

Dear Mr. Sergei Stanishev and Mr. Gianni Pittella,

I am writing to ask you to remove the membership of the Romanian Social Democratic Party within the PES and S&D groups. I firmly believe in doing so the extensive, ongoing, gaslighting of the Romanian citizens by the nonprogressive PSD, its satellite parties and its ruthless, callous media propaganda will be brought to a halt, and, consequently, the kakocracy in which it has always been imbued in since its beginnings, together with its inauthentic social democracy, will be brought to a halt definitely.

According to the “New York Times” website,

[t]housands of people marched through the Romanian capital and other cities Sunday, [January 22, 2017] to protest a government proposal to pardon thousands of prisoners which critics say could reverse the anti-corruption fight.

More than 10,000 protesters massed in University Square, and later broke through police lines, before heading toward government headquarters. Thousands also protested in the cities of Cluj, Timisoara in western Romania, in Sibiu and Iasi, a city in the north. The protest in Bucharest ended after nearly four hours.

In the capital, protesters yelled: “We want democracy, with thieves in prison.” They cheered after President Klaus Iohannis, a government critic who supports the anti-corruption drive, turned up at the protest.

“A gang of politicians who have problems with the law want to change the legislation and weaken the state of law,” Iohannis said. “Romanians are rightly indignant.”

Liviu Dragnea, chairman of the governing Social Democratic Party, later accused Iohannis of “inciting social disorder and violence,” suggesting his actions amounted to the start of “a coup d'etat.” . . .

Donald Simionoiu, an art director, said that he believes that the proposal “hides other things,” noting that it would benefit Dragnea, who has a two-year suspended prison sentence for voter rigging, and media mogul Dan Voiculescu, who is serving a 10-year sentence for money-laundering.

The justice ministry published a draft of the plan Wednesday, which was criticized by Romania's top prosecutor, magistrates and opposition politicians. The proposal could primarily affect primarily those with sentences under five years, except for those convicted of crimes of a sexual nature, violence or corruption.

[This draft is indeed absurd and unjust, as it also asserts that] prisoners over 60 . . . and inmates with young children would see their sentence halved regardless of their conviction.

I would like to add that inexperienced citizens examining Prime Minister Sorin Grindeanu's proposed emergency ordinances are at risk of being easily deceived by the deliberate wording used in its writing.


The website “Nine O’ Clock” reported on January 23, 2017 the PSD Chairman Liviu Dragnea stated that

upon returning from the US, he found Romania's President “heading a new Mineriad”, “an unauthorized protest against the constitutional order” and he labeled these protests as “a beginning of a coup d'etat.”

“I have returned from the swearing-in ceremony of the US President and I have found Romania’s President heading a new Mineriad, an unauthorized protest, against the Government of Romania, against the constitutional order and against the popular vote on 11 December, sabotaging the legality that lies at the base of the rule of law. Today, the President placed himself outside the law, targeting personal political advantages and demanding constitutional aberrations, such as: some ordinances to be withdrawn, especially some ordinances that weren’t even issued,” Dragnea stated.

According to him, the events in the past days represent a beginning of “a coup d’etat.”

“It’s a beginning of a coup d’etat. Actually, President Iohannis wants, just like former President Basescu wanted, to put in cuffs the power legitimated through the democratic vote. He wants Romania to still be led by institutions without democratic legitimacy, through terror so that Romanians can be prisoners of some unelected powers. I have stated in the campaign that I want Romanians to live freely in their country, without fear of being listened, followed, harassed, blackmailed and aggrieved. I won’t take my words back. I support the actions against corruption, but actions against the true corruption,” the PSD leader stated.



Prima pagină - Media - Stiri - Liviu Dragnea: L-am găsit pe președintele României în fruntea unei noi mineriade; Este un început de lovitură de stat



Președintele PSD Liviu Dragnea, a scris pe Facebook duminică seară că, la revenirea din SUA, l-a găsit pe președintele României "în fruntea unei noi mineriade", "o manifestație neautorizată împotriva ordinii constituționale", și a calificat protestele ca fiind "un început de lovitură de stat".

"M-am întors de la instalarea președintelui Americii și l-am găsit pe președintele României în fruntea unei noi mineriade, o manifestație neautorizată, împotriva guvernului României, împotriva ordinii constituționale și împotriva votului popular din 11 decembrie, sabotând legalitatea care sta la baza statului de drept. Președintele țării s-a situat azi în afara legii, vizând avantaje politice personale și cerând aberații constituționale: retragerea unor ordonanțe, mai ales a unora care nu au fost date", a afirmat Liviu Dragnea.

Potrivit acestuia, evenimentele din ultimele zile reprezintă "un început de lovitură de stat".

Screenshot from the official PSD website.

It is unacceptable and unpardonable for a so-called left-wing political leader to use such a repugnant, heinous gaslighting manipulation technique! The following excerpts from various publications serve as evidence as to why PSD, whose founder, former president and currently honorary president is Ion Iliescu, must be eliminated from both PES and S&D groups. PSD was a nefarious, iniquitous political formation from the beginning, hence the never-ending corruption permeating all its structures and misrepresentation of the left in government.



Prima pagină - Oameni



Liviu Nicolae DRAGNEA  
Președintele PSD



Marian NEACȘU  
Secretar general PSD



Mihai Viorel FIFOR  
Președintele consiliului național



Gabriela FIREA  
Primarul General al Capitalei



Ion ILIESCU  
Președinte de onoare PSD

Screenshot from the official PSD website.

Ramet (2010) makes it clear that

[m]ore importantly, the ease with which political parties were set up made for a fragmented party system, which numbered close to 180 different formations in the early 1990s. The party system was dominated by the FSN, which benefitted from the Communist Party's huge membership, strict hierarchical structure, and an unparalleled penetration at the local level. Fragmented, polarized, and inexperienced, lacking leadership and resources, the political opposition was unable to mount credible campaigns in the weeks leading up to the 1990 and 1992 elections. It managed to gain parliamentary representation without the right to form the government. This modest result was due not only to its many weaknesses, but also to the FSN's undemocratic style of conducting politics. The 1990 poll was seriously tainted by the FSN's smear campaigns against the budding opposition, allegations that the opposition was ready to deprive ordinary Communist Party members of their political rights and to reinstate interwar social inequalities, and insistence that Romanians should unite around the FSN if they wished to prevent the country's disintegration in the face of Hungarian demands for [Transylvania, a Romanian region which, after having been previously incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was retrieved to Romania in 1918, only to have 40% of its territory reassigned to Hungary as a result of the 1940 Second Vienna Award until this aforementioned Dictate was voided, and the 1947 Treaty of Paris reaffirmed the borders between Romania and Hungary as originally established by the Treaty of Trianon in 1920.]

An important intimidation factor was the so-called *mineriade*, the descent on Bucharest of angry Valea Jiului miners, encouraged, organized, and condoned by Iliescu and his FSN. Shock troops of hundreds of miners came down on the capital in January, February, and June 1990, and again in September 1991, ransacking the headquarters of opposition parties, and physically assaulting opposition leaders. . . . The *mineriade* greatly divided the Romanian electorate, damaged the country's international reputation, and isolated it within Europe.

According to Bideleux and Jeffries (2007),

Anti-government demonstrations continued, inspired by the widespread worries that so many of Ceaușescu's apparatchiks were still quite obviously in power. In April 1990 young protesters established a 'tent city' in University Square in central Bucharest. When President Iiescu denounced them as *golani* (hooligans) in a television broadcast, they proudly adopted that name. However, there was a major international outcry when large numbers of coal miners from the Jiu valley were bused into Bucharest in June 1990 and used by the authorities to beat up, arrest and disperse the *golani* with gratuitous brutality and bloodshed. This so-called *mineriada*, combined with the over-hasty execution of Ceaușescu on 25 December 1989 and the pogrom against Hungarians in Tîrgu Mureș on 19 March 1990 shocked international television audiences, Western governments and international NGOs (non-governmental organizations), dragging Romania into even deeper international disrepute. Western responses to the FSN regime were increasingly tinged with distaste for what was widely perceived to be an authoritarian, corrupt and brutal neo-Communist regime.

Bush (2004) notes that

[t]he typical pattern of disputes was established early in 1990 and could still be seen as recently as the *mineriada* of 1999. First, the workers would launch a major work stoppage and demand negotiations with the president or the prime minister. The latter would publicly declare that it was not appropriate for them to participate, and insist that the workers deal with the local enterprise management or lower level bureaucrats. Then, if the work stoppage threatened valuable production or public services (or public safety in the case of the miners), the politicians would cave in and, in an air of great crisis, meet with the trade union leaders and grant most of their demands (although the only agreements that typically were kept were those regarding salary increases; promises to effect structural changes usually were not honored by the government). Thus, the leaders of the emerging trade unions learned very early that to achieve economic goals, they had to succeed in political struggles with the government, notwithstanding the politicians' efforts to devolve responsibility onto the local state enterprise managers when it suited their purposes.

Prior to the 20 May 1990 national elections, the trade unions were active in partisan politics only in one significant respect. The National Salvation Front leaders had promised the country that they were a transitional government and that they would not contest the election. However, they quickly reneged on that promise, registering the Front as a political party in February 1990 and scheduling elections for that May



Their platform was vague, without a commitment to privatization, and advocated a “liberalized, decentralized and diversified system based on market mechanisms.” In response, many Romanians —writers, journalists, students, and intellectuals — held rallies in support of the “Timișoara Proclamation,” which called for free enterprise and banning all former Communist Party officials from political office. Many trade unions — “Frăția” and labor organizations in Timișoara in particular — participated in some of these demonstrations.

The National Salvation Front’s election victory in May was soon followed by the disastrous *mineriada* of the Jiu Valley coal miners, in June 1990. It is important to note that the vast majority of trade unions and workers did not heed President Iliescu’s call to arms against the “enemies of the regime.” Many trade union leaders risked retaliation by actively discouraging their members from participating. In fact, President Iliescu publicly castigated them in a speech given in the midst of the chaos, a speech in which he also praised the miners.

Stowe (2017) relates the following:

The joy that followed the fall of the Ceaușescu was short lived. Rather than power going to someone untainted by the old regime, the figure who emerged as the new leader was Ion Iliescu, a Communist Party official who had been seen as a threat and sidelined by Ceaușescu. Within hours of the dictator’s overthrow, Iliescu was on TV, hailing the revolution. Even before the old leader was shot, he seized control of the country with other party members as the leader of the National Salvation Front (FSN), which became the provisional ruling authority. The sudden converts to democracy repealed some of the most unpopular Communist laws and ran as candidates in the May, 1990, elections where — thanks to the FSN’s stranglehold on the media — they were overwhelming winners. The new government was packed with former Communist officials. . . .

Horrified by the direction their new “democracy” was taking, Bucharest protesters again took to the streets. Iliescu denounced the demonstrators, led by students and university professors, as “hooligans,” and called in the miners to quash the protests. In the infamous “Mineriad” of June 1990, the workers set about clubbing the protesters, killing more than a hundred people, according to NGO estimates, and wounding another thousand. Iliescu later thanked the miners for stopping ‘the fascist attempt to create a coup d’etat.

Cernat (2016) describes the 1990 events as follows:

The first *Mineriada* started in late January to mid-February 1990, when opposition groups conducted political demonstrations against the governing National Salvation Front. Opponents of the regime mounted non-stop protests against it, in University Square in Central Bucharest. President Iliescu declared them fascists and hooligans seeking to overthrow the government with violence, and called upon the Romanian workers to come to Bucharest to defend it ( *Romania Libera* 1990, p. 1). Thousands of coal miners from the Jiu Valley promptly descended on the capital, where, together with workers from some local factories, they roamed the streets for two days attacking students, intellectuals, opposition party leaders and newspaper offices. The precise extent of collaboration between President Iliescu and the miners' leaders has always been vague, but he publicly praised and thanked them in a speech given in the midst of their rampage (BBC 1990).

Hipper (2015) provides evidence to how Ion Iliescu and his henchmen never hesitated from committing crimes in order to stop communism from becoming extinct.

In line with old communist practices, Iliescu used fear and intimidation to counteract protests concerning his communist past. Geddes notes that “the continued existence of the RCP successor parties explains the existence of a number of undemocratic features in the new democracies” (ibid. 1996:18). One example of such undemocratic mechanisms is the so called “*mineriada*,” which was turned into a weapon against Iliescu’s political opponents. . . .

Richard Hall remarked that the only difference between the Romanian revolution and other Central Eastern European revolutions was the concentration of violence not from demonstrators, but from the regime itself (Hall 2000:1069). Throughout the 1990s, Iliescu called miners from the Jiu Valley to respond to ongoing street protests by students, intellectuals, and opposition parties who felt betrayed by the lack of change in the political leadership of the post-communist era. Recognizing that the revolution did not bring a genuine change, students, intellectuals, and traditional political parties such as the Liberal Party and the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party (PNTCD) gathered to demonstrate against the FSN’s attempts to consolidate its power on 28 January 1990 (Stoica 1993:23). The hope for change was short lived “since the main target of the second row communists was the replacement of Ceaușescu and not the reform of the state” (Hall 2000:1071). The FSN responded to the protests with violence, i.e. by calling miners from the Jiu Valley to “protect” the new democracy. As a result, over 5,000 miners attacked the demonstrators and destroyed the headquarters of the PNTCD and PNL parties on 29

January 1990. This practice continued during Iliescu's later attempts to secure power during the so-called "mineriads" in 1990 and 1991.

Nevertheless, anti-communist demonstrations continued in the following months, and the demand for a clean break with the communist past remained a constant concern. Demonstrators drew upon Article 8 of the Timișoara Proclamation, which called for lustration, i.e. banning active communist party leaders and leaders of the Securitate from participating in political elections for a period of ten years (Durandin and Petre 2010:8).

The demonstrators' frustration emerged from the lack of genuine political change and the continuation of old practices of intimidation through the instrumentalization of state television, the main instrument of manipulation for FSN. It became clear that Iliescu had no intention of addressing unanswered questions such as the massacre caused by the so-called "terrorists" (Siani Davies 2001:15; Cesereanu 2003).

Labeled "golani" (hooligans, vagabonds), the demonstrators received great support from national and international dissidents, intellectuals, and elites. For instance, Doina Cornea and Andrei Pleșu declared themselves "golani" in order to express their solidarity with the demonstrators. When the "golani" refused to leave the Universitatea Square even three weeks after the May elections had ended, police tried to remove them by force. Once again, Iliescu called the miners to protect the democracy on 13 June 1990 (Nelson 1991). As Cesereanu notes, the miners were considered a perfect tool of oppression and intimidation, in contrast to their brave colleagues from 1977, who stood up against Ceaușescu. Bribed or forced by their mine directors, the miners damaged and destroyed buildings and the university, which was considered a symbol of intellectualism (Cesereanu 2003).

During the international wave of protests against the use of violence, Iliescu thanked the miners for their service to the country, considering it an expression of self-defense and protection of the newly elected democratic institutions (Gallagher 2004:115; Cesereanu 2003). The damage done to university buildings and the offices of the traditional parties demonstrates the rivalry between the working class and intellectuals under the Iliescu regime. Similar to the previous regime, intellectuals continued to be oppressed.

The composition of the leadership of the newly installed Iliescu government reveals that 74.2 percent of the communist nomenklatura remained active in key institutions in post-communist Romania (Grosescu 2011:62). Examples include former Securitate leaders such as General Victor Marcu, who was appointed to a leading position in the Authority for Privatization and Administration of State Ownership (APAPS). General Decebal Iliu, who was appointed to the Ministry of Industry and Resources; and General

Constantin Silinescu. appointed as an advisor to the Prime Minister's Office (Romanian Academic Society 2001:40).

The strategies used by Iliescu to consolidate his power, [namely] *institutional accommodation and mimicking* include rule adoption with insufficient constitutional provisions aimed at strengthening judicial independence, accountability, efficiency and integrity. Constitutional provisions attributed vague and ambiguous powers to the judiciary and ensured that they remained loyal to the executive power. Hence, Colomer's assumption that actors choose to maximize their profits during the transition phase by misusing the judiciary is confirmed in the Romanian context (Colomer 1995).

Before Iliescu ordered the massacre in the Universitatea Square in 1990, Romania seemed to have an advantageous position as the first country in Eastern Europe to start external relations with the European Community. In the beginning, Romania's relationship with the European Community was marked by strong socialization mechanisms. At first, the European Community showed sympathy for the hardships suffered under the rule of Nicolae Ceaușescu and the Securitate, and Romania was invited to sign the Community's Generalized System of Preferences. . . . [T]he Community condemned the mineriads for using "several thousand rough and angry miners, who in a single day managed to do serious and possibly permanent damage to Romania's international reputation" (Bohlen:1990).

While mechanisms of conditionality in the form of binding benchmarks did not exist at that time, the European Community suspended its relations with Romania due to violations of the rule of law.

Sanborne (2004) offers some insight into who these "terrorists" were.

What was the source of the stubborn, murderous resistance against the revolution that persisted from December 22 to 25, and that waned only after the preemptive execution of the Ceaușescu? Who were the army and their civilian allies fighting against? Initially the resisters were labeled Securitate, then criminals, and finally simply terrorists. Wild, unprovable rumors circulated: The terrorists were special forces — much better armed, trained, and equipped than the regular Romanian army — from Ceaușescu's personal

guard who operated outside the regular Securitate chain of command. They included a cadre of robot-like [orphan] fanatics . . . raised to be brainwashed super soldiers who would fight for their dictator with blind obedience, pumped full of drugs to make them abnormally strong. They were supported by scores of Palestinian, Libyan, and Iranian terrorists, foreign mercenaries brought into the country by helicopter to rescue Ceaușescu and wreak havoc.

The stories amounted to a mix of fact and paranoid fantasy. No solid evidence has emerged of the crazed “orphan brigade.” But Ceaușescu may have had secret military agreements with Libya and Iran (whether they were ever activated is another question), and there were a few Palestinian guerrillas undergoing training in Romania who apparently became involved in the fighting. And there is no question that the terrorists were well-trained killers armed with exotic weapons-like sniper rifles with night-vision scopes who spread panic by traveling via a secret tunnel system beneath Bucharest and popping up out of manholes to shoot unsuspecting victims.

The bloodshed was real enough. Hundreds died in Bucharest, more than had been killed in Timisoara, although interestingly most of the dead were civilians, not soldiers. (The official death toll for the entire revolution was later put at more than 1,000.) But what first raised people’s suspicions was the fate of those terrorists — and there were quite a few — who were wounded, captured, or surrendered in the days after Ceaușescu’s execution. They all essentially disappeared from jails and hospital beds, and none were ever brought to public trial or made available for questioning. By August 1990, the new government said it was still investigating 1,456 people, of whom 30 had been convicted and 69 others were still being tried. But all these cases involved crimes committed before December 22, 1989; that is, they were unrelated to the ‘terrorist’ phase of the Bucharest fighting.

Iliescu himself was elusive when questioned about the identity of the “terrorists” in 1990, after he became president, “It’s the most obscure problem,” he said. “History will clarify these things one way or the other. It is possible that some of them will forever remain a riddle . . . I myself cannot name even those who possess all these secrets.”

There were a host of other unresolved questions, some of which were obvious to anyone who examined the devastation in central Bucharest following the fighting. In Palace Square the only structure that escaped unscathed was the Central Committee building, in which the NSF leadership gathered during the crucial days and on the balcony of which they even appeared to exhort the population to resist. But nearby buildings of no obvious military significance — such as the Royal Palace, which housed the national art museum, and the university library — were virtually destroyed, at great cultural cost. Similarly, the television station survived with only a few bullet holes, while structures around it were heavily damaged or flattened. No attempt was made to blow up the TV antennae or cut power to the station.

Much of the damage was caused by indiscriminate tank fire by inexperienced soldiers. But many people wondered why the terrorists, presumably well-schooled in urban commando tactics, did not take the most obvious military steps to squelch the revolution, attack the NSF leadership and silence the broadcast facilities that were rallying the nation. Other questions arose in the weeks and months that followed, such as why were high-ranking army and Securitate officers implicated in the Timișoara massacre promoted to high posts in the new government.

Romanians have a national tendency to see the hidden hand of conspiracy behind most public events, but in this case they seem to be well-justified in their suspicions. The problem is that there are too many conspiracy theories to choose from, and they cannot all be correct. One major theme of the critics is that the fighting in Bucharest following Ceaușescu's fall was “an operetta war, a staged affair in which only the victims were real,” Nestor Ratesh wrote. According to these critics, this mini-war was meant to legitimize the new power, to give it the aura and prestige of the savior of the revolution.

Even today, intellectuals who were themselves in the midst of the revolution are unsure what happened. “From [December] 16th to the 22nd, the fact is that the army killed the people,” says writer Selian Tanase. “From the 22nd to the 25th, the army was still shooting, but we don’t know who or why. I think platoons were shooting platoons.” But Radu Grozea, a former academic turned television producer, has a theory: “The shooting was organized by the army as a diversion on behalf of the winners — President Iliescu — to create the idea of a civil war.”

Others hypothesize that the army's motivation was not so much to bolster the new civilian leadership as to rehabilitate its own public image, which had been badly tarnished by the events in Timișoara. The staged battle against the terrorists — if that is what it was — had the additional benefit of further discrediting the Securitate, the army's long-time rival, which during Ceaușescu's regime had come to eclipse the military in power and privilege.

Certain French journalists advanced yet another theory, one remarkably similar to Ceaușescu's own: The revolution was a foreign plot devised by the Soviet Union. There is some intriguing evidence to support this theory. For example, a Soviet journalist claimed that there were nearly a dozen correspondents from TASS — the Soviet news agency that often served as cover for KGB agents in Timișoara on December 10, five days *before* the protests began. But while Moscow may indeed have had contacts with anti-Ceaușescu conspirators dating back years, most observers of the Romanian revolution, not its godfather.

There is no doubt that elements in Romania's political and military elite had been plotting unsuccessfully against Ceaușescu for years, and the NSF itself had been in existence for months before the revolution. In a videotape of the NSF's chaotic "founding meeting" on December 22, Nicolae Militaru, a retired army general, can be heard saying, "Hey guys, the National Salvation Front has been in action for SIX months, man!"

Militaru was a key plotter and briefly served as defense minister of the new regime. In August 1990 he and Silviu Brucan went public in an interview in a Romanian newspaper with details of the longstanding anti-Ceaușescu conspiracy. (Brucan, author of the famous "Letter of Six," had served as the NSF's ideologist and spokesman before having a falling out with Iliescu.) They said the plotting against Ceaușescu had begun back in the mid-1970s, and that by the early 1980s the conspirators had settled on Iliescu as the best candidate to succeed the dictator. They said a coup had been set for 1984 but fizzled after news of it leaked.

Militaru and Brucan said that the plotters were caught by surprise by the Timișoara uprising but were able to take quick advantage of it due to their years of organizing. They gave full credit to the common people for launching the revolution, but added that "the idea that this 180-degree change [by the security forces] would have been made spontaneously is entirely mistaken . . . the dissident work within the army fully proved its political usefulness and its decisive role in preventing a bloody massacre in the whole country."

Iliescu himself in 1990 said elliptically that "we may just as well speak of several conspiracies." The question of whether the revolution was a genuine popular uprising or a coup, or an uprising cut short by a coup, continues to haunt Romanian politics to this day.

Most analysts agree that if not for the spontaneous bravery and righteous rage of the people in Timișoara and Bucharest, the revolution could not have succeeded. (At least, not at that time. Obviously Ceaușescu could not have continued in power indefinitely.) On the other hand, the people alone could not have ousted the hated dictator if the army and Securitate had stuck by him. In some ways, the coup plotters can be seen as the short-term victors, for they are the ones who [unfortunately] seized power and prevented a more complete, [rightful] and radical revolution from taking place that might have tried to eradicate all aspects of the old regime.

Tismaneanu and Bogdan (2015) argue that

[t]his single trial, however, proved insufficient to get a clear image of the chaos produced after Nicolae Ceaușescu fled Bucharest. The absence of investigations and trials continued to leave room for the most diverse of theories, ranging from the involvement of obscure, “terrorist” forces to criminal political interests. For instance, throughout the transition, certain NSF leaders continued to talk about “terrorists,” which they identified as Securitate troops or “fanatic supporters of Ceausescu.” In their turn, adversaries of the NSF accuse Ion Iliescu directly of the crimes perpetrated after December 22: “When Ion Iliescu understood that the protesters would never have a communist leading the country, he created this terrorist-Securitate diversion. This was instigation to war at a national scale. The population was given weapons to fight ghosts. They were talking about the glorious Romanian Army who fought the terrorists, just to realize later that the terrorists were their colleagues.” The image of the Romanian Revolution thus continues to be fragmented and incomplete.

Hentea (2007) affirms the complexity of the “terrorist” diversion.

After the Ceaușescus’ escape on 22 December, the leadership of the armed forces took measures to [safeguard] the new political power emerging in Bucharest (after 2 p.m. the leaders, including Ion Iliescu, occupied the former building of the Ministry of National Defense on Drumul Taberei Street), and the revolutionaries occupied the buildings of the former Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, and of Romanian Television and Radio Broadcasting. Similar measures were taken all over the country to return to normalcy. Beginning at 9:30 p.m., firing was opened against the former building of the Ministry of National Defense from the blocks across the street, and in the night between 22 and 23 December, other headquarters and military units were targeted in “terrorist” attacks and shootings. To this day nobody knows exactly who attacked the revolutionaries after 22 December, nor who commanded these attackers, but people called them “terrorists”

because of the terror that they produced. The same night, around 9 p.m., attacks were launched against the Romanian Television building on Dorobanți Avenue and the Radio Broadcasting building on Berthelot Street.

To defend these buildings, a large number of troops and armored vehicles were sent to them. That night also meant the beginning of the first diversions and electronic warfare, which, together with rumors and skilled disinformation, strongly influenced the execution of military actions not only in Bucharest, but also in other cities, where fights against



“unseen terrorists” took place. To defend and maintain the revolution’s political achievements, 211 soldiers sacrificed their lives and 633 were wounded; a total of 1,104 Romanian citizens perished and 3,321 in the country were wounded.

According to CIA files made public under the Freedom of Information Act, Ion Iliescu, “ a former youth leader, party secretary, and later provincial party chief who [had been] dispatched to political oblivion several years [before],” had been identified ever since December 1985 as a potential successor to Ceaușescu after the communist dictator would have passed away.

As of recently, Iliescu is being prosecuted for crimes against humanity.<sup>1</sup> If it hadn't been for the intervention<sup>2</sup> of the European Court of Human Rights, the Mineriad case<sup>3</sup> wouldn't have been reopened after it was unjustly closed.

In addition, these articles demonstrate why PSD should not be a member of the PES and S&D groups.

<http://thepoliticalscienceclub.com/psd-is-romania-gop/>.

<https://www.vice.com/ro/article/psd-nu-e-de-stanga-sau-socialist>

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<sup>1</sup> Romania Insider. (2015, October, 21). Former Romanian President Ion Iliescu will be prosecuted for crimes against humanity. *Romania Insider*. <http://www.romania-insider.com/former-romanian-president-ion-iliescu-will-be-prosecuted-for-crimes-against-humanity/>

<sup>2</sup> Romania's Ion Iliescu facing crimes against humanity charges. (2015, October, 21). *BBC News*. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/amp/34594391>

<sup>3</sup> Ion Iliescu heard in "Mineriad" case. (2017, January 16). *Agerpres*. <https://www.agerpres.ro/english/2017/01/16/ion-iliescu-heard-in-mineriad-case-10-52-59>.

<http://m.romanalibera.ro/politica/institutii/cum-s-a-intors-psd-la-manipularile-din-anii-90--„lovitura-de-stat---„legionarii---presupusii-bani-luati-de-manifestanti---inventate-de-iliescu--reesapate-de-dragnea-438989>

<http://www.romania-insider.com/romanians-plan-protests-justice-laws-audiovisual-watchdog/>

During the 2014 Romanian presidential election, Ponta employed the populist, nationalist “Mândri că suntem români!” (Proud to Be Romanians!) slogan, while his sympathizers brazenly attacked Iohannis for his otherness, that is, his German ethnicity and Lutheran faith.

The PM option of the far-right United Romania Party, PRU, that Sebastian Ghiță ran for as MP in 2016, was none other than Victor Ponta. It is noteworthy to mention that Ponta has self-admitted to be of Albanian and Italian descent.

Victor Ponta who also ran as MP for PSD in the 2016 parliamentary elections, said he believed that if PRU passed the electoral threshold, it would definitely support PSD in its endeavors. He also stated that he liked the fact that PRU members were brave, for they had the guts to express the political positions which the social democrats were too timid<sup>4</sup> to do so. Furthermore, Ponta even made a declaration at odds with pro-Europeanism where he affirmed he and the rest of PSD members would like Romania to be standalone and govern itself irrespective of the EU.

Ghiță is currently now wanted by Europol for corruption and launderings of the proceeds of crime.

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<sup>4</sup> Țucui, T. (2016, December 6). Ponta (PSD): Îi ajut pe cei de la PRU pentru că spun ce gândim și noi, dar nu avem curaj să spunem. *Agerpres*. <https://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2016/12/06/ponta-psd-ii-ajut-pe-cei-de-la-pru-pentru-ca-spun-ce-gandim-si-noi-dar-nu-avem-curaj-sa-spunem-19-07-56>

Dragnea supports holding an infamously discriminatory referendum<sup>5</sup> proposed by the appalling, loathsomely homophobic, transphobic, anti-feminist, ultranationalist, chauvinistic, xenophobic, bigoted, traditionalist Coalition for Family (Coaliția Pentru Familie).

The Coalition for Family is in fact a Trojan Horse. Its endangering of LGBTQIA rights is just only one of the many threats it poses: <https://www.vice.com/ro/article/cine-sunt-oamenii-din-spatele-coalitiei-pentru-familie>

To make matters worse, Igor Dodon<sup>6,7</sup> gave Vladimir Putin an old map of Moldova while undiplomatically asserting that “half of today’s Romania is actually Moldova.”<sup>8</sup>

“Dodon also said he regretted the fact that in 1812, when the Russian Empire annexed Bessarabia, as it was then called, Russia stopped at Prut River and did not grab everything all the way to the Carpathians.”<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Viski, V., & Nachescu V. (2017, January 17). Americans Are Trying to Poison Romania With Homophobia. *Advocate*. <http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2017/1/17/americans-are-trying-poison-romania-homophobia>

<sup>6</sup> Nemtsova, A. (2016, October 29). Igor Dodon is Vladimir Putin’s Moldovan Mini-Me. *The Daily Beast*. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/10/29/igor-dodon-is-vladimir-putin-s-moldovan-mini-me.html>

<sup>7</sup> Frej, W. (2016, November 11). Moldovan Presidential Candidate Criticized For Being A Single Woman. *The Huffington Post*. [http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/us\\_5825ae9ee4b0c4b63b0c2a16](http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/us_5825ae9ee4b0c4b63b0c2a16)

<sup>8</sup> Touma A. M. (2017, January 18). Putin’s Old Moldova Map Alarms Romania. *Balkan Insight*. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/putin-s-old-moldova-map-alarms-romania-01-18-2017>

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

The truth is that Bessarabia is really a Romanian province which has been forcefully annexed by Russia many times throughout history.

Moreover, faux socialist Dodon wants to scrap the Moldova - European Union Association Agreement.

Igor Dodon won the 2016 Moldovan presidential elections in a most dubious way, as reported below:

<http://jurnal.md/en/politic/2016/11/15/presidential-elections-totally-defrauded-andrei-nastase-dodon-won-neither-in-the-country-nor-in-diaspora/>

<http://jurnal.md/en/politic/2016/11/15/new-proofs-that-the-elections-were-defrauded-many-electors-who-were-brought-in-an-organized-manner-from-transnistria-could-not-explain-who-brought-them-and-why-they-came/>

<http://jurnal.md/en/social/2016/11/15/a-moldovan-settled-in-london-went-to-vote-but-found-out-that-someone-else-voted-instead-of-him-in-the-republic-of-moldova/>

<http://jurnal.md/en/social/2016/11/15/one-more-proof-that-the-elections-were-defrauded-a-woman-from-floresti-went-to-vote-in-the-usa-but-found-out-that-she-already-voted-in-her-native-village/>

<http://jurnal.md/en/politic/2016/11/15/dodon-threatens-that-will-remove-the-people-on-the-street-to-defend-his-victory-if-i-tell-hundreds-of-thousands-will-come-out-to-counter-protests-do-not-play-with-fire/>

In 2014, during the Romanian presidential election, Gabriela Firea, then PSD spokesperson and now mayor of Bucharest, harshly criticized Klaus Iohannis for running for president. She deemed him unfit to be head of state on the sole premise of his being childfree:  
[https://youtu.be/eHEVcSMsc\\_8](https://youtu.be/eHEVcSMsc_8)

According to the “Romania Journal” website, she asserted the following:

“From my point of view, a person is more well-natured when he raises a child from his first days up to maturity. A man living in a cold house, without hearing baby’s babble, without seeing his first steps, his first grades cannot feel all these (...) You can adopt a child if you want to have a complete family, from all points of view (...) In all civilized countries, all aspirers to the President seat belong to complete families, they are married with children and grandchildren (...),” Firea told that conference. Asked by a journalist if having no children represents a deficiency for a future president, PSD spokesperson answered: “Categorically.”

January 31, 2017 is the day when Romania's government “adopted an emergency ordinance [which] decriminalizes official misconduct.”<sup>10</sup>

“Romania Insider” announced that the changes to Romania's critical law allowed<sup>11</sup>

public administration officials [to be] prosecuted for abuse of power only if the damage they cause[d] [was] over RON 200,000 (EUR 44,000) and only if the damaged side file[d] a complaint within three months from the moment it got knowledge of the facts.

The maximum punishment for abuse of office [would] also be reduced from 7 years to 3 years of jail time . . .

[Those] changes [would] apply immediately after the ordinance becomes effective, even for ongoing corruption cases, as the Romanian criminal law says that the most favorable dispositions always apply in judging criminal cases.

“Romania Insider” also added the following:<sup>12</sup>

The National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) reacted to the draft ordinance published by the Justice Ministry and pointed out that these changes would affect many of its ongoing cases. Abuse of office is one of the most common corruption related crime in Romania.

DNA also pointed out that the emergency ordinance draft also brings changes to the way conflict of interests is defined in the penal code. “A public clerk will have no problem in providing advantages to private companies in which he has or had a direct interest,” reads DNA’s statement.

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<sup>10</sup> The Associated Press. (2017, January 31). Romania's Govt Decriminalizes Official Misconduct. *The New York Times*. <https://mobile.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/01/31/world/europe/ap-eu-romania-prisoner-pardon.html>

<sup>11</sup> Romania Insider. (2017, January 19). Romania’s Government plans to redefine abuse of power in criminal law. *Romania Insider*. <http://www.romania-insider.com/romanias-government-plans-redefine-abuse-power-criminal-law/>

<sup>12</sup> Romania Insider. (2017, January 31). Romania’s Govt. approves changes to the criminal law by emergency ordinance in evening session. *Romania Insider*. <http://www.romania-insider.com/romanias-govt-approves-changes-criminal-law-emergency-ordinance-evening-session/>

After the cabinet meeting ended, the Minister of Justice Iordache declared Tuesday that<sup>13</sup>

the ordinance included some of the observations received in the last two weeks. For example, investigating a public official for abuse of power won't be conditioned by the existence of a complaint from the damaged side, as the initial draft provided. However, the Government maintained the RON 200,000 (EUR 44,400) limit for abuse of power to become a criminal offence.

According to the same, online news source,<sup>14</sup>

[t]his means that public officials who cause damages under RON 200,000 won't be prosecuted. The ordinance also applies to the ongoing investigations and even to the cases already sent to court.

The ordinance, which comes into force the moment it is published in the Official Gazette, will likely help top politicians such as the Social Democratic Party (PSD) leader Liviu Dragnea, former interior minister Gabriel Oprea, and former transport minister Dan Sova, who have been sent to court by the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) for abuse of power, according to local Hotnews.ro.

Justice minister Florin Iordache was repeatedly asked by the journalists if the ordinance helped his party leader Liviu Dragnea solve his justice problems, but he avoided a direct answer and said that the ordinance was not adopted to help one person or another but because the Constitutional Court ruled that some provisions included in the criminal law were unconstitutional. However, as the General Prosecutor pointed out, the changes brought by the Government to the criminal law far exceeded the Constitutional Court's recommendations.

The ordinance will likely impact more than 2,100 abuse of office cases currently investigated by the anticorruption prosecutors, according to DNA. Between 2014 and 2016, some 1,171 people and 34 legal entities have been sent to court on abuse of power charges. The total damages in these cases amount to over EUR 1 billion.

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

The Government also decided on Tuesday to let the Parliament decide on the other project, which aims to pardon thousands of convicts.

“Deutsche Welle” reports “the new measures, which take effect immediately, include pardons for convicts sentenced to less than five years and reduced sentences [by half] for prisoners over 60, [inmates with young children and pregnant women]. They are likely to result in the release of at least 2,500 convicts. . . . ”<sup>15</sup>

Another vile and sordid measure adopted by the government states that from now on, under no circumstances will it be legally possible for politicians to be accused of official misconduct for whatever regulatory actions they may issue, approve, or adopt.<sup>16</sup>

I look forward to your reply and a resolution to this situation.

Yours sincerely,

. . . (full name purposely omitted for social media versions of this letter)

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<sup>15</sup> Deutsche Welle. (2017, February 1). Romania decriminalizes official misconduct amid mass protests. *Deutsche Welle*. <http://m.dw.com/en/romania-decriminalizes-official-misconduct-amid-mass-protests/a-37361047>

<sup>16</sup> Modificarile din CP, adoptate. Guvernul s-a asigurat ca nu poate fi acuzat de abuz. Ce scrie in OUG, TEXT INTEGRAL. (2017, January 31). *Știrile Pro TV*. [http://m.stirileprotv.ro/lbin/mobile/index.php?article\\_id=3743071](http://m.stirileprotv.ro/lbin/mobile/index.php?article_id=3743071)



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