

2 Lecture Notes on Dialectical Materialism

(p. 265) [p. 187]¹ *Chapter One: Idealism and Materialism*

1938²

This chapter will discuss the following questions:

- (1) The two opposed forces within philosophy;
- (2) The differences between idealism and materialism;
- (3) The origins of the emergence and development of idealism;
- (4) The origins of the emergence and development of materialism.³

1. *The Two Opposed Forces within Philosophy*

(p. 266) The entire history of philosophy is the history of the struggle and development of the two mutually opposed philosophical schools of idealism and materialism. All philosophical trends of thought and schools are disguised forms of these two fundamental schools.

Sources: Takeuchi Minoru (ed.), *Mao Zedong Ji* (Tokyo: Hokubasha, 1970-72), Vol. VI, pp. 265-305; and Takeuchi Minoru (ed.), *Mao Zedong Ji Bujuan* (Tokyo: Sososha, 1984), Vol. V, pp. 187-239. Translated and annotated by Nick Knight.

The various forms of philosophical theories are all created by persons who belong to definite social classes. The consciousness of these persons is historically determined by a particular social life. All of the theories of philosophy express the needs of certain social classes, and reflect the level of development of society's forces of production and the historical stage⁴ of mankind's knowledge of nature. The fate of a philosophy is determined by the extent to which it satisfies the requirements of a social class.

[p. 188] The social origins of idealism and materialism are to be found in the contradictory social structure of class. The occurrence of the earliest idealism was a product of the ignorance and confusion of a primitive and barbaric humankind. The development of the forces of production which followed acted as a spur to the subsequent development of scientific knowledge, and idealism should have declined and materialism should have emerged to replace it. However, to the present day idealism has not only not declined but has developed, to compete vigorously with materialism on an equal footing; and the reason for this is that society has had class divisions. On the one hand, an oppressing class cannot but, in the pursuit of its own interests, develop and consolidate its idealist theories; on the other, the oppressed class, similarly in pursuit of its own interests, can do no other than develop and consolidate its materialist theories. Idealist and materialist theories both exist as instruments of the struggle between classes, and prior to the elimination of classes, the opposition between idealism and materialism cannot be eliminated. In the process of its own historical development, idealism has represented the consciousness of the exploiting classes, thus performing a reactionary function. Materialism, the world view of the revolutionary classes, has grown and developed in class society in the ceaseless battles with the reactionary philosophy of idealism. Consequently, the struggle in philosophy between idealism and materialism has consistently reflected the struggle of interests between the reactionary classes and the revolutionary classes. Whether philosophers are conscious of it or not, their particular philosophical tendency invariably approximates the political orientation of their own class. All tendencies within

philosophy always directly or indirectly⁵ fosters the fundamental political interests of their class. In this sense, the particular form taken by the policies of their class can be seen as the implementation of a particular tendency within philosophy.

(p. 267) The specific features of the Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism are its ability to explain clearly the class characteristic of all social consciousness (philosophy included), its open declaration of its proletarian character, and its resolute struggle with the idealist philosophy of the propertied classes; and moreover, these specific tasks are subordinate to the general task of overthrowing capitalism, organizing and establishing a proletarian dictatorship, and constructing a socialist society.

The tasks of philosophy during the current stage in China are subordinate to the general tasks of overthrowing imperialism and the semi-feudal system, the thorough achievement of bourgeois democracy, the establishment of a completely new Chinese democratic republic⁶ and also to prepare through peaceful means⁷ for the transformation to socialism and communism. Philosophical theory and political practice should be intimately connected.

[p. 189] 2. *The Differences between Idealism and Materialism*

What is the fundamental difference between idealism and materialism? It is the opposite answers that each provides to the basic question of philosophy, namely the question of the relationship between spirit and matter (the question of the relationship between consciousness and existence). Idealism considers the world to have its sole origins in spirit (consciousness, concepts, the subject), and matter (the natural world, society, the object) to be dependent on it. Materialism considers matter exists independently of spirit, and spirit to be dependent on it. A confusing variety of opinions on all questions grows from the opposite answers given to this basic question.

According to idealism, the world is either a synthesis of the entirety of consciousness, or the spiritual process created by our reason or the world's reason; it regards the external material

world as either a completely fabricated illusion or the material external trapping of spiritual elements. Idealism regards the knowledge of humankind as emanating spontaneously from the subject, and the product of spirit itself.

(p. 268) Materialism, on the other hand, considers the unity of the universe to derive from its materiality, and that spirit (consciousness) is one of the natural characteristics of matter which emerges only when matter has developed to a certain stage. Nature, matter and the objective world exist apart from spirit and are independent of it. Human knowledge is a reflection of the objective external world.

3. The Origins of the Emergence and Development of Idealism

What are the origins of the emergence and development of idealism, a philosophy which considers matter to be a product of spirit and which has inverted the position of the real world?

[p. 190] As previously stated, the emergence of the earliest idealism was a product of the ignorance and confusion of a primitive and barbaric humankind. However, following the development of production, the division of manual and mental labour created the primary conditions under which idealism became a philosophical trend. The result of the development of society's forces of production was the emergence of division of function, and with the development of this division of function were created persons who specialized in mental labour. But during periods when the forces of production were poor and undeveloped the degree of separation between the two remained incomplete. However, a major transformation occurred when classes appeared, private property emerged and exploitation became the basis of the existence of the dominant class; at that time mental labour became the prerogative of the dominant class and manual labour became the fate of the oppressed class. The dominant class began to observe the relationship between themselves and the oppressed class in an inverted fashion, perceiving that it was not the workers who provided the dominant class with the means of livelihood, but themselves who provided the workers with it. Because of this, they

disdained manual labour and there emerged the idealist view. The elimination of the distinction between mental and manual labour is one of the conditions for the elimination of idealist philosophy.

Of the social origins of the development of idealist philosophy, the principal one was the conscious representation of ruling class interest by that philosophy. The dominance of idealist philosophy in all spheres of culture must be explained by reference to this. If there were no exploiting class idealism would lose its social basis. The final elimination of idealist philosophy must follow the elimination of classes and the establishment of communist society.

(p. 269) The reason why idealism has deepened, developed and had the capacity to struggle against materialism, must be sought in the process of knowledge of humankind. When humankind employs concepts to think, there exists the possibility of drifting into idealism. Humankind cannot but use concepts when thinking and this facilitates the division of our knowledge into two aspects; the one deals with individual and particular things, the other incorporates generalized concepts (such as the judgement that "Yan'an is a city"). The particular and the general are actually indivisibly connected, for to divide them is to depart from objective truth. Objective truth is expressed in the unity of the general and particular; without the particular, the general could not exist; and without the general, there could be no particular. To separate the general from the particular, that is, to treat the general as an objective entity and to regard the particular only as a form of existence of the general, is the method adopted by all idealists. All [p. 191] idealists substitute consciousness, spirit or concepts for objective entities which exist independently of human consciousness. Commencing from this premise, idealism stresses the dynamic role of human consciousness in social practice; it cannot point out the materialist truth that consciousness is limited by matter, maintaining instead that only consciousness is dynamic and that matter is nothing but an inert ensemble of objects. In addition, driven by inherent class characteristics, idealists utilize every possible means to exaggerate the dynamic role of consciousness, one-sidedly developing and limitlessly

expanding it so that it becomes the dominant aspect of intelligence. They conceal the other aspect, leaving it subordinate. This artificially expanded role for consciousness is established as a general world view to the extent of transforming it into a god or an idol. Idealism in economics greatly overstates one non-essential aspect of exchange by elevating the principle of supply and demand to the extent that it becomes the basic principle of capitalism. Many people have observed the active role that science plays in the life of society; but they fail to realise this role is determined and limited by definite social relations of production, and come to the conclusion that science is the motive force of society. Idealist historians perceive heroes as the creators of history, idealist statesmen see politics as an omnipotent entity, idealist military strategists wage all-out war regardless of the costs, idealist revolutionaries advocate Blanquism, and there are those who advocate revival of the national character and restoration of the old morality;⁸ all are the result of an excessive exaggeration of the dynamic role of the subjective. Our thought cannot reflect a phenomenon in its entirety at one stroke, but is constituted of knowledge which, in a dialectical process, approximates reality, and is lively and (p. 270) infinitely variegated. Idealism is founded on the specific properties of thought and has exaggerated this individual aspect; it is thus unable to achieve a correct reflection of this process and only succeeds in distorting it. Lenin said: "Human knowledge is not a straight line, but a curve. Any segment of this curve can be transformed into an independent, complete, straight line and this straight line may lead to confusion. Rectilinearity and one-sidedness, to see the trees and not the wood, woodenness and petrification, subjectivism and subjective blindness - voilà the epistemological roots of idealism". "Philosophical idealism is a one-sided, exaggeration of one of the fragments or aspects of knowledge until it becomes a deified absolute, divorced from matter, from nature. Idealism is thus a religious doctrine. This is very true."⁹

[p. 192] Pre-Marxist materialism (mechanistic materialism) did not emphasise the dynamic role of thought in knowledge, attributing it only with a passive role, and perceiving it as a mirror which reflected nature. Mechanistic materialism adopted

an unreasonable attitude towards idealism, ignoring the causes of its epistemology, and consequently was incapable of overcoming it.

Only dialectical materialism has correctly pointed out the dynamic role of thought while at the same time pointing out the limitations which matter imposes on thought, has pointed out that thought emerges from social practice, and at the same time that it actively guides practice. Only the dialectical theory of the "unity of thought and action" can thoroughly overcome idealism.

4. The Origins of the Emergence and Development of Materialism

The foundation of materialism is the recognition that matter exists independently of thought in the external world, and was acquired by humanity through practice. Through the practice of productive labour, class struggle, and scientific experiment, humankind gradually broke away from superstition and wishful thinking (idealism), gradually recognised the essence of the (p. 271) world, and in so doing arrived at materialism.

Primitive humans, yielding before the force of nature and capable only of using simple tools, were unable to explain change in the environment and so turned to the gods for help. This was the origin of religion and idealism.

However, during a lengthy process of production, humans came into contact with the surrounding natural world, acted on it and changed it; and in producing the basic necessities of life, made the natural world conform to their interests, and allowed them the firm belief that matter exists objectively.

In the social life of humankind, there emerges relations and influence between people, and in class society class struggle also occurs. The oppressed class evaluates the situation, makes an estimation of its own strength, formulates a programme, and when its struggle succeeds, it becomes confident that its own views are not merely the product of an illusion, [p. 193] but a reflection of the objectively existing material world. The failure of the oppressed class because it has adopted an incorrect

programme, and the success resulting from a correction of that programme, allows the oppressed class to comprehend that only correct knowledge in which a subjective programme relies on the materiality and law-like regularity of the objective world can achieve its purpose.

The science of history has proved to humankind the materiality and law-like regularity of the world, and given rise to a consciousness of the uselessness of the fantasies of religion and idealism, and resulted in humankind's arrival at materialism.

In summary, the history of humankind's practice - the history of the struggle with nature, the history of class struggle, the history of science over a protracted period - has, through the necessity of life and struggle, led to a consideration of material reality and its principles, and so testified to the correctness of the materialist philosophy. Consequently, humankind has found the ideological instrument for its own struggle - the philosophy of materialism. As the development of production advances to a higher level, as the class struggle becomes more developed, and as scientific knowledge reveals even more 'mysteries' of nature, so does the philosophy of materialism develop and become consolidated; and humankind is increasingly able to liberate itself gradually from the two-fold oppression of nature and society.

The bourgeoisie, during the period of its struggle against the feudal classes and at a time when the proletariat did not yet constitute a threat, had already discovered and moreover employed (p. 272) materialism as an instrument in its own struggle; it was already convinced that objects in the environment were material products and not spiritual products. It was only when the bourgeoisie itself became the ruling class and the struggle of the proletariat threatened it that it abandoned this 'useless' instrument and took up once again another - the philosophy of idealism. Evidence of this is the change in thought from before to after 1927 - from materialism to idealism - on the part of the spokesmen of the Chinese bourgeoisie Dai Jitao and Wu Zhihui.¹⁰

The proletariat, which is the gravedigger of capitalism, "is intrinsically materialist". However, because the proletariat is historically the most progressive class, its materialism is

different from the materialism of the bourgeoisie, is more thorough and profound; in character, it is completely dialectical, and not mechanistic.

Dialectical materialism was created by the spokesmen [p. 194] of the proletariat Marx and Engels as a result of the practice of the proletariat¹¹ and at the same time because the proletariat had assimilated all the results¹² of the entire history of humanity. Dialectical materialism not only maintains that matter is divorced from human consciousness and exists independently of it, it also asserts that matter changes. Dialectical materialism became a thoroughly systematic and completely new world view and methodology. This is the philosophy of Marxism.

Chapter Two: Dialectical Materialism

The problems which emerge from this subject and which will be discussed are:¹³

- (1) The revolutionary weapon of the proletariat - dialectical materialism;
- (2) The relationship between dialectical materialism and the philosophical legacy of the past;
- (3) The unity of the world view and methodology within dialectical materialism;
- (4) The question of the object of philosophy; (p. 273)
- (5) On matter;
- (6) On motion;
- (7) On time and space;
- (8) On consciousness;
- (9) On reflection;
- (10) On truth;
- (11) On practice.

My viewpoint on these problems is stated briefly in the following sections.¹⁴

1. Dialectical Materialism Is the Revolutionary Weapon of the Proletariat

I have already referred to this problem in Chapter One, but will discuss it again here in simple terms.

Dialectical materialism is the world view of the proletariat. The proletariat, which has been given the task by history of eliminating classes,¹⁵ utilises dialectical materialism as a spiritual weapon in its struggle and as the philosophical basis for its various viewpoints. Only when we adopt the standpoint of the proletariat to gain an understanding of the world can we correctly and completely grasp the world view of dialectical materialism. Only if we set out from that standpoint can the real world be truthfully and objectively known. This is because, on the one hand, only the proletariat is the most progressive and revolutionary class; and on the other, because only dialectical materialism, which closely integrates advanced and rigorous (p. 274) scientificity with a thorough and uncompromising revolutionary quality, is the most correct and revolutionary world view and methodology.

The Chinese proletariat, which is at present¹⁶ shouldering the historical task of the bourgeoisie-democratic revolution in order to arrive at socialism and communism,¹⁷ must adopt [p. 195] dialectical materialism as its spiritual weapon. If the Chinese proletariat, Chinese Communist Party, and the broad revolutionary elements of all those people who wish to take the standpoint of the proletariat adopt¹⁸ dialectical materialism, they will have gained¹⁹ a most correct and most revolutionary world view and methodology, and they will be able to correctly understand the development and change of the revolutionary movement, put forward revolutionary tasks, unite their own and their allies' forces, triumph over reactionary theories, adopt correct courses of action, avoid errors in work, and achieve the goal of liberating and transforming²⁰ China. Dialectical materialism is an especially indispensable subject for cadres and personnel who lead the revolutionary movement. This is because subjectivism and a mechanistic outlook, both of which are incorrect theories and methods of work, frequently exist amongst cadres and personnel; and this often causes them to act contrary to Marxism, to take the wrong path in the revolutionary movement. This weakness can only be avoided and corrected through conscious study and an understanding of dialectical materialism, and in so doing, arming their minds anew.

2. The Relationship between Dialectical Materialism and the Old Philosophical Legacy

Modern materialism is not a simple inheritance of the various philosophical theories of the past. It was engendered and matured in the struggle to oppose previous dominant philosophies and in the struggle of science to rid itself of idealism and mysticism. The Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism not only inherited the supreme result of idealism - the achievements of Hegelian theory - it also simultaneously overcame the idealism of that theory and by the application of materialism transformed its dialectics. Marxism is likewise not merely the continuation and completion of the development of all past materialisms, it is also at the same time in opposition to the limitations and narrowness of all past materialisms, (p. 275) namely mechanistic and intuitive materialism (of which French materialism and the materialism of Feuerbach are the most important). The Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism inherits the scientific legacy of past cultures, while at the same time giving this legacy a revolutionary transformation, thus forming an historically unprecedented [p. 196] science of philosophy, one which is most correct, most revolutionary, and most complete.

After the May Fourth Movement in China in 1919 and following the Chinese proletariat's conscious entrance onto the political stage and the heightening of its scientific standard, there emerged and developed the Marxist philosophical movement. However, during its first stage, the understanding of materialist dialectics within Chinese materialist thought was still poorly developed; bourgeois influenced mechanical materialism and the subjectivist trends of the Deborin clique constituted its principal ingredients. After the defeat of the 1927 revolution, Marxist-Leninist understanding took a step forward and dialectical materialist thought gradually developed. In very recent times, because of the gravity of the national and social crisis, and because of the influence of the movement to expose and criticise within Soviet philosophy, there has developed an extensive movement of materialist dialectics within the Chinese intellectual world. It can be seen from the extensiveness of this movement

that, while it is at present still in its youthful stage, it will develop along with the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat and revolutionary peoples of China and the world; and with a strength that sweeps all before it, it will establish its own authority, guide the Chinese revolutionary movement's courageous and large-scale advance, and lay the foundation for the path along which China's proletariat will lead the Chinese revolution to victory.²¹

Because of the backwardness of the evolution of Chinese society, the philosophical trend of dialectical materialism which is presently developing in China has not resulted from inheriting and transforming its own philosophical legacy, but from the study of Marxism-Leninism. However, if the dialectical materialist trend of thought is to deepen and develop throughout China and, moreover, is definitely to lead the Chinese revolution along the road to complete victory, then it is necessary to struggle against the various existing outworn²² philosophies, and raise the flag of criticism on the ideological front throughout the entire country. It is also necessary to expose and criticise the ancient philosophical legacy of China. Only thus will the objective be achieved.

3. The Unity of the World View and Methodology within Dialectical Materialism

(p. 276) [p. 197] Dialectical materialism is the world view of the proletariat. It is at the same time the method by which the proletariat gains knowledge of the surrounding world and a method for carrying out revolution. The world view and methodology of dialectical materialism constitute a unified system. Idealist Marxist revisionists consider the entire essence of dialectical materialism to be only its "method". They separate the method from the world view within the general philosophy, and separate dialectics from materialism. They do not understand that the Marxist methodology of dialectics is not the same as the idealist dialectics of Hegel, but is materialist dialectics; or that the methodology of Marxism cannot depart from its world view in the slightest degree. On the other hand, mechanical materialists only perceive in the philosophy of

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that, while it is at present still in its youthful stage, it will develop along with the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat and revolutionary peoples of China and the world; and with a strength that sweeps all before it, it will establish its own authority, guide the Chinese revolutionary movement's courageous and large-scale advance, and lay the foundation for the path along which China's proletariat will lead the Chinese revolution to victory.²¹

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Marxism the world view of a general philosophy, removing its dialectical element. Moreover, they consider this world view to be nothing more than the conclusions drawn from mechanical natural science. They do not comprehend that Marxist materialism is not simply materialism, but is dialectical materialism. Both of these viewpoints which dissect Marxist philosophy are incorrect. The world view and methodology of dialectical materialism are a unified system.

4. The Question of the Object of Materialist Dialectics - What Is It that Materialist Dialectics Studies?

Lenin (as an observer of Marxist philosophical science) regarded materialist dialectics as learning concerned with the principles of development of the objective world and the principles of the development of knowledge (in which the objective world is reflected within the various categories of dialectics). He said: "Logic is not learning concerned with the external form of thought, but learning concerned with the principles of development of all material, natural and spiritual things; namely, learning concerned with the principles of development of all of the concrete content of the world and knowledge of it. In other words, logic is concerned with the sum total and conclusion of the history of the world's knowledge".²³ Lenin emphasised the significance of materialist dialectics as a general scientific methodology, and this was because of the conclusions [p. 198] arrived at by the system of dialectics from the history of world knowledge. (p. 277) It was because of this that he said: "Dialectics is the history of knowledge".

The meaning of the definition, given above, which Lenin gave to scientific materialist dialectics and its object is as follows: firstly, materialist dialectics, as with any other science, has its object of study, and this object is the most general principles of development of nature, history and human thought. Moreover, the task of materialist dialectics when studying is not to arrive, through thought within the brain, at the relationship which exists between various phenomena, but to arrive at that

relationship through investigation of the phenomena themselves. There exists a fundamental distinction between this view of Lenin's and that of the Menshevik idealists (who in fact depart from concrete science and concrete knowledge) over the categories of study which function as the object of materialist dialectics. Because the Menshevik idealists have attempted to establish a philosophical system whose various categories have become dissociated from the actual developments of the history of knowledge, social science and natural science, they have in fact abandoned materialist dialectics. Secondly, all of the various sciences (mathematics, mechanics, chemistry and physics, biology, economics and other natural sciences and the social sciences) study the various aspects of the development of the material world and its knowledge. Because of this, the principles of the various sciences are restricted in a narrow and one-sided way²⁴ by concrete realms of study. Materialist dialectics is however quite different; it is the universalisation, the totality, the conclusions and the finished product of all the general content of value from all of the concrete sciences and all of humankind's other scientific knowledge. In this way, the concepts, judgements, and principles of materialist dialectics constitute exceedingly extensive laws and formulations (incorporating the most general principles of all of the sciences, and consequently incorporating the essence of the material world). This is one side of the picture and from this perspective, materialist dialectics is a world view. From the other perspective, materialist dialectics is the logical and epistemological foundation for genuine scientific knowledge liberated from all idle speculation, fideism²⁵ and metaphysics; hence it is at the same time the only true, objectively reliable methodology for the study of concrete science. This further adds to our comprehension of what we mean when we speak of materialist dialectics or dialectical materialism as a unified system of world view and methodology. In this way can also be understood the errors of the vulgarisers and distorters of Marxist philosophy who deny its philosophical right of existence.

(p. 278) [p. 199] In relation to the problem of the object of philosophy, Marx, Engels, and Lenin all opposed the separation

of philosophy from concrete reality and allowing philosophy to be transformed into various independent entities. They pointed out the necessity of a philosophy which grew out of analysis founded on real life and real relations, and opposed the approach of formal logic²⁶ and Menshevik idealism in which logical concepts and a natural world of logical concepts are the object of study.²⁷ The so-called philosophy which grew out of analysis founded on real life and real relations is none other than the theory of development²⁸ of materialist dialectics. Marx, Engels, and Lenin all explained that materialist dialectics was a theory of development. Engels described materialist dialectics as the theory "of the general principles of development of nature, society and thought".²⁹ Lenin regarded materialist dialectics as "the theory of development which is most profound, multi-faceted and richest in content". They all consider that³⁰ "the forms of all principles of development stated by all other philosophical theories beside this theory, in their narrowness and lack of content cut in two the actual process of development of nature and society". (Lenin) And the reason why materialist dialectics has been described as the theory of development which is most profound, multi-faceted, and richest in content, lies in the fact that materialist dialectics reflects, in a manner which is most profound, multi-faceted, and rich in content, the contradictoriness and leaps within the process of change of nature and society; there is no other reason.

One further problem must be resolved in this question of the object of philosophy, and that is the problem of the unity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology.

Lenin emphatically pointed out the identity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology, stating this is "an extremely important question" and that "the three terms are superfluous, they are one and the same thing". He fundamentally opposed those Marxist revisionists whose approach involves treating the three terms as completely distinct and independent theories.

Materialist dialectics is the only scientific epistemology and it is also the only scientific logic. Materialist dialectics studies the emergence and development of our knowledge of the external world, studies how we move from a state of ignorance to one of knowledge and the transformation of incomplete

knowledge to more complete knowledge; it studies the increasingly profound and extensive reflection of the principles of development of nature and society in the mind [p. 200] of humankind. This is the unity of materialist dialectics and epistemology. Materialist dialectics studies the most general principles of (p. 279) development of the objective world, and studies the form reflected in thought of the most developed behaviour and characteristics of the objective world. In so doing, materialist dialectics studies the principles of emergence, development, passing away and mutual transformation of each process and phenomenon of material reality; at the same time, it studies the forms in which the principles of development of the objective world are reflected in human thought. This is the unity of materialist dialectics and logic.

To gain a thorough understanding of the reasons why dialectics, logic, and epistemology constitute a single entity, we will turn now to an examination of how materialist dialectics resolves the problem of the mutual relations between the logical and the historical.

Engels said: "In relation to the method of thought of the various philosophers,³¹ the strong point of the Hegelian method of thought resides in the extremely rich historical sensitivity which permeates its foundations. Although its form is abstract idealist, the development of its thought nevertheless frequently parallels the development of world history. Moreover, history was actually taken as the verification of thought. History frequently progresses through leaps and in a confused manner. Consequently, if history is to be complied with, not only must a mass of insignificant data be given attention, but thought must be allowed to pursue a discontinuous path. At such a moment, the only appropriate method was the logical method. However, this logical method was basically still an historical method, but one which had abandoned its historical form and accidental character". Marx, Engels, and Lenin paid ample attention to this concept of "the unity of the development of logic and history". "The categories of Logic are abbreviations for the 'endless multitude' of 'particulars of external existence and of action'". "Categories constitute divided compartments which help us comprehend the dividing line between classes of things". "The

practical activity of man had to lead his consciousness to the repetition of the various logical figures thousands of millions of times in order that these figures could obtain the significance of axioms". "Man's practice, repeating itself a thousand million times, becomes consolidated in man's consciousness by figures of logic. Precisely (and only) on account of this thousand-million-fold repetition, these figures have the stability [p. 201] of a prejudice, an axiomatic character".³² These words of Lenin's demonstrate clearly the distinguishing characteristic of materialist dialectical logic which is dissimilar to formal logic which regards (p. 280) its principles and categories as empty, divorced from content and autonomous, and whose form is unconcerned with content. It is also unlike Hegel, who regarded logic as estranged from the material world, an independently developing conceptual essence, reflected and transplanted in our minds; moreover, he perceived the manifestation of the movement of matter as being dealt with via a process of creation in the mind. Basing himself on the identity of existence and thought, Hegel saw the identity of idealism in the identity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology. In contrast, the identity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology within Marxist philosophy is founded on a materialist basis. Only when materialism is employed to resolve the question of the relationship of existence and thought, and only when one adopts the position of reflection theory, can the problems of dialectics, logic, and epistemology be completely resolved.

Marx's *Capital* must be regarded above all others as the finest model of the utilisation of dialectical materialism to resolve the mutual relationship between things logical and things historical. *Capital* contains firstly an understanding³³ of the historical development of capitalist society, and simultaneously incorporates the logical development of that society. What *Capital* analyses is the dialectics of the development of the various economic categories which reflect the emergence, development and passing away of capitalist society. The materialist character of the solution to this problem resides in the fact that it takes material objective history as its basis, resides in taking concepts and categories as reflections of this actual history. The identity of the theory and history of capitalism, of

the logic and epistemology of capitalist society, is expressed in model form in *Capital*. From it we can gain access to some understanding of the identity of dialectics, logic, and epistemology.

What has been discussed above is the question of the object of dialectical materialism.

[p. 202] 5. *On Matter*

(p. 281) Marxism continued and developed the materialist line within philosophy, and correctly resolved the question of the relationship between thought and existence; that is, it thoroughly and in a materialist manner indicated the materiality of the world and objective reality, and the material origins of thought (or, the dependent relationship of thought to existence).

The recognition that matter is the origin of thought has as its premise the materiality of the world and its objective existence. The first condition of belonging to the materialist camp is the acknowledgement that the material world is separate from and exists independently of human consciousness - it existed prior to the appearance of humankind, and following the appearance of humankind it remained separate from and existed independently of human consciousness. The recognition of this point is the fundamental premise of all scientific research.

How can this point be verified? There are numerous proofs. At the very moment humankind comes in contact with the external world, it must employ harsh means to cope with the oppression and resistance of the external world (the natural world and society); humankind not only should but can overcome such oppression and resistance. All of the actual conditions of human social practice manifested in the historical development of human society are the best proof of this point. Throughout the course of the ten-thousand *li* Long March, the Red Army had no doubts about the objective existence of the regions it traversed, the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, the snow-covered mountains, and the grasslands, or the enemy armies which did battle with it, etc.; neither did it doubt the objective existence of the Red Army itself.³⁴ China³⁵ does not doubt the objective existence of an invading Japanese imperialism, nor of

the Chinese people themselves; neither do students of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University doubt the objective existence of this university and the students themselves. These are all material things which exist independently and are separate from our consciousness; this is the fundamental viewpoint of all materialism, it is the materialist viewpoint of philosophy.

The philosophical materialist viewpoint and the materialist viewpoint of natural science are not identical. If we say that the philosophical material viewpoint resides in its pointing out the objective existence of matter, that what is described as [p. 203] so-called matter is the entire world which is separate from human consciousness and exists independently (this world acts on the sense organs of humans which produces human sense perceptions, and from these sense perceptions reflection is achieved), then that way of portraying it is permanent and unchangeable, it is absolute. The material viewpoint of natural science resides in its study of material structures, for example, previous atomic theory and subsequent electron theory, etc; and the way in which this is described changes in line with progress in natural science; it is relative.

The distinction, based on the insights of dialectical materialism, between the materialist viewpoint of philosophy and the materialist viewpoint of natural science, is a necessary condition for thoroughly implementing the orientation of the philosophy of materialism, and is of great significance in the struggle with idealism and mechanical materialism.

(p. 282) Materialists³⁶ were not aware of scientific knowledge of material structures, such as electron theory which demolished the erroneous theory of the elimination of matter and which clearly bears out the correctness of the materialism of dialectical materialism. Through the discoveries of modern natural science, such as the discovery of electron theory, certain material properties which appeared in old material concepts (weight, hardness, impermeability, inertia, etc.) were shown to exist only in certain material forms and not in others. Facts like these eradicated the one-sidedness and narrowness of old materialism's approach to material concepts and nicely demonstrated the correctness of materialism's recognition of the world.³⁷ The materialist viewpoint of former dialectical

materialism perceived the unity of the material world through diversity, that is the unity of the diversity of matter; and there is not the slightest contradiction between this materialist viewpoint and the fact that the movement and change involved in the transformation of matter from one form to another are eternal and universal. Ether, electrons, atoms, molecules, crystals, cells, social phenomena, phenomena of thought - these are various stages of the development of matter, are various temporary forms in the history³⁸ of the development of matter. The deepening of scientific research, and the discovery of all manner of forms of matter (the discovery of the diversity of matter) only serves to enrich the content of the materialist viewpoint of dialectical materialism; and is there any contradiction in that? It is necessary to make a distinction between the materialist viewpoint of philosophy and the materialist viewpoint of natural science, and this is so because the two do have differences which range from minor to extensive; however, [p. 204] they are not mutually contradictory, for matter in the broad sense incorporates matter in the narrow sense.

The materialist viewpoint of dialectical materialism does not acknowledge that there are so-called non-material things in the world (independent spiritual things). Matter exists eternally and universally and is limitless in both time and space. If there is something in the world which has "always been thus" and "everywhere is the same" (like its unity) then that something is so-called objectively existing matter referred to by philosophy. If things such as consciousness are observed employing the thoroughgoing insights of materialism (that is, the insights of materialist dialectics), then so-called consciousness is no different; it is only³⁹ a form of matter in movement, it is a particular property of the material brain of humankind. It allows material processes external to consciousness to be reflected in consciousness, which is a particular property of the material brain. Accordingly, it is apparent that it is conditional when we make a distinction between matter and (p. 283) consciousness and moreover oppose the one to the other; that is to say, it has significance only for the insights of epistemology. Because consciousness and thought are only properties of matter (brain),

the opposition of knowledge and existence, that is, the opposition between matter that knows and matter that is known,⁴⁰ cannot be sustained. In this way, the opposition of subject and object departs from the realm of epistemology and is without any significance. If, beyond epistemology, consciousness and matter are still placed in opposition, this is tantamount to foresaking materialism. In the world there is only matter and its various manifestations; and signified by this are the following - the subject itself is matter, the so-called materiality of the world (matter is eternal and universal), the objective reality of matter, and matter as the origin of consciousness. In a word, matter encompasses everything in the world. The saying goes, "Unity belongs to Si-ma Yi"; but we say, "Unity belongs to matter". This is the principle of the unity of the world.

What has been discussed above is the theory of matter of dialectical materialism.

6. *On Motion (On Development)*

[p. 205] The first fundamental principle of dialectical materialism is its theory of matter; namely, the recognition of the materiality of the world, the objective reality of matter, and that matter is the origin of consciousness. This principle of the unity of the world has already been explained in the previous section "On Matter".

The second fundamental principle of dialectical materialism is its theory of motion (or theory of development): that is, the recognition that motion is a form of the existence of matter, that it is an intrinsic property of matter, and that it is a manifestation of the diversity of matter; this is the principle of the development of the world. The principle of development of the world and the principle of the unity of the world referred to above are linked one to the other to become the complete world view of dialectical materialism. The world is none other than a material world of limitless development (or, the material world is one whose development is without limit).

(p. 234) The theory of motion of dialectical materialism cannot tolerate (1) thoughts on motion separate from matter;

(2) thoughts on matter separate from motion; and (3) the simplification of matter in motion. The theory of motion of dialectical materialism has instituted an unequivocal and resolute struggle with these idealistic, metaphysical, and mechanical viewpoints.

The theory of motion of dialectical materialism is first and foremost in opposition to the idealism and religious deism of philosophy. The essence of all idealisms and religious deisms resides in their refusal to recognise the material unity of the world; they assume that the world's motion and development are non-material, or were at the very beginning non-material, and are the consequence of the operation of spirits or God's supernatural power. The German idealist philosopher Hegel believed that the contemporary world had developed out of the so-called "World Idea"; and in China, the philosophy of the *Book of Changes* and the moral theories of Song and Ming neo-Confucianism all engendered views of the development of the world which were idealist. Christianity asserts God created the world, and in Buddhism and the various Chinese fetishisms the motion and development of the world's myriad things is put down to the supernatural. All of these explanations which contemplate motion divorced from matter are fundamentally incompatible with dialectical materialism. Besides idealism and religion, all pre-Marxist materialism and all present-day anti-Marxist mechanistic materialism, are proponents of materialist theories of motion when it comes to discussing natural phenomena, but the moment social phenomena are mentioned, they cannot but become [p. 206] divorced from material causes⁴¹ and revert to spiritual causation.

Dialectical materialism resolutely refutes all of these incorrect views on motion and points out their historical limitations - the limitations of class status and the limitations of the degree of development of science - and constructs its own view of motion on a thoroughgoing materialism which takes the standpoint of the proletariat and the most advanced level of science as its basis. Dialectical materialism first of all points out that motion is a form of the existence of matter, it is an intrinsic attribute of matter (and not a function of some external impetus); to imagine motion without matter and matter without motion is

equally incomprehensible. Materialism's view of motion is in intense opposition to the views on motion espoused by idealism and deism.

(p. 285) The observation and study of matter divorced from motion results in a metaphysical theory of a static universe or a theory of absolute equilibrium. These consider matter to be eternally unchangeable, and that within matter there is no such thing as development; they also consider absolute immobility to be matter's general or original state. Dialectical materialism resolutely opposes these viewpoints, and regards motion as the most universal form of the existence of matter and an inseparable property intrinsic to matter. All immobility and equilibrium have only relative significance, and motion is absolute. Dialectical materialism recognizes that all forms of matter possess the possibility of relative immobility or equilibrium, and moreover considers this differentiates matter, and consequently that it is the most important condition for distinguishing life (Engels).⁴² However, it considers the condition of immobility or equilibrium to be only one of the essential aspects of motion, it is a particular condition of motion. The error of observing and studying matter separate from motion resides in overstating the importance of the factors of immobility or equilibrium, in concealing their limitations and substituting these partial factors for the whole, in generalizing a particular condition of motion, and in presenting them in absolute terms. The saying beloved of China's ancient metaphysical thinkers, "Heaven changeth not, neither does the *Dao*",⁴³ is indicative of this theory of a static universe; and although these thinkers recognised change in the phenomena of the universe and society, they refused to recognise it as change in their essence. From their perspective, the essence of the universe and society remained eternally unchangeable. And the principal reason that they thought like this was the limitations of their class; for if the feudal landlord class admitted that the essence of the universe and society is in motion and develops, then theoretically this was tantamount to signalling the [p. 207] death sentence of their own class. The philosophy of all reactionary forces is the theory of immobility. The revolutionary classes and masses have perceived the principle of

the development of the world, and therefore advocate the transformation of society and the world - and their philosophy is dialectical materialism.

In addition, dialectical materialism does not recognise the theory of the simplification of motion which lumps all motion in one particular form, namely, mechanical motion; this is the distinguishing feature of the world view of old materialism. Although old materialism (seventeenth and eighteenth century French materialism, and the nineteenth century German materialism of Feuerbach) did recognise the permanence of the existence and motion of matter (recognised the limitlessness of motion), it still had not broken free of the metaphysical world view. Needless to say, the explanations of their social theories were still idealist in their views on development; in their approach to the theory of nature, they also restricted the unity of the material world (p. 286) to a certain one-sided attribute, namely one form of motion - mechanical motion. The cause of this motion is an external force, like a machine which moves when externally impelled. They do not explain, by reference to essences or internal causes, matter or motion or the interrelated diversity of things. Rather, they are explained by reference to simple forms found externally, and to external force as a cause. In so doing, the diversity of the world is actually lost. They explain all of the world's motion as movement in place and an increase or decrease in quantity; an object at a certain place at a particular moment, and at another at a different moment, is thus described as motion. If there is change, it is only change involving an increase or decrease in quantity, not qualitative change; motion is cyclical, a repeated production of the same result. Dialectical materialism takes a contrary position to this view; it does not perceive motion as simple movement in place and as cyclical, but as limitless and qualitative in its diversity. Dialectical materialism regards motion as transformation from one form to another, and the unity of the world's matter and the motion of matter as the unity and motion of the limitless diversity of the world's matter.⁴⁴ Engels said: "Each of the higher forms of motion is necessarily connected with mechanical (external or molecular) forms of motion. For example, just as chemical action is not possible without change of temperature

and electric changes, so too is organic life without mechanical (molecular), thermal, electric, chemical, etc. changes. This naturally cannot be denied. But the presence of these subsidiary forms does not exhaust [p. 208] the essence of the main form in each case".⁴⁵ These words absolutely and truthfully correspond to the facts. Even simple mechanical motion cannot be explained by the metaphysical viewpoint. It must be understood that all forms of motion are dialectical, although there are enormous differences between them in the depth and diversity of their dialectical content. Mechanical motion is still dialectical motion. And as for the view that an object "occupies" a point in space at a certain moment: in actuality, it both "occupies" that point while simultaneously not occupying it. The so-called "occupation" of a point and "immobility" are only particular conditions of motion; the object is still fundamentally in motion. While an object moves within the confines of time and space, it invariably and unceasingly overcomes such confines; it moves beyond the definite and limiting bounds of time and space to become an unbroken stream of motion. Moreover, mechanical motion is only one form of the motion of matter; in the real world, it has no absolutely independent (p. 287) existence and is always related to other forms of motion. Heat, chemical reaction, light and electricity, right through to organic and social phenomena, are all qualitatively particular forms of the motion of matter. The great and epoch-making contribution rendered by natural science at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries resides in its discovery of the principle of the transformation of motion, in pointing out that the motion of matter is always via the transformation of one form into another, and that the new form produced by this transformation is in essence different from the old form. The reason for the transformation of matter is not external but internal; it is not due to the impulsion of an external mechanical force, but to the struggle of the two mutually contradictory and qualitatively different elements which exist internally, and it is these which impel the motion and development of matter. Because of this discovery of the principle of the transformation of motion, dialectical materialism was able to extend the principle of the material unity of the world to natural and social history, not only

to observe and study the world as matter in unceasing motion, but also to observe and study the world as matter in motion involving limitless advance from lower to higher forms; namely, to observe and study the world both as developmental and as a process. The following saying makes this point: "The unified material world is a process of development".⁴⁶ The cyclical theory of old materialism is thus exploded. Dialectical materialism has profoundly and comprehensively observed the forms of motion of nature and society. It considers the process of development of the entire observed world as eternal (without beginning or end). At the same time it regards each historically progressing concrete form of motion [p. 209] as temporary (having a beginning and an end); that is to say, it comes into being under definite conditions and passes away under definite conditions. Dialectical materialism considers that the process of the development of the world whereby lower forms of motion give rise to higher forms of motion expresses the historical and temporary character of motion; simultaneously, any one form of motion is a part of the eternal flow of motion (a flow without beginning or end) and therefore never the very first or last. According to the principle of the struggle of opposites (the reason for motion itself), each form of motion invariably arrives at a higher stage than that which preceded it and makes a real advance; however, at the same time, when considering the various forms of motion (the various concrete processes of development), there can occur motion which alters or reverses its direction. Forms of motion which advance and retreat are linked one to the other, so that in entirety they become a complex spiral motion. This principle also considers that a new form of motion occurs as the opposite of (or in antagonism to) an old form of motion; however, that at the same time the new form of motion necessarily preserves many essential elements of the old form of motion (p. 288), that new things grow out of old things. It considers that the new forms, characteristics, and properties of things are produced in leaps through successive ruptures, namely through conflict and division; but also that the connection and mutual relationship of things cannot be absolutely destroyed. Finally, dialectical materialism suggests that the world is infinite (limitless); not only is it so in its

totality, but also in its parts. Are not electrons, atoms, and molecules⁴⁷ manifestations of a complex and infinite world?

The fundamental form of the motion of matter also determines the various subjects of the basic natural and social sciences. Dialectical materialism observes and studies the development of the world as a progressive motion which passes through the inorganic world to the organic world to arrive at the highest form of the motion of matter (society); the subordinate and related components of forms of motion constitute the foundations of the subordinate and related components of their corresponding sciences (inorganic science, organic science, social science). Engels said: "*Classification of the sciences*, each of which analyzes a single form of motion, or a series of forms of motion that belong together and pass into one another, is therefore the classification, the arrangement, of these forms of motion themselves according to their inherent sequence, and herein lies its importance".⁴⁸

[p. 210] The entire world (including human society)⁴⁹ adopts qualitatively different and varying forms of matter in motion. Consequently, we cannot forget the question of the varying concrete forms of matter in motion; there is no such thing as so-called "matter in general" and "motion in general". In the world there is only motion or matter which is different in form and which is concrete. "Words like matter and motion are nothing but *abbreviations* in which we comprehend many different sensuously perceptible things according to their common properties" (Engels).⁵⁰

Narrated above is the dialectical materialist theory of motion of the world or the principle of development of the world. These theories are the quintessence of Marxist philosophy, the world view and methodology of the proletariat. If all proletarian revolutionaries grasp the weapon of this thoroughgoing science, they will be able to understand and transform this world.

(p. 289) 7. *On Time and Space*

Motion is a form of the existence of matter, and space and time are also forms of the existence of matter. Matter in

motion exists in space and time, and moreover, the motion of matter is itself the premise for these two forms of existence of matter, space and time. Space and time cannot be separated from matter. The sentence "matter exists in space" says that matter itself possesses the capacity of expansion; the material world is a world in which the capacity of expansion exists internally. It does not suggest that matter is situated in a space which is a non-material void. Neither space and time are independent non-material things; neither are they subjective forms of our perceptions. They are forms of existence of the objective material world; they are objective, have no existence apart from matter, and neither does matter exist apart from them.

The view that sees space and time as forms of the existence of matter is the thoroughgoing materialist viewpoint. This conception of time and space is in fundamental opposition to the [p. 211] various idealist conceptions of time and space listed below:⁵¹

- (1) The Kantian conception of time and space, which considers time and space are not objective realities, but forms of intuition of humankind.⁵²
- (2) The Hegelian conception of time and space, which incorporates a conception of time and space as developing, increasingly approaching the absolute Idea.
- (3) The Machist conception of time and space, which considers time and space are "categories of sense perception", and "instruments for the harmonization of experience".⁵³

None of these idealist viewpoints recognizes the objective reality of time and space, or recognizes that, in their own development, the concepts of time and space reflect materially existing forms. These incorrect theories have all been refuted one by one by dialectical materialism.

On the question of time and space, dialectical materialism not only struggles against these idealist theories listed above, it also struggles against mechanical materialism. Of particular note⁵⁴ (p. 290) is Newtonian mechanics, which treats space and time as unrelated and static insubstantial entities, and which situates matter within this insubstantial context. Dialectical materialism, in opposition to this theory of mechanics, points

out that our conception of time and space⁵⁵ is a developmental one. "There is nothing in the world but matter in motion, and matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in space and time. Human conceptions of space and time are relative, but these relative conceptions go to compound absolute truth. These relative conceptions, in their development, move towards absolute truth and approach nearer and nearer to it. The mutability of human conceptions of space and time no more refutes the objective reality of space and time than the mutability of scientific knowledge of the structure and forms of matter in motion refutes the objective reality of the external world". (Lenin)⁵⁶

This is the conception of time and space held by dialectical materialism.

[p. 212] 8. *On Consciousness*

Dialectical materialism considers consciousness to be a product of matter, that it is one form of the development of matter, and a specific characteristic of a definite form of matter. The theory of consciousness of materialism and the historical approach⁵⁷ is in fundamental opposition to the viewpoint of all idealisms and mechanical materialisms on this question.

According to the Marxist viewpoint, consciousness originated in the development from the inorganic world without consciousness to the animal world possessing rudimentary forms of consciousness; there then developed humankind which possessed high-level forms of consciousness. Such high-level forms of consciousness not only cannot be separated from the advanced nervous systems which came with physiological development, they cannot be separated from the labour and production which comes with the development of society. Marx and Engels have emphatically pointed out the dependent relationship which consciousness has to the development of material production, and the relationship between consciousness and the development⁵⁸ of human language.

So-called consciousness is a particular characteristic of a

definite form⁵⁹ of matter; this form of matter is composed of a complex nervous system, and this type of nervous system can only occur (p. 291) at a high stage in the evolution of the natural world. The entire inorganic world, plant kingdom, and rudimentary animal kingdom - none of these has the ability to comprehend those processes which occur either within or without them; they are without consciousness.⁶⁰ It is only the animal being that possesses an advanced nervous system that has the ability to comprehend processes;⁶¹ that is, which has the ability to reflect internally or comprehend these processes. The objective physiological processes of the nervous system of human beings function in line with the subjective manifestation of the forms of consciousness that they adopt internally; these are themselves all⁶² objective things, are certain types of material process; however, these simultaneously also constitute subjective psychological functions in the substance of the brain.

There is no mind comprised of thought which is in essence distinct, there is only ideational matter - the brain. This ideational matter is matter of a particular quality [p. 213], matter which has developed to a high degree following the development of language in human social life. This matter possesses the particular characteristic of thought, something possessed by no other type of matter.

However, vulgar materialists consider thought to be matter secreted from within the brain; this viewpoint misrepresents our conception of this problem. It must be understood that the behaviour of thought, emotion, and will is weightless, neither does it possess the capacity to expand; and yet consciousness, together with weight, and the capacity to expand (*shenzhangxing*), and so on, are all matter with different characteristics. Consciousness is an intrinsic condition of matter in motion; it reflects the particular characteristics of the physiological processes which occur with matter which is in motion. These particular characteristics cannot be separated from the objective processes of nerve function, but they are not⁶³ identical with such processes. The confusion of these two and the repudiation of the particularity of consciousness - this is the viewpoint of vulgar materialists.

Similarly, the mechanistic theory of sham Marxism echoes the viewpoint of certain bourgeois right-wing⁶⁴ schools of thought within psychology; this in actuality has also completely overturned consciousness. They consider the processes of the physiology and comprehension of consciousness to be a particular characteristic of the nature of advanced material substance, and do not recognise that consciousness is a product of the social practice of humankind.⁶⁵ For the concrete historical identity of object and subject, they substitute the equality of object and subject, and the one-sided mechanistic objective world. These viewpoints which confuse consciousness with a physiological process are tantamount to the abolition of the fundamental question of philosophy of the relationship⁶⁶ between thought and existence. (p. 292) The idealism of the Mensheviks attempts to employ a compromise theory, one which reconciles materialism and idealism, as a substitute for Marxist epistemology. They oppose the principle of dialectics through the principles of⁶⁷ the "synthesis"⁶⁸ of objectivism and subjectivism and the "mutual assistance" of these two methods.⁶⁹ However, this principle of dialectics is both non-mechanistic objectivism and non-idealist subjectivism, and represents the concrete historical identity⁷⁰ of objective and subjective.

However, there is also the unusual theory of Plekhanov's animist view on the problem of consciousness, which is fully expressed in his celebrated dictum "a stone also possesses consciousness". [p. 214]. According to this viewpoint, consciousness does not occur in the process of development of matter, but exists in all matter from the very beginning; there is only a difference of degree between the consciousness of humans, low-level organisms, and a stone.⁷¹ This anti-historical viewpoint is fundamentally opposed to the viewpoint of dialectical materialism which considers consciousness to be the ultimately occurring particular characteristic of matter.⁷²

Only dialectical materialism's theory of consciousness is the correct theory on problems of consciousness.

9. *On Reflection*

To be a thoroughgoing materialist, it is insufficient simply to acknowledge the material origins of consciousness; the knowability of matter by consciousness also must be acknowledged.

The question of whether or not matter can be known is a complex one; it is a question which all philosophers of the past have felt powerless⁷³ to deal with. Only dialectical materialism is able to provide the correct solution. On this question, the standpoint of dialectical materialism has been in opposition to agnosticism and is different to strident realism.

The agnosticism of Hume and Kant isolates the subject of knowledge from the object, and considers that it is not possible to transcend the limits which isolate the subject; between the "thing-in-itself" (p. 293) and its outward form exists an impassable chasm.

The strident realism of Machism equates the object with sense perceptions, and considers that the truth is already established in final form in sense perceptions. At the same time, Machism not only does not understand that sense perceptions are a result of the effects of the external world, it moreover does not understand the active role of the subject in the process of cognition, namely, [p. 215] the transformative work of the sense organs and thinking brain of the subject,⁷⁴ on the effects of the external world (such that two forms - impressions and concepts - are made manifest).

It is only the theory of reflection of dialectical materialism which has positively answered the problem of knowability to become the "soul" of Marxist epistemology. This theory has clearly demonstrated that our impressions and concepts not only arise from objective things, but also reflect them. It demonstrates that impressions and concepts are neither a product of the spontaneous development of the subject as the idealists suggest, nor the label given objective things as suggested by the agnostics; they are rather the reflection of objective things, a photographic image and sample copy of them.

Objective truth exists independently and does not depend on the subject.⁷⁵ Although it is reflected in our sense perceptions and concepts, it achieves final form gradually rather than instantaneously. The viewpoint of strident realism, which considers objective truth achieves final form in sense perceptions and that we gain it thus, is a mistaken one.

Although objective truth does not achieve final form at once in our sense perceptions and concepts, it is not unknowable. The reflection theory of dialectical materialism opposes the viewpoint of agnosticism, and considers that consciousness can reflect objective truth in the process of cognition. The process of cognition is a complex one; in this process, when the as yet unknown "thing-in-itself"⁷⁶ is reflected in our sense perceptions, impressions, and concepts, it becomes a "thing-for-us". Sense perceptions and thought certainly do not, as Kant has stated, isolate us from the external world; rather, they are what links us with it. Sense perceptions and thought are reflections of the objective external world. Mental⁷⁷ things (impressions and concepts) can be no other than "material things, altered (p. 294) and transformed, within the brain of humankind". (Marx) In the process of cognition, the material world is increasingly reflected in our knowledge more closely, more precisely, more multifariously, and more profoundly. It is the task of Marxist epistemology to carry on a struggle on two fronts against Machism and Kantianism, and to expose the errors of strident realism and agnosticism.

[p. 216] The reflection theory of materialist dialectics considers that our capacity to know the objective world is limitless; this view is in fundamental opposition to the viewpoint of the agnostics who consider the human capacity for knowledge to be limited. However, there are definite historical limits on each approach we make⁷⁸ to absolute truth. Lenin referred to it thus: "The *limits* of approximation of our knowledge to objective, absolute truth are historically conditional, but the existence of such truth is *unconditional* and the fact that we are approaching near to it is also unconditional. The contours of the picture are historically conditional, but the fact that this picture depicts an objectively existing model is unconditional".⁷⁹ We acknowledge that human knowledge is

subject to the limitations of historical conditions, and that truth cannot be achieved at once. But we are not agnostics, and⁸⁰ recognise that truth becomes complete in the historical movement of human knowledge. Lenin also stated: "The *reflection* of nature in man's thought must be understood not 'lifelessly', not 'abstractly', *not devoid of movement, not without contradictions*; but in the eternal *process* of movement, the arising of contradictions and their solution".⁸¹ The movement of knowledge is complex and replete with contradictions and struggle. This is the viewpoint of the epistemology of dialectical materialism.

The anti-historical standpoint of all those philosophies which, epistemologically, do not treat knowledge as a process consequently lacks breadth of view. This narrow viewpoint in the empiricism of sensationalism⁸² has created a deep chasm between sense perceptions and concepts; in the rationalist school, it has caused concepts to become divorced from sense perceptions. It is only the epistemology of dialectical materialism (reflection theory) which treats knowledge as a process, and in so doing thoroughly eliminates this narrow viewpoint; it does so by attributing knowledge with a material and dialectical status.

Reflection theory points out: The process of reflection is not limited to sense perceptions and impressions, and exists in thought (in abstract concepts); knowledge is a process of motion from sense perceptions to thought. As Lenin has said: "Knowledge is the reflection of nature. But this is not a simple, not an immediate, not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, (p. 295) the formation of concepts, laws, etc".⁸³

[p. 217] At the same time, Lenin has pointed out: "The process of knowledge involving a movement from sense perceptions to thought is accomplished through a leap".⁸⁴ Lenin, here, has clearly expounded the dialectical materialist viewpoint of the interrelation between experiential and rational elements in cognition. Many philosophers do not comprehend the sudden change that occurs within the process of the movement of knowledge, that is, the process of movement from sense perceptions to thought (from impressions to concepts).

Consequently, to understand this transformation, which is produced by contradiction and adopts the form of a leap, namely, to comprehend that the identity of sense perceptions and thought is a dialectical identity, is to have comprehended the most important element of the essence of Lenin's reflection theory.

10. *On Truth*

Truth is objective and relative; it is also absolute - this is the viewpoint on truth of materialist dialectics.

Truth firstly is objective. Having recognised the objective existence of matter and the origin of consciousness in matter is to recognise the objective character of truth. The so-called objective truth, that is to say, the objectively existing material world, is the only source of the content of our knowledge or concepts; there is no other source. It is only idealists who deny that the material world exists independently of human consciousness - this fundamental principle of idealism maintains that knowledge or concepts emerge subjectively and spontaneously, and without any objective content.⁸⁵ Because of this, it acknowledges subjective truth and rejects objective truth. However, this is at odds with reality, for any knowledge or concept which fails to reflect the laws of the objective world is not scientific knowledge or objective truth; it is superstition or wishful thinking which subjectively engages in self-deception and the deception of others. All practical activity of humankind which has as its purpose the transformation of the environment is subject to the direction of thought (knowledge), regardless of whether it be productive activity, activity involving class struggle or national struggle,⁸⁶ or any other forms of activity. If this thought does not conform to objective laws, that is, if objective laws (p. 296) are not reflected in the brain of the person undertaking the action and do not constitute [p. 218] the content of his thought or knowledge, then that action will certainly not be able to achieve its purpose. The errors made by so-called subjective guidance⁸⁷ within the revolutionary movement is indicative of this sort of situation. Marxism became revolutionary scientific knowledge precisely because it

correctly reflected the actual laws of the objective world; it is objective truth.⁸⁸ All thought that opposes Marxism is therefore incorrect, and this because it is not founded on correct objective laws and is completely subjective wishful thinking. There are those who say that what is universally accepted is objective truth (the subjective idealist Bogdanov stated this view). According to this viewpoint, then, religion and prejudice are also objective truth, because, although religion and prejudice are in fact erroneous views, they are frequently widely accepted by a majority of people; and sometimes correct scientific thought cannot overturn these erroneous widely held beliefs.⁸⁹ Materialist dialectics is fundamentally opposed to this viewpoint; it considers that it is only scientific knowledge which correctly reflects objective laws which can be designated as truth. All truth must be objective. Truth and falsity are absolutely in opposition. The only way to determine whether any knowledge is truth is to see if it does or does not reflect objective laws. If it does not conform to objective laws, even though it is acknowledged by the general populace or by certain wildly extravagant theories within the revolutionary movement, it can only be treated as erroneous.

The first problem⁹⁰ of the theory of truth of materialist dialectics is the question of subjective and objective truth. Its response is to deny the former and recognise the latter. Its second problem is the question of absolute and relative truth. Its response is, while recognising both, it does not one-sidedly accept or reject either aspect; moreover, it points out that the mutual relationship between them is correct, that it is dialectical.

It is absolute truth it acknowledges when materialist dialectics acknowledges objective truth. This is because, when we say the content of knowledge is a reflection of the objective world, that is the same as acknowledging the object of our knowledge is that external absolute world. "All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and hence essentially absolute". (Engels)⁹¹ However, objective absolute truth does not instantaneously and completely become the knowledge that we have; rather, through the introduction of countless relative truths in the limitless process of development of our thought, absolute truth is arrived at. [p. 219] The sum

total of these countless relative truths is the manifestation of absolute truth. By its very nature, human thought can provide us with absolute truth. Absolute truth can only come about from the accumulation of many relative truths. Each stage of the development of science adds a new dimension to the sum total of absolute truth. However, the limits of the truth of each scientific principle are invariably relative; absolute truth is only manifest in countless relative truths; and if it is not so manifest through relative truth, absolute truth could not be known. (p. 297) Materialist dialectics certainly does not deny the relativity of all knowledge; but in doing so it is only indicating the historically conditional character of the limits of our knowledge's approximation to objective absolute truth, and not suggesting that knowledge itself is only relative. All inventions of science are historically limited and relative.⁹² But scientific knowledge is different from falsehood; it displays and depicts objective absolute truth. This is the dialectical viewpoint on the interrelationship between absolute and relative truth.

There are two viewpoints, both of which are incorrect on the question of the interrelationship between absolute and relative truth. One is metaphysical materialism, the other is idealist relativism.⁹³

On the basis of their fundamental metaphysical principle of "the unchangeable material world", metaphysical materialists consider that human thought is also unchanging; that is, they consider that this unchanging objective world can instantaneously and in its entirety be absorbed in human consciousness. That is to say, they acknowledge⁹⁴ absolute truth, but for them it is acquired only once by humans; they regard truth as immobile and lifeless, something that does not develop. Their error resides not in acknowledging that there is absolute truth - to acknowledge this point is correct. It is rather in their failure to understand the historical character of truth, and in their not perceiving the acquisition of truth as a knowledge process. It resides also in their not understanding that absolute truth can only come to fruition little by little in the process of development of human knowledge and that every step forward in knowledge expresses the content of absolute truth; that, in relation to complete truth, however, such knowledge possesses

only relative significance and certainly cannot instantaneously achieve the completeness of absolute truth. The viewpoint on truth of metaphysical materialism is an expression of one extreme of epistemology.

[p. 220] The other extreme within epistemology on the question of truth is idealist relativism. This denies that knowledge is characterised by absolute truth, only acknowledging its relative significance. It considers all scientific inventions contain no absolute truth; they are thus not objective truth. Truth is only subjective and relative. Consequently, all erroneous viewpoints have the right to exist. Where imperialism invades a weak and small nation, where a ruling class exploits the labouring masses, this doctrine⁹⁵ of invasion and system of exploitation are also truth, since truth is anyway only subjective and relative. The result of the rejection of objective and absolute⁹⁶ truth inevitably leads to this conclusion. Moreover, the purpose of idealist relativism is actually to present the case for the ruling class; for example, the purpose of relativist (p. 298) pragmatism (or experimentalism) is just that.

It can therefore be seen that neither metaphysical materialism nor idealist relativism can correctly solve the problem of the interrelationship between absolute and relative truth. Only materialist dialectics can provide the correct answer to the problem of the relationship between thought and existence, and consequently determine the objectivity of scientific knowledge; furthermore, it at the same time provides a correct understanding of absolute and relative truth. This is the theory of truth of materialist dialectics.

11. *On Practice* - [Refer the second translation in this volume - Ed.]

[p. 234] (p. 298) *Chapter 3: Materialist Dialectics*

The two questions of "Idealism and Materialism" and "Dialectical Materialism" have been briefly dealt with above. We come now to a systematic discussion of the problem of dialectics which has only been mentioned in outline.⁹⁷

[p. 235] The Marxist world (or universal) view is dialectical materialism; it is not metaphysical materialism (also called mechanistic materialism). This distinction is a major issue of the utmost importance. What is the world? From ancient times until the present, there have been three major responses to this question. The first is idealism (either metaphysical or dialectical idealism), which states that the world is created by mind, or through extension, by spirit. The second is mechanistic materialism which denies that the world is a product of mind; the world is a material world, but matter (p. 299) does not develop and is unchanging. The third is the Marxist response which has overturned the two previous responses; it states that the world is not created by mind, and neither is it matter which does not develop; rather, it is a developing material world. This latter position is dialectical materialism.⁹⁸

Is not this Marxist conception of the world, which has revolutionised the perception of the world previously held by humanity, a discourse of earth-shaking significance? There were those in the West's ancient Greece who espoused the view that the world is a developing material world; but because of the limitations of the era, it was only discussed in simple and general terms, and their view is described as naive materialism. It did not have (indeed, could not have had) a scientific base. However, its viewpoint was basically correct. Hegel created dialectical idealism, stating that the world is developmental, but is created by mind. He was a developmental idealist. His theory of development (that is, dialectics) was correct, but his developmental idealism was erroneous. In the West during the three centuries of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the bourgeois materialism⁹⁹ of Germany, France, and other countries was mechanistic materialism.¹⁰⁰ They asserted that the world is a material world, and this is correct; however, they stated that the world is machine-like in its movement, with only changes involving quantitative increase and decrease or in place, there being no qualitative change - an incorrect view. Marx inherited the naive dialectical materialism of Greece, transformed mechanistic materialism and dialectical idealism, and created dialectical materialism which hitherto had not been

placed on a scientific basis, and which became the revolutionary weapon of the entire world proletariat and all oppressed peoples.

Materialist dialectics is the scientific methodology of Marxism, it is the method of knowledge and logic,¹⁰¹ and yet it is a world view. The world [p. 236] is actually a developing material world: this is a world view. This world view becomes a method if used to observe the world, to study, think about, and resolve the problems of the world,¹⁰² to lead a revolution, to do work, to engage in production, to direct warfare, and to discuss¹⁰³ a person's strengths and weaknesses; this is a methodology. There is no other single methodology apart from this; therefore in the hands of Marxists,¹⁰⁴ world view and methodology are a single entity, and so too are dialectics, epistemology, and logic.

We will systematically discuss materialist dialectics and its many issues - its numerous categories, laws, and principles (these several terms have one meaning).

(p. 300) What actually are the laws¹⁰⁵ of materialist dialectics? And of these, what are the fundamental laws and which are the subordinate laws which constitute the aspects, features, and issues of the theory of materialist dialectics which are indispensable and must be resolved?¹⁰⁶ Why is it that all of these laws are laws inherent in the objective world and not created subjectively? Why study and understand these laws?

The complete revolutionary theory of materialist dialectics was created by Marx and Engels, and developed by Lenin. To the present, with the victory of socialism¹⁰⁷ in the Soviet Union and the period of world revolution, this theory has entered a new stage of development which has enhanced and enriched its content. The following categories included in this theory are, firstly:

The law of the unity of contradictions;

The law of the transformation of quality into quantity and vice versa;

The law of the negation of the negation.¹⁰⁸

These are the basic laws of materialist dialectics. Apart from the naive materialism of ancient Greece which simply and unsystematically pointed out some of the significance of these laws, and Hegel who developed these laws in an idealist

manner, they have been repudiated by all metaphysical philosophies (the so-called metaphysical philosophies are theories opposed to the theory of development). It was only with Marx and Engels who transformed these laws of Hegel in a material way, that they became the most fundamental part of the Marxist world view [p. 237] and methodology.

Besides the basic laws outlined above and related to these laws are the following categories of materialist dialectics:

(p. 301) Essence and Appearance
 Form and Content
 Cause and Effect
 Basis and Condition
 Possibility and Reality
 Chance and Necessity
 Necessity and Freedom¹⁰⁹
 Chain and Link, and so on.

Of these categories, some were previously studied in depth by metaphysical philosophies and idealist dialectics, some were studied only one-sidedly by philosophy, and some were put forward for the first time by Marxism. In the hands of Marxist revolutionary theorists and practitioners, these categories have stripped away the idealist and metaphysical husk of former philosophies, overcome their one-sidedness, and discovered their authentic form; moreover, as the era progressed, they greatly enriched their content to become an important component of revolutionary scientific methodology. The combination of these categories and the basic categories mentioned above forms a complete and profound system of materialist dialectics.

None of these laws and categories is created by human thought itself; they are the actual laws of the objective world. All idealisms assert [p. 238] spirit creates matter, and from this perspective, the tenets of philosophy, its principles, laws, and categories, are naturally created by mind. Hegel, who developed the system of dialectics, perceived dialectics in this manner. He saw the laws of dialectics not as being abstracted from the history of nature and society, but as a logical system in pure thought. After human thought has created this system, it imposes it on nature and society. Marx and Engels stripped

away Hegel's mystical shell, discarded his idealism, and placed his dialectics on a material basis. Engels stated (p. 302): "It is, therefore, from the history of nature and humankind that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development. And indeed they can be reduced to three fundamental laws: the transformation of quality into quantity and vice versa, the unity of contradictions, and the negation of the negation".¹¹⁰ While being laws of the objective world, the laws of dialectics are also laws of subjective thought, and that is because the laws of human thought are none other than the laws of the objective world reflected in the brains of humans through practice. As was discussed previously, dialectics, epistemology, and logic are one and the same.

Why do we study dialectics? We study it for no other reason than to change this world, to change the age-old relationships in this world between humans, and humans and matter. The lives of the vast majority of this world's humanity are filled with misery and suffering as a result of the oppression of the political and economic systems dominated by a minority. The people who live in China suffer a twofold cruel and inhuman oppression - national and social oppression. We must change these age-old relationships and strive for national and social liberation.

Why is it necessary to study dialectics to achieve the objective of changing China and the world? It is because dialectics is made up of the most general laws of development of nature and society; when we comprehend dialectics, we have gained a scientific weapon, and in the revolutionary practice of changing nature and society possess a theory and method suited to this practice. Materialist dialectics is itself a science (a philosophical science); it is the starting point for all sciences, and it is also a methodology. Our revolutionary practice¹¹¹ is itself also a science, called social or political science. If we don't understand dialectics, our [p. 239] affairs will be badly handled; mistakes made within the revolution are those that violate dialectics. However, if dialectics is understood, immense results can be achieved; and if all things done correctly are investigated, it will be found they conform with dialectics.

Consequently, all revolutionary comrades, and above all cadres, should diligently study dialectics.

There are those who say: many people understand practical dialectics, and moreover are practical materialists; and although they have not read books on dialectics, things that they do are done correctly, and in fact conform with materialist dialectics. They surely have no particular need to study dialectics. This sort of talk is incorrect. (p. 303) Materialist dialectics is a complete and profound science. Although revolutionaries who really do possess materialist and dialectical minds learn a great deal of dialectics from practice, it is not systematized and lacks the completeness and profundity already achieved by materialist dialectics. Therefore, they are unable to see clearly the long-term future of the movement, unable to analyse a complex process of development, unable to grasp important political links, and unable to handle the various aspects of revolutionary work. Because of this, they still need to study dialectics.

There are others who say that dialectics is abstruse and difficult to fathom, and that ordinary people have no possibility of mastering it. This is also incorrect. Dialectics encompasses the laws of nature, society and thought. Anyone with some experience of society (experience of production and class struggle) actually understands some dialectics. Those with even more experience of society actually have a greater understanding of dialectics, although their understanding remains in the chaotic state of common sense and is neither complete nor profound. It is not difficult to bring order to this commonsense dialectics and deepen it through further study. The reason why people feel dialectics is difficult is that there exist no books which explain dialectics well. In China, there are many books on dialectics which, while not incorrect, are explained poorly or none too well, and which frighten people off. Books which are good at¹¹² explaining dialectics employ everyday language and relate moving experiences. Sooner or later such a book must be put together. This talk of mine is also far from adequate since I have myself only just begun to study dialectics. There has been no possibility of writing a useful book on the subject as yet, although perhaps the opportunity may present itself in the

future. I wish to do so, but this will be decided by how my study proceeds.

In the next section various laws of dialectics will be discussed. [There follows *On Contradiction* in the *Bujuan* text; see the third translation in this volume - Ed.]

Notes

1. Pagination in round brackets refers to the text published in *Mao Zedong Ji*, Volume VI, pp. 265-305 (hereafter *Ji*). Pagination in square brackets refers to the text published in *Mao Zedong ji bujuan*, Volume V, pp. 187-280 (hereafter *Bujuan*).

2. "(Lecture Notes)" in *Ji* only. The date 1938 appears in both *Ji* and *Bujuan*. However, this date almost certainly refers to the date of publication, rather than composition. On this issue, see the Introduction to this volume, particularly notes 2 and 17.

3. "This chapter ... materialism" in *Ji* only.

4. *Jieduan* in *Ji*; *jieji* in *Bujuan*, apparently a misprint.

5. "Indirectly" only in *Ji*.

6. "... the establishment of a completely new Chinese democratic republic ..." only in *Ji*.

7. "... through peaceful means..." only in *Ji*.

8. This last clause only in *Bujuan*.

9. This quote is an inverted and rather loose translation of a passage from Lenin's "On the Question of Dialectics", in V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1961), Vol. 38, p. 363. In *Bujuan*, the inverted commas cease before "This is very true".

10. This last sentence in *Bujuan* only.

11. "... as a result of the practice of the proletariat..." in *Bujuan* only.

12. "... results..." in *Bujuan* only.

13. This sentence and the following list of headings appear in *Ji* only.

14. This sentence in *Ji* only.

15. This last clause in *Bujuan* only.

16. "... at present ..." in *Ji* only.

17. "... in order to arrive at socialism and communism..." in *Bujuan* only.

18. "adopt" in *Bujuan* only.

19. "... they will have gained..." in *Bujuan* only.

20. *Gaizao* in *Bujuan*; *Jianshe* (reconstruct) in *Ji*.
21. The last sentence in *Bujuan* only.
22. *Chenfu* in *Ji*; *fandong* (reactionary) in *Bujuan*.
23. Inverted commas in *Bujuan* only.
24. "One-sided" in *Bujuan* only.
25. "Fideism" is the doctrine that knowledge depends on faith or revelation.
26. "Formal logic" in *Bujuan* only.
27. "... natural world of logical concepts (*lunlilguannian de ziran*)..." in *Bujuan* only. The *Ji* text reads here as though part of the sentence has been inadvertently deleted.
28. *Lun fazhan de xueshuo* in *Bujuan*. The word "*lun*" has been left out of *Ji*, making the English translation, "this developing theory".
29. See Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (Peking: FLP, 1976), p. 180; also Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature* (Moscow: FLPH, 1954), p. 353.
30. According to the editors of *Ji*, the direct quote from Lenin commences here. In *Bujuan*, it commences at "cut in two (*jiequ*)".
31. *Zhexuejia* in *Bujuan*. The *jia* has been omitted in *Ji*.
32. These quotes are from Lenin's "Conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*", in *Collected Works* (Moscow: FLPH, 1963), Vol. 38, pp. 90, 190, 217.
33. "... firstly an understanding of..." in *Ji* only.
34. This last sentence in *Bujuan* only.
35. "The Chinese" in *Bujuan*.
36. "Idealists" in *Bujuan*.
37. *Bujuan* reads: "... and nicely demonstrated the correctness of the recognition by the materialist viewpoint of dialectical materialism of the materiality and objective existence of the world".
38. "history" in *Ji* only.
39. "only" in *Bujuan* only.
40. This last clause in *Bujuan* only.
41. *Yuanli* (principle, tenet) in *Ji*.
42. See *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 92-93.
43. A quotation from Dong Zhongshu (179-104BC). Mao also uses this quotation in the official text of *On Contradiction*. See *Selected Works*, I, p. 313.
44. "... as the unity and motion of the limitless diversity of the world's matter", in *Bujuan* only.

45. This quote is drawn from Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 328. I have stayed as close to the official Soviet English translation as the Chinese permits.

46. See Lenin's "Conspectus of Hegel's book *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*", in *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 256. Lenin states, "... the universal principle of development must be combined, linked, made to correspond with the universal principle of the *unity of the world*, nature, motion, matter, etc." (emphasis in original).

47. "molecules" in *Bujuan* only.

48. This quote is drawn from Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 330. Emphasis in original. The official Soviet English translation has been used.

49. Parentheses in *Bujuan* only.

50. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 313. Emphasis in original. The official Soviet English translation has been used.

51. The paragraphing of the following four paragraphs is based on *Ji*. They are all incorporated in one paragraph in the *Bujuan* text.

52. *Renlei* in *Bujuan*; *Keguan* (objective) in *Ji*.

53. For a lengthy discussion on space and time, and the Kantian and Machian conceptions of them, see V.I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (Peking: FLP, 1972), pp. 202-218.

54. "Note (*xianzhu*)" in *Bujuan* only.

55. "time" in *Bujuan* only.

56. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, p. 203. The translation used here is taken from this source.

57. *Lishizhuyi*. Mao also uses this term in his 1938 speech "On the New Stage". See *Ji*, Vol. 6, p. 260. Stuart Schram has translated the sentence "Women shi Makesizhuyi de lishizhuyizhe" as "We are Marxist historicists". See *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, revised ed.), p. 172. For my reasons for rejecting this translation, see N.J. Knight, *Mao and History: An Interpretive Essay on Some Problems in Mao Zedong's Philosophy of History* (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of London, 1983), pp. 222-223.

58. "Development" in *Bujuan* only.

59. "Form (*xingtai*)" in *Ji* only.

60. This last clause in *Bujuan* only.

61. This last sentence in *Bujuan* only.

62. "All (*fan*)" in *Bujuan* only.

63. The negative *bu* omitted from *Ji*.

64. "Left-wing" in *Bujuan*.

65. *Bujuan* reads: "They understand consciousness as a physico-chemical physiological process, and consider that the study of the behaviour of this advanced substance can be carried out through the study of objective physiology and biology. They do not understand the qualitatively particular characteristics of the essence of consciousness, and do not recognise that consciousness is a product of the social practice of humankind".

66. "Relationship" in *Bujuan* only.
67. "Principles" in *Ji* only.
68. *Zonghe* in *Bujuan*; *liangmeng* (alliance, coalition) in *Ji*.
69. "... and the 'mutual assistance' of these two methods" in *Bujuan* only.
70. Identity (*yizhi*) in *Bujuan* only.
71. "Stone" appears in *Bujuan* only.
72. No paragraph break in *Ji*.
73. *Wuli* in *Bujuan*; *wufa* in *Ji*.
74. *Quanti* in *Ji*, possibly a typographical error.
75. *zhuti* in *Bujuan*; *zhuguan* in *Ji*.
76. *Zizaizhiwu* in *Bujuan*; *Zizailun* in *Ji*.
77. *Sixiang*.
78. Apparent typographical error in *Ji*; the negative *bu* appears before "approach" (*jiejìn*). Replaced by *zhi* in *Bujuan*.
79. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, pp. 152-153. Emphasis in original. The official Soviet English translation has been used. In *Ji*, the quotation is incorrectly extended for a further sentence.
80. *Bu* in *Ji*, an apparent typographical error; replaced by *you* in *Bujuan*.
81. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*", *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 195. The official Soviet English translation has been used. The Chinese version reads slightly differently. The quote is incorrectly broken in two in *Bujuan*.
82. *Ganjuezhuyi*: the doctrine that sensation is the sole origin of knowledge.
83. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*", *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 182. The Soviet English translation has been modified, as the quotation has been slightly altered in the Chinese texts.
84. Given as a direct quote in *Ji*, but not in *Bujuan*.
85. "Content" (*neirong*) in *Bujuan* only.
86. This last clause in *Bujuan* only.
87. "Guidance" (*zhidao*) in *Bujuan* only.

88. This sentence in parentheses in *Ji* only. The last clause in *Ji* reads: "it is the truth of the objective world".
89. *Puji* in *Bujuan*; *dongxi* in *Ji*.
90. The following paragraph in *Bujuan* only.
91. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 310.
92. This sentence in *Bujuan* only.
93. Paragraph break in *Bujuan* only.
94. *Chengren* in *Bujuan*; *fouren* in *Ji*.
95. *zhuyi*, in *Bujuan* only.
96. "Subjective" (*zhuguan*) in *Ji*.
97. Paragraph break in *Bujuan* only.
98. Paragraph break in *Bujuan* only.
99. "Idealism" in *Ji*.
100. "Idealism" in *Ji*.
101. "Logic" in *Bujuan* only.
102. "Think about and resolve the problems of the world" in *Bujuan* only.
103. *Yilun* in *Bujuan*; *renshi* (to know) in *Ji*.
104. "Marxism" in *Ji*.
105. *Faze*.
106. Paragraph break in *Ji*.
107. "Revolution" in *Ji*.
108. See Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 83-91. In this source, the law on contradiction is referred to as "the law of the interpenetration of opposites".
109. In *Bujuan* only.
110. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 83. Mao has left out a significant clause in Engels' quote, perhaps to make his attack on idealism more forceful. The quote is as follows, with the clause omitted by Mao shown in emphasis:
- "It is, therefore, from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development, *as well as of thought itself....*"
111. "Practice" in *Bujuan* only.
112. "Good at..." in *Bujuan* only.

65. *Bujuan* reads: "They understand consciousness as a physico-chemical physiological process, and consider that the study of the behaviour of this advanced substance can be carried out through the study of objective physiology and biology. They do not understand the qualitatively particular characteristics of the essence of consciousness, and do not recognise that consciousness is a product of the social practice of humankind".

66. "Relationship" in *Bujuan* only.
67. "Principles" in *Ji* only.
68. *Zonghe* in *Bujuan*; *liangmeng* (alliance, coalition) in *Ji*.
69. "... and the 'mutual assistance' of these two methods" in *Bujuan* only.
70. Identity (*yizhi*) in *Bujuan* only.
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72. No paragraph break in *Ji*.
73. *Wuli* in *Bujuan*; *wufa* in *Ji*.
74. *Quanti* in *Ji*, possibly a typographical error.
75. *zhuti* in *Bujuan*; *zhuguan* in *Ji*.
76. *Zizaizhiwu* in *Bujuan*; *Zizailun* in *Ji*.
77. *Sixiang*.
78. Apparent typographical error in *Ji*; the negative *bu* appears before "approach" (*jiejìn*). Replaced by *zhi* in *Bujuan*.
79. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, pp. 152-153. Emphasis in original. The official Soviet English translation has been used. In *Ji*, the quotation is incorrectly extended for a further sentence.
80. *Bu* in *Ji*, an apparent typographical error; replaced by *you* in *Bujuan*.
81. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*", *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 195. The official Soviet English translation has been used. The Chinese version reads slightly differently. The quote is incorrectly broken in two in *Bujuan*.
82. *Ganjuezhuyi*: the doctrine that sensation is the sole origin of knowledge.
83. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*", *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 182. The Soviet English translation has been modified, as the quotation has been slightly altered in the Chinese texts.
84. Given as a direct quote in *Ji*, but not in *Bujuan*.
85. "Content" (*neirong*) in *Bujuan* only.
86. This last clause in *Bujuan* only.
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91. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 310.
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93. Paragraph break in *Bujuan* only.
94. *Chengren* in *Bujuan*; *fouren* in *Ji*.
95. *zhuyi*, in *Bujuan* only.
96. "Subjective" (*zhuguan*) in *Ji*.
97. Paragraph break in *Bujuan* only.
98. Paragraph break in *Bujuan* only.
99. "Idealism" in *Ji*.
100. "Idealism" in *Ji*.
101. "Logic" in *Bujuan* only.
102. "Think about and resolve the problems of the world" in *Bujuan* only.
103. *Yilun* in *Bujuan*; *renshi* (to know) in *Ji*.
104. "Marxism" in *Ji*.
105. *Faze*.
106. Paragraph break in *Ji*.
107. "Revolution" in *Ji*.
108. See Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 83-91. In this source, the law on contradiction is referred to as "the law of the interpenetration of opposites".
109. In *Bujuan* only.
110. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 83. Mao has left out a significant clause in Engels' quote, perhaps to make his attack on idealism more forceful. The quote is as follows, with the clause omitted by Mao shown in emphasis:
- "It is, therefore, from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development, *as well as of thought itself....*"
111. "Practice" in *Bujuan* only.
112. "Good at..." in *Bujuan* only.