

On the Universality of Protracted People's War

Red Guards Austin

Introduction

When I first declared myself a Maoist, I had no clue what I was talking about. What I meant was that I really liked Mao's style of leadership, I admired the Chinese revolution, and I felt like it offered valuable lessons for the way forward for the development of communism. Like many of my comrades, I started to take politics seriously at the height of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. I became a Communist when I saw the inefficiencies and backwardness of so many other schools of thought. And when I saw the reaction of revisionism and its impeccable ability to blame, tail, and corral the masses, I decided I was a Maoist. I knew that I saw people calling themselves Maoist in this country whom I really looked up to. People who really seemed to be embracing the wave of rebellion that BLM was defined by at the time. So I started to study, and I started to really understand what made Maoism the only anti-revisionist communism of today.

And in this journey I learned about the three instruments of revolution that were the invaluable weapons for victory in the Chinese revolution. And I learned that these were actually not a "use once and destroy" type of thing but instead are universally applicable in defeating the enemy

everywhere. I started to understand that in fact Mao contributed many universal lessons to each component part of Marxism. And in reading the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM)'s documents and discovering the different line struggles that played out within RIM, I began to realize that there were two trends: Maoists like those of the Communist Party of Peru (PCP) who understood that it was Mao's contributions to the three component parts of Marxism that qualified it as a continuation of Marxism-Leninism, and those who called themselves Maoists because it seemed like the hip thing to do, and it was a great cover to sneak in horseshit ideology like "New Synthesis" nonsense. It didn't take long for my comrades and I to realize that what we had in the U.S. was the latter of the two. We had the task to struggle against people who called themselves "Maoists" in order for a genuine Marxist-Leninist-Maoist line to emerge in the U.S. MLM movement. For this we'd have to break with our own liberalism, shake off the chains of unprincipled peace and friendship, and struggle against some of the people we had once thought were the first germinations of the struggle to build a Party. We were not willing to build a house on sand. A Party can only emerge and be fortified through struggle: the struggle for unity and the struggle for correct political lines and ideological consolidation.

One of the most important political lines that must be tackled if we are to build a Maoist Party in the U.S. is the military line. We cannot neglect this question lest we give up the lessons the comrades before us have killed and died for.

Without further ado, I'd like to go ahead and dive right in and start off with this quote from one of my favorite texts: the General Political Line (GPL) of the Communist Party of Peru.

On the People's War in Peru

[Extract] Chairman Gonzalo, reaffirming himself on the universal law of revolutionary violence, takes up the highest military theory of the proletariat established by Chairman Mao: People's war, which is universally valid and is applicable in all types of countries, in accordance with the conditions of each revolution. The world People's War is the principal form of struggle that the proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the world should launch to oppose imperialist world war. His point of departure is that People's War is a war of the masses and can only be accomplished by mobilizing the masses and relying on them. He says: "The masses give us everything, from the crusts of bread that are taken from their own mouths to their precious blood which stirs jointly with that of the combatants and militants, which nourishes the road of the People's War for the New Power."

As Communists, specifically Marxist-Leninist-Maoists, principally Maoists, we must be able to understand and defend the universality of Protracted People's War, and in fact we should cease to call ourselves Maoists if we do not.

Before I dive into the military strategy of the proletariat proper, it's extremely important that I discuss the top-

ic of the proletarian military, which is referred to as an “army of a new type.”

This army of a new type was an improvement on the Soviet model. When the Bolsheviks seized power in November 1917, their only military force was the Red Guards. These Red Guards were made up mainly of untrained, undisciplined armed industrial workers and former soldiers. In 1918 the Red Guards, having accumulated more forces and being more officially organized along socialist lines, became the Red Army. Realizing that they required a larger, more professional standing army, Leon Trotsky (who had been elected war commissar of the newly formed Red Army) conscripted thousands of ex-officers and former NCOs (non-commissioned officers) from the now-defunct imperial army. His justification was that the new country had no time to train and educate new officers—it needed the experience and expertise of military specialists immediately, regardless of their origins. These tsarist officers, Trotsky claimed, would be “squeezed like lemons, then thrown away.”

While this accomplished the task of creating more discipline and professionalism within the Red Army’s ranks, this created a contradiction within the political make-up of the group. With the recruitment of many former tsarist soldiers who had no political allegiance or affection for the Bolsheviks, the risks of desertion, defection to the Whites, and worst of all anti-Bolshevik espionage increased. The method that was used to try to resolve this contradiction was to assign Party commissars to be attached to every military unit to help politicize soldiers as well and report on

the soldiers who showed signs of betraying the Bolsheviks. With this new strategy, there were far fewer instances of the aforementioned offenses. And most importantly, it gave us a model to improve upon and learn from for building a proletarian military.

An army of a new type

“Without a people’s army the people have nothing.” This was the correct conclusion by Mao, which the movement has taken from the Chinese experience. The Chinese Communist Party (CPC)’s Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies under Mao’s command were able to grow at an amazing rate while not compromising the integrity of their politics. How were these forces able to accomplish this? By becoming a People’s Army that wholeheartedly served the interests of the people. This army of a new type performs three major tasks: fighting, mass work, and production. It is under the complete leadership of the Communist Party. This means it also carries out the policies and political lines of the Communist Party through mass work and production. This army has a high degree of class-conscious discipline and carries out the task of propagating the righteousness and necessity of the war and inspiring a fighting spirit in the people. This army requires unity between cadre and soldiers, high-ranking and low-ranking soldiers, the various different departments, and the various fraternal army units. It also must have unity with the people.

This means that the army must serve the people in every way that it can. Everywhere it goes, it must do propaganda work among the masses, organize and arm them, and help them set up revolutionary political power. This army becomes a part of the masses. This army of a new type can be fully utilized and carry out its three primary tasks only through the military strategy of Protracted People's War.

What is Protracted People's War?

Protracted People's War is a war that an inferior army with the proletariat at its heart can wage to overcome a far superior army, without the necessity of external aid. This is a war that progresses through three stages: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate/equilibrium, and strategic offensive. The first stage, while being strategically defensive, still carries out tactically offensive campaigns. Its defensiveness is defined by its mobility. This is a major time for accumulation of forces and arms. The second stage, strategic equilibrium, is characterized by the enemy having switched from the offensive position to one of protecting its strongholds. The Communist Party at this point has influence over many parts of the country, having spent its time setting up Base Areas where the enemy is the weakest. This is a time of great peril when the forces between revolution and reaction are balanced at a seeming impasse. And the last stage, strategic offensive, is the stage at which the enemy has largely retreated and the final encirclement and annihilation campaigns can be carried out.

Our enemy is always the same no matter the level of de-

velopment of capitalism of the country we're in. Through fighting this enemy, the international proletariat has discerned the weakness and strengths of this enemy and has used these objective facts to formulate a strategy that can be creatively applied to our conditions and ensure our success against this enemy. The enemy relies on capital, technology, and foreign aid, but it is not capital, technology, and foreign aid that make history. Communists understand this well, which is why we rely on the most important resource of all: the people.

Maoism contains many truths; at the core of them all is the truth that it is right to rebel. We could examine what this means a little more closely, as is it a heavy commitment as well as our greatest gift—the right to rebel as a unity of opposites. What is rebellion? The simplest definition is rising in opposition or arms against the reactionary established class order. This is the truth Mao places at the core of all Marxism.

From this we can understand the need for the military line being centered within our political line. There is no possible way to avoid the question of military strategy. Without a military strategy and more precisely the military strategy of the proletariat, our political line defaults into revisionism. Clausewitz understood strategy like this: "Strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the end of the war; it must therefore give an aim to the whole military action, which must be in accordance with the object of the war; in other words, strategy forms the plan of the war, and to the said aim it links the series of acts which are to lead to the same, that is to say, it makes the plans for the separate cam-

paigns, and regulates the combats to be fought in each. As these are all things which to a great extent can only be determined on conjectures, some of which turn out incorrect, while a number of other arrangements pertaining to details cannot be made at all beforehand, it follows, as a matter of course, that strategy must go with the army to the field in order to arrange particulars on the spot, and to make the modifications in the general plan which incessantly become necessary in war. Strategy can therefore never take its hand from the work for a moment.”

This thesis, in spite of it not being a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thesis, is correctly in accord with the laws of war and follows dialectical materialism in the way in which he stresses bringing the strategy to the battlefield and hence changing both the battlefield itself as well as the strategy brought. War cannot be won by dogmatists any more that it can be won by those foolishly shooting in the dark with no military strategy. We can say that Clausewitz is correct and that the laws of Marxism apply to war.

While we cannot predict the fine details of the coming war, using this fact to advocate against formulating a military strategy is subjectivism, as it rejects the objective conditions that make war a necessity in resolving irreconcilable contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. This is a particularly alluring subjectivism, as it appears to issue sober decrees from a position of “common sense” and moral concerns about needless loss in guarding against adventurism. We would do well to recall that “common sense” and “moral concern” all have a distinct class character. They serve a class faithfully, and what we come to with

this subjectivism is the common sense of the bourgeoisie, who always try to convince us that they cannot be overthrown. We get the moral concern of the petty bourgeoisie that eschews self-sacrifice and maintains that seeking comfort over struggle is the compassionate way forward. In the crazed imagination of these classes, the strategy is to fight only for reforms to seek a more comfortable servitude, because after all class is not in motion but in stasis, and this is “human nature”—just an unchanging fact of life.

Our subjectivists maintain that this is not their position, and they may very well dream of an ideal, largely bloodless insurrection, no doubt inspired by their historically illiterate conception of the Great October Revolution, which again due to their subjectivism zooms in only on the moment of storming the Winter Palace—which was in its part largely bloodless. Mao Zedong concretely understood by centering the correctness of rebellion in the heart of all Marxism that he was centering war as the principal method for solving class contradictions.

The insurrectionist dreams of mass defection from the imperialist military over to the side of the revolution as if the superstructure can just cease to exist or can be made ineffective due to changes in the forces of production (a common thread in almost all revisionist thinking).

We should understand the dance moves of this opponent. While it is correct that there can be mass defection from the enemy camp in moments of great crisis, it is wrong to think they will always, without error, defect to the revolutionary camp. The history of fascism demonstrates

that defection has a class character, and that large swaths of the bourgeoisie's democratic military is prone to defect not to the left but to the right, constituting the hard core of reaction in fascism.

What our opponents are trying to say is that the role of the masses is inconsequential to military affairs, which leaves military affairs to-be-decided, not by the masses with the proletariat at their core but by the bourgeoisie, the class enemy.

Comrade Mao had one virtue that stood above his countless qualities, and that was that he always without fail cherished the role of the masses, whom he loved with revolutionary fervor. Mao taught that in war, like everything else, mass participation is key. Mao said, "Reading is learning, but applying is also learning and the more important kind of learning at that. Our chief method is to learn warfare through warfare. A person who has had no opportunity to go to school can also learn warfare—he can learn through fighting in war. A revolutionary war is a mass undertaking, it is often not a matter of first learning and then doing, but of doing and then learning, for doing is itself learning. There is a gap between the ordinary civilian and the soldier, but it is no Great Wall, and it can be quickly closed, and the way to close it is to take part in revolution in war. By saying that it is not easy to learn and to apply, we mean that it is hard to learn thoroughly and to apply skillfully. By saying that civilians can very quickly become soldiers, we mean that it is not difficult to cross the threshold. To put the two statements together we may cite the Chinese adage, 'Nothing in the world is difficult for one who sets his mind to it.'

To cross the threshold is not difficult and mastery, too, is possible provided one sets one's mind to the task and is good at learning."

Mao describes the process in which we go from having nothing in terms of war to having everything. We understand that the proletariat has no soldiers—so it must get soldiers. We understand that the proletariat now has no power and that it must get power through means of war. Just as it was described in that formulation by Clausewitz, the war itself is not only a means of change but a changing means. PPW is like this—our mass work from its inception must be geared toward the initiation of the People's War—which brings about a qualitative change in our practice. This change has an effect on our mass work, which is carried out primarily by means of war. Changing the mass work and changing the war—People's War grows from small to large in the process of the three stages laid out by Mao. It is through reliance on the masses and converting the masses into red soldiers that the People's War grows.

Mass support is earned through war against the class enemies—this is the most uncomfortable fact for the revisionists, who eagerly attempt to slander us with the charges of "focoism." Even if they claim to uphold the universality of People's War, they imagine it as the subjectivists do, of being initiated only once a large army is already under the command of the Party—ignoring the fact that the People's Army is developed and built in, and through, the People's War.

The revisionists will say that “no mass base exists to support armed struggle.” Well, this is partially true and partially false, yet what the revisionist opportunists pathologically forget to tell you is that no mass base will ever exist to support armed struggle if armed struggle is always put off to a distant future by fake Communists. In reality, armed struggle is required to generate support for itself: it must reproduce itself and grow in People’s War. To accomplish this, the Communist party must be at the helm and the masses must be educated in revolutionary violence. “Upholding, defending, and applying Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, principally Maoism, Chairman Gonzalo has established the military line of the Party. In the First Expanded National Conference of November, 1979, it was agreed upon as being central to the general political line and it is now being developed through the People’s War.” (GPL)

PPW in the USA?

So can Protracted People’s War happen in the United States? Obviously, we know where I stand. Yes, not only can we do it, but we must do it.

To come to such a conclusion we must look at the overall imperialist character of the United States and its geography, as well as its economic and social life, its history of class struggle, and its composition of class forces. To begin we know that the proletariat in the U.S. has been acting a very long time without its political organization—the Communist Party. We can understand that in spite of its size and strength, without a head, a creature

is bound to be oppressed without change. It is bound to sway back and forth from progressive to reactionary, and to stumble without leadership.

Is it the proletarian masses we can blame for not having a Party to guide it? No, we cannot, we can blame only two things: first we blame the history of revisionism, from the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) all the way to the rat traitors the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP-USA); and secondly, we blame ourselves for having not kept pace with the material conditions that are ideal for the formation of the Party.

Geographically the U.S. is huge and wide, with a diverse terrain from coast to coast and top to bottom. It has many cities spread throughout and no real countryside. We can understand that geographically there are depressed and oppressed regions where the masses face acute forms of oppression—this can be both political oppression as well as environmental oppression, and the latter is always exacerbated by the former. We have oppressed nations within the U.S. as well, which produces a compounded oppression on their proletariat and a national form of oppression on their bourgeoisie. We can look at and consider these facts to understand that the contradictions are most sharp regionally and that they often will flare up in one region while being less prevalent in another. This understanding helps to dispel the idea that “conditions will be right” spontaneously on a countrywide scale, ever. For this reason we look at the Sun-belt region as an area most prone to popping off in organic mass rebellion. We can also understand that the Rust Belt

is another area like Appalachia that has suffered a specific kind of depression from deindustrialization.

Deindustrialization is directly linked to U.S. imperialism and what some call “neoliberalism,” which is really just imperialism trying to mask itself as an optional policy in order to conceal what it truly is: the inevitable development of capitalism and a falling world rate of profit. We often talk of what imperialism does to the people of the Third World, how it forms the principal contradiction in the world today—that between imperialists and the oppressed nations. We should understand first that this contradiction expresses itself here in two ways. The first is that we have oppressed nations in the U.S. that are underdeveloped by imperialism, and this is most evident in the existence of the Black nation, historically rooted in the U.S. Deep South and forced into diaspora throughout the country. Second, we must understand the effect this has on the entire U.S. proletariat, with the loss of jobs as the monopoly capitalist class seeks cheaper labor. What follows is the deindustrialization of all major and medium-sized U.S. cities.

The urban industrial proletariat becomes dispensable as a class in the process of declassing the urban industrial landscape. These changes produce what we commonly call gentrification, but which is more correctly understood as a shifting class landscape. The proletariat in the cities are no longer mainly workers in large factories who must keep rigid hours at the mercy of production quotas but are more locked into the aspect of production away from the point of manufacture, into the points of distribution, communication, and reproduction. Service industry jobs are the main

jobs available in mid-sized cities like Austin, and almost the only industrial jobs are in construction. Due to this, large quantities of workers are no longer needed to be kept in or near the city centers, and the process of relocating them has been going on since the 1970s.

It is the “success” of imperialism that has so many bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie seeing our cities as playgrounds to throw money around in—necessitating the demand for service industry workers who can be bussed in from the suburbs but who are too dangerous or rebellious to have dwelling in the city proper.

The city becomes the place of leisure for the vampire class who can afford it. And what follows is that ugly factories are removed or repurposed. Active factories are pushed to the semirural areas (as with auto manufacturing in the U.S. South) and the proletariat is to follow this trend and is pushed further and further into the suburbs and rural areas—into rings of slums that begin to literally encircle the cities. We have seen this already come to fruition in Paris, where the banlieue are punctuated with endless housing projects that house workers and stretch as far as the eye can see. Hosting over 80 percent of “Paris,” these zones are not part of Paris proper, but it is the only place you will find Parisian and immigrant workers living. In this condition, Comrade Pierre of PCM (Maoist Communist Party of France) became one of the first to theorize Protracted People’s War in an imperialist country.

The banlieue are a glimpse into the future of all major and mid-sized U.S. cities as the proletariat gets pushed into ring-like formations around the cities—the servants' quarters on the master's plantation, and the hot spot for rebellions against the master.

Lima, Peru, which is larger than any U.S. city, demonstrates the exact same phenomenon: it is surrounded by rings of slums and ghettos, and the city itself is host to the country's most elite, who suck the blood from the countryside and slums. This factored into the People's War in Peru and understanding how that occurred is of utmost importance to us here. The shantytowns of Lima, the banlieue of Paris, and the popular neighborhoods of Austin will all come to surround the city, and this is the geographic base for the coming People's War. It is physically where the deepest and most profound sections of the masses live and breathe the class struggle. These can come to form constricting belts around the cities and can choke them economically and impact the infrastructure.

In this context, the mass work must be understood only as the trembling first steps toward a torrent of revolutionary violence. We must, as Mao says, preserve our forces and destroy the enemy forces. The early stages of People's War will not be a romantic struggle against tanks and planes or any other fantasy.

It will more or less be small guerrilla bands operating in the slums, ghettos, and other depressed areas forming a steel belt around the city. All our mass work should be to create these networks and solidify them and temper them in class

struggle toward initiation. It will be characterized by small mobile assaults on police substations, defensive actions, and assaults on infrastructure combined with armed propaganda actions like assassinations and bombings.

The Maoists in India have produced a document that even in their semi-feudal conditions expressed the need to develop and improve their urban strategy, and they looked exactly to the work being conducted in Lima's slums by the PCP. The Indian comrades stated, "The largest mega city, Mumbai, has 49% of its population in the slums. Our Party has so far paid limited attention to the organizing of this section. Other revolutionary parties, particularly the Peru Communist Party (PCP) have been particularly successful in this respect. In fact the shantytowns of Lima have been the strongholds of the revolutionaries for a long period. We too should work at creating such strongholds in India's major cities."

If a Maoist Party in a country such as India with 70 percent of its population living in the countryside is forced by the trends of urbanization and ghettoization to consider focusing its energy onto developing urban Base Areas, then we absolutely must devote serious consideration to this need.

The fact remains that "gentrification" does not exist in a bubble. We cannot only look to the short-term preservation of our communities but more importantly should look to the trajectory of relocation and understand that if an area is gentrified, those workers are relocated somewhere else in a process of ghettoization of proletarian suburbs. This is a particular type of urbanization—a suburbanization. These

popular suburbs will face more and more economic degeneration, as they are the places where the crisis of imperialism will be felt most sharply in the imperialist countries.

The urban strategy, Base Areas, and revisionism

Understanding the need to establish dual power presents another concern for the subjectivist revisionists. They want dual power but do not want to fight for it. They do not want to conquer bases, and see dual power as they see most things: as a long march through institutions, or the hobby-like pursuits of activists.

Many feel they can just walk into a neighborhood without having conquered turf and set up shop—peacefully converting it into a “base area” or peacefully transitioning to “dual power.” Understanding that the law of revolutionary violence is universal, we know that this is a daydream. A New Power can never emerge without destroying the Old Power.

There are a multitude of forces controlling the popular neighborhoods in the absence of the Party of the proletariat. The first major force is usually the police, the second is the churches/NGOs and other non-governmental class actors, and the third is the drug gangs and other lumpen-proletariat. To meaningfully develop these neighborhood

trenches means fighting for space—this cannot be a non-violent fight as the crypto-pacifists imagine. For capitalists, control means profit. Whether they are on the black market or not, these types will fight violently for their profits in the popular neighborhood. Serving the people means fighting to establish control over the community—it means the establishment of people’s committees (three-in-ones), which form the basis of the New State.

First and foremost, the demarcation of PPW or no PPW poses itself in the question of approaching revisionists—especially in areas where revisionists hold influence or marginal power. The revolutionary line is to battle them tooth and nail, politically always and physically when conditions permit. This is essential to clear the table of the rotting filth before you serve the masses.

This uncomfortable truth panics those red-tinted liberals who insist on unprincipled peace and “left unity,” which is always a call to tail revisionism and stifle revolutionary forces (a call to rob the proletariat of its Party, People’s Army, and United Front). They want a soft-touch relationship with revisionism. They want to allow those would-be butchers to continue misdirecting the masses. We should not allow for such thinking in our ranks. The organized revisionist must be the first to go in our political struggles; it is them we must make the first political demarcation against. We should hit them repeatedly until they break.

What follows in the cultivation of Base Areas in the interest of initiation of People’s War is battling with NGOs and the police. One is simply the ideological wing while the

other is its enforcement wing. We should rid our streets of both and infiltrate the ranks of the former to split and confuse them, to hasten their discredit. The second we must mobilize and organize against in the most aggressive way. This is how we till the soil in preparation for initiation of armed struggle in the context of service to the people programs. The dialectical relationship is formed between insurgency and community service: this relationship must be given attention and respect.

The importance of the military strategy of the proletariat is not just crucial to our mass work, but to our Party-building as well. We must center PPW in our political line, especially in conditions like our own where we are beset on all sides by revisionism and reaction.

The way People's War shapes and builds the Party and its cadres is illustrated by Chairman Gonzalo in his 1988 interview:

[Extract] Obviously war forges in a different way. It steels people, permits us to imbue ourselves more deeply with our ideology, and forge iron-like cadre who dare to challenge death, to snatch the laurels of victory from the clutches of death. Another change in the Party that we could point to, but on a different plane, has to do with the world revolution. The People's War has enabled the Party to demonstrate clearly how, by grasping Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, we can develop a People's War without being subordinate to any power, be it a superpower or any other power—how it's possible to rely on our own strength to carry forward People's War. All this has given the Party prestige on an inter-

national level that it never had before, and this is not vanity, far from it, it's just a simple fact, and it has also allowed us to serve the development of the world revolution as never before. In this way the Party, through the People's War, is fulfilling its role as the Communist Party of Peru.

In this thesis, Gonzalo has demonstrated his mastery of MLM, stressing both solidarity as part of world revolution as well as the independence of the proletarian forces from world powers and superpowers, a self-determined internationalism that is self-reliant. Has there ever been a greater master of MLM than the great leader Chairman Gonzalo? No, there has not been.

Conclusion

There are those who are better at hiding under rocks than at making revolution.

Some organizations are better at avoiding the question of PPW and substituting for it what they may call an "objective scientific approach." How, in fact, could you call yourself a Maoist while ignoring and avoiding the question? They treat their work today as merely a time to gather the affection of the masses, and their military strategy is simply to develop to a point when the masses are of course so impressed by our service programs and mass organizations that they are ready to lay down their lives for us. What they fail to understand is that the war begins the moment you form the Party.

The establishment of the Party sends a battle cry to the

bourgeoisie. The Party from its inception is locked into a battle, an antagonistic contradiction that can only be resolved through means of war. This war starts from the first step the Party takes. The revisionists conceive of war only at the point of bloodshed. They fail to understand that the enemy has ready a strategy and a plethora of tactics to try to crush our forces even before blood is shed. We would be foolish to enter into a Party with those who oppose military strategy. They have no interest in preparing their forces for battle. They have no strategy to defeat the enemy today or tomorrow. They are political procrastinators. They do not seek to learn war by making war—they seek to wait until war is already being made by some other poor bastard and enter if it looks like they will win. Like the intellectuals of the Kasama Project, they measure successes only in quantity, declaring PPW to be a failure in Peru because it did not seize State power. They lack a very basic principle that prevails in our movements: “Dare to struggle, dare to win.” It’s lucky for us that they often do not enter struggles where the stakes are high, or where they are expected to show force and bravery. And at the point where we find ourselves in the company of such people, we should analyze the quality of our work and look for places where these people have managed to find themselves comfortably existing within our ranks.

Organizations such as Mass Proletariat are dogshit. Their politics are so muddled it’s hard to discern whether they’re a cadre org or a mass org. They espouse revisionism at every corner where the rest of us have been forced to mature. While Mass Proletariat has decided there is no need to fight fascism since “fascism isn’t in power,” they seem to also be

lackluster on the question of fighting capitalism though it is in power. Their military line is to call upon the masses and Communists alike to do nothing, and in some magical future manifest an insurrection. Materially, what they practice is the peaceful road to socialism while giving lip service to armed struggle. As their recent disaster of a theoretical paper states, they do not believe in the universality of PPW. They aren't even creative with their revisionism. They regurgitate all the same half-cocked nonsense leveled at real Marxist-Leninist-Maoists over the decades—shit like, “We don't have a peasantry or countryside in the United States so we can't have a PPW” and “Mao said it wasn't universal!” Both of these arguments rely on book worship and dogmatism.

So much has already been written to dispel this type of dogmatic revisionism that it doesn't concern me terribly today to repeat what so many comrades have already said. What is our concern today is how to orient toward these types of revisionists in our movement. Some have suggested that in building the Party with people who have not yet come to correct ideas we can win them over. To this I ask, what type of Party are we trying to build? The Communist Party is the vanguard of the proletariat. It is the most advanced, organizationally and theoretically. We must stand above the confusion and reaction of revisionism. We do not need to give them power and legitimacy in our ranks to win them over. They will be won over by People's War or they will continue to serve reaction and fall with the enemy.

So let's build the Party in the foundation of unity around People's War and beat revisionism back into the hand of the bourgeoisie where they will march together to the same grave.

—Red Guards Austin, January 2018