness would be a pleasing quality like the warmth of the sun's rays on a winter day. This line of argument would have the net result of emptying "good" of any strictly moral imperative: what is good ought to be, but there is no duty incumbent upon anyone to further it. Again, it is highly unlikely that this was Mill's intention, since he commended the love of virtue for itself alone as a disposition valuable in the promotion of acts contributing to the general happiness - virtuous conduct is good as a means to the one intrinsic good, the general happiness. As a utilitarian, Mill could hardly maintain that virtue is an end entirely in itself.

It is in terms of a derivative theory of morality that one can partially justify Mill's logical carelessness. In a clearly definable sense, "ought" must be grounded in "is." Here is the second of a pair of antinomies: it is indisputably the case that "ought" cannot be derived from "is," and likewise that "ought" must be derived from "is"; and yet both are also untrue. The solution to these antinomies hinges upon the dual interpretation of "derived." In the first, one cannot derive "ought" from "is" in the analytical sense - in other words, there is no necessary relationship of implication - but one can in the looser sense that an "ought" is a natural desire that has been moralized. In the second, one must derive "ought" from "is," otherwise the "ought" is empty - one ought to do nothing. On the other hand, one must not do so, otherwise the moral quality of the thing that ought to be done is lost. The strictly moral properties of a desirable action are injected by the moral will; the fact that there is a desire to do it does not entail its morality. However, if it were not desired the moral will would be working in a vacuum.

As Hegel would say, the difficulty arises from taking each of the antinomies in isolation from the other. A synthesis of the two can be made in such a way that the truth of each is preserved. The synthesized truth is that what ought to be done satisfies human nature, and what makes it morally obligatory is the conscious decision to make it part of a rational plan of action. Every blind impulse, every unreflective desire is not automatically a moral obligation. However, a moral obligation created in defiance of natural good - and some moral codes have contained commandments contrary to human survival itself - must be unworkable. Furthermore, the content of the will is ultimately supplied by desire; the will imposes itself upon the desire - in the case of the moral will, from a moral motive. The moral will can be its own end, but to be an effective will it must be a will to do something good, and the handful of goods which are

³ Ibid., p. 32.

intrinsically good are so largely because they are desired. Their goodness and their being desired are inseparable. Anything which is conducive to them ought to be done because it is desirable - in both senses of the word. If goodness - which is presumably something which ought to be for its own sake, if not the only end in itself - is detached from human desires, it surely loses all relevance to the moral life. The desirable must be capable of being desired, it must answer to some human need, as well as be desirable in the strictly ethical sense of the word. For the desirable to be good, it is not sufficient for it to be desired, but it is necessary.

Some moral philosophers have argued very convincingly that there are certain right actions whose rightness cannot be derived from goodness, that there are some things which one ought to do regardless of consequences, such as pay one's debts or tell the truth. Nevertheless, something must be done, some change in the actual state of affairs must be at least intended, and the moral will must place itself in the world of conflict and passion - either deliberately or heedless of the consequences. In the same way, the intrinsically good, whose goodness cannot be derived from some higher or more inclusive good, is a natural as well as an ethical object. It is a complex of needs and desires which have been moralized; a process of mediation is required before a desire can be desirable. The establishment of a connection between "is" and "ought" involves greater use of self-conscious reason than that revealed in Mill's apparently unwitting shift from desire to desirability. However, in making that shift, he implicitly affirmed an important ethical truth which has often been lost sight of: although that which is desired is not necessarily desirable, the desirable must be something which is capable of being actually, humanly desired.

Mill's "naturalism" places him, as a moral philosopher, closer to Hegel than those British Hegelians, notably Green, who were influenced in their ethics as much, if not more, by Kant as they were by Hegel. For Hegel, the natural heteronomous desires are not amoral, not something to be coerced into moral order by the good will. The pursuit of pleasure, for example, is implicitly moral, although not the height of moral endeavour. Contrary to hedonism, men do desire ends other than pleasure. Contrary to Kantianism, there is no loss of morality in the desiring of them - or of pleasure. There can be no morality without desire, not because morality must suppress desire or else die of inactivity, but because morality is rationalized desire. Hegel's concept of *Sittlichkeit* and Mill's version of the principle of utility both devote considerable attention to the morality of everyday life, including that of the marketplace. One frankly acknowledges the hedonistic motive; the other seeks to transform it into an ethical precept. While Hegel's is the more ambitious theory, tracing a rational continuity between family life and law, and between "getting and spending" and service of the state, both purport to unite unreflective need and self-conscious effort to realize the good.

Henry Sidgwick explicitly recognized Mill's logical error, and did not try to derive the desirability of something from the fact of anyone's actually desiring it: he saw clearly that to argue the entailment of a thing's desirability from its actually being desired was to confuse psychology with ethics.⁴ He maintained that the utilitarian goal, the greatest

⁴ H. Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, 7th ed. (London, 1907), bk. I, ch. 4 and bk. III, ch. 13.

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) was, like T.H. Green, a product of Thomas Arnold's Rugby. He went to Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1855, became a fellow in 1859, resigned in 1869 because of conscientious objection to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, and was reappointed when the law requiring subscription was changed. He was elected Knightsbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1883. He lectured and wrote voluminously on a wide variety of topics, economic, political and literary as well as philosophical. He initiated an eccentric Cambridge tradition of serious philosophical interest in extra-sensory perception and psychical research, which has been continued, first by a student of his, McTaggart (of whom more later in ch. 10 and 11), and then by McTaggart's expositor, C.D. Broad.

happiness of the greatest number, was a fundamental moral intuition; whereas Mill believed that from their being desired it directly followed that any amount of happiness or combination of happinesses was desirable. Sidgwick regarded the utilitarian goal as ethically irreducible - it is an analytical truth that the supreme good is the general happiness.⁵ One cannot, on the basis of human behaviour, prove the desirability of the general happiness and the superiority of universalistic over egoistic hedonism. The consistent egoist is irrefutable. He is also very unusual in that he has either successfully suppressed all his disinterested motives, or else he had none to begin with. Such a person will have to either conduct himself as if he were in a Hobbesian state of nature with other persons; or, given the existence of a moral sense in human beings, he must irrationally hope for better treatment from others than he metes out to them. The core of Sidgwick's argument is the construction of a universalistic ethic out of the alleged utilitarian intuition that individual welfare is inseparable from the general welfare. Psychological hedonism, the theory that each person desires only his own separate happiness, was an ethical red herring as far as Sidgwick was concerned.

For his defence of universalistic hedonism, Sidgwick drew upon intuitionist moral philosophers. From Bishop Butler's doctrine of the paramountcy of conscience and from Kant's theory of the self-legislating practical reason, he fashioned arguments in support of his belief that there is, in fact, a sense of moral obligation which prompts human beings to pursue the happiness of a widening circle of others. Sidgwick agreed with the intuitionists that people feel they are absolutely obliged in certain cases to act in a certain way, that they have moral duties which take precedence not only over their personal interests but even over some more general good; that there are, in short, moral rules which people obey without further consideration, without looking beyond the rule itself.⁶ Sidgwick went on to assert that such rules, in spite of their being felt to be completely autonomous and categorical, can nevertheless be shown to be comprehended by the greatest happiness principle, and that conflicts between these categorical imperatives - which conflicts constitute one of the most demanding aspects of the moral life - are usually resolved by some such principle. The utilitarian end is a unifying, synthetic principle. It gathers together all the different duties and obligations, all the separate moral intuitions, under one head. It is their common ground, although not their common source, and it is itself an intuited moral truth:

"...the Intuitional method rigorously applied yields as its final result the doctrine of pure Universalistic Hedonism - which it is convenient to denote by the single word, Utilitarianism."⁷

Sidgwick's explanation of the connection between intuitionism and utilitarianism did not make the greatest happiness principle respectable in the eyes of the British Hegelians. Their quarrel was with the fundamental intuition itself, that the moral end for man was a net balance of pleasure. It was not redeemed by being a collective or social objective rather than one for separated individuals. Their critique of the greatest happiness principle is best exemplified in the work of F.H. Bradley, which will be discussed in the following chapter. Their objections to hedonism were an integral part of their campaign against the utilitarian view of man in society.

⁵ "...if the duty of aiming at the general happiness is thus taken to include all other duties, as subordinate applications of it, we seem to be again led to the notion of Happiness as an ultimate end categorically prescribed - only it is now General Happiness and not the private happiness of any individual. And this is the view that I myself take of the Utilitarian principle." (H. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 8.)

⁶ This did not prevent Sidgwick from objecting, in almost Hegelian fashion, that Kant's conception of "humanity as an end in itself" was a sort of "paralogism," in that no principle of benevolence toward actual human beings with "empirical desires and aversions" could be deduced from it. (*Ibid.*, p. 390.)

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 406-07. See also pp. 475-80.

Utilitarian political writings of the post-Napoleonic period were a defence of liberal-democratic gains against the general European reaction, in which campaign offence was the most effective form of defence for the English utilitarians because the Industrial Revolution and the attendant increase in power for the middle classes had advanced so much further in Britain than elsewhere in Europe.⁸ Utilitarianism's belated success in inspiring many nineteenth century English legal and political reforms owed a great deal to its ideological links with laissez-faire political economy and its decidedly unrevolutionary opposition to those feudal remnants which both romantics and reactionaries were futilely trying to breathe new life into. With the co-optation of the industrial bourgeoisie by the British ruling class, utilitarianism became almost respectable. It had always been contemptuous of the natural rights of man, and its espousal of political democracy was one of cool calculation, not heartfelt commitment; but as a science of social reconstruction, it was inherently subversive of the closed corporations and hierarchical structure of traditional society. The method of utilitarianism's founder, Jeremy Bentham, was the method of enlightened despotism - the confidence in human malleability of a Condorcet wedded to the power of a Hobbesian sovereign.

James Mill proceeded, under Bentham's tutelage, on the assumption that society can be theoretically broken down into its individual components without residue or loss and that these individuals are independent, self-contained units. Furthermore, they are entirely and inevitably self-centred - each pursues only his own best interest. One's best interest is a favourable balance of pleasure over pain, which it is in the nature of the human being to seek. In his Essay on Government (1828) Mill says of human nature:

"We must content ourselves with assuming certain results...for example, in general terms that the lot of every human being is determined by his pains and pleasures, and that his happiness corresponds with the degree in which his pleasures are great and his pains are small."⁹

Every human being, says Mill, "has an insatiable desire for the means to his own greatest happiness," the chief of which is the power to induce - or coerce - conformity of others' wills to the pursuit of his interest. This is a "law of nature," the result of which, in concatenation with other such laws, is that "the interest of the community, considered in the aggregate or in the democratical point of view, is that each individual should receive protection...."¹⁰ It is, of course, one's interest to calculate the long-term and indirect consequences of one's actions, and the reactions of others, and to weigh pleasure against pleasure, pain against pain. The enlightened man recognizes that his pleasure frequently lies in that of others - there is a natural identity of interests. This natural harmony can be reinforced and enlarged by an artificial one, the manipulation by the government of the incentive of pleasure and, more effectively, the disincentive of pain. The good society on this view is a legal framework within which the individual can pursue undistracted his own particular happiness. His fellow members of society are no more to him than contributors - or hindrances - to his personal happiness.

The utilitarian account of society was an atomistic one. It derived much of its original impetus from the comparatively new science of political economy, which deliberately isolated the economic motive for the purpose of studying the exchange of material wealth, of land, labour, capital and their products. The theoretically untrammelled operation of the economic motive was taken by the early utilitarians to corroborate their theory that society is an

⁸ The European dimension should be noted because, while utilitarianism was a primarily English-speaking phenomenon, it had deep roots in the Continental Enlightenment. Bentham drew at least as much from the philosophical materialism of Helvetius and the penology of Beccaria as he did from the associationist psychology of Hartley. Furthermore, he wrote for a European audience and was read much more widely in translation than in English.

⁹ James Mill, An Essay on Government, ed. C.V. Shields (Indianapolis, 1955), p. 48.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 65.

aggregation of self-centred pleasure-seekers. It was for them the mechanism and the activities of the free market writ large. The institutional side of social life - those slow historical accumulations which survive the generations - was regarded with intense suspicion as the shield of sinister interests. The role that society plays in shaping man as a moral being, and in presenting him with fresh moral demands and opportunities, was not recognized by Bentham and James Mill. In fact, they seem to have been singularly insensitive to the whole gregarious side of human nature. This cannot, in fairness, be said of either Sidgwick or John Stuart Mill; but they failed to take full account of the extent to which man is a creature of the society which he has himself created. J.S. Mill acknowledged the existence of "a deeply rooted conception which every individual even now has of himself as a social being, [which] tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures...." "This conviction," says Mill, "is the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality."¹¹ Mill never abandoned the atomistic view of society implicit in Benthamite utilitarianism, in spite of "this conviction" of social "harmony," and in spite of what Coleridge had taught him about the underlying rational meaning and purpose of many received opinions and ancient institutions. He continually reaffirmed the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the supreme good and refused to abandon psychological hedonism as the basis for utilitarian ethics. He talked of harmonizing individual feelings and aims, never of sharing a common interest which transcends any combination of individual interests.

Sidgwick had more sense of historical continuity than other utilitarians and tended increasingly to see some kind of moral fulfilment in the expansion of "the European polity." For Sidgwick the greatest happiness principle was primarily an explanatory device, a method of analyzing the moral life and of synthesizing moral rules. For both the Mills and Bentham, it had greater cutting edge, more practical employment. Although J.S. Mill belonged to a less revolutionary age than did his father and Bentham, he too looked upon the greatest happiness principle as the exposer of dangerous "fictions," the solvent of dogma and the scourge of antiquated laws and rotten institutions which impeded human progress. He was also confident that the enlightened man or "philosopher" could safely rationalize the common moral consciousness as enlarged self-love. Mill did not deny that conventional morality was indispensable to social cohesion; but it required rationalization, it needed to be examined in the light of the greatest happiness principle and trimmed accordingly. He was sure that the introduction of that principle into the moral life would simply confirm most of the established moral code and strengthen the existing sense of duty and social obligation. As has been noted many times before, Mill tried valiantly to combine two opposing philosophical traditions: the root-and-branch reform one of Bentham, and the conservative, historically minded one of Coleridge. He attempted to graft a sense of community and the notion of cumulative social growth onto the utilitarian trunk, the idea that society is no more than the aggregate of individuals who presently compose it and that nothing binds them together but enlightened self-interest. The attempt failed because it was a graft which could not take - the two ideas were incompatible.

It is interesting to compare Hume with the utilitarians on this matter - if only because coming to terms with Hume was seen by many of the British Hegelians, especially T.H. Green, as an essential propaedeutic to disposing of utilitarianism. Hume was a precursor of utilitarianism in his advocacy of the principle of utility. Yet in Hume's philosophy the principle of utility was invoked in support of natural sociability. Ordinary virtue was a useful means to the preservation of social harmony and stability. The utilitarians, on the other hand, regarded the social order as a means to promoting individual happiness, albeit the greatest amount of the greatest number. They conveyed no sense of society being anything other than the aggregate of individuals composing it, of its constituting any common bond among them. It is a common interest only insofar as it serves every particular individual interest;

¹¹ J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism (Everyman ed.), p. 31.

in other words, it is something different to each one. Morality is as much a matter of enlightened self-interest within society as it would be without - if such a condition were conceivable - the only difference being that one must in one's own interest be more considerate of the interests of others in an organized political society. One interpretation of Hume depicts him resisting the spread of this "personal convenience" view of society:

"His 'utility' is based not exclusively or even primarily on the separate, calculating individual, but essentially on what he took to be general and objective social experience.... By derivation [from what was seen to be an organic relation between the market and society as a whole] the relationship between personal moral decision and the social process could also be seen as organic.... The emphasis on separate individual moral calculation had appeared long before Hume, and was an object of his conscious attack.... His whole enterprise can be seen as an attempt to restore the identity of social and personal virtues at a time when the tensions of change had forced and were forcing these apart."¹²

In the light of Raymond Williams' interpretation, one might discern an affinity between Hume's social and political thought and that of the British Hegelians. His appreciation for the social virtues places him closer to them than to his utilitarian successors. Strangely enough, both Bradley and Green evinced at least as much empiricism and Humean skepticism about theoretical preconceptions as did their supposedly inductivist utilitarian opponents. But then it was a common charge of their critics that the utilitarians were excessively abstract theorists of man and society. J.S. Mill himself, in the sixth book of his System of Logic, drew attention to Bentham's "geometrical method in politics" and its fundamental error of deducing social effects from one allegedly comprehensive premise about human nature.¹³ The Benthamite premise is that men's actions are always determined by their private interests. One could argue for and against that premise, produce contradictory as well as confirmatory examples of human behaviour. The theoretical point of importance is that the utilitarians abstracted individuals from their social context, only to re-assemble society out of those same individuals, now stripped of prejudice and prescriptive right. The image of human nature which emerged from this procedure was a monstrosity. However, the utilitarians were less concerned to explain the real nature of man in society than they were to rid people of obscurantist political notions and replace them with the principle of utility. Mankind's "two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure...determine what we shall do." We can only "pretend to abjure their empire."¹⁴ It was the pretensions of "principles adverse to that of utility" which Bentham was especially concerned to destroy. A lot of painful mistakes would continue to be made if legislators and administrators were not supplied with a clear utilitarian rationale for their actions. Such a rationale was the utilitarian science of morals, which is to say, of human behaviour.¹⁵

¹² Raymond Williams, "David Hume: Reasoning and Experience," The English Mind: Studies in the English Moralists Presented to Basil Willey, ed. H.S. Davies and G. Watson (Cambridge, 1964), p. 144.

¹³ Macaulay is the critic usually credited with successfully identifying in the public mind the name of Jeremy Bentham and absurd abstraction from social reality.

¹⁴ J. Bentham, Morals and Legislation, p. 125.

¹⁵ "The only right ground of action, that can possibly subsist, is, after all, the consideration of utility, which if it is a right principle of action, and of approbation, in any one case, is so in every other. Other principles in abundance, that is, other motives, may be the reasons why such and such an act has been done: that is, the reasons or causes of its being done: but it is this alone that can be the reason why it might or ought to have been done." (Ibid., p. 146.)

CHAPTER 7

F.H. Bradley: The Organic Theory of Society

In the very first sentence of F.H. Bradley's first published work, The Presuppositions of Critical History (1874), that subtle combination of elements drawn from Hegel's and other idealist thought with apt and acute psychological insights and an elegant, cadenced prose style which distinguished all of Bradley's writing manifests itself:

"In the world the mind makes for the manifestation of itself, and where its life is the process of its own self-realization, there the action and the knowledge of it are children, the hours of whose bringings-forth are never the same, and whose births are divided. Alike in the life of mankind and in the development of the individual, the deed comes first and later the reflection; and it is with the question, "What have I done?", that we awake to facts accomplished and never intended and to existences we do not recognize, while we own them as the creation of ourselves."¹

In spite of this Hegelian introduction to critical history, the critical part is itself strongly reminiscent of Hume on miracles. The historian, says Bradley, cannot accept testimony to the occurrence of an event for which there is no analogy in his present experience. If he is a critical historian, he possesses a coherent body of knowledge based upon the presupposition that, just as a natural event has a natural cause, so a historical event has a historical cause. Insofar as he can identify himself with the mind and the experience of the witness, the historian can accept his testimony; but his total experience is different and he is bound, as a critical historian, to apply the whole of his knowledge to his judgment of the acceptability of a piece of historical evidence. The critical historian does not passively receive facts; he exercises his judgment upon testimony. Every judgment is an inference, and every inference presupposes an already existing body of knowledge.² Bradley stresses the scientific element in the historian's knowledge - which is to say, the scientific knowledge available to him. It is scientific knowledge above all which makes of the historian's experience a criterion for judging the credibility of witnesses and the probability of historical events attested to. If there is nothing analogous in the historian's present experience, then the event as reported must be deemed improbable and rejected.

"The rule for the critical historian is always to keep on the side of safety. It is better to suspend the judgment and be wrong than to be right against reason and in the face of science."³

Natural science advances, and with its advance the presuppositions of critical history

¹ F.H. Bradley, Collected Essays (Oxford, 1935), p. 5.

Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924) was the son of a leading light of the Evangelical Clapham sect. While an undergraduate reading "classical moderations" and literae humaniores at University College, Oxford, from 1865 to 1869, he came briefly under the "spell" of T.H. Green. He became a fellow of Merton College in 1870 and remained there until his death. There were no teaching or lecturing duties attached to his fellowship, and he devoted himself to study and writing, being something of a recluse. Although he never exercised the sort of moral authority nor enjoyed the sort of community influence that Green did - nor could he in his circumstances - Bradley has been the British Hegelian most highly regarded by professional philosophers.

² This theory of judgment Bradley was to elaborate in his Principles of Logic (Oxford, 1883).

³ CE, p. 64.

change. History is the history of the present - that is to say, of the present state of knowledge. In Bradley's presentation of this theory, the mind continually subsumes new matter until it discovers that its experience is divided, that it contains within itself two conflicting systems of knowledge. A synthesis will emerge in which the new system conquers the old while assimilating it. This dialectical growth of the mind must continue as the mind seeks to overcome its limitations and comprehend the totality of things, to discover in the universe and in itself the mutual reflection of unity and system.⁴

This was as close as Bradley ever came to professing the Hegelian unity of thought and being. His great metaphysical work, Appearance and Reality (1893), consigns all kinds of discursive thought, all manner of reflection, to varying degrees of unreality. Each distinct area of rationalized experience is adequate in and for itself; but viewed metaphysically - sub specie aeternitatis - they are all self-contradictory because they are all infected by relations. Bradley began his attack upon relational experience - in other words, experience as analyzed by thought or reflection into related elements - in his Principles of Logic (1883) and sustained it on an increasingly wide front thereafter.

A prevision of the Absolute, which for Bradley was the metaphysical totality of all appearances, may be experienced at the level of unself-conscious feeling. At this level, before thought has occurred, there is no distinction between subject and object. The subject is a mere "form" of consciousness inseparable from its content. To feel something is to be immediately, unreflectively aware of a "non-relational unity of many in one." Even at the pre-judgmental level of experience, "from the very first beginnings of soul-life, universals are used."⁵ Between this level and that of the Absolute intervene countless levels of relational experience. The Absolute is supra-relational: it transcends relations while at the same time it is present only in relational experience; ultimate reality is contained entirely within its appearances. The Absolute resembles pre-relational experience in that it is a seamless whole, but it can only be reached through relational experience, through the various ways in which discursive thought separates and analyzes the modes of experience. We are never entirely separated from or unable to glimpse what Bradley calls the Absolute. Judgment and inference are thought processes which both separate and re-unite our experience. For Bradley, thought itself is driven to seek satisfaction - or rather, it is driven by dissatisfaction with its own partial "truths" - in comprehension beyond thought and its necessarily relational character.

The brunt of Bradley's attack on psychologism and the "school of experience" was that (logical) meaning and (psychological) "facts" or the alleged contents of the mind are two different things. His acerbic insistence on the difference was prompted by what he saw as bad

⁴ See F.H. Bradley, "Presuppositions of Critical History," appendix E, Ibid., pp. 69-70. Unlike Jowett and other members of the English "clerisy" who drank from the spring of German Biblical criticism, particularly from the "vessel" of F.C. Baur, the Tübingen historian and theologian, Bradley's interest was entirely philosophical and without any ulterior theological motive. Indeed, Bradley's Presuppositions remained a unique English example of the "scientific" philosophy of history until the appearance of Michael Oakeshott's Experience and Its Modes (1933) and R.G. Collingwood's The Idea of Nature (dating largely from 1934) and The Idea of History (dating largely from 1936). In his Autobiography (1939), Collingwood acknowledged a heavy debt to Bradley's work, as well as, of course, to the intervening and more extensive historicist writings of Dilthey and Croce.

⁵ F.H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1922), p. 34. See also his "Association and Thought," CE, pp. 205-38; and for the unitary and the holistic quality of human thinking, A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (Cambridge, 1933), esp. part 3: from Plato to Bradley, "the advance in psychology has added to our conscious discrimination, but it has not altered the fact that inevitably [bare intellectual] perception is clothed with emotion" (p. 299).

theory, an exercise in simple-minded reductionism which resulted in a unity where differences had been merely obliterated. His own theory purported to show that even animals are incapable of sense perception without judgment as to the meaning or significance of what is perceived, without connecting the perception and the perceiver's experience as a whole. Only human beings are capable of abstracting something called sense data from experience. "My impression is..." means that I have an idea, which means that I have made a judgment about the relation between something and something else. That something else is a collection of pre-existent experiences, which must be an integrating system of meanings and values. It could conceivably be a fully integrated, i.e. closed, system, in which case a new experience would be rejected - but that is a judgment. What it cannot be is a mere collection; otherwise each new arrival could not be inducted (as the empiricist might say), or made sense of at all; they would be meaningless "blips" on my perceptual screen. The relating of everything to everything else within a system of experience is not some arcane and mystical pursuit; it is the necessary accompaniment, from first to last, of all we feel, know and do. Analysis can arrest the flow of experience, but only to draw inferences which generate fresh relationships in the form of logical implications. This activity is "the development of an unbroken individual identity to a result which is its own and which meets its particular requirement."⁶ There are unities within the unity of thought. But thought, no matter how unified, no matter how coherent, is not the whole of experience and essential distinctions must be maintained. There is no infallible model of how to think and reach the truth, and it is "the pleasure and the privilege of the emotions to take their revenge" upon those who would intellectualize our thought processes, either as the association of ideas or as the application of the rules of formal logic.

Because the Absolute is inaccessible to discursive thought, Bradley admits that its nature cannot be described. All that is known is that it must re-unite the separate but related elements of experience. Philosophy as a form of relational experience cannot be adequate to expression of the Absolute. Bradley's metaphysic gives the impression that thought is being forced beyond its limits, that a self-defeating self-transcendence is being attempted. As a coherent, self-consistent whole, Bradley's Absolute is modelled partially on Hegel's Vernunft, on human reason as the highest expression of world spirit. But it is more than coherent; it is all-inclusive as well, by which Bradley meant that it includes, and therefore transcends, philosophy. It looks back to a lost unity and is as much an emotional longing as an intellectual ideal.⁷ Bradley was fond of saying that metaphysics is "the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct."

Bradley's mature work contains occasional oblique references to Hegel, Herbart and Lotze, but in his first full-length book, Ethical Studies, he quotes Hegel twice at length and cites a number of other passages from the Phenomenology of Mind and the Philosophy of Right. Most of these occur in "My Station and its Duties," a sustained and at times shrill attack upon individualism and the atomistic view of society. In this essay he affirms the derivation of the individual's moral sense from the society in which he has been born and educated and, furthermore, that he need not look beyond "the morality already existing ready to hand in laws, institutions, social usages, moral opinions and feelings."⁸ Here is the content of the formula "my station and its duties." Only in the life of the community - which is the real moral idea, not a mere "ideal" - do individuals achieve self-realization. This view is advocated with great eloquence and passionate conviction, and although he came to regard Ethical Studies as excessively polemical in style and somewhat outdated in emphasis, Bradley never repudiated its main conclusions. It was a tract for the times, attacking the widespread notion that the

⁶ F.H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, Terminal Essay I, "On Inference," p. 618.

⁷ Richard Wollheim, in his F.H. Bradley (1959), has speculated along Freudian lines on the (non-pejoratively speaking) infantile psychology of Bradley's metaphysical quest for wholeness in experience and its appeal to some subconscious human drive.

⁸ F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1927), p. 199.

individual is something substantial apart from society as well as the political theory associated with it, utilitarianism. It also attacked the "two undying and opposite one-sidednesses" of mechanical necessity and capricious liberty of the will in the name of "a philosophy which thinks what the vulgar believe..."⁹ A person's freedom of choice is compatible with predictability precisely because he is not pre-determined, but has formed an habitual, reliable and predictable character for himself; his freedom is the obverse of his responsibility and moral imputability, which are impossible without a relatively "fixed" character.

Bradley's political theory is to be found in Ethical Studies, but the book is not primarily about political life. It is an inquiry into the nature of the moral end for man and it self-consciously treads the well-trodden path of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.

"Is it not clear that, if you have any ethics, you must have an end which is above the Why? in the sense of What for?; and that if this is so, the question is now, as it was two thousand years ago, Granted that there is an end, what is this end?"¹⁰

With this kind of antecedent, Ethical Studies clearly has a great deal to say about the life of man in society. But it does not end with the notorious fifth essay, "My Station and its Duties." It does not identify the moral end for man with the life of the community, and the political part of Ethical Studies provides only a partial answer to the question: What for man is the ultimate end?

The short answer is self-realization, and Bradley gives it in the second essay entitled, "Why Should I be Moral?", devoting the rest of the book to enlarging upon this answer. The initial response is that it is an illegitimate question because it presupposes that morality is a means to an end. With great relish Bradley smites the philistines for suggesting that morality could be anything other than an end in itself. In defence of virtue against "those who do not love her for herself, against the base mechanical 'banausia' which meets us on all sides, with its 'what is the use' of goodness or beauty or truth, there is but one fitting answer from the friends of science, or art, or religion and virtue: 'We do not know and we do not care.'"¹¹ However, he does have logical grounds for rejecting the seemingly transparent question: Why should I be moral? As soon as one asks it, one has embarked upon a discussion of something else, not morality; one is discussing the something or other to which morality is a means. Within the limits of a discussion about morality, the question is strictly superfluous. It is a bit like asking: Why is a corpse dead? If the question is rephrased to ask, Is morality an end in itself? - if, in other words, the redundant "ought" is removed - then, says Bradley, the question is legitimate. The answer is not an unconditional yes, because the ultimate end is self-realization, of which morality is an integral part. When he speaks of morality being "included under" the end of self-realization, Bradley implies that morality is a, and not necessarily the only, means to the larger end. However, in a moral action the thing to be done and the doing of it are interchangeably end and means. It is quite correct, for example, to speak of an act of generosity as contributing to the self-esteem of a generous person without thereby detracting from the moral worth of the generous act itself. Conversely, the moral quality belongs as much to the agent, or self, as to the action and its consequences. To that extent, morality and self-realization can be identified. Thus morality remains an end in itself, although contained within the more comprehensive end of self-realization.

The pursuit of pleasure for pleasure's sake and the doing of duty for duty's sake are next examined, and both are rejected as maxims of conduct. Through neither can self-realization be achieved. Both suffer from the same defect of abstraction - the one an abstraction of an

⁹ Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 61.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 63.

endless series of pleasurable states of feeling from pleasure-producing activities, the other an abstraction of the pure, formal will to do good from all particular, concrete instances of the good will in action.

Hedonism, or pleasure for pleasure's sake, cannot offer a concrete goal in either its universalistic or its egoistic forms. Its objective is to amass the greatest net personal or social product in extent and intensity of pleasurable feeling. This is a futile pursuit, because states of pleasurable feeling are evanescent. It is also amoral, because the means are a matter of indifference to the end; one way is as good as another from the point of view of a consistent hedonism. Bradley was especially vehement in maintaining that the greatest happiness of the greatest number was not a pronouncement of the common moral sense. Utilitarianism was hopelessly entangled with hedonism or the pursuit of pleasure for pleasure's sake. Putting the pleasure of others before one's own and distinguishing between higher and lower pleasures did not mitigate the central and pervasive error of designating pleasure as the moral end for man. "If the alternative is presented to us of lower functions with less pains and greater pleasures or higher functions with greater pains and less pleasures, then we must choose the latter."¹² This was Mill's choice too. But in their anxiety to make happiness a tangible goal and a practical criterion, the utilitarians chose, for all its seeming solidity, the most illusory of goals, a balance of pleasure over pain. In addition, argued Bradley, they were flying in the face of the common moral consciousness. No one, not even the utilitarian moralist, adjusts his conduct with a view to maximizing pleasurable feeling. The moral individual conducts himself virtuously because it is expected of him by his fellows or because he cannot do otherwise - virtuous conduct has become a part of him - not because of the pleasure to be gained by such conduct. On the contrary, he often does so in spite of the pain it costs him. It would cause even greater pain if he were to act immorally; but the pleasurable satisfaction of being himself is not the moral end for such a person.

Just as the self as a collection of particular feelings is not the one to be realized, so neither is the self as an abstract universal, the pure form of the will. The formal will to do one's duty for duty's sake is, like hedonism, non-moral - in this case because it is open to the insertion of any content whatsoever: "The morality of pure duty turns out then to be either something like a hedonistic rule, or no rule at all, save the hypocritical maxim that before you do what you like you should call it duty...."¹³ The categorical imperative ignores circumstances which determine the priority of duties in different situations.

Having eliminated both hedonism and Kantianism as ways to full self-realization, Bradley next arrived at the theory of "my station and its duties," which is intended to resolve the contradictions inherent in the pursuit of pleasure and in the good will. It is for some the locus classicus of the organic theory of society. It postulates a symbiotic interdependence of the social organism and its individual members. The collective moral being is superior to that of the individual only because it is the indispensable medium for self-realization. In Bradley's words:

"It is the self-realization of the whole body, because it is one and the same will which lives and acts in the life and action of each. It is the self-realization of each member, because each member cannot find the function which makes him himself apart from the whole to which he belongs; to be himself he must go beyond himself, to live his life he must live a life which is not merely his own but which, nonetheless, but on the contrary all the more, is intensely and emphatically his own individuality."¹⁴

The self to be realized is not the separate, particular self; it is the self which owes its

¹² Ibid., p. 91.

¹³ Ibid., p. 156.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 162-63.

ideals and aspirations, as well as its primary development and formation, to a community of selves. Full self-realization necessarily entails some self-sacrifice. The individual cannot "find himself" without accepting the laws, customs and morality - in short, the values - of the society in which he lives. This involves the suppression of what Bradley termed "the bad self" and the transformation of the unmoralized parts of one's character. The full assertion of certain personality traits, of all the talents (even of some considered entirely admirable in themselves), is inconsistent with the individual moral quality of society as a whole. This essay ends, however, with Bradley pointing out that its central contention is open to serious objections.

Full self-realization is thwarted by the opposition, on the one hand, between the "ought" in the individual and the objective world, and on the other hand, between the bad self and the general "ought." This conflict between the real as existent and the real as it is to be is crucial for Bradley's moral philosophy. His ethical, like his metaphysical, aim is satisfaction through harmony, the transmutation of all contradictions. In the process of reaching for this consummation, morality is superseded because it is found to be infected with an incurable self-contradiction, a contradiction without which morality would not be morality and because of which morality must transcend itself. It is essential to morality, in Bradley's view, that there be a ceaseless striving to realize what is not, to transform the "ought" into "is."

"It is a demand for what cannot be.... Nothing is to be real (so far as willed) but the good; and yet the reality is not wholly good ["real" here meaning "existing"]. Neither in me nor in the world is what ought to be what is, and what is what ought to be; and the claim remains in the end a mere claim."¹⁵

The contradiction in morality is a contradiction in man. But man is above the contradiction in that he is aware of it and feels it as foreign to his real nature. If the contradiction is overcome and the tension between "is" and "ought" resolved, then there is an end to morality proper. "Morality issues in religion."¹⁶ God is what ought to be, the realization of the moral ideal. But even God, who must exist in relation to the non-divine, is inferior to the Absolute. Only the totality of all things can overcome the limiting of each thing by what it is not, no matter how comprehensive in appearance it may be.

Morality, in addition to being self-contradictory, is partial. It does not comprehend goodness in all its aspects, "for every kind of human excellence - beauty, strength, and even luck, are all undeniably good."¹⁷ Morality maintains that only the good will is good, that a man is to be judged solely on his inner will, on the intensity of his volitional identification with whatever seems best to him. "The doctrine that nothing is good but the Good Will is clearly untenable," says Bradley in a footnote to the sixth essay, "Ideal Morality," written shortly before his death and added to the second edition of *Ethical Studies* (1927).¹⁸ No matter how good the will becomes, it cannot dissociate itself from its content, nor is it any worse for having non-moral contents. Goodness itself includes many qualities which have nothing as such to do with the good will or morality; yet they are all aspects of goodness and approved of.

While the content of the good will is acquired from many non-moral sources, and an instinctive or habitual goodness is not to be valued less than one which has to be continually and consciously willed, there is nothing which may not be moralized. It is, for example, a moral duty to amuse oneself; and it could conceivably be a moral issue as to whether one did it playing tennis or playing chess. Although the self to be realized is the good self in its widest sense, self-realization is a moral purpose. Bradley, like Green, could not - or would

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 313.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

¹⁷ F.H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd ed. (London, 1897), p. 387.

¹⁸ *ES*, pp. 244-45.

not - contain Moralität. Self-realization "is not perfection simply, but perfection as carried out by a will."¹⁹ In the seventh and final essay of Ethical Studies, "Selfishness and Self-Sacrifice," Bradley says that with self-conscious direction against the bad self, "good acts are now done as good...the good self is now morally good..."

"This higher will is known as the true will of the self, where law ceases to be external and becomes autonomy, and where goodness or the identity of the particular will with the universal is only another name for conscious self-realization."²⁰

The political theory of "my station and its duties" - the theory that the moral end for man is realized in the existing state of society - is found wanting on two counts. First, it cannot keep pace with the bad self and the unremitting moral struggle to overcome it, to subordinate it to "the true will of the self." Secondly, it overlooks the fact that the social organism, no less than the physical, is susceptible to disease. The ideal of non-social perfection is introduced in recognition of two interconnected facts: the moral world, being in a state of historical development, cannot be self-consistent and all that it should be; and knowledge of other moralities in other communities results in some men professing a cosmopolitan morality. In aiming at a supra-societal ideal, "we are trying to realize ourself not as a member of any visible community."²¹

Nevertheless, "common social morality is the basis of human life," and it continues to sustain and direct "the ideals of a higher social perfection and of the theoretic life." There must inevitably be conflicts of duty, and occasionally the duty enjoined by social morality must defer to a higher;

"...but open and direct outrage on the standing moral institutions which make society and human life what it is, can be justified (I do not say condoned) only on the plea of overpowering moral necessity. And the individual should remember that the will for good, if weakened in one place, runs the greatest risk of being weakened in all."²²

Any organized society is the repository of laws and customs, the moral code, the habits of mind, that distillation of moral and political experience, without assimilating which no individual can find his moral bearings. It is the embodiment, however imperfect, of a moral order without which no individual can challenge either himself or the conventional wisdom of his group; it is society that supplies the incentive and the materials for the individual's freedom of action as well as the standards for the exercise of political judgment by free moral agents. Bradley rested his case upon the "common moral consciousness" and the "vulgar notion of responsibility," neither of which have ever been noted for their tolerance of social protest or eccentric individual conduct. Yet Bradley was no enemy of freedom of artistic expression and philosophical inquiry. The feudal flourish of chivalry in his defence of "standing moral institutions" was his way of responding to the provocations of bad metaphysics - bad, in part, because unwitting - which masqueraded as social science. At times he seems to belabour the obvious, but as with his scathing attack on psychology which pretended to be logic, Bradley clearly enjoyed ridiculing his opponents, one result of which was that he argued himself into some extreme positions - this notwithstanding his oft-repeated assertion that the striking power of criticism lay not in its denials but in what it affirmed in place of what it denied. What Bradley affirmed above all was coherence, in both truth and reality. At the social and political "degree" of reality coherence consists in the individual member of the social organism recognizing in theory at least (but also in practice, if according to slightly different criteria) that his community is of greater value, because more inclusive, than he is. His individuality is borrowed from that of the society which has developed an identity for his generation, as it has for previous generations. Creating oneself through the act(s) of

¹⁹ F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 366.

²⁰ ES, pp. 300-01.

²¹ Ibid., p. 205.

²² Ibid., p. 227.

character formation requires stability in the social environment and some expectation that models of conduct will not shift like tastes. Exceptional individual characters are important, but not as important as the shared social nature. Regardless of how assured or how magnanimous an individual's moral character may become, it would be a kind of ingratitude - as explained by Socrates in the Crito, when he refused to escape the Athenian sentence of death - to detach himself from the mores of that society with which, willy-nilly, he is identified. At best it would be a delusion of grandeur, at worst an expression of hubris threatening the whole social fabric. Bradley offers advice, attributed by Hegel to some unknown Pythagorean, to the effect that the best civic education is that acquired by living in a state whose laws, customs, institutions and usages are in a healthy condition. The good life is lived by the lights of those who best exemplify the moral tradition of such a state.

Bradley bore an even more implacable hatred than did Hegel toward the romantic self-indulgence of unrestrained individualism - unmediated claims for subjectivity, as against the objective moral order of organized society - which was the prevailing "one-sidedness" of the age. The principal focus of Bradley's animosity was J.S. Mill's On Liberty, in particular the chapter on individuality. He felt that the combination of a hard-headed felicific calculus with Mill's tenderness toward the individual conscience was morally debilitating. To allow the individual to pick his way through the rich and complex growth of received morality and tested institutions by the light of the greatest happiness principle was to promote moral disorientation and invite social disorder. Mill's presumption in favour of individual moral judgment evoked the same indignant response from Bradley as did the English Jacobins' assault upon the British constitution from Burke. There are parallels between Bradley's animus against utilitarianism and the ethics of individualism and Burke's against the radical reformers of his day. Indeed, Burke's enemy was the spiritual ancestor of Bradley's. Both men inveighed passionately and eloquently against the same "metaphysical abstraction," the unattached individual set in moral judgment over society.

CHAPTER 8

T.H. Green: The Pursuit of the Common Good

In the "general introduction" to his and T.H. Grose's edition of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (1874), T.H. Green subjected Locke, Berkeley and, above all, Hume, the suicide of the "way of ideas," to a strenuous idealist critique. It was Kant's answer to Hume's skepticism which prepared the ground for the Hegelian system. The Treatise itself was an essential stage in philosophy's "progressive effort towards a fully articulated conception of the world as rational."¹ The crux of Green's argument is that the Kantian synthesis offers the only way out of the impasse of psychologism into which the empiricist tradition had worked itself. We are trapped in our perceptions of a putative external world unless we can establish some sort of relationship between the perception and what is perceived. We do not perceive any such relationship; it is supplied by our minds even as we perceive something. We know that the flash of white in the darkness is a headlight, a searchlight or a streetlight because of the way in which we have ordered our experience. The immediate raw data of white light is a highly intellectualized abstraction from the relatedness of our experience of it, and, as such, testimony in itself to the element of mental construction in even the simplest sensation.

The objectivity of what we experience is guaranteed, for Green, by what he calls "the eternal consciousness," which is reproduced in each individual consciousness. The natural history of human experience reveals a progress - never completed - toward a state of being which strongly resembles the timeless Platonic realm of Ideas. We know what we know to the degree that we participate in eternal consciousness. In virtue of our participation "in some inchoate measure in that consciousness which is also the real world of which it is conscious," we have an idea of perfection which directs our moral endeavours. As so directed, we are under the influence of "practical reason," striving to identify ourselves with a power for good in the world which is supernatural but not above and beyond us, not an external authority but something which commends itself to our rational faculty.

The rational ideal is a social ideal:

"It is in fact only so far as we are members of a society, of which we can conceive the common good as our own, that the idea [of "some absolute and all-embracing end" which affords full satisfaction] has any practical hold on us at all, and this very membership implies confinement in our individual realization of the idea. Each is primarily to fulfil the duties of his station."²

Like Bradley, however, Green could not rest in the theory of "my station and its duties." The laws, customs and institutions of the existing social order are not morally complete. Green was more emphatic on this point than Bradley, insisting that the realization of the ideal is meaningful only in relation to personality. It is realized in individual human beings qua individuals, or nowhere; it cannot be realized in a supra-personal sphere or through any kind of self-immolation. Bradley was in complete agreement that the conception of the good life carries us beyond the norms and values of even the best organized political society, but he conceded less than Green to individual conscience in the development and actualization of the ideal.

The most interesting feature of Green's ethics from the standpoint of social and political

¹ T.H. Green, Works (London, 1885-8), vol. I, p. 4.

² T.H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, 5th ed. (Oxford, 1906), p. 209.

theory is his insistence that the reciprocal recognition of rights and duties in the light of a common interest, which characterizes the life of the citizens of a rational state, be extended to include the whole of humanity. Implicit in the development of the nation-state is the principle that all men are free. Bradley - following Hegel - attached more significance to the historical vicissitudes in the actualization of that principle than did Green. Green accepted the historical, developmental nature of the rational state, while embracing the Kantian kingdom of ends. The right of any man to be treated as an end and not as a means is not conditional upon his membership of polis or state. According to Green, it is a fact of the modern moral consciousness that the citizens of an organized political society have an idea of the wider application of the justice which obtains in their own class or community.³ Bradley was more inclined to regard the historically created conditions of a community's justice as a necessary and inseparable element of that justice: remove the particular social conditions of a particular society's system of values and the remainder would be an abstraction, unable to subsist anywhere in the world. A universal code of rights presupposes a universal common interest in the reciprocity of rights and duties, a universal recognition that the exercise of rights requires the performance of duties in return. The principal drawback in the extension to the whole of humanity of the reciprocity obtaining in the rational state is that there is little experience, let alone habit, of community across the boundaries of nation-states. The extra-political extension of a principle so intimately connected with the state could be an empty gesture of charity, self-righteous and condescending, or, equally bad, a unilateral declaration of interdependence which was a futile sacrifice of solid moral achievement to an empty ideal.⁴

It is a Hegelian idea that the principle inherent in Christianity represents a spiritual advance on the principle inherent in the life of the ancient Greek polis. It is also a Hegelian idea that the modern nation-state comprehends both these principles. Green maintained that the state cannot contain the Christian principle, that it cannot satisfy the demand of all men to be free. The perfection of mankind, the realization of all human potentialities, necessarily involves a common good and a common effort as extensive as humanity itself. The common good transcends the limits of organized political society, even though it is a product of political development. Bradley argued, from the nature of the moral will as well as from the psychology of what he called the bad self, that the demands of the moral life exceed the capacity of any actual society to satisfy them. Green went further - as one of those evangelical humanitarians whom Bradley could not abide - saying that while the state affords the conditions of the good life, the moral life directs us to a higher form of community. Green insisted that self-perfection must subordinate itself to - or rather transform itself into - a pursuit of improved conditions and expanded opportunities for those whose capacity for self-perfection was frustrated by circumstances beyond their unaided control. The moral ideal is a social ideal; but it is logically prior to the state, no matter how much our sense of community may depend upon loyalty to established institutions. The legal person, in full possession of his rights and enjoying the other benefits of a well-organized political life, is comprehended by the person who seeks to improve his fellow man. Although political life is the necessary medium for the cultivation of humanitarian moral ideals, their pursuit is the ultimate justification of the rational state. To be moral is to be more than a good citizen, not forgetting that it is nothing less than that.

Green's political philosophy has been neatly encapsulated in the famous chapter heading

³ Ibid., pp. 239-46.

⁴ "And nations differ in value, and there is no organism to ensure that loss of one shall advantage the others." (F.H. Bradley, "The Limits of Individual and National Self-sacrifice," CE, p. 175.) This essay first appeared in Mind (1896). The same point might be made, mutatis mutandis, about the attempts of some of Green's followers to extend the fellowship of an Oxford college to embrace the whole population of a complex modern society.

from his Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: "Will, not Force, is the Basis of the State." It was aimed specifically at the definition of sovereignty which had been developed by John Austin and other "analytical jurists," and which had been incorporated into much utilitarian political theory. The habitual obedience which governments receive from the governed is primarily derived not from the government's coercive power and the subject's fear of it, as the Austinians would have us believe, but from "that impalpable congeries of the hopes and fears of a people, bound together by common interests and sympathy, which we call the general will."⁵

Social contract theorists were mistaken in postulating pre-social natural rights and morality which had been exchanged for legally defined rights protected by a legitimized political power. Rousseau corrected the error by recognizing the possibility of a common ego or general will, a disinterested sentiment of common good more powerful than any sovereign - indeed, the indispensable component in any political arrangement whatsoever. The general will, or recognition on the part of a group that it shares a community of interests, is presupposed by any political order, not the other way around. Furthermore, it is only through the political expression of the general will that morality itself can develop.

"It remains true that only through a recognition by certain men of a common interest, and through the expression of that recognition in certain regulations of their dealings with each other, could morality originate, or any meaning be gained for such terms as 'ought' and 'right' and their equivalents."⁶

Although the morality of reciprocating rights and duties is said to be that of "political subjection," it has nothing to do with subjection in the sense of oppression. The political subject has rights secured to him in return for the fulfilment of certain duties. He freely accepts this arrangement because he has made the common interest his interest. His civic actions are self-conscious attempts to realize the general will.

A state possesses a necessary reserve of coercive powers; but if the majority of its citizens are incapable of conceiving a common good, or of observing rules and regulations which further that good without compulsion or the threat of compulsion by the state power, then that state is no real state. If there were no collective conception of a common good, no mutual recognition of rights and duties among a group of people, then it could never constitute a state in the first place. The sovereign power in a state secures rights - and therefore powers - to its subjects, and without them they would have no moral life or self-development worthy of the name. But it cannot enforce morality, any more than it can create the common good presupposed by its sovereignty.

It has long been a criticism of Green's political theory that his treatment of what was for him the central problem of political obligation involves a bad case of is-ought confusion.⁷ Obedience to one's real, i.e. the general, will is less a matter of reciprocating practical reason, of the principle that (in Rousseau's words) "no one but appropriates to himself this word each and thinks of himself in voting on behalf of all,"⁸ than it is of the dictates of the social psyche. A particular state either has the requisite level of consciousness of common good, or it doesn't have what it takes.

"Whether or no any particular government has, on this ground, lost its claim and may be rightly resisted is a question...[which] seems generally, if not always, to answer itself. A government no longer serving the function described...brings forces into

⁵ T.H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London, 1941), p. 98.

⁶ Ibid., p. 124.

⁷ See, for example, L.T. Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory of the State (London, 1918), p. 121, and H.A. Prichard, "Green's Principles of Political Obligation," Moral Obligation (Oxford, 1949), esp. pp. 82-83.

⁸ J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, ed. L.G. Crocker (New York, 1967), p. 33.

play which are fatal to it."⁹

This formula can only provide ex post facto answers to questions about the legitimacy of a particular government or, for that matter, its policies. The same criticism applies to Green's treatment of what we would now call the human rights issue, the question of extending benefits to those who claim them as of right, but beyond what the majority may allege society can bear. There may be a right or rights which are not legally recognized, but which some conscientious citizen or group of citizens may assert, not so much against the state as for the fulfilment of its "ideal function," to realize "the true end of the state as the sustainer and harmonizer of social relations."

"The reason that the assertion of an illegal right must be founded on reference to acknowledged social good is that, as we have seen, no exercise of a power, however abstractedly desirable for the promotion of human good it might be, can be claimed as a right unless there is some common consciousness of utility shared by the person making the claim and those on whom it is made. It is not a question whether or not it ought to be claimed as a right; it simply cannot be claimed except on this condition."¹⁰

Again, it might well be asked: How much is "some"? How much "common consciousness of utility" is needed to properly ground a claim as of right? And, one might further ask, where does that leave the "untaught and underfed denizen of the London yard with gin-shops on the right hand and on the left"?¹¹ A "common consciousness of utility" suggests a somewhat sophisticated, not to say calculating, sense of justice. The burden of the criticism, however, is that the legitimacy of a claim to a certain kind of treatment as of right does not depend upon a state of readiness in the common consciousness.

The coercive power of the state should, says Green, do more than merely abstain from intervention in the moral life (where it can, even with the purest intentions, only impede man's moral purpose); it should extend as well as secure those rights and powers whose exercise men require in their pursuit of perfection. In doing so, the state is only indirectly promoting moral development, although it may, in the process, directly interfere, in the interest of the common moral life, with the freedom of action of a certain class or classes of people. The state is the "society of societies," reconciling and sustaining "rights that arise out of the social relations of men."¹² Family and property are pre-political, but in return for certain restrictions the state guarantees, and may even increase, the scope and the autonomy of their roles in society. It is the state which established the family relationship and the possession of property as enforceable - and therefore actual - rights. In addition to enforcing and maintaining rights, the state can augment them. This can be seen clearly in the state's power to remove restrictions upon freedom of movement, of disposal of property and labour, and in its power to prevent interference with these freedoms. It is more difficult, however, to understand the state's capacity for increasing freedom as related to its power of restriction and constraint. Compulsory education, a controversial idea in Green's day, although it restricts the freedom of both children and parents, gives the child the added right of preparation for a fuller, more comfortable adult life, removing a major obstacle to self-realization and moral development. The state can also restrict freedom of contract and use of property, all in the name of the common good. An example of the first sort of restriction is legal recognition of the closed union shop. Such action contributes to the material welfare of the persons whose freedom is, in the first instance, curtailed - including employers, who have in many cases admitted the industrial peace and even the profitability of a measure of employee control over hiring and promotion practices. The critical and most awkward question for a theory such as Green's is, of course, whether state action or reinforcement of this sort contributes to the

⁹ PPO, p. 62.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-49.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8 (My emphasis).

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 146-47.

moral welfare of those persons directly, or indirectly, involved.

If the state in any way regulates the individual citizen's liberty to do as he pleases, he has no counterclaim against this regulation unless he can, to the satisfaction of his fellow citizens, refer his claim to the common good. "It has been the social recognition, grounded on that reference, that has rendered certain of his powers rights."¹³ There is no right against the state unless a discrepancy can be shown between the general will and the government of the state, the administrative expression of that will. Here the fundamental tension of Green's philosophy of man and the state has reappeared. Political action, for Green, was a continual moral struggle and reaffirmation of democratic virtue - not for him the easy acceptance of *Sittlichkeit* and the political leadership of the universal class, an "estate" of civil servants and academics. However, in spite of a career of volunteer community action which virtually drove him to an early grave, Green fell back on a curiously positivist approach to political power when a theoretical conflict arose between the imperatives of reform and the actual condition of the general will. As in his landmark Leicester address, "Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract," Green generally resolved the conflict by arguing that certain governmentally imposed reforms, far from decreasing personal freedom of choice, actually increased it by making possible a "growth of capacity" among whole classes of individuals previously incapable of exercising any but the most trivial freedom of choice. In other words, the problem tended to present itself to Green as one of convincing recalcitrant Liberals, if not rugged individualists and believers in the gospel according to Herbert Spencer, that affirmative social action requiring state revenue, state organization and state power did not "interfere with the spontaneous action of social interests."¹⁴ That it rarely presented itself as a problem of political disobedience, resistance or rebellion had a lot to do with Green's practical experience as a reformer. He was quietly confident that God and history were on the side of social progress, and there were plenty of "forces" (to use his own term) in society and the economy, in religion and philosophy, which in Britain in the 1870s were promoting positive liberty as the natural successor to existing and rather shopworn conceptions of man and the state.

Like Bradley, Green was very diffident about his Hegelianism. For both, Hegel was one of the masters of those who know, but he was also far too ambitious. They both felt that he claimed too much for the discursive intellect, Bradley advancing the claims of feeling and emotion, Green those of religion and the external world. Green thought the dialectical method was an attempt, Hegel's assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, to construct the universe out of pure thought. He accepted the epistemological necessity of the Hegelian unity of thought and being, but preferred the Kantian approach to it. That is to say, he was a transcendentalist, when all is said and done, and maintained that Hegel's objective idealism "must all be done again."¹⁵ Although "something like Hegel's idealism must be the result of the development of Kantian principles rightly understood," no man can fully comprehend the spirituality of the universe; although we are self-conscious participants in the eternal consciousness, we cannot "be God."¹⁶ In a review of John Caird's Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion which appeared in Academy for July 10, 1880, Green expressed the view that Caird had been "too much overpowered by Hegel," and argued the need for caution in philosophizing about God and the totality of things.

"The unifying principle of the world is indeed in us; it is our self. But, as in us, it is so conditioned by a particular animal nature that, while it yields that idea of the world as one which regulates all our knowledge, our actual knowledge remains a

¹³ Ibid., p. 147.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 208.

¹⁵ So says Edward Caird in his preface to Essays in Philosophical Criticism (London, 1883), p.

¹⁶ Ibid.

piecemeal process.... We never reach that totality of apprehension through which alone we could know the world as it is and God in it. This is the infirmity of our discursive understanding."¹⁷

The Hegelian unity of thought and being has here reverted to a Kantian regulative idea, no longer the ground and the result of all human experience.

There were two factors which impelled Green to withhold unqualified support from Hegelian metaphysics: first, his irreducible Kantianism, which was reinforced in later years by the German movement "back to Kant" and the seminal Critiques; second, his suspicion that Hegelianism was designed to supersede religious faith. Green felt that the Cairds, especially John, reproduced Hegelianism only too well, its vices as well as its virtues. The principal vice was the idea that human reason is equal to the grasp and penetration of the totality of things, the elimination of any distance between human self-consciousness and the eternal consciousness. The God of religion is comprehended by the Absolute of Hegelian philosophy. Green was not as reconciled - or as oblivious - as was Caird to the implications of this proposition for religion. For the less acute Hegelians, the "unifying principle of the world" and the God of religion were interchangeable. They clothed the unity of thought and being, a rational process and goal, with a religious aura, which had the side effect of destroying the Christian God's transcendence and converting Christian theology into a kind of pantheism. Perceiving the threat to religion in this procedure, Green retained a sphere of the unknowable beyond the reach of human reason. "Totality of apprehension" is beyond the reach of the human mind. We continually strive to approach perfect comprehension, but it will always remain unattainable. "To assume, because all reality requires thought to conceive it, that therefore thought is the condition of its existence, is indeed unwarrantable."¹⁸ The Hegelian assumption is, in a sense, precisely this: we have significant knowledge because everything - including God - is a product of the logos or world spirit. It is a distinguishing feature of Hegelianism that the external world is an externalization of the world spirit. Everything we experience is a manifestation of the spiritual principle whose supreme manifestation is philosophy, or fully rational thought. The only satisfactory explanation of our having knowledge of reality is that in acquiring it the mind is somehow recovering itself. An identity of subject and object is the necessary presupposition of our being able to think coherently about what we experience. There is, however, a universal and "inveterate supposition to the contrary" that the external world is another world. To exist is not to be conceived as existing. Green was not satisfied that Hegel's otherwise fruitful idea of self-externalization had not, while overcoming the dualism in Kant's theory of knowledge, contrived to reduce the natural and moral worlds to categories of his "subjective logic," and efforts to tame nature, human as well as physical, to moments in a theodicy of strictly metaphysical interest. He also felt, though less keenly than Bradley, that Hegelianism failed to do justice to the richness of human experience, conative and emotional, aesthetic and religious.

There is a long history of misunderstanding about the nature of Hegel's political philosophy arising out of the quietistic, contemplative tone of his oft-quoted dictum about the owl of Minerva in the preface to his Philosophy of Right. As a philosopher, Hegel was offering an explanation of political life, not a creed to live it by. Green was a lay preacher as well as a philosopher, and was trying to instil a civic religion in his readers and listeners. In

¹⁷ T.H. Green, Works, vol. III, p. 145.

John Caird (1820-1898), like his younger brother Edward, only more so, retained a close association with the University of Glasgow after undergraduate study there, and became a powerful shaping influence, helping to make it one of the academic founts of Hegelianism in Britain. His main interest was in the philosophy of religion, and after a brief spell as a minister he became Professor of Divinity at Glasgow, 1862-73, then Principal and Vice-Chancellor, 1873-98.

¹⁸ Ibid.

Hegelian language, he operated at least as much at the level of Sittlichkeit as he did at that of moral and political philosophy. He was trying to refurbish the mores of his society, and it would be no denigration of such activities to say that they made him a political subject but a philosophical object. As for Hegel, he was quite aware of continuing potential for divergence between what is the case and what ought to be. It is the philosopher's task to understand this gap and to give us insight into the teleology of its closure. He can, qua philosopher, only explain the potentialities in an existing, operative state of affairs; but "...once the realm of notions is revolutionized, actuality does not hold out."¹⁹ For Green, the rationality of the real was a moral imperative and a demand for service and self-sacrifice which could not be denied. Like Rousseau, Green prized civic virtue above all else, but its field of action was not confined to the state. Charity, however, began at home, and the moral imperfections of British society in his day and age were, he felt, sufficiently grave to override the theoretical superiority of the vita contemplativa and the long-term, metaphysical truth that the real is rational.

"It is no time to enjoy the pleasures of eye and ear, of search for knowledge, of friendly intercourse, of applauded speech or writing, while the mass of men whom we call our brethren, and whom we declare to be meant with us for eternal destinies, are left without the chance, which only the help of others can gain for them, of making themselves in act what in possibility we believe them to be."²⁰

¹⁹ Hegel, letter to Niethammer, October 28, 1808. See A.S. Brudner, "The significance of Hegel's prefatory lectures on the philosophy of law," Clio (Fall 1978), note 19, p. 48.

²⁰ PE, pp. 320-21.

CHAPTER 9

Bernard Bosanquet: The Idealist Theory of the State

As a political philosopher, Bernard Bosanquet belongs to the second generation of British Hegelians.¹ Although he was a contributor to Essays in Philosophical Criticism (1883), his fully developed theories of man and society did not appear until the late 1890s, some twenty years after the first blows for Hegel and the idealist theory of the state had been struck by Bradley and Green. He wrote when utilitarianism had lost all of its early radical thrust and become another stage in the history of philosophy. It was no longer a revolutionary plan of action; nor did it enjoy the intellectual dominion which it had in mid-century. The intellectual authority of philosophical idealism, on the other hand, was full and assured in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Admittedly, it was still, in spite of the original and distinctively British work of men like Bradley and Green, regarded as something of an exotic growth. At that time, however, it was a serious contender for philosophical orthodoxy, if by no means the unquestioned truth of things. Pragmatism and the "new realism" were already beginning to challenge the recently acquired eminence of philosophical idealism. Nevertheless, the late Victorian and Edwardian ages were the years of idealism's widest appeal and greatest self-confidence, the years when synthesis and construction replaced much of the earlier analysis and criticism.

Bosanquet's The Principle of Individuality and Value and The Value and Destiny of the Individual (the Gifford Lectures for 1911 and 1912 respectively) represent British philosophical idealism in its fullness. In these lectures organicism is extended to describe the whole of experience, not just the political life. The experience of an individual is important not for its individuality but for its content, "the thing to be done, known and felt; in a word, the completeness of experience, his contribution to it and his participation in it."² His experience is part of a larger experience which goes before and after him; "and the more he realizes the continuity the less he cares about the separateness of the contribution to it. It is impossible to overrate the cooperative element in experience."³ Although the universe is "from the highest point of view concerned with finite beings, a place of soul-making," the ultimate value of the individual experience lies in its special contribution to the whole of experience - "the value of the particularity is indirect and depends on what it helps to realize."⁴

¹ Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923) was an undergraduate at Balliol, where he studied under Green. He became a fellow of University College, Oxford, in 1870. In 1881 he moved to London, an independent income freeing him from the need to perform regular teaching duties. He continued to write philosophy as well as engage in social work, for which the London of Mayhew afforded more than sufficient scope. He succeeded D.G. Ritchie as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of St. Andrews (1903-08). Like Green at Oxford, Bosanquet managed to combine a wide range of volunteer community work of both an organizational and a propagandist kind with teaching, lecturing and scholarship. He was one of the founding members of the London Ethical Society (1885), which was dedicated to both the teaching and the practical application of the "social gospel" of philosophical idealism. It attracted not only other Hegelians, such as Caird, Haldane, Muirhead and Wallace, but also the utilitarian Sidgwick and the Fabian socialist Graham Wallas. In 1897 it transformed itself into the School of Ethics and Social Philosophy, partly as an attempt by Bosanquet to counteract Fabian and positivist tendencies.

² B. Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value (London, 1912), p. 21.

³ Ibid., p. 22.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 26-27.

The individual person is, for Bosanquet, the finite consciousness of the particular self, and, as such, cannot be the ultimate good. True individuality is marked by completion and harmony, and is reserved for the totality of things. The universe is an individual in the fullest sense, and therefore the only true individual. It has overcome all contradictions without destroying differences or "negativity," as, after Hegel, Bosanquet preferred to call it. Differences are not fixed, as in the positivistic, atomistic view that everything is what it is and not something else, but dialectical, seeking unity in difference, the identity of identity and non-identity. The multiplicity of individual experiences making up the totality of experience, far from being a defect, is a contribution to the comprehensiveness of that totality, and "a certain completeness through incompleteness is attained."⁵

In the process of overcoming suffering and wrongdoing in their quest for completion, finite conscious beings undergo relative loss of self. Self-completion requires a harmony amidst the tension of pleasure and pain, good and evil. This sort of harmony between conflicting qualities can occur to some extent in the finite individual, but when the conflict ceases, when the bad self ceases to be an obstacle to goodness, with the power to prevent its realization, then morality and the finite self have been transcended. The harmony of total experience does not exclude - in fact, it demands - the presence of evil and suffering. Their presence is a function of its completeness. Although they have been transcended, they have not been obliterated. They persist in finitude and finite conscious beings, through whose struggles alone can completeness be attained.

The completion or fulfilment of finite individuals is a process of "negativity" and conflict, not of formal contradiction. In this process, which exhibits an underlying continuity between self-consciousness and "what is more than the self," both satisfaction and sacrifice "contribute of their nature to the complete experience."⁶ If the Hegelian Absolute is to contain discord and unify differences qua differences, then it must include imperfect finite beings in all their imperfection. The tension and the disharmony which are features of the experience of the finite self seeking perfection afford a partial clue to the nature of the Absolute:

"...it is in the highest of our own experiences that we must seek for the clues to the fullest reality. And that we experience ourself most completely just when we are least aware of its finite selfness is a clue which must not be forgotten."⁷

Self-perfection is a matter of selfless self-seeking. This is Green's prescription for self-realization through service to mankind. Sacrifice and satisfaction are interdependent, and an element of discord is an essential truth of the self. "A soul which has never known pain, like a nation which has never known war, has no depth of being, and is not a personality at all."⁸ This is a hard saying, but it was easier to say before the First World War. Bosanquet, like Bradley and McTaggart, was no militarist, nor an advocate of moral hygiene through punishment (although there are grounds for doubt about McTaggart on the latter score); but he, like they, assumed a Roman fortitude and patriotism in the face of claims of duty to valued institutions (although, once again, a partial exception must be made of McTaggart, who could never understand the high value placed by other British Hegelians on something as abstract as the state).

The single individual, the finite self-consciousness, is a "world of experience," limited but conscious of its limitations. In other words, the individual has the power to realize "the logic and spirit of the whole." The ultimate value - in other words the only value of which one can finally say there is no further end to be served - of any individual experience lies in the

⁵ Ibid., p. 238.

⁶ Ibid., p. 256.

⁷ Ibid., p. 250.

⁸ Ibid., p. 245.

whole of which it is a fragment. The criterion of ultimate value was, for Bosanquet, a logical one: the combined consistency and comprehensiveness of the totality of any experience. The same logic governs both the world of truth and existence and that of satisfaction and value. Value judgments are not simply isolated expressions of feeling, although they originate in feeling; as judgments, they are susceptible to rational, objective argument. They and the finite individuals who make them seek a wider and fuller unity. A particular state of consciousness always implies a unity of self-consciousness, and each unity is bound by mutual implication to all other unities, and to the full unity of thought and being.

"When you have admitted the unity of the person with himself, it is impossible to stop short of his unity with others, with the world, and with the universe; and the perfection by which he is to be valued is his place in the perfection of these greater wholes. The principle that all value is value of individual experience is thus absolutely maintained; the difference is in what we call individual experience, and the point of departure in valuing it."⁹

For Bosanquet, organized political society was the most striking example and the best available model of an infinite (in the circular, Hegelian sense) whole of finite centres of experience which is at the same time a hierarchical standard of perfection. Not all good is social good.¹⁰ But every society, great and small, involuntary as well as voluntary, partakes of that ultimate unity-in-difference which is the logical ground for evaluating the elements of experience.

"The social life and experience is that of one mind in a number of bodies, whose consciousnesses, formally separate, are materially identical in very different degrees."¹¹

The state exhibits a very high degree of perfection, as much because of its comprehension of differences, its inclusiveness, as because of its integrating power. As he himself was the first to admit, Bosanquet drew directly from Plato as well as from Hegel for the idea of the unity and individuality of the state. Furthermore, his version of the rationality of the real and the metaphysical necessity inherent in a system of values owed as least as much to Plato's Idea of the Good and to Kantian and Coleridgean conceptions of reason as it did to Aristotelian and Hegelian teleology; and, to complete this eclectic picture, he threw in a great deal of social psychology (as will be seen later in this chapter and in chapter 13).

From the insufficiency of the finite individual Bosanquet concluded that the world of distributive justice, of deserts apportioned according to merit, of claims and counterclaims, is as nothing beside "the great world of spiritual membership."¹² The individual who is conscious of being a member of a larger whole is content to identify his lot with that of the society of which he is a member. Its good is his good, its pain his pain. The result is that the best suffer most. The justice of this is that they are best equipped to sustain the suffering and to derive some lasting value from it. The comfort of the weak is fitting and just, not so much from their point of view as from that of society as a whole. They do not "deserve" the opportunity to "die to live." Those who do, because of their reasoned convictions about the universal order and their own place in it, are free from any illusions about their own personal importance.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 315-16. Compare ch. 7, pp. 58-59, and the discussion of Bradley's logic of internal relations. Bradley continually urged his readers to consult Bosanquet's writings on the logic of philosophical idealism, especially his account of inference.

¹⁰ Compare Bradley's "Ideal Morality," the sixth essay of *Ethical Studies*, for the view that even the "best lights" of the mores current in a society may be inadequate, and that there is a non-social as well as a social ideal of the good life. See ch. 7, pp. 62-63.

¹¹ *PIV*, p. 314.

¹² E. Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual* (London, 1913), p. 152.

Like D.G. Ritchie, Bosanquet made great play with the principle of natural selection in his social philosophy. However, in keeping with the Hegelian view of man and society, social change is seen as the outcome of a rational will, not of irrational forces. The spiritual world is "elicited" from the primarily natural by the activity of the thinking will."

"We should note, further, that in eliciting this the will is by the same operation eliciting a definite and adapted shape of itself. Thus the creative process of volition is the process of moulding by natural selection as interpreted from the point of view of the soul which is being moulded. We are finding our self in the world as the world comes to life in our self."¹³

It is natural that we should shape ourselves as conative beings in constructing and reconstructing social structures. The clue to Bosanquet's connection between "soul-moulding" by natural selection and the strictly biological theory of natural selection could be said to lie in Hegel's "civil society," the world of industry and competition. In another one of his hard sayings, Bosanquet maintains that "society carries on the work of soul-formation by a severe and inevitable process."¹⁴ The morally weak go to the wall - not necessarily of material destitution, but of spiritual impoverishment. This is natural selection in its social form, and according to the "social gospel" of British Hegelianism the state should do no more and no less than remove obstacles to and create opportunities for active self-perfection by individual selves.

In The Philosophical Theory of the State (1899) Bosanquet was already propounding the organic theory of self-assertion, the theory that the moral end and value of the finite individual is his contribution to something larger, something more comprehensive and coherent than himself. "It is in the difference which contributes to the whole that the self feels itself at home and possesses its individuality."¹⁵ In this work Bosanquet lays considerable emphasis upon the classical Greek source of the idea that man aspires to a good which "is necessarily in some degree a good which extends beyond himself, or a common good."¹⁶ The constant factor is the Platonic element in the classical tradition of political thought, whose principal legacy is the logical priority and ethical supremacy of the state. Man cannot be man without the polis. A.E. Taylor, an early Bradleyan who later became a Christian apologist, was highly critical of Bosanquet's Hegelianizing of that tradition.¹⁷ In Taylor's view, Plato meant just what he said about studying the human soul writ large in the polis. His prime concern was the conduct and quality of the individual life, not the nature of the rational state. Bosanquet insists that the classical tradition is, above all, a political one and, indeed, that the modern nation-state is a much better illustration of classical political theory than the polis itself was. What was only implicit or dimly discerned in the Athenian city-state has now emerged into the full light of day.

Contrary to Taylor's contention, Bosanquet was in danger of Platonizing Hegel rather than Hegelianizing Plato. Bosanquet held the view that political theory was in a condition of reculer pour mieux sauter between Plato and Rousseau. The ideas of natural law and sovereignty, the political thought of Hobbes and Locke, the historical speculations of Vico and Montesquieu - all were mere preparation for the recovery of the philosophical theory of the state by Rousseau. This view of the history of political philosophy achieves unity at the expense of accuracy. Bosanquet tended to neglect the individualistic strain in modern political thought,

¹³ Ibid., p. 113. See ch. 10, pp. 82-84, for a discussion of Ritchie's use of the idea of natural selection.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 89.

¹⁵ B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State, 4th ed. (London, 1923), p. 118.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 114.

¹⁷ See A.E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, 3rd ed. (London, 1929), esp. the chapter on Plato's Republic, and his Gifford Lectures (1926-28), The Faith of a Moralist (London, 1930), series 1, pp. 241-43.

which reflected and was reflected in the ideology of natural rights, the expansion of economic life, and the growth of bourgeois society during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hegel was acutely aware of all these developments and regarded them as increasingly self-conscious manifestations of the subjective strand in the unfolding of the world spirit in human history. The average citizen of ancient Athens was, according to Hegel, in quite unself-conscious unity with civic law and custom. There was only the most rudimentary recognition of individual autonomy and initiative. Modern civil society structures and articulates the play of subjectivity, and its emergence has forever precluded the reproduction of the city-state. The modern state, with its multiform social, economic, professional and cultural life, is a higher form of human society than the polis. Its unity is a function of self-conscious individuality, so that the individual is not lost as an individual. His membership entitles him to a sphere of autonomy and sheer self-assertion, which finds its most characteristic outlet in the economic life of civil society. By giving the individual scope for self-assertion, civil society performs a moral function. It rationalizes the appetitive side of human nature without suppressing it, giving it a necessary place in society.

Bosanquet's political theory allows insufficient weight, by Hegelian standards, to civil society and the subjective element. The unity of his state is insufficiently mediated through the labour of the negative, through the fissiparous self-assertion of artisans, factory-owners, traders, and guilds and corporations of all kinds.¹⁸ With Bosanquet, civil society is tightly reined in as an implicitly objective element in "the general life of the state."¹⁹ There is no moment in Bosanquet's state of sheer subjectivity. It is a characteristic failing of British Hegelianism to employ the anaemic concept of reciprocity in place of the thrust and parry of the dialectic, and so it is in Bosanquet's treatment of subjectivity and objectivity in civil society. Bosanquet was well versed in social psychology and small-group theory, but his equipment in, for example, political economy was such that the "philosophical theory of the state" could not "draw blood" and penetrate the industrial society of his day. His state looks more like Plato's "republic" than Hegel's Rechtstaat, with economic life reduced to a realm of sheer physical necessity and emptied of all moral or rational significance.

One of the central notions of idealism, and one that continues to bear fruit in political theory and our attempts to render normative judgments about social conflicts, is its linking of the concept of liberty to the quality of life. Freedom from external constraint is shown to be cancelled but somehow completed by freedom from the rule of appetite. Internal control of one's irrational impulses and transient desires sets free capacities for living a larger and more satisfying life; political control over the freedom of certain classes or interests makes possible the wider enjoyment or prevents the destruction of certain values. Such a life is lived in common, and such values are shared with others. The ends pursued are such that they are not diminished by being shared.²⁰ In this freedom through the conquest of a "lower" and egocentric by a "higher" and social self lay the key to the "paradox of self-government," as Bosanquet termed it. Pursuing the common good, the good citizen obeys the commands of the state, because they come to him as the imperatives of his "real will" and express his true self. To be a good man and a good citizen can never be conflicting objectives. The selfish will

¹⁸ "The family feeling and the individual interest are in the modern State let go, accented, intensified to their uttermost power...." (PTS, p. 261.) But Bosanquet nowhere affirms the autonomy of economic life; it is decorously likened to soul-formation, no longer recognizable as competition for material goods and power.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 254-57.

²⁰ This is the language of St. Augustine. It is used deliberately, to point up the contention that those, like Bosanquet, who followed Green out into the world of social reform had a quasi-religious vocation. They were enjoined to practise, and preach to the privileged and the underprivileged, an ethic of self-sacrifice - not in a quest for grace but for worldly goods and satisfactions.

can find no lasting satisfaction in its partial and transitory objects, and is drawn to seek it in that of others and, by a necessary progression, to seek it in the common life of all. The larger and more stable objects of the general will, not his casual impulses and random passions, no matter how strong and insistent, are what give the individual the greatest and most genuine satisfaction. The "lower," less satisfying and less satisfactory self is disciplined and organized by life in society, above all by membership in a state, and it is directed towards "objects which have power to make a life worth living for the self that wills them." Thus the problem of political obligation is solved, for Bosanquet, by a combination of Rousseau's general will and Bradley's notion of what it is to be moral.

"Any system of institutions which represents to us, on the whole, the conditions essential to affirming such a will, in objects of action such as to constitute a tolerably complete life, has an imperative claim upon our loyalty and obedience as the embodiment of our liberty."²¹

Bosanquet had put forward the same theory about the nature of the will and the moral end for man, but without the political setting, in his Psychology of the Moral Self (1897). Here the moral self is described as "the realization of a certain nature which is the outcome of those (other) selves working together in society."²² The individual cannot realize or "find" himself fully in isolation from the moral efforts of others. He requires a moral end larger than himself. The individual moral self must have a systematic, rational purpose in life. The wider the compass of that purpose, the fewer the loose ends and the greater the prospects for fulfilment. Such a purpose is not a mere ideal, but can be gleaned from everyday experience. Bosanquet illustrates the point by arguing that an ideal means something in the life of an individual only insofar as it is not something set over against the present social facts and then projected into the past or future. Insofar as it is unrealized, it involves "a mere rounding off or completion of the whole."²³ The realization of that ideal is to be found in actual social life or nowhere.

"That which constitutes the measure of morality seems to be the actual identification of the private self with the universal self, the actual surrender of the will to the greater will of the system to which we belong."²⁴

While some British Hegelians conceived of an ideal society beyond the political sphere (or, in the case of McTaggart, beyond space and time), Bosanquet's good society was firmly political. As the acknowledged British spokesman for the idealist theory of the state, he bore the brunt of attacks upon it. These became increasingly virulent during the 1914-18 war with Germany. Bosanquet resolutely defended the theory throughout, and published a third edition of The Philosophical Theory of the State in 1920, unchanged except for some additional vindictory remarks in the introduction. In 1917 he published a collection of essays under the title, Social and International Ideals. Two of them in particular, "The Wisdom of Naaman's Servants" and "The Function of the State in Promoting the Unity of Mankind," are noteworthy for their undiminished support for Hegel's theory of the rational will and skepticism about international political organizations. Those who blamed the war on the existence of sovereign nation-states and called for their dismantling and the creation of a world-state ignored the absence of the indispensable conditions for such a state. Another school of thought foresaw the imminent dissolution of the state in the evolution of political, economic and social relations, maintaining that the state, far from being "powerful but malignant, is an unreal creature of theory." Bosanquet reminds us of Bradley's saying that in times of stress the state does, "with the moral approval of all, what the explicit theory of scarcely one will morally justify."²⁵

²¹ Ibid., p. 139.

²² B. Bosanquet, The Psychology of the Moral Self (London, 1897), p. 94.

²³ Ibid., p. 108.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 113.

²⁵ See ES, p. 166.

Contemporary events were providing further evidence of the hold of the idea of the state over men's minds, but that did not somehow warrant the abuse being heaped upon state institutions. The persistence of war did not detract from the rationality of the general will. The spirit of the state is "the same thing as conscience," and, like the individual, the state pursues moral order and the actualization of right. While the objectivity and universality of the state are superior to those of the individual conscience - being ground and goal for our highest moral endeavours - nevertheless the state too can commit moral errors:

"The simple fact is that the spirit of the community, brought to consciousness and practice in its executive organ, the State, is the great moral force of the world.

Like every moral force, it can, when biased or perverted, make wrong its right."²⁶

In such cases, the corrective normally consists in bringing the errant state back into line with its own immanent idea. An "enterprising" foreign policy is usually a sign that a state is trying to avoid its own better self, and diverting attention from internal defects by embarking upon foreign adventures. If, as many critics of sovereignty assert, the state is an invariably irresponsible agent, then, says Bosanquet, there is need for more, not less, power to the state - in the sense of organization, cohesion and collective effort to achieve greater equality of opportunity, enlightenment, and so on.

There is a question as to how far the best life can be promoted by force or threat of force. For the most part, Bosanquet follows Green in restricting the use of force to indirect improvement, to the "hindering of hindrances" to the good life. Voluntary is always preferable to enforced reform - unless the only alternative to enforced is no reform, or the resultant increase in the quality of life is of such an order that the disadvantages of coercion are outweighed. In itself, force "is not in pari materia with the expansion of mind and character in their spiritual medium."²⁷ It is an affront to the reason of the communal mind, which is the true ground of all social action. Force, however, is the distinctive feature of the state. Because of what Bosanquet calls "its ultimateness de facto" the state is the "flywheel" of our lives. All the mechanical and apparently automatic processes necessary to the functioning of a complex organization are driven by the power of the state. Without this "automatism," state power could not be the supreme creator of opportunities for self-realization. The exercise of coercive power on the part of the state is not interference of the state with the individual unless there is an abuse of power, in which case the state hinders itself.

There are no natural rights vis-a-vis the state. Whereas Ritchie sought to retain some sort of role for the ideology of natural rights within an idealist theory of the state, Bosanquet stuck closely to Green, maintaining that every right is relative to the common moral consciousness, to the actual state of the general will. Any unrecognized right must be shown to be "a requirement of the realization of capacities for good."²⁸ Society must be seen to be inconsistent with its end, with what it professes to be, before one can say that there exists any unrecognized right. In other words, it has to be recognized before it can be recognized; until the state has modified the law, the right does not exist qua right. The state must enforce it in order that it be a right. The state, in short, creates rights, and they can emerge only in the context of an organized political society. These rights are means to self-realization, but its value is in turn instrumental. Ultimate value resides not in individuals but in individuals-in-community.

A long-standing and well-worn criticism of the idealist ethic, and one that Bradley dealt with at some length, is that self-realization is not an ethical concept at all. For all their talk of the moral self, the good self and the bad self, the idealists provided no criterion for distinguishing between the crudest forms of self-assertion and whatever it was they meant by

²⁶ B. Bosanquet, Social and International Ideals (London, 1917), p. 307.

²⁷ PTS, p. 175.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 198.

self-realization. Talk of coherence and completeness is of little assistance, because these concepts, again, are non-moral. The moral philosophy of Bosanquet (and of Bradley, too, in some respects) lends itself to an interpretation which suggests that the problem of self-realization may not be what it has so often been said to be. The idealists, far from attempting to make egotism respectable by clothing it in the high-falutin language of religion and patriotism, were seeking a solution to the alienation and rootlessness experienced by members of the ever-expanding and amorphous middle class of industrialized mass society. The value, as distinct from the psychology, of the moral self lay, for Bosanquet, in its modes of experience. He was all for expanding the range of a person's experience.

"True individuality, as we have said, is not in the minimization which forbids further subdivision, but in the maximization which includes the greatest possible being in an unviolable unity."²⁹

Now this could concentrate more and more around a single personal focus, or it could spread a person so thin that he ceased to have a distinct identity and became a mere vehicle for organizing experiences. An apt analogy might be losing oneself in one's work - or in good works. The individual is not free to carve himself out of society: all his modes of self-realization, including the non-social ones - such as the intellectual pursuit of truth or the artistic pursuit of beauty - are determined by the social setting. One might elect to lead a totally disorganized life with no goal beyond momentary pleasure; but assuming that one seeks satisfaction and some stable object in life, then one must pursue a common good, if only as an adjunct.

The paradox at the heart of the idealist theory of the state is the implicit denial that the individual's will is his own, combined with the claim that he is most fully and freely an individual when he submits to the sovereignty of the general will. The finite individual, on this theory, is not a stable, "real" entity. The "facts" of individual moral life and action can only be explained adequately by placing what Bosanquet calls "the centre of gravity of the self" outside the circumscribed individual, and by adopting a perspective which sees the individual as an abstraction from the communal mind. As such, the individual is not an entity unto himself or herself, but is a fragment of the common moral consciousness which seeks to be reunited in a way which enriches both itself and the whole of which it is a part. This is a psychic drive whose energy is metaphysical, in the sense that it is a universal necessity which can in fact be denied but only at the cost of self-diremption and frustration. The individual wants - in both senses of the word - the moral support of the community; and he can begin to find it by reflecting on the resources of his own psyche, their origins and their ramifications.

The moral force of the common good was, for Bosanquet, a matter of "social logic." This notion he derived from Hegel's world spirit, the rational principle at work in the world. The state is one of the highest manifestations of this rationality. Notwithstanding the violence attending the birth and development of actual historical states, each one is a manifestation of "divine Reason," just as every human being, whatever his physical, intellectual or moral shortcomings, is still a human being. The rationality of the state is expressed in its members' self-consciousness as members. Most people will admit, on reflection, to some consciousness of common good. Having conceded that, they are then driven to either reconcile it with the role of the state - law enforcement, the regulation of everyday life, and so on - or use it to "contradict" the immoral and coercive character of the state. Either way, a dialectic of state and society, common good and particular interest, is set in motion.

Bosanquet, as we have seen, expected the state to endure, and that the dialectic would resolve itself as a unity-in-difference in which the institutions of organized political society are "the ideal substance which, as a universal structure, is the social, but in its

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 170. See also the discussion of Jones and Muirhead in ch. 13, pp. 106-07.

differentiated cases is the individual mind."³⁰ The greater the unity of society, the greater the scope for distinctive individual contributions to the common good; and the greater the differentiation among such contributions, the greater the resultant unity.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 277.

CHAPTER 10

Idealism, "Evolutionism" and Utilitarianism

The publication of Darwin's On the Origin of Species in 1859 and the sort of anthropological speculation to which it gave impetus lent fresh credence to the theory that the mind of man and all that it had produced were natural phenomena, explicable entirely in terms of material cause and effect. It gained persuasive - albeit invalid - support from the principle of natural selection. Darwin himself would not endorse this extension of his theory; and the foremost advocate of his work, T.H. Huxley, repudiated it.¹ Huxley argued that natural selection tells us nothing about our moral duties or the moral end for man, which hold true in spite of natural selection. In other words, the self-conscious mind - or, as the philosophical idealist might say, the self-positing world spirit - cannot be understood in entirely natural terms. Humanity is subject as well as object.

Whatever its natural history, self-consciousness presupposes order and continuity in human experience. This is not given; nor can it be created out of nothing. In Kantian language, synthetic a priori judgments are an indispensable part of our experience. We can perceive nothing without the transcendental unity of apperceptions. Human experience implies some persistent identity, an ongoing cognitive self. By the same token, there must be a moral self - the cognitive self from another point of view - without which we could not distinguish between impulse, conscious desire and morally purposive action. The moral self is the principle of order and continuity in the midst of various, frequently conflicting, wants and inclinations. As it is not a different self from the cognitive self, so the reason of moral judgments is not divorced from that of cognitive judgments, and unity and consistency are the chief characteristics of both the rational moral self and the rational cognitive self. The undivided reason demands that the moral and political world, no less than the natural world, be a world of experience and not a mere agglomeration or succession of sense data - even a bare succession of disconnected experiences is impossible in the absence of some ordering principle. The will for good is a rational will. It is therefore common to all human beings in virtue of their humanity and their human capacity for rationality. Its content varies from society to society, but its dictates are always objective, in the sense of intersubjective - they overrule purely subjective wants and inclinations - and its judgments are universal judgments.

For Hegel, rationality was immanent throughout nature and human history. He rehabilitated natural heteronomous desires, which Kant had set over against the rational good will. They are inherently rational, and require only to be mediated by the moral will for their rationality to be realized. In their turn, they provide the good will with its content, without which it would be a merely formal will, a will to do nothing in particular. The rational will is not simply a self-consistent will; its rationality depends upon what it wills and upon its realizing something. Self-realization requires putting oneself out into a world of other things and selves.

Putting the rational will to work in purposive moral action, and especially in social reform, was one of the primary goals of the majority party in British Hegelianism, which is to say, Green, Bosanquet and their followers. As did Kant, and in large part inspired by his example, these British Hegelians consciously directed their heaviest fire against naturalism in the moral sciences. It must be remembered, however, that the basic Hegelian principle is that

¹ See his Evolution and Ethics, the Romanes Lecture for 1893.

self-realization is a process of knowing as well as doing, and that what we realize (in both senses of the word) are manifestations of the universal reason at work in us as well as, and more so than, in other "things." The logos is both the subject matter and the motive force of the process whereby everything comes to be, and the mind of man has a special role to play in that process. We must comprehend it - again in a double sense: to understand the necessity of what has happened and in what is temporary and contingent, and to round it off or complete it. This is what is meant by saying that man is subject as well as object, and it is important that the subjectivity in Hegel's idealist system of philosophy not be confused with the subjective idealism which plagued the British empiricist tradition. The Green-Bosanquet brand of idealism stressed the creative role of individual and, even more, collective moral endeavour, frequently in defiance of or in uneasy alliance with the historicist determinism of Hegel's world spirit.

Of those Hegelians who imbibed their idealism - both philosophical and practical - from T.H. Green, D.G. Ritchie was the most overtly political writer.² The problem to which most of his writing is devoted is the relationship of evolutionary ethics to the idealist theory of the state. The thesis of his popular Darwinism and Politics (1891) is, first, that the biological theory of natural selection is applicable to the intellectual, moral and social development of man only if the supervention of human consciousness in natural history is accounted for by that theory, and second, that the theory "(in the form in which alone it can properly be applied to human society) lends no support to the political dogma of laissez-faire."³ It is the power to reflect upon and evaluate social structures and mores, customs, laws and institutions which distinguishes human from other animal evolution. Man is not at the mercy of natural selection; he is capable of rational selection. Human history contains examples of societies deliberately embarking on a new policy or adopting an innovative technique, even in anticipation of changing circumstances. Such social adaptation is usually a matter of imitation - unconscious as well as conscious - of other human, often rival, societies. Human beings are not dependent upon heredity in a biological sense for the transmission of ideas, customs and sentiments. Their spread is achieved much more rapidly and securely by social inheritance, through language and institutional inculcation. The process of social "heredity" and social "variation" is less a blind instinctual struggle for existence between individuals and races than a competition of ideas and institutions. One idea or institution can supplant another without loss of life, although human betterment is impossible without a great deal of struggle. The struggle, according to Ritchie, is one against nature - primarily human nature - for which the so-called laws of nature cannot themselves dictate.

Like Green, Ritchie sought a moral role for the state and a theoretical justification for increasing governmental intervention to remedy social ills. Collective reform based on cooperative endeavour is not inconsistent with social evolution, which has nothing to do with the struggle for individual survival or, as Herbert Spencer insisted, with a progressive "restriction and limitation of state functions." On the contrary, state action for social purposes signifies an advanced stage of civilization. Furthermore, the individual person, possessing rights and liberties, will continue to benefit from state action; and maximization of heterogeneity, which Spencer extolled as the salutary design of evolution, is dependent upon increasing political articulation - to forestall, we might add over eighty years and many malign experiments in totalitarianism later, both political and non-political forces which contribute to a reversion to homogeneity. Whether one thinks of the state as an organism or as an aggregation, the individuals who compose it owe it such freedom of action as they have. The

² David George Ritchie was a fellow and tutor of Jesus College, Oxford, from 1881 until 1894, and of Balliol from 1882. In 1894 he was appointed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of St. Andrews, which post he held until his death in 1903. He was active in the London Ethical Society, and it was partly through the widely ramified membership of that society that he became a convert to Fabian socialism.

³ D.G. Ritchie, Darwinism and Politics (London, 1891), p. iii.

state is one of man's great triumphs in his struggle to escape from the struggle for mere survival, from the realm of sheer physical necessity. In Ritchie's words, this struggle has seen "a gradual diminution of waste...."

"In the lower organisms nature is reckless in her expenditure of life.... When we come to human beings in society, the State is the chief instrument by which waste is prevented. The mere struggle for existence between individuals means waste unchecked. The State, by its action, can in many cases consciously and deliberately diminish this fearful loss; in many cases by freeing the individual from the necessity of a perpetual struggle for the mere conditions of life, it can set free individuality and so make culture possible."⁴

The value, for Ritchie, of the idealist theory of the state was not entirely explanatory nor merely justificatory. It was also a program of political action. He was confident that the democratic extension of the franchise would increasingly bear out the theory that the state is the embodiment of the common good and that its action is the expression of the general will. He followed Green closely in regarding the idea that all are free in the modern state as an ideal yet to be realized, indirectly through legislation, directly through that self-culture for which legislation can establish the necessary conditions. He was more inclined than Green, however, to accept the necessity of direct state action for social improvement and less inclined to defer action out of regard for the autonomous moral will of the individual person. Jowett complained that Green's teaching turned his students into hair-splitting and quietistic metaphysicians. In Ritchie's case the effect was quite different, if no less disastrous from the standpoint of a conservative like Jowett. Ritchie proceeded, with few theoretical qualms, from the organicist conception of society to its alleged practical consequences of increased collectivism in public policy-making.

"The person with rights and duties is the product of a society...and for the purposes of practical ethics and politics, it is sufficient to recognize that personality is a conception meaningless apart from society."⁵

Ritchie claimed to have discovered a link between Green and Bentham in their conceptions of social welfare. Both emphasized the collective nature of social goals and both urged the desirability of collective action, using state power to achieve those goals. Although Ritchie preferred Green's conception of the greatest self-development of the greatest number to the utilitarian greatest happiness principle, he felt "we are safer with the Utilitarian method."⁶ While it was "too narrowly conceived," the greatest happiness of the greatest number had more practical effect than the idea of self-development.⁷ It possessed a further advantage in that it was a corrective against the complacency and quietism encouraged by the historical method in politics and by the success criterion implied in "theories which apply the conceptions of organism and evolution to society as if they were as adequate in politics as in biology."⁸ As far as utilitarianism was concerned, Ritchie regarded Sidgwick's universalistic hedonism as an immense improvement upon the old individualistic or egoistic hedonism. Ritchie called them "Individualist" and "Evolutionist" utilitarianism. The latter's advantage lay in its recognition of the primacy of the general welfare. It also made room in its political perspective for a past and a future, recognizing the importance of the legacy of previous

⁴ D.G. Ritchie, The Principles of State Interference (London, 1891), p. 50. This is a collection of four essays, two attacking the individualism of Spencer's The Man vs. The State, one on Mill's individualism and one on the political philosophy of Green. See, in addition, The Principles of State Interference, p. 148.

⁵ D.G. Ritchie, Natural Rights (London, 1894), pp. 101-02 (Ritchie's emphasis).

⁶ D.G. Ritchie, Darwin and Hegel (London, 1893), p. 28.

⁷ As will be seen shortly, McTaggart was another self-styled Hegelian who used much the same argument in favour of combining philosophical idealism and political utilitarianism.

⁸ Ibid.

generations and of the claims of posterity. Ritchie sought to combine a sense of organized political society's continuity and immanent moral purpose amidst the welter of transient demands and factional interests with the analytical egalitarianism of the felicific calculus.

In the essay which gave the collection its name, "Darwin and Hegel," Ritchie tried to incorporate the theory of natural selection into an idealist social theory. Darwin and Hegel could be reconciled without sacrifice on the part of either. There was no essential conflict; they were complementary. Ritchie's syncretic doctrine of "Idealist Evolutionism" could explain social advance in terms of rational, not natural, selection - in terms of reflection, foresight and voluntary change rather than blind and brutal natural processes - because, he said, Hegel and Darwin both recognized the operation of final causes in the Aristotelian sense. In the case of Darwin, the final cause was the survival of the species. In the case of Hegel, the final cause was the fulfilment of reason, especially in the rational state. For both, the end to be realized was a social or collective one. Like Green, Ritchie preferred the activist interpretation of the Hegelian dictum about the rationality of the real. The ideal is yet to be realized in social reform; "the process is not completed." Ritchie's easiness with naturalistic doctrines, such as utilitarianism, led him away from the Hegelian notion that development is not an open-ended process but a process of recovery in which we know enough to know the end by looking back over the history of the world, and in particular the history of self-conscious mind. The achievements of the modern state held, for Ritchie, the promise (but by no means the guarantee) of further progress toward human equality and enlightenment. Something like Kant's kingdom of ends was, if not inevitable, certainly the natural outcome of events as they were then unfolding - in a sense of "natural" to be explained shortly. In his zeal for a comprehensive synthesis, Ritchie also tried to enlist the idea of the social contract in support of his views. In spite of their mistakenly reversing the development of man as a political animal and finding the beginning in the end, contract theories did afford a glimpse of the rational ideal of free obedience to self-imposed laws. Although classical utilitarianism flatly and vehemently rejected the idea of a social contract, one may detect in Ritchie's attempt to graft natural rights as a political program onto a conception of society which was in part teleological and in part mechanistic the influence of Sidgwick's broadly based utilitarianism as well as Green's Kantianism.

In his best-known and most reprinted work, Natural Rights, Ritchie gathered together themes enunciated in his earlier essays on the relationship between Darwinian and Darwin-inspired theories of natural selection, on the one hand, and the idealist theory of the common good as propounded by Green, on the other. The tone is still strongly and sarcastically critical of Spencer and social Darwinism, but Ritchie's syncretic urge is as strong as ever. Now it is applied to the task of reconciling philosophical idealism with eugenics. In a lengthy, two-part discussion of the natural right to life, Ritchie subjects claims to parental control over child-bearing and rearing, and to what we might now call maternity benefits, to the argument that any such rights are subordinate to the state's right to enforce social hygiene. In short, the state has a "natural" right to determine the quantity and quality - both physical and mental - of its future citizens.

What does Ritchie mean by "natural"? The answer to that is the crux of the argument in Natural Rights, and it is to be found in chapter 5, "What Determines Rights?" In the previous chapter Ritchie makes great play of the distinction between natura naturata and natura naturans. The former is any and every particular phenomenon, "the totality of what exists." But "many phenomena turn out not to be realities (i.e. not to have worth), but to be 'shams'."⁹ The correct way to view nature - including human nature - as a whole is teleologically. Natura naturans is an older and incomplete way of expressing the full Hegelian version of the idea that we are part of a scheme of things which in its totality is a process driven by a built-in

⁹ D.G. Ritchie, Natural Rights, p. 76.

purpose or telos. Nature is an ideal, a potential seeking to be actualized; and the natural is not so much the normal or the original - and even less the "savage" or anti-societal - as it is the rational, which is to say, what human nature makes of the rest of nature and how it employs the instruments and achievements of its own evolution. Insofar as actual human societies are concerned, there is no equality of rights, but that is an unimportant "fact" by comparison with the potential of all human beings to be fully autonomous persons in virtue of their common humanity.

"The 'equality' of human beings as such, which alone is necessarily implied in an idealist system of ethics, would be more correctly expressed as their potential membership of a common society. It is only insofar as we can think of humanity as a possible society that we can regard human beings as equal moral units. They are persons potentially because they are potentially members of a society."¹⁰

Ritchie, like Green, conceived it as natural that human societies should evolve into a world society of all human beings. There is no guarantee that we will achieve that condition, given the human capacity for perverse and bloody-minded behaviour. But our knowing the rational necessity of the proposition that all are free, that all are persons, means that we know what is right, and what we could achieve, and puts us in a vastly different position vis-a-vis the existing state of affairs than are those whose highest expectations are dictated by the best that their society has been able to achieve, as opposed to what our "higher natures in advance of their surroundings" may prefigure.

Natural rights, for Ritchie, are social rights. They are not brought by individuals to society to be bargained against securities enforceable at law. Or rather, one should say, such an arrangement can have no moral validity; one cannot bargain with the sovereign good of society. "The good of a community gives us our only criterion for judging of what is right for individuals to do; but the good of a community is itself identical with the good of its members."¹¹ As it stands, the preceding statement is tautological - and perhaps deliberately so. There is no scope in it for particular goods, or for conflict between partial goods and the presumed good of the whole. Ritchie talks only of the (singular) good of the community's members. He shared the full-blown British Hegelian (Bradley out of Aristotle) assumption that we are born into a common good and that we never know any other good which is good without qualification.

In partial answer to the question, what determines rights?, Ritchie says that "...certain mutual claims which cannot be ignored without detriment to the well-being and, in the last resort, to the very being of a community may in an intelligible sense be called fundamental or natural rights."¹² One obvious upshot of this attempt to define natural rights is that we are faced with the further question: what determines well-being? Ritchie has no hesitation in saying that the general welfare is a utilitarian standard. We can make practical political use of the intuition that the common good of the earthly city is our highest rational good, "so that the details of a professedly Intuitionalist ethical code are filled up on Utilitarian principles."¹³ Having become organicist, as well as universalistic with Sidgwick - having acquired an expanded view of before and after - the utilitarian ethic was now available to those who professed the common good as the highest good.¹⁴ As for traditional, and still highly popular, theories of natural rights and the social contract, they are simply "an inaccurate, but possibly convenient, way of judging any given society from the point of view of a supposed

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 253-54.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 99.

¹² Ibid., p. 87.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ "The conception of evolution or, more precisely, the theory of natural selection has at once corrected the errors and vindicated the truth of Utilitarian ethics and politics." (Ibid., p. 98.)

wider or higher society."¹⁵ An example of Ritchie's use of the utilitarian criterion can be found in his treatment of property rights. An "inexpedient" property right, or a particular exercise of it, should be curtailed only "with the least amount of friction" and with "just compensation," because property rights have on the whole proven their utility.¹⁶

The truth of Ritchie's view that nature is normative was grounded in the evolution of public opinion. That there is an "underlying principle or immanent reason of the universe" is believed by "all except thoroughgoing pessimists or sceptics," who "practically do, whatever theories they may profess, whatever speculative doubts and difficulties they may feel."¹⁷ Ritchie is fairly typical of the second generation of British Hegelians in availing himself of a wide range of theories drawn from social and natural science in order to give greater currency to the idealist theory of the state. There is little about the Hegelian unity of thought and being in his mature work, and arguments from the nature of reason and of our activities in pursuit of rational order in our experience are few and far between.

"As we understand nature better, and as we understand human nature better, we can secure adaptation and adjustment by bending nature in many ways to ourselves instead of bending ourselves in every respect to nature."¹⁸

All tendencies in science and society, he concludes, point in the direction of a collectivist solution to the "social question." He appeals to socialists to have patience and "reverence for the long toil of the human spirit." Although work is required to bring the "good elements" in regressive sentiments and institutions to the fore, and while ethically superior structures may be defeated by "inferior surroundings," nevertheless, the "Divine purpose...is gradually revealing itself in the education of the human race."¹⁹ On the one hand, rights are only as good as the social consciousness out of which they emerge; on the other hand, there is an important educative role for new laws and institutions to play: "they must be such as prepare people to go beyond them in quiet and orderly fashion."²⁰ Social adaptation was not for Ritchie merely a matter of reacting to environmental changes. He possessed to a high degree the rationalist's confidence in human prospects for directing social change into just and orderly patterns of growth.

The remainder of this chapter will be taken up with an examination of that part of the work of J.McT.E. McTaggart in which he attempted to combine a form of utilitarian ethics with a metaphysic which was, at least initially, inspired by the Hegelian unity of thought and being.²¹ McTaggart wrote extremely little that could be called moral or political philosophy, and what he did bears scant resemblance to that of any other British Hegelian - or of Hegel himself.

As C.D. Broad, McTaggart's first and most comprehensive expositor, has said, McTaggart's thought can be broken down into three distinct areas: commentary on Hegel's logic and what

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 102.

¹⁶ See Ibid., ch. 13.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 112.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 286.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 282.

²¹ John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart (1866-1925) was an undergraduate at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he studied moral sciences under Henry Sidgwick. He had already developed, even as a schoolboy, a precocious interest in Kant and a talent for speculative philosophy. He was elected a fellow of Trinity in 1891 and was college lecturer in moral sciences from 1897 to 1922. Like Bradley, he could not abide the generalized humanitarian sentiments and diffuse good works of other British Hegelians. As for his own views on current events and issues, there is no ready label, because "one of McTaggart's great intellectual virtues was that he chose his opinions à la carte." (P.T. Geach, Truth, Love and Immortality (London, 1979), p. 11.)

McTaggart called "Hegelian cosmology"; discussion of metaphysical propositions which are of interest not just to professional philosophers but to all human beings in their relations with what for McTaggart was the Real World; and, thirdly, McTaggart's own vision of that world worked out in a deductive ontology. The three areas of McTaggart's philosophizing are almost three distinct temporal phases. According to his most recent expositor, P.T. Geach, McTaggart "wrote Hegel out of his system" before turning to the philosophical method of Spinoza and Leibniz. McTaggart devoted himself in the middle period of his career to the semi-popular exposition of metaphysics, especially of questions relating to personal immortality, as well as to more formal teaching and his own philosophy. Although he continued to expound the importance of metaphysics to everyman, his latter years were primarily taken up with the laborious working and re-working of the argument of The Nature of Existence. McTaggart's thoughts on morals and politics are peripheral to his main concerns - which in itself makes him an exception to the general rule among British Hegelians - and they are to be found scattered through his earlier work on what he came to regard as Hegel's only permanent contribution to knowledge, the dialectic.

As will be discussed further in the next chapter on idealism as a substitute religion, McTaggart's vision of supreme good (in the Supreme Reality) is that of a society of perfect persons who perfectly and eternally know and love each other. That does not seem to have any bearing on the here and now, and McTaggart said as much. Nevertheless, his metaphysical personalism unavoidably coloured what he had to say about man and society. Geach thinks Hegelianism had virtually nothing to do with McTaggart's philosophical account of his vision of the universe. This is true, but McTaggart "knew" the nature of reality before he had dispensed with Hegelianism as the way to rationally persuade others of the truth of his vision, and his writings on Hegel exhibit a mixture of his own beliefs, Hegelian logic and utilitarian ethics, which, if hardly constituting a synthesis, does amount to more than just unconnected lines of thought. His comments on the moral and the political life were made in conscious opposition to other British Hegelians; but in discussing McTaggart on morals and politics, I will proceed on the assumption that, however eccentric, his mind was one and not two or more.

McTaggart's supreme good is a society consisting solely of incorruptible lovers, perfectly differentiated but transparent individuals; but, as will be seen in chapter 11, the supreme good will be realized whatever happens in or to the society we live in as mortal beings. It has no value in political theory or as a guide to political conduct. The perfect society is a perfect differentiation in unity, but this tells us nothing about temporal society.

"Philosophy can afford us no guidance as to the next step to be taken at any time.... That must depend upon the particular circumstances which surround us at the moment - our needs, dangers, resources. It can only be decided empirically and it will just as often be a step which throws the unity into the background as it will be one which brings it forward into increased prominence."²²

The modern state, the organized society of the present, "is the natural and inevitable introduction to the society of the future, but it is so only in the same way as everything else is." Anarchy, sin and hatred, as well as society, virtue and love, are all "necessary incidents in the movement towards the ideal." One cannot say that the state is organic as the Absolute is organic, any more than one can say that human love is perfect as love among the immortals of the Absolute is perfect.

"Absolute Reality, according to Hegel, is eternal, and cannot be fully realized in any state of the world which is still subject to succession in time. Absolute Reality must see and be seen under the highest category only, and is not realized while any reality is unconscious of itself or appears to others under the form of matter. Absolute Reality, finally, is incompatible with pain or imperfection.

"This is clearly not the society in which we live, and we are not entitled to

²² J.McT.E. McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology (Cambridge, 1901), p. 195.

argue that the society of the present is an organic unity because the ideal society is such a unity."²³

However, we have lives to live in temporal society, and they must be lived as best we can, according to the best lights available to us as temporal beings.

To live in temporal society is to live in relationships upon which "overwhelming influence is exercised by considerations which we cannot suppose will have overwhelming influence in that ideal society in which all our aspirations would be satisfied."²⁴ Temporal society exhibits a continuous dialectical movement from differentiation to unity and back. At one stage differentiation will be the dominant tendency, even to the verge of anarchy; at the next there will be a swing to unity which threatens excessive homogeneity and uniformity. There is in this dialectical movement no "cunning of reason," no underlying progress towards an eventual state of perfect unity combined with perfect differentiation. The theoretical problem is how to define the relationship, here and now, between the individual and organized political society.

McTaggart's exaltation of the individual person, so evident in his vision of the Absolute, is reflected in his political theory.

"Each of us is more than the society which unites us, because there is in each of us the longing for perfection which that society can never realize. The parts of a living body can find their end in that body, though it is imperfect and transitory. But a man can dream of perfection and, having once done so, he will find no end short of perfection. Here he has no abiding city."²⁵

Here is a very clear expression of the connection between McTaggart's metaphysics and his view of man in society. The triumphs and disasters of man the political animal may have no bearing whatsoever upon the realization of the Absolute, but the nature of that perfection which will be realized in the Absolute is more like any one individual member of society than it is any society of individuals - short of the perfect society of the Absolute itself. McTaggart was the last one to argue analogically; but given the intensity of his personalist vision of the supreme good, it is hardly surprising to find him valuing one man's dream of perfection more highly than the collective compromises of political life. That the individual is to a large degree "determined in every direction by the society in which he lives" does not entail the state being the end for man, nor that it is in any way superior to the individual.²⁶ The existence of intrinsically determining relations between individuals and between the individual and "the unity in which he stands with the other individuals of the same system" does not entail any sort of subordination of the individual to society, temporal or eternal. Determining relations are compatible with a unity which is a mere means to the separate ends of its constituent related parts. Again, this sort of unity obtains only in the supreme good, where the constituent parts are literally immaterial, where the individual is a soul (in traditional, religiously inspired language) and all is spirit. However, the nature of perfection leaves us as free to say that society is nothing but a means to individual fulfilment as that the individual is an instrument of the common good.

"...the highest realization of the State - that in which it is the universal which completely sums up the individuals which compose it - may be considered as being in the past or the future, but not in the present."²⁷

From that it would be reasonable to infer that the perfection of differentiation in unity cannot be found in political life as we know it - from which it does not follow that the individual should defy or ignore the demands of the state. But the drift of McTaggart's Hegelian "cosmology" is clear: even the "highest realization of the State" (which is not a

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

practical political prospect) is so far removed from the individualism of the supreme good that it would be irrational to subordinate individuals to the state. It might be politic, it might help secure some temporal good - it would certainly have no effect, adverse or otherwise, on the supreme good - but such a policy could not rationally defend itself by trying to argue that the state is the good, the end, the fulfilment of the individual.

One of the features of British Hegelian political philosophy which McTaggart found quite intolerable was a propensity to invest Hegel's obiter dicta about the state being some sort of earthly God with evangelical seriousness, and to encourage the state to bask in the reflected glory of the Absolute. For those tempted to indulge in any form of state worship, McTaggart caustically remarks: "It would be as reasonable to worship a sewage pipe, which also possesses considerable value as a means."²⁸ As for the state's claim to exercise moral authority over the citizen, McTaggart has another aphorism: "A man is not a child, and the State is not God."²⁹ Men may have found their fulfilment, their perfection, in the polis; but the state is not the polis, nor is it the real or rational will of its citizens. The moral authority which society possessed in the ancient city-state has devolved upon the individual conscience. There are cases in which an individual may find himself "in the same childlike relation to the State as was possible in classical times," but on the whole "the development of individual conscience and responsibility has been too great for such an attitude."³⁰ The state can no longer be the unquestioned judge of right and wrong; it can now itself be judged and condemned by the individual on moral grounds. "It has still a claim to obedience, but not to unquestioning veneration."³¹ In this part of his argument, McTaggart is attacking a straw man. He appears to have felt a dangerous imbalance in the political theory of philosophical idealism and the need to reassert the claims of the individual with the force of some exaggeration.

McTaggart's moral philosophy has the same curious relationship with his metaphysics as does his general theory of value. The supreme good could not be more remote, and yet it is right there, on the other side of a clear but impenetrable wall of glass. The Absolute has no logical connection with morality here and now. On the other hand, "if we care for virtue we can scarcely fail to be interested in the ultimate righteousness or iniquity of the universe...."³² The Absolute, of course, is perfection, the complete development and realization of our ideals. That includes happiness, which "is also an element of perfection."³³ Happiness and moral development, or self-realization, cannot thwart one another as elements in the supreme good. For one thing, moral development is complete - by definition - and, for another, there cannot be morality without something evil, ugly, painful or simply incomplete to overcome.

When we look at the moral life of temporal man in temporal society, we can find no harmony among ethical principles. The great debate, when McTaggart began his philosophical career, was between the idealist ethic of self-realization and the utilitarian one of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. One might have thought that McTaggart, as a personal idealist, would have chosen self-realization as the most congenial ethical principle. But no, he found it too slippery a criterion to apply to hard cases; it could not meet the exacting demands of problems of moral choice. What McTaggart was looking for was something which worked as well as explained. The greatest happiness principle filled the bill, because "no one ever mistakes intense pain for intense pleasure, while ideals of perfection have been so different and incompatible that, whoever is right, many people must have mistaken great defects for great

²⁸ J.McT.E. McTaggart, Philosophical Studies, ed. S.V. Keeling (London, 1934), p. 109.

²⁹ SHC, p. 148.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 147.

³¹ Ibid., p. 149. For the idealist theory of the state properly understood, the nexus of political obligation is neither obedience nor veneration.

³² J.McT.E. McTaggart, Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic (Cambridge, 1896), p. 258.

³³ SHC, p. 122.

excellences."³⁴ To the contention that the employment of happiness as a moral criterion involves the addition and subtraction of intensive quantities, McTaggart's response was that no criterion, not even that of perfection, can dispense with the calculation of intensive quantities of itself.

"How can we act rationally with regard to consequences, unless the different intensive quantities in different sets of consequences can be compared? Although the excess of A's intensity over B's is not a pleasure, it is, nevertheless, pleasure. Whatever has quantity must be homogeneous in respect of some quality, and it is only quantitative in respect of that homogeneous quality. If, therefore, pleasure has an intensive quantity, then each part of that quantity must be pleasure, including that part by which it is greater than another."³⁵

Scornful idealists such as Bradley, who charged the felicific calculus with futility and immoral casuistry, were nevertheless obliged to measure and compare the consequences of different courses of action. Let us suppose, McTaggart suggests, a man of limited means, with conflicting moral obligations making demands beyond those means:

"Shall he send his sons to a second-rate school and pension his old nurse, or shall he send them to a first-rate school and let her go to the workhouse? Problems like these are the real ethical difficulties of life, and they are not to be solved by generalities - or even by contemplating the idea of the supreme good, in which there are neither school-bills nor workhouses, and whose perfections are in consequence irrelevant to the situation."³⁶

It is unlikely that the "laborious empirical calculation of consequences" which McTaggart's hypothetical father must undertake would involve the balancing of pleasures and pains, their intensity, duration, distribution and so on. It is quite likely that he would know intuitively what to do, or fall back on what Bradley called the common moral consciousness. In either case, what he might do and why, and how it might be rationalized theoretically, are two different things. McTaggart no doubt received the ethics of universalistic hedonism straight from Sidgwick; but the tenor of his remarks on the conduct of the moral life is oddly reminiscent of Bradley's Ethical Studies.

The upshot of what McTaggart has to say about ethics is that the supreme good can only offer a kind of religious consolation. The ideal of that perfect happiness which we will enjoy as members of the perfect society has to be transformed into the pleasure-pain principle in order to give us something to steer by in our everyday lives. Ideals of perfection, such as self-realization, have no practical moral bearing, and virtue is presumably left to its own devices. The observation with which this discussion of McTaggart's moral philosophy began now appears to mean that "to care for virtue," to have a moral sense, guarantees an interest - a vital interest for McTaggart - in the nature of the supreme good and the fate of human beings as the bearers of value. It does not mean that "the ultimate righteousness of the universe" can direct us into the paths of virtue. We have grounds for hope in the Absolute, but the most we can strive for is approximate happiness. A limited good is still good, though limited. "The beatific vision is good; and so is a bottle of champagne."³⁷

34 Ibid., p. 117.

35 Ibid., p. 116.

36 Ibid., p. 105.

37 Ibid., p. 193.

CHAPTER 11

Idealism as a Substitute Religion

During the nineteenth century many in the educated classes of Britain turned increasingly from religion to philosophy as their source of spiritual inspiration and consolation. There was a tendency, in short, for philosophy to become a substitute religion. This tendency is associated particularly with the influence of Hegel and the development of a distinctively British version of philosophical idealism. Most philosophers, as well as other writers on philosophical subjects, at first resisted the claims of the Absolute, almost instinctively rejecting the idea that Hegelianism (or any other philosophy) could understand Christianity better than it understood itself. However, in spite of some later disenchantment, several British Hegelians made use of idealist metaphysics for quasi-religious purposes. Some tailored Hegelianism to suit a more or less orthodox Christianity; others, such as McTaggart, were carried by their speculation on the nature of the Absolute far beyond the confines of even the most unorthodox Christianity. Bradley's Absolute contained God, religion and personality as related and lesser degrees of reality. The Absolute was not, however, something he believed in instead of God or his immortal soul; he was driven to it as an inescapable metaphysical conclusion. Although he himself had no faith in anything supernatural, he respected the pronouncements of the common religious consciousness - as he did those of the common moral consciousness - and distrusted those thinkers who would presume to tell it what it was really trying to say.¹ This was in marked contrast to McTaggart, who sought to disabuse it of dogmatic errors and replace them with sound, rational belief in personal immortality.

Green stands somewhere between the strict separation of religion and philosophical idealism and the collation of the two undertaken by Edward and John Caird.² There is a strong religious undercurrent in Green's Prolegomena to Ethics - for example, in his use of the term "eternal consciousness" to describe the metaphysical ground of his ethics and his epistemology. However, he rarely uses overtly religious language, and nowhere does he explicitly equate the eternal consciousness with the God of religion. Although, on the whole, he avoided the language of religious imagery in his philosophy, or anything to suggest that he might be using philosophical arguments to reinforce a religious creed, Green's "Lay Sermons" reveal an enthusiasm for social reform which was partly religious in inspiration.³ The pursuit of self-perfection surpassed the limits of the political life; but the moral life was lived primarily in pursuit of the good of others, if only because of the still pressing "condition of England." Green did not say that political society and political virtue would ever become unnecessary. He did, however, look beyond the state to a world society in which the mutual regard and consciousness of common good which bind the members of the mature nation-state would bind the human race as a whole. Such a community would also be a form of communion for its members, their concern for each other's spiritual matching that for their material welfare.

With the exception of Bosanquet, the British Hegelians were not content to tie man's

¹ See F.H. Bradley, "Concluding Remarks," ES, esp. pp. 314-24, and Bradley's diatribe against Matthew Arnold's "eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness."

² See ch. 5, p. 46, and ch. 8, pp. 69-70, for earlier mentions of Edward and John Caird respectively.

³ Practically every account of Green and his work makes reference to the character, Mr. Grey, in Mrs. Humphrey Ward's novel, Robert Elsmere (1888). The hero is racked by agonizing religious doubt until he hears one of Grey's charismatic sermons, most of which is lifted verbatim from Green's work.

destiny to that of the state. "Here," says McTaggart, "he has no abiding city." Even Bosanquet, however, displayed "une certaine ambiance religieuse."⁴ The Absolute was, for Bosanquet, no respecter of persons. Therefore it could not be God, unless it were a Spinozistic substance. Bosanquet talked about the ubiquity of the Absolute, its presence in varying degrees everywhere in the world. The strong whiff of pantheism repelled many, but it was Bosanquet's insistence that the value of the finite individual lay in his distinctive contribution to the world, his refusal to grant any ultimate value to personality, which most aroused the antipathy of Christian and personal idealists against Hegelianism.

The religious "ambiance" of British Hegelianism is perhaps sufficiently explained by the fact that German philosophical idealism was a fascinating intellectual novelty which arrived at a time when many members of the educated classes were looking desperately for something to fill the spiritual void being created by the inability of the traditional faith to withstand rational criticism. It either ignored the challenge, condemned it, appealed to authority, or it sought the assistance of new ideas about man as a rational animal. Idealism was a self-confessed theodicy with far-reaching intellectual ambitions. The self-appointed task of "der neueste Philosophie" was set out by one of Hegel's first and most fluent translators, William Wallace:

"To explicate religion is...to show that religion is the truth, the complete reality, of the mind that lived in Art, that founded the state, and sought to be dutiful and upright; the truth, the crowning fruit of all scientific knowledge, of all human affections, of all secular consciousness. Its lesson ultimately is that there is nothing essentially common or unclean..."⁵

Edward Caird, whom we have already encountered as an assiduous and tireless spokesman for Hegelianism, found the key to the Hegelian system in self-consciousness as the unifying principle of experience. Just as the sun reveals both itself and the darkness, so self-consciousness is the light by which man knows both himself and all other things. This does not mean that the mind can know nature a priori, but rather that the fact of knowledge implies the unity of thought and being. Human reason discovers a rational principle in experiencing an external world. Hegel's unity of thought and being was, for Caird as for other Hegelians, the solution to the problem raised by Kant's version of idealism, which could be maintained "only if self-consciousness were found to be a principle adequate to the explanation of that which is the very opposite of self-consciousness - i.e., only if spirit could be shown to be the reason of nature, and mind to be the key to matter."⁶

The important feature of Caird's thought for us at this juncture is his identification of the unifying principle in experience with God. Green's eternal consciousness is the same unifying principle; but Green left its religious nature problematical. Caird also looked on the unity of thought and being as a principle designed to overcome the Kantian dualism of subject and object, experience and the thing-in-itself. But for Caird that principle may just as well be called God as self-consciousness.

"...in the consciousness of self is involved also the consciousness of the universal unity or centre which all knowledge implies, and in this sense the consciousness of self and the consciousness of God are essentially bound up with each other."⁷ This notion of self-consciousness and the consciousness of God being "bound up with each other" is, if anything, even more imprecise than Green's of our being "partakers in some inchoate measure" of the eternal consciousness. In the Gifford Lectures for 1890-92, Caird expressed

⁴ Jean Pucelle, L'Idéalisme en Angleterre (Neuchatel, 1955), p. 16. "La philosophie anglaise n'a jamais été pleinement secularisée."

⁵ W. Wallace, Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (Oxford, 1894), p. xlvi.

⁶ E. Caird, Hegel (Edinburgh, 1883), p. 132.

⁷ E. Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (Glasgow, 1889), vol. I, pp. 215-16.

himself more forcefully, if no more clearly, on the matter of linking the unity of thought and being to the idea of God.

"The idea of God, therefore - meaning by that, in the first instance, only the idea of an absolute principle of unity which binds in one 'all thinking things, all objects of thought,' which is at once the source of being to all things that are, and of knowing to all beings that know - is an essential principle of our intelligence, a principle which must manifest itself in the life of every rational creature."⁸

The question posed in this statement is whether Caird meant God or merely the idea of God. The parenthetical part of the statement, amplifying "the idea of God," suggests that he meant both, that he was talking about a creative "source of being" as well as a metaphysical principle. That would be consistent, as far as it goes, with the Hegelian logos or world spirit. But Caird apparently believed that Hegelianism was simply a higher form of the old faith and that the Hegelian principle was the God of religion in metaphysical guise.

Caird's religion comports easily with his Hegelianism. He shows no circumspection in concluding that the Absolute is God - in fact, it is less a conclusion than an assumption - and that the spirit of reason at work in the world is divine providence. There is a great deal in Hegel's writings to support such an identification. For example, Hegel makes very effective philosophical use of Christian revealed truths, such as the Incarnation and the Atonement. His philosophy is intended, however, to "see through" Christianity, not in the sense of exposing religious deceit but of understanding and making explicit the rational meaning of Christianity. In the sense of having been understood, Christianity has been "cancelled and preserved" by Hegelianism. Caird's identification of the Hegelian unity of thought and being with the Christian God is rather too facile.

Caird's religion of Hegelianism as a natural successor to Protestant Christianity - the Holy Spirit rightly understood - was one way in which idealism became converted into a substitute religion. Another, and intrinsically more interesting, way was that of McTaggart. In the following discussion of McTaggart's "religion," reference will be made exclusively to his Hegelian phase. I am not equipped to properly discuss McTaggart's Nature of Existence - which is a product of pre-Kantian pure reason, and which has been fully and fairly treated by C.D. Broad and P.T. Geach - and as already stated, McTaggart's faith was fixed before he abandoned Hegelianism as the method to establish its truth.

The Hegelian dialectic begins with the category of being and ends in the Absolute Idea. In between is a series of manifestations of the principle of the unity of thought and being. Of the whole dialectical process, says McTaggart, we can know absolutely only the beginning in the abstract idea and the end in the Absolute Idea. This knowledge assures us on general grounds that "everything must be rational, without showing us how particular things are rational."⁹ Facts and events can only be known empirically, whereas we know the beginning and the end of the process a priori. Although the intermediate stages require sense perception to be known and something like intuitive judgment to be evaluated, they turn out in the end to be constituted by the highest category, the Absolute Idea. One cannot deduce the existence of the entire universe from pure thought, but one can discover the rationality of everything through pure thought. Hegel, says McTaggart, "endeavours to find the idea in everything, but not to reduce everything to a manifestation of the idea."¹⁰ The highest category, the Absolute Idea, is present implicitly in all our thought and draws us on from the incomplete form of it which is explicitly before us at any one time to its full realization, its full explication. This is the motive force of the dialectic.

⁸ E. Caird, The Evolution of Religion (Glasgow, 1893), vol. I, p. 68.

⁹ SHD, p. 250.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 29.

The universe as a whole is in fundamental agreement with the human mind. There is harmony of thought and being - the real is rational - but not identity.

"[Their relationship] may be expressed by saying that Thought is adequate to express Being, and Being adequate to embody Thought. On the one hand, no reality exists beyond the sphere of actual or possible knowledge, and no reality, when known as completely as possible, presents any contradiction or irrationality. On the other hand, there is no postulate which Thought demands in order to construct a harmonious and self-consistent system of knowledge, which is not realized in Being."¹¹

The harmony of thought and being does not mean there is no immediacy - only contingency has vanished in Hegel's system, says McTaggart.

From the point of view of theory, reality is rational. From that of practice, it is righteous, "since the only view of reality which we can consider as completely rational, is shown to be one which involves our own complete self-realization."¹² If reality is righteous, if the completely perfect as well as the completely rational is eternally present, then the problem which all the idealists had to face presents itself: how to reconcile the perfection of reality with the existence of manifest imperfection. Imperfection is not a delusion; if it were, our being deluded would vitiate the perfection which permitted such a delusion to persist. Imperfection is the inability to see the whole universe immediately.

"...if we can attain to the point of looking at the whole universe sub specie aeternitatis, we shall see just the same subject-matter as in time; but it will appear perfect, because seen as a single concrete whole, and not as a succession of separated abstractions.

"...the whole drift of Hegel's system is as much against the ultimate reality of a succession of phenomena, as such, as it is in favour of the ultimate reality of individual persons, as such."¹³

The logical possibility of being able to stand outside time, like some neutral observer, and survey the whole thing, past, present and future, contradicts the possibility of "a succession of phenomena" past, present and future, because past, present and future are ascribable only from the standpoint of the present. The first possibility's reality precludes the second's. If time is unreal, it would seem that present experience is no longer a sound basis of knowledge. To solve the problem of how to reconcile the a priori arguments for the eternal presence of the Absolute with the equally sound a posteriori ones for the existence of change, McTaggart availed himself of Bradley's maxim that "what may be, if it also must be, assuredly is" - or, in Geach's even more Bradleyan wording, "when everything that is impossible has been excluded, whatever remains, however improbable it may seem, must be true."¹⁴

The supreme good, or the Absolute in its practical aspect, is so remote from our everyday experience that it would seem to be irrelevant to the moral life. The moral life is lived on a level far distant from that of the Absolute. Imperfection is its daily lot, and in non-philosophical parlance such a life is real. But its end - or reality, in the sense of its realization or fulfilment - is, like that of every stage in the dialectical process, the supreme good of the Absolute. The Absolute is both realized and to be realized, both implicit and in the process of becoming explicit.

Whereas Hegel found the Absolute in the presently unfolding life of the world spirit - in art, religion and philosophy, and in the rational state - McTaggart found it in a timeless heaven of immortal souls which he was nevertheless convinced would inevitably occur at some point in time. Perfection is not simply the Absolute, or the world seen sub specie aeternitatis

¹¹ Ibid., p. 119.

¹² Ibid., p. 120.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 177-78.

¹⁴ P.T. Geach, Truth, Love and Immortality, p. 18.

(if we could but do so), but also the necessary outcome of the temporal process. The seeming contradiction here McTaggart neatly eliminated by the proof of the unreality of time. However, he offered no reason why the temporary delusion of a temporal process might not last forever. Forever is a long time, but it is nothing to the Absolute. The supreme good, or absolute perfection, will come to be in spite of humanity if necessary. Hegel conceived of the history of the human spirit and all its works as the way of the Absolute Idea. McTaggart was not historically minded and the purely deductive derivation of his Absolute in no way impaired its reality as far as he was concerned.¹⁵ In sketching the world's "progress," through past pain and despair and unimaginable future horrors to the perfect society, McTaggart displays a breathtakingly optimistic fatalism.

"The ideal is so enormously distant that the most perfect knowledge of the end we are aiming at helps us very little in the choice of the road by which we may get there. Fortunately it is an ideal which is not only the absolutely good, but the absolutely real, and we can take no road that does not lead to it."¹⁶

McTaggart's Absolute is not indifferent to persons in the here and now. Its realization will see "a complete development of our ideals, and a complete satisfaction of them when developed."¹⁷

"Every conscious being...will express all his individuality in one end, which will truly and adequately express it. The fulfilment of such an end as this would give satisfaction, not partial and temporary, but complete and eternal."¹⁸ The Absolute is a supra-organic society of selves or persons existing in a state of mutual love - not love of truth, or virtue, or beauty, nor sexual desire, but "passionate, all-absorbing, all-consuming love."¹⁹ It is a city of God without God, a timeless communion of immortal souls. McTaggart defended his improbable Real World, the everlasting community of immortal Platonic lovers, partially on the grounds that it was the only truly adequate interpretation of Hegel's statements about the Absolute and the only conclusion consistent with the whole dialectical process. The whole drift of Hegelian metaphysics, he claimed, is in the direction of an Absolute which, infinite as a whole, nevertheless consists entirely of finite individuals - and these individuals, though finite, are perfect.

Bradley, Bosanquet and their epigoni were profoundly mistaken in arguing from the incurable contradictoriness of relations to the inevitable imperfection, the ultimate unreality, of the individual self. There is, says McTaggart, "no reason to hold that a finite person is necessarily an imperfect person."²⁰ The perfection of a person's knowledge, volition and emotion is a function of, but not constituted by, his relations with others; it does not lie in his self-sufficiency. Self-determination is the corollary of more intimate and complex relations with external reality.

"There can be only one meaning in calling a thing imperfect without qualification - that it does not realize the ideal inherent in its nature. Now what necessary imperfection in the realization of my nature is brought about by the mere fact that I am not the universe? What postulate or aspiration is involved in personality which is incompatible with external relations on the part of the person?"²¹

¹⁵ McTaggart was the most mercilessly metaphysical of the British Hegelians, and he looked upon Hegel's moral and political philosophy, and his philosophies of history and religion, not as the explication of the Absolute Idea, but as misleading glosses on the only permanently valuable part of Hegelianism, the dialectic of categories.

¹⁶ SHC, p. 196.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 122.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 96.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 260. Compare G.E. Moore's ideal, described in ch. 13, pp. 103-04.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 80.

²¹ Ibid.

External relations do not destroy the harmony of the related object, nor is the harmony of the perfect society impaired by its being made up of externally related individuals.

The lodestar of McTaggart's life was the proof that the world was really people loving one another. One of the chief obstacles to achieving that proof was the account of the self given by Bradley and Bosanquet. In an essay entitled "The Individualism of Value," McTaggart explained his divergence from other idealists over the question of the social character of the supreme good. Too many idealists had failed to recognize the individualism of value, partly through "the assumption that the value to be found in a whole must have as much unity as the whole itself has," and partly through an over-emphasis upon the relation as distinct from the related objects in any particular good. Some had even argued that the relation had intrinsic value. But the British Hegelian argument - which McTaggart tentatively accepted²² - is the organicist one that the whole formed by the relation and the related objects has value in itself: the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. From there it was concluded that the whole universe enjoys the highest intrinsic value. McTaggart repudiated that position, arguing, first, that value must be confined to consciousness, and second, that the universe, or any number of conscious beings, is not itself a conscious being:

"If A loves B, what is good is not the relation between them, but the state of A in being one of the terms of that relation...a state of A and a state of B cannot (as ends) have a different value together than the sum of the values they would have had separately. For A and B are not a conscious being, but an aggregate of conscious beings...."

"[The only value of an individual sacrifice lies in the possibility of its being] a means to the creation, in other individuals, of value exceeding that which was lost in the self-sacrifice."²³

McTaggart's views on morality have already been discussed in the previous chapter. All morality contributes to happiness as well as self-development. The supreme good is the perfect combination of development and happiness. But as we have seen, only happiness is a practical ethical standard and the felicific calculus a guide. The supreme good might just as well not exist as far as the moral life is concerned. We must, *sub specie temporis*, pass moral judgments and strive to realize goodness in ourselves and in society. But perfection is coming to be regardless of our efforts, whether they are crowned with success or not. The Absolute is remote and human moral effort ineffectual.

"Fortunately, the attainment of the good does not ultimately depend upon action.... If the nature of reality was hostile or indifferent to the good, nothing but the most meagre and transitory gains could ever be made by creatures so weak and insignificant as we should be in such a universe. But if, as Hegel teaches us, that which we recognize as the supreme good is also the supreme reality, then it must inevitably realize itself in the temporal process, and no mistake of ours can hinder the advance and the eventual attainment.

"For this is one of the most profound and important consequences of all metaphysical idealism. Virtue, and the science which deals with it, imply the possibility of sin, they imply action, and they imply time. And they share, therefore, the inadequacy of matter and the physical sciences."²⁴

It followed for McTaggart, with rigorous deductive logic, that reality must be denied to everything except what can be proved without reference to experience. This doctrine was not, contrary to a widespread belief, the common property of philosophical idealists. Bradley's Absolute was timeless, but Green's eternal consciousness, like Hegel's *Geist*, was necessarily incarnate as nature and human history. The necessity in this process of incarnation was a bit

²² See *SHC*, pp. 80-96.

²³ J. McT. E. McTaggart, *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 107-09.

²⁴ *SHC*, p. 127.

like the Christian doctrine of predestination: human freedom lay in carrying out divine providence in all too human ways - and for Hegel the greatest freedom lay in knowing that, as it were, from the inside out. McTaggart alone believed that the Absolute would realize itself in time, but not over time - perhaps we should say, all in good time. The reality of the Absolute was entirely indifferent to the temporal process, to the history of nature and of man. Knowledge of the reality of perfection may develop in human minds, but the truth of the matter was completely independent of change of any kind.

McTaggart's Absolute, his personalist vision of supreme good and reality, was an article of religious faith as much as a philosophical conclusion.²⁵ It had a certain practical value too. It gave consolation - and thereby some happiness - by assuring human beings of the ultimate righteousness of the universe. Although the Absolute can afford no explanation of, or guidance for, the moral and political life, it can supply comfort, reconciliation and justification.

"...such conclusions as to the ultimate nature of things as we have seen can be reached by Hegel's philosophy have obviously a very intimate connection with the problems which may be classed as religious.... Any system of philosophy which gives any reasons for deciding such questions, in one way rather than another, will have a practical interest, even if it should fail to provide us with counsel as to the organization of society, or with explanations in detail of the phenomena of science."²⁶

The practical value of "such conclusions" lies in their support for a loose collection of quasi-religious beliefs which McTaggart considered fundamental to human happiness - not in the sense of a balance of pleasure over pain, but in that of being at peace with the universe or Absolute Reality. To those who ask, "What is the use of philosophy?", McTaggart answers, first in the manner of Bradley, that it is an impertinent question to ask about the search for truth, and second, in a more personal manner, that its use "lies not in being deeper than science, but in being truer than theology - not in its bearing on action, but in its bearing on religion. It does not give us guidance. It gives us hope."²⁷ McTaggart maintained throughout his philosophical career that his theodicy without God was the only correct interpretation of Hegelianism. Those Hegelians who sought to apply the Hegelian dialectic to religion, to history, to morality and the state forgot that such phenomena all contain empirical elements and are open to contingency and unpredictable change. In no religious creed, in no moral code, in no form of political life, can we find the key to the Absolute Idea.

²⁵ Geach refers to McTaggart's "mystical experiences that gave him an utterly satisfying and unshakeable conviction that he had penetrated through appearances and divined the secret of the universe." (P.T. Geach, Truth, Love and Immortality, p. 15.)

²⁶ SHD, p. 236.

²⁷ SHC, p. 196.

CHAPTER 12

R.B. Haldane: Hegelianism With "Dirty Hands"

The strengths and the weaknesses of British Hegelianism as a school for life are nowhere better exemplified than in the career of R.B. Haldane.¹ Earnest and energetic in an eminently Victorian fashion, yet cosmopolitan in his tastes and interests, he came as close as anyone to being Edwardian England's philosopher-king. A.J. Balfour, Conservative Prime Minister from 1902 to 1906, and more (some have argued) a philosopher in his own right, made much less impact on either the philosophical or the political world. He was skeptical and fastidious and for him "politics was little more than a serious game."² By contrast, Haldane struggled throughout his political career to infuse the administration of imperial affairs - the War Office, the Lord Chancellorship, public education policy, whatever it might be - with moral purpose. His mastery of the details of high office, his high moral tone and his (sometimes devious) efforts to convert the fractious Liberal Party to his vision of social reform brought him both rewards and punishments.

In spite of his radical reforms, several high-ranking professional soldiers expressed their regret at his departure from the War Office. In 1912 Asquith asked him to be Lord Chancellor and he was created Viscount Haldane of Cloan. Although he was an active, and at times combative, member of the Liberal Party for many years (and laterally of the Labour Party), Haldane owed much of his political reputation to his discharging his ministerial duties in the manner of those illustrious servants of the Prussian state during the Napoleonic era upon whom Hegel supposedly modelled the administrative class of his Philosophy of Right. Even after his political star had fallen and philosophical idealism had fallen out of fashion, he was sought out by distinguished men of letters and science such as Einstein. On the debit side, his admiration for German culture and society made him the target for a press campaign of extreme vilification during World War I.³ He was driven from office in 1915 in spite of testimonials from such a patriotically unimpeachable source as Field Marshal Haig, only to re-emerge as Lord Chancellor in the first Labour government of 1924.

While many intellectuals were driven by the war's devastations to despair of liberal democracy, and others of any sort of political action whatsoever, Haldane retained his

¹ Richard Burdon Haldane (1856-1928), like Seth (Pringle-Pattison), was one of a number of Scottish philosophers who took the cure for religious doubt at the University of Gottingen under Lotze. He returned to the University of Edinburgh in 1875, studied Hegel and then law, also finding time to translate Schopenhauer. He was called to the English bar in 1879. He eventually became Lord Chancellor (1912-15 and 1924), but he is best known as a reforming Secretary of State for War (1905-1912) - "the greatest England has ever had," according to Earl Haig. He was Liberal MP for East Lothian from 1885 to 1912. He joined the Labour Party in 1921 after gradual disenchantment with the Liberal Party, especially over its neglect of educational policy.

² George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England, 1910-1914 (New York, 1961), p. 13.

³ When the British government began negotiations for entry into the EEC in the early 1960s, the media credited one of its diplomats with extraordinary powers of persuasion because he knew enough German to rapidly reduce complex German proposals to what he called "Hegelian fruit salad" or "Kantian kitsch." Haldane conversed unaided in German with the Emperor and Chancellor of Germany when on his so-called secret mission to Berlin in 1912 to try to slow the Anglo-German arms race.

enthusiasm for both new theories and old values and his willingness to use the coercive powers of the state in defence of liberalism. He was one of the founders of Liberal Imperialism and he continued to believe in the civilizing mission of the Imperial government. For Haldane this mission was a universal one, for the improvement of metropolitan subjects as well as far-flung colonials. He was a Home Ruler, an advocate of woman suffrage as early as his first election in 1885, and a tireless worker for universal higher education. He was also the chief architect of the British Expeditionary Force and the Imperial General Staff, an advocate of the use of force against Ulster at the time of the Curragh Mutiny (although he trimmed his sails rather awkwardly on that one), and a strong anti-Boer, maintaining that the non-Boer Uitlanders were oppressed by the Boers and supporting Milner's draconian measures against them.

Haldane looked beyond the Empire and the English-speaking world to the establishment of, first, a European *Sittlichkeit*, and eventually a set of mores which would be the indispensable underpinning of an international legal order. In his capacity as Lord Chancellor, he was invited to address the American Bar Association in Montreal in September 1913. His address, entitled "The Higher Nationality: A Study in Law and Ethics," brings to bear upon a thorough knowledge and practical experience of the law a Hegelian conception of society and the state. The explanation of social conduct lies, Haldane says, not in legal sanction nor in private conscience, but in *Sittlichkeit*. Custom or the done thing is the cement of social cohesion. It is also - and here Haldane is at one with Green, Bradley and Bosanquet - the ground and condition of the civil rights and civic institutions whose possession and enjoyment provide scope and opportunity for moral improvement and self-realization.

"It is the instinctive sense of what to do and what not to do in daily life and behaviour that is the source of liberty and ease. And it is this instinctive sense of obligation that is the chief foundation of society. Its reality takes objective shape and displays itself in family life and in our other civic and social institutions."⁴

Haldane supported this view with a Hegelian theory of knowledge - that is to say, one which holds that "behind knowledge we cannot go; there is no standard of truth save in its own process."⁵ We start with knowledge, not with a theory of knowledge. We are from the beginning immersed in a common intelligence, and "we cannot reach the intelligence of our fellow-men except by recognizing our very inmost selves as in them too."⁶ If we were not part of the universal reason, we could not distinguish ourselves as individual selves. We would be reduced to solipsism if we did not "recognize that even our own knowledge is dependent for its possibility on being not so limited [limited, that is, by 'what the bodily self suggests to us']...." "[The mind] can recognize itself as identically present in other selves, and discourse not merely about a world but about a universe."⁷ Although the distinguished Hegelian scholar, J.N. Findlay, has said that the British Hegelians' universe is less a concrete universal than it is a most un-Hegelian abstraction, Haldane - at least in his earlier, pre-World War I work - addressed himself to actual modes of human experience. According to T.M. Knox, "the writer in English who really was a Hegelian is Lord Haldane."⁸ His Gifford Lectures for 1902-04, *The Pathway to Reality*, were in part a conscious attempt to demystify Hegelianism. "The world as it seems" has different aspects - life as well as mechanism, morality as well as art, religion as well as morality - all of which are adequate in themselves.

"And if Philosophy gives us back what Science threatens to take away and

⁴ R.B. Haldane, *Selected Addresses and Essays* (London, 1928), p. 69.

⁵ Haldane's preface to *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. Johnston and Struthers (London, 1929), p. 14.

⁶ R.B. Haldane, *Human Experience: A Study of its Structure* (New York, 1926), p. 185.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 193-94.

⁸ T.M. Knox, "A Plea for Hegel," *New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy*, ed. W.E. Steinkraus (New York, 1971), p. 16.

restores to plain people their faith in the reality of each of these phases of the world as it seems, then Philosophy will have gone a long way to justify her existence."⁹

In spite of the suggestion that philosophy was being thrown into a holy crusade against science and irreligion, Haldane was a rationalist and orthodox Hegelian, a philosopher for whom philosophy is its own justification.

Haldane may have been most at home in the rarefied atmosphere of speculation, both political and metaphysical. Nevertheless, he acquired considerable skill in the parliamentary arena and risked the hostility of both his party and the electorate by defending some controversial public figures and by identifying himself with some unpopular causes. Although he never refused to dirty his hands, he developed a Platonic persona, seeming to assume the responsibilities of public office not for any satisfaction he might derive, but rather to ensure that the worse did not govern the better. He had a philosophical vocation, but he never withdrew from "the life of action generally, power, politics, success, wealth and ambition," essentially because he felt obliged to bring light into the cave of unknowing.

"What is the good of our reading to us who are in public life if we cannot use it in the effort, with all the strength we possess, to guide the current of opinion among our constituents."¹⁰

However much his approach to political education may strike us today as a species of upper-class condescension and paternalism, it is clear that his, as it were, extra-curricular activities in the field of public instruction cost him much leisure time - and Haldane was a very convivial sort of person who enjoyed the pleasures of society. Adult education was a lifelong passion and remained for him the key to improving the lot of the British working class. From 1881 he was an intermittent lecturer at the Working Men's College, he ventured to speak against the theories of Marx and Lasalle at the Soho Radical Club, and he was a consistent advocate of the expansion of a system of secular universities serving their respective communities. It was, he claimed, the Liberal Party's failure to vigorously pursue a democratic policy of higher education which more than anything else persuaded him to abandon it for the Labour Party.¹¹ From a Marxist or social-revolutionary point of view it is all too clear why Haldane of Cloan, Lord High Chancellor and confidant of kings, should be so zealous in the cause of adult education. He personifies the smooth transition from classical liberalism to welfare state politics. Indeed, Haldane's letters contain several references to the need for a "moderating conservatism" and "a steady effort to avert revolution." He might well be used as the prototype for all those who would domesticate the masses, training them to take up the command posts of liberal-democratic society. He believed in encouraging advances in working class power and responsibility, and he sought to influence their direction; but he never thought he could do that from afar, only through close cooperation on shared terms.

The problems attendant on trying to be a practising Hegelian are painfully apparent in Haldane's self-appointed role as conscience of the Liberal Party. The Liberals had become the embodiment of British respectability, and their leader, Herbert Asquith, was (in Dangerfield's words) "the Humour of Moderation." Unfortunately for the Liberal Party, there were highly immoderate forces surfacing and a general impatience with respectability. Haldane himself was anything but immoderate and was quite respectable, but he believed for rather recondite philosophical reasons that existing British institutions were the necessary expression of a necessary stage in the necessary unfolding of the world spirit. This was not a fatalistic

⁹ R. B. Haldane, The Pathway to Reality (London, 1903-4), vol. I, p. 119.

¹⁰ Letter to Mrs. Humphrey Ward from Germany, summer of 1890. See F. Maurice, The Life of Viscount Haldane of Cloan (London, 1937), vol. I, p. 55.

¹¹ In 1892, during the fourth and final Gladstone administration, Haldane advocated some reforming move which would gain the confidence of the "labour party" in the Commons.

doctrine. On the contrary, it compelled him to support any movement to expand the range of opportunities for relatively deprived groups and classes. His basic position, however, was not conducive to the structural changes demanded by many of those protesting social and political injustice. He looked upon improved conditions and enriched lives for individual members of society as a contribution to the self-realization of the individual writ large, the state. The ambivalence of Haldane's position - one could dub it conservative liberalism, democratic elitism or Hegelian socialism - is well revealed in a letter he wrote to a Liberal colleague in 1889:

"To my dying day, I think, I shall maintain the proposition, based on the analogy of my own mind, that a democracy has not got, as is assumed in practice, a body of definite opinion for the expression of which in Parliament it seeks delegates, but that it is an assembly of human beings earnestly seeking guidance from those of whose sympathies it is sure."¹²

A democratic society is an embryonic political assembly on this view. Its potential for enlightened self-government has to be parentally nurtured and then cultivated by astute statesmen and patient public servants.

Although Haldane was not a product of Oxford University, and therefore not exposed to classical Greek studies to the extent that other British Hegelians were, the roots of his political philosophy clearly lie in the polis, even if it was plucked from Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts (which his biographer tells us Haldane kept by his bedside and read more than a dozen times). Haldane was one of many Victorians who wished to hellenize British public life to counteract the native philistinism. One of the leading motives with him, as with others, was to head off a general condition of middling prosperity coupled with mediocrity and complacency. The goal of life was the good life, pretty much along the lines to be found in Aristotle's Ethics. When Haldane broke with the Liberal Party in 1920, he made it clear that his departure was caused primarily by disappointment with Liberal failure in "soul culture."

"Fifty years ago Matthew Arnold warned the Liberal Party of the certainty of the coming of the trouble which has actually wrecked it today. He asked in so many words whether material prosperity would permanently reconcile men to living in places like St. Helen's."¹³

¹² Ibid., vol. I, pp. 49-50.

¹³ Ibid., vol. II, p. 75.

CHAPTER 13

The Decline of British Hegelianism

British Hegelianism, like the British Empire, was mortally wounded by the First World War; unlike the Empire, Hegelianism did not linger long. Philosophical idealism continued to show vital signs in the philosophies of art and of history, but British Hegelianism rapidly became a memory with very few defenders outside some Oxford colleges and the Scottish universities. It is still regarded as something of a period piece.

There is some justification for its being so regarded. It owed its brief ascendancy as much to its association with social reform tendencies in late Victorian and Edwardian times and the quasi-religious quest for metaphysical consolation as it did to intrinsic philosophical merit. Representative figures such as Green, Ritchie and Haldane entered into the world of political action at some risk to their philosophical credentials. There was the double danger of being seen as merely irrelevant or, alternatively, expedient. There was not primarily a political doctrine, however, and such political impact as it had was largely the indirect result of its role in the political education of some leading members of the British ruling class. The greatest threat to the reputation of British Hegelianism was its own philosophical inadequacy. Radical departures from received truth in many fields of intellectual endeavour - particularly in social science, the philosophy of natural science and mathematical logic - in the years immediately preceding World War I, combined with the demoralizing effects of the war itself, drove British Hegelianism into a philosophical backwater. Bosanquet and the Haldane brothers tried especially hard to assimilate the new ideas. In spite of their efforts, British Hegelianism failed badly to convince the new wave of philosophers that it had much of continuing interest to say. Its lasting claim to fame was as a whipping boy - the most favoured example of how not to philosophize.

Without wishing to liken the British to the Roman Empire, it could nevertheless be said that the Hegelians were Stoics in a climate of opinion whose prevailing wind was Epicurean. They were no enemies of individual creative freedom and social experiment, but their generally Platonic attitude to art, their missionary zeal for civic uplift through mass education, and the classical republican gravitas with which they treated the pressing social problems of the day served to isolate them from advanced and fashionable thinking. It is tempting to suggest that they were the ants of the fable, whose prosaic efforts to put the societal house in order before the winter storms of uncivil disturbance and discontent were somehow less engaging than the grasshoppers' displays of intellectual virtuosity and art for art's sake.

Something of the quality of that form of life which has become a stereotype of the Edwardian age has been captured by J.M. Keynes, who is one of those who took the peace and security of the Edwardian order for granted. Writing in 1938, he remarked: "One cannot live today secure in the undisturbed individualism which was the extraordinary achievement of the early Edwardian days."¹ Keynes was a prominent member of the intellectual circle whose Socrates was G.E. Moore. "We were," says Keynes, "living in the specious present, nor had we begun to play the game of consequences. We existed in the world of Plato's dialogues; we had not reached the Republic, let alone the Laws."² They were the archetype of ivory-tower intellectuals, so otherworldly that they quite ignored "not only social action, but the life of action generally,

¹ J.M. Keynes, "My Early Beliefs," Two Memoirs (London, 1949), p. 95.

² Ibid.

power, politics, success, wealth, ambition, with the economic motive and the economic criterion less prominent in our philosophy than with St. Francis of Assisi, who at least made collections for the birds...."³ Keynes vividly evokes the mood of Platonic contemplation of that small group, which included, in addition to Moore and Keynes, Bertrand Russell, Lytton Strachey, Leonard Woolf and G. Lowes Dickinson.

Although they were a small, isolated group disdaining influence and oblivious of practical affairs, they represented an intellectual attitude which was peculiarly in keeping with the seeming timelessness of Edwardian life - an illusion produced by historical hindsight perhaps - and which has continued, with the assistance of the eminence attained by many of the group's members, to exercise a powerful attraction for the intelligentsia. It would be an extremely difficult and hazardous operation to make detailed connections between the highly intellectualized life of the Moore circle and Edwardian life as a whole, but one can sense an affinity even if one cannot trace any exact causal relations. There is a quality of suspended animation, of Arcadian calm, about both. The Moore circle's intellectual idyll owed much to a social, political, and economic stability of whose origins and conditions they were blissfully ignorant or which they chose to ignore. This indifference to their political and socio-economic environment did not survive the war. One has only to look at the subsequent career of Keynes. Nevertheless, the social concern and political involvement of Keynes, as of Russell, never completely lost its cloistered, academic air.

The source of the Moore circle's splendid isolation is to be found in Moore's philosophy. Although Keynes talks of the group's adherence to "Moore's religion," he hastens to add that they did not accept all that Moore offered. For one thing, they "discarded his morals," which included a good deal of "Sidgwick and the Benthamite calculus and the general rules of correct behaviour."⁴ But Moore's Principia Ethica (1903) - the point of departure for much of the moral philosophy of the English-speaking world in the twentieth century - was their bible, in particular the last chapter, entitled "The Ideal." Keynes summarizes their "religion" as follows:

"Nothing mattered except states of mind, our own and other people's of course, but chiefly our own. These states of mind were not associated with action or achievement or with consequences. They consisted in timeless, passionate states of contemplation and communion, largely unattached to 'before' and 'after'.... The appropriate subjects of passionate contemplation and communion were a beloved person, beauty and truth, and one's prime objects in life were love, the creation and enjoyment of aesthetic experience and the pursuit of knowledge.

"Our religion closely followed the English puritan tradition of being chiefly concerned with the salvation of our own souls. The divine resided within a closed circle. There was not a very intimate connection between 'being good' and 'doing good'...."⁵

The tendency of those who fell under Moore's spell to divorce being good from doing good, to neglect rightness as an attribute of actions in their enthusiasm for goodness as an attribute of states of mind, protected them from "the game of consequences" and made them impervious to Benthamism. Their "escape from Bentham," as Keynes calls it, was outdone by that from philosophical idealism, by which they were untouched - apart from Bertrand Russell's brief flirtation with it.⁶ All the two schools of thought had in common was their abhorrence (with

³ Ibid., pp. 95-96.

⁴ Ibid., p. 82.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 83-84.

⁶ Russell was briefly converted by McTaggart, the British Hegelian with the least appreciation of Hegel's historicism and social philosophy. McTaggart's ideal bears, in certain respects, a striking resemblance to that of the Moore circle - it is characterized by the same timelessness and emphasis upon personal love. It is a curious and perhaps significant fact that McTaggart,

the notable exception of McTaggart) of the felicific calculus and the definition of goodness as a surplus of pleasure over pain.

Moore maintained that good was just good, no more definable than yellow, and any attempt to define it he called "the naturalistic fallacy." To be intrinsically good, a thing must have no quality beyond that of bare goodness. Moore's attempt to strip goodness of all but purely ethical meanings was subverted by his own definition of "the ideal." The supremely good he almost casually defined as consisting of the contemplation of and communion with beauty, truth and a beloved person. Each is an intrinsic good and an inseparable part of the ideal, although a type of love for which the adjective "Platonic" should be reserved seems to occupy a special place in this trinity: "...the love of love is far the most valuable good we know...."⁷

Moore's account of virtue in chapter 5 of Principia Ethica, "Ethics in Relation to Conduct," is an essentially utilitarian one, in which virtue is merely a means to the supreme good. Virtue is a disposition to perform duties, which are on a par with interests; an action performed out of a sense of duty and an "interested" action are both judged entirely on their results. The only ethical distinction between them is the utility of sanctioning duties, "since they are actions which there is a temptation to omit."⁸ With this, Moore disposed of intuitional ethics and the problem of the moral will.

Moore dismissed "metaphysical ethics" - the ethics, for him, of both Kant and the idealists - as examples in supernatural guise of the naturalistic fallacy.⁹ Moore's own description of the ideal commits a supernaturalistic fallacy as much - or as little - as do idealist theories. He was driven to identify goodness with something other than goodness and to try and show that there is some sort of rational, i.e. non-accidental, relationship between the quality of goodness and what we attribute it to. At the same time, he strove to detach (free?) it from dependence on whatever it is which it qualifies, so that it would not be qualified in its turn. None of the "metaphysical" moralists advanced an ideal to match Moore's in its otherworldliness and remoteness from life in the terrestrial city. Moore's ethic was more suitable for anchorites than for active members of society. He acknowledged the social utility of conventional morality but took organized political society for granted, or implied that it was superfluous. The good life according to Moore could be lived in no society larger and more diversified than a kind of pantisocracy. Keynes remarked, revealingly, that Moore's fundamental intuitions "furnish a justification of experience wholly independent of outside events."¹⁰

Although Moore's socially detached ethics never attracted much attention from the British

Moore, Keynes and Russell were Cambridge men and those who applied Hegel to moral, social and political problems all Oxford men.

⁷ G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1962), p. 204. Bradley never reacted to Moore's moral philosophy in print, but it must surely have been an earlier example of the thinking of Moore and his circle which prompted the memorable phrase in Ethical Studies, "star-gazing virgins with souls above their spheres." Moore's ethic, with its utilitarian notion of virtue and its beatific vision of a timeless supreme good, would have been in Bradley's eyes the worst possible combination of hard-headedness and high-mindedness, the elevation and rarefication of his ideal serving only to encourage casuistry in a creed already prone to minute calculation and the cost-benefit analysis of moral action.

⁸ G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 170.

⁹ In an essay entitled "The Refutation of Idealism" and collected in his Philosophical Studies (London, 1922), Moore claimed to have destroyed the common and sacred ground of all philosophical idealism, the doctrine that to be is to be perceived. That doctrine has very little to do with an objective idealism such as Hegel's. Unfortunately its refutation is still used, and regarded as sufficient, to dispose of Hegelianism and idealism of all kinds.

¹⁰ J.M. Keynes, "My Early Beliefs," p. 95.

Hegelians - perhaps because of that same social detachment - it presented a more potent threat to Hegelian moral and political philosophy than the old enemy, utilitarianism, ever had. The individualism preached and practised by Moore and his companions outdid that of any of the utilitarians. The latter at least had a social theory, and one which was closely integrated with their moral theory. The Moore circle did not recognize society at large as having moral significance at all. Following that lead, the most influential British moral philosophers of the twentieth century have put forward completely asocial theories of morality. No matter how far they have travelled from the rarefied ideal of Moore, they all, like Moore, treat ethics in abstraction from social and political theory. They have been preoccupied with the classification and analysis of moral judgments. They have examined the logic of moral judgments, or even the metaphysical presuppositions implicit in making moral judgments, but never their full social context. Since World War II, British moral philosophers have shown, partially under the influence of existentialist writings, a special concern for the autonomy of individual moral judgment - for the individual's moral freedom and independence from external causation - which is reminiscent of both Kant and the "imperviousness" of human personality insisted on by Pringle-Pattison and the personal idealists. As with Kant, the individual is depicted freely obeying the moral law in defiance of social pressures. Morality is treated as something which has its centre of gravity within the individual conscience.

The idealist tradition, with which Hegel is identified, places the moral centre of gravity outside the individual in the social whole, in the social complex of laws, customs and mores. It is a fundamental tenet of philosophical idealism that no philosophy can be coherent which does not attempt to explain all the facts of experience; certainly a theory of values cannot neglect a set or range of value judgments and expect to be taken as adequate. The moral philosophy of G.E. Moore ignored altogether an important area of the human experience of values and evaluational conflicts: the political life, and the life of man generally in modern commercial and industrial society. It was unattached to any social or political theory. Although the moral life and the political life can be distinguished, each involving judgments which are in no way dependent for their validity upon those of the other, a moral theory which disregards the social conditions of the moral life is deficient. In this respect, as well as in matters of metaphysics and epistemology, there was no real point of contact between Moore and the main stream of British Hegelianism (the most notable exception being Bradley, who was at least regarded as a worthy opponent by Russell). On the other hand, Moore's philosophy did not lack for that high moral tone and suggestion that knowledge (of the prescribed kind) was in itself virtue, which can be readily detected in some of the more widely read works of British Hegelianism and which partially accounts for their rather dated appeal. Although philosophical idealism satisfied many people's spiritual yearnings, its social and political theory also spoke to and for its generation. It was in harmony with the great changes occurring under the surface of Edwardian life - changes which have continued more or less in the same direction. It was a philosophy conscious, as we have seen with Bosanquet, of its peculiar fitness to explain the predominantly urban, heavily industrial and increasingly democratic state which was developing and asserting itself during the late Victorian and Edwardian years. This view of itself was not entirely justified, if only because idealism frequently stressed the identity of social interests at the expense of the subjective element's role in society. However, it stands in marked contrast to the social detachment of most British philosophy since Moore.

The Great War and its effect on Haldane's political career have been noted in the previous chapter. It had equally damaging consequences for British Hegelianism. This was due in part to a wholly unwarranted association with Prussian militarism. The proposition that Hegel's philosophy was one of the motive forces of the Reich was ludicrous; yet it emerged again, with even less justification, in literature about the Nazi regime (although not in the Nazis' own justificatory writings); and there are still learned debates about whether or not Hegel was a proto-fascist or in some way connected, however remotely, with totalitarian political doctrines. In 1918, L.T. Hobhouse, a distinguished sociologist, philosopher and one of the "New Liberals," directly linked Hegel's political philosophy with German war guilt in his attack on

what he called the "metaphysical theory of the state."¹¹ Apart from such crude but effective discrediting tactics, British Hegelianism was damaged by the widespread loss of faith induced by the war experience - faith in God, in church, in state and in civilization itself.

Generally speaking, the Hegelian faith was a faith in human reason and in the rationality of human institutions - which meant having faith in the real world. The logos or meaning of things was in all things, so there was no point in looking beyond things as they were, or wishing they were different, in order to satisfy human aspirations for freedom and justice. "To live in Main Street is, if one lives in the right spirit, to inhabit the holy city." This may be something to chew on for the moralist who thinks that liberal-capitalist society is beyond redemption, but it is difficult to discover the Hegelian "cunning of reason" in some of the starker horrors perpetrated by twentieth century man.

As we have seen, those British Hegelians who were not orthodox believers tended to be at least looking for some kind of metaphysical consolation in Hegel's philosophy, if not a substitute religion. One of the best illustrations of this cast of mind - and of its persistence well after the war and the displacement of idealism by more positivist and empiricist philosophies - can be found in J.S. Haldane, brother of R.B. Haldane and a distinguished natural scientist. He first appeared in print as a contributor to Essays in Philosophical Criticism (1883), along with his brother, Bosanquet, Ritchie, Seth, and a number of other (mostly minor) figures loosely associated with British Hegelianism. He became an expert on respiratory physiology, while retaining his faith in the intelligible principle of the universe, which he called "Supreme Active Reality."

"The conclusion forced upon me in the course of a life devoted to natural science is that the universe as it is assumed to be in physical science is only an idealized world, while the real universe is the spiritual universe, in which spiritual values count for everything."¹²

It is our actual everyday experience, he argued, which guarantees the spiritual unity of life, because we cannot perceive anything or consciously direct our behaviour in any way without encountering shared values and shared interests. We strive to create them, but we cannot do anything in their absence, so, to put it very simply, there is something there, and it is not outside us or above us or beyond us.

In political philosophy the British Hegelians had to combat personalism, anarchism, internationalism and other varieties of doctrine directed against the state and some or all of its works. They chose, by and large, to fight on the ground that the state, for all its imperfections, was the only vehicle for realizing the common good, and that "every moral good is a common good."¹³ They confronted the problem of political obligation, as they did the problem of knowledge, as a problem in philosophical psychology. Bosanquet's treatment of the

¹¹ L.T. Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory of the State: A Criticism (London, 1918). Another wartime production which found Hegelianism guilty by association with German political and military excess was George Santayana's Egotism in German Philosophy (London, 1916). This hostile account of Hegel's notion of objective mind creates a caricature out of elements drawn from Fichte and Nietzsche, as well as from Hegel himself. "The existent did not really concern him, but only 'knowledge,' that is, a circle of present and objectless ideas... Egotism could hardly receive a more radical expression than this: to declare the ego infinite because it can never find anything that is beyond its range" (p. 75). Santayana maintained that German philosophical idealism, by attempting to bring the world within the ego, had made the external world philosophically insignificant and idealism a philosophy obsessed with externals. The world thus conceived was the plaything of individual and national egos.

¹² J.S. Haldane, The Sciences and Philosophy (London, 1929), p. 273. This was first delivered as the Gifford Lectures (University of Glasgow) for 1927-28.

¹³ Henry Jones, The Principles of Citizenship (London, 1919), p. 70.

general will can be taken as their paradigm. Their point of departure was the phenomena of individual volition. That society is "precipitate with instincts, habits and dispositions which, from the first, are not merely individual, but point beyond individual and exclusive interests to an interest in the whole," is explained on the analogy of an individual person referring "a particular object to a whole of interest, which in turn is overshadowed and penetrated in normal cases by the sense of the individual's interest as a whole."¹⁴ The problem of reconciling man to organized society, or justifying the ways of the state, was particularly acute during and after World War I, because many writers in many fields were arguing very forcefully and effectively for a sharp division between the rationality of individuals or small groups of people and the atavistic irrationality of mass society. Although they drew different conclusions, Graham Wallas and Vilfredo Pareto are prime examples of how potent the case for collective unreason could be, and several of the British Hegelians felt compelled to take Wallas' Human Nature in Politics into account. They had to show that the seemingly inexplicable mass of inherited customs and folkways was "instinct" with a moral purpose in which the individual pursuing a coherent form of life for himself could be at home, and furthermore, that the state was both the chief agent of this process and chief bulwark against any relapse into barbarism.

Individuality was a process of comprehension in both senses of the word for Bosanquet and all those lesser Hegelian lights who more or less followed his lead: Henry Jones, J.H. Muirhead, H.J.W. Hetherington, J.S. Mackenzie, Ernest Barker, A.D. Lindsay and E.J. Urwick. The crux of their psychology of the general will was the individual self seen as the focus of collective moral energy. There is no such thing as the individual standing over against society or the state. He or she occupies a place in the social order - a "station" with "duties" - which may or may not change but which either way affords the only point from which to "focalize and assimilate" his or her world. "Man is measured by his world," says Jones, and "he helps the world at the level on which he finds it, and he finds in its needs his fulcrum for raising it."¹⁵ It was an activist point of view, and it required a morally active state. Just as the individual member of a society must put himself out into the world and make as much of it a part of himself as he can, so the state must seek to comprehend and identify with - make a part of its moral life - more and different experiences of life.

"The sovereignty of states, like the liberty of individuals, depends not upon their privacy but upon their comprehension; not upon being free from the world but on finding the world to be bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh."¹⁶

As a political theory, the ethic of "comprehension" has distinctly aggressive overtones. What might have been defensive in the heat of battle - "a state that does not advance goes back," said A.C. Bradley in addressing the ethics of international conflict - can appear, when hostilities have ceased, to be nothing so much as a version of what was being fought against. However, the advance referred to is spiritual, and the comprehensive state is not a closed, totalitarian state but one that contributes to the "total work of humanity." The state is our "nearest" obligation and our only school of civility, but "insofar as the State is the guardian of the right on the part of its citizens to be put in full possession of themselves, its highest function consists precisely in the extension of their interests to what lies beyond itself."¹⁷

Those men who learned their Hegelianism directly from Green at Oxford or Caird at Glasgow, and whose chief theoretician was Bernard Bosanquet, might be called the second generation of

¹⁴ H.J.W. Hetherington and J.H. Muirhead, Social Purpose (London, 1918), pp. 84-85.

¹⁵ H. Jones, The Principles of Citizenship, p. 72.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 64.

¹⁷ Hetherington and Muirhead, Social Purpose, p. 95.

British Hegelians.¹⁸ There was a loss - perhaps it was inevitable - of philosophical power and sheer intellectual excitement. The enthusiasm remained high, but it was spread pretty thin. Attempts were made to assimilate new intellectual specializations, in some cases with disappointing results, and a welter of social reform and relief activities were entered into. Bosanquet himself was conscious of a loss of concentration on the "citizen spirit, the pulse-beat of the social heart,"¹⁹ and of a danger that philosophical idealism would lose some of its adherents to other reform creeds without its coherence and comprehensiveness. He was all in favour of practical applications of the ethic of self-realization, of decentralization of effort, and of a measure of local control over the organization and administration of education, public works and even some industry. He seized upon neighbourhood improvement studies both at home and in America, and he tried to show how they and philosophical idealism could be mutually enriching. However, Bosanquet's primary and distinctive purpose was to impose some kind of order on all this activity, to relate it to a common social purpose.

The most comprehensive unifying formula was universal education, and the source of this approach could be traced to Green - if no further back. The ideal polity envisaged by Green was dubbed the "educative state" by Klaus Dockhorn. One of the undoubted success stories of British Hegelianism was organizing adult education and the beginnings of a national system of education which integrated universities, technological institutes and community colleges.²⁰ Of course, the educational reform movement predates the advent of Hegelianism in Britain; but earlier advocates such as Matthew Arnold and Benjamin Jowett were not totally unrelated to the growth of philosophical idealism. Its success "on the ground" owed a lot to the political power and perseverance of some of its idealist promoters. R.B. Haldane in the Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith governments (not to mention his tenure in the short-lived MacDonald Labour government) and R.L. Morant in the civil service are the two most notable examples.

Bosanquet saw his own role as primarily educational. Through such organizations as the London Ethical Society and the Charity Organization Society (in which his wife, Helen Dendy, was very active), he hoped to be able to promulgate a doctrine of reforming patriotism. While he could say that "of practical socialism, i.e. the workman's ownership of the means of production, we cannot have too much,"²¹ it was more typical of him to say that he anticipated an increase in the number "of men and women of the wage-earning class who have had something of

¹⁸ The two who have been most quoted in this chapter are Henry Jones and John Henry Muirhead. Henry Jones (1852-1922) was a Welsh schoolteacher who entered Glasgow University in 1875 and became a convert to the Hegelianism of Edward Caird. There he earned a fellowship in philosophy, returning to teach the subject at University College, Aberystwyth (1882-84). He was successively Professor of Philosophy and Political Economy at Bangor (1884-91), Professor of Logic, Rhetoric and Metaphysics at St. Andrews (1891-94), and Caird's successor as Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow (1894-1922). He was knighted in 1912.

John Henry Muirhead (1855-1940) was another Caird disciple at Glasgow. He lectured successively at Holloway College (1889-91), Bedford College (1891-97), and Mason University College, Birmingham (1897-1900). He was Professor of Philosophy at Birmingham University from 1900 to 1922. A founding member, with Bosanquet, of the London Ethical Society, he was also active with Jones in the Workers' Education Association. He is best known in academic circles as the general editor of *The Muirhead Library of Philosophy*, whose catholic list of titles reflects the Cairdian ideal of reconciling divergent points of view, which inspired - corrupted, some would say - the work of so many second-generation British Hegelians.

¹⁹ B. Bosanquet, "The Duty of Citizenship," Aspects of the Social Problem (London, 1895), p. 26.

²⁰ This story has been well told by Peter Gordon and John White, Philosophers as Educational Reformers (London, 1979).

²¹ Quoted in W.S. Fowler, "Neo-Hegelianism and state education in England," Educational Theory (January 1959), p. 59.

a humanizing and formative training...."22 Whether the members of the "Great Society" would be servants of the state or its moral trustees was an open question for Bosanquet. As we have seen in chapter 9, he emphasized group values, even at the expense of individual values; and, like Haldane, he admired the national efficiency of Germany. It would be instructive to compare his position, as a species of pluralism, with the democratic control philosophy of the guild socialist G.D.H. Cole. In political theory the British Hegelians were resolutely prescriptive, and their goal was to heighten the sense of community purpose in order to more effectively combat entrenched privilege and more confidently drive the engine of social reform. From one perspective, their objective was a society of self-possessed individuals, and the state was the principal means to that end. However, they were the artists and the architects; they possessed the vision of the whole, knew the grand design. In the design of the world spirit, the state was not destined to wither away, and for the foreseeable future it had an extensive moral-educational role to play. What had to be learned was the necessity of something which can act for us in a way we would not if left to our own devices, and through which we can translate impotent, perhaps conflicting, aspirations into rational, because realizable, policies.

"...for a true comprehension of group life it will always be necessary to refer its inward and spiritual side to something like the general will, and its outward and visible form to a complex of institutions, and thereby to set its outward and inward aspects in their true relation to each other and to the social unity."²³

It is the task of the state to express that relation, and only the state can accomplish it. It combines the widest extent with the greatest intensity of moral force. Smaller units lack its objectivity, larger ones its cohesion.

This theory of the state, drawn from "lesser and more clear-cut objects" (i.e. the Greek polis), deepened and expanded by Hegel, was applied to late nineteenth and early twentieth century British society by the philosophical idealists with some success. As they were the first to admit, the size and complexity of the modern state - its vast wealth unevenly distributed, and its remoteness from individual lives - made it extremely difficult to explain in terms of sharing a common interest and moral experience. They believed, however, that the persistent fact of the state could be explained only in these terms, and that those who failed to perceive its underlying rationality and moral purpose were incapable of seeing the wood for the trees. The British Hegelians drew encouragement in this belief from the mounting evidence that the state, far from withdrawing or atrophying, was assuming more and more social functions and responsibilities. The First World War put their theory of the state to a test which it apparently failed, because it was widely felt that the war demonstrated the moral bankruptcy of the nation-state and marked the end of its era. That feeling of moral revulsion fuelled much wishful thinking, such as can be found in Bertrand Russell's Principles of Social Reconstruction (1919). Few, however, did not remark on the extraordinary mobilization of men, material and morale effected by the belligerent states. This great fact of the twentieth century has still to find an adequate theory, one which seeks, as the British Hegelians did, to humanize political power in a manner free from moralistic illusion.

22 B. Bosanquet, Essays and Addresses (London, 1889), p. 28. See also H. Jones, The Principles of Citizenship, p. 117: "The State is an educational institution, and in the last resort it has to teach only one thing - the nature of the good."

²³ PTS, p. xxxi.

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