


With God's help'

The king's doctrine

First part: The
Laws of Nefshoth
Nin Israel to the
Nations

Yitzhak Shapira Yosef Elitzur

**Clarifications of Halacha on matters of
royalty and wars
that were clarified at the Torah Institute
next to
Yeshiva 'Oud Yosef Chai'**



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. Lev Hashamron, 44831

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ל עיני?

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הרב יצחק גינזבורג

B.A., New Year of Mercy 5699.

To my beloved and dear students, Rabbis Yitzhak Shapira and Yosef Yeremiahu Elitzur, may God live on them.

I was happy to see your book Torat Hamelech HA, the fruit of long labor at the Torah Research Institute near our yeshiva K. "Oud Yosef Chai", which deals with important issues regarding the difference between Israel and the nations. These issues are very relevant to our situation today in the Land of Israel, as we must conquer it from our enemies. In order to act as I should, from the spirit of the Torah, and to strengthen the spirit of the people and their forces, a deep clarification of Torah opinion such as this must be sought. Of course, as explained in our article "Kabbalah, Halacha, Reality" (Kings of Israel 1880), the real way to correct reality according to Halacha depends on the inspiration of the Torah's interiority - the way of Kabbalah and Hasidism - on the whole of reality, so that reality 'softens' and it is correct to accept the instructions The 'strict' law. And also, it is known that no one can aim at the truth of Halacha without being well versed in the wisdom of the truth, and that the main mission of our generation is to connect all the layers of the Torah together, until in our generation "there is no revelation without the hidden and no hidden without the revelation", as explained in MA. May you, together with all the students of the Yeshiva and the Torah Institute, continue to dwell in the depths of Halacha from a deep connection to the innermost aspects of the Torah, and things will be clarified and clarified, happy as they are given from Sinai, and will give the good fruits in reality, until the true and complete redemption is brought.

"There is no honor but the Torah", and for the sake of the book we will look at the structure of the Shas issues dealing with the general that is explained at length in chapter 1 as a source of the prohibition of killing Gentiles by Israel (and we have already expanded on this matter also in Deuteronomy 7.P., and more for those of Milin 1A):

The rule "like from my hand, etc." appears 4 times in the Shas, and according to our way,

מרת מרים ו

הוקדש על ידי בני משפחה

יצחק ישמח ישראל ז"ל
בן יחזקאל ושולמית שפירא
יבלחט"א
נלב"עכ"וטבתשם"ט

תחיה ז"ל
ת אריה ונילי רוקח יבדלר
נלב"עב"וניסותש"ם

it should be adjusted against the upper sefirot (which correspond to the strength of the human soul and its ways of worshiping its Creator, blessed be He). * And we see a dish to tune against Nehim precisely, which is accurate in the Sefirot Nehim, the part embedded in the soul (and the sefirot treading on the ground of external reality in order to find out and correct in practice

Ali"), in the secret of Rabbi Akiva's article in the Mishnah (Shabbat 9:1): "Rabbi Akiva said, "From a foreign work that is defiled by a load, it is a curse. When it is said that a donor like a dera comes out, you shall say to him, "What is a defilement? Doh was the word for "Nadat Dota". In the prohibition of handa, it is said in the Torah, "And a man who lies with his wife is a dua, etc." There is also a connection here between Nervata and Enslaved, everything is a flaw in the count of majesty, and Doc.

The issue Dholin Leg, 1 discusses the prohibition of an animal part, which is directed against the counting of the element, the living part of the sacred, as explained in 24. It is precisely in this issue that it becomes clear that there are those who apparently did not find the rule of Licha Midi reasonable (and according to Rambam it seems that she followed his example). After all, this is the place of discovering Israel's holiness in essence - the foundational counting is the brainy, the intelligent, which is embedded (as explained at length in the MA), where "the one who distinguishes Israel from the nations" openly. And there is the place of the letter of the holy covenant that comes to differentiate also in the body between Israel and the nations - all Israel are pure and holy while "all the nations are celibate." And in any case, there is no place here to draw a comparison between Israel and the nations and to say who from the hands of Del Israel is a priest and a forbidden Gentile. that Israel is basically allowed in everything, while the Gentiles are basically forbidden in everything, as explained in MA (the basic pronoun is "every", here everything is good or everything is bad, and Duk).

The issue rests in the Dessanhedrin, in which it discusses an unusual birth and the extent of the pleasure a woman has in this birth. Dion emphasized you to correct the count of the kingdom, the face of the nokba, that you will not stand on the back side of ZA her husband but that you will return to be face to face with him. Here we see the difference in attitudes between the sages of the Land of Israel and the sages of Babylon (in the difference between the Jerusalem method and the Babylonian method in this, and see inside the book in the note at the beginning of Appendix B to Chapter 1), also in the secret of the kingdom standing face (in the Land of Israel) or behind (in Babylon), etc. The main thing here is "and stick to his wife", the devotion of the foundation of the Dekura to the foundation of the Nakba, in the holiness of which we were in the same holy and pure place, the place of the inspiration of the Shekinah, the Knesset of Israel (which gathers Israel with its husband, as it is known) in its purity. Here, too, it seems that Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Hanina, the sages of the Land of Israel, did not agree with the rule of "Who is my hand, etc." After all,

this rule is not suitable for the air that the Land of Israel is waiting for, for "the land that the Lord your God always demands, the eyes of the Lord your God will allow it this year and it will rise after a year." (And from them and through them to the rest of the nations of the world, but precisely by informing everyone in the world of the self-separation of the people of Israel, the chosen people, and how they should not be compared to the rest of the nations of the lands at all and most of all).

In the blessing of the Torah,

Rabbi Yitzhak Ginzburg

Literally), any similitude is possible between Israel and the nations ~ "Who is it from the hands of Delisrael that is a priest and a God is forbidden" (which is not the case in the above sefirot, perceptibly and sensibly, that there is no side of similitude prepared by Israel for the nations):

The issue to the Sanhedrin Net, 1 brings the rule of Licha Midi, etc. to justify Rabbi Yossi's rule of Rabbi Hanina (to reject 11 of the Gemara which makes it difficult for him) that every mitzvah that was said to the sons of Noah and not obeyed at Sinai was said to Israel and not to the sons of Noah. Here is this rule in the secret: "And Israel for ever shall not lie nor be comforted, for it is not a man to be comforted." The unleavened bread given to all mankind before the giving of the Torah was given in order to find out the good in man, and inwardly they were given to find out the root of the souls of Israel and to fulfill "Whoever cleans and impures not one" - "Abraham Matrah", etc. "And we have nothing but the sinew of the woman [and the Rabbis of Judah]", and it is known that the mitzvah of the sinew came to correct the defect in the counting of eternity that was made by the touching of Esau's servant to the palm of our father Jacob's thigh, when the completeness of the correction was made by Shmuel the prophet saying "And the eternity of Israel will not He will lie and not be comforted, etc., and it is known that Shmuel = Gid Hanshe. A mitzvah that was said to Noah's sons and was not obeyed at Sinai is the next mitzvah to reveal the eternity of the people of Israel in the world, and to discover the roots of Israel that existed from the beginning even before the giving of the Torah (and also before the creation of the world in general, and even before the desire to create the world. It begins with thinking, as explained in the Ra'ah in the secret that is the root of Beit Hillel's opinion in the Land of Karma", that is, "Israel's thinking preceded everything" even to the ancient Torah, and therefore this step was revealed precisely in the mitzvah that was said before the giving of the Torah and was not recited at Sinai, even though we existed The mitzvah today is by

virtue of the revelation of the bones Desini - "I am who I am" - and as the Rambam wrote, and it will be further explained to Keman EI, et al) how he is an "eternal ancestor" (= Messiah).

The issue of the Dessanhedrin Na, 1 discusses the division between a slaughtered animal and a slaved animal and states, on behalf of "Licha Midi, etc.", that it is not possible for a Gentile slaved animal to be killed because there is no law for killing a slaved animal in Israel. This issue is against the count of honor, about which it is said "An Indian has become a destroyer of me". From the majesty of majesty we are the thanksgiving to God and his work be blessed, the opposite of the one who worships an animal (inwardly we were his own animal soul, that is, who bows down and submits - the majesty of majesty is the measure of submission in the soul - to his animal nature, and establishes him as God, the complete distortion of what is known to God in the gematria of nature). Rav Sheshat brings in this topic the B'rayta "What is the ilnoth that there is no eating, no drinking, and no perfumer, the Torah said, the hay is burnt and consumed, because a problem comes to a person because of them, etc." Reversed mutual letters ("Indian reversed

RABBI Z. N. GOLDBERG
Goldberg

Abbad Bias Horaa'h "Hayashar Vehatov-
Sher and the Sov^m;a - Av
Member Of Supreme Rabbinical Court

Rabbi Zalman Nehemiah

"an instruction to the one who commands

Beit Rabbi Hagdanel

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גלמן נחמיה ז"ל



"חזון יעקב"

אגודה לתורה וחסד ולקירוב לבבות
בנשיאות הרב יעקב יוסף שליט"א

ד"ר ה' אהרן טייטלבוים
כתיבה ואלון חקלא, בן
אנ' מנצח חסד ה"ם.
וקצור צב. שהיה אהרן
התורה חסדים את ה'יהו
להכות אלו. ק' ספק
לספר צב 'צכה את
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תּוֹבַן עֲנִינִים

Rabbi Dov Lior Rabbi of the city

Kiryat Arba - Hebron

אלול תשס"ט

Dov Lior sword

introduction

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- Noah -----

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nutshell **Conclusions in a**

introduction

In 28 Nisan 571, the Lubavitcher Rebbe said:

The only thing I could do - hand over the giant to you: do everything you can - things that are faded lights but in the form of religious tools - to **actually bring the Messiah of our righteousness immediately and right away!**

When there are firm and strong desires - 'Orot Datoho' - one must learn how to bring them into reality with the help of 'Klim Detikon', tools that know how to be within the frameworks and limitations of reality. An example of the 'orot datuho' that needs many 'religious tools' is in the public laws and what is between Israel and the nations. There is here a holy and firm desire of all the Jews for true and complete redemption and for God's reign in the world, and this desire gives rise to many important and holy deeds. But this desire needs religious tools, to clarify the details of the laws that lead to the penetration of the light of the desire in a corrected form into the tools, then the actions are directed, and the desire comes to fruition.



At the Torah Institute next to Yeshiva 'Oud Yosef Chai' we have been engaged for years in clarifying the details of the laws related to public laws and the relationship between Israel and the nations; while clarifying the details of the laws according to the way of the Torah and with their reference to other sources.

Of course we would be happy for any kindling and clarification of things with the readers according to the way of the Torah.

We thank the Creator of the world for placing some of us among the residents of the Beit Midrash.

A big thank you to Rabbi Yitzhak Ginzburg Shlita from whose water we drink and from whose water we live. The rabbi went over large parts of the book, and made many comments for us (in Bengali and in secret); Many of them were corrected in the body of the book without noting that it was previously written differently; others were brought in

the name of the rabbi; And many more were not brought inside due to the shortness of
the canvas.

We would also like to thank Rabbi Yosef Plai Shalita who did the initial editing of the
material prior to writing and has been involved in clarifying these issues for many years.

Yosef Yermiahu Elitzur (Hershkowitz) *

Yitzhak Shapira

The Torah Institute next to the 'Oud Yosef Chai' yeshiva

The exile from Zion Yosef the Tzadik in Nablus in 1951, and is now camped

in Yitzhar

Chapter One

*The penalty of killing a Gentile

In this chapter we will deal with the fact that the prohibition 'thou shalt not kill' is not stated in killing a Gentile, and the prohibition for Israel to kill a Gentile is learned from the prohibition of Noah's sons to kill each other. In the appendices to the chapter we will further deal with the principle that Israel is bound by the mitzvot given to Noah's sons.

Bloodshed as KC Grimm .x

the prohibition of bloodshed · This is the Rambam's language ^{in the} Law of Kings Chapter 9:

[A] The first Adam was commanded about six things, about idolatry and God's blessing and bloodshed and adultery and adultery and the laws... He added to Noah a limb from the animal... [D] Noah's son who killed a soul even passing through his mother's intestines was killed on him

Rambam's words concern a Gentile who kills a Gentile. Here we will find out the Halacha regarding a Jew who kills a gentile: is there a prohibition in this, and if so, what is the prohibition.

"thou shalt not kill" .ב

The Maimonides wrote in the Laws of a Murderer, Chapter 1, Law 1:

Anyone who kills a human being from Israel ^{transgresses} by not doing what it says you shall not murder, and if he murders maliciously in front of witnesses he will be put to death by sword...

This prohibition is learned from what was said to the first man: "Let the Lord God run .x over man" (Genesis 2:16), > from what was said to Noah and his sons: "Whosoever sheds the blood of man shall his blood be shed by man" (Genesis 9:6). See at the end of the Sanhedrin no, b-nez, a.

Introduction-content in brief

In the book before us we deal with the prohibition of killing a Gentile, in times of peace and in times of war.

In the first chapter we will deal with the origin of the prohibition of killing a Gentile who does not violate seven commandments.

The second chapter clarifies the judgment of a Gentile who violates seven commandments.

In the third chapter, we refer to a gentile who is in danger, and his only way to be saved is by killing another gentile.

In the fourth chapter we discuss Israel's prohibition of handing over one's soul in order not to kill a Gentile.

In the fifth chapter we will deal with the war according to what we learned in the previous chapters, and we will see what opinions exist in different situations in the war.

In the sixth chapter we will talk about the need to harm precisely those who are innocent in certain cases, and the reason for the permission to do so.

At the end of the book, the conclusions of each chapter are briefly presented. The conclusions are structured according to the order of the chapters (and in any case also help to understand the course of the book and its order).

It should be emphasized that in dealing with war in this book, we refer to war against enemies who harm us ('Ezerat Yisrael meid tsar') only.

We will not inquire about the obligation to kill every male (said simply in a situation where we occupy a place and control it); killing seven nations and Amalek; calling for peace; charge of leaving a fourth account open; The permission to start a war of authority (both from the side of the danger to fighting Jews and from the side of the permission to start a war against Gentiles); and more.

These jinn need further explanation (built to a large extent on top of what is written: obituary), and they will be isolated if God wills in the future.

All the quotations from the words of the Maimonides are according to the new .ג
accurate editions that we received from Oren, such as the Frankel edition and the
Rabbi Kapah edition.

See as the exact editions (omitted in some editions due to censorship). And in the .ג
Book of Mitzvot 3 · Raft the Maimonides wrote: "Let us not kill one another [or: each
other]". And in Baori Maharash

And it is true that all of these prohibitions must be interpreted as being in the same verse, along with "You shall not answer your neighbor to a lie", and from what is written there teaches about everything mentioned in this verse that they are all prohibited only towards "your neighbor"; And in particular this is proven in the ten commandments in Parashat Vathanan, where there is a connection between these commandments (we heard from

Rabbi Ginzburg Shalita),

In another way, it is possible to interpret that what is not written in 'thou shalt not murder', 'thou shalt not commit adultery' and 'thou shalt not steal', which is only towards 'your enemy', will come to light according to the midrash (Mikhilta Darbi Ishmael Yethro, Maschata 'Dovmosheth' Parsha 5) that G-d returned the shadow of the nations offer them the Torah, and offer them these three commandments; And that's why it doesn't say

'Reach' in them, because of God's desire to give them to Gentiles as well.

And more: in these three mitzvots Gentiles are obliged to strengthen the seven mitzvot of the sons of Noah. And the words agree with the Gemara in Baba Kama (Lach, 1): "He stood and measured the land and saw the rest of the Gentiles - what did he see? He saw seven mitzvahs that Noah's sons accepted and did not fulfill, he stood and permitted them. Itagori Etgar? If so we find a hired sinner! Mr. Baria Darbna said: To say that even if they observe them - they do not receive a reward for them... as a mitzvah and one who does it, but as one who does not command and does it." And refer to the Ramban (Machot 9:145 "and he knows") which interprets that the result of the fact that they became For those who do not command and do, their lives are not precious in our eyes either, and therefore a Gentile who does not live a resident who accidentally kills is killed and is not an exile, because we

do not bother to save one of these with the help of cities of refuge.

And here is Rashi on the Gemara there (D.H. 'Mparan') interpreting that the stage in which God "despaired" of them fulfilling these mitzvot was at the time of the giving of the Torah, when God turned to the Gentiles and offered them the Torah and they did not accept it. Even though the Gentiles did not say "We will do and obey", and in that they already lost the chance to win the Torah as it was given to Israel (as explained in Shemot Rabbah 30:9: "Thus God said to Israel: Before I created this world I established the Torah... I did not give it to one of my servants stars except for Israel, since Israel stood up and said, 'All that God's word is done and heard, he immediately gave it to them') - still the Almighty offered them the seven commandments. But they were also tired of this, and on this it was said, "Look and leave the Gentiles." If they were accept the mitzvot after asking "what is written in it" they would observe the seven mitzvot as commandments and do (and it is possible that even then they would have had to sacrifice their souls for murder like Jews have to (see the beginning of the third chapter)) but they lost and their lives are not precious in our eyes because they are not They wanted to be fenced off according to the Torah (and our words

should not be made more difficult than what they are required to do in foreign work, and apparently even Mitzvah W was supposed to be written in a language suitable for Gentiles as well; since the obligation to do foreign work is different between Israel and Gentiles (just as there are erroneous opinions that are not warned about sharing, see Shu'a OH Kano in the Rama'a, and in the Sach in the Yod Kana sek 7; and also refer to the beginnings of the Tshuva where the sign Kemo sek 2); therefore a Gentile who worshiped a foreign idol and is converted is not obligated to die, compared to a Gentile who murdered a A. Israel or Naf with Bat Yisrael; And as we explained at length elsewhere in the commentary of the Gemara in the Sanhedrin 1a, 2 on 'a sinful Gentile who will be converted').

Is it clear to us that the prohibition "thou shalt not murder" refers only to a Jew who kills a Jew and not to a Jew who kills a gentile, even if this gentile is a follower of the nations of the world? Also in Sefer Yarayim (Simen Ramach ⁵) he wrote that killing a gentile is not at all "thou shalt not murder." And he also wrote in an educational sermon (at the beginning of Mesra Led):

Not to kill a soul, which is said 'thou shalt not murder', but the one who kills a gentile and even a resident resident who has received seven mitzvot is not killed for him, nor is it the same.

It occurred to us that from the verse 'Thou shalt not murder' it is impossible to learn the prohibition of killing a Gentile?

To the SMG, Levin Kess, brought a version that the SMG also brought the aforementioned words of Maimonides ("everyone who kills a soul from Israel"). This version is also proven from the continuation of the halacha that if a murderer is killed by a sword, and this certainly refers only to those who killed Israel as explained in Rambam there 2:11 and as brought to Lakman.

Where did the Maimonides learn that killing a gentile is not included in "Thou shalt not murder"? There are several proofs for this from the sayings of the Sages: 1. This seems to be the case from the Michalta of the Prophet Lakman, who were required to learn the prohibition of killing a Gentile with a stick and material. B. In the Michalta and Gemara (Sanhedrin Fu, 1. And also in Rashi on the Torah) they said that "you shall not steal" speaks of stealing souls, because it is a prohibition that includes a death penalty such as "you shall not murder" and "you shall not commit adultery." And according to this, since the person who kills a Gentile does not owe death Included in "You shall not murder".

And where did the Sages learn that "thou shalt not murder" speaks only of the obligation to die? We can say that this was learned from what the Torah repeated and interpreted in the Parashat of Laws that the murderer must die, and there it is emphasized that it is

precisely Israel ("And because one will lie against his neighbor", Exodus 21:12), and the Parashat Laws as a whole repeat and interpret the Ten Commandments; and if so, in the Ten Commandments we are talking about such a murderer who must die (whereas a Gentile is not required to die as you learn from the verse).

And one can also say that the simple thing that is simply a prohibition refers to Israel precisely, and as if it were said "Thou shalt not kill Israel". And he believed like this, the Maharsha'l wrote in Bish'sh 2K PI Siman 20, but the sage-Zvi in the answer to 20 disagrees with him, see ibid.

Siman Kea in the "Ram Aviation" edition. It is changed there: "The history of the murder not to kill the Gentiles" (refer to exact formulas), and "Toldot" was the Durbanan prohibition, as Hirayam explained in the introduction to his book, and as he used this term in many other places (and see the second chapter in the paragraph "Rabbi Yona's Method" where we will explain more than the ban from this spur).

This is proven in the words of the book of education that he wrote at the end of the commandment "and he violated her and killed on purpose and there are witnesses who let him kill him with a sword", and this of course only speaks of killing Israel as will be explained.

In the interpretations of the Pasht, we point to Raba'a who wrote (Exodus 20:12): "And here we need acceptance. Because he did not mention in the scripture with a bee, 'You shall not murder', nor 'You shall not commit adultery,' nor 'You shall not steal,' 'Enemy' when he mentioned in the years of the remaining bees" - In other words, the acceptance of a Sage is decisive that all these prohibitions are only for "your neighbor".

פרק ראשון: איסור הריגת גוי <כא

A resident ger is a gentile who has agreed not to work idolatry with the rest of the unleavened bread ; that Noah's sons were commanded... after all, they accept him and he is one of the followers of the nations of the world...

A Jew who killed even a resident resident is not liable for death at the hands of a person, and Rambam emphasizes the difference between a resident resident and a Canaanite slave. A Canaanite slave is a Gentile who was bought to be a slave of Israel, goes through a process of conversion and is bound by all the mitzvot as a woman; In this way he is "added to the property of the 11th, which is not a resident resident."

In any case, Rambam is only talking about the punishment here, but of course it is forbidden to kill a resident resident, and not only that it is forbidden to kill him, but also that it is a mitzvah to revive him (as the Prophet Lakmen said). And so it is also precise in the Rambam's language, "We will not kill him in a court of law" - meaning that it is a forbidden act. And the money changes there precisely because there is also a punishment at the hands of Heaven: And this is what our Lord wrote that he is not killed in a court of law, that is: but by the laws of heaven he is bound.

d. The words of the DMKM as laws? Boda Zeda

The Maimonides wrote in the Laws of Foreign Worship Chapter 10:

[There is no covenant made with the workers of foreign worship so that we may make peace with them and put them into slavery, as it is said that you shall not make a covenant with them. But they will return from her work or be killed. And it is forbidden to have mercy on them as it is said and you shall not be spared. Therefore, if a gentile sees a person working idolatry and gets lost or drowns in a river, they will not ascend. See a client die, they won't save us. But losing his hand or pushing him into a furnace and the like is forbidden because he is not making war with us...

[p From this you learned that it is forbidden to heal idolaters even for a fee... and a resident resident because you command to revive him heals him for ^{free} .

It follows from this that there are ^{three} degrees of Gentiles:

11 The Israelites are God's inheritance, as for example in 2 Samuel 21:3: "And they blessed the inheritance of God."

12. Usually, the expression "Ak'um" in the Gemara or in the scribes raises the concern that it is a change of the censorship, or that the printers themselves changed it because of the threat of censorship, and perhaps it originally read Goy or Nechari. And in many rulings, the author himself already preferred to use the language אקמום etc. in order to avoid complications. Admittedly, Maimonides was very precise in his language in the laws, and we know the original wording today with a relatively high level of accuracy, according to many manuscripts, so it is possible to be precise in his language in accurate editions.

third. the punishment

Rambam in the laws of a murderer, chapter 2:

Ni] A person who kills an Israelite or kills a Canaanite slave is killed on him... [11]

An Israelite who kills a foreign resident is not killed on him in a court of law as it is said "And because one man will rise against his neighbor" and there is no need for a scholar who is not killed on the Gentile. And one who kills the slave of others or who kills his slave is killed on him because the slave has already accepted Mitzvos on him and is added to God's property.

In other words, a Jew who kills a gentile, even such a gentile who is a "resident", is not liable for the death of a beit din · A "resident resident" is a gentile who has accepted before a court of Israel to fulfill seven commandments and is one of the " followers of the nations of the world" · as the Rambam wrote in the Laws of the Prohibitions of Biya (14:7):

And see the words of Habarbanel in Deuteronomy 53 ("the fourth answer") it seems from him that you shall not kill Kai even against Gentiles; But the reader there in all his words will see that there are things in them that are certainly not according to the method of the Halacha, but in the way of interpretation and the like (for example: in the first and second answer it means that the loan loaned at interest is only to seven nations and not to the rest of the Gentiles! Take a good look there and compare it to Tosha Yod Kent. And what's more, there really is a Dauriyta prohibition on killing a Gentile, but it is not a 'thou shalt not murder' prohibition, as Lakman will explain in the chapter; if so, one can push his intention by saying that he wanted to say that there is a Dauriyta prohibition on this, even though it is not a 'thou shall not murder', and this is not subtle; and see also In his words to the Ten Commandments, even there one should say yes).

And refer to the book Ibn HaEzer to Rabban who wrote on Baba Kama page 12: "... Do not

steal silently, do not murder or commit adultery, fade between Israel and Gentile." Talking about the theft of souls for which death is required, and this is only in Israel. And also in 'You will not commit adultery', we did not find anyone who would say that he belongs to the Gentiles, and he who marries a Gentile man's wife must be put to death! (Refer to a work foreign to him, 2; and in Rambam 52 of the Laws of the Prohibitions of Bringing; and in Tosha'a Ibn Ha'azar 16; and also refer to Ibn Shlomo's commentary on the Rabban that remains in the 17th century. And perhaps his intention is to say that you shall not steal It is similar to 'thou shalt not murder' and 'thou shalt not commit adultery' in that all these things are also prohibited against Gentiles - although it is not a prohibition of 'thou shalt not murder' and 'thou shalt not commit adultery' themselves for which death is required, but as their clauses, and as will be explained in the source The prohibition from Dauriata to kill a Gentile).

As explained in Mishna Sanhedrin 9, 2. n

17 Saad, 2, according to the opinion of the sages and as it was decided in the raids of .ט
Rambam, the forbidden laws came in 517 and the laws of kings 5811-11; And Tor and Shu'a
Yod Kakad, II.

J. And Rambam rules in the Laws of Kings (8:11) and in the Laws of Repentance (3:5) that
followers of the nations of the world have a share in the world to come.

פרק ראשון: איסור הריגת גוי *כג

That is: from the word "rehu" we learn that the one who kills a gentile ("others") is not obligated to die ¹⁸. Then the words of Issi ben Akiva are quoted, which divides between "before the giving of the Torah" when we were in the fence of the "sons of Noah" and "after the giving of the Torah". And he explained in the Mishna's Merkavat on the Mishnah: "Under what conditions were they made more difficult? 10. - I wonder", that is: Is it possible that in giving the Torah in which we were given the Torah and mitzvot - the Almighty reduced the mitzvot that we were already obligated to, and the prohibitions we had become permissible for us? That is why even now we are warned about Gentile bloodshed.

According to this, the continuation of my words containing "They really said..." is also understood: although a Jew is forbidden to kill a gentile, just as a gentile is forbidden to kill a gentile and as was already the case before the giving of the Torah - there is a change between a Jew and a gentile: a gentile is liable to death for killing a gentile, but a Jew is not killed for it; Because after the giving of the Torah, a Jew is already obligated to perform the three mitzvot, and to kill someone who is obligated to perform the three mitzvot - a crime with special gravity is required, and the source of the seven commandments of the sons of Noah and the punishment for them is not ^{enough}? Therefore, a Jew who kills a Gentile is not liable for death at the hands of a person, and "his judgment is committed to heaven"?

18 And refer to the Mishnah coin (in chapter 2 of the Laws of a Murderer) which cites the Halkhta as a source for the Rambam's words that we saw above.

19. It is also possible to explain the contents in slightly different ways (although in a simple way there is no halachic difference between them and what we have written):

A. It can be said that Issi's words also refer to the matter of punishment (and not to the matter of the prohibition), and I would like to say that since there is no death in any case, it is not possible that they were so relieved that there is no punishment at all, and therefore they "really said" that it is obligatory by the laws of heaven. And it also appears from the text quoted in the midrash "Mishnat R. Elior" (a midrash that the Rambam quotes in his answers) PT: "But whoever kills the Gentile before the giving of the Torah is the one who is killed in the Bible where it is said, 'Whoever sheds a man's blood on a man, his blood shall be shed,'" from the Torah it is said "And a man will swear against his fellow man to kill with guile," not the gentile. Issi ben Yehuda says, not that the one who kills the gentile is exempt, but is exempt from human rights and is bound by the laws of heaven, even if we were in our country we would not have killed him, but his judgment is by the laws of heaven"). And it seems that the same

sermon was the same as the one in the book (and Issi ben Yehuda is Issi ben Akiva, as in Yoma Nev, 2). Indeed, also for way W, meaning that there is certainly a prohibition in the matter, except that we did not discuss it in the commentary.

about. And it is possible to interpret "because they were made worse, they were lightened" narrowly, meaning that the reason that Israel is not killed for killing a gentile is that since Israel was made worse by giving the Torah, they were therefore "lightened" in this matter and they are not punished with the death penalty for anything. He also explained the continuation of wisdom (Exodus 21, Yad Ai'S. And see the interpretation of Be'er Avraham for Michalta). Also for the interpretation and - finally, from what is lessened from punishment at the hands of a person means that everywhere there is a prohibition in the matter.

Ger Toshav - a mitzvah to revive him and of course he must not be killed. א.
 A gentile who does not make war with us - it is forbidden to save it from death and ב.
 it is forbidden to kill it.

A nation that makes war with us. ג.

"Ger Toshav" is a vital mitzvah - as the Dambam writes in Halachah 2 - and if so we have a clear code to forbid killing him™. But we need to find out what the prohibition is to kill a gentile who is not a resident.

ה. The ban fence

Ita in the michelta on the verse in Exodus 21:10:

"And because one will rise up against another to kill by treachery from my altars, you will kill us" - each other, to the exclusion of others - Issi ben Akiva says, before the giving of the Torah, we were warned about loud spills, after the giving of the Torah, while those who were aggravated were relieved. Truly they said exemption from the laws of the flesh and loud and his judgment is devoted to heaven.

13. It is possible to make further divisions within the types of gentiles, such as 'Ben Noah' who observes seven commandments but did not fold them before three of Israel, a gentile who we know violates seven commandments compared to a gentile whom we do not know but who believes that he is such, a gentile who practices idolatry compared to such a gentile who transgresses other mitzvots from the seven but does not practice tz, and the like. But we will not dwell on it here because we are referring to the question of why it is forbidden to kill a Gentile regardless of observing the seven commandments; And in the second chapter we will deal with a Gentile who violates seven commandments.

Hand. It should be noted that in the simplicity of the mitzvah to revive it refers only to a permanent resident - which is not accepted except during the Jubilee period (Arakhin 90:1 and Rambam Halchots 17:51 55; Halchots Mila 51:55; Halchots Shabbat P.C. 14; Laws of prohibitions of Bia 14 58-9; Laws of Shemita and Yuval 159), but the encryption of a written cipher (in the Laws of Archin 58 88, and from the Medot HL Avoda -Zera Pi 15) In Rambam's opinion, even a person who is not a permanent resident (as in the time when the Jubilee does not practice), regardless of whether he actually observes the seven mitzvot of the Bnei Noah mitzvah, is a mitzvah to revive him. And its proof from the words of the Maimonides in the Laws of the Kings, p. And refer also to the Gemara 17 Sa, 1 and the Menchat for Education in the Mitzvah Tsad (at the end of his words), and in Rab'd the Laws of the Prohibitions of Bia'a Pi4 88 that while there is no jubilee practice there is no mitzvah to revive a living resident, and Akhmal.

Tu. Regarding the mitzvah to revive a resident resident, refer also to the book of mitzvot to Rambam, Eshin Ksetse; And in the Ramban's findings for the Shemach, the additional mitzvot of doing 16.

16 And there is an opinion that an Israelite who accidentally kills a resident must go into exile for atonement, see Rambam's Laws of the Murderer 55 13 (and the alternative versions there); Ritva 1 Makhot 9:1; The Mitzvah Education book.

A. This study, that "another" belittles the one who kills a Gentile who is not obligated to die, is cited in Rashi on the Torah (Exodus 21:10; omitted in some editions due to censorship).

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What is added to us, "Thou shalt not kill", refers only to killing a Jew, and there is also a minority of the death penalty, which is called "Rahu" Lev.

"Lika from the hands of Del'Israeli priests and illegal .1 aliens"

This principle, that Jews must also observe the seven mitzvot of the sons of Noah, is also found in the Gemara Sanhedrin Net, 1: Lika their information from Israel is sacred and stary work is forbidden.

[Commentary of Rashi:] Licha miri rel Yisrael shri and transgressors of stars is forbidden - that when they came out of the community of the sons of Noah to sanctify themselves, they went out and did not make it easier for them.

And it's just like what I said in the book, "But if they were made worse, they were made lighter?" !"

Maimonides emphasized this principle, that Israel is still bound by the seven commandments, at the beginning of his words on the subject of the seven commandments (beginning of Chapter 9 of the Laws of Kings):

The first man was commanded about six things: about idolatry, about God's blessing, about bloodshed, about incest, about robbery, and about the laws, even though they are all accepted by us from Moses our Lord, and the opinion is inclined to them, from all the words of the Torah it is seen that these were commanded ; He added to Noah a part of the animal that was said but flesh with its blood in it you shall not eat, found seven; Mitzvot; And this was the case all over the world until Abraham, Abraham came and was commanded more than those in the word, and he prayed at dawn, and Isaac removed the tithe and added another prayer to break the day, and Jacob added Gid Hanshe and prayed Arabic, and in Egypt Amram was commanded to do extra matzos, until Moses came and the Torah was perfected by him. a ^{pitcher}

approx. This principle is true in all seven commandments of Noah's sons: a gentile who eats an animal part is liable to death, while Israel is not liable to death for it. The reason is that an

animal part is not such a serious offense as to kill Israel for eating it (and this should be extended further in the context of the explanation of the issue of a sinful Gentile who converted in the Sanhedrin 1:2; and ACM).

Kg. See also Cholin Lag, 1 (and Thom. 45 one). and also in the Sanhedrin Na, 1; And also there Noah, 2 according to the version of the Thom' (there 45 Mi Icha, and see Maharsha and the tradition of the Shas there). And it is proven from the Gemara that what is meant is that what is wrong must not be done to a Gentile, certainly Israel must also not be done to a Gentile, as the Maharsha in the Sanhedrin Net, 1 Aiish. And also refer to Yoav's section of the first edition, part of Orach Haim, number 1, which links between the הֶחֱחִיטָא and 'Likha Midi'. And we extended the explanation of the sources dealing with 'Likha Midi' in the appendix at the end of the chapter.

jug. And this does not contradict what the Maimonides explained in the interpretation of the Mishna Chulin 57 MM6, that the obligation of mitzvot is a power If so, we learned from the words of Issi in Michalta that a Jew is forbidden to kill a Gentile by virtue of the same prohibition of Noah's sons to kill each other, which we are also obliged to ^{do}. But the special prohibition

about. Above we quoted the Rambam's words that the one who kills a resident "is not killed in a court of law", and from this it can be seen as in the Bible, that even in a court of law he is not killed - there is a punishment in the hands of Heaven for this (and as we brought from the money Mishnah). Although in Maimonides it was possible to understand that this is true only for those who kill a resident and not for those who kill a "Gentile" - about which the Maimonides writes there: "And it should not be said that he is not killed for the Gentile" (and refer to the instruction manual at the beginning of the Mitzvah Led). But from the Mikhilta it seems that "his judgment is committed to heaven" is said in general about the killing of a Gentile, and not only about the killing of a resident resident, and yet it seems that this is also the intention of the Rambam (and this is also what it means in the change in the name which says that a resident resident is also generally "others" of The Tosefta, see *ibid*.) Although when the gentile does not keep seven mitzvot, there is a party to kill him from his own right as a transgressor of seven mitzvot, and this is discussed in the second chapter, see *ibid*.

It should be noted that from the Rambam's words it is clear that "his judgment is committed to heaven" does not refer to death at the hands of Heaven, since in all cases of killing in the Grama, etc., the Rambam pointed out in the commentary that there is an obligation to die in the Yash (see the Laws of the Murderer PB). But here it is not He clearly

wrote such a thing, and it is only accurate to write that he is not killed "in a court of law", and it is proven that in his opinion, "his judgment is committed to heaven" is a law in Alma and not a death sentence in the Jewish Law. And it is possible that the term "his judgment is committed to heaven" is interpreted here as follows: sometimes the act deserves a severe punishment, Sometimes for a light punishment, and sometimes not at all; and this depends on the context of the killing and also on the intention of the doer, and as will be explained to Lakman in explaining the method of the Rambam and the Beit Yosef regarding the killing of a Gentile who violates seven commandments in the second chapter, see *ibid*. And it is possible to interpret that his intention is to say that he is not killed in a court of law, But the matter is left to the king's judgment, who can kill such murderers if the time calls for it (refer to the Laws of a Murderer 2, 4) (we heard this interpretation from Rabbi Ginzburg Shalita's commentator).

XX. They also wrote in the Talmudic encyclopedia entry 'Gentile' that the prohibition to kill a Gentile stems from the fact that a Gentile is not allowed to kill a Gentile, and there is nothing that is forbidden to Gentiles and is permitted to Israel. And in the book of Menchat Avraham (to Rabbi Avrom Shapira *zt'l*), sign 5 (page 9): "From here it is clear that *disor dal muridin* (=do not kill Gentiles) is the prohibition against murder according to Noah, and even on the back of Israel, a Gentile is exempt from the laws of murder of Israel - But in the law of murder Davni Noach he is warned."

It is also necessary to mention the words of the 'Tsada Le Derech' (on parashat Mishpatim), who learned from this *mikhilta* that a priest who killed a gentile does not carry his hand (as in the law of a 'priest who killed the soul'), since his judgment is committed to heaven (and the words were brought by the fruit *Maggid* in a way of life *Siman Kakhah*, A. A. S. K. Na); Although the retirement (in *Orach Haim* there) says that this is not enough to prohibit a priest from presiding over *kafims*, *ai'sh* in editions that are not censored, and this is how the law was ruled (see, for example, *Shuat Tzitz Eliezer* yd, 3 and *Shut Yahuva Daat* 2, yd). (And we heard from Rabbi Ginzburg of Israel that this is strengthened by the fact that in the blessing of the priests it is emphasized that the blessing is specifically aimed at Israel ("Thus bless the children of Israel", "and put my name on the children of Israel", "to bless his people Israel with love")).

Additional considerations .ז

In addition to the prohibition from Dauriata to kill a Gentile because of 'shedding human blood' - it is appropriate to mention the words of the Sage in Tana Dachi Eliyahu (Ish Shalom edition, Parsha 20) about the severity of the prohibition of killing a Gentile because of the blasphemy in the word, and also that the slaying of a Gentile ends up killing Israel:

... He sheds blood for a Gentile to the end that he sheds blood for Israel, and the Torah did not give for that purpose except to sanctify his great name.

As such, there are several laws that require not to harm gentiles (even those who violate seven mitzvot and simply must die as will be explained in the second chapter) in order to prevent blasphemy. And some laws were said to prevent enmity²⁷ and from ways of peace^{sect}. Certainly, in the issue of killing a gentile, these reasons must also be taken into account according to reality.

Summary .ח

A gentile must not kill his friend, and if he kills he must die. .א

The prohibition "Thou shalt not kill" refers to a Jew who kills another Jew. .ב

A Jew who kills a Gentile does not have to die. .ג

The prohibition for a Jew to kill a gentile stems from the fact that a gentile is .ד forbidden to kill a gentile, that is: from the verse "shed the blood of man"; Since he "suffered from the hands of Israel's priests and aliens are forbidden."

An array of dishes was laid out and his servant entered and gave him a piece, a second gave him an egg, a third gave him a vegetable and so on for each and every one. To the worshipers of the stars except for a little of the unleavened bread, but when Israel stood up he said to them the whole Torah is for you as it is said (Psalms Kamez) Do not do this to any Gentile."

c. For example: In the matter of the Shabbat being lost, Rambam halchots usurp and lose PIA 13, Shu'a Chom Raso, a. And regarding the error of the Gentiles, Rambam says 5. And in the Tosefta BK PI: "A donkey plunders the Gentiles plunders Israel because of the hollowness of God." And Gitin Mo, a in the matter of the Gibeonites.

It is true that in Yerushalmi NK FD 13 it means that precisely in matters of mammon they decreed because of blasphemy and not "they said so in the prohibition to give birth and to breastfeed, Ai's."

XXI As in the matter of healing and saving from death, Rambam Halchut Abode Zerah PI 12, Shu'a Yod Kanach, a. power As in the matter of giving charity to the poor Gentiles, Rambam Laws 17 p. 15, Laws of kings p. 12.

That is: the seven mitzvot are the beginning of the Torah, and Moses completed receiving the Torah - without the mitzvot which we were destroying before being canceled = ^e. If so - just as before the giving of the Torah we were prohibited from killing a Gentile, so we are prohibited from doing so after the giving of the Torah.

The giving of the Torah, and not striking down previous commandments, because he makes it clear there that the intention is that Moses gave effect to the prohibition that was stated before the giving of the Torah, and here also the meaning is that Moses forbade us to kill a Gentile "in what was commanded at Sinai that shall remain... forbidden" (in his words there; and see In this also in the Mishna for the King of the Laws of Kings p.i. 17, DD written by the Ram).

Another note: In the Gemara in the Sanhedrin Net, 1 it is said that everything that was said before the Torah and was not changed - is forbidden only to Israel and not to the Gentiles (like Gid Hansha); Whereas what was said before the Torah was given and changed - was said both to Israel and to the Gentiles. And here we have seen that the prohibition 'thou shalt not kill' is said only against the slayer of Israel, and if so it follows that the prohibition of killing a gentile does not change with the giving of the Torah; And according to this only Israel is forbidden to kill a Gentile, and there is no prohibition for a Gentile! And also the killing of a fetus, which is simply learned from the verse of Bnei Noah (refer to the first appendix to the chapter) is supposed to be forbidden only to Israel and not to Gentiles - and this is against the Gemara (ibid. Nez, 2) that "Ben Noah was killed for the fetuses" (and as the Rambam ruled in the Laws of Kings 10 , d)!

However, the latter have already written (the HaRatz Hayut Torat Nevi'im, end of chapter 11; and on the right-hand page 16:1, 10) that since the root of the prohibition of murder as a whole was changed in the giving of the Torah - this is considered for this matter as having been said and changed, therefore all the details of the laws that were said before the giving of the Torah remain binding both both Israel and the Gentiles, and this includes the prohibition of killing a Gentile and a fetus (and is consistent with the words of Maimonides in the seventh root in the opening of the Book of Mitzvot, where he clarifies that the roots of the mitzvot are included in the 13th century and not all the sentences and details therein; and according to this his words above will be understood about The Mishnah in Holin there emphasizes that "the three commandments were given to Moses

from Sinai," and we are bound by what was said before the giving of the Torah only because when the Torah was given, God commanded Moses to remain obligated to it. And here you see that the main thing is that the three commandments of the roots were given in Sinai, and that is already It also teaches us about the liability of the details that are included in them. In any case, it means for our purposes that if the root is changed, it includes the details in any case, as above).

(It is true that Davidi, who offers education in the mitzvah of the Lord, should be reminded that he wrote: "And here he loses himself in knowing... It seems to me that Noah's deity is not a mitzvah, it was taught that 'your blood shall be for your souls', and you did not hear it at Sinai, so it was said to Israel and not to Noah's children." But It cannot be said that in his opinion, details that have not been changed oblige only Israel, just as we made it difficult to kill a Gentile and a fetus whose prohibition to Gentiles is explained there in the words of the educational guide in the same place. Let us not change in Sinai (and refer further to the words of the above-mentioned right-hand column which was difficult for the Manach from the Gemara)).

so. The source of these words of the Rambam is in Shemot Rabbah 30:9: "He did not do this to any nation - but to one, to Jacob, who chose from all the starlings, and gave them only a little." He gave Adam 6 Mitzvos, added one to Noah, Abraham 8, Jacob 9, but to Israel he gave them 'everything', A. R. Simon in the name of R. Hanina: a parable for the king who was before him

In Ominia of Rav Sheshat: What is a foreigner who comes on the beast?... Rav Sheshat said, Tanitovah: What is a thorn in which there is no eater, no drinker, and no perfumer, said the Torah, the hay is burnt and consumed, since a fault comes to a man by them, who misleads his friend from the ways of life to the ways of death - all the more so. But from now on a foreigner who bows down to his animal will be punished and slaughtered? - Who among the people of Israel did not forbid, and for foreigners? - Yisrael Gofia Litsar, from Deva Arbia. Abey said: This is a lot of calumny, and this is a little calumny. - And Ilanot, Dain Klonan from a lot, and Torah said the hay is burnt and finished! - In animals Kamrinan, Deham Rahmana Aliyahu. Raba said: The Torah said an animal that enjoys transgression will be killed. And mountains of illanot, Dain Nahanin transgresses and said Torah the hay is burnt and finished!

The Gemara wants to learn from animals that were passed on as foreign worship and the Torah told the abadam that even an animal that was worshiped by a Gentile as foreign worship will be killed. But the Gemara says that this is not possible, because we know that

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a Jew's animal that was worked as foreign labor is not killed, and it is impossible for Israel to have something that is allowed (to continue to own an animal that was worked as foreign work) and a Gentile is forbidden; And so my father and Raba make excuses - each in his own way - why there is a difference between a wild animal and an animal, and the animal is not killed in Israel or among the Gentiles. Here, the Gemara teaches halachic law that it is not possible for there to be something that is forbidden to a Gentile and is allowed to Israel.

And also there on the page of Noah, 2:

Rabbi Elazar said, Rabbi Hanina said: A son of Noah who came to his wife not according to her way - must, as it is said: and stick - and not not according to her way. Raba said: Who among the Jews of Israel is not liable, and a foreigner is liable 6 ?
Rather, Rava said: A son of Noah who came to his friend's wife not according to her way - is exempt, for no reason - with his wife and not with his friend's wife, and sticks - and not according to her way.

Nineteenth Because there is a verse to prohibit it as a sacrifice, and they see that it is forbidden only for sacrifice (as explained in Rashi).

To. Admittedly, refer to Aruch Laner there, which explains that this is not the usual 'Lika from my hand', but rather a law of light and material from Israel to the Gentiles (according to the words of the Rabbi and the Ramban there); But in any case, the Gemara's use of this language means that this rule is agreed upon.

No. Refer to the tradition of the Shem, which provides an accurate version: 'Whoever from the hands of Del Israel is a priest and a Gentile is forbidden' (because it is simple that there are things for which Israel is not obligated to die and a Gentile is obligated (such as an animal limb and robbery)).

appendix A

"Lika from the hands of Del'Israeli priests and illegal aliens"

In the body of the chapter we explained that the prohibition of killing a Gentile derives from the prohibition of Gentiles to kill each other, since 'it is forbidden to strike from the hands of

Del Israel, and to a Gentile.' In this appendix we will detail the sources and other things learned from this law.

The Gemara in Sanhedrin Net, A says:

Rabbi Yossi Barbi Hanina said: Every mitzvah that was said to the sons of Noah and recited in Sinai - it was said to this and that. To the sons of Noah and not to the sons of Noah was it said in Sinai - to Israel it was said and not to the sons of Noah...

Mer said: Every commandment that was said to the sons of Noah and repeated in Sinai was said to this and that. On the contrary, from a censer in Sinai - it was said to Israel and not to the children of Noah! - From Da'itani idolatry in Sinai, and I forgot Danesh Nechari Ailva - He heard a name for this and for this it was said. It was said to the sons of Noah and not to the sons of Noah at Sinai. On the contrary, it was said from a niche in Sinai to Noah's sons and not to Israel! - It is forbidden to inform Israeli priests and foreigners. - and not? And what a beautiful title! - Hetam because of the lack of people who conquered Ninhu. - And less than a penny! - Hetam because they lacked Bnei Machila Ninhu.

The Gemara understands that commandments that were said before the giving of the Torah and were not changed after it were said to Israel and not to the Gentiles; Because it cannot be said that they were said only to Gentiles, since there is no such situation in which a mitzvah was said only to Gentiles; Israel always owes what the Gentiles owe.

And the Gemara makes it difficult with two laws - the wife of Yafet, title and robbery - and makes the excuse that there are differences between Israel and the Gentiles that cause a difference in what is forbidden and what is permitted, but there is no "difference" in the actual obligation of the mitzvot (we will not go into the explanation of the words 'No Bnei Kibush Ninhu' and the difficulty and the excuse of a robbery of less than a penny, because the things are long and need a separate explanation).

In this Gemara, we see that 'Likha information from the Israelites is forbidden, and to the Gentiles it is forbidden' is a simple opinion based on which the Gemara decides how to study the verses.

v

This sbarā is cited in two other places in the Sanhedrin treatise. On page 1:

That is: the case of Bnei Ma'im according to Rav Acha bar Ya'akov is similar to the law of

Yaft Tavar, where there is a special opinion that distinguishes between Israel and the Gentiles and from which the permission for Israel derives; This is because Israel has a law of slaughter, and since that is how they measure the death of the animal according to the time of slaughter and not according to the time of death, and in any case it follows that the intestines are not considered a part of the animal; And there is nothing here that is allowed to Israel and forbidden to Gentiles .

And in any case, the conclusion of the Gemara means that the opinion of Rabbi Acha bar Ya'akov was not accepted as Halacha and this meat is also allowed for gentiles, so in practice is this not a case where there is something that is forbidden for gentiles and is allowed for Israel?

And if so, also in this gemara, we see that there is no dispute about the rule that 'it is forbidden to strike from the hands of Delisrael priests and Gentiles'.

In addition to this, it is seen in Gemda that the verses that were said about the bloodshed of Gentiles are also true for Israel. This is what the Gemara says in the Sanhedrin (Eb, 2), which deals with the laws of persecution in Israel:

A chaser who was chasing his friend to kill him, said to him: See that Israel is, and he is an ally, and the Torah said: 'Who sheds a man's blood - by a man shall his blood be shed'.

And this means that this verse is also true for Israel, and accepting the Torah did not exempt them from the laws of Noah's sons.

And also in the Midrash (Bereishit Rabbah, Parsha 14) they learned the prohibition of losing oneself knowing from the verses that concern the sons of Noah, and it means there that it also concerns Israel, and this is the language of the Midrash:

heart. And in the additions there you see that if something is allowed to Israel - this is a sign that it is also allowed to the Gentiles, since there is a rule of 'lika midi'; And in their opinion, this is what obligates the opinion that Gentiles are also allowed in Bani Ma'im. Although it is also simple for them that when there is an argument for dividing Israel and the Gentiles - it is impossible to learn from what is permitted for Israel that it is also permissible for the Gentiles, and therefore they remained in 'Timah' on the Gemara on this, because here there is an easy argument for dividing Israel - who committed to slaughter - and Gentiles -

who do not belong In the slaughter (for an additional explanation of the words of the Tosaf, refer to Hagion Yitzchak, chapter 9, and in the Barshash there, in the book 'Or Hamma' on the Shasas, in the book Bichuri Yehuda (pages 119-118) , in the book Devri Radach, Seaman 1, and in the book HaZikhron Shem Olam' (Yeshiva Telez, Ohio), page 264).

Lg. Although Rambam means that he ruled as Rabbi Acha bar Jacob; And see more Lakman.

Here, too, the Gemara learns from the explanation 'Likha Midi' that it is impossible to say that a wrongdoer is forbidden to his wife who is not in her way, and therefore it should be said that the words of Rabbi Hanina are to make things easier for the Gentiles and not to forbid them more than what is forbidden to Israel.

In the Gemara Bhullin (Leg, 1) this rule appears in another context:

In person, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Slaughter the reed and then pierce the lung - kosher [Rashi: Since a draya hangs on the reed and the reed is slaughtered, it is as if the whole thing was taken from the animal and placed in a basket and the animal is not cured by it]... said Rabbi Acha bar Ya'akov, He heard an appointment from Dr. Shimon ben Lakish: Israel summons over the sons of Maiim, and there is no gentile summoner over the sons of Maiim; From itema? Yisrael dvashkhita tlia milta, because it was slaughtered from aliita Ishtar to him, Gentiles to snort sagi to him and to die tlia milta, the [sons of the bowels] as a member of the animal his blood. Rabbi Papa said: Oh Yativna Kamiya Darb Acha Bar Ya'akov, and always said to him: Who is from the hands of Del Israel a priest and a forbidden Gentile? And don't tell her, damina ha tema camer. Tania dela rabbi Acha bar Ya'akov: Whoever wants to eat an animal before it dies, cuts meat from the slaughterhouse like an olive and salt it well and rinses it well, and waits for it until it dies and eats it, one Gentile and one Israel is permitted to do so. Rabbi Idi Bar Evin helps her, Damer Rabbi Idi Bar Evin said Rabbi Yitzhak Bar Ashian: The one who wants to be healed, cuts like an olive of meat from the slaughterhouse of an animal and they are nicely salted and washed nicely, and he waits for her until her soul comes out, one gentile and one Israel is put to death.

The Gemara cites a case in which Rabbi Acha bar Ya'akov opines that Israel is allowed wrong meat and is forbidden in it. And Rabbi Papa comments that it is apparently more difficult than the rule that there is nothing that is forbidden to Gentiles and is allowed to Israel, but he did not make it difficult since there is a special reason for the difference here. And 5 mo

Shambar Hashaba there:

Amina ha tema kamer - that is, since datema kamer does not belong to the mimer 'who is it from me', as Damarinan in the Sanhedrin 'like the information of Israel is a priest and a foreigner is forbidden', and Perich 'and why is it a title of Israel that

is a priest and a foreigner is forbidden', and secondly, - And he is a good person
and in all of it he will have a taste, alma badaikha a taste likha lakshoy.

I will forget Rabbi Ya'akov bar Acha Dahua, it is written in the book Agdaha Debi Rav: Ben Noah was killed in Dayan. One, and by one, not without notice, from the mouth of a man and not from the mouth of a woman, and even a relative. feedback! Rabbi Ishmael said: Even on the transgressor. Do you like Millie? Rav Yehuda said: Damer called: 'But your blood for your souls I will require' - even in one lawsuit, 'from every animal' - even if not with notice, 'we will demand it and from the hand of man' - even for one, 'from a man' - and not from the hand of a woman, 'his brother' - even close. Because Rabbi Ishmael said even about the transgressor. What are the tastes of Derby Ishmael? - Diction: 'A man's blood shall be shed in a man, his blood shall be shed', what kind of man is in a man - he says this is a fetus
in its mother's womb.

And it is explained in the Tosafs (ibid. Net, 1 D5 'Licha') that although Israel was not killed for killing a fetus - this is forbidden, and it means that it is forbidden because of what was
forbidden to Noah's sons.
And so it will be explained in many of the last ones, as concluded in Neshem Avraham
(Hoshon Mishpat, the beginning of Siman Tacha):

According to the majority of the former and the latter, according to Torah law it is forbidden to kill a fetus when there is no danger or fear of danger to the fetus. And also wrote to me the Gers haz Auerbach Shalita (ZTL): Since Ben Noah was killed for the transgressors, and he was struck by the hand of Del Israel Sheree and Ben
Noah was killed for that, Equal.

And we found many more places in the first and last ones" that brought the rule that "it is forbidden from the hands of the Israelites and the Gentiles are forbidden" as a simple matter,
and they also brought forth varieties of Halacha from this.

to him. Ahiezer 3, Se (hand letter); Aruch Lener Yavmot from Mb, 1 (in the 5th century, the Lord has mercy on her); Yair Siman farm no; Ibn Ha'Ezer's Torat Chesed Association, MB; Maharam Shik Yura Dea, bought; The strength of a bull sign is 20; Happy Light Laws Isori Bia 3, 2; Purification orders of Ahlot 7, 6; Agrot Moshe HOM II, set; Yavia says part 4 Ibn Ha'Ezer, 1. Admittedly Bitzitz Eliezer (9 Na, 3) disputed this source for the prohibition of

killing a fetus, and we will refer to it later.

to For example: in the questions of Parshat Noah, question 6; The Book of Great Laws Siman Sah; Tosaf Kiddushin 21:2 DD 'Aseth'; Ez 5, 2 D'e 'manin' (the second); Chulin 23, 1 D.H.

'You will die'.

damp. For example: Lehm changes the Laws of Kings 10:9; Shach Yore Dea Siman Sab Sec 3; Pethai Tshuva Yora Dea Siman Kana S. K. D (in the name of the Gamma box); The face of Yehoshua Kiddoshin Lez, 1:45 'this and more'; In the comments on the true language (written by his son-in-law) on Rosh Hashanah page 10, 1; Ibn HaEzer 3:12 (in the paragraph beginning with the words 'and what he wrote to divide between Umdana and Umdana'); The Beit Yehuda association Yore Deah end of Siman 17; Associate Professor Yehezkel Siman Kecht; Shu'at Yehuda Yela a Yod Siman Shn; There is a part in Hoshen, a skipped sentence; Questioner and answerer, edition 1 A, Ramb; Ibid 2, 8; There is a fire sign 'But your blood for your souls' can bring the strangler himself, as Saul? Learn to

say 'Ach', can you like Hananiah Mishael and Azariah? Learn to say 'but'.

And it means in the Midrash that even for Shaul and Hananiya Mishel and Azariah the prohibition to commit suicide exists if there is no special reason to permit it; That is: that the verse also binds Israel even though it is meant for Noah's sons.

The Midrash was brought into Halacha in Sefer Arhot Haim (Simen 4, Halchut Eibat HaShem Letter 1) and in Barash (Moed Ketan 3, Tsad), and it is clear from their words that the Midrash teaches a prohibition against Israel as well. And so Habit Yosef (Yorah Dea Kenz in Bedek Habit) brought this midrash (and even brought differences of opinion on the question of whether Shaul acted fairly and how to understand the midrash, see *ibid*); And so he is in the Shach (Yorah Dea, named Sec. A) to me.

And in the words of Maimonides, it is made clear that the verses prohibiting murder among Noah's sons are also true for Israel, who wrote thus (Halchot Mukitz 2, 23):

But the tenant kills to kill his friend, or he sends his servants and they kill him, or he forces his friend and places him before the lion and the like and kills the animal, as well as the one who kills himself, each one of these sheds blood and commits murder by his own hand, and owes his death to heaven, and there is no judgment of death in them. And where does the law come from, since he says, 'He that sheds man's blood by man shall his own blood be shed' - this is the one who kills himself and not by a messenger, 'I will require your blood for your souls' - this is the killer himself, 'Immediately every animal we will demand' - this is the one who kills his fellow before an animal to its prey, 'From the hand of man to the hand of his

brother I will demand the soul of man' - the one who hires others to kill his friend;
And in the interpretation it is said that the three are in the language of demand,
after all their judgment is given to heaven.

So we see that the Rambam learned some details about the prohibition of murder from what was forbidden to the Bnei Noah, and understood that simply, if it is forbidden to them, it is also forbidden to ^{Israel}.

Another subject in which we learn the prohibition of what is forbidden to the sons of Noah is the killing of a fetus. The source in the Gemara for the prohibition of killing a fetus is what was said to the sons of Noah, as explained in the Sanhedrin (Nez, 2):

Led. And also refer to the Michilta on the verse 'You shall not murder'; And in the vessel of covetousness on Parshat Noah, letter 3; And we have already commented above (at the end of the chapter) on the words of the education leader in this matter.

her. And truly Noah's sons are also killed when they cause death, since they must die for what is considered a prohibition of murder in their case (and as will be explained in the third chapter).

And it is clear: here are additions (in Chulin there; as well as in the Sanhedrin Net, 1) clarifying that the rule 'licha midi' is not correct in that there is a mitzvah for Israel to do it: And it is not to be made difficult from Ta Damer, Chapter R. Mitot (Sanhedrin Noah, 2) 'A Gentile who is bound by the Sabbath; And the one who deals with Torah ^{Ma} ; A thing that is a mitzvah for Israel to do does not belong to Mimir Mi Ika from the hands of Del Israel Shari, etc.

That is to say: although the rule 'lika midi' is true, and generally Israel must do whatever wrongs were commanded - if the Torah specifically wrote that we must do something that the Gentiles are forbidden to do, then there is something here that is permitted to Israel and forbidden to the Gentiles.

It can be explained that the words of the book Varish Lakish are similar to the words of the Tosaf. They also agree that it is not possible that 'out of what was made worse they were made lighter', and Israel remained obligated to what they committed to before the giving of the Torah. But this is true in things in which we did not find an exception and an explicit change; When the Torah explicitly established a different law in Israel - this law voids the obligation that existed before the giving of the Torah, and creates a situation where

something is permitted for Israel and forbidden for Gentiles (as in the case of a mitzva, such a reality exists for all Alma).

According to this - the intention of the book is this: even though Israel remained obligated to the mitzvot given to them before the giving of the Torah - we found a case in which an animal part was allowed to them. After all, the Torah stated that it is permissible for them to eat meat after slaughter, and if so, it is permissible to eat meat even though it was cut from an animal that is still convulsing; And this despite the fact that it is forbidden in the Gentiles. And if so towards this - the rule 'lika midi' is not correct. That is why an explicit verse is needed to prohibit such an animal organ to Israel.

Ma. Refer to Aruch Laner Sanhedrin Net, 1 D.H. "Shem D.H. Licha Information", which comments that the difficulty of making additions from a Gentile who deals with the Torah is not clear, since a Gentile who deals with the Torah is killed because he usurps it from us or he is considered to have come over his friend's wife since the Torah is betrothed to us. As explained in the Gemara in Sanhedrin Net, 1); And if so, then there is simply no place to explain "Licha Midi" because the reason for their prohibition is our mitzvah! Indeed, in the Sanhedrin, additions are made difficult only because of the prohibition of Gentiles to rest and not because of their prohibition to study Torah (and it should be said that the intention of the Tosafs is to compare and say that just as in Torah study there is simply no place to explain "Likha from the middle" - so it is everywhere a mitzvah for Israel).

Mb. According to this, the book reiterates that Israel is forbidden to eat meat that has been cut from the meat, and this is not according to the method of the Halacha according to the Shas Dilan (as we saw on page 13, 1 on 'Cut like a live olive from the slaughterhouse', and refer to Rambam Halchot Shchita 1, 2). But it's hard to say that the book talks about lost from ordinary animals, because it's forbidden

Although it should be noted that we have found places where it means that the rule 'lika midi' is not absolutely true. For example: in the words of the book AAP "And the soul shall not eat with the flesh" (Deuteronomy 12:23):

And you shall not eat the soul with the meat - it is an animal organ. And the law is: What meat in milk that is allowed to the sons of Noah is forbidden to Israel, an organ of the animal that is forbidden to the sons of Noah is not a law that is forbidden to Israel? Yaph Tuvar and everything similar to it will prove that it is forbidden to the children of Noah and allowed to Israel, you also do not wonder about an animal part that although it is forbidden to the children of Noah it is allowed to Israel. You will learn to say: And the soul shall not eat with the flesh,
it is a part of the animal.

This means that they do not say that everything that is forbidden to a gentile is also forbidden to Israel, and therefore an explicit verse is needed to prohibit an animal organ in Israel.

And so we also found in the additions in the holin (Leg, 1 end of the 5th chapter 'Ahad'): additions make it difficult to 'lika midi' from the opinion of Rish Lakish who believes that half a portion is permissible from the Torah, because according to his method it follows that Israel is allowed to eat half a portion of an animal organ while a Gentile is forbidden Even in half a lesson (because lessons were said only to Israelis"). And they make an excuse there that really according to Rish Lakish the rule 'lika midi' is not correct.

And according to this, it appears that the rule 'lika midi' is in dispute; And regarding the problem that does not exist - there is no Torah prohibition of killing a Gentile and fetus, nor is there a Torah prohibition of suicide.

But it becomes more clear that the Seferi and Dish Lakish do not completely disagree with the Gemara in the Sanhedrin that we cited above: "Rabbi Yossi said to Rabbi Hanina: Every mitzvah that was said to the sons of Noah and recited at Sinai - to this and that was recited. To the sons of Noah and not recited at Sinai - it was recited to Israel and not to the sons of Noah..." . And as we saw in the Gemara there the things are based on the rule 'likha midi'.

But they believe there are exceptions to this rule.

(at the end of the paragraph beginning 'and here is the hand of our word in Jerusalem');
Cohen's Law Society, Seeman 24, 5; Association of the Yitzchak Ibn HaEzer Temple 2 no, 4

(and see there also in the sign 10); Agrot Moshe Yore Dea 3, to him (in Pisca 'And what Hachiezer wrote'); Menchat Shlomo 1, 29 (in Piska 'in your interest'); There is a sign 4 (and refer to this also in Shu'at of the tribe of Levi 2:20; and in Mishnah Halachot 12:13; and there 13:18); Shu'at Mishna Halkhot 12, Shafah.

Lt. Refer to Rambam's Laws of Kings 9:10 and the sources on the subject of vessels there.

M. Although refer to Torah Shlomo Yethro 2, letter of before giving the Torah; But since we have added fences - it turns out that there are certain details in which gentiles are forbidden and Israel is allowed.

By the way, it should be noted that Mitzvah Eitan al Chulin excuses the difficulty of additions in a different way, and explains why the fact that 'half a lesson is permitted by the Torah in Israel and forbidden in Gentiles' is not a contradiction to the rule that 'likha midi' as it appears in the Gemara in the Sanhedrin. And also refer to the Tara edition of the Maharsha's Innovations, where he comments on the conclusion of the additions.

And it is apparently possible to explain the difficulty of the additions in another way: it is possible to interpret that this is exactly the difficulty of the Gemara in Sanhedrin Net, 1, which makes it more difficult to 'licha midi' than one who is wrongfully liable for a robbery of less than a penny, and this is different from Israel. And refer to Rama's hand there, which has difficulty in explaining the difficulty of the Gemara, since apparently even Israel is forbidden from the beginning to extort less than the equivalent of a penny, and if so, there is no right here for Israel's ministers and foreigners to be forbidden. And it is possible to interpret that the difficulty is only according to Reish Lakish, according to which half a lesson is permissible from the Torah, and therefore according to his method it is permissible to extort less than a penny worth. And according to this - it is possible to understand that the excuse that 'Gentiles are not the sons of forgiveness' is true not only in regard to robbery, but in the whole matter of lessons: 'They are not the children of forgiveness' means that they are not discerning and careful in lessons, and therefore with them there is no place for lessons both in the mitzvot between a person and his fellow man and in the mitzvot between a person to a place; And this is the reason for the difference from Israel (and also refer to the heart of a lion on Chulin). And according to this, the Gemara in the Sanhedrin clarifies that it is Charish Lakish, who also agrees with Tsam Sabrat 'Likha Midi', even though at this point according to his method there is a linguistic difference between Israel and the Gentiles. But in the words of the Tosafs, it does not mean so, and in particular as is proven in the words of the Ram on Parashat Mishpatim (21:12, 45, 'and one who will strike') in the explanation of the words of the Tosafs, see ibid.

gauge. The Maimonides wrote (at the end of Chapter 9 of the Laws of Kings) that a gentile must not eat meat that was cut from an animal after slaughter as long as it is flailing, because it is a part of the animal; Although this is allowed to Israel. And this simply corresponds to the

method of Rav Acha bar Ya'akov in Holin, that because 'Gentiles are not the sons of slaughter,' there is a special case here in which there is an excuse for something that is forbidden to Israel and is allowed to Gentiles.

Although it is difficult for Maimonides why he ruled as Rabbi Acha Bar Ya'akov when he hears there that the conclusion of the Gemara is weak according to his opinion, but this is also allowed for Gentiles; And in this difficult settlement many recent scholars have extended (refer to the key book of the Frankel edition and the like; and refer to the sweet words of Maharam Schiff on the issue in Khulin); And the vast majority of them explained Maimonides without saying that there is any contradiction here with the understanding of the Gemara in the Sanhedrin that the rule 'likha midi' is true in every detail.

But we found some recent ones who wrote in the Rambam's opinion that the rule 'likha midi' is subject to the controversy of the issues and was not decided as a Halacha, and this is how they explained this ruling of the Rambam. This is the case, for example, in the edited text of Lener in the Sanhedrin (Net, 1 DD "Shem DD Licha Midam"). But on the other hand - in the Bible (Mab, 1) the editor wrote to Ner^ that the prohibition of killing a fetus is learned from 'Licha Midi', which means that there is no dispute about it. And if so, it is proven in his words that in his opinion the Rambam's opinion is as we stated in the book's commentary and additions: usually we remained obligated

And this is how Rish Lakish will also be explained: although Israel owes the mitzvot of the sons of Noah, the Torah specifically stated that Israel does not owe half the lesson.

Therefore, in this particular, it is not correct to say the rule 'li ka^{midim}md'.

X.

In any case, since the animal was not slaughtered; And how is there a reliable person in my book that this is allowed? (And it cannot be said that a verse is needed in order for there to be a law that requires flogging, because if so - how can there be a believer in my books that 'likha midi' is sufficient? After all, 'likha midi' is not enough to require flogging, since the rule is true for the prohibition and not for the punishment). And we must say that this is the case of meat that was cut from the carcass, which from a slaughtering point of view is not prohibited from eating it - and the book re-states that it is forbidden by law to be an 'organ of the animal' (and it should be noted that according to this Okimata it seems to be the book's opinion that Israel is forbidden to eat the intestines of a slaughtered animal, 'because they are were cut from the animal before it died completely; but it is possible that small intestines are from meat that was cut from the carcass, since they are part of the slaughtering process, and therefore, although they are 'guidelines in the dikula' and do not prohibit hunting - they are not considered an 'organ of the animal' (see the Mahram's difficulty there (in 5 'in the Gemara and there is no time') and the words of the Maharam Schiff, in his words they see that the intestines are not like normal meat that is

cut from the carcass, etc.), and it is also possible that the books were of the opinion that the intestines are not considered to be 'offerings in the dikula' after the slaughter of the animal, unlike a shark for kish).

According to this, it can also be said that the book does not disagree with the Gemara in the Sanhedrin, which says that there is a reason for this, that adverbs are allowed in Israel and forbidden in Gentiles; But he says that here too there is a reason for some, since it is an animal after slaughter and Gentiles 'don't slaughter them,' and therefore 'Licha midi' cannot be a source of prohibition for Israel in this case. Admittedly, in the words of the book, Debi Rav, and in the words of the Commissioner in their commentary to the book, we see that they understood that the language 'a good title and all those similar to it will prove' shows that in the book's opinion, wherever there is a permit for Israel - the rule of 'lika midi' does not exist, and there is no need to explain a special reason for the division between Israel and the Gentiles; And it is as dense as the Gemara in the Sanhedrin (and refer to what will be written in the note after the next one about the words of continued wisdom on this verse).

It is also possible to explain the book in another way: it is possible to interpret that the book's intention in 'organ from the animal' is to eat the flesh of an animal while it is throbbing after the slaughter, and according to the book this is prohibited from this verse (while in the Shas Dilan this is taught from the verse 'You shall not eat on the blood' As explained in the Sanhedrin seg, 1; see also Rambam's Laws of Slaughter 1, 2 and Lehem mishna there; and in the Maharatz Hayut on Rashi in Chulin 29, 2). But this possibility is difficult to describe in the words 'organ from the animal' in my book.

(Also refer to the Sefer Yarayim in Simen Kello (Simen Pa in the Ram edition of the Toafut) which explicitly wrote that the prohibition of an animal organ is learned from what is forbidden to the Gentiles, and "all in general are the sons of Noah", and in the words of the Toafut Ram and an interpretation surrounding Lirayu there)

Mag. This is similar to what we brought above (in note 24) from the seventh root in Rambam's opening to the Book of Mitzvot, which lists only the 'roots of the mitzvot', and not the 'mitzvah of the mitzvot' which are the branching details of each mitzvah. And so it is here: according to Rish Lakish we remain obligated to all the roots of the mitzvot in which we committed ourselves

And in any case, we have not found a source in Halacha that there is no Torah prohibition to kill Geri (which does not violate the Seven Commandments).

Killing a fetus to save the mother, and even if it is forbidden - perhaps Israel in such a situation is not forbidden to help the act; and needs further study); And in the Beit Yehuda Shu'at (and he relied on it also in Shu'at Haim and Shalom 1, end of mark 3) which writes that the prohibition is spurnable, but there it is only about killing by taking a drug, while he explicitly says that killing with the hands is prohibited from Dauriata because of 'Licha Midi' (And in truth, Tsa on the House of Yehuda in what he wrote that Samm is Darbanan; and perhaps this is a link to the fact that a nursing mother is allowed to eat whatever she wants even though it is harmful to the child because her life is being destroyed, see Shu'a Ibn Ha'Ezer 5:12 and in Mastaf, and Akmal).

In all the mitzvots we committed ourselves to before the giving of the Torah, but when we found an explicit law in the Torah that changes us from what it was before the giving of the Torah - there may be a situation in which there is something that is permitted to Israel and forbidden to the Gentiles.

Likewise, the HaTas in Shu'at Yod Siman 19 and in the Mahduk of his Haddushi to the Gemara in Hulin, where he wanted to hang the rule 'likha midi' in the controversy and say that it was not accepted in the Halacha to explain the above-mentioned Rambam. And in his words we seem to explain as we explained in the opinion of the Aruch Lener. Apart from this, it should be noted that his words there on the subject of occupation are not as numerous as the first ones (see for example Baran on the Sanhedrin on the net page, and Barshba on Gitin which is quoted in his words); And also in the Tera edition of his innovations to Khulin, he wrote to the contrary, that 'most of the arbitrators, like all of them, were sall mi icha midi' (and see there who explained Rambam in a different way), as well as in his innovations to Baba Metzia (Sa, 1 D.H. Discusses according to this rule and does not mention the possibility that it is not agreed upon.

During a wisdom on the aforementioned books, he wrote that the mikhilta that wondered 'from which they were aggravated were they eased?' is only for the MD that the rule 'hit me from the hand' was accepted into Halacha, and the Rambam rules not according to this opinion and if so it turns out that the mikhilta is not according to Halacha and there is no prohibition for a Jew to kill a Gentile. But he remains in need of study on these words; The echoes are difficult for several reasons: First - the Rambam brought the prohibition of killing a Gentile as we have seen, and it originates simply from this mikhlata, as the Al-Hajit Mishna wrote (and we also explained above that the accuracy of the Rambam's language corresponds to the mikhlata). And more - according to him, it is not clear how Maimonides learns the prohibition of Israel losing itself knowing from the verse 'shedding the blood of man' that was said to the Gentiles; And how will the Rambam explain in the laws of kings (the beginning of chapter 9) that we brought in the body of the chapter about the fact that Moses completed the Torah on top of the seven mitzvot of the sons of Noah, and their obligation did not expire from us in giving the Torah! And probably this is what we mean by the continuation of wisdom in what he ended his words with 'needs further study', and wrote the things only in the possible way. And in fact, the continuation of wisdom itself, in his book Od happy on the Dambam (Isori Bia 3:2) brings this kikelta and derives a rule of law from the fact that we remain obligated to the mitzvot to which the sons of Noah were bound before the giving of the Torah, see there (and in the continuation of wisdom to Exodus 21, hand he refers to the light Shimkh this; and there also explains this content and does not mention that it is rejected by Halacha).

In addition, refer to Tzitz Eliezer (9, Na, part 3, especially in chapter 2) who wanted to say that according to Halacha they do not say 'lika mido' and therefore Israel does not have a pre-existing prohibition to kill a fetus; But it is difficult since he decisively cites the prohibition of losing oneself to knowledge (see, for example, part 7 of Matt. 1) and its origin from "I will require your blood for your souls"; Likewise, he discusses (part 10:9) the lifting of the hands of a priest who killed a Gentile, brings the words of the side to the road and the fruit of Magdim based on the michlat (cited in note 11 above), and does not comment that there is a side to reject them since the michlat is rejected by the Halacha.

And also refer to Shu'at Maharash Angil 5, Pet (which brings up the possibility that there is no prohibition from the Torah to kill a fetus, but in the conclusion says not to rely on this as a halacha); And Shmuel Sof Sim'ad's Belief (which means in his words that the prohibition is only spurring them on, but it is difficult to understand how he explains this in the words of the Tosaf that he brings there that say that he was 'licked from the middle', and perhaps Tsal means precisely the case of the killing of a Gentile fetus that she fears will be swallowed by her If the pregnancy continues and indicates that she has committed adultery, then there is an option in the tosafs that are allowed for Gentiles

It is possible to add a twist to the question: in the Tosafs (Sanhedrin Net, 1 D.H. 'Licha') it is clarified that they do not say 'Licha Mido' instead of a mitzvah to Israel, and that in any matter in which a Jew has a mitzvah - pk to forbid what is forbidden to Gentiles, as explained there in the Tosafs that even if it is wrong, one must not shut Every day of the week - Israel does not have such a prohibition, since they have a Sabbath unleavened bread on Shabbat, and this invalidates the prohibition for Israel on the other days of the week as well.

And here a Jew should be "in all your ways consider him", so basically all his actions should be for the sake of heaven and then all his actions are mitzvot (and as he extended to clarify in the book Obligations of the Hearts, the Gate of God's Worship, chapter 4). And according to the interpretation of the Baal Shem Tov on the verse "A Mitzva Keeper Knows No Bad Thing", which for a Mitzva Keeper - all his actions are a violation of your Mitzvot, and therefore does not belong in the "bad thing" - which is a casual thing far from God may He be blessed. And if so - if a Jew does something for that heaven and he needs to do something that is forbidden in the seven mitzvot of the sons of Noah - apparently this is a place of mitzvah and should be permitted¹

As it must, and this is the language there: "Rabbi for help in the name of Rabbi Hanina: Whence are the children of Noah warned against nudity like Israel? The Talmud says: And

he clung to his wife - and not to his friend's wife, and he clung to his wife - and not in remembrance, and not in beast. Rabbi Shmuel Rabbi Abhu, Rabbi Lazar in the name of Rabbi Hanina: Noah's son who came after his wife in a way that was not her way was killed. what's the point And he clung to his wife and they became one flesh, from the place where they both became one flesh." And apart from the very conclusion that a wrongdoer is obligated to marry his wife contrary to her way, even though in Israel this is permitted - here it must also be specified in the Jerusalem language that the third prohibition, Noah's son coming to his wife contrary to her, differs from the first two prohibitions (wife Habiro and Zakhor-Bhema), about whom it is said, "From where the sons of Noah are warned against promiscuity like Israel", which means that Israel is not warned about promiscuity that is not in its way, and yet Ben Noah was killed for it (although without the precision it can be said that the Yerushalmi is of the same opinion as Man Damer that promiscuity is also forbidden in Israel Not according to her method (refer to this in vows, page 20) and does not disagree with the rule "Licha midi", and Akmal).

brain According to this it is possible to explain the words of Balaam: "They are a nation that dwells alone and the Gentiles will not be considered", that is: that this nation is completely separated from the Gentiles and therefore does not do their accounts and is not obligated to what they are obligated to. Balaam, who knows a higher opinion, feels very well that the Jews are not bound by the obligations of the Gentiles. It does upset him, but at the same time he blesses us with all his might.

And according to a secret, here it is stated in Etz Chaim (Shear 12, Chapter 4) that "badad" is a (double) sign of doubts in Bard'a ('Rishah dela ide and ela etithide' in the crown, and the matter is explained at length in the book 'David's Graces of the Faithful', part 6) , that is, to the place of simple faith in the very soul.

From Kamerna) it is narrated:

And Maran the Ba'al Shem Tov told him that when he was still small, his distinguished rabbi, Ahi Shiloni, the prophet, taught him all the uses of the (sacred) names to understand and instruct. And because he had little desire to see if they cried

Appendix B

The discussion at "Liva Tid"

In this appendix we deal with the internal explanation of the "Licha Miri" theory. We received the words from Rabbi Ginzburg Shalit'Apa.

A. Why is it so simple ?

We dealt with the concept of ``Licha from the hands of Del'Israeli priests and the Gentiles

are forbidden", and we learned that everything that is forbidden to the Gentiles is also forbidden to Israel. This statement, that what is forbidden to the Gentiles is also forbidden to Israel, appears in the Gemara and the Machilta as a simple argument: Is it possible that
 what is forbidden to the Gentiles is permitted to Israel?

And here is this simple argument, it is not simple at all: Who said that what is forbidden to a gentile is also forbidden to Israel? And didn't Israel change, receive the Torah, and how is it so simple that the prohibitions of the Gentiles are forbidden to them as well? Maybe these prohibitions belong precisely to those who are still at a low level?

Furthermore: In the Torah seminars it is explained that in this world there is the work of inquiry, and when a Jew eats or uses something - he inquires and elevates it to sanctity (for this reason it is important not to prohibit the permissible, since the permissible awaits clarification, and if we prohibit it - we will thereby lose the ability to inquire and elevate it). And if so - it is possible that it is even requested that Jews, who are capable of the work of inquiry, should be allowed wrong things that are forbidden in them; Since Jews have the ability to find out and raise these things, as opposed to Gentiles who, if they deal with these things, will not find them out, but will fall with them · And how does the Gemara simply state
 ' that it is not possible for what is forbidden to a gentile to be allowed to Israel ? C

what. There is a supplement to what is written here as an appendix to chapter 4, see there. Mo. And similarly to what is explained in the Book of Mea Shearim that Baal Shem Tov made it much easier on himself than his students, because he could find out and correct the things
 he made easy, which his students could not.

from It should be noted that in Yerushalmi we did not find the word "Licha Midi" anywhere. Furthermore: while in Babylon (Sanhedrin Noah, 2) it is said that it is not possible to say that it is wrong for a man to marry his wife who is not in her way, he is obligated, since this is allowed in Israel and "it is forbidden from the hands of Del Israel, and the Gentiles are forbidden" (this Gemara was brought up in the first appendix to our chapter) - here in Yerushalmi (Kiddoshin 1 , a) It was said in the raids that it was wrong for him to come upon
 his wife who did not

A situation in which the words of authority still exist in a Jew and he does not live in the consciousness that all his actions are mitzvot because they are actions related to G-d - this is the situation during the exile. This state of having "the words of the Authority" is what nursed the Gentiles, whose souls are made of impure husks. It turns out, then, that the rule

"he was healed from me" is only true because in the face of our sins - there is still room for

G-d to suck the impure skins from the indeterminate skin of Venus that we have.

We will explain this in Bengali as well: simply, it is forbidden to kill a Gentile - even if he is not a resident resident - because of "likha midi". The prohibition to kill a resident is a complete Dauriyta prohibition, since there are mitzvahs done to revive him. The prohibition that derives from "Licha Midi" only adds the prohibition to kill a Gentile who is not a resident resident, that is: a Gentile who is not reformed and settled. And here is the reality of such a Gentile is not legitimate, for "Moses commanded the mighty tax to compel all the people of the world to accept the mitzvahs commanded by the sons of Noah." ^{mememe} _ A situation in which we do not fulfill this commandment is a situation of exile, of hindsight, in which we are forced to put up with the existence of non-reformed gentiles and we have no ability to force them to become permanent residents. In boarding schools, this situation in which they have animals and existence is due to the fact that with us the Nega shell still occupies a place by itself, we have "words of permission".

That is: the appearance and existence of the Gentiles who do not observe seven mitzvot results from the fact that we give them existence in that we treat the world disconnected from God seriously, and give place to the words of the Authority that are not related to holiness. In this, we give place to Gentiles who are not related to G-^d (they are not residents), and we stick to 'a trace of Gentiles'.

Matt. Laws of Kings 8, 10

N. And as we know that this world is 'mostly evil', meaning: most of it is heathen, cut off from God. please. We have not yet been granted the fulfillment of the verse "They are a nation alone shall dwell, and among the Gentiles shall not be considered" as above in note MH. The exodus from Egypt is called "a Gentile from among a Gentile" (= Egypt = the "diamond" of a Gentile (we were two triangles of 19 (= Gentile), as known in the wisdom of numbers)), and on the sea the angels claimed that Israel was also with worshipers of foreign worship as explained in the Midrash (Michilta Beshalach, from Maschata Duhi Parsha 6), that is: that we were still Gentiles. Only by giving the Torah was there a proper conversion (we walked, we went far enough, we counted fifty days, etc.), but the reality of the sojourner clings to the kingdom (dazilot) that descends to the Jewish people, and is not completely cut off from the separate worlds. And in any case there is an examination in which we are

still a part of the gentile world and are therefore obligated by the mitzvot of the gentiles,
as explained inside.

To Kaman, we will explain three possible explanations for this interpretation, in the order of 'submission, separation, the sweet', based on the theory of the Baal Shem Tov (the crown of Shem Tov, aut kachh).

First explanation: they did not completely escape Grimm's rule

As we stated above - your opinion "Licha midi" is only correct regarding the authority. Existence of a situation in which a Jew has "the words of the authority" is a situation in which there is still a place for the kilipah in the world, since the line between holiness and the kilipah is still blurred.

In the Torah internals it is explained that the animal soul of Israel is from a Venusian shell, which is an average shell between the holy and the impure shells. This shell can become clear and ascend to holiness. When Israel observes mitzvahs and good deeds in their bodies - the shell of Venus worn on the body is included in holiness. But a casual preoccupation with the things of the Authority when it is not related to G-d - leaves the shell of Venus in the sea, and in any case she continues to nurse the three impure shells.

to do some action, and put a piece of cloth on (the river) Nestir and cross it in the name (meaning: with the help of a holy name). And for this he did penance all his days, and many fasts to correct this defect. And the end of this correction was that it was necessary to cross the Nestir once because of the danger of death of the Ishmaelites, and he put a belt on the Nestir and passed without any name but with great faith in the Gods of Israel

(And refer to this in the book 'Or Israel' part 2, pages nd-nez). Whoever comes there, to the truly simple belief of the Bes'at who crosses the river without mentioning the name, is not at all affected by the rule and the main thing.

And for our purposes, the meaning of "the observant of a mitzva did not know a bad thing": "a bad thing" was the similitude to a gentile from a side basket which is, "Licha from the hands of Delisrael Shari and a forbidden gentile" we meant "a bad thing that the mitzva keeper does not know about at all (and the hint: Licha from the hand is a bad thing = 613, the completeness and completeness of the entire Torah, all the mitzvot of the Torah, and to the extent that everything a Jew does is within the scope of a mitzva just like the above.

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And this should also be implied: it is known from Hafetz Chaim and other righteous people that at this time, the time of the exile, they practice only the mitzvot, secretly "I sleep [in Golota] and my heart is awake", and 343 = 7 is missing in the 3rd power (When the sun rose in its glory seven times like the light of the seven days at the coming of the Messiah (see Isaiah 30:20 and Barshi ibid.)). And if so, it appears that during the exile, from the rules of the mitzvot - which are, 'Licking from my hand is a bad thing' - only the 'bad' part, but when we come out of exile and fulfill all the mitzvot, we will know and understand very well that 'Licking from my hand is a bad thing', which includes all the mitzvot as above).

According to this logic, it is possible to interpret in another way the statement "Lika Midi": really, from the point of view of the matter - there is no reason to forbid us what is forbidden to gentiles, since we did indeed come out of the generality of the gentiles, as explained above. But nevertheless it is simple for the Gemara that we are forbidden in what is forbidden to Gentiles - since it is blasphemy to say otherwise. It is true that we understand the reasoning that Jews are allowed to do what is wrong and forbidden - but the gentile world does not understand this, and in any case a blasphemy is created that seems as if because we are close to God - we do not care about spoiling and corrupting the world.

This explanation is an explanation of 'difference': there really is no real connection between us and the Gentiles, and we are completely separated from them. It is precisely this difference that causes us to be careful even in what is forbidden to Gentiles, since we understand that because of most of the gap and distance between us and them, this will be perceived incorrectly by them", and because of our sensitivity to the separateness and sanctity of Israel, we are careful to keep that the name is not profaned by us.

The third dam: for the purpose of correcting the Gentiles .ד

In another way, it is possible to make it clear that we are prohibited by the Gentile prohibitions in order to create a connection between us and them (and in this the vocation of "one Gentile in the land" will be fulfilled). That is: for our part, we are distinguished from the Gentiles by a thousand thousand distinctions, and there is no reason for us to be forbidden in what they are forbidden. But in the end we are commanded to correct the whole world, including the Gentiles, and to be a light to the Gentiles. In order to raise them - we need to be related to them in some way (as explained in Hasidism that "a believer should dress in the clothing of the revealed one" and thus resemble the revealed one). That is why we are also prohibited by the prohibitions of the Gentiles, so that we identify with their situation and work at the moment, and from this we can correct and elevate them.

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transgressions from the Torah, and his opinion was that "it is better that you remove one letter from the Torah and let not the name of heaven be defiled by persuasion" (Yavmoth At, 1, see *ibid*); the Israelites resurrected the Gibeonites (Joshua 9) even though it was against the law of the Torah (at least for some of the first opinion, see Ramban for words 20:11); and also see *Sefer Malchut Yisrael*, part 3, pages 33, 36-9.

Nez. After all, the huge difference between Israel and the Gentiles is mainly subtle on the part of the divine soul in Israel, which the Gentiles have no way of achieving. They only understand that we claim to be "the people of God", and therefore if we do not do what they see as the duty of all humanity - we thereby desecrate the name of God that we bear.

Noah Refer to Maimonides' words at the end of Chapter 8 of the Laws of Kings.

Because of this 'taint of Gentiles' that we have not yet been able to shake off - simply according to the Gemara that we are forbidden in everything that is forbidden to Gentiles and we still have no ability to claim that we have nothing to do with the prohibitions against us that belong to Gentiles only.

This understanding is an understanding of 'submission': we are forced to admit that unfortunately the world still remains mostly bad, and we have not been able to change it - so much so that it affects us and we cannot ignore it and claim that we have nothing to do with the gentile lifestyle ¹ ?

third. The second dam: blasphemy

We found in several places that we change the simple Torah Dek so that the things will be accepted by the Gentiles. For example: a gentile who donates something for a mitzvah - it must not be changed to another mitzvah, even though in Israel this is allowed, since the gentile will claim that he was tricked (Sho'a Yod Rant, ^{Gen^d}); A person who swears by rape must not break his oath, even though the law has no validity, if this becomes known to the Gentiles and they suspect him of breaking his oath (Ralav, Yad Barma); One witness who knows the testimony of a gentile against Israel - testifies for the gentile if the gentile has singled him out in advance to be a witness and there is blasphemy in not testifying, even though in Israel there is no obligation according to one witness and here the gentiles will oblige him (Hom 20, 3); Although "the loss of the gentile is permitted... and the return is a transgression, because he holds the hands of transgressors" - "If the return is to sanctify the name so that they may glorify Israel and know that they have faith, then that is fine. And where there is blasphemy, its loss is forbidden and must to return it" (ibid. Rousseau, 1) ^{Ni} .

post Scriptum. For our case, the interpretation of the word "forbidden" from a related language is very appropriate, along the lines of the Hasidic interpretation according to the Sages, "The people of the land are forbidden to eat meat", that is: it is forbidden and tied to his desire to eat meat.

Ng. The submission is precisely on the part of the body, because outwardly there is no distinguishing between the Gentile's body and the Jew's (only that G-d freely chooses the Jewish body, as explained in the DAH, while the Jew, in his submission to G-d and knowing full well how much he resembles a Gentile, fulfills the sabra by himself of "Licha from the hands of Delisrael Shari and forbidden Gentiles").

Ned. And look there at the topics of the tools that bring the words of the Rabbi in the answer that precisely in Gentiles there is blasphemy in this, but not in Israel even if he protests.

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Nah. "And a writer from the Israel Defense Forces there, or that they feel that Israel knows about the matter and such as the allusion to the cancellation of the existence of Jews, indicates in the first place" (Sh. Ibid. Sec. 7).

Well We also found more severe examples, in which the words of the Torah are transgressed so that the Gentiles do not think that there is an improper act here: David killed Saul's sons in order to appease the Gibeonites, even though he violated two

Against you who hurt his name, "And you shall not profane my holy name" sa : which is not the case in the sweet, where he says: You were not sensitive enough to the purpose of my intention in the creation of the world.

In addition, it seems that the division between the different understandings of "Licha Midi" is related to the period we are in: during the exile - we are also sensitive to the theory of subjugation, since unfortunately we are indeed subject to the Gentiles in practice - and probably still clinging to "a trace of Gentiles". At the beginning of the redemption, when there is no yoke Gentiles are on our necks, we are in a situation where "a nation will dwell alone and the Gentiles will not be considered", then in fact the main part of our belonging is to the doctrine of the difference. Later, when we move to spread the word of God to all the world's islands, the doctrine of sweetening is the main thing .

Sa. And as explained in the previous comment that "blasphemy" is from the word "hollow of a sword", and God claims, so to speak, against those who blaspheme His name, "You killed me!"

grandfather. Another explanation should be added to this: we explained at the beginning that "likha midi" depends on the question of whether there is a fence of authority that is not either a mitzvah or a transgression, since if all our actions are mitzvah then there is no "likha midi" instead of a mitzvah as explained in the Tosafs. And in fact this question is the question regarding The essence and status of the shell of Venus, which stands at the holy end of impurity. In the Tanya (end of chapter 1) it is simple (according to the Ari) that the shell of Venus that animates the body of Israel is essentially different from that which animates the body of a Gentile: "But the explanation of the matter according to MS Harhar In the Shear HaKudosh [in the 8th Shear N. 52], in every Israelite, one righteous and one wicked, there are two souls, as it is written, 'and souls I have made', which are two souls, one soul on the part of the shell and the other side, and it is the one clothed in blood Man revives the body and as it is written, 'For the soul of the flesh is blood,' and from it come all the bad virtues from the four evil elements in it... and also the good virtues that are in the nature of all Israel in their history, such as mercy and benevolence, come from it, because in Israel this soul is a peel, it is from the shell of Venus, which also has Yes good,

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and it is the secret of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. What is not so, the souls of the pill worshipping nations are from the rest of the impure husks that have no good at all, as in the Bible in Shear 39 pg. The verse 'And kindness to the nations has sinned' that all the charity and kindness that the nations of pill worshipers do is nothing but boasting. But the innovation of the Elder Rebbe, transmitted by Rabbi Hillel of Paritch, that the follower of the nations of the world has a beastly soul from the skin of Venus, similar to that of Israel, is known. And in a simple way The division is an ordinary mistake, it does not belong to the shell of Venus, but to the impure shells, but a resident resident - who was accepted by a third court in Israel - has undergone a kind of actual conversion that changes his essence and now he belongs to the shell of Venus.

But in any case there is still a fundamental difference in the intellectual soul between Israel and the nations, as you can see that even when one becomes a resident ger it is not allowed in the Talmud Torah as a Jew, because his human mind is not capable of understanding the words of the Torah to their Ashuram (and similarly it is forbidden to observe Shabbat because it does not belong to the purpose of the world like the people of Israel) . Nor can it be said about the animalistic soul of a resident citizen that it has the third dimensions of

In this explanation there is the 'sweetness' of the words of the Gemara: truly Israel is completely differentiated, and there is not even a fear of 'what the Gentiles will say' here. By free choice, which is the essence of the Jew as known, we 'clothe' ourselves in the mitzvot of the gentiles so that we can engage in clarifying the gentile world and correcting it.

Nefka named: Israel Shazenover's punishment for "Liva ה.ה Midi" -

We believe that there are three possible explanations for the prohibition of harming Gentiles, which originates from "Licha Midi" .

If we are still damaged by the slander of Gentiles - then those who go through this are hurting and damaging. Although according to the Torah he is not liable for harming a gentile, but we found that the king inflicts punishments that are not according to the Torah in order to ensure the order of the state. When the king sees someone who clings to the slander of Gentiles and he allows himself to transgress what is forbidden to Gentiles - he is asked to punish him in order to prevent the harm he creates in Maschinent.

In the perception of the difference - although there is no flaw in this act in Israel, since we are distinguished from belonging to these offenses as explained. But nevertheless - there is an offense of blasphemy here, which is one of the most serious offenses and is severely punished by Heaven .

But in a situation where only the belief of the sweetening exists - the punishment for the one who violates it is similar to the one who violates the Mitzvah of Asa, whose punishment is much less. That is: in the concept of difference, God asserts

Net. Above we brought that the first explanation, of subjugation, belongs to our perception of ourselves as foreigners, who belong to the kingdom of Dazilot that descends to the Jewish people and therefore still has a belonging and resemblance to the Gentiles. The things correspond to what is explained here that it is the king - who holds on to the kingdom - who takes care of correcting this exam.

And these things are also related to what is explained in the Middle Rebbe (in the 19th century "And they are humble in the joy of joy" in the Middle Rebbe's essays on Nach) which explains that one should be humble even towards a gentile because everything that I have as a Jew is not my own but from what we received as a gift and inheritance from our forefathers to gain faith (and in this one can divide between submission - which on my part I am worse than a Gentile, separation - on the part of God who gave us a gift and set us

apart from the Gentiles, and emulation - in that this consciousness that we live in brings us to the level of a repentant person, which is in the fence = Those who repent) in the Holy One of Israel, they will find "that he is above the meek (righteous) in joy", as explained in the book "The Heart of Knowledge" in "Praklavobudat Ha" (commentary 8), see *ibid.* _

S. And only death atones for this, as explained in Yuma Fu, 1; And it is because death is to be a space without animals, and it is measure for measure for blasphemy, space for space.

second chapter

Killing a gentile who violates seven commandments

In this chapter we will deal with the killing of a Gentile who violates seven commandments, which requires death. Despite the obligation of death - the Gemara says that it is wrong (he probably violates seven mitzvot) that he is not taken down, that is, he is not killed. In the settlement of these two sources we found four methods:

The Ramban and the Shach understood that what is not 'removed' is when we have no certainty that it violates seven mitzvot.

The Ritva understood that 'no muridin' is instead of enmity.

Rabbi Jonah and the 16th understood that sages decreed not to judge Gentiles. The house of Yosef and Daimya (in the opinion of Maimonides) understood that it is forbidden to kill without legal necessity.

A Gentile was killed as one witness and one judge .x

A gentile who transgresses one of the seven mitzvot must be put to death, and he is killed according to one witness and one judgment and without warning, as explained in the Gemara (Sanhedrin Nez, 2):

I will forget Rabbi Yaakov bar Acha Dahua wrote in the book Agdata Debi Rabbi: Ben Noah was killed in one dayan, and by one party, without warning, from the mouth of a man and not from the mouth of a woman, and even a relative.... Manhani Mili? Rav Yehuda said: Damer read: '(And) I will demand your blood for your souls' - even in one lawsuit, 'from every animal' - even if not with warning, 'we will demand it from the hand of man' - even in favor of one, 'from the hand of

a man' - and not from the hand of a woman , 'his brother' - even close.

And as the Rambam ruled in the Laws of Kings Chapter 9: ■

[On six things the first Adam was commanded, on idolatry and on God's blessing and on bloodshed and on adultery and on robbery and on the law... added to Noah

Aber Man

the animal...

[Yid].. .And Noah who transgressed one of these seven commandments would have sinned. Kiser, one who commits idolatry or who blesses God or who sheds blood or who owns one of their six fornications or who steals... or who eats any part of an animal... or who sees someone who has passed

"Compassionate, timid, and repaying kindness" (because this belongs to Israel in terms of their soul being from the bark of Venus the secret of the tree of knowledge of good and evil) and we were on the good side of it; and this explains what in the Holy Epistle (chapter 12) we see from the words of the Elder Rebbe that these qualities are on the part of the divine soul " Because it is known that the Jew has a divine soul with the third of the Medot, the ancestors, from the side of nobility, "nobility is also here (=she, also here)" - in his B.E., in his animal soul, until the third of the Medot actually refers to his animal soul; what (which is not the same with regard to a Gentile - even a resident citizen - who has no test of nobility at all, he is not among the nobles of the Israelites). The only novelty is that his soul being of a sorrowful shell, he may do a good deed not in order to brag, but rather well. And what emerges from the above is that the rule "struck from my hand" Belongs only in the reality of an authority, and in other words: the whole reality of the authority is to create a meeting place, as it were, between the Jew and, in contrast, the Gentile, so that we, the Jews, can be a light to the Gentiles and correct them as much as possible, like the test of the sweetness that was predicted. In the future, in the coming of the Redeemer of Justice and we already need to live with Messiah) the barrier of authority will be abolished, and we will be the destination of natural awareness, we will return to the state of not doing a mitzvah and doing to a degree that is higher than the mitzvah and doing now, as is well explained in the book "Natural Awareness", when 2 In preparation for the resurrection of the dead, then Mitzvos are void (according to the ruling of the 17th chapter of the Tanya, the Holy Scriptures, end of chapter 20). This means that in the days of the Messiah there is no more permission than mitzvah, everything is permission - it is not a mitzvah and a doer - and everything is a mitzvah, that is, the purpose of the will of the Lord, both together (both permission and mitzvah = Shema Yisrael, the God of our God, is one!). And from this it is understood what is not accepted by those who live then, that a space and a free place will be created, so to speak, between the holy and the holy, as is known in the secret of Shabbat. And then there really won't be any place for him to be "immediately harmed" as above.

And here it is precisely about that time that it is said, "For then I will turn to the nations a clear language to call all in the name of the Lord to serve him one shekel", but it will be an action of "athapka" from above precisely (when the light we shine on the Gentiles skips the space between us and them, on a secret way of drawing The sign that there is a space between the roof and the left leg, and it is the secret of the very divine nothingness that is revealed in us, etc.), and corresponds to the words of Maimonides (in the accurate editions) in chapter 11 of the Laws of Kings, where we see that the correction of the entire world is not one of the tasks of the Messiah, but rather one of "thoughts" Creator of the world, there is no power in man to achieve them, because we have not walked his ways

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and our thoughts are not his thoughts. And all these things... are nothing more than to pave the way for the Messianic king, and to set the whole world in order to worship God together, as it is said: For then I will become a people, a clear language, all of them will call in the name of God, and their worshipers will be one" (see also the foreign work , 1, and 11).

Rambam also sees it this way, since he explains the act of Shimon and Levi by saying that they killed the people of Nablus for breaking the law. And here we did not find that Shimon testified before Levi or vice versa, and the Rambam's interpretation is that Shimon and Levi were both the parties and the judges: they saw the people of Nablus committing a crime, and therefore judged them for their actions? And as is accurate in his language:

Or he saw someone pass by one of these and they didn't discuss and kill...

From his words we see that one wrongdoer who saw another committing an offense - is supposed to judge and kill him (and according to Maimonides - if he could have killed and did not kill - he must also die since he canceled the commandments of law).

This law is also proven from the Gemara which teaches that when a judge saw something - he does not need witnesses, but he can judge directly based on what he saw; And in the language of the Gemara: 'hearing shall not be greater than seeing'. This is how it is written in the Gemara on Rosh Hashanah (Ka, 2) about the laws of Kiddush

The month:

Mishna: They saw it [the new moon] as a court of law only - they will stand for years and testify before them, and they will say, Holy, Holy. They saw it three and they are a court - the years will stand, and they will sit their companions with the individual, and they will testify before them, and they will say, Holy, Holy - that the individual is not faithful by himself.

Gemara: 'If a court saw him, they would stand for years and testify before them' - and Amai? Hearing will not be greater than seeing - Rabbi Zira said: A belly that they saw at night.

That is: if three judges saw the brick in its renewal, and it was another day - they sanctify the month according to their sight, because 'hearing will not be greater than sight'. Only when they saw at night, then they cannot judge - they must testify before other judges, since the month is not sanctified (and there are no judges at all) at night, so their sight is not enough to judge and they need to testify before other judges because of the rule that 'there is no witness to make a judge' .

This law was also decided in Shulchan Aruch (Hom 7:5):

B. And also the Ramban (in Parashat Vaishelach) says that the sons of Jacob could judge the sons of Nablus for seven mitzvot that they had transgressed, as he says: 'And what would the rabbi ask for in them? And that the people of Nablus and all seven believers are not laborers, foreigner and discoverer of adultery and do all the abominations of God? more detailed at the end of the chapter). And also refer to the words of the sealer in the book

'Torat Moshe' for Parshath Vaishala (i.e. 'The sons of Jacob came upon the graves'). For one of these and did not discuss and kill - after all, it will be killed with a sword. And because of this, all the owners of Nablus committed murder, because Nablus was robbery and they saw and knew and did not discuss it. And Ben Noah was killed for one **cause and one judgment without**

warning...

x

Until justice is done .ב

Among Noah's sons, the witness himself can also be a judge, that is: if one sees the other commit a crime - then he can judge him and kill him for it, since he is the witness and he is the judge.

This is how it is explained in the Gemara in the Sanhedrin, which learns from the act of Moses who killed the Egyptian:

Rabbi Hanina said: A foreigner who struck Israel - must die, as it is said: 'And so and so, and he saw that there was no one [and the Egyptians]' and so on.

Moses saw the Egyptians beating Israel, and according to that they killed. Here Moses is the witness and he is the judge, and this does not hinder the making of the judgment in Egypt.

The same is also explained in Rashi Bivamoth (Maz, 2), who explains why teachers teach the mitzvot of ket that was forgotten:

And from the information of that wrongdoing to the forgetfulness and forbearance - that these poor people should not say to the Loctin of the field that they are robbers and stand over them and kill them in their judgments, that Noah's sons were warned about the robbery in the Sanhedrin and this warning was given without warning.

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That is: Rashi understands wrongly that he sees another gentile usurping his field - he can be killed - 'and they were killed according to their laws'. This is because he is the witness and he is the judge, and he judges the Gentile who transgresses the Mitzvot of robbery. For this reason, the Hagar who converts should be warned that those who gather from his field are doing so lawfully, so that he does not rise up against them and kill them out of the habits of his behavior when he was a kosher Gentile.

And look at the Dan (in the Sanhedrin there) which gives an opinion that the death penalty is a form of robbery; Although in fact the Maimonides ruled in the Laws of Kings that he is not obligated to die (10:6), and compared to his words in the Laws of Harmful and Harmful (5:3), there is no room to expand on all this (it will be explained well in the book "Kelkot Yisrael" part 3 in the article "The Beginning of the Way of a Redeemer" Israel'); On the face of all those who discuss the matter (Haran ibid.; Lehem Yehuda on Rambam in the Laws of Kings; Keli Hamda beginning of Parashat Shemot; Yosef's part Siman 13) simply understood that Moses could make a law in Egyptian and there is no problem with him being both a witness and a judge, and what is not He was killed according to the DMBAM for other reasons.

The original rule remains that 'hearing shall not be greater than sight'. And according to the teacher of education there (same, ⁷):

And here these laws do not belong in Ben Noah, a religious as soon as they see that a transgressor is allowed to be killed, this is written in Israel. And there in Ben Noah, the one who sees and even the witness is made righteous, because fornication does not belong and he is killed according to one righteous person and according to relatives as explained in Rambam... and this is simply ^{ch}.

And refer to the Chazon Ish on the Sanhedrin (Simon 11:5) who wrote that in Massit - that there are no revolutionaries in his right - even in Israel if a court saw him - he was killed by their mouths and there is no need to discuss it in another court of law.

And so it is also explained in the educational guidance in Mitzvah Thi, Letter 9: 'In any case, if a son of Noah who fulfills seven mitzvot kills a Gentile, i.e. he works idolatry or does not fulfill one of the seven mitzvot - surely he is exempt even on purpose. Because the mitzvah is to kill him and he is the witness and he is the judge, etc., as explained in the 14th Kings And see Baram, where the tribes killed the people of Nablus because it was about the laws,

and the Ramban on the Torah wrote that they did not keep seven mitzvot and do idolatry,
etc.

And it is necessary to read about the camp Chaim (2:23; these things were also brought up .n in the book 'Yishev Sofer' (written by his son) about the Sanhedrin Nez, 2) and the full of shepherds (Ben Nach's edition, letter 4; and he also brought this up in his book 'Parsha' 'Derech Eтарim Drosh 1:16) who wrote that 'there is no witness to make a day' among Noah's sons - how does this fit with the rule of 'hearing shall not be greater than evidence' as above.

And here is the hard camp Haim, if we state the rule that 'hearing shall not be greater than evidence', it follows that 'I shall not give my life to any creature', since each one will kill his fellow man on the grounds that he has transgressed seven mitzvot. And it is necessary to understand what he is making difficult: if it is a matter of gentiles who break seven mitzvot - then the situation is a state of confusion anyway since they break seven mitzvot; And anyway they don't listen to us if they were told to kill or not to kill their comrades. And if we are talking about gentiles who keep seven mitzvot -

Why would they kill each other? After all, they observe seven mitzvot.

And if he means Gentiles who keep seven mitzvot and the fear is that someone will come and kill people under the pretext that they have broken seven mitzvot and we cannot judge him for murder - here in the amended situation the kingdom can determine that we do not discuss alone but discuss among the seven amended laws that exist (so this does not invalidate the commandments of law, and similarly For what will be explained in the opinion of the House of Joseph and the Rambam later in the chapter), then whoever judges not according to these houses of law - the kingdom can kill him (see Laws of Kings 3:10); But this is no reason to change the simple law that 'hearsay shall not be greater than evidence'. (It should also be noted that such a murderer will probably also extort and commit additional crimes so that he will be caught committing crimes anyway and killed for them even without the royal decree).

Three judges saw the deed, they even directed their sight in the Torah of Testimony, if they saw it on the day they become judges and discuss that deed;

But if they saw him at night, there is no evidence according to them . ם

And here, among Gentiles, we didn't find the restriction that they don't discuss at night? And there is no need for three judges or expert judges. Therefore, among Gentiles, anyone who sees a crime admits that he can be just towards it, and in any case, it is true that 'hearing shall not be greater than seeing.'

It is true that there are opinions that in Israel this rule is not stated in the laws of souls. This

is how he wrote, for example, in the Education Book (Mitzva Tet ם):

Not to kill a destroyer before he is brought to justice. Let us refrain from killing the sinner when we see him committing the act of sin that would result in him being put to death before we bring him to court, but let us commit to bring him before court and bring the witnesses before them and they will punish him with what he owes, as it is said [in Midbar 35:12], 'And the murderer shall not die until he stands before the trial witness'. And the language contains it! Sebri Zota here], he may be killed if he kills or commits adultery, learn to say and the murderer will not die until he stands, etc. And even the great court saw him that he killed, all of them will be witnesses and they will bear their testimony before another court that will judge him,... and as they demanded their memory to be blessed [RA 26 11]. And judge the witness, etc. and save the witness [in Midbar 35, 24-25], that is, that they should be reversed by his right, and if he has a right, they will save him, and if he is not killed, and therefore we were warned that the judgment will come in any case before a court of law, and not the witnesses who saw it This in their eyes is forever, because perhaps from their view of the matter, they will not be able to reverse it because their hearts will be awakened to accept it in any case.

But also according to his method - the things are true only with regard to Israel, about whom the verses were said 'and save the congregation' and 'and the murderer shall not die until

he stands before the congregation for trial/ but with Gentiles -

which originates from verses that were spoken only to Israel ('on the day they enshrined ם

their sons' or 'and on their lips will be every quarrel and every wound - from quarrels to wounds', see Sanhedrin 4, 2 (and also Baba Batra Kig, 2).

And a gentile must also be righteous towards her from the commandments of law (as explained in the Rambam's words about the people of Nablus).

Take a look at the educational guide there who understands that according to Maimonides, even in Israel, in the laws of souls, 'hearing shall not be greater than sight', and take a look at the sources he cites there. We will not be able to go into the issue of this extension here.

There is no warning regarding a Gentile and no witnesses... if he had prayed for him without any witnesses; He wanted to kill him, wouldn't it be a great hearing from a testimony that would be useful on Rosh Hashanah, chapter 'See Him'... and therefore, upon the city of Nablus, we were obliged to kill him because we did not condemn Nablus for the plunder he plundered and transgressed the laws that the sons of Noah were commanded to stand and ^{kill} ²⁰³.

Glam^lak and Amodidin

The Gemara in a foreign work (20, 1-2) brings in the Reita:

Let R. Avho come up, Dr. Yochanan, the Gentiles and herdsmen a minute neither raising nor lowering.

Simply that 'not above you' means that it is forbidden to raise up, that is: to save or heal, the Gentiles; As explained in the Gemara there that even with a reward it is forbidden to raise them from the pit when it is possible to avoid enmity with various excuses, and as it was ruled in the Shulchan Aruch (Yorah Dea Kanah):

Gentiles with whom there is no war between us and between them... It is forbidden to save them if they are inclined to die, such as when he saw one of them fall into the sea, he does not save him even if he gives him a reward. Therefore, it is forbidden to treat them, even with pay, if it is not due to enmity.

11 These words of the Ram are censored in some editions; And also look at the lion cub who brings the things and agrees with them.

12. Later on, it is also explained in the Bible and the Ramban about Mechat 9:1; Barmano Yona on the Sanhedrin Nez, 1 (D.H. 'The Kotim'); And in Beit Yosef, in the ways of Moshe, in the

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16th century, and in the 16th century, it is proven by Yore Dea Kanah that a Gentile who transgresses seven mitzvot can judge him and kill him (except that according to the 16th century, there is a prohibition from Darbanan to judge a Gentile at this time as explained in his words).

13. It should be noted that what is said in this chapter deals with men, since women do not judge or testify to Noah's sons (Laws of Kings 9:10). It is true that the Menchat Chinuq (1:9) wrote: 'And even a woman who does not testify to them and does not discuss as explained in Ram there, in any case if she knows that a mitzva has been passed on her to kill as well, but she does not believe that it has been passed, but if it is known even from the mouth of a witness, surely it is a mitzvah Every island in the world must kill him.' Admittedly, things are renewed, and especially according to what has been explained to Lakman in the opinion of the House of Joseph that there is no complete obligation of death among Noah's sons, and they do not become 'killers' except after they discuss and decide to kill without allowing them to repent (and apparently, the instructor of Ezil education according to his method further on in his words there who believes that even a Gentile who transgresses Seven mitzvot that killed a Gentile other than him is exempted because the person killed was bar kataia; but this is apparently hidden from the words of the Gemara and the Rashoni, as will be explained in the note to Me Lakman).

And so he also wrote in Shu'at Hacham Zvi (Fed):

A son of Noah who saw his friend transgressing one of the mitzvahs for which he was killed is permitted to kill because he is the witness and the judge."

And in the hands of Moshe (on Berishit Rabba Parsha LD S. K. 7):

'One side and one judgment' he wanted to say that the judge himself will be the witness, and in our religion the witness does not become a judge, but in the Bnei Noah it is written 'man's blood shall be shed by man' one, and one witness and judge - 'his blood shall be shed'.

That is: Handi Moshe explains that from the word 'badam' they learned that one person - he is the witness and he is the judge - is enough to shed the blood of the person who commits the crime (and see there how he explains well the words of the midrash according to this).

In conclusion, we will quote the words of the Ram in Parashat Shemot about the killing of the Egyptian by Mesha:

(And perhaps the intention of the shepherds is that 'there is no witness to make justice' when such an orderly system is established according to the good of the city or the

kingdom, and then as part of the legal order it turns out to behave in such a way that 'there is no witness to make justice'; but not to say that from the side of simple law there is no rule that Hearing will not be greater than seeing.

And also refer to the appendix on the words of the Chazon Ish at the end of the chapter.

ninth. The wise man Zvi brings these things in the context of a dispute with the Ba'h (in the Old Testament of Kiya) who believed that a goat that was bred to a Gentile is forbidden for pleasure (and in any case there is no disagreement between them on the matter of Didan, see *ibid*).

And take a look at the pages of the Shas Lemhar'i Engil on ZA Sed, 2 who commented on the wise man Zvi that according to his words and in addition to the words of the Yerushalmi at the beginning of a consecration a wrong person is killed according to himself a wrong person who has committed a crime is obliged to kill himself due to the commandments of the law. His difficulty is based on the words of the sage Zvi who perceived that there is a death obligation here that causes the prohibition of pleasure for an animal (if an animal is condemned by Gentile law), and if there is such an obligation here - the Gentile is really obligated to kill himself. But additions in a foreign work there prove from the reality of a resident ger that it is possible to forgive a gentile for transgressions he has committed, and if so - there is no absolute obligation here, and this also explains why an animal herded by a gentile is not prohibited for pleasure (as opposed to an animal herded by Israel which is prohibited for pleasure since there is Obligation to kill the quarter and the animal, and it is not possible to forgive this).

Although it seems that Hachim Zvi and the Beh thought that even though a boy who has committed a crime can be forgiven and not killed - this is because we hope for his correction; But in the case of an animal, this opinion is not valid, and therefore as soon as an offense is committed in it (and there is a fault for a person because of it, see the issue in the Sanhedrin Na, 1-2) - there is a charge of her death, and

J. And also refer to the words of Mahar'i Parla (on the Sham't for Ras'g) LT Pad, ie 'They are true'.

Israel and they agreed upon him before God, since they accepted him before us, the Torah warned about them, more than the rest of the sons of Noah who did not accept them, because he is very strict about them, and also because they said (Bk 16:1) See 7. And he granted them that they should not receive wages for them except as one who is not a mitzvah and a doer, and the one who accepted them upon himself in the 4th of Israel is a mitzvah and a doer, and he best interprets it in the chapter on the hirer of the work (17 Sad, 2), and Noi, who is mentioned everywhere, is the son of Noah who did not It was held whether one observes their

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Mitzvos or not, and it turns out that most of them do not observe them, and therefore they were discussed as doubtful and he was not careful about it, except that they
neither raise nor lower (ibid. 20:1).

That is: the Ramban understood that a gentile that we know and know violates seven mitzvot - can be judged and killed. The reason why the Gemara says that 'no muridin' is that this is simply a Gentile whom we do not know, and since we do not know him - we cannot decide that he has violated seven mitzvot and condemn him, and therefore it is forbidden to kill ^{him}

This is how the Gemara agrees with the Sanhedrin, which says that it is impossible to write that it is permissible to kill a gentile: when the Gemara speaks of just a gentile, it means one we do not know, and therefore we do not know for sure that he violates the seven commandments. To such a Gentile it is impossible to write that it is permissible to kill him™.

Tu. Although it seems from the language of the Ramban that his intention is not to say that according to the Torah it is forbidden to kill a Gentile as long as we have not seen with our own eyes that he has violated seven mitzvot, even if this is clear because he is in a place where everyone is held to transgress the mitzvot: and in particular the Ramban explains that the people of Nablus were killed by Shimon and Levi because they are transgressors (as will be explained at the end of the chapter), and Shimon and Levi did not see any of the people of Nablus transgressing seven mitzvot but assumed that this was their assumption as the Ramban writes there. And the Ramban's intention in his words, "We discussed them as a doubt" is that our Rabbis decided that if there is no war between us and them and there is no reason to harm them - we will not harm them according to the presumption, and we will discuss them only when we come to deal with a specific case that we have seen (and the words are in line with the previous comment in which we explained that the Ramban It explains here how to identify individuals who belong to a certain company and we do not know and know exactly who they are. And see further the note by Lakman.

16 The Shach also wrote the Ramban's opinion that there is a division between a gentile who is known to violate seven mitzvot, and such a gentile who, although it is assumed that he is such a gentile - but we have no certainty about the matter. Here is the Shach's writing (Yorah Dea Kanah, Sec 2): "Gentiles who have no war between us and between them... There is no reason for them to die - that is, there is no mitzvah to kill them even if they transgress the seventh commandment of the sons of Noah, and who is Heka Damkaimi 7 "The mitzvot of the sons of Noah means the prohibition to take them down...". And the 16th made it difficult for the Shachak from the words of the additions in a foreign work,
page 10, 2:

According to this, it can be seen simply that "no muridin" means that they must not be lowered into the pit, that is: they must not be killed.

This is also proven from the Gemara in the Sanhedrin (Nez, 1), which brings the same creation:

And for the robbery Ben Noah was killed? And the stipulation "On robbery, a thief and a robber, as well as a title holder, and so on, as in the case of a foreigner in a foreigner and a foreigner in Israel is forbidden and an Israelite in a foreigner is allowed." Because it is stated in the Sipa Mitani "Israel in foreigners is allowed" Tana Risha is forbidden. And all of this is the case, to which a dictum from Katani, Dakatani Risha was brought, "For the bloodshed of a foreigner. In a foreigner and a foreigner in Israel, Israel owes a foreigner an exemption." Them Hebi litany, litany forbidden and permitted, and the stipulation "Gentiles and herders of small animals neither raise nor lower".

From this issue it is proven that "not lowered" means that they are not allowed to be lowered into the pit. After all, the Gemara brings this baryata to explain why the other baryata could not use the language 'forbidden' and 'permitted' and write "On bloodshed... Israel among foreigners is permitted" - Because this is forbidden! And as Rashi interprets it there: "They did not come from a ship to Mitana in the language of a prohibition, because it is permissible for a foreigner to come to Mimir Israel, and not from a ship that gives to her."

the difficulty .ד

And here is just a gentile breaking seven commandments - and why does the Gemara say that he must not be killed? After all, it was explained above that anyone who sees a gentile transgressing seven commandments can be judged and killed - and why are they not 'taken down'?

We found in the first and last four possibilities to justify this difficulty.

The Ramban method .ה

This is what the Ramban wrote (Machot 9:1):

And he knows that Ben Noah, who is mentioned everywhere, is not a Ger Toshav, but that Ben Noah is the one who practices their mitzvahs fairly with my friends,

and the Ger Toshav is the one who came before the 4th of

Hand. In the words "who practices their mitzvot fairly with his friends", it seems that the Ramban meant to say that the term "son of Noah" refers to an entire society that observes seven mitzvot, and in such a situation we will treat each of this society as a son of Noah (who is allowed to raise him as opposed to a Gentile who is not allowed to raise him), even if we are not You know this man privately.

And since they received it in a court of law, he is called in these seven mitzvahs a mitzvah and a doer, and that we must resurrect him according to the dictum, 'I will live (your brother) with you' (And he read like this, to her), and it is not necessary to say that we are not allowed to cause him any death and even lower him to the pit.

And Ben Noah is the one who did not accept them in the Bible, but thin ones, who fulfills them on his own, and he is judged by them as one who does not command and does from writing, he stood and measured the earth, saw and left other nations, it is worth it in Baba Kama (Lach, 2) and a foreign burial (Sad, 2), and that we are not obligated to revive him And we shouldn't take him out of our hands and not cause him any harm, because in the end he does them even if he is not a mitzvah and does a reward, he has some merit.

And it's just that a Jew is not careful to observe the seven mitzvos, and that it is permissible to lower him into a pit in a place where there is enmity, or to cause him to be killed, even though there is no reason for it.

The Rabbi understood that it is really permissible to kill a gentile because he does not observe seven mitzvot. He cites the Gemara from a foreign work from which we see that this is forbidden, and he excuses himself that what is written there that it is forbidden is because it is a place of enmity, and as it says in the Gemara that si.

In order to understand "his words, we will explain the course of the Gemada in the same work according to the Ritva. At the beginning, the Gemara brings a Bariita that says: Gentiles and cattle herders - neither raising nor lowering, but the Minin and the traditions and converts - lowering and not raising.

18 It should be noted that it is proven in the Ritva that one does not kill a gentile - even though he probably violates seven mitzvot - until we know of a certain offense that he committed (as we wrote in the opinion of the Ramban above). This must be proven from the words of the Ritva on the same page (in the 5th "Warminhu"): 'And this is what was interpreted in Berita, this is basically their warning, this is their death. Even the one who is careless should be put to death for a mere Kuthi. That is: a gentile is liable for offenses he commits even if he does it inadvertently, but a Noahide - it is possible that he was killed only on purpose. And here if the Ritva believes that it is permissible to kill a gentile because he is held to have violated seven mitzvot even without us knowing that he committed a certain offense - there is no need to say that he was also killed accidentally, since he was killed even without us knowing about his offense at all. We must say that even according to the Ritva we need to know about a certain offense (and it is true that such a gentile is killed even if he transgressed accidentally and not on purpose).

The Ritva method .I

The writer of the Ritva (beats there):

C. Tongues were spoken in Kotim' , Ger Toshab and Ben Noah and Kotim:

A resident resident is one who has accepted in the Old Testament of Israel to fulfill the seven mitzvot commanded by Noah's sons to work in foreign labor (Sed, 2) and such a person is allowed to settle among us and is called a resident.

The Gemara there tells that Antoninus would secretly go to visit Rav; Yehuda the President, and would take two slaves with him as an escort and kill them at the end of the visit so that they would not betray him. Additions complicate this: "And if you say: And not shedding blood is one of the seven commandments, and even for Israel it is forbidden, it is forbidden (Lakman 20:1) 'Gentiles and herdsmen do not raise or lower a small animal!' And we said, 'If it comes to kill you, the wise one to kill'; it should also be said that he was the arbiter of the species and the traditions, he duffed on the backs of the species in the nations for the matter of receiving a sacrifice from their hands, for the matter of Horra, as you said in the PK Dholin (page 13, 2) 'Has Israel brought down fish from Beiaa?'" . From the difficulty of additions, the 16 proves that 'not removing' is a prohibition to remove, and how does the Shachak say that 'there is no mitzvah to kill' but it is possible to do so if one wishes? The Shach answers this question (in the silver points there): "And from what the Tosafs wrote in the first chapter on foreign worship, there is no evidence. They wonder who knew Antoninum. He who does not observe the commandment of the sons of Noah? The arbiter of the unbelievers and traditions - Alma of unbelievers and traditions in which it is

permissible to change, certainly all those who do not observe the seven mitzvot of the sons of Noah for unbelievers and traditions. The Shach explains that additions make it difficult for Antoninus' actions, since he simply did not know what his servants were doing and what offenses they were committing; And even though they are probably breaking seven mitzvot and therefore it is forbidden to bring them up - this is no reason to allow their killing as long as there is no knowledge of it. Although if he knew that they were breaking seven commandments - he would have been allowed to judge and kill them. (And why didn't the Tosafs write that he took slaves whom he knew violated seven commandments? For this, the Shachak gives two excuses: 1. Infidels and traditions is a more famous thing than the knowledge of someone who violates seven commandments, and so the Tosafs would like the actions of Antoninus. B Antoninus took with him slaves who break seven commandments, and this is what the Tosafs mean when they say 'infidels and apostates' - transgressors, meaning: breaking seven commandments). (Also in the book Tefarat Lamsheh you explain the difficulty of the 16th from additions in this way.

Although it should be noted that the Shach agrees with the Ramban's words on Halacha, but not with the commentary of the Gemara. In the explanation of the words 'no muridin', the Shachak does not explain that it is precisely a gentile that we do not know has violated seven mitzvot, and therefore I will order him to be killed - but that it is all gentiles, and the meaning of the words 'no muridin' is that there is no obligation in the matter, but there is also no prohibition (and as will be explained in the words of the Yosef Lakman, see note to her).

17 In the entire issue in the Ritba, the word 'Kotim' replaces the word 'Gentiles' (probably because of the censorship).

Because there is enmity and it's a situation where you can't put your hands in the pit. And this is the intention of the Ritva in the beatings we saw above, which says:

And whether it is permissible to lower him into a pit in a place where there is enmity or to cause him to be killed if there is no reason, it is useful in a foreign job (20, 2) and in the Dapadishna it was written that 'the Hittites neither raise nor lower' by saying in a place of enmity.

It follows from the Halacha that the Bar'ita says that it is forbidden to kill Gentiles in place of enmity, but it is permissible to do so by taking a ladder because then there are reasons to evade the enmity; And also that it is commanded to kill species that are not in a place of enmity, and in a place of enmity one must kill by taking a ladder for a reason.

And here is Chazon Ish ²¹ the difficulty of the Ritva, according to which it follows that both

species and gentiles are killed not in place of enmity, and are killed by taking a ladder in place of enmity; And if so, their laws are the same, and why wasn't the same wording written in Berita regarding both of them

And according to what we said above, it is established that the wording is different in the species, and the Berita writes there "Moridin" - that it deals with a case in which there is no enmity as described (and which the Berita has not spoken about so far) - since it was important for the Berita to emphasize and renew the need and the mitzvah to kill species (in contrast to Gentiles where we do not have a mitzva to kill them) At least for now, as long as they are not under our hands), and there is no innovation in the simple halacha that a wrongdoer is killed if he transgresses his commandments).

Rabbi Yona's method (the 16th) .ר

Rabbi Yona in his commentary to the Sanhedrin (Neza, 1) answered the question in a different way:

The Kotims and cattle herders Daka and Bo. It looks like Da Dain Muridin Gabi Gentiles from Darbanan, Del-Kharach Lao Begar Toshav Mishtei Kara [that is, it is certain that the Baryata does not speak about a Gar Toshav] i.e. Yes it rests that he fulfills the 7th mitzvah, Damahe surely does not say that there is no Ma'lin Q. Dodai Mealin because it is a mitzvah to revive them. But in other nations who do not observe the 7th mitzvot of Shu'tei, read [- the Hari'ta] and it is our duty to kill them. Amerinan son of Noah was killed for one cause and in one case, 20, and since his judgment is seen as a demerit, it is forbidden to take them down...

Avoiding the difficulty of other methods of rishonim (such as the Ramban above) according to which it follows that the "non-exalted" is not the same in Risha and Sipa.

XX. See the appendix to the chapter.

At this point, the Gemara simply understands that "neither raise nor lower" means to be in return and do not do. But later on, the Gemara discusses species and traditions, and it has a difficulty:

Mr. said: lowering but not raising. My sister-in-law, Asuki Mibai?! Rav Yosef bar Hama said, Rav Shashet said: It is not necessary, that if she had raised in a pit from a dragger, Dankit Lia Ila and said: She will not put up a high animal. Rabbi and Rav Yosef Damri Taruyahu: It is not necessary that if there was a stone at the mouth of the well covering it, he said: Pass over the upper part of the well. Rabina said: If there was a ladder from his removal, he said: In the eyes of my sister Berry Maigra.

That is to say: the Gemara makes it difficult why it should be written "Muridin and not above you - and if you take down - it is easy to not raise! And the Gemara justifies that it is written both 'Muridin' and 'not above you' since there are situations in which it is impossible to take down because of enmity, and in such situations one tries to kill in a way in which one can avoid the problem of enmity by giving a reason (taking the ladder and the like).

And what is right in my opinion" Datna teri mini kamer, demoridin really not in place of enmity and not raising in place of roin daikha enmity, and anan parkinan dakion demoridin not in place of roin pishita dain raising hands instead of roin, and parkinan dela not consumed but saying dafilo in place of roin prevented from him rising and as "To.

And from this we were reminded that "not above you" means that it is permissible to take in one's hands a ladder or a way to rescue someone who is in a hole, and this is possible even in a place of enmity since it is possible to find a reason for it that saves from enmity. And the "Moridin" that is said about species really deals with another case, a case where there is no enmity.

It appears that the creation renews regarding species a novelty in two situations ("teri sex"): when there is no enmity - it is permissible and necessary to kill; And when there is enmity - although one does not kill with one's hands, one commits an act of killing by preventing rescue, since in this there are reasons to evade the enmity.

And from this we understand that "it is not above you that in the Risha it is not only do not do it, but also to do it with the hands of killing in preventing rescue^{as} ; and what we "do not

19. The Ritva disagrees with other commentators who interpreted the Gemara's intention to be that the permission is precisely when removing the ladder, but there is no permission to lower species into the pit with the hands, see *ibid*.

about. And refer to Lakman in Piska 8 ("The Disagreement of the 16th and the 16th"), where it is explained that the 16th also understood that the "non-exalted" in Risha is the same as that in Sipah, and therefore ruled that it is permissible to kill Gentiles to prevent salvation.

And the Ritba in his explanation

The dispute between the 16th and the 16th .n

In his words, the 16th again renews that since this is a Darbanan prohibition - the prohibition is only for direct killing, but it is permissible to kill by preventing rescue:

And it is true that in Israel there is a death charge, the rabbis strictly forbade it, but turning a death such as taking the scale and the like, which in Israel is exempt from the death of a court, is strictly permissible in the first place, as long as there is no enmity involved in it.

Indeed, on this point, the 16th disagrees with the new home (his father-in-law), who wrote here (Yorah Dea Siman Kanah):

Even if he fell into the pit first, it is forbidden for him to turn his death easily by a hand that is removed to a ladder.

Since he causes him to die by his hands, who removes him to the ladder, they will consider him as if he died by his hands. But the 16th thought that even though their rabbis decreed not to judge gentiles as we have explained - they decreed this only in the case of killing by hand, and not in taking a way of salvation such ^{as a} sword.

power Where did the 16th century learn this law that causing the death of a Gentile is permissible? He clarifies this from the Rambam, who wrote in the Laws of a Murderer (4:11): 'The species... and the hypocrites... it is a mitzvah to harm, if he has the power to harm... but the Gentiles with whom there is no war between us and between them and herders of small animals from Israel and the like among them are not The death is passed on to them and it is forbidden to save them if they are about to die, such as when one of

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them saw that he fell into the sea he is not above him, as it is said 'You shall not stand on the blood of your neighbor', and it is not your neighbor'. Here the Rambam changed his language here and wrote 'there is no way around them the dead' as opposed to 'it is forbidden to save them', which means that in Risha there is no prohibition as in Sipa. Therefore, the 16th understood that it is really permissible to commit suicide, which is killing by taking a ladder and the like, and the Rambam only wrote that 'there is no circumcision' to say that there is no obligation in the matter (compared to the types and heretics mentioned before who are obligated to kill if possible).

The 16th explains that the Rambam learned this from the Gemara that we cited above in explaining the words of the Ritva. The Gemara there makes it difficult why it is necessary to write about heretics 'moridin and not melin', after all if they are miridin - it is easy and material not to melin. And she excuses herself that the innovation is that even when it is not possible to actually take it down - one still has to try to cause death by removing a ladder and the like, in which there are reasons to evade the enemy; That is to say: the words 'not raising' are not sit and don't do, but stand up and do a round of death in Gramma. Since it is now clear to us that in Sepafa, towards heretics, 'not raising' is taking a ladder in a standing position - this is how we will explain the exact same words at the beginning; And according to this, the meaning of 'no ma'lin' that is said towards gentiles is the same: not only do they not save and stay in the sit and don't do - but it is also allowed to take the ladder by standing up.

Rabbi Yona understood that it is permissible to judge and kill a Gentile who transgresses seven mitzvot even without the Torah - our Rabbis forbade doing so, and therefore it was ruled that you are not taken down.

This is also explained in the Sefer Yarayim (Simon Ramach^{Nev}) who wrote:

The history of the murder not to kill the Gentiles (also idolaters").

In the introduction to the book, it is explained that "Tuldut" was the prohibition of incitement, and if so, Hirayim believed that there is an incitement prohibition in killing a Gentile. In simple terms, it means Gentiles who practice idolatry and violate seven mitzvot and it is permissible from the Torah to kill" - and yet the Rabbis forbade doing so, As Rabbi Yona said

According to the words of Rabbi Yona and the fearful, he also understood the 16th (Biura Dea Kanah²⁰):

Most of them said that there is no commandment from the Torah to be naked, and the rabbis said that there is a prohibition in this matter.

Kg. The words in parentheses appear in the publication with the interpretation 'around his fears'.

jug. Even without the version that explicitly states that these are 'idolatrous worshipers', and without the precision of the word 'Gentile' which is used to refer to someone who violates seven mitzvot - it cannot be said that this is someone who observes seven mitzvot: if it is a resident resident - simply that it is not only a Durbanan prohibition, but Revoking Dauriyta did to revive him; And even if it is a Gentile who is not a resident, but does not violate the seven commandments ('Ben Noah') - it is impossible to say that there is no prohibition from Daoriyata to kill him, since 'he was struck by the hand of Del Israel, and a Gentile is forbidden', and a Gentile is forbidden by the Torah to kill such a Gentile (and as will be explained at length in the first chapter).

so. According to Rabbi Yona's method, it also means in the words of the glosses Ashrai in the foreign work 5, 5.

c. It should be noted that the 16th may have realized that the Ramban also agrees with this opinion, and his meaning that we 'discussed them sufficiently' is that the Sages decreed not to discuss them under any circumstances, even though they believed that they were violating seven mitzvot (and - when we know for sure that they pass). Although it pushes his tongue, and it turns out more like we explained it above, see there.

XXI And it seems that the Rabbis did not rule to prohibit in a case in which we control and because of this we discuss the seven mitzvot, and in particular according to Maimonides who believes that there is an obligation to discuss them in such a situation, refer to the Laws of Kings at the end of chapter 8; And in his opinion it means in the words of Rabbi Jonah that we are 'commanded' to discuss them, and this is not only* permission (and compare to the Ramban's method in his commentary on the Torah in Deuteronomy 20, 10, and 24); And it does not seem that the Sages decreed to cancel this commandment completely (because then these early ones would have mentioned it), but they decreed it only at a time when we do not have an attack on the Gentiles, when there are great fears of enmity and that it will not be useful, etc.

Or if he drowns in the river we will not come up, if we see him inclined to die we will not save him, but if he is lost by his hand or: pushing him into a pit and the like is forbidden because he is not making war with us. What are things supposed to be? In the heathen, but the morals of Israel and the heathens and the heretics are commanded to go to Abern Bir and bring them down to Beer Shashat, because they draw Israel away and turn the people away from following God, like the Christian

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Jesus and his disciples, and Zadok and Bethom and their disciples, where the wicked will rot.

And in the laws of a murderer (end of chapter 4):

The sexes, and they are worshipers of idolatry from Israel, or the one who commits crimes to anger, even if he eats lewdness or wears something that causes anger, is sex, and the hypocrites, and they are those who disbelieve in the Torah and the prophecy, from Israel, it is a commandment to destroy, if he has the power to destroy with a sword, he kills, and if not, he will come upon them in plots until May they kill you. How, he saw one of them falling into the well, and the ladder in the well, first and removed the ladder and said to him, I was busy getting my son down from the roof and we returned it to you, and the like in these words. But the Gentiles where there is no war between us and between them and herds of thin cattle from Israel and the like do not turn the death over to them and it is forbidden to save them if they are about to die, such as when one of them saw that he fell into the sea he is not above him, as it is said 'You shall not stand on the blood of your neighbor', and it is not your neighbor.

Here the Rambam in the laws of idolatry explains that it is forbidden to kill a 'Gentile who works idolatry', i.e.: violates seven mitzvot. If so, it is impossible to compare the words of the Rambam with the words of the Ramban, because according to the Rambam, if we know that he is an idolater, it is permissible to commit idolatry ¹; And it is also difficult to reconcile with the Ritva's excuse, since Rambam simply wrote that it is forbidden, and did not limit the prohibition only to the case where there is enmity.

The 16th wanted to interpret the Maimonides' words as corresponding to the words of Rabbi Jonah. In his opinion, the prohibition is a Durbanan prohibition, and according to his opinion, it is also clear why in the Laws of a Murderer, Maimonides wrote, 'There are no circumlocutions for the dead and it is forbidden to save them'. The 16th clarifies that there is a difference between the Risha and Sipa: in the Risha it is written 'no' and in the Sipa it is 'forbidden', and in his opinion the reason is that there really is no prohibition to turn the dead body (which is only taking a way of saving which in his opinion is permitted as above);

But there is no obligation to do so.

No. And there is a great urge to interpret that 'a Gentile who works idolatry' means one who

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believes that he works idolatry, but we are not sure of that (what if this is the interpretation - why did Maimonides bother to add the words 'doer of idolatry'?).

Subtotal ט.

So far we have learned three methods to explain the contradiction between the permission to judge and kill a Gentile who violates seven mitzvot and the words of the Gemara about Gentiles who are not 'put down':

<p>Not just Modidin, when we didn't see him commit a crime</p>	<p>. Killed for one and for one Ramban (Washach) j When you know that he has committed a crime</p>
<p>instead of enmity</p>	<p>Ritban is not a place of enmity</p>
<p>It is forbidden to spurn (probably because of enmity)</p>	<p>Rabbi Yona (Rat'7): the remainder of the Torah I : :</p>

J. The words of Maimonides and the Beit Yomen

The DMBM referred to the killing of a Gentile in two places. In the laws of idolatry (beginning of chapter 10) Maimonides wrote;

There is no binding covenant with the workers of foreign worship so that we make peace with them and put them into slavery, that it is said 'You shall not make a covenant with them; But they will return from her work or be killed. And it is forbidden to have mercy on them as it is said 'and you will not spare'. Therefore, if a Gentile sees idolatry, he is lost

Nineteenth In a way of leveling, the 16th of the Gemara on foreign work (13, 2) which says that it is forbidden to kill a slave bought in the market of foreign work: why does the Gemara not say to kill him in the manner of a grama? But it seems that there really is no problem since the 16th does not permit causing death, but only taking a way of rescue; And there is no permission to bring the slave into a situation where we can prevent his rescue (and what the 16th wrote there, 'indeed, in Israel there is a charge of death in the hands of the Gentiles, their rabbis forbade it in Gentiles, but turning a death such as taking a ladder and the like - in Israel is exempt from the death of a beit din - in a Gentile it is permitted to begin with' - He does not mean that every manslaughter for which Israel is not obligated to die is permitted in the Gentile; but that preventing rescue is not considered manslaughter, contrary to the words of the BH who wrote that the column calls it "manslaughter" because they are doing an act here).

And see also the note from

To. According to the 16th it seems that it is permissible to kill herders of small animals to prevent rescue, since they have the same judgment as Gentiles. And this is a great innovation: the Nikha towards Gentiles - there is permission to kill because they break the seven commandments; However, it is a novelty to say that the Sages permitted the killing of cattle herders in the Gramma, and not only decreed not to save them (see also the value of the Shulchan on Yod Kanach and Akmal in his words).

Until they abandon idolatry, while the seven nations were commanded to kill them
wherever we could unless they abandoned idolatry.

So this is where the contradiction between 'no muridin' and the permission to judge a gentile who violates his commandments is explained: 'no muridin' is that there is no obligation to remove, even though the gentile violates seven commandments. Although if Israel wants to judge him for breaking seven commandments and kill him - this is allowed. According to this the Rambam's words regarding the laws of a murderer are understood: 'There is no way to kill them' - that is: it is permissible to kill them if they want to per dunam, but there is no obligation to do so; 'And it is forbidden to rescue them' - this is already a complete prohibition, and not just permission.

But this excuse seemingly contradicts the Gemara in the Sanhedrin that we cited above, from which it is proven that 'not muridin' is a complete prohibition, and not just a permission.' And more than that: this explanation contradicts the Rambam's own words in the laws of idolatry, which he specifically wrote 'but it is forbidden to lose it in his hand or to push it into a pit and the like!' And as the Mitzvah Education Facilitator asked:

And here the Rambam wrote here "But it is forbidden to lose it by his hand or to push it into a pit" in that he does not make war with us... and it is clear to him that the Rambam considers the prohibition of taking them by the hands... and look at Beit Yosef... and I am amazed that the crystal of Rambam's words disappeared
from his eyes Here Damforesh comes out of his mouth there is a prohibition.

Let's summarize so far:

From the words of the Tosafs, the Book of Education, and the Rambam, Beyt Yosef and Daimiya understood that 'not muridin' is permissible: one does not have to judge and kill a Gentile who transgresses seven mitzvot, but this is permitted. It is true that this is difficult from the Gemara in the Sanhedrin, where it is seen that 'not removing' is a prohibition; And also from the words of Maimonides himself at the beginning of chapter 1 of the laws of

her. In the words of the Shach in the sign of Kanah (already quoted in note 16 above) we see that he understood the Rambam and Beit Yosef so that they agree on Halacha with the

Rambam, but disagree with him in the commentary of the Gemara.

And it is clear: The Ramban explained that "not bringing down" is forbidden because it is precisely a Gentile who we do not know if he violates seven mitzvot. But this explanation in the Gemara was not accepted in the opinion of the Rambam and the House of Joseph (apparently in their opinion it is difficult to do OK, since it is precisely a gentile that we do not know; and in particular, most of the gentiles are held to be those who violate seven mitzvot, and why should we not trust the presumption 10); And so they explained that 'not muridin' is the resta, that is: all Gentiles are involved, and the Gemara

says that there is no obligation

But Beyt Yosef, Derbi Moshe, and the Darshilev (in Yod Kanach) had difficulty in understanding this in Rambam. And it seems that their main flavor is that the Rambam wrote in raids in the Laws of Kings that Ben Noah was killed for one and one judge (as we brought at the beginning of the chapter), and he did not write there any restriction of the prohibition

x of the Darbanan to discuss them at this time .

Therefore, the House of Yosef and Daimya wrote that the meaning of the words 'not taking down' is really that there is no obligation to take down, but if you want to judge the gentile and kill him for violating the seven commandments - this is allowed:

And from the words of the additions, it is not to Mimra that it is forbidden to take them down, but rather we would say that it is not a mitzvah to take them down even though they violate the seventh mitzvah. And who is Hika Demkiimin 7, the mitzvot means to take them down. And the Damarinan in the tractate of Sofrim (in Petu 17) as a tribal minister was killed during a war. And it is also seen from the words of Maimonides in the Ped of the Laws of a Murderer (111).

They rely on the words of the Tosafs, which they wrote about 'No Muridin':

And even though they are just gentiles who work idolatry and transgress the seven mitzvot - in any case there is no muridin.

And here is the simple words of the Tosaf meaning that the meaning of the Gemara in saying 'do not take down' is that it is permissible not to take down, but there is no prohibition in my words.

As these words also mean in the book of education in Mitzva Tzeg (and exactly as the guide of education in his words):

But there is a division between seven nations and the rest of the nations who worship idolatry, because if the rest of the nations do not fight with us, we are not commanded to kill unless they live in our land

heart. And according to them it also means in clothing there; And also refer to Mordechai's article on Orach Haim Kakah, sk Mag.

Lg. It should also be noted that we mentioned above that the 16th method is difficult, because according to it it is permissible to kill small cattle herders in a round of death, which is a great innovation. And if we disagree with this on the 16th and read the Kabbalah, which urges that it is forbidden to kill a gentile even in the Gramma - we need to explain the Rambam's language that he wrote towards gentiles, 'There is no way around them to kill and it is forbidden to save them' (and he did not write 'forbidden' in both places, as we mentioned there, It is precisely the 16th that killing in Grama is permitted).

Led. Although the 16th explained that the Tosafs say that it is permissible not to be killed, and since it is permissible - the Sages determined that it is forbidden to be killed at all. But it's a bit tight because there's no hint of it in the extras.

The mitzvot from then on. In this there is a difference between the charge of death in Israel and the charge of death in Gimli.

x

This is proven by the reality of a resident resident, who is seen in the Gemara (Avodah Zerah Sed, 2) that he is one who has 'received upon him' seven of the mitzvot of Bnei Nahli. It means that this is a gentile who has not kept the mitzvot so far, and yet we forgive him for what happened and accept his repentance.

And as they wrote additions there:

Some kind of resident dweller in it [anyone who received seven mitzvahs]. In the conclusion camer means to revive him and if you say and not immediately after completing seven mitzvot he must die during the birth of Noah's sons, she will die without witnesses and be warned! It must be said that a time that was not discussed by a court does not oblige her to die. You will know that the transiting stars neither raise nor lower.

This is also seen in the Rambam's words in the Laws of Kings, chapter 8: 19] Jephthah, you did not want to put down idolatry after the twelve month, you disciplined it. And the people of a city that has completed it do not have a covenant

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with them until they atone for foreign work and lose all its places and accept the rest of the commandments commanded by Noah's sons. Any gentile who does not accept the mitzvot commanded by Noah's sons will be punished if they sleep under our hands...

[p ... Moshe Rebbe commanded from the mouth of the hero to compel all the people of the world to accept every mitzvah commanded by Noah and anyone who did not accept it should be killed, and the person who accepts them is the so-called resident resident in any place...

And as we saw in the laws of foreign worship (beginning of chapter 10, cited above): , there is no covenant with the workers of foreign worship so that we make peace with them and put them into slavery, as it is said that you shall not make a covenant with them but they will return from their work or be killed. The Rambam speaks specifically about foreign slave workers who have the opportunity to work for a foreign slave, and there is no obligation to kill them for having slaved until now.

to him. Regarding the difference between the obligation of laws for Israel and the obligation for Gentiles, refer also to Yoav's section (Taniyna edition, 1998) and in the passage of wisdom in Leviticus 22:22 (I.E.

to See there that there are several opinions, although according to Halacha it is ruled that one should accept seven mitzvot.

11 As a commentary on the opinion of the House-Yosef and Dei&ia

In order to reconcile the opinion of the House of Yosef with the Gemara in the Sanhedrin, from which it is explicitly stated that it is forbidden to kill a Gentile - Nakdim a Gentile is indeed obligated to die for seven of his mitzvot, but there is no obligation to kill him, but rather he can waive what has passed so far and allow him to take on the Seven

To kill, even those who we know break the seven commandments. But now it is difficult why the Gemara in the Sanhedrin cannot write that it is 'permissible' to kill a gentile, if 'not muridin' is the exception? The Shach understood that the Rambam and the Beit Yosef believed that it was because it is also Gentiles that we do not know if they break the seven commandments, and it is not possible to simply write that it is permissible to kill Gentiles when this includes this possibility as well.

This is proven in the words of the Shach that explains the additions about the slaves of Antoninus (IZ 10:2; cited in the above note dealing with the words of the Shach) in that Antoninus could not have killed the slaves if he did not know that they were breaking seven commandments, and this is the intent of the Tosaf in its difficulty From 'La Modidin'. And this is also consistent with the Rambam's words in the laws of a murderer who wrote, 'There is no way around them to kill and it is forbidden to save them' - the Rambam was careful not to write 'permitted' or 'forbidden' about killing gentiles, since it depends on which gentile is involved: if it is known that he violates seven mitzvot - it is permissible to kill him; But without it - forbidden. And these two types of Gentiles - must not be saved. That is why Maimonides made sure to write 'in masabbin' which means - there is no obligation to kill (in contrast to the heretics mentioned earlier who must be killed if possible); Without discussing the question of whether this is permissible (which depends on the question of whether we know that it has passed or it is only held as such).

It is true that the Shach's explanation in the Rambam's opinion is not possible according to the exact version of the Rambam we have, since the Rambam wrote at the beginning of chapter 10 of the laws of idolatry: "Therefore, if a Gentile who practices idolatry is lost or drowns in a river, they will not ascend, see italics To die will not save us, but to be lost by his hand or pushed into a pit and the like is forbidden. In other words: even those who we know break seven mitzvot - must not be killed, according to the Shach.

And what the Shach didn't feel about it - it's probably because he had before him the censored version of the Rambam, in which it was said 'Therefore if he sees one of them lost or drowning in the river, they will not ascend', etc. From this version it is difficult to conclude

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that in the original text it was explicitly stated that it is forbidden to kill a 'Gentile' even one who 'does idolatry', so it was impossible to know that Rambam does not agree with this explanation.

What emerges from this is that the Shachak explained the words 'no muridin' like the Beit Yosef, but according to the Halacha - he agreed with the Ramban and like him explained the Gemara in the Sanhedrin which says that it is not possible to say 'permissible' about killing a Gentile; And in this explanation he actually shared the Maimonides (and the House of Joseph who followed his path) who said that even a Gentile who is known to violate seven mitzvot must not be killed.

Even though 'Bar Minya' does not observe seven mitzvahs." And the one who does not keep seven mitzvot does not make him a 'bar katla' that those killed are exempt™ and in a similar way it must be proven from the Gemara in Sanhedrin Gaz, verse 1 which explicitly says that on bloodshed 'a gentile is liable to a gentile' (and just a gentile is one who does not keep the seven mitzvot as above). From these endings we see that it is wrong to kill another gentile who violates seven commandments - to be killed, since he did it as a murder and not for Shem Din™.

It turns out that the killing of seven mitzvos depends on the circumstances and the context: if it is in the way of correction - we have here some of the mitzvos of 'laws'. But if it were possible to correct and ensure the observance of the seven mitzvot from here on out by repenting, for example - there is no observance of mitzvot dinim here, but killing and the corruption of the world, and there is no permit for this killing.

Hence we must also discuss the case in which we do not have the power to correct, neither through repentance nor through killing. Such is the situation in a simple way during the exile, when we cannot force the Gentiles to keep the seven commandments. Judging individual gentiles who violate seven mitzvot is not interpreted as law, since the world is completely broken in this matter, and this killing is not part of a true observance of the observance of seven mitzvot in general.

An example of what is said is in the Gemara on a foreign work (13, 2) which discusses a : slave bought in the market of a foreign work

From this they said: The bearer and giver in the market of a foreigner - an animal will be sterilized, fruits and utensils will rot, deformities and metal utensils will lead you to the Dead Sea... I will forget Rabbi Yona to Rabbi Ilai Dakai Apitha Dzur, he said to her: I will kill an animal, Abd May? slave

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Mag. And as it is explicitly explained in the words of the Ritva and the Ramban there (cited above in the explanation of their methods) that a 'goy' in the Gemara is one who does not keep seven mitzvot.

gauge. Compared to those who owe death in Israel, those who were killed are exempt (Book in the Wilderness Piska xix (on chapter Ia verse no); and refer to the Torah Tamima on the verse there, as well as in Archin 6, 2).

what. It is true that the Menchat Chinuq (Ti, 9) wrote incorrectly that killing another gentile who violates seven mitzvot is not killed for that* since the rabbi 'bar katla'. But his words are very difficult from the conclusions we have brought inside: and in any case it turns out that even the educational leader admits that in the first place a gentile is not shot to kill another gentile if he does not do it and for the sake of justice but for murder, and his words are only in retrospect after the deed has been done.

And although according to Rambam ⁸ when a gentile is under our control, then we must force him to accept seven mitzvot, "and anyone who did not accept shall be killed!"; In any case, we clearly see that even if it is known that up until now the gentile has violated seven mitzvot - we do not have to judge him for it, and it is possible to ignore what happened ^{before}

And in a simple way even nowadays, there is no resident resident who practices ^M, there is no difference in this regard, if he received a mitzvah for him from then on - he should not be killed for what has happened so far. And it also turns out that it doesn't matter if he repented among himself or in Pegi Shalasha from Israel, since in any case now he observes seven mitzvot ^{from} ..

What emerges from this is that when discussing a gentile's transgressions, one should also consider the question of whether he has repented, and if so, he must not be killed (and the killed violates the 'shedding of human blood!'). And more: it is better for the gentile to repent, and not for us to kill him. If we come to a gentile who does not keep seven mitzvot and there is an opportunity to explain to him the importance of their existence so that he repents - we would prefer to choose this way, and not discuss and kill him ^{from} .

In other words: a Gentile who has transgressed seven mitzvot is not a 'Bar Katla'. This is also proven by the words of the Gemara in Makkot (9:1), which says that it is wrong for a slain 'bar minya' - that is, another Gentile - to be killed,

damp. Compare the words of the Rambam on the Torah (Deuteronomy 20:10) and the Rabbad (Laws of Kings 6:1) who disagree with the Rambam on this, and 29.

Lt. And to comment from here on the words of the Mahar'i, without regard to the Ram'3 Lt Pad, i.e. 'Ebra Dakal this is not'.

M. Refer to the words of the Rambam and the Rabbad in the Laws of Isori Biya Yad, 8; We did not enter into their dispute there because there is no issue for our case as explained inside.

Ma. This is also what it means at the end of Chapter 8 of the Laws of Kings: "Anyone who accepts the seven commandments and agrees to do them is one of the followers of the nations of the world, and has a share in the world to come, and he is the one who accepts them and does them because God commanded them in the Torah and we were informed by Moses that Noah's sons from before were commanded to do them , but if they do so because of the decision of the mind, it is not a resident citizen and is not one of the followers of the nations of the world, but one of their sages." Maimonides compares here between the one who received because of the knowledge - he probably did not do this in

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front of three of Israel - and the one who received because he believes in the Torah. And if so, it means that in both cases it was not done in front of three of Israel.

Mb, this is strengthened according to the Rambam's method, which believes that the mitzvah of calling for peace includes a call to the gentiles to repent and start observing seven mitzvot from then on, and it is forbidden to fight them and kill them without this (refer to the beginning of chapter 6 of the Laws of Kings) (we did not go into the issue of calling for peace here, because Things are long and do not belong here).

In other words: when we kill the slave we say to him: 'We are killing you because you break seven commandments!' The slave will argue: 'And don't all the Gentiles around me also break seven commandments, and why did you cry out and decide to kill me in particular?' What is the answer to that? that he was bought in the foreign labor market? What does this have to do with the seven commandments?

But when we approach a gentile who violates seven mitzvot and kill him out of concern for the fulfillment of the seven mitzvot - there is no prohibition in the matter, and for this it is said that they are killed for one cause and one debt. To this end the intention of the House of Joseph is now understood by saying that there is no prohibition: there is no prohibition to kill Gentiles for their seven commandments if the killing is indeed aimed at keeping seven commandments and punishing them for not observing them.

(A principle similar to this, that the purpose of the doer has meaning, also exists among Jews. Here we found that it is permissible to beat and bruise a friend in order to set him free from prohibition (Rama Boshushan Mishpat, end sign:

Likewise, whoever is under his permission, and sees him as committing a crime, may beat him and torment him as well as remove him from prohibition, and there is no need to bring him to court.

And it must be discussed: one hits someone who is under his permission and it is clear from his actions and behavior that his purpose is not to set aside the prohibition but to harm the hit person. Although after the deed, when the battered person sues him, the battered person claims that he did not intend to exempt the battered person from the prohibition - after all, in practice it turned out that he exempted the battered person from the prohibition, and therefore he should be exempted since he struck permitted blows. Will the blow be exempt?

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(It should also be noted that it is possible that the OT also admits to Beit Yosef in the verse, and it is simple for him that there is a Dauriyta prohibition of killing a Gentile if it is not for the sake of his judgment. If it is said this way, it will be understood why the 16th does not make it difficult from the Gemara on page 13, since there it is clear that the killing is not for the purpose of law, And therefore there is no question about the Beit Yosef. The question is only from the Gemara in the Sanhedrin which says that it is not possible to write 'permissible' about killing a Gentile, and if there is no prohibition from

Darbanan to judge the Gentiles - apparently it is possible to write 'permissible'). dead. According to this interpretation in Doda Koshiyat Ha-Tosaf on page 10, 2, which relates how Antoninum killed his slaves who accompanied him, and it is written 'not muridin': Antoninus did not kill the slaves out of a desire to judge the slave in front of him who was breaking seven commandments, but out of considerations of danger to himself. If so - what is the destination place for him to be killed? After all, this is not killing for legal reasons, but killing for other reasons! That's why additions are difficult and excuses are made. Above (in note 16) we brought the words of these additions and saw how the Shach explains them; He explains differently since he believes as a Ramban, as we explained there.

**Israel is not a problem for me, because it is a problem for me
- a Gentile slave, right? He said to her: Mai ka mibiaya for
you? Tania: The Gentiles and the Herdsman are small animals
- neither Mealin nor Muridif?**

**Whoever buys things in the labor market - fine him not to enjoy them
but** to corrupt what he bought. The Gemara asks what a person who bought a slave in the market of a foreigner should do - should he be killed? And she replies that it is forbidden to kill him, which we both agreed that "the gentiles - neither elevate nor modify." From this Gemara we see that the intent of the Baryata is that it is forbidden to kill a gentile, and this is the meaning of the words "do not bring down ". **After all, if "they don't take you down, it's just that it's permissible not to take them down - what evidence do you bring from the creation in the case of this slave?" It is possible that here, because he was bought** in the market of idolatry, there is a duty to kill him; And the words of the creation speak of the situation in general, where it is permission!

Although if it is said that what is allowed to discuss a gentile is only when it is part of correcting the seven mitzvot - the words of the Gemara are clear: the purpose of killing the slave is not to deal with the seven mitzvot - but to deal with the problem of the Jew's enjoyment of the market of foreign worship. If we kill the slave under the pretext that he has broken seven mitzvot - then a situation will arise here in which we 'take advantage' of the permission to kill someone who breaks seven mitzvot in order to deal with a problem of the Jew who bought ^{him} .

Mo. Rashi there: "And there is no muridin - them to the pit to kill them with the hands, but it is forbidden to kill a Gentile servant with the hands."

from This Gemara was cited in the book Orach Mishor on the long Derbi Moshe in Yore Dea Kanah, as evidence for the 16th century method that 'not a moridin' is an isura. Although - apart from what we explained here in the opinion of the Rambam and Daimya (and it is clear that even in the opinion of the Rambam it turns out to be explained this way in this case) - the Gemara can be explained in other ways:

According to the Ramban, it is possible to make an excuse that since we do not kill just any Gentile as long as we do not know that he has violated seven mitzvot - we did not approve of killing a slave bought in the market of foreign worship, since we may not have known that he had violated seven mitzvot, and we did not approve of 'waiting for him in the round'

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and killing him When he transgresses seven mitzvot before us (and anyway we did not correct at all, even if we know he transgressed seven mitzvot).

According to the Ritva, it is possible to justify that it is not permissible to kill a gentile slave even if he violates seven mitzvot because there is a fear of enmity, and as explained in his
" method in the explanation of 'no muridin'.

Apart from that, it seems that Karli Alma has no problem, since the slave can repent from then on (to which everyone admits, not just Maimonides and his faction), and if so, it cannot be corrected that such a slave is killed in any case.

In a Gentile it is allowed, since there is no complete permission here, and therefore the

Rambam also wrote that it is forbidden to bring it down to the Barat when it is empty?

Now it is also well established in the Rambam's language:

In the laws of Evarda Dera, the Maimonides, in Geri's position, wrote that he writes incorrectly - even though he is a worshiper of idolatry - he must not be killed just like that (from the rule of "shedding human blood"),

But as the laws of a murderer, the Koran refers to different degrees of wickedness: species and heretics, heathens , herders of small animals, etc. There he writes about the species that are killed without justice, and about the Gentiles for whom 'there is no way around death and it is forbidden to save them'. When we refer to their wickedness - it is impossible to write that it is forbidden to kill, because it is possible to kill them and kill them for breaking seven mitzvot. That's why Rambam wrote the word 'in' which means that you don't do it unless there is a good reason such as doing din^{nig} . This is in contrast to 'it is forbidden to save them' which is an absolute prohibition.

The Maharsha'l in his comments to the SMG (Leoin Mah) made it difficult for Beit Yosef from the precision we brought above in the body of the chapter, that 'not lifting' is a prohibition as expressed in the Gemara - it must be understood that 'not lowering' is also a prohibition and not only that there is no mitzvah to lower. According to what we have written now - the things are also settled in the opinion of the House of Joseph: truly a 'non-moridin' is one who does not have permission to do so unless it is for the purpose of law, and if so - there is a place to compare the veh with 'no ma'lin' which is a prohibition because sometimes it is forbidden.

(In the matter of small animal herders, one should also comment on 'Maori Or' (to Rabbi Yitzchak Ayvik Shur) in the sign of Kanah who wrote: "Akum workers who have no war between us and between them and small animal herders from Israel came p Israel

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believed that most of Israel's fields and the like - there is no mitzvah to kill, and if they tend to die it is forbidden to save them." And here his words mean that even shepherds of small animals 'there is no mitzvah to kill' but it is permissible, and it is a miracle." There is no mitzvah to kill, so it must be checked in each one whether there is a place for him to be killed: a Gentile who violates seven mitzvots - he can be killed because he is condemned for one cause and one judgment, which there is no herder of a small animal here and there is no reason to allow him to be killed and therefore it is prohibited in any case).

And also refer to the note to above at the end of the paragraph dealing with the BH and TTO dispute.

post Scriptum. According to this, the wording of the Darbi Ishmael in Parsha Mishpatim (Msakhtha Danzikin Parsha 4, on the verse 'and the hand is one against another') about killing a gentile is more understandable: 'His judgment is committed to heaven' It is not written 'obliged by the laws of heaven', since the meaning is that the attitude to the act depends on the context and the intention of the doer, and it is 'left to heaven' to examine the 'kidneys and heart' and check whether the act is like murder or if it is correction and justice in the world. . Ng. Although according to the Rambam in certain situations there is an obligation to judge the Gentiles, and not just permission, as the Rambam says at the end of Chapter 8 of the Laws of Kings 'Any Gentile who does not accept the mitzvot commanded by the sons of Noah will disobey him if they sleep under our hands' (cited above; and explained in several places Berambam). That is why Maimonides wrote

It seems simple that the blow must in such a case. The permission to strike in order to set aside the prohibition is only when the minister of Mecca does so for heaven's sake; But if the hitman wants to hit his friend and the rescue from the prohibition is only an 'excuse' to get rid of payments - there is no permission in the matter, and there is no exemption from payments in such a situation .

Let's go back to the words of the Hariita "La Modidin": according to the Rambam and Beit Yosef, this means that there is no mitzvah to hunt a Gentile even though it is known that he violates seven commandments, and in any case it depends on the intention of the killer: if he kills the Gentile because the Gentile violates seven commandments, there is no prohibition in this (After all, until we make justice, etc.), but if he just means corruption and corruption - it is forbidden/ and therefore the Gemara says in the Sanhedrin that it cannot be said that Israel's bloodshed

Matt. Refer to the words of the Sma'a there (Bmk 20) who wrote similar to our words inside that even if Reuben struck Shimon and thereby saved Levi who was beaten by Shimon - Reuben must if we know him and know him that he did not do this to save Levi but out of a desire to hurt and harm Shimon.

And also refer to the 17th century, where he disagrees with the Sma'a and says that Reuven is exempt from paying since he did the right thing in saving Levi. But he said his words only in the case where there is actual damage, then Reuven is a herd to him even if he didn't intend for it, and according to him the actions are desirable even without their good intentions. But in the case of a normal 'lafarushi from prohibition' (between a person and a place) - the punishment should come precisely from the power of a court that does its actions in order to exclude prohibition, and without that its actions are undesirable from a point of view; Therefore, it is certain that the 16th will agree with the sma that the mecca must pay.

A case of judging a gentile who violates seven mitzvot is similar to the case of a normal 'lafarushi from Isura', since we come to judge by the power of a court of law and observe the commandments of law; What's more, there needs to be consideration as to whether to allow the sinful Gentile to repent as we have seen.

N. Another illustration is given in Hafetz Chaim (Halakhots leshon ha're 10:3) that the intention of the act determines whether it is permissible: Yehu was punished for killing the house of Ahab (Hosea 1:4) even though he was commanded by God to kill (2 Kings 9:7); Because after the fact it was revealed that he did not do it for the sake of God - after all, he himself had sinned in a strange work (refer to interpretations in Hosea there; and similarly refer to Kings 16, 1-7 and

Barashi there).

please. It should be noted that according to herders of small cattle, in raids it means that 'not taking down' is a prohibition, and this is now settled according to our words that it is not permitted to kill neither gentiles nor herders of small cattle - unless someone condemns them (and with small cattle herders, who are Jews, there is no place to judge them to her death). (And to comment from here on the Ritva'a that according to him, 'no muridin' among Gentiles is only because of enmity, which is not the case with small cattle herders who have no permission to kill; and it should be said according to his method that really 'no muridin' is interpreted somewhat differently by gentiles and by small cattle herders). But the issue of Nablus, because the sons of Jacob, because the people of Nablus were wicked and their blood was important to them, like water wanted to take revenge on them with a vengeful sword, and they killed the king and all the people of his city because they were his slaves, **and disobeyed his discipline, and the covenant that he had signed was not considered in their eyes to be worthless because it was** to flatter their masters. And Jacob said to them here that they had brought him in danger, as it was said, "You have made me afraid, to make me afraid," and there he cursed their noses because they had done harm to the people of the city, who told them, "We will sit with you, and we will be one nation." A rule, and that's what Keli said

They heated their mines (hereafter Met Ha).

The Ramban makes it difficult for the Rambam: Why should it be said that the people of Nablus were killed because they transgressed the commandments of the laws / and that there is no commandment that the people of Nablus transgressed / after all they transgressed all seven

The commandments!

This difficulty of the Rambam is explained according to what we explained in the Rambam's method: The Rambam believes that in order to kill a gentile who violates seven mitzvot - there must be a law here, and not an exploitation of the law for the purpose of 'settling accounts' for other reasons,

The fact that the people of Canaan violate seven commandments is a well-known and old fact, which the sons of Jacob did not refer to until now in their travels in the Land of Israel. If they have some kind of problem with one of the gentiles and to solve it they rise up and

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kill him under the pretext that he is breaking the seven mitzvot - this is not 'law', and according to what we explained in Rambam - this is forbidden.

Let's illustrate by case: Jacob's sons pass by the house of a very rich Gentile without heirs, and if he dies - they will be able to take all his property. Are they allowed to discuss and kill him for eating an animal organ (and then use his money for charity and kindness)? It's not a law, it's a desire to make money that uses the law as a pretext.

Therefore Maimonides understands that the charge of death of the people of Nablus was not related to all the 'ordinary' offenses they committed, because we did not find a law of the Bnei Ya'akov against anyone for these offenses and there is no reason to suddenly wake up and decide to judge them because of a side reason.

But in Nablus the sons of Jacob do not take advantage of the ability to discuss - but deal with offenses that concern them and in any case they do not ignore them. It is not an exploitation but a reference. for an offense that 'comes within our borders'. Because of this situation, the sons of Jacob condemned the people of Nablus.

12. The people of Nablus - the opinion of the Rabbinat

Regarding the killing of Nablus by Shimon and Levi - Rambam's writing (end of chapter 9 of the Laws of Kings, cited above):

And because of this, all the owners of Nablus will commit murder, because Nablus was robbery and they saw and knew and did not discuss it.

The Rambam on the Torah (Bereishit 4:13) went on to disagree with the Rambam on this for reasons

Various, among other things he wrote:

And in my opinion, the Dinkashmana to the sons of Noah in their seven unleavened breads are not to appoint a judge in every country and country only, but enjoined them in the laws of theft and adultery and adulterer and the hire of a hired servant and the laws of the guards and infidels and the seducer and the fathers of torts and harming one's friend and the laws of a loan and a loan and the laws of taking and selling and the like, as a matter of the law that Israel was commanded, and he was killed for them if A thief and a thief or an anam and seduced his friend's daughter or he lit a fire and harmed him and the like. And of this mitzvah that they should sit down as judges even in every city and town like

Israel, and if they did not do so they would not be killed, this is a mitzvah he did in them, and they did not say (Sanhedrin Nez 1) but a warning of them this is their death, and no warning will be called but the prohibition against them, and also according to the Gemara in the Sanhedrin (Nataf)...

And what will the rabbi demand for them? And that the people of Nablus and all seven believers were not worshipers of idolatry and revealed adultery and did all the abominations of God? And the scripture screams about them in several places (Deuteronomy 12:2) 'On the high mountains and on the hills and under every fresh tree' and so on/ 'You shall not learn to do', etc. 18 27), except that it is not left to Jacob and his sons to judge them.

At the beginning of the first halacha in chapter 10 of the Laws of Kings (which was also quoted above): 'No covenant shall be made with those who work in foreign worship so that we may make peace with them and place them in slavery as it is said that you shall not make a covenant with them, but they shall return from their worship or be killed.' Here we are talking about Gentiles who are under our control, and for this reason we have an obligation to judge them for their seven mitzvot (while later in the Halacha we are talking about Gentiles who are not under our control, so there we are not allowed to kill unless we are interested in a dunam, as we explained in Rambam's opinion). (Refer to this matter in Lehem Mishna there, as well as in Kiryat Sefer, in the Great Knesset on the end of Siman Techa's Chom (letter 13), and in Shushans for David on Tractate 17:1, 8).

In the revisions of the Dan on the Sanhedrin (no, at the end of the DD, 'wither') he brought these words of the Ramban · and from his words there we see that he understood that it is permissible according to the Ramban to kill a Gentile who transgresses seven troubles if we have any need for it. And this is his language:

And in any case it can be said that the giant killed the people of Nablus who were already liable to death because they were worshipers of idols, except that their judgment was handed over to the children of Jacob who had no **doubt in their hands**. Shame on me in the house of the Arch.

That is: it was permissible for the sons of Jacob to kill the people of Nablus for being wicked and breaking the seven commandments. Jacob thought that even though this is allowed - it

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should not be done, because the few sons of Jacob do not have the strength to deal with the consequences of the act that would revolt all the inhabitants of the land against them. And what emerges from this is that, according to the Rabbinite, it is permissible to harm any Gentile who transgresses seven mitzvot, if there is any need for Israel to do so." Although it should be noted that even according to the Rabbinical Law, if it turns out that this gentile repents of his transgressions and from then on observes seven mitzvot, he must not be killed. Lakman) ^{net} .

Nez. Although he does not mention the Ramban specifically, but look there his language is very similar to the Ramban and it seems simple that he is explaining this Ramban. Noah And according to him it should be said that what the Gemara in the Sanhedrin does not agree with saying that it is permissible to kill a Gentile is because of enmity (Kritbaa) or because it is not certain that we know of this Gentile that he transgressed seven mitzvot (Kramban), and among the people of Nablus (according to Shimach and Levi) there was no creation Enmity (since anyway they breached the fence first and created enmity by usurping law) and it is clear that they violate seven mitzvot (since this is their culture, and as the Torah testifies to them). And it is also possible to say that this also fits the opinion of Rabbi Yona who says that the Gemara in the Sanhedrin forbids from Darbanan to a Gentile don, and in the time of Shimon and Levi there was not yet a prohibition from Darbanan.

Net. In addition, it must be pointed out that Rabbi Maha Dassar had to rob the gentile (as was ruled in the Shoah Ch'om at the beginning of Siman Shim), and simply that this is also a gentile who violates seven mitzvot. And according to the Rabbinite, it is permissible to kill for any need, and "there shall be no punishment for his body"! (As the Gemara says in Baba Kama Kit, 1). And it should be said

That is: when gentiles commit transgressions that are far from us - one can understand why we should not engage in condemning them (as a wrongdoer is not liable to death if he does not condemn gentiles who are far **from him who transgress seven mitzvot** ⁿⁱ).

But when a gentile commits an offense in a way that affects us , then ignoring it is a kind of 'consent' to the offense, so here it is clear what the place of ^{the} wine is.

Rambam also explains in this way in the Laws of the Prohibitions of Biya (12:9):

A Gentile who comes against the daughter of Israel - if a man's wife, she will be killed on her.

And apparently it should be made difficult that a "Gentile" in any case is one who violates seven mitzvot and can be killed for any of the mitzvot (therefore, wherever Maimonides writes that he is "obliged" for a certain transgression of the seven mitzvot, he is talking about a "son of Noah" who is one who does not violate on the mitzvot usually); And what's more - why only a gentile who came to the daughter of Israel? After all, even if he comes on a Gentile, he must! According to us, it is understandable that the Rambam says that when there was an offense that concerns Israel - we must discuss it and not ignore itTM.

13. The people of Shebam - the opinion of the Ramban

Now let's find out the Ramban's opinion regarding the people of Nablus: on the one hand, he writes that they are wicked and their blood is as important as water, and it means that it is because of what he wrote above that they are idolaters and discoverers of adultery and do all the abominations of God · But on the other hand, later on, he qualifies this by saying: 'But the matter is not left to Jacob and his sons to judge them.' And further on: 'And they killed the king and all the people of his city because they were his slaves, and disobeyed his discipline.' And apparently the words are not understood: if it is permissible to kill - what does the Ramban mean by saying that 'it is not dedicated to Jacob and his sons'? And if the reason for the killing is the transgression of the seven commandments - why should it be explained that the people of the city were killed because they were the king's slaves?

Ned. After all, it was precisely the people of Nablus who pledged her death, and not all the Gentiles in the land who heard of the deed of Nablus.

Nah. And it can be seen from the words of Maimonides that in the situation of a Gentile who

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killed Israel or attacked an Israelite woman - the Gentile cannot repent from this point on, nor even convert. And in the article "Sinner Gentile Let's Be Converted" (to be published in Israel in another place) we extended more on this.

Well And according to the words of the living light on Parshath Vaishala: "And the late Ramban... gave reason for killing Nablus to the side that would have to die for being idolaters, etc."

Let's summarize in the table:

<p>Why were the people of Nablus killed? ___ _ They were tried for offenses concerning the sons of Ya Lo^b</p>	<p>opinionated Ramban</p>
<p>They were condemned for their actions because in order to make amends it is better not to expect them to return</p>	<p>Ramban according to</p>
<p>in reply</p>	<p>the other option</p>
<p>They must be put to death because of their crimes, and it is permissible to kill such gentiles when the need arises (since they will probably not repent)</p>	<p>Ramban according to the Haran</p>

Hand. Killing someone who repented

Above, we proved from the reality of a resident gentile that there is no absolute obligation to die, and he can repent of his transgressions and then he should not be judged for what he ^{was}. The Ramban initially explains that Jacob was angry with his sons because they endangered him with their actions; But later on, he explains why Jacob was angry with them at the end of his days, when there was no longer any danger from the Gentiles and no harm happened to the house of Jacob as a result of the act. And so he explains:

there (in Parashat Vihai) he cursed their noses, because they had done harm to the people of the city, who told them in his position, we would sit together and be one nation, and they would choose them and kick their backs, and maybe they would return to God and kill them for nothing, because they did not harm them at all.

That is: there was a chance that the people of Nablus really intended to keep the seven commandments from then on, and in such a situation it is understandable that it is better not to kill them but to allow them to repent; And on this point Ya'akov protested sharply in his words to Shimon and Levi at the end of Yoseb.

It seems that no one would dispute that if it is possible to take this way - it is better.

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to their other actions and to say that because they must die anyway to kill them (even if it is not said that the suspicion is so great as to "come to your killer, it is wise to be killed" like the second excuse in the additions there); And it is not the same as killing a Gentile and taking his money.

Sa. Although it is very possible that someone who is already a resident - we will not waive his offenses, because he has entered a mandatory status. grandfather. Admittedly, refer again to the Torah of Moses (signed by a scribe) on Parashat Vaishelach, i.e. 'Rambam Sof 15 of the Laws of Kings' and i.e. 'The sons of Jacob came on the graves', which says that perhaps Jacob thought they were Geri Tzedek (and also refer to Radev 7 at the end of Chapter 9 of the Laws of Kings).

Although it is possible to explain the Ramban's words in another way:

It can be said that the Rambam also generally agrees with the principle explained in the Rambam's opinion, that one should not kill a gentile who violates seven mitzvot when the killing is not for legal purposes but for other side needs. According to this, the Ramban's words are well explained when he says that this was not given to Jacob and his sons: his intention is to say that Jacob and his sons are not allowed to harm the peoples who lived in the land of Canaan at that time, even though they break the seven commandments, if there is no intention here to **judge the perpetrators of the offense.**

Although according to this it is difficult: why is it permissible to kill the people of Nablus? After all, here too there is an exploitation of a side need - the anger at the usurpation of a law - and as a result harm to all the people of the city who did not commit an act against Bnei Jacob that requires death (according to the Ramban's method no death is required for the annulment of laws)!

And we seem to explain: If they had broken the seven commandments regardless of us, we would not have condemned them, because before that we would have tried to call them to repent and correct them. But in Nablus the presence of these Gentiles created the reality in which Nablus harms the sons of Jacob. In such a situation, the way to correct it is precisely to judge them and not to ignore their actions, and we kill them because they must die; This is how the words of the Ramban are understood, who justifies the killing of the people of Nablus by being obedient to their evil king.

Although in the case where a certain gentile does not interfere with the correction and observance of the mitzvot, but we want to kill him in order to use this killing to our advantage - this is forbidden. Let's go back to the example we gave above about the rich gentile who eats an animal organ and we kill him to take his money and do charity with it: according to what we now explain in the words of the Ramban, this is forbidden. In such a situation 'it is ^{not} up to us to judge him', as the Ramban says .

According to his opinion, the Torah allowed killing a Gentile even for personal interest, knowing that in any case, it is legal to violate the seven commandments, but there is no law in robbery, and therefore there is no reason to allow it.

S. The Shach's words regarding the additions will also be explained in this way: above (in

note 16) we brought the Shach stating that Antoninus was allowed to kill his slaves because they were those who break the seven commandments. Is this about using the seven mitzvot for other needs? This is similar to what we explained in the opinion of the Ramban about the people of Nablus: although there is no direct reference here to the seven mitzvot that these slaves followed - but these slaves are a danger in their presence because they are part of a public of gentiles who could harm Antoninum if it were known that he was studying Torah. In such a situation where they are a danger - it is permissible to separate them

about this either, and everyone will admit that when there is a reformed monarchy, individuals will not judge but will leave the law in the hands of the judges and judges

We will complete the table above in this way:

Ramban according to the Haran permitted	Ramban according to the other option permitted	Rambam N	1 The case
permitted	permitted	permitted	Discuss to fix
permitted	permitted	forbidden	To discuss as dealing with 1 malice
permitted	forbidden	forbidden	2. discuss to earn i Other things
forbidden	forbidden	forbidden	3. discuss repentant/ 10, to discuss when there is a kingdom

16 The words of the Great Knesset

The owner of the Great Knesset in his book Remains of the Great Knesset (Yora Dea Kanah)

concludes in practice on the matter of killing a Gentile who violates seven mitzvot:

I was asked about the doctors who heal the Ishmaelites and the Arals⁰ if they are allowed to make the opposite medicine so that they die or withhold the medicine that is beneficial to them so that they die.

And build a railing so as not to cancel the mitzvah. And even if he claims to the house committee that he will build a railing on a certain side and this railing will be built faster

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than they will build - they will answer him that although that side will be built faster, but the result will be that each neighbor will do as he sees fit, and all in all the roof railing will not be built well.

Sue. The 16th-century system, which states that it is forbidden to judge gentiles, should be made more difficult: according to the Rambam, there is an obligation to judge gentiles who violate seven mitzvot. And how did the sages cancel this commandment? (And it is a little difficult to say that there is an exceptional case of uprooting a word from the Torah in a sit and don't do way). According to what we have written so far - it is established that this prohibition does not displace a mitzvah, but that the Rabbis understood that a legal mitzvah would not be fulfilled properly if at this time everyone came and discussed, similar to what we wrote inside about the fact that in a reformed monarchy not everyone discusses according to Razat Einiz.

Tu. Revised Gentile Kingdom

When there is a reformed kingdom of Gentiles - they set up a system of courts for them to judge those who violate their commandments, as explained in Rambam (End of Farhan 9 of the Laws of Kings):

And how do they point to the law? It is imperative to seat judges and judges in each and every province to discuss these six mitzvot, and to warn the people .

When such a kingdom exists, it is very likely that it will determine that since there is a revised system that discusses and treats those who break seven mitzvot - from now on this will not be done by private individuals, but will be left to the care of this system. This regulation is very reasonable in terms of existence and order of the amended public.

This is especially true in light of what we have learned about how it is necessary to consider in each case whether the sinner should be killed or whether it is better to allow him to repent from then on. When there is a reformed monarchy - there is room for this consideration, and it turns out to leave this consideration in the hands of the judges and judges in each and every county™.

It is important to emphasize that there is no abrogation of Mitzvo Dinim here by the one who sees the transgressor as an offense and does not judge, since he can submit his case to the judges and judges who will judge him; And rather - this is how Mitzvah Dinim Yes-Oisa will take place.

seg. And according to Maimonides, Israel too (and perhaps especially Israel) is obligated to see to it that the gentiles make laws, as he says in chapter 10 of the same book, halakha 11: 'The court of Israel must make judges for those who live abroad, to judge them according to these laws, so that the world will not be corrupted, If they saw a court that they would appoint their judges from among them as witnesses, and if they saw that they would appoint judges from Israel as witnesses.' And in another place we will expand on Maimonides' method in this.

chock. If the only consideration for private individuals not to be tried is because of public order - here in hindsight if someone killed another gentile who violated the seven mitzvot he would not be liable to death, since according to the law he is allowed to be killed (unless the kingdom decides to kill the person who does so as murder according to the kingdom's law) . But since there is also a consideration of repentance here - the fact that the killing will be punishable by death, since according to the judges and judges in this case he was asked to go in the direction of repentance, and the killing was unnecessary (although it is possible that as long as the sinner did not actually repent - it is impossible to punish Sisek with death and killed him).

Sa. Parable What is it similar to? There is a building where a railing needs to be built for the shared roof. When the house committee builds a railing properly - there is no room for one of the neighbors to decide that since the mitzvah is (also) imposed on him - he will erect it

17 Summary

On the one hand, it is decided that a wrongdoer is judged in one favor and in one judgment, and if so - whoever sees him transgressing one of the seven commandments can be killed; But on the other hand, it is written about the Gentiles that they will not be 'taken down', and apparently this is despite the fact that they break seven commandments.

We found four methods in the settlement:

- The Ramban and the Shach understood that what is forbidden to bring down a Gentile is only in a Gentile that we do not know for sure that he violates seven mitzvot (despite his belief that he is such and therefore it is forbidden to bring him up).
- The Rabbi understood that the prohibition is only because of enmity, and when there is no enmity it is permissible to discuss a Gentile.
- Rabbi Yona and the 16th understood that sages decreed from Darbanan not to judge Gentiles.

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The House of Yosef, the Ways of Moses, and the Rebuke (in the Rambam's •
opinion; and this also means in the Book of Education and in the Tosafs)
understood that it is possible to discuss gentiles who violate seven mitzvot; And
the intention of the Gemara in 'no muridin' is that it is forbidden to kill if the
purpose of the killing is not law but other considerations.

We explained that even those who disagree with the latter method teach that one should
not kill a gentile who violates seven mitzvot if the act is corruption, for example when the
gentile repents or there is a revised system that will do it more correctly. We also saw that
cases that are not outright corruption must be discussed, but the main goal in them is not
the law, and there are different options for this.

To make it easier according to their method against the opinion of the 16th (and to
comment that other arbiters ruled on raids according to the opinion of the House Yosef
and the Shach (yes he is in clothing, and also ruled in the light of light), and did not think
there was any reason to fear the opinion of the 16th and the 16th).

And I replied to the opinion of the Tachkad [Beit Yosef] that they are not allowed to take them down, but that they are not required to take them down, it is simply a matter of giving them countermeasures so that they die, there is no prohibition or commandment here, and the permission is in his hands to do what his heart desires. And in the opinion of the BH that they ruled that it is actually permissible to take them down by hand, but even to the point of their death is not allowed, it is not a problem to allow them to take drugs, but even to withhold the beneficial drugs from them is prohibited, but in the opinion of the 16th, to take them down by hand is prohibited, and to the point of their death it is also permissible here to withhold the beneficial drugs from them. As a round of his death **and it is permissible to give him antidotes, it is as if it is taken by hand and it is** forbidden.

And regarding the act, since according to the words of our Rabbi, the author, a mitzva like this is only a permission given to a slave, and according to the Bah'ah, it is forbidden to sit and do not do better. And even to prevent them from the beneficial medicines, since according to the words of the Brahmin, it is better to sit back and do not do it. And who, if he is a gentile who is a strait to Israel, can rely on the words of the author Disora Lika, even a mere gentile, especially in that the strait to Israel is to lay hands on him to give him countermeasures, even more so to prevent him from beneficial medicines.

What is the 'strait nation to Israel' that the remnants of the Great Knesset allow to kill?

If he endangers lives from Israel - then he should be killed by a persecutor, and that is without a doubt for all of us. Therefore, it should be said that this is a Gentile who usurps a brother of Israel and so ^{forth}. And in such a case, the 2nd and the 16th and the 16th and the 16th divided: according to the House of Joseph - it is permissible for Israel to judge a gentile, therefore it is possible to judge this gentile for robbing us and kill him; But the 16th Rabbanan forbade us to judge the Gentiles, so there is no permission to kill him.

If we compare this case to the various cases we have given in the table - it is similar to the first case we are discussing to correct, because the offense concerns us; And this is allowed to discuss both the Ritva method, the Damban method, and the Beit Yosef and the Damban

sez Ishmaelites were Muslims. And heretics we were Christians. And from this it is proven that in the opinion of the 3rd, Muslims also fall under the fence of gentiles who do not observe seven mitzvot, even though they are not considered idolaters. See Rambam's Laws of Forbidden Foods, Chapter 11, Law 7, and the subjects of the utensils there.

Sah A Gentile who indecently broke out against Israel; or a judge threw out the judgment to the detriment of Israel; And so on.

Set. Although according to the Rambam and Beit Yosef it is permissible to judge and kill even a gentile who is not close to Israel, if we do it for the sake of justice and correction and not in a way of corruption; But in this case the Great Kneset is not actually decisive Beit Yosef, the Darbi Moshe, the Shachak, the Maori Or and the glory of Moses? (In his language it means that he finds it difficult to say that 'no muridin' is not in the language of prohibition; but 'not muridin' is 'isura' also according to the Ramban, for example, and why is the explanation of the 16th better than the explanation of the Ramban?).

Although it should be noted that he adds an innovation to the words of the 16th chapter because he says that the prohibition against Gentiles also applies to Gentiles, so there is a problem with testifying before a tribunal of Gentiles who are judging another Gentile. Further to this, he reiterates that the prohibition from Darbanan does not exist when it comes to gentiles who are guilty of a certain offense, and in such a case also according to the 16th century it is permissible to judge and kill them if they violate it (therefore it is permissible to judge and kill a gentile who steals, for example).

But his words need to be studied, because in another place he says that two kosher adis are needed to judge a Gentile, and that they do not say that 'hearing will not be greater than evidence'. And according to this, killing a gentile is forbidden from Dauriata, as long as two kosher witnesses did not testify about it (and maybe if two kosher witnesses are needed - a court of 23 nearby people is also needed!). And apart from the fact that these very words of the Chazon Ish are an innovation whose origin is unclear - here they contradict his words which agree with the 16 that the prohibition to kill a gentile is only a spurn He is without two witnesses, and on this the 16th says that the prohibition is only spurred on).

And more: his words contradict the words of the first and last, because in the words of the Ramban, the Ritva, Rabbi Yona, the Beit Yosef, the Beh, the ways of Moshe, the Shachak,

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the 16th, the boasting of Moses and the Maori Or see that it is permissible to kill a Gentile from Daoriyata, And there is no hint that this is allowed only when there are two kosher witnesses. And if so, simply in their words that two witnesses are not needed and until justice is done. This is also explained in the Gemara in the Sanhedrin, Rashi, Rambam, Minach Shinoch, Hacham Zvi, the hands of Moshe and the Ram who were brought at the beginning of the chapter (in the paragraph "Until we make a dayan"), and this corresponds to the fact that the Gemara assumes as a simple matter that there will be no great hearing Shows like we brought there.

The Chazon Ish's difficulties about the Ritba are also justified. As we explained very well in the opinion of the Ritva in the body of the chapter - the Bariata did not write the same wording for species and gentiles because it wanted to emphasize the mitzvah and the need to kill species, as opposed to gentiles that we do not need to kill (at least for now) and there is also no novelty in the fact that they are killed for their mitzvot.

attache

The words of the Chazon Ish

There are several places in the Chazon Ish's words related to the things we wrote in the body of the chapter, where his words need clarification. Although there is reference here to several topics in the chapter - the words of the Chazon Ish set a place for themselves and we chose to address them separately. The main points in his words:

Discussing gentiles in our time - "And here is the Torah's ruling in the laws of the sons of Noah [after all the nations do not observe them and as he wrote in Tosaf 17 20:2] that we are not obligated to the religion and not to a single one of them, and therefore even though they do not observe them, they are not taken down at any time that we did not discuss They must not be taken down, and if there is no taking them down, we would be forbidden" (Yorah Dea Sof Siman 7; Chom Bk 1, 16). According to this, it follows that one should not testify against a gentile murderer because the gentiles who kill him will do so unlawfully - but he says that the mitzvahs in which the gentiles are circumcised can be discussed even now and therefore it is possible to testify against a gentile murderer before their courts (BK 10:15).

Imposing judgment on Gentiles - a Jew does not judge a Gentile on the testimony of a Gentile, but needs two kosher witnesses to testify in Israel (Yorah Dea and B.K. ibid.); A witness cannot be valid even in Gentile law (Aven ha-Ezer end of Siman Ka).

He extends the difficulty of the Ritva we mentioned above, and his main difficulty is that if the prohibition to kill a gentile is due to fear of enmity - then a gentile is the same as the species that is also killed unless there is enmity, and if so it is not clear why the creation divides gentiles and converts (B.K. , 10).

Now let's find an account one by one:

Here the Chazon Ish clarifies that there is no obligation to discuss Gentiles and in any case it is forbidden. Why is this forbidden? The Chazon Ish did not explain what the prohibition was.

It is possible to explain in his words that the reason is that there is a prohibition of drabnan in it, and this also corresponds to the fact that he relies on the 16th, which in his words is interpreted as a prohibition of drabnan ,

Ben Noah who was forced to violate one of his commandments is allowed to pass,
even forced to work ; One works idolatry, according to the fact that they are not
mitzvah for the Holy One ·

Although regarding the mitzvah of murder - some have restricted Ben Noah's permission to
pass in the place of rape. In the book "Parashat Ka'vein" (Derech Eтарim Darosh Shani ^B)
a controversy was brought up regarding the obligation of the dedication of the souls of
Gentiles to the prohibition of murder:

**And know that it means to me that Da Marivan Davan Noah
does not command the holiness of God. We were precisely
foreign work and fornication, but in bloodshed he should kill
and not kill, and Tema Damilta** because of foreign work and fornication

what Israel is warned about is because of the flags in which he called... and if so
Ika to Mimer Davban Noah dela Gali Karabhuichalmimer dela were warned about
God's holiness. But the shedding of blood came from the Bible , but from the
Sabbarah · He wrote and this is his language: Daff on the back of Ramsbara Nefka
from the front, etc. - Since the Rabbis of Noah were not commanded to surrender
themselves for idolatry and incest because Israel will be renewed, this is biblical -
it also follows that they were not commanded to surrender their lives for
bloodshed, so far.

And already before the Torah, which forbids a Gentile to kill his fellow man even in the place
of a soul control, the Maharal in Gur Aryeh (Bereishit Lev, 8):

And it should not be said that he was afraid lest he kill others, that is, those whom
Esau brought with him, and even on their backs to kill and say, "Come to your
slaying, it is wise to kill" that I am the next

And it is proven in Yerushalmi (Sivait 4:2). And it was also decided in the Tosaf (Sanhedrin .x
10, 1 D.H. and Om '), Bar'an (ibid.) and Sefer Hasidim (Rit). And in a simple way the
explanation is that the mitzvot of the Gentiles are for the restoration of the world,
compared to the mitzvot in Israel which are a connection with God. And according to the
words of the midrash (Shemot Rabbah 30:9): "Rabbi Elazar said: A parable of a king who
went to war and there were legions with him and he slaughtered an animal and he

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distributed to each one a portion so that he would come. , therefore God gave the worshippers of the stars raw unleavened bread that they touched and did not differentiate between impurity and purity, Israel came and interpreted the unleavened bread for them each and every one, its punishment and giving its reward as it is said, 'Yishkani menshikot his mouth', that is why it is said, 'His laws and judgments for Israel.'"

It was also brought up in a nutshell in his Mishna to the King of the Laws of Kings 10:2. ב.ג. "Alright, go, go, Parsha from the 4th sign of the 5th day of the year "that was"" (in the book ג.א. "Yafa Tavar").

Chapter three

Self-sacrifice for murder - among Noah's sons

In this chapter we will deal with the law of self-sacrifice for a murder among Noah's sons. We will deal with three cases: 'Kill so-and-so or we will kill you; in healing by killing another in order to be saved (for example: taking his organs for transplantation); And killing a hostage is enough to be saved from a murderer who takes advantage of the hostage's presence so that he can kill without being killed.

As explained, in the last case we mentioned - for all Alma it is allowed for Noah's sons to kill the hostage in order to be saved.

Charge of leniency for murder - in Israel and Gentiles א.

A Jew must surrender his soul for three serious crimes, among them the mitzvah of murder, such as Shaita in Gemda (Sanhedrin Ad, 1; Yoma Febv, 2; Pesachim Ka, 2):

That one gave to Kamiya Darba and said to her: 'Mari Dorai told me: Zil Cataliya for Palnia, and no - Catalina to you.' He said to her: 'Katloch and you will not kill!

Who will bet that you did not blush? Dilma dama dahua gbra blush tefi!'

And so it was ruled by Rambam (the basic laws of the Torah 5:67; on the Shulchan Aruch, a dea marks a buy mark and a treasure mark):

And slaying in every imorin in the Torah in a place of danger except for idolatry and fornication and bloodshed, which even in a place of danger there is no slaying in them....and the killing of a soul from Israel to spare another soul or to save a

person from the hand of anim - a thing that opinion tends to is that no one loses
a soul for a soul.

Gentiles, on the other hand, are not obligated to devote themselves to the seven commandments, even in the commandments and situations in which Israel is obligated, and according to the words of the Dambam in the Laws of Kings (10:2):

And there are those who say that the shedding of blood is a mitzvah (in self-sacrifice), their honey also has a sabra; Yes: 'May the front of Dadama Didach' and all of that (subordinate to the king). And the words of the Dambam do not mean that, since he wrote 'even to work' and all, which means indeed indecency and bloodshed. And it must be said that there is a reason for this, and he himself brought this reason in chapter 5 of the Foundations of the Torah, in any case if he did not want to give his life away as he was told.

Killing a lifeguard according to the Maharash is beautiful ב.

We will refine the explanation why the Mahrash allows killing in order to save oneself, with the help of another case: a Gentile flees from a danger to lives and another Gentile blocks his way (Baonsi'); His only way to escape the danger is to kill the one who blocks his path. According to the Mahrash Yaffe - it is allowed to run over the road blocker. The Maharash Yaffe says that it is permissible for a gentile to kill others if it is his only way to avoid dying. The reason for the permit in the case of 'kill Saloni' is not that the killer received an order from someone else and he is just carrying it out. Receiving instructions is not a reason for exemption, since the words of the rabbi and the words of the student are the words of those who hear them · The reason for the exemption is that in the case of controlling the soul of a Gentile it is not a mitzvah in any mitzvah, and in any case it is not forbidden to murder. This is true both when a murderer is commanded to do so, and when the reality is such that murder is the only way to be saved. (Furthermore: in the case where someone blocks the way - there is a greater reason to allow his killing, because it actually harms the one who wants to be saved; which is not the case in the case of 'kill so-and-so', where so-and-so did nothing to the person who kills him, and the relationship between them is born only from the threat of the rapist).

The Jerusalemite - evidence of a crossroads א.

פרק שלישי: מסירות נפש על רציחה - בין בני נח ♦ פט

It is said in Yerushalmi in the treatise Abode Zerah (chapter 2, halacha 2):

Says and Yore Dea 13:8); And in the Moharash Muhliver Association, at the end of the book, "Tiddhushim in the Shas and the Rambam" sign A.

Rule 7 (quoted above). .ט

After all, if he blocks the way on purpose, he is chasing. .ח

Kiddoshin Mb, II. .ט

Danums were his noises forced them to come with him - this is not possible!

Daha Amaranan chapter every **hour: All offenses in the Torah he shall pass and shall not be killed except for idolatry, incest and bloodshed shall be killed and shall not be passed, if they say to him 'kill so-and-so or we will kill you' he shall kill and shall not pass.** Dilma dama dahai somek tfi', and if so it is not appropriate to say his noises forced them to have a womb, let him die,

Crossroads. And Daimya renews that even though a gentile is not obligated to devote himself to his commandments - he is not allowed to kill a gentile whom he is forced to kill, since there is a reason to forbid such murder; As the Gemara cites this sabra as a source for charging self-sacrifice for the murder of an Israeli.

In contrast to them, the Mahresh Jaffe simply understands that a wrongdoer does not have to surrender his soul for any of his mitzvahs, therefore if he is told to 'kill so-and-so or we will kill you' - he is allowed to kill the other Gentile to save his life. Also according to him, it is simply forbidden for a third gentile to intervene and kill the gentile whom the rapist demands to be killed, and thereby save the ^{rapist}. The permit is only for the rapist gentile since he is not obligated to sacrifice his soul, but there is no permit for a third gentile to intervene and kill one to save another.

In Aruch the Future Shulchan he wrote as a Yaffe:

In the Shu'at Mishpat Cohen Kamag (Page Shevat) brought the words of the Ramban in .T the wars (Sanhedrin page 18, 1 from the pages of the Harif) who wrote: "But let every resident of Sana'a live - even in foreign work and incest - let him cross and not kill, and it did not worsen them Torah in foreign work and indecency more than other (mitzvots) of which they do not have a reading from the Torah in this." And it is true that the words of the Ramban mean that the shedding of blood of Gentiles is indeed graver than the other offenses, and according to the words of the Secession of the Ways and its Daimya (and this is also true in the Shu'at. Beni Benim means from "3, and he probably did not see Rabbi Kook and therefore did not bring his name). Although it can be said that accuracy is not necessary, since the Ramban brings the things in the context of a discussion with Baal Ha'Maor about the limits of idolatry and incest, but there is no discussion between them about bloodshed (as explained According to this, it is possible that what the Ramban only deals with these two offenses is because they are discussed with the Baal HaMaor. But in any case it seems from the language of the Ramban there

as Rabbi Kook says, see there.

In the case where the person killed is not a pursuer, then others are also allowed to kill him (refer to the beginning of the fifth chapter where it will be explained that even among gentiles it is permissible to kill the pursuer).

Laws of kings 5, 4 And he also wrote in Mishchil to David (Pardo) about the verse 'And Jacob was very afraid and created for him', see there where he extended it; And it is also seen in the Maharil Diskin Kontras Aharon (Simon Kamed) (quoted in the statement

Rejecting the evidence based on the explanation of 'the appearance of the face'

It is possible to smell the evidence from the Yerushalmi according to the explanation of 'the appearance of the face'.

By the look on his face, he had a hard time with the words of the Jerusalemite who says: "It's not the end of what he said to kill such and such a man, but Hamos said to him such and such a man." That is: it is forbidden to ferret and rob his friend, even if by doing so the foal saves his life.

Apparently, these words of the Yerushalmi are puzzling, because there is an obligation of self-sacrifice for three **serious crimes, but we did not find that there is an obligation of self-sacrifice so as not to rob another! And why** is it explained here that regardless of whether he was told to 'kill such and such a person' or whether he was told to 'heat such and such a person' one should hand over the soul and not do so?

The appearance of the face is excused according to the Gemara in the inscriptions (19:1), where it is said:

Rav Hasda, Kasbar Ram said: Witnesses, who were told to sign a lie and do not kill - let them kill and do not sign a lie. Raba said to him: "Shut up, if you go with him to the Amalekites, they will say to him: 'Sign it and you won't fall', Damer said: You have nothing that stands in the way of soul control - only idolatry and open nudity and bloodshed!

Here we found that Rabbi Hasda says that one should surrender the soul in order not to give false testimony that will cause the other person to lose money. That is: one should die and not cause financial damage to others. In Ramban and Bershaba Shem ¹² they quoted a Tosefta that gives such an opinion:

A crime, even if he did it without witnesses and warning (see Rambam in the Laws of Kings 9:10; Ibid. 10:1). But Israel was only killed if he allowed himself to die in front of witnesses and after being warned. The crime alone does not require death, but also the serious form in which he committed it, that is: witnesses and warning. Therefore, in the case of rape - Israel is not killed, as the conditions for killing Israel were not met. But a gentile is liable if he has done an act that he is not allowed to do, even without witnesses and warning, therefore even if he commits rape when his law is "to kill and not pass away" - he is killed. It is true that all that is said here about there being a difference between Israel and Gentiles in this is not like the words of the 'Our Shimch' which will be cited later, since he understood that this law of obligation written in Yerushalmi taught Maimonides to

Halacha 'for the case of a Jew who is cured of an offense that he owes, and as follows.

12. They also bring additional explanations to the Gemara, according to which all non-Pelegian scholars do not have an obligation to sacrifice one's soul for robbery, see *ibid*; But here we brought the explanation of the Gemara concerning our matter.

Rabbi Hanina said: That is to say that Shaq embraces bloodshed. Dataninan Taman: 'Most of it came out. They do not touch him, 20/ They felt that he should not die and there is no washing of soul before soul, not the end of a rebbe who told him to kill such and such a man, but he told him to heat such and such a man. A Gentile among the Gentiles, a Gentile in Israel - must;

Israel in the Gentiles - Exemption;

The last sentence in Yerushalmi deals precisely with the issue in which the Maharash Yaffe and the crossroads were divided. After the Jerusalemite wrote the law regarding Israel - "There is no cure for bloodshed," and it is forbidden to kill the other person even when a rapist "told him to kill such and such a man" - he writes the law regarding gentiles and their attitude to Israel in these laws. And here - this issue seems to have Convincing proof of a crossroads, because in Yerushalmi it is explicitly stated that not only is it forbidden for a gentile to kill another when a rapist tells him to do so - but if he did so he "must" - be charged with death ¹¹! These things are exactly like the words of the crossroads.

J. The last sentence is a quote from a Berita that appears in the Sanhedrin treatise (Nez, 1) regarding charging a penalty for murder. It is true that in Babylon there the baryata is brought for murder just for nothing, not during rape. But the Yerushalmi did not bring the baryata, but only quoted the words 'a Gentile in a Gentile, a Gentile in Israel'

and a foreigner, and it is clear from the context in the Yerushalmi that these words were cited regarding the law of killing a Gentile as rape (and in the Yerushalmi at the end of chapter Yad Dashab a Gemara parallel to the one here is given, and there it is written 'A gentile in a gentile is a gentile in Israel is forbidden, Israel in a gentile is permitted'. That is: the language of creation is presented in the same structure but with a change of language (in order to renew the permit, as explained at the beginning of the fourth chapter regarding this Jerusalemite, see *ibid*).

11 Maimonides wrote in the Laws of Kings (10:1): "A son of Noah who neglected one of his commandments is exempt from anything." And apparently there was reason to say that when he passes because of threats of rape, he is considered to be inadvertent and should be exempted. But here in Yerushalmi it is wrongly written that he harms his friend because of threats of rape must! And it should be said that there is a difference between accidental and the rape we are talking about here. An inadvertent person did the act unintentionally, therefore it is impossible to write that it is forbidden to be inadvertent. But the rape in question here is an act done with full knowledge and will of the perpetrator, but an external reason of fear of death caused him to do the act.

The Jerusalemite says that he is obliged to this situation.

It should be noted that if Gentiles are indeed liable for an act they did under the threat of rape - then they are different from Jews in this, since the Rambam wrote about Jews (Halchot Yesodi Torah 5:4): The Lord,... and even so, because he passed by rape, he is not to be punished, and it is not necessary to say that a court of law does not punish him, even if he has been killed by rape, that there is no punishment and punishment except for the perpetrator who willingly witnesses and warns...."

The division between Jews and Gentiles in this matter can be seen from the accuracy of the Rambam's language who wrote that the exemption in Israel is because "there is no malkin and waiting except for the one who willingly passes through witnesses and warning". Goy was punished for passing

Thus: The prohibition of murder is not (only) due to the severity of the prohibition - but (also) from the fact that it is not permitted to harm another in order to be saved, even though other mitzvot are rejected due to the control of the soul.

From this we are thrown into the devotion of Gentiles: Gentiles do not have severe commandments for which one must surrender one's soul. Even idolatry among them is not as severe as among Israel ¹⁶. Therefore, due to the seriousness of the offenses, they are not required to commit suicide. But if there is a sense of self-sacrifice on the part of harming the other - as we understood in the words of Rav Hasda - in this there is no difference between Israel and Gentiles, and Gentiles are also not allowed to harm another Gentile in

order to save my soul. According to this, it is clear why in the Jerusalem issue it is written that wrongdoers are prohibited from harming each other even in the place of mental supervision: this issue is according to the opinion of Rav Hasda, and according to his opinion - just as it is forbidden to rob in the place of mental supervision, so murder is prohibited, both among Gentiles and in Israel, as explained in ¹⁸.

But for the rabbi who says that there is no problem with harming a friend instead of sanity control, and robbery is rejected because of sanity control - it is not clear what the Gentiles' law is on murder. Harming the other is not a reason to prohibit the place of supervision according to his method, and their offenses are not as serious as in Israel. In his opinion, it is possible that wrongdoers are allowed to commit murder instead of probation, because they are not required to commit suicide regardless of the seriousness of the offense. According to this, there is no evidence from the words of Rabbi Hanina against the Maharash Yaffe, since his words are aliba darv chesda, and according to the halacha it is ruled as rabba.

Rejecting evidence according to division prepared .ה healing for salvation - the light is happy

We found another excuse for the difficulty about the parting of the ways in the words of Haor Shim (about Chapter 5 of the Laws of the Basics of the Torah). Haur Simach refers there to a contradiction in the words of Maimonides, who deals with the laws concerning the mitzvos of Kiddush G-d for dedication of the soul to the mitzvot. In Halacha IV, the Maimonides wrote:

16 And refer to our article on "a sinful Gentile who will be converted" where we expanded on this.

17 This opinion is more understandable among Gentiles, since Gentiles are not obligated to save each other, and there is no connection between the supervision of one's soul, property and the life of the other; Which is not the case in Israel, which is obliged to "thou shalt not stand on thy neighbor's blood".

18 According to this explanation, it will also be understood why the Jerusalemite brings here the laws of the Gentiles, which are apparently unrelated to the issue. According to us, the Yerushalmi brings the opinion of Rav Hanina who considers as Rabbi Hasda, and the Gentile laws in the Yerushalmi are the result of their method. That is why the laws of these Gentiles are brought immediately after Rabbi Hanina's words and as a continuation of his

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words.

There are three things that do not stand before an open-minded person, and
these are: idolatry, fornication

and bloodshed; Rabbi Meir says even the robbery.

And if so, it can be explained that the words of the Jerusalemite here are according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir (according to Rabbi Meir) and not as Rabbi. This is the language of facial expression:

'It is not the end of the matter that he said to kill such and such a man, but he said to him to heat such and such a man' - this is **the interpretation of Rabbi Hamda in Babylonian chapter 2 of the book, page 19, 1, he said, 'The interpretation of Rabbi Meir witnesses who told them to sign a lie and do not kill - let them kill and not sign a lie'. But** Raba Rahi was pleased with the raids and said:

'Would you be surprised if you let the Amirinan emirs lay their hands on 'Zilo and seal it and don't be disobedient,'" Damer said bitterly: 'You have nothing that stands in the way of soul control except idolatry and indecency and bloodshed only.'

According to Halacha, one should not surrender a soul for plunder, as explained in Rambam ¹ and Shulchan Aruch; And according to this, the Yerushalmi's words about the fact that even in Hamos a so-and-so person should be killed are a single opinion that did not stop at Halachah 11 ·

According to this explanation, it is possible to explain that the words of the Yerushalmi about the fact that wrongdoers must sacrifice their souls for murder are only according to the opinion of Rav Hasda, while for the Rabbi - like the Halacha - this law is also not correct. Here is apparently the opinion of Rav Hasda Moksha: didn't we find only three transgressions for which one should hand over the soul, and as Rabbi makes it difficult. And it should be said that Rav Hasda's opinion is: although all offenses are dismissed due to the supervision of the soul, this is against Shamia. God, blessed be He, is applied to His commandments for the life of Israel. But to hurt someone else - there is no permit even in the place of mental health supervision: the other is not obliged to smile to the point of harming him. That is why it is forbidden to steal from the friend instead of controlling the soul according to Rav Hasda. And you can also understand murder

Hand. Yore Dea Kenz; Hoshen Mishpat Mu, 17; Shant, d.

Tu. It is true that in the battle of the congregation (on Shabbat, chapter 14) he wrote to justify the Yerushalmi in a different way: "Not exactly when he said to him that someone killed so-and-so and whether or not I will kill you that it is forbidden to kill his friend, but he even said to him that he robbed so-and-so and if he did not kill you it is forbidden to rob him. He himself is on his money and will come to the point of bloodshed, and this is how he took a robbery and did not take a stolen one, it is theft from the owner's mind and their desire [that there will be bloodshed here] which is not the case with theft."

The happy light explains that the one who initiated the ban will be punished, even though he initiated the ban to save himself from death. Such a situation - the offender is interested in committing the offense in order to save himself, and he is not, he can claim that the danger to the lives "forced" him to commit the offense. But when the danger of death arises from the prohibition - the rapist is not interested in committing the crime, and it is not considered that he commits it voluntarily. In such a case, he is not punished, since "there is no wrongdoing or waiting except for the one who passes by his will", according to the words of Maimonides. *And so* it is in the crown jewels (Aven ha-Ezer 15, Yetit):

And in this will be settled the words of the Rabbinat 55 of the basic laws of the Torah... Dain Onam except **that because of this death came to him, as they tried to worship 17; But the patient is not a mask** preventing the treatment, and the patient is his own face, and he wants it in order to be cured, and his desire is, and is similar to someone who wants to be killed and does it to relieve his will.

Rabbi Shimon Shakos also wrote in his innovations on inscriptions (at the end of Siman 9): And it must be said that the main difference between anus on this matter and the law is to save himself, as anus on the matter he wants it not to be the matter at all and what he does he does under compulsion but he has no deduction from the matter at all, if it were not for this matter he would not be forced to do anything. But the savior himself has a favor from the thing that if it weren't for him, he lacks the rescue and he finds a will from the reality that is the rescue and why is will most important in the case of a crime?

ח ■ י ■ צ ■ 1 פרק שלישי: מסירות נפש על רציחה - בין בגי

But the happy light becomes difficult: how did the Maimonides know that in the case of healing - the rapist is considered to have committed a crime of his own free will and is liable for punishment? And he explains that Rambam's origin is in Yerushalmi, which we mentioned

above. And these are his words:

But where did our Lord get this law from? Its origin is seen in the chapter of Yerushalmi, "There are no adversaries": "And there is no repelling soul from soul, nor the end of a thing, etc. A stranger among strangers, a stranger in Israel is obliged, Israel among strangers is exempt." And as Kai seems to have said about what he said nearby that there is no cure for the shedding of blood, and for this he said that a foreigner must be a foreigner, even if he killed someone for his cure, but Israel

19. And also in Yora Dea Shaw, Ld.

about. And similarly they wrote: Sho'at Ong Yom Tov, 13; Rezzo Education Facilitator, 2; Shavut Yaakov II, Keys; A miracle addressed to 19; A file of address lessons, section 8-9; Minach Solomon 18:5; There part 2 Peg, 11; The work of the king in the Laws of the Basic Torah chapter 5 (although refer to a new fruit in the Laws of the Basic Torah there that makes a different excuse (provided in the Book of Collections in the Frankel edition)) And we further explained this division in the appendix at the end of the chapter, see there.

And whoever it is said in it shall be killed and shall not cross and cross and not be killed - after all, this blasphemes the name,... **and even so, because he crossed in Onam, it is necessary to say that Atz is waiting for him in court, even if he killed in Onam, that there is no malkin and waiting except for the transgressor willingly** witnesses and admonishment .

And in the law, V is calculated;

As the giant said in Ensin, so they said in the scumbags... and knocks on all the prohibitions of the Torah in a place of danger except for fornication and incest and bloodshed, which even in a place of danger is not cured, and if he transgresses and is cured, the same court will punish him with the punishment he deserves.

And apparently this is a complete contradiction: in halacha 4 it is written that one who transgresses a mitzvot because of danger is not punished (even in the event that this is forbidden), while in halacha 6 it is said that one who is cured by prohibition is punished "with the punishment he deserves". And as he wrote in four stone columns there:

Tamiya Li Daha began and wrote as a giant that they said in Onsin that's what they said in the sick, and above Gabi Onsin in Halacha D wrote Dam trans in Onam there is no punishment for it and as he proved there, then why did he write here that if we are cured we will punish it? After all, he also did it out of his own selfishness! Mena Lia to divide between them? And wonder at all the interpreters of his words who did not pay attention to this and need a lot of study.

In this difficult settlement Haor wrote that he is happy that there is a division between the case of one who saved himself by the prohibition and the one who was cured by the prohibition;

Ha Veral Rala Dami for what was ruled in Halacha 4, in the place of onam even in the measure of killing and let him not cross. , Daino does of his own free will only at the will of others, who wants him to kill so-and-so and if not he will kill for something that does not kill so-and-so, then whose party is his killing if they kill the manso? A party that does not want to kill so-and-so. But here the patient who

comes to him is for no reason, only able to save himself with such and such blood or such and such foreign work. If so, it is a case of a finished object of his own volition in his life, and as every murderer wants to pour out his anger to see revenge, so here he is obliged if we are cured by all the punishments of the court.

From the first excuse we clearly see that the happy light understands that in the case of salvation - Gentiles are obliged to sacrifice their souls, and they are also allowed to kill their friends in order to be saved; If Katz understands like the Maharash Yaffe that wrongdoers are allowed to kill their friends in the case of 'kill so-and-so or I will kill you. But this is only in case of rescue; In the case of healing - they must be devoted, and even must be punished if they cross and kill in order to be saved. And from this Rambam also taught Israel, that they are obligated in the case of healing (since Israel is more severe than Gentiles, for whom there is a prohibition even in the case of salvation; and if so, it is easy and material that they will be obligated in the case of healing).

What emerges from this is that the Jerusalemite does not contradict the Mahrash Yaffe, the Jerusalemite is concerned with healing, when the killer is interested in the existence of the slain, then Gentiles are also forbidden to kill in order to heal (and even must if they killed); And the Mahrash Yaffe deals with rescue, when the killer is not interested in the existence of the slain, and the existence of the slain is the one that causes the problem, and then the gentiles are allowed to kill another in order to be saved.

According to this the Maharash Yaffe agrees with the parting of the ways that exists among the Gentiles who believe not to kill another in order to be saved, but in his opinion it only exists in the case of healing. In the event that the presence of one Gentile endangers another Gentile - the other can ask him: Why do I have to die because of your dangerous presence? And according to this he is allowed to be killed and saved. But in healing there is no opposite claim, since the killer is interested in the existence of the killed in order to be saved"

In conclusion; According to the Maharash Yaffe Goi who was told "Kill so-and-so or we will kill you" it is permissible to kill so-and-so. The happy light realized that although it is permissible to kill another gentile in the case of "kill so-and-so or we will kill you" (or in the case of a gentile who blocks the other's way of salvation, even if by rape) - it is not permitted to use his friend and kill him in order to heal.

jug. And refer to Lakman in the LD comment, in which we explained that even in the BH there is a sabra similar to these words of Haor Shim. so. In contrast to Haor Simach's words - in the words of the educational leader, it seems that according to the Mahrash Yaffe it is even permissible to be healed by bloodshed, and not only to be saved. His language is: "But the son of Noah... all the mitzvot are rejected because of the supervision of his soul because he does not command the sanctification of God and he can heal himself of the transgression, and the Mahrash knows that even bloodshed in general is good" (Menchat Shinoch Rezzo, 5). Admittedly, in the words of the teaching guide there (letter 3) there is a different opinion for prohibiting healing: "If so, in my humble opinion, there appears to be a new law with God's help, 4.. ...certainly if a rapist violates one of his commandments, and if they do not kill us - oh, he is allowed to pass and not kill. But if they catch a sick person who is in danger, and if he does not heal himself

In men, he is exempt from sin, and if Israel is healed by murdering Israel, he is also obligated, and if he says that a Gentile is obligated [even on a back that does not command God's sanctification] or because Noah 's son was killed, even if he says that it is permissible to be healed by murder according to our law, no matter how it is expressed, he will be healed penally The same punishment he deserves and

Doc.

The happy light understood that the words of the Jerusalemite about "foreigner in foreigner" etc. are not dealing with the trial before them, in the case of a gentile **"who said to him** (a rapist) **kill so-and-so", but in the words of Rabbi Hanina: "There is no maharfin from bloodshed". On this law it is written that a wrongdoer is liable if he transgressed the prohibition and harmed his friend in order to be saved. In the case of the healing of the Jerusalemite, a wrong writer must, and the same is the case** in Israel. This is how the Maharambam taught that even though a martyr is exempt, a healer must, and there is no difference in this between Israel and Gentiles.

Although according to this one should understand why the Jerusalemite wrote the judgment among the Gentiles and not in Israel. Didn't we talk about Israel until now! What is the innovation that Gentiles have that makes it preferable to write this Halacha on them?

To this the happy light answers two answers:

And Kamsmeh Len Havba Daf a foreigner is obligated [even on the basis that he does not command God's sanctification], or because Ben Noah was killed even if he says it is permissible to be cured by murder according to our law.

That is:

Gentiles have an innovation because they are not obligated to sacrifice themselves, .X yet in the case of healing they are obligated to sacrifice themselves and even must be punished if they went through and were healed by murder (in other words: compared to Israel who have a transition from exemption (saving) to obligation (healing) - with Gentiles this is a greater innovation Because we go from permitted

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(in salvation) to required (in healing)).

Gentiles are also obligated in the case of 'Omer Muthram' because they had to study ב.ג.
22 ; And I would think that instead of controlling the mind, there is a great deal of
reason to think that it is permissible - we will not oblige the gentile, because there
is room to make a mistake in this ^{as c}. That's why the Jerusalemite came to teach
us that wrongdoers must even say such a 'permissible' and despite the great reason
to permit.

< come. In print: "Mashov", and it seems that it is not.

approx. Refer to the end of Halacha 1 in Chapter 10 of the Laws of Kings.

Kg. And it corresponds to the fact that according to his method in saving it is permissible for a
gentile to kill another, and therefore there is reason to think that it would also be
permissible in healing.

It is true that the hard damach (in Halachot Yesodi Torah 5:5; was also quoted in the money
mishna there):

Even though it is found in the addendum according to his words - he did not know
the taste of May, Daha collects' **in the Passovers so Damshom the most
serious in bloodshed 'he will kill and not cross' Dasbra is:** 'Why
did the front of Dadma Didach somek tefi?', and the next Lika Hai Sabra Daha will
kill everyone and he himself , and it is better that he himself be killed and not kill
everyone!

But the money has already changed its name:

What is written in high bloods, 'Sabra is' is not the main point, they had a dakbala
in their hands, that they had a blood pressure for him to die and not to work, but
they gave a reason from the sabra to this one, but it is not the most Nami, even
if this one does not belong to the taste, Oi Dinah, he was killed and let him not
pass."

Difference between Israel and the Gentiles - Sabra vs. .n Mitzvot of self-sacrifice

Now we will discuss a faction of Gentiles:

save himself .

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In faction what is forbidden is because the surrender stems from wickedness; And he is in the Mahram Shik Yod Siman Kana and Beit Yitzchak Yod 2 Co., Kesav. And this is also proven in the Chazon Ish, who compares the law of handing over in a faction to the law of throwing a dove into the sea because of the storm, even though the danger of the storm does not arise from wickedness (Yorah Dea Set; Sanhedrin 20). of a faction trapped under a building. The permission in Chazon Ish Shem is based on the fact that no one is killed but only the danger is diverted from the many (similarly to the fact that one person is allowed to divert harm in the laws of munitions as long as it did not reach him, even if due to the diversion of the nook - it will reach another (Yerushalmi Baba Kama 3:1), refer also to Tzitz Eliezer on this matter (10:5)); but killing was not really permitted (and refer to this further in the dedication money on the Shulchan Aruch Hoshen, Law 18 of the Shachak, Sec. 18). In Simen Tzeg he wrote that the sect's judgment is only when gentiles want to transfer us, and not when it is the reality that then there is no belief 'from the front' and there is no obligation to sanctify Hashem, see there. And according to his opinion, this is how a death for others in the kingdom is explained, see his words at the end of Simen 17 in the right column .

XXI And refer to the latter ones (for example: Merkavat Mishna, there; Ḥot Ḥaḥ Ḥishnat mag; Ḥṭṭdam Hamd Shlomo Siman 4; Ahiezer Yore Dea 16:5; Chidhushei R. Shimon Shekum Ketovut 3; Mishpat Cohen Kemag) which strengthened and clarified the words of the money Substitute these.

And, a summary mess

to heal in another	'Kill such or i will kill	Hot through	1
permitted	permitted	allowed	1
forbidden	permitted	permitted	1
forbidden	forbidden	(will be explained	Crossroads Y

G. faction

Ita in Yerushalmi (end of chapter 8 in contributions):

Give: factions of people who were walking along the road and were attacked by Gentiles and said: 'Give us one of you and we will kill him, and if not we will kill all of you' - even if they are all killed, they will not deliver a single soul from Israel; They will single out one such as Sheva ben Bakri - they will hand him over and not be killed. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: And he who will be responsible for the death of Sheba ben Bakri. And Rabbi Yochanan said: Although he is not obligated, he died about seven years old.

And it was ruled in Rama'a (Yorah Dea Kanz, 1):

Gentiles who said to Israel: 'Give us one of you and we will be killed' - they will not give them one of them unless they unite him and say give us so-and-so. And there are those who say that Rafilo ^{Bakhai} has no moral character unless he is obliged to die as a seven-year-old son .

By transgressing one of his seven commandments, he will die - surely he is not allowed on the part of the priest to save himself in this transgression... and this is true and clear." But the viceroy disagrees with him on this, as he points out there. ~

c. This law is also true when the group of people is in danger that does not arise from wickedness, then there is no issue of God's sanctification towards the wicked in the non-handover of the individual in favor of all. For example: when a group of people was trapped in an earthquake under the ruins of a building, and their only way to be saved is by one killing shot - this is prohibited for the same reason. This is how they see the layers of the Ramach and the silver mishna that were brought to Lakman, who discuss the matter from

the side of Sverat "Mai Chazada" and do not mention an additional sabra to prohibit because of God's sanctification (and in any case, this is how they see many of the latter who extended the words of the silver mishna to Beer, see the next note). In addition, this is proven from the words of the Glory of Israel (Aholot 7:6 in Boaz), which renews that when a mother and child are about to die and the only way to save the mother is to kill the child (otherwise both will die) - it is permissible to kill the child. The Pride of Israel understands that this law must be reconciled with the prohibition of handing over in a faction, and does not divide

According to him - even among gentiles it will be forbidden to hand over in the case of a faction when they are not singled out, because everyone who wants to hand over his morals claims against the others: 'May Hadith Dadma Didkhem Somek Tefi Madmei hand over yourselves and not me!'

But the education facilitator believes that even if they are not singled out - there is no reason to ban the handover, because the one who is handed over is valued: 'What do you care? After all, you'll die with everyone anyway!'

Bloodshed is re-killing and he should not cross the side of the sabra. May the front/ And we would say that if his friend was saved by giving his life, he should give his life to save his friend, but the next one, even if he gives his life, his friend will be killed because the rapist wants to kill everyone, and if so, why would he kill? Since his brother is not saved - if so everyone else can save himself from a coward and it would be appropriate to be 'every Dalim man', why would one brother give up his life for nothing without saving his friend?

According to his opinion, even when they are not singled out - the ban on Jews does not stem from sarcasm, but from the severity of a murder like we found from the money from Nacht. Gentiles don't have murderous hardware, so it's permissible to kill one to save all, even if they don't single him out, because you didn't think 'maybe a front' in a case where all would be killed anyway?

Nineteenth As the words of the Silver Mishnah are also explained in the order of purity for the gods 7:6; And it is also seen from the words of the 16th chapter of Yore Dea Kenez, 19th century, which discusses the case of women who were told: 'Give one and impure her, and if not we will defile all of you' and explains "Let one of them get together and say: 'If you do not allow her to be defiled, then we will all kill you. ', Dapshita Damhani is unique

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in this and they will hand her over, since there is no act by the woman here and it is not at all adultery, and if so she herself is not killed at all and should not cross - therefore they will hand her over if she is married, so it seems in my humble opinion." The 16 emphasizes that only if together is it permissible to surrender one, but when not together each can say to her friends 'I don't want to go, and if you think that one should be surrendered - surrender yourselves', and as was explained in the money change. But according to the explanation of the education facilitator - there is no room for a division between 'separate' and 'non-separate', since in any case one must be surrendered for all of them, and therefore the law should be 'every Dalim prevails' (or, more precisely: every Dalima prevails), or oblige to make a fate and according to it determine who will be delivered. To. Although it is possible that the money also admits that the admonition not to kill each other in the event that they are not singled out is true* only in Israel, for whom the admonition leaves a prohibition in place, and the one who wants to allow killing is the "issuer" and therefore his friends argue to him: Surrender yourself and do not kill others. But with Gentiles - who in principle have no devotion to the mitzvot and the propaganda creates a new prohibition - maybe the money also makes a difference

Even according to a parting of the ways that says wrongdoers are obliged to sacrifice their souls for murder - they are obliged to de masbara. In the case of a faction in which one was singled out for killing - there is no reason not **to kill them. To save everyone, because surely everyone's blood (and he is among them) is worth more** than his blood alone. And indeed, the educational leader (Ratso, Kah) wrote that the tzligoys - simply give away that which is special, and thereby save everyone:

And here it seems simple, according to the words of the money, that Mishna is accepted in our hands, but Dvash'm gave **another reason for it, so in Ben Noah, according to what the Rambam ruled** (chapter 10 of Kings Halachah 2), **one should surrender himself even to idolatry.**

Hashem, but with bloodshed, the Mishnah wrote to the viceroy there because from the point of view he too will be killed because his friend's soul is lost, he is not allowed to pass because of 'May Hazard' see there... So in Ben Noah Kahai Guna if a rapist is singled out for one of them even though he is not obligated to die In any case, since they are Naharin, it does not belong to the Shabra and it is forbidden to surrender their lives.

If so in the case where one is singled out - among the Gentiles it is certainly allowed; And in Israel this is subject to controversy

(Supposedly, and disagreement among the arbitrators).

Is there actually a name issue even in the case where they are not singled out? This depends on the question of why one of the members of the faction should not be handed over to save all in the event that one is not singled out. The money changer understood that in this case the sabbarah prohibits the delivery:

On the pretext that they did not single him out, that they did not say but give one of you and we will kill him, in each of them who want to hand him over to Mimar Leho: What is his face that you will hand him over? Give one of you and save it! Damai his front Ddma Dhaich blush tefi - dalma dama dhai blush tefi? And according to this claim it is impossible for them to hand over any of them.

sect. Apparently this is allowed according to both opinions in the Mahresh Yafa and as we will detail: if it is a case in which one is singled out - surely this is allowed, since then it is a

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rescue since the presence of the one singled out endangers the person who kills him. Although if it is a case in which one was not singled out - killing one in some cases is healing and taking advantage of the presence of the slain (for example: everyone is stuck in the desert, and one needs to be given to predatory animals to distract them from the other people who will be saved); And we wrote above that it is possible that there is no permit to kill according to the Mahrash Yaffe when the presence of the person being killed is taken advantage of. But it seems that even those who think so will admit that in the case of a faction it is permissible to kill in order to save oneself, because without it everyone will die, and therefore there is no reason to prohibit this killing (refer to what is written later in the ruling and the comment after the next one).

J. The difference in salvation between Israel and the Gentiles

Above we have brought forth examples of acts between gentiles in Israel in the dedication of the soul for the mitzvah of murder to the method of separation of ways. Now it seems that even in the explanation of "May Hazad" itself there is a difference between Israel and the Gentiles. That is: even according to the parting of the ways, which claims that there is "no front" in the Gentiles - this is not the same opinion as the one that is said in Israel.

The interpretation of "May Front" in Israel is explained by Rashi Soh (Sanhedrin Ad, 1 D.H. May

front ^{of the heart});

'May you face, did you die, did you blush,' - who knows that your blood will be kinder and more beautiful to your creator than the blood of your brother? This is not to say here: 'You shall live in them - and you shall not die in them'. The scripture did not allow it except because of the kindness of Israel's soul to the KKK, and here there is a loss of his friend's soul, the king's word is not given to postpone the order for the murder.

In other words: in principle, Israel must surrender their souls to all the mitzvot - but there is a special verse that allows them to pass when the soul of Israel is saved by it: "and live in them". When one soul is spared and another is killed - we have gained nothing, and the prohibition of committing crimes even in Makos of sacrificing a soul is blinded to its place.

And also the Ba'h wrote in his Shu'at (Haishnot Mag):

Isn't the main point of the May dekamer, 'May the front of your dadmach sumka tfi' and all of it is nothing but a depravish, that we will commit a crime and Israel

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will also be killed - it is better that you be killed and not be committed a crime.
Dam not so, Mai Kamer 'May Khadesh Dadmach sumka tfi' and all, on the contrary,
she is the one who gives Damakh 'Mai Khadesh' Amaranan 'Hainim Kudmin', and
as a darish Rabbi Akiva in the chapter 'Izhu Nishech' to the akiton of Maim Dam
both will drink both will die Amaranan Mai Khadash You smiled Kormin, but Baal
Kareach, the main flavor is because

Takes care of himself, and therefore there for all men we become 'all Dalim men' (similar
to what we wrote in the previous comment).

heart. And so it is in Rashi in the additional sources of 'Mai Hazad' in the Gemara (cited at
the beginning of the chapter).

Lg. Baba Metzia Sev, a.

He wrote in the book Tefarat Lemshe (Yorah Dea Keno):

It seems from all places that the ministers will give another according to the fate of their children as Ovada Duna, and also explained from the Ovada of the Gibeonites, they said, "Give us 7 people, and we will give them to God, and we will give according to the reception of the ark, even if they are not separated..."

According to the method of boasting to Moshe - to Man Damer, which is allowed to give when they are singled out - it is allowed to give even when they are not singled out if they do a lottery, because we want to save as much as possible anyway.

The Chazon Ish (Sanhedrin) disagreed about Moshe's boasting in this:

At the beginning of repentance, he brought poison to Moses in the name of glory according to fate, one can hand over the only one as we mentioned in Jonah and the sons of Saul, they will die by pen. To know who caused the noise and Jonah himself told them to throw him into the sea and that Rabbi Shaul according to a prophecy made by David, but mere mortals are not allowed to decide according to fate...

We will not get into the controversy of the praise of Moses and the vision of the Jewish people - but simply that among Gentiles it is permissible to make a lot and decide according to that who will deliver and thereby save everyone. For Gentiles, the prohibition stems solely from a sabbarah. In the case where they will all die anyway - the HaSabra says that it is better for them to draw lots and choose one than for all of them to die."

that there is no prohibition to kill even in the event that they are not singled out (the difference between explanations for Jews and Gentiles is well explained to Kaman in the body of the chapter, see *ibid.*).

No. It is possible to find differences of opinion on the question of whether some of the faction can force the others to make a fate or 'every Dalim is a man', although the others prefer the second option. The education leader says that in a situation where one must be handed over, they do 'every dalim man' as we have seen, and it is impossible to argue against this 'from a front'; But in the opinion of the glory to Moshe, we see that he realized that 'every Dalim is a man' is an unacceptable solution, and destiny is a good solution; And if so, it turns

out that even among the Gentiles, one can force others to make a fate and not decide on 'each Dalim Gebr'. The money changer also understood that you believed that 'may have a front' rejects the possibility of 'every Dalim is a man', and according to him it turns out that fate would be the desired solution for gentiles. Although it is possible to divide this and say that among Jews - everyone is a guarantee to each other to solve the problem and therefore fate is better than 'all dalim men', but among Gentiles - in the state of self-sacrifice that fell upon them - there are no mutual charges and each

The gentile who is killed cannot convince that he should not be killed because of a "front line" - there is no prohibition to kill him. There are cases in which the explanation allows that it is permissible for one to kill the other, since there is a "past life" claim, and the "from the front" theory is not always correct (as explained in B'Hali). In such cases - Gentiles will be allowed to kill the other for this reason, even if it is forbidden for Jews.

11 Nefka appointed a ready Jew for the Gentiles

Reuven committed a crime and was not careful, and hurt Shimon who suffered human wounds. Shimon will not be able to live, unless a liver from a healthy person is transplanted into his body. He wants to kill Reuven, and take his liver in order to be saved.

In Jews - it seems forbidden. Although Reuben committed a crime, he does not have to die for it. A Jew must surrender his soul in order not to commit bloodshed, because if a crime is committed here - we will not 'spare' the lives of Israel.

to him. A similar wording is also found in Sho'al and Shiv 1a, 2b: "One must not reject one's soul for another's sake, but a person himself is allowed to reject another's life for his own life.

Led. In the case of someone who hurt his friend on purpose - it will be understood that even in Israel there is a sabbath to allow him to be killed in order to take his liver and thereby save the exile. This is according to the words of the Rabbi in Baba Kama (22:2). The Gemara there deals with the dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Dish Lakish as to whether he was burned because of his arrows or because of him, and it brings evidence to Rabbi Yochanan: "Ta Shema: He who lights the gadish, and there will be a goat of his feet and a slave next to him and burned with him - obliged, a slave of his feet and a goat next to him And he was burned with him - exempt; for the sake of the MD I will be burned because of his half, because the most exempt, but for Man Damer I will be burned because of him, my mother is exempt? If he killed a Torah servant, the most Nami is not obligated? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said to you: This May we are dealing with - when

he set fire to his body of a slave, dekam liya in derba minya". In the Tosafs and in the Rashba it is explained that there is 'Kim liya barraba minya' because the arsonist is considered a persecutor, and because of the charge of his death as a persecutor he is exempt from paying the shadow of what he harmed. Although the Rashba adds: "But I asked a question to me: To Rish Lakish Dhuha Liya when setting the fire on the body of a slave obligates his soul, and after the death of the slave the Gaddish is burned, and Amai is exempt from the Gaddish? And it should be said that the Gaddish before the death of the slave, Dchal Shata and Shata Haskinan Liya Dodif until the death of the slave, but if the gaddish is burned after the death of the slave, he is obligated, and according to the doctrine in the chapter Ben Surer and Mora (Sanhedrin Ag, 1) 'those who let themselves be saved with their soul, a transgression in them is not saved with their soul', as above, and I still need a Talmud. That is to say. : The Rabbi makes it difficult that, according to Rish Lakish, this is about someone who "set fire to the body of a slave, and if so it turns out that the Gadish was burned after the slave died. In such a situation - why is he considered a persecutor? After all, the persecution is over? And so he makes an excuse that even though he set fire to the body of a slave - the slave died After the Gaddish is chased, and as long as the slave is not dead - the person who ignites the body of the saber is still considered a chaser

That Israel is killed here and the mitzvah is void - why would it be better in the eyes of the place that you transgress a mitzvah, why should your blood be dearer to it than the blood of this ^{one} ?

Gentiles, on the other hand, are not commanded at all to sanctify God: "even one who is forced to worship a foreign idol works, according to the fact that they are not commanded to sanctify God." With them there is no offense, since there are no offenses among gentiles instead of mental control, and the prohibition is only because of the claim of the slain against the slayer. Here the explanation is said to create a prohibition, not to leave an existing prohibition in its place. **The meaning is that in Israel it is forbidden to violate the prohibition of murder in any case, since this will harm another Jew and in any case the basis for the permit is null and void. But in a gentile there must be a sabra explaining why it is forbidden** to kill the other gentile, and it is this sabra said by the person killed that creates the prohibition, since in principle the gentiles are not bound by their mitzvot instead of soul control. If

Led. It is necessary to extend the understanding of these words of the Bah: the Bah quotes from the Gemara as Baba Metzia that when years go by in the desert and the hand is looking for a bucket of water - the owner of the water claims 'my previous life', therefore he is allowed to keep the water with him in order to live and not give it to Hebraz as well . From this the BAH learns in the case of a rapist who says, 'Kill so-and-so or I will kill you', that it is permissible for a rapist to kill in order to be saved, since he is claiming a 'past life' (and what is forbidden in Israel is because we will lose a soul here anyway, and if so there is no reason to allow passing on prohibition). And apparently it is difficult to learn this from this: after all, during the years when one is walking in the desert with a bag of water in one's hand - the one who leaves the water with him and claims 'Hey Kudamim' does not harm the other in any way (and refer to the author's signature there which says that if the other has water in my hand - I should give it to him , because he is the one who claims 'my previous life' by virtue of his ownership of the water; and it is a matter of fact that it is forbidden to take by virtue of water from the other). And if so - how can one learn from the permission of the Gemara there in the case where I kill and kill another?

And it seems to explain the opinion of the BH in that there is a difference between a case of water in the desert and a case of 'killing so-and-so': in the case of water in the desert - the presence of the other does me no harm, and if I suffer from his water - then I take

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advantage of his presence and is healed by it; And in this the bah understood that there is no place to explain 'my past life' since the owner of the water claims 'from a front' that you are involving me in your problem with the water and are taking advantage of my presence in order to be saved? But in the case of 'kill so-and-so' - the presence of so-and-so (who 'tangled' with the rapist) causes me harm and forces me to choose between my life and his life; And in such a situation he can't argue against 'May Fahad' because I can say to him: 'May Fahad that I will have to suffer because of your presence?', and that is why I hurt him because 'my previous life'.

It follows from what has been said: If the HC believes that the theory of 'may have a front' is sufficient to oblige gentiles to sacrifice their lives for murder - in his opinion, this will only be in the case of healing and not rescue (as we wrote in the opinion of the happy light).

her. Rambam Laws of Kings 10:2 (quoted above).

Although in cases where my employer harms me - I am allowed to harm my employer, and he cannot claim "from a front", since I can claim "my employer first" (on the weight of my "**past life**"), and why would I have to suffer your damage without being able to defend myself? As stated in the Gemara (Bava Kama 20, 1):

A bull that climbed on top of his friend for our turn and the lower owner came and dropped his and the upper one fell and died exempt.

Pushed to the top and he died - if he could drop it and didn't drop it, then it is obligatory, and if he couldn't drop it, then it is exempt .

When a person sees a bull that is harming his bull - he does not need to find out whether it is the owner's crime or whether the bull's owner has kept his bull very well and the bull is harming the owner's well-being. In any case, he is allowed to defend himself against the bull that harms him; And in particular that the Gemara explicitly states this baryata also in bulls Tam, regarding which it was ruled that 'just bulls are in possession of permanent preservation'. That is: even when the owner is exempt from paying - I am allowed to harm his harmful property in order to defend himself against his damage.

And as the Rabbi concludes (Halakhot nazaki monon, 5):

If his friend's money damages his money and it is not possible for him to save his own except by damaging his friend's money, it is permissible, and it is not

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necessary to be damaged by his friend.

It occurred to us that when someone else's wealth harms my wealth - even if it is through the rape of the owner of the harmful wealth - it is permissible to defend oneself and harm the harmful wealth in order to be saved from its harm, and its owner cannot argue against

'Why did you kill your father?'

He took the money in his hands. The Shach's opinion is that although Sam will take it in his hands. It's simple that he is liable as we wrote in the body of the chapter - in the event that he only handed over and did not take in his hands an exemption, since what is handed over is only liable for a fine because it is actually a grama, and this fine was not charged when it was committed by rape, even if it was financial rape. But even according to the Shach, there is no permission to hand over money in rape of money in the first place, as explained in the GRA (ibid. Sec. 20), since this includes the opinion of "not a front" as explained inside.

Lt. Shulchan Aruch Hoshan Mishpat Shep, 2 which summarizes the explanation of the baryata in the Gemara.

M. Baba Kama Tu, 1; Shu'a Ch'om A, a. And also refer to the words of the House Yosef in Hoshan Mishpat at the end of Siman Shep; And in the Rama's Association Siman Tza, 3 which is the source of the words of the ways of Moshe there. And we will explain things more in the appendix at the end of the chapter.

But in gentiles - the injured gentile cannot be prohibited from harming the one who injured him. With them, the opinion of 'may front' is the opinion of a person to his friend, which the murdered claims against the murderer. Here **the wounded man cannot ask 'from the front', since the whole disaster happened through his fault! The question** here is asked of him: 'Who can pretend' that you can hurt another carelessly without bearing the consequences of your actions?

12. Rescue from Madak - in money and in terms of lives

You said "may the front" without the severity of the prohibition of "thou shalt not murder" can also be said in Mamon: "may the front did you die, did you blush, do you die?". Even with money when the choice is to give someone else's money or your money will be harmed - it is forbidden to give the friend's money, and the person who takes his friend's money in such a case is obligated, as explained in Shulchan Adukh⁸.

that he can be killed to save the persecuted, and therefore he is exempt from what he harmed at that time. And if so in the case where taking the persecutor's liver would help save the persecuted - it is permissible to do so, because he still has a persecutor's right to be killed in order to save.

Although in the opinion of the Tosafs, who did not make this comment, it seems that they also believed that Laman Damer 'fired for his own sake' - if he set fire to the slave's body, he will be absolved of everything that happens, because everything is a result of this act of arson, and for one act they say 'Kim liya in darba minya' Even if the persecution is over (and even though it is not one act for the purposes of the law of persons - for the purposes of persecution it is considered one act). And according to their opinion there is no need for the renewal of the rabbi, and apparently they believe that it is forbidden to kill another persecutor who has done his act (even if the persecuted one takes advantage of it), because the renewal is in 'Kim liya in darba minya' and not in persecution.

And in the opinion of the Rabbi, it is possible that it is permissible to kill the persecutor who has done the act of persecuting if the persecutor will benefit from it - it is only when his presence causes danger (for example: he forcibly blocks the way to put out the fire, etc.), then I look at him as continuing to persecute me: But to be healed and to take advantage of his presence to be saved is not allowed, because in this he does not continue to persecute.

(Also refer to Ahiezer Ibn HaEzer 19: And there is more to be extended in the explanation of these words of the Rashba, etc.). In the case of Onam - there is no place to permit in

Israel. And Gentiles (if it is said that they command dedication of soul) - this should be discussed apparently according to the disagreement of the Rabbis and the disagreement of the Shulchan Aruch and the Shach regarding the case of one who was forced to show his friend's wealth in their own souls (Hom Shafach, 4 and Bashach, Sec. 24, See also the first appendix to the chapter in paragraph f), where they differed on the question of who is called the one on whom the rape fell: the one from whom the money was actually taken, or the one who was forced to take it by threats. And apparently the same dispute will be here on the question of who was raped: on the one who actually died, or on the one who causes this death.

damp. Shefah, 2 Barma. It is true that the section there (Section 22) retroactively exempts a person in rape of money from payment, if not

The woman who makes it difficult for the child cuts the child in the intestine and removes him organ by organ because his life is ruined. His head came out, no one touches him, no one repels a soul from him soul.

What will be the law in the case that is similar to it in the law of employers? Someone sold the embryo of his cow after a pregnancy . Now the cow is making it difficult for the child and the only way to save her is to cut the fetus. If they don't cut the fetus - the cow will die and the fetus will live.

It can be understood that the fetus harms the cow, and therefore the owner of the cow is allowed to kill it like a bull that got on top of his friend. Even though the damage is rape - it is permissible to harm the harmed person with rape in order to defend himself from his harm, as we explained.

Although it is possible to understand that the cow harms the child as well, since it does not allow him to leave her womb, and if so there are years here that are harmed by rape, as Ibn Hazel says (The Laws of a Murderer and the Protection of the Soul 1:9): On this Dahasha in that she blocks the fetus from exiting Hoi Mezmat Hoi Hoi Nami a murderer." In such a situation it is not clear who is the harmer and who is the harmed, so there is no permission for one to harm the other. To illustrate the sentence: if my wealth falls by force on the horns of a bull and the horns harm it - surely it is not permissible to harm the bull, since it does not harm me, but I am harmed by it. Similar to this: if Reuben's bull falls in rapine on Shimon's bull and with it he strangles his bull, and the strangled bull hurts Reuben's bull in order to save himself from being strangled - Reuben must not harm Shimon's bull because

his bull is the harm here. In a woman and a fetus - it is impossible to know who is considered the one who started the damage and is guilty of it, therefore it is impossible to determine who is harming whom. No one can say that the other is harmful and no one can harm the other.

If we understand as the second option that the mother and the fetus harm each other - it is clear why a woman who makes it difficult for a child must not kill the fetus, as in customary law. But if we understand that the fetus harms the mother and she does not harm him - why is it forbidden for a woman to kill the fetus in her intestine after it has removed its head? After all, she explains her "past life" and she is allowed to defend herself, just like in the laws of mammoth where the owner of the cow is allowed to kill the harmful fetus!

Mb. Refer to Sho'a Chom Ret, 4, how the sale should be done in order for it to apply (by the way: also refer to the ends of the chest there, section 3, which brings a tax collector to the assumptions made regarding the prohibitions of souls in the fetus).

13. The meaning of the laws of souls of Gentiles

We have seen that even according to the parting of the ways - which says that the belief "from the front" exists in the laws of the souls of Gentiles - it is no stronger than in the laws of mammoths. In the Gentiles there is no seriousness of murder, but only a presumption. If in the law of persons it is allowed to harm a harming person and you did not think "from a front" - also in the law of souls it should be allowed to harm a harming person from the law of "past lives". In Israel, to prove this, the doctrine of "from the front" reinforces an existing prohibition, and there is no doctrine of "my previous life" since a Jew is obligated to surrender his soul if there is no smell of Israel's life.

According to this, in the case where a Gentile harms his fellow man according to the law of souls, even if he does so by rape, it is permissible for the harmed person to harm him also according to the separation of ways, as in the law of mammon. For example: Capricorn climbs a high ladder. Suddenly, a sword falls out from under him, and it is a sword "that was strong and tight and fell off, or it got stuck... This is a blow by the hands of Heaven ." He falls on another Gentile who is standing below, and this causes the lower one to die. The one who falls. Another example: A gentile is attacked by an epileptic fit (rape) and this fit causes him to knock the one next to him off the top of the roof. The other's only way to be saved is to throw the sick person himself. Here also a parting of the ways admits that it is

permissible for the person killed to throw the sick person, since he harms him, And the slain man can claim against him "my previous life". This law is the same as the "bull that went over his fellow" in the above mentioned cases.

In Jews, on the other hand; There is an obligation to surrender the soul to the Torah. It is true that when the soul of Israel will be saved - the Torah permitted most of the prohibitions: "and live by them". But when Israel dies in any case - one must hand over the soul so as not to commit a crime; And if so, it is simply forbidden to kill in the case of "kill so-and-so or we will kill you", as we explained above according to Rashi. And this opinion is also true in the case of Israel killing another Israel in their own way, that the killed must not hurt the killed in order to be saved, since we will not spare a soul from Israel here.

Hand. the difficulty for the child

It is said in the Mishnah (Ahlot 7:6):

Ma. See Shulchan Aruch Choshan Mishpat Sha'ach, 3.

Tu. Discord as a tool and a Jerusalemite

The Gemara in the Sanhedrin (Eb, 2) says:

Rav Huna said: The little one who persecutes can be saved with his soul. A chasing Xaver needs no warning, neither a desolate hater nor a small hater. Rabbi Itibia of the Wild to Rabbi Hona: 'If his head is out, he shall not be touched, according as no soul shall be repelled from another soul.' And my mother? Chaser is! that I have
a desire **to pursue her.**

It seems that the Gemara understood that although the child endangers the mother even though she does not endanger him, she must not kill him because he endangers her by rape, according to the words of the Glory of Israel (Aholot 4:6):

And he said that he was a pursuer who wanted to save him with his soul - that I
was the next one who was not prepared to give birth to death.

According to this understanding, there is more severity in the souls of Israel than money as

above. But in Jerusalem

Dessanhedrin (8:9) means differently:

What is saving the big in the soul of a small? Rabbi Yermiah's translation: And the crocodile's head came out and most of it was not touched, so that soul does not turn away from soul. Rabbi Yossi in Rabbi Bon's name Rabbi Hesda: Shaniya is a man that you do not know who killed whom.

The Jerusalemite says that there is no evidence from the Mishnah that it is forbidden to kill a small chaser, since here they are chasing each other, as interpreted by Hafin Moshe: That is: just as she is dangerous and about to die because of Hold, so Nami Hold is about to die because of the difficulty of her birth and she should be called chasing him just as he is chasing her.

According to this, if indeed only one party pursues the other - even if he does it by rape - it is permissible to kill him, like the laws of property in which it is allowed to harm the property of the person harming even if it is harmed by rape. What emerges from this is that the question of whether it is permissible for Israel to kill an Israeli after the one killed by rape is subject to Babylonian-Jerusalem controversy: according to the Babylonian, it is forbidden to kill him even though it is harmful because there is severity in the prohibition of murder; But according to the Jerusalemite, it is permissible to kill him, and what makes it difficult

Mo. And he is with the help of Cohen Kat.

The things are in line with what we wrote that in Israel - there is no permission to kill unless we gain Israeli life here. Here, one of them will die anyway, and therefore the woman should stay **in the Shev and not do anything and she should not kill to save herself** ^{from} . **There is more seriousness in souls** than in ordinary property laws, and it is forbidden to kill a persecutor by rape even though it is permissible to harm the harmful property by rape.

And according to Rabbi Yisraeli (right column, Mark 16:4, 6):

And even though a fetus from the outside of its head is not to be touched, it is only in Israel from the point of bloodshed that exists in Israel.

In mamonos, on the other hand, there is no obligation of devotion and do not do anything, and it is necessary to check in any case who is the harmer, as explained above.

Among the Gentiles, the law is the same as the laws of the appointed, for with them devotion of the soul is only an explanation of "no front" of 'between a person and his fellow' and not by virtue of an obligation of devotion to a mitzvah. If in civil law it is permissible for the owner of the cow to kill the fetus that harms it - it is also permissible for the woman who gives birth to kill the fetus that endangers her with the claim of "past life".

Mag. Although the Meiri (Sanhedrin EB, 2 D.H. and the Talmud) brought an opinion that a woman is allowed to kill the fetus: "The sages of the generations before us wrote yes, he wanted to say that the woman herself can cut that she is persecuted, and whoever is persecuted where there are no others holding the persecutor is himself permitted ". But we did not find another source in the Rishonim for this opinion, and on the contrary - from the words of the Rishonim we see that they believe that even the woman herself is not allowed to harm the fetus: this is what the Meiri language means when they bring this opinion; This is proven in Rashi (Sanhedrin Ab, 2 D.H. 'his head came out') which makes it difficult why it is forbidden to kill a fetus whose head has come out even though it was permitted to hand over Sheba ben Bakri - and if he had understood the words of the sages of the ages there would not have been such a difficulty, since Sheba ben Bakri was handed over by the injured parties themselves and not by a third party, and the injured parties themselves are allowed to kill the pest in our issue; And so it means in Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch that they did not mention a division between a midwife

and the woman herself.

gauge. It should be extended in what links it there to the controversy between the Rambam and the Rabbad at the end of the laws of Habul and Mazik, and there is no place here.

what. And from what they wrote in the Tosafs (Sanhedrin Net, 1 DD "Likha") that even among Gentiles, the midwife is not allowed to harm the newborn (and they are satisfied with what the law is when the head has not yet come out), there is no evidence, because they are talking about the midwife, who is a third party, and it is possible that the Tosafs believe that a third party is not allowed to intervene in favor of one of the parties, even though they are allowed to save themselves.

Here it is impossible to determine that the fetus pursues the woman, but rather there is a situation where both parties are guilty and in any case it is 'from heaven' and there is no permission to harm the fetus ⁸". According to this possibility - there is no difference between Jews and Gentile laws, and it is permissible to kill a pursuer by rape both physically and mentally .

In any case, Gentiles' laws of self-devotion are no more cute than the laws of mammoths, so there is no dispute that a Gentile is allowed to kill a Gentile who falls on him from the roof in rape and is about to be killed.

<p>The Babylonian thanks the Jerusalemite (Explanation 3)</p> <p>Do not interfere</p>	<p>There is a dispute only in the laws of appointment (dam 2)</p> <p>Babylonian: The owner of the cow is allowed to</p>	<p>The Jerusalemite thanks the Babylonian (Explanation 1)</p> <p>The owner of the cow is</p>	<p>* Controversy in Babylon; A Jerusalemite! i possibility of explanation . ; (The simple explanation. n in</p>	<p>Babylonian: The owner of the cow is allowed to harm the fetus</p> <p>The law on the Sera fetus (and the Gentile fetus)</p>
<p>It is forbidden to harm</p>	<p><u>Do not hurt</u></p>	<p><u>Do not hurt</u></p>	<p>] It is forbidden to harm</p>	<p>The law is in the fetus</p>

brain This is how it is explained in the book 'Shebat Mihuda' by Rabbi Ontedman (first gate, letter 11) in the opinion of Maimonides. (Although one must ask whether the persecutor himself, who is rational, must kill himself - after all

Israel is commanded to save the persecuted in the soul of the persecutor. etc.).

It should be noted that in Rashi's opinion it is difficult to understand that it is permissible to kill a rabbi in Onam: Rashi makes the prohibition to kill a fetus more difficult than the permission to kill Sheva ben Bakri. And apparently his difficulty is because he perceives that the fetus is a persecutor and that he is not killed *m* because he is a rapist, and makes it difficult why Sheva ben Bakri was killed because he endangers the group he is in even though he is a rapist. And we see from his words that in his opinion the fetus is persecuting the mother, and the reason for the exemption is that it is a rape. In addition, it is possible to be more precise from the words of Rashi who states, 'from Shamyā Kaddafo to her - to the mother', and it seems that he wants to say that it is really the mother who is being persecuted by her husband, but it is 'from Shamyā' (and not according to the words of the Yerushalmi that they both persecute each other). Also, in the Torah of Israel on the Mishnah in Ahalo it is specified that the fetus is considered to repel the mother, and the exemption*

He's just being a murderer.

And refer also to Shu'at Mishna Halkhut 12, 19; And there's a hand, shaking.

The child is not allowed to kill Velda because here it is impossible to determine who is guilty at the beginning of the event, and according to this who is harming whom ·

But it can be understood that there is no dispute about this:

x

In the legends of Moshe (Yuda Dea 2, s (branch 2)) he wrote that it is possible to understand in the words of the Yerushalmi that he meant to say that although the fetus harms the woman and not him - since " **he does not intend to pursue only what happens from heaven that it is impossible for both of them to exist... It is even though he is the reason for this since it is unintentional.**" That is: the Jerusalemite also agrees that it is the fetus that harms the mother. But the Jerusalemite also agrees that since he is doing it by rape - there is no permission to kill him since according to the laws of souls among Jews, no harm is killed by rape. In such a situation, both are in danger from each other, and neither has the stake to harm the other. This is what the Jerusalemite calls "you don't know who killed whom": even though he is a pest, you cannot call him that because he is a rapist and it is forbidden to harm him. To this method the Jerusalemite agrees with the Babylonian as we understand that a rape pursuer is not obliged to die, even though it is permissible to defend against a harmer in rape in the laws of tyranny.

It can be said that even the Jerusalemite agrees that one does not kill a pursuer by rape, and what he preferred. Rejecting the evidence from the Mishnah by saying that they both harm each other - this does not mean that it was impossible to reject it by saying that here he pursues rape, but that he believed that it was that they both pursue each other is a division that is more required than the saying, even though even without this it is forbidden to kill the little one because he pursues rape (And we can also add that it was important to reason in this way in order to learn from this to the laws of Mounat that even there it is forbidden to harm a child, even though there is no narcissism). According to this, there is no disagreement between the Babylonian and the Jerusalemite that they do not kill a pursuer by rape, but there is a disagreement between them on how to look at the reality of being difficult for the child and in any case whether in a situation of a stressed cow and a stressed fetus and the cow makes it difficult for the child, the owner of the cow is allowed to defend himself against the fetus.

Another possibility is to understand that the Babylonian thanks the Jerusalemite, and they really kill a pursuer by rape. According to this possibility - the Babylonian intention in the words 'man Shmya ka radpo la' is

from According to this understanding in Yerushalmi, it turns out that even the third party (the midwife) is allowed to harm the persecutor by rape (and not only the persecutor himself). Although it can be said that the Yerushalmi wrote that 'you don't know who kills whom' to explain why the woman herself is forbidden, but to a third party it is simply forbidden even without this explanation, since he gave birth to an anus.

to heal in another permitted	'Kill so-and-so or I will kill you' permitted	Harmful in rape permitted	; blocking your way ■ rescue y. from murderer I Mahdash Yaffe allowed (for simplicity)
forbidden	permitted	permitted	A happy light is allowed (perhaps from the beautiful Harsh)

forbidden	forbidden	permitted	(allowed, it will later)	method be explained : Crossroads
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17 Harmful rape in the version - blocking a private road

Above, we brought up the issue at the beginning of the third chapter of Baba Kama, where it is explained that it is permissible to harm a harming person in order to be saved from his harm, even if he harms by rape. Now we will deal with another example of harm given in the Gemara there:

The one who fills his yard put together a wine jug and an oil jug, the owner of the yard breaks and goes out breaks and enters.

Simply in the Gemara there, if the owner of the yard loses as a result of the pots being in his hay, he is allowed to damage them in order to be saved from the loss. Does the Gemara there only speak of a case in which the owner of the urns deliberately placed the urns with the permission of his friend, or does the same apply to rape? For example: one person's property flies violently into the other's yard and he blocks the other's way. The owner of the yard is in a great hurry, and if he doesn't get out of his hay now he will lose a lot of money.

He wants to go out, even though it will harm the money that came to his court by rape. According to what we stated above - even when someone's belongings are placed in my possession by force - I am allowed to damage them if they block my permission and thereby cause me a monetary loss. In such a case, the owner of the items is considered harmful because his items are in a possession that is not his. It is permissible to harm as a harm in rape in order to be saved from harm as explained above.

in the fetus	in the fetus	in the fetus	in the fetus	Israel
Damage is allowed to damage him	It is forbidden (even) to harm him	It is forbidden (even) to harm him	Babylon: forbidden ; To hurt him Yerushalmi: Damage is	The law in Israel falling from the roof on his friend
The victim is allowed to hit the fallen	The victim is allowed to hit the fallen	The victim is allowed to hit the fallen	The victim is allowed to hit the fallen	The judgment of a gentile who falls from the

16 Summary

In the case of "kill so-and-so or we will kill you" among the Gentiles, there is a dispute: according to the Mahrash Yaffe, it is permissible for a rapist to kill in order to be saved, and according to the passage of the road, this is forbidden from a sbará.

The permission according to the Mahrash Yaffe is in any case where the presence of the other person causes danger, and therefore it is permissible for a gentile whose path is blocked by another gentile to kill the blocker in order to be saved.

And it must be discussed whether it is permissible for a gentile according to the Mahrash Yaffe to kill another gentile when the other's presence does not endanger him but rather he wants to take advantage of the other to save his life.

Also according to the separation of ways - a gentile is not obligated to sacrifice one's soul for a murder like Israel, since with Israel this stems from the obligation of self-sacrifice for the mitzvot, while with gentiles the obligation stems from mere circumspection. .

Part of the ways admits that in the case where one pursues and endangers the other even if by rape - it is permissible for the victimized gentile to kill the offending gentile, even though the aggressor does so by rape, just as in the law of mammoth it is permissible to harm the one who harms me by rape in order to be saved from his harm. This is despite the fact that in Israel this is illegal.

Matt. Although we stated in the previous comment that this is allowed in Israel as well, it is not necessary for our case since we are dealing with the laws of Gentiles, among whom *khoa* is allowed.

The simplicity of the Gemara is that the Gadish blocked the ability to harm the ^{Nev Philistines}, and despite this, he must douch if he harms them, since it is considered saving himself with the money of his friend. This is also the ruling regarding a persecuted person who broke the dishes:

A pursuer who was pursuing his friend to kill him... if the pursued broke tools... of another person is liable, the rescuer himself with his friend's money is liable.

This means that this rule is true even when the tools blocked the way of the persecuted. Even though they blocked the way - the persecuted must, if he legally broke them, save himself with his friend's money. That is: even though the persecuted person is allowed to harm the money that blocks his way since his life is in danger - he must pay. According to the laws of the tax authorities, the blocking fund is not considered harmful, and it is not possible to damage it without paying. (In other words: if there was no danger to lives here, but only financial damage that the Philistines or the pursuer wanted to cause - it was forbidden to harm the money blocking the way, and therefore when it is permissible to harm it because of the supervision of the soul, the person who harms must pay).

19. The division between Medak and Nan is a barrier

And here we seem to be facing a dilemma: on the one hand, we have seen that when another person harms me - it is permissible to defend against him and harm him in order to be saved from his harm, even if he harms the owner. But on the other hand, when money blocks my way and I harm it

will explain David's renunciation, and in particular according to his words there (and also in his Shout Hahodesh Siman Keag) that it is forbidden to give up one's life and one who does so is considered a suicide).

post Scriptum. Admittedly, refer to the words of the Tolls Moshe Ch'om 2, Seg which writes that David was healed in Gaddish, and was not saved from his injury (and in this he settles why David must pay even though he saves others and there is a regulation that the saving of others is exempt from paying). And also look at the netivots of the law Siman Shet, Sadak and which in his words sounds like the fees of Moses (because in his opinion Reuben

who heals with Shimon's money in order to save Levi is exempt, and is also exempt even if he is a survivor along with the others who save; and we must say according to him that it was before the installation, or it is necessary To say that in David's opinion it was possible to save in a different way (as we wrote in the previous comment), and therefore one has to pay (and according to this it follows that he is allowed to take in order to pay in such a situation, and perhaps in this they shared some additions to Rashi that was cited in the previous comment), and check that Achmal). But in any case, to all scholars it is simple that whoever harms the property that blocks his way in order to save himself - must pay the owner as we wrote inside - * (as explained in the Moshe scrolls, which is what the Gemara talks about, which exempts those who save others from a persecutor as a result of the regulation, and there it is made clear that the persecuted himself must if He broke vessels), and as it also means the words of the Shach which were well explained in Appendix A to our chapter (paragraph 6) see there.

Another example: Reuven throws dishes from the top of the roof onto pillows and pots he pulled out that are placed in the public domain (in the place where he is allowed to put them). Shimon falls in Onam and is about to push the pillows and covers as he falls - and as a result the dishes falling from the top of the roof will break. In simple terms, Reuven is allowed to push Shimon and prevent him from falling and push the pillows and covers, even if doing so will cause financial damage to Shimon. Shimon damages Reuven's money in his fall, and Reuven is allowed to defend himself.

18 Charging payments for hitting a roadblock

Regarding gaddish that block the path of salvation, it is said in the Gemara in Baba Kama (S, 2) that the one who harmed them in order to be saved must legally pay the savior himself with his friend's money, even if he did so instead of a spiritual supervision:

Gaddish of the Shaouds of Israel, they were fighting against the Philistines in him, and he asked her what it was to save himself with the money of his friend. They sent her: one must not save himself with his friend's money.

and as an explanation of additions there:

Abia Lia Ei must pay when he saved himself from the supervision of Nafshana.

N. If the pots and pans are unoccupied - apparently it is initially permissible for those who want to move them (subject to the laws of the 'poor man of change in anxiety' (Sho'a HoM Ralez, 1, see ibid)), even though this will cause damage to the owner of the tools; And in any case,

it is certain that the owner of the utensils is not allowed to harm the one who takes them (although when he can leave them until after the utensils have fallen and he has no monetary loss in this - there is no doubt that he must wait and you did not take away from the law of Shabbat Avira). And refer to this matter in the signs of heroes at the end of the second chapter; B. H. Hoshan Law of Shafu, 4; Chazon Ish Baba Kama 2, 16 (and it seems strange that they all wrote the same thing and did not mention each other).

please. Although Rashi clarifies that the question was whether it is permissible or not to burn, and not only for the purpose of charging the payments. And many made it difficult for him that you have nothing that stands in the way of mental control. But he already explained in the letters of Moshe (Yorah Dea 1, Reed) in Rashi's opinion that in his opinion there was no certain death for Israel if they did not burn the Gaddish, but only a risk. And here the owner of the Gaddish himself is allowed to take risks in order to save his money (just as it is allowed to take risks at work, see Baba Metziya Kiv, 1 and Benuda Bihuda Tanayina Yore Dea, 10). Therefore it seems that Rashi understood that even David and his warriors cannot harm the Gaddish in a situation where if they were the owners of the Gaddish they would not have done so. And this is proven by the fact that David did not agree to use his permission to burn the Gaddisim as king, and if there was a definite danger to Israel - there is a degree of Hasidicism here at the expense of Israel's lives if he does not do so! (Also refer to Shu'at Benin Zion xix; but see how

And also in blocking off his friend's court by rape: the empty place is bought for the one who seizes it first in order to be saved from harm; But the other's yard is not mine, and if a rapist threatens to harm my money if I don't block the other's yard - this is forbidden, even if I lose money as a result.

about. The smile of Akhira's darkness, both Israel and Gentiles

Let's go back to the case of someone who took a no-man's land for his own use, and another needs this land to save himself from financial damage. We have explained so far that the one who is about to be damaged does not have permission to damage the belongings of the one who occupied the area first, because he was appointed first and has the right to occupy the area for his use. Should the one who occupied the area make an effort to clear his belongings so that the other can be saved from loss? In the case of Jews, he is legally bound to lose the Shabbat, as explained in the Shulchan Aruch (Hoshon Mishpat Rant):

The one who sees the knight of Israel must take care of it to return it to its owner as it is said: 'Respond shall restore them'.... The knight of the land must also reply

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that if he sees water coming to wash his friend's field he must fence in front of
them in order to save it.

Although this right is limited to the case where he will not lose money as a result of the evacuation of the area. There is no obligation to lose money in order to recover a loss, as explained in the Resed sign (section A):

The one who lost his knighthood and was harmed by his loss and the loss of his friend - if he can return both, he must return them, and if not - he must return his, whose loss comes first.

A person does not have to lose money to save the loss of his friend, but when there is no financial loss, he is obliged to restore his loss. It is forbidden to demand payment for the efforts to save his friend's money, since he is not allowed to take payment for restoring a loss: "He who sees a loss must return it for free" (Rasa, 1). He is ordered to clear the way without any payment. It is a matter of fact that Israel is forbidden to enter the rescue path of its friend without reason and thereby prevent him from saving himself from harm, even if the blocker stands where he is desolate. This is only allowed when the person blocking the road will lose if he does not block - then he is exempt from the Shabbat Avida since his loss precedes.

To be saved - I have to pay him. why? This rhizhammon blocks my way and endangers my life, so I am allowed to hurt him in order to be saved. And why is it different from money that harms me?

The difference between the cases is that if from the beginning it was permissible for the perpetrator of the rape to do his actions (in the case where he is trying to save himself from monetary damage) - the other is prohibited from harming him. This is the reason why the owner of the gaddish is not defined as harmful according to the laws of superiors and must be paid to him. A person is allowed to put his property in his possession and even in the possession of the homeless person, even if this causes financial damage to **another. For example: if someone's cart breaks down (with no passengers in it) and the only way to save it is through a place where I am going (and I have permission to go in that place)**

- **I cannot** be charged for not stopping and making room for the cart even if I did it on purpose, because the place Enslaved to me and my use at the moment (and the only reason to oblige me to leave it is the Shabbat Mitzvah Abida, as follows). Even if I do it on purpose - the owner of the money must not harm me and make himself responsible for not reimbursing his loss. This law is the same as the fact that it is not permissible to steal a little money from another in order to earn a lot." Therefore, in Gaddish, David is considered to "save himself with his friend's money": the owner of the Gaddish does an act that is permitted according to the laws of money, and it is permissible for him to do it even in the first place in order to save himself from losing money. Although according to the laws of souls it is permissible Harming the gaddish because life precedes the money - according to the laws of mammon, it is impossible to call the owner of the gaddish harmful, therefore there is no reason not to pay him for the gaddish.

Thus, if a rapist comes and demands someone to block another's escape route in the no-man's land so that the other cannot be saved from the rapist's financial damage, and he threatens the person blocking the road with monetary damage - it is permissible to block the road. It is true that one has to lose money in order not to harm others as explained in the Shulchan Aruch - but here it is not harmful (but one avoids returning a loss, and for returning a loss there is no obligation to spend money, as follows).

But in the case of a rising bull - it is forbidden to send the bull to hurt another bull. That is why the owner of the bull is considered harmful even if he is violent, and it is permissible to

defend against the damage.

Ng. It is true that there is a Yehoshua rule that in certain cases it is permissible to harm a little in order to gain a lot ('Yine and honey rule', see Hoshan Mishpat Resad, 5). In any case, it's simple that you have to pay the one who was damaged by me as explained there.

To return a loss and clear the way for the other, and he is allowed to block the way by virtue of "I paid first"?

approx. Blocking a rescue route - in the lives of adults

From here we will move on to discuss the blocking of a way to save souls.

A vehicle in which a person suffered a heart attack is traveling on the no-man's road. If the patient does not get to the hospital quickly, he will die. One wants to occupy the no-man's land for his needs, but by standing there he will block the vehicle's path.

Gentiles are not obligated to 'thou shalt not stand on the blood of thy neighbor,' therefore if a gentile sees another gentile in danger - he is not obligated to save him. But in the case we are dealing with, we saw that there is not only a law of 'thou shalt not stand on the blood of thy neighbor', but a blocking of the way of salvation for the gentile in danger.

The one who blocks the way and harms the salvation of the other is harmful and murders in grama. Certainly he cannot claim against the one who kills him 'from the front' and 'my past life': after all, he can get up and solve the problem by doing so.

This law is also true in sit and do not: if a gentile sits on the path of salvation of another gentile and refuses to stand up, the other gentile is allowed to kill him, since there is no reason that obliges him to surrender his life in order not to kill the one who blocks the way of salvation (the gentile who blocks the way cannot claim The front of Dadma did you blush, because the one who needs the way says to him: Get up and clear the way and that's how we will both be saved ·

Nah. Although if Shimon's monetary loss is smaller than Reuven's loss - in certain cases he may

have to clear the way when Reuven pays him for his loss as the wine and honey regulation mentioned above.

Well A gentile who blocks the way by standing up - it is very possible that he must also die, since gentiles are also killed for murder, as was brought to light in the body of the chapter.

Of course, if he does this in Shev and don't do - it must be discussed whether he is liable to die: according to the Ramban (Bereishit 4:13) who says that the people of Nablus did not commit death because they did not condemn Nablus and Hamor, since there is no obligation to die in Shav and don't, it is seen that there is no liability to die ; But according to the Rambam, it is alleged that he must die even in the Sabbath and do not do, etc.

But among the Gentiles there is no Mitzvah of Shabbat. When a gentile has occupied territory - he has no obligation to vacate it, even if he can do so without causing him any harm · His right to stay where he is, and his right to claim towards the other: "Pay me if you want me to clear the way for you".

According to this, we will draw an additional verse: the cow of a Goy runs away. The owner of the cow chases her in the no man's land where there is a narrow path. The cow owner's enemy wants to stand in the middle of the narrow path and block the way, thus causing loss to the cow owner. From the side of the law, it seems impossible to prohibit him from doing so. His right to use the homeless person as he sees fit" even if this use causes financial damage to another...

come. Blocking an escape route in the mountains - because of a rapist (in Israel)

We explained that Israel must not block the way to save another Israel's money because of the lost Shabbat mitzvah. What is the law when evil threatens and causes such a situation? For example: Evil set Reuven's house on fire. This became known to Reuven and he felt like saving his burnt house. The evil one turns to Shimon and tells him: "Stand in the no-man's land where Reuven is supposed to pass, and do not clear the way for him. That way he will arrive late and will not be able to save anything from the fire. If you don't do this - I will take money from you." Shimon stands and blocks the way. Reuven arrives and asks Shimon to clear the way. Does Shimon have to do this?

According to the rule we stated above that 'his loss precedes' - Shimon is allowed to block Reuven's path. Although the Torah innovated that there is a mitzvah to save one's money - but the Torah limited this innovation to physical trouble and not to the loss of money. There

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is no difference in this in the case of the rape of an evil person. If evil obliges someone to block the way of the homeless before saving his friend's money - the blocker will lose money if he does not block. Therefore, now the obligatory renewal of the Torah does not apply to him

Ned. We assume here that there is no law that obliges to move in such a case, and the matter was left as if completely abandoned. If there is a law that states that the road must be cleared in such a case - in any case, the one who does not move is considered harmful, since the kingdom - which is the owner of the land (see the Rabbi Shu'a at the beginning of the Laws of the Nomads and Reaching the Border) - obliges to clear the road.

Throwing the load will not be equal between them. The one whose body weight is fifty and the weight of his cargo is a hundred will have to cast many times more years than the one whose body weight is one hundred and the weight of his cargo is fifty, even though together with the weight of the body both burden the ship to the same extent. In such a picture of a chaser it is clear to us that money is considered chasing the people and not the other way around. And according to the words of Hazen Hazal in the Laws of Habul and Mazik (8:15):

And really from this it is proven that it was not mentioned that the people will pay, it does not mean that the people will also pay according to their weight, they were not called a burden, and Katani calculates according to the amount. And

of course, the main thing is that when a ship sinks because of its weight, it doesn't matter who came first or last. Any weight is the cause of the sinking of the ship, and therefore it is the law that the cargo should be thrown to save the people.

Ramsha, with regard to people, is the law that pursues the cargo...

We see here that human life precedes money, so when money and life harm each other - the load is considered to harm life, so they calculate according to the weight of the load and throw it away. What emerges from this is that the prohibition to block the way of rescue for those fleeing from danger exists even without the law of 'thou shalt not stand on the blood of your neighbor', and it stems from the legal precedence of the survivor from danger

compared to the person occupying the road.

And for the same reason, if one is in his territory and another wants to save his life by passing through that territory - the owner of the territory must not interfere with passing there; And if he gets in the way - he pursues and is allowed to be killed ⁰ (although if the owner of the road has a loss of money - the passer-by must pay him, according to the law 'saves himself with his friend's money' and as we stated above that a chased person who broke the tools of any person should be shot).

M. And even if he blocks the way with Shab and don't do, he is a persecutor (refer to the old rabbinical law in Simeon Med which says that one who does not pay his debts and thereby causes harm to all Jews is considered a persecutor, even though it is only with Shab and don't).

Sa. Although in the case of cargo on a ship - there is no obligation to pay the owner of the cargo who dumped his cargo; But this is because there the cargo harms and sinks the ship, and it is not like our case where one only prevents rescue by his presence; And in the matter of monies, he is first and therefore must be paid (and like the division we brought above between a case in which it is permissible to defend oneself against harm in one's own, and a case in which there is no permission for this). Despite the division

[in B. Blocking the way to salvation - in the lives of the Jews

This passage deals with Jews, whose laws are a little more complex and complicated than with Gentiles, as we will see. It can be skipped, and it is intended for the copyist to delve further into the question of blocking the road in case of danger to lives.

This law, which tends to fish out the one who blocks the way, is also true in Israel, and not only among the Gentiles.

And even though he who does not save his friend and violates 'thou shalt not stand on the blood of your neighbor' - is not considered a persecutor, and is not allowed to be killed"; here it is permissible to kill him because the blocker causes damage without which he would not exist-9.

And even though the blocker reached the road first - danger to lives precedes monetary rights, so the road is now enslaved to the one who saves his life. And what we wrote in mammon that I have the right to use the pakar even if another's mammon is damaged - this is because my mammon right precedes his mammon. But danger to lives precedes monetary rights.

There is a good proof that souls have monetary priority over monetary rights in the issue dealing with the division in the case of a ship that needs to throw cargo from it because it tends to sink (Baba Kama Katz, 2):

A ship that was traveling in the sea and was subject to a surge and was lightened by cargo - a calculator according to cargo and there is no calculator according to money.

The calculation according to cargo does not include the calculation of the body weight of the people, even though this weight also causes the ship to sink, for example: if there are two people in the ship - it weighs one hundred and its cargo weighs fifty, and this one weighs fifty and its cargo weighs one hundred - division

Nez. See Rambam at the end of Chapter 1 of the Laws of a Murderer and Shu'a at the end of Hoshen Mishpat. And even though he loses money - he owes it, as explained in Sanhedrin Ag, 1 and in the aforementioned sources.

Noah For example: two are standing by a river, they see one drowning in it and they don't save him. The drowning person can kill one - and so the other will panic and rush to save him.

He is not allowed to do this, because even though they violate 'thou shalt not stand on the blood of thy neighbor' - they do not persecute.

Net. And even though it is in the Grama - a persecutor in the Grama is also killed, just as a moral is killed if there is a fear that he will give more (Shulchan Aruch Hoshen Mishpat Shefah, 11), even though he is harmful in the Grama. And it is also explained in the Rabbi Sh'ut Siman Ralach (first edition); And in the light of joy, the laws of the murderer of PA 88; Association of Galia treatise Yod C. H.; Ahiezer 19:3; Tribe of Judah p. to no.

One's monetary ownership of the water when he needs it to save his life takes precedence over the life of his friend. Hatam Sofer (in his innovations on Baba Metzia Shem ^{Sab}) emphasizes that it is monetary ownership that determines whose life will be saved:

The one who has in his hand a kiton of water belonging to his friend - a peshita that should be given to his friend even if he dies because it belongs to his friend.

Another example of such ownership is given: Reuven has a house with a shelter. And Shimon has no shelter. Now shells begin to fall on the place where they live, and the shelter only has room for one of them.

Even if Shimon arrived at the shelter first - Reuven can sue him to leave. The shelter belongs to Reuven, and Reuven's financial ownership makes him a priority over Shimon in using the shelter.

We see in the raids that this law of "past life" is also true in the desert. When two are about to die of thirst, and there is water of the Hakad that is sufficient for one of them and close to both of them - it is permissible for one to take the water and drink in order to save his life, even though in doing so he is actually killing the other with a grama (since he is depriving him of the water that would save his life) ^{sg} . Just as the owner of the water can claim "my past life" - the one who grabs the water first can claim "my past life". For the same reason, it is permissible to seize the only way of salvation when years escape from a rockfall. Each claims a "past life" and there is no reason for the other to come before me. How did you foresee that the other's blood is redder than mine and he will forbid me to be saved? That is why it is permissible for each of the years to hurry and take the road even if the road is blocked in front of the Shinisi.

so. Blocking a way of salvation - souls in souls - harm to another

Although we agreed to grab the water or the only place where you can be saved - this law

is limited only to the case where you save yourself, and not to the case where you harm another.

grandfather. And also refer to the revisions of legends to the Marsha there; And in the Mishna Halkot Yad, Raz in this matter.

seg. From the words of the underwriter above, it is clear that after one has grabbed the water - the other is not allowed to take it from him.

chock. Another example: Is it permissible for a person to make an appointment for urgent surgery - even if in doing so he takes another person's appointment (and one of them dies because of the delay)? This case is exactly the same as the nomad's catch of water. Here, too, you seize the only saving ability and use it for yourself, even though in this you block the use of it for another person.

The law of the Gentiles	Dini chases	the case
They do not have to stand on their own	There is no permission to kill someone who refuses to save	'Thou shalt not stand on thy
Gentiles are also forbidden to persecute their friends	It is allowed to kill the road blocker	Precedence of life to money - blocking the road

And to conclude, between Israel and the Gentiles, it is forbidden to block the way of salvation for another, and it is permissible to kill the one who does so on purpose because he is a persecutor.]

jug. Blocking a way out - Souls in Souls - "My Past Life"

So far we have written that one who stands on the way to salvation must give up material rights for the sake of the other's life: the danger of one's life takes precedence over the material rights of the other. But all this is true when it comes to masses versus souls. Now we will discuss the situation of souls against souls. For example: years were caught in a rockfall - and there is only one way to be saved. One wants to take the way to be saved, even though in doing so he takes the way of salvation and his friend will die.

The Gemara in Baba Metzia (Sab, 1) says:

For years there were people walking on the road with one of them holding a water

bottle, if they both drink, they both die, and if one of them drinks - he comes to the settlement, Ben Petura demanded: it is better that they both drink and die, and that neither of them should see the death of his friend. Until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: 'Your brother lives with you' - your life comes before the life of your brother.

The Gemara here talks about a case where the water belongs to one - "and in the hand of one of them is a kithon of water" - and Rabbi Akiva ruled that he is not obligated to give the water to the other.

This is proven from the issue of the ship, the judgment of souls before the masses, as you can see from the form of calculation and the determination of who pursues whom.

c. Blocking an escape route - on purpose

The "past life" claim is only true when you are in danger. When your life is not in danger - there is no permission to take water or seize the other's way of salvation, and this is murder in the Gramma. A Jew who does this to another Jew is indeed not liable to death, but

Rambam says about him (in chapter 2 of the Laws of a Murderer):

The tenant kills to kill his friend, or he sends his servants and they kill him, or he forces his friend and places him before the lion and the like and kills the animal... Each of these pours out

the blood and commits a murder in his hand and owes his death to heaven, and there is no court death among them... And all those who murder and the like in them who do not destroy The death of a court - if the king of Israel wanted to kill in court the kingdom and the rule of the world, the authority is in his hand. And also if they saw a court to kill them by order of time if the time needed you - then they have permission according to what they see.

If we go back to the example of the Gemara in Baba Metzia - there is no dispute that if someone is about to die of thirst and there is a water kithon in front of him - it is forbidden for someone who does not need water to take the kithon from him, and this is murder in the

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Gramma. Or, in the example of the shelter: if Reuven prevents Shimon from entering the shelter even though there is room for both of them - then he murders him with a gremlin (he "forced his friend and put him in front of the shells").

A Gentile who does this must die, as it is written in the Midrash Rabbah (Bereishit 4:5): 'Mir every animal we will ask' - the one who hands over his fellow animal to be killed. 'A man of his brother' - the one who hires others to kill his friend.

And Maimonides ruled (in the Laws of Kings 9:4):

Ben Noah who killed... was hunted or forced and given in front of Harry or starved to death because the dead were killed everywhere.

Maimonides specifically talks about a case of "starved to death", in which the murderer did not touch the murdered but only locked the door in his face and caused him to starve to death. Even in such a case, a gentile murderer must die.

And in the words of Ahiezer's Companions (3:17):

For example: Reuven and Shimon rush to grab the abandoned water they saw in the distance. Reuben sees that Shimon is about to reach the water first, but he can move a stone that will block Shimon's path' - then Reuben will grab the water. In raids it seems to be forbidden. Here Reuben does not save himself - but hurts Shimon in order to be saved, which is forbidden. And even though he did not harm Shimon's property but only in a wayward way - indeed he did not do an act to take care of himself, but an act intended to harm Shimon. He created here a death for Shimon, which would not have existed without him;

And it turns out that he killed Shimon in order to be saved™.

Sa. Another example: The Gemara Bivmoth (Et, 1) speaks of the sons of Saul who were killed by the Gibeonites: "'And the king killed the two sons of Retzpa, the daughter of Aya, who bore Sha'ul Armoni and Mephibosheth, and the five sons of Michal, the daughter of Shaul, who bore to Adriel, the son of Barzilai the Moholite.' Rabbi Huna said: The transgressors before the coffin, all those who were in the coffin were taken to death, those who did not have a coffin were taken to life. From the Rabbi Hana bar Katina: 'And the king punished Mefibosheth son of Jonathan, son of Shaul!' They did not pass it. And there is bias in what I said except that they passed it. And they took him in, and asked for mercy for him and let him out. And I think there is partiality in the matter! But ask for mercy so that the coffin will not take us in." He didn't take Mephibosheth - it is permissible to ask for mercy so that the coffin will not take him in, even though in this he causes someone else to be taken (this rule also appears in the laws of mammoths, refer to the Shach at the end of the sign Kasag which wrote: "The king or a minister who imposes something on a rich man or B. And the Jews of A. have the power in the palace of the king and the minister to try to get rid of them - if this is clear, then it is certain that if he gets rid of those he will impose on others, he is not allowed to save them or not - ruled in the answer of the Rival H. B. C. M. Ram has already imposed the king on well-known people and singled them out and they were caught in his net, so no Jew is allowed to try to dismiss them in any matter that would harm others, of course, but if there is a decree to impose on B people, then a Jew can simply try on any people he wants not to be in the decree at all, even though others will certainly come in and bring evidence Borura from Mephibsheth in the chapter on the veil that David prayed over so that the ark would not be swallowed up", and also refer to the money for the dedications there). And here it seems simple that what you allowed to avoid the damage before it reached you - is only when you take care of yourself; But avoiding the damage caused by harming others is prohibited. For example: David the King is forbidden to pray that the ark will take in someone else, so that it does not take in Mephibosheth. Although as long as the coffin has not received - it is permissible to pray that the coffin will not receive the mafibush, but not to pray for harm to others (and in the law of taxes: it is simply forbidden to hand over and vote for others to take their money so that the tax does not reach me.

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Although it is permissible to lobby so that I do not receive the The obligation - there is no permission to worry that the obligation will harm others; and it is also simply forbidden to pour water into another's garden so that it does not reach my garden, even though it is permissible to block the water from entering my garden even if by doing so it will continue to wash and enter the garden of another (refer to Yerushalmi in the first paragraph at the beginning of the third chapter, and "A HOM Shafah, end of section b)).

at him. Blocking the way to salvation - souls by souls in rape - in the Jews

After we explained that it is permissible to block the other person's way of salvation in order to save yourself, but it is forbidden to do so without such a reason - the following case must be discussed: a murderer requires you to block someone's way of salvation, so that he can murder him; And the killer threatens that if you don't do so - he will kill you.

And here is what the education leader wrote (Retsu, Kaa): His accessories are loud spills, all Alma Sibira, he was killed.

And Abiuriyahu, it is such that one would place his friend in front of Ari and the like in the Sanhedrin, and the like. But here there would be a loss of soul, why would he go through for his soul, from the front of dalma dama dahabria blush tefi, and simple.

And it is under the signature of a writer (addresses Y T I ^{S H}):

In any case, it is clear from what I wrote that there is no difference between causing death by being awake or killing by hands.

It should be emphasized that the educational guide refers to the Gemara in the Sanhedrin where it is (among other things) about someone who takes a blind to protect his friend from an arrow and says that he is exempt from death. Even about such a case, the instructor of education says that one should surrender the soul, as explained in his words that he refers to all cases in the Gemara - "to bring one's friend before Ari and the like" ⁰⁰.

(See, for example, Ahiezer there (S.K. 1). Also, it means in Meyri Sanhedrin Nez, 1 D.E. "and in the matter of bloodshed" from his reference to the words of the Maimonides in the Laws of a Murderer 2, 3. "Keli Hamada" in the counters "Seven Mitzvot Bnei Naach" Letter 8). But there are those who understood that the Rambam was exempted from sending (see, for example, the instruction on education in the Mitzvah to the Lord. And for this method, one needs to understand why he ruled only part of the midrash. And see

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also the Shu'at Maharil Diskin (contras aharon, kmed), Bibia Omer (and Yore Dea, 13) and on the right-hand page (beginning of the 16th mark)), and In any case, we have not found a dispute that it is a wrongdoing if he kills his friend in Grama.

Sah And also refer to his Shu'at Ch'om Siman A. Set. The leader of education refers to the Rambam with the laws of the killer of the desert even about the one who hires others to kill his friend. Even in such a case, the educational leader obliges to surrender the soul, even though such a case is serious

It is explained from this that Davan Noah owes a small ^{gram}

What emerges from all that has been said: a Gentile who blocks the path of his friend and prevents him from escaping from a murderer who is coming to kill him - if he does it on purpose - must be put to death."

Sue. Beyit Yosef also made a wrong ruling and is liable for debt. After all, the columnist wrote (Yora Dea at the beginning of Siman Kalev): "Even though the touch of a Gentile with our wine is prohibited for pleasure, it is permissible to take his blood from the same Gentile who prohibited it." And Habit Yosef wrote about this: "And so are the words of the Rambam at the end of chapter 13 (Halakhah 20). And from his words, it is clear that in a Gentile who intends to harm him and forbids his wine, it is permissible for Mishkel the blood of her sex, but if we do not intend to do so, it is forbidden to Mishkel the blood of her sex. If we intend to harm him and imprison him, he is not obligated to pay, and since he is not obligated to pay him - because a shekel of wine fees is a shekel. And if you say: Because we do not intend to harm him, am I not obligated to my salvation? Bin Mezd! One must say this in words that are known to the whole world to be damages, in this way they say that there is no claim that it is a mistake or that it is not intended to be dismissed. But touching the alma in the wine - my dear alma lit in it is not harmful at all except to Israel or to those who know their nature - anything that we do not intend to harm is not obligated to pay ". And here it is said about damage that is not apparent in Israel (Sho'a Chom Shefa, 1): "He who harms his fellow man by harming him that is not apparent, such as mixing wine with him, is exempt from the Torah, but the Sages fined him to pay the full amount of damage from the beauty of his property according to the law of all harmers... (f) If he was negligent or a criminal, he is exempt from not being fined, but intentionally." According to this, the words of the Tor and the Rambam are clear, saying that it is wrong to inadvertently exempt such a Hizak. And why does Beit Yosef make it difficult for him? Isn't it what is said about a tortfeasor that he is liable "either accidentally or intentionally" is for ordinary damage, and not for damage that is not apparent! We see that Beit Yosef simply assumes that a wrongdoer is liable for a defect that is not evident as Israel is liable for ordinary damage, and therefore a negligent should be liable for damage. He should explain that here there is an exemption because it is a special mistake (which is not known to the whole world), ha is considered rape. His words are well explained from the holocaust to the laws of souls. In the law of souls, we saw that a wrongdoer owes a grama, and it is difficult to say that in souls he owes death and in mammunes he is exempt from paying. Therefore, it was clear to Beit Yosef that he was wrongly obliged to pay Hizak which is not evident from the Torah, since it did not detract

from Gramma. And as he wrote in Ahiezer (ibid.): "According to this, a non-citizen is liable for a tort from the law, he is also liable for damage that is not apparent from the point of view of the law without a tort of tort, and since he is liable from the law, there is no distinction between accidental and intentional. It is also appropriate that he be bound by the law as in the remainder of the torts" (although in Menchath Shinoch (Kia, 8), in Shuel and Shiv (Edition 1B, 21A) and in Avni Nazr (Yura Dea 21A) they disagreed about Beit Yosef and believed that it was wrong to exempt payments from Hizak that is not evident by mistake, but They said their words also in the opinion of the Maimonides, so it is clear that they did not disagree with the Maimonides in the matter of charging gentiles with grama in the laws of souls. And it seems that they believed that the zakat is not easily evident from grama for

Man Damer s'lau shmya thaq' (see also Ahiezer there who expanded on this)).

sez Although regarding the charge of a gentile who sends his friend to kill the differences of opinion. In the Midrash quoted above we brought a wrongly liable for this, but Rambam did not bring it even though he ruled on other cases of grama that he is liable as we have seen. Some have understood that Rambam believes that he is obligated in this as well, and this is similar to the Grama cases he brought

Prevents him from fulfilling his ^{plan}. But in the case where the murderer is able to kill someone - and instead of killing another person he makes it difficult for him to stand in the way of the other - this is forbidden to him, because here it is proven that the murderer wants to kill the other and not him, because if he wanted to kill him he would have killed him immediately and did not order him to go the other way ^{Eb}.

so. Blocking your way to salvation - souls in souls in the lake - in the Gentiles

Now we will discuss the same case among Gentiles: Ham commands Yapheth to block Yeshem's way of salvation, so that he can be killed.

According to the Maharash Yaffe - Gentiles are allowed to kill someone with a gun or with their hands in order to be saved, and therefore it is permissible for a Yaffe to do so.

But according to the separation of ways - it is forbidden for a Gentile to kill another in order to be saved, and also killing by killing and blocking a way of salvation will be forbidden, just as it is forbidden among Jews. And more: above we have brought wrongdoers who must die also for killing by blocking the way (by killing). If among Jews it is forbidden to kill by rape in such a situation - it is easy for Gentiles to divide and say that such killing is permitted while killing by hand is prohibited.

Aa. In the event that there is doubt whether the murderer is conscious of murder or whether he is not at all aware that what he is raping to do causes murder - in the case of Jews, the serious offenses for which self-sacrifice is required must be discussed with the Jews, refer to this in the "Tov Taam Vadet" (Lemharsh Kluger) preamble , a minus sign.

But among the Gentiles there is no doubt that this is allowed. For them, the prohibition to murder in the case of mind control was born from the argument of the second, and in fact the argument 'between a person and his fellow'; Therefore, it is necessary to discuss according to 'the one who takes out from his author'. The one who forbids taking the road is 'the one who takes away from his friends', and he has to prove his words. In case of doubt - his words are not proven, so the other is allowed to take the way to save himself.

Eb. It should be noted that if one is saved from a natural danger and a murderer takes advantage of this to murder someone - this does not make the act of the survivor a prohibition, and he is allowed to seize the way of salvation by claiming "past life". For example: Reuven pursues Shimon to kill him. Shimon has only one way to escape from Reuven the murderer. At the same time, a rockfall naturally occurs, endangering Levi. Levi's only way to escape the rockfall is the same way that Shimon can escape from Reuven, but after one passes through it -< the road will already be destroyed and blocked and the other will no longer be able to pass through it. Here Levi does not help the murderer but saves his own life. That is why he is allowed to claim a "past life". What was prohibited him from blinding the murderer is only when saving his life comes from helping the murder, but not when saving his life does not come from helping the murderer.

Shezan, the education leader, is: "He was not allowed to commit any offense." Blocking a rescue route is an offense as explained above, and one should also hand over the soul according to this.

Masbara is very clear that this is forbidden: even here someone was killed only because of an evil murderer. Although it is permissible to take the road if you are saving your life from a fall of stones and the like as explained above - when a rapist commands to kill it is not called rescuing but killing, and it is forbidden to block the road in such a situation. Here you are simply hurting another, and not saving yourself.

He also wrote explicitly in Moshe's letters (Yorah Dea 1, Kama):

And if so, simply in my humble opinion, if they force him to do an act that he cannot save himself from, such as someone falling into a pit and there is a ladder and they force him to remove the ladder from there, the sentence will be killing

and not passing, if there is no prohibition of murder from anywhere, why?

And in the Holocaust Gemara Baba Metzia: If a murderer tells Reuven to drink the water of the desert in order to cause Shimon to die of thirst because he will have no water - Reuven should be killed and not drink the water. Here Reuven cannot claim "my previous life" because he does not need water because of a dangerous natural reality - but rather that a murderer created such a reality, and one must not help the murderer even if one is killed by it.

Although if years escape from a murderer who wants to kill both of them or one of them and it doesn't matter to him who - everyone is allowed to take the only way of salvation, even if it means that the other will be killed by the murderer. Anyone can claim a "past life", since he does not help the murderer but

Less than blocking a way of salvation, as we saw in breaking others into murdering the offering of wrong-thinking education are exempt according to Rambam, while in blocking a way of salvation Rambam makes it clear that they are obligated as stated above.

P. This is also proven by Meiri in the Sanhedrin, Ad, 1, who wrote (about the fact that he 'grounds a world that I am'): 'And in the case of a murderer without doing anything, if they were to stop him and throw a baby on him and the baby is crushed, he is not obliged to omit himself, since they exaggerate his death so that he does not drop from there. Likewise, if Israel was thrown into a pit and the rapist said to him, "Warn you not to come up, that if you come up I will kill you, he is not obliged to bring him up." From his words we see that he allows not to save because it is sit and do not do; But if he is required to prevent rescue by doing so, for example: they say to him, 'Take the ladder and with it you will prevent another Jew from climbing out of the pit', this is forbidden (the proof was given in the book 'By all your soul', mark 8 in note 6).

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But in the souls of Gentiles - the reason is that the road blocker is considered a murderer. It is forbidden to cause the death of another" surely the one who does this - cannot claim a "past life".

From here we will return to the case where a rapist threatens and forces to block the road:

In Israel's monon - in such a situation the Shabbat mitzvah is lost. That's why it's allowed there as the rapist wishes.

But in the soul - this is an act that is defined as a prohibition, and not only as the cancellation of a mitzvah. According to the parting of the ways, it is forbidden to harm the soul of another when he claims against a "front-runner".

That is: helping a murderer by blocking a road is joining the act of murder; While helping the lake in Mamunon by blocking a road is canceling a mitzvah that I am not obligated to אם יש לי הפסד

ממונות של ישראל	המקרה
	חסימת דרך השני ללא סיבה
אסור, רציחה בגרמא	אסור, השבת אבירה
	חסימת דרך השני
"מותר", חיי קודמים	מותר, אבידתי קודמת
אסור, עזרה לרוצח מוגדרת כרציחה, ואי אפשר לומר "חיי קודמים" כאשר משתתפים ברציחה	מותר, ממוני קודם
	חסימת דרך השני בגלל, איום של אנס

To. Comparing murder as Gentiles to murder as Israel

After we have clearly defined that joining the act of a murderer is complicity in the act of murder even if you take the place of the nomad - we came to the skin of Nefka Mina in the explanation of "may front" between Israel and gentiles:

In Israel - you believed that "may front" means "sit back and don't do it". It is better that you do not commit a crime - as long as we do not lose the souls of Israel from this act.

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Therefore, in any case where Israel will be killed anyway - it is better that we do nothing.

In summary: what we have allowed to take water or block the way to save yourself is only when you save yourself from danger and not when you harm another. If a murderer has created the situation in which you have to kill indiscriminately in order to save yourself - this is an injury to another, and you must not do this to Jews or Gentiles according to the crossroads.

Nineteenth Comparing murder in the Gentiles to restoring a crime in Israel

In Israel, we understand why it is forbidden to block the road in the case of souls: they must sacrifice themselves in order not to murder. That's why any criminal act, even a crime, in which no Israeli soul is harmed - is forbidden.

But apparently what we wrote about Gentiles is difficult: above we learned that it is permissible for a gentile to kill another gentile who harms him by rape, because he can claim a "previous life"; And we have learned this from the laws of mammone where it is allowed to claim "mammone first" and to harm the harming person in their own right (because the entire prohibition is from the side of Sabrah and not from the masquerade of murder).

And here, when we dealt with blocking the road with monetary loss, we wrote that if Shimon has a monetary loss if he does not block the road - he is allowed to block it. We explained that this law is true even if the evil Levi threatens Shimon that if he does not block the way he will harm him, and by doing so he is blocking the way of Reuven Levi who wants to hurt him.

If so, we must ask: in Mamunon, we see that Shimon is allowed to block when he has a financial interest: even if the interest stems from an evil rapist. But in the souls of Gentiles it is forbidden to block the way when there is an evil rapist, and even when there is a soul's interest in blocking (if he does not block the way he will be killed by the evil one) - his interest does not precede the interest of the one being blocked. Why does the interest of the blocker come first in the funds, while in the souls the interest of the blocked comes first? In other words: why do we follow the interest of the rapist who loses money and not the rapist who makes a ban by blocking the road, while in souls we follow the interest of the rapist who makes a ban and not the rapist who saves himself?

To understand this, we will have to compare the prohibition to block the road in the event that there is no loss in the funds of Jews and the souls of gentiles. Although in both cases

it is forbidden to block the road, but the reason is different."

In Mammon the reason for the prohibition is the loss of Shabbat Mitzvah. This mitzvah is void when there is a financial loss to the one who fulfills it.

You can multiply examples with different details™ - but all of them will have the same principle: when the presence of Yafet blinds the killer to murder Shem - it is permissible there to kill Yafet and be saved. For this matter, it doesn't matter if he commits a rape and does not commit an act: if he is in a place that creates a murder - he cannot claim "my past life" and "from a front", since that name claims against him: 'If you were not here - you would not have died, and when your presence helps the murderer you are not can claim "my previous life". Therefore, for that name it is permissible to kill him in order to be saved.

No. Ngj^roba of their kinds

Examples are given:

- Ham holds Yaphet hostage and shoots at Shem. It is allowed there to shoot at him, even if Yafet will also be hurt by this. Japhet is in a place where he helps the murderer, and cannot claim a past life.

A Philistine□ looked at him, and he asked her what it was to save himself with his friend's money. They sent to her: one must not save himself with his friend's money." And the additions there explained: "If he saved himself from the control of his soul, he did not have to pay." Must he save himself with his friend's money?" (Baba Kama Keys, 2; Sanhedrin Ad, 1). And it seems to explain that in the law, "the persecuted who broke the vessels" - King David simply had the idea that the persecuted must, after all, save himself with his friend's money, and there is no reason why he would not pay. But in his case David was satisfied - the Philistines took advantage of the Gaddish to harm and kill with their help. In such a case, David thought that the Philistines made the Gaddish part of the harm, and therefore the persecuted here harmed the harm and does not have to pay for it, and like the interpretation that was explained in the words of the Parting of the Roads, which permits killing the helper of the murderer even if he does so . in rape Admittedly, the answer that David received was that although there is such an opinion regarding souls among Gentiles - we do not say it regarding payments. In mamonos - the costs are the determinants, and since the owner of the gaddish did not put his gaddish in a forbidden place - the one who harms the gaddish in order to be saved must pay (and as explained above the shadow of the division between the lost Shabbat in Israel

and the laws of souls among gentiles). And even though it is simply permissible to harm them in order to be saved, since life comes before money - then you have to pay the owners (and refer to what we commented on this Gemara above in paragraph 18). Eh. For example: Ham misled Yaphet and he set out on the road to his death without knowing that in doing so he was helping the murderer; Japhet the Yod was on the way from the beginning and Ham tied him up and so he was forced to stay there; Jephthah was on the way and a heat threatened him that if he stood up - he would be killed; Jephthah does not know that he is fighting because he is blocking the way, and this ignorance is their own fault; and so'.

But among Gentiles - as we have already explained - the belief "from a front" is a claim of "between a person and his friend". When one claims to the other "from a front" one should check if he is indeed in a place where he is allowed to be, and the other is the one who wants to hurt him in order to live. We have already seen that when one falls on another - he cannot claim "from the front". He is the harmer, and it is permissible to defend against his harm.

This reasoning is also true in the case where someone is in a place where he helps the actions of a murderer. When a gentile helps the actions of a murderer - he cannot claim "my previous life" and in any case he cannot claim "from a front".

For example: Ham binds Yaphet, and blocks the way with him to kill Shem. The only way for Shem to be saved is if he kills Yafet and that way the way will not be blocked. For Jews - this is forbidden: we will not harm the soul of Israel, therefore "sit back and do not do". But among gentiles - Yaphet cannot claim "from a front" towards Shem, because Shem answers him: you are harming me, you are in a place where you help the murderer, and there is no claim of "my past life" when your presence hurts and harms the latter, witness.

Eg. Above we quoted the words of the 'tribe of Judah' (Rabbi Unterman), which permits a Jew to kill another Jew who rapes him, since the victim is considered a persecutor even though he is a rapist. And it is difficult to say that according to him it is permissible to kill those who block the way and the like, since Israel has a reason to prohibit it, since a soul will be killed anyway, and why would we go over prohibition *I* (and as explained above in the explanation, you believed 'from the front' in Israel). Therefore, it seems that his intention is that when a person's honor causes something - it is considered in matters of tort and murder as an act, refer to this at length in the book 'Act and Grama in Halacha' (by Rabbi Levi Yitzchak Halperin) in part seven (and also in his book 'Elevators on Shabbat' in chapter

seven). And if so - in such a case a person is indeed considered a stalker. But when he is only blocking the way - he is not doing anything, and therefore it is possible that he cannot be called a persecutor when he is violent, because both parties are violent and endanger each other, and neither one does anything like the other.

In any case, also according to him - with gentiles there is no place for this division, and among them it is permissible to kill a road blocker even though he does not commit an act as explained in the body of the chapter. This is because among gentiles - the question of whether the raped gentile commits an act is not important. For Gentiles, the question is the result. Therefore, with them, if it is forbidden to block the road in order to be saved from rape, it is also permissible to kill the road blocker; Because this proves that he is considered harmful to another (and just as in the law of appointment there is no room for division between one who does an act and one who does not do an act for the purpose of the permit to defend against the harm). This is in contrast to Jews, for whom the question is whether the rapist is doing an act, and when his honor is harmful - if his honor is considered an act - it turns out that he is doing a prohibition and is considered a persecutor.

Until. According to what is explained here, the Gemara can be well explained in Baba Kama (3, 2). The Gemara explains that King David was satisfied with the law of "saving himself with the money of his friend":

<p>----- P to be healed by another Allowed, no Gentile soul</p>	<p>'Fish so- and-so P or I'll kill you (among Gentiles) Allowed, no Gentile soul</p>	<p>Harmful in their own right Allowed, no Gentile soul</p>	<p>Prevents rape) as a way of saving from a murderer (among Allowed, no Gentile soul</p>	<p>the opinion Beautiful maharash (for simplicity)</p>
<p>It is not allowed, in ZD there is Sabra forbid</p>	<p>Allowed, no dedication Gentile soul</p>	<p>Allowed, no dedication Gentile soul</p>	<p>Allowed, no dedication Gentile soul</p>	<p>happy light (maybe from Harsh Yafe)</p>
<p>It's forbidden, you thought front"</p>	<p>It's forbidden, you thought "May." front"</p>	<p>It is allowed, it is not harmful can claim "May front"</p>	<p>Allowed, helping the murderer cannot claim "May Front"</p>	<p>method the discharge ways</p>

Lg. Summary

The Mahrash Yaffe and the Passover agree that among gentiles it is permissible to harm those whom murderers help or hide behind if this is the only way to be saved from the murderers.

The Yaffe Mahrash allows a gentile to kill one in order to be saved, so according to his method it is permissible.

The Parting of the ways indeed forbids a gentile to kill in the case of 'kill so-and-so or I will kill you', but also according to his method this is a prohibition based on the explanation of "may-front", and one who helps the murderer cannot claim "may-front" because he is an accomplice to the murder.

Ham shoots at there from a gathering of many people. There it is difficult to identify • the source of the shooting and to return fire in order to be saved. It is allowed there to shoot and kill the other people to hurt the heat. These people help murder, and " cannot claim a 'past life' towards them.

Ham needs a gun to kill there. He can't get to Rufa alone, and he asks Mapa to • bring him the "bag". Yafet does not know that by giving Ram the bag - he is handing him a rifle that will kill Shem. The only way for Shem to be saved is to kill Yafet so that he does not pass the rifle. It is allowed there to do this, because Japhet helps the murderer. Even though he doesn't know and he's ignorant about it - in a situation of helping a murderer, you can't claim "from the front" and that's why it's allowed to call it that.

heart. Summary of a parting of the ways opinion

A parting of the ways forbids a gentile to kill his friend in the case of "kill so-and-so or I will kill you". We explained that this law is also true in the case of culpable homicide by occupying a deserted place and blocking a road and the like. On the other hand, it was clarified that when there is no murderer but a normal danger for years and only one way of salvation - it is permissible to take the way from the "past life" law. We explained in a crossroads opinion that those who help a murderer cannot claim a "past life". Dean is right even though he does not intend to help the murderer but only to save himself. Even those who help the killer in rape - such as he didn't know and sit back and don't do it - cannot claim a "past life" and "may not have a front". For this reason it is permissible to kill the killer's helper in order to be saved.

O. Although Anas pretended that he did not know - in practice his ignorance appealed to the murderer. That's why his ignorance is considered help to the murderer and cannot claim a "past life" (like someone whom the murderer contacted and put on the road, who is

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anomalous - but helps the murderer and therefore cannot claim a "past life"). This is compared to someone who does not know that the place where he is is blocking another's way from being saved from a natural danger, then he must not be killed because he claims a "past life" - after all, I am also a rapist in that I do not know, and it is no different from your rape.

ב. Punishment for those who have committed three crimes in Onam

In the graph of the chapter (paragraph 5.) we brought the contradiction in the words of the Maimonides, you saw the veil from it in his opinion: He who is healed while committing three transgressions - will be punished; But the one who committed three crimes because of the order of a person who threatened to kill him - does not owe death.

The reason for this division is that we check whether the offender intended to commit the offense **or not. In the case of healing - he intended the offense; Without the crime he would have died of his illness. But in the case of rescue - he did not desire the act of the crime, and he would prefer** that this act did not exist in the world.

The same applies to those whose reality forced him to commit a crime, but it would have been better for him that the reality of the crime did not exist, for example: a Jew who killed another Jew who blocked his way of saving lives by rape. The killer would have preferred the victim not to be here, so this killing is considered an act of rape, and he is exempt (even though he did a forbidden act)."

ugh. On the right-hand page (mark 16:4, 9) we see that he understood that whoever harms someone standing on his way to rescue will be punished, although he will not be punished if he kills another according to the instructions of a rapist. But it is extremely difficult to say that the rapist's will and orders are a reason for exemption, since he is not allowed to hear: 'the words of the rabbi and the words of the student - the words of those who listen' (and as explained in the previous comment). In addition, it is necessary to clarify according to this understanding: in the case of a patient whose parents and doctors put a lot of pressure on him to do a certain medicine, and after he agrees with their opinion, he discovers that it is God's, and they continue to pressure him to do it - is it his initiative and he is obligated, or is it the initiative of others (Although they are not rape in the usual sense) and is exempt.

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And in any case - even if we can narrowly accept his opinion regarding the punishment of those who have committed three offenses of rape - surely it cannot be said regarding the permission of a Gentile to kill another in case of danger to lives, and there it is certain that according to the Happy Light it is permissible to harm those who block the way to salvation. This is because with regard to punishment, one can perhaps say that what interests me is the intentions of Dash who commits the offense and there is no objective measurement of danger here, and therefore the question must be discussed to whom to associate the initiative and in any case the act of the offense; But with the devotion of Gentiles we ask if it is permissible in the first place to kill another in order to be saved. In this issue, the discussion is not who invented the killing, but who is endangering whom, and on this matter there is no place to say the Israeli rabbi's division, since simply standing in the way of salvation endangers the escaper, more than a certain rapist who
told you to kill him endangers you.

(While simplifying the words of Rabbi Israeli, it seems that he understood that this division is also true for actions in the first place, but it needs to be studied as above; and refer to note 12 in the fourth chapter).

appendix A

The division of rescue katz to refeed katz as the different issues"

In the interpretation of the happy light opinion at the beginning of the chapter, we brought the division between those who are cured of a crime and those who are forced to commit a crime.

This division between healing and rape was brought up in several issues: the charge of self-sacrifice in murder according to the happy light; Punishment of those who have committed three serious crimes in Onam; Blessing on rape food (on Yom Kippur or non-kosher food); Selling rape ("Taliyohu and Zabin").

In addition, a similar division was brought up regarding the morality of money in rape - but the name of the division is not the same as the division in these cases, and as explained.

A. Charge of self-sacrifice for murder among gentiles - according to Haor Shim

It will be explained (in paragraph 5 in the body of the chapter) that according to the happy light - gentiles must surrender their souls in order not to kill others in the hope of healing, but they are not obliged to do so in the case of rescue. The explanation for this is that in healing - the slain claims, 'Why did your face die?', why do you allow yourself to kill me in order to be saved? But in the case of a rescue - the justification does not exist, since the killer says to the killed: it is your presence that causes me harm, and in such a situation - you cannot claim against me that it is forbidden to kill you: and that I have to die because of your presence? That is: the permission to kill in the case of a rescue stems from the fact that the presence of the person killed causes damage.

This belief that permits killing another in order to be saved is correct in the case of 'kill so-and-so or I will kill you' as explained in a happy light; And it is also true - and even more so - in the case of one who obstructs the way of saving another from some kind of danger. Even though there is no one who threatens and commands to kill the road blocker - in

reality his presence harms another, and if so he cannot claim 'may I have fronted'.

goat. And it is impossible to say that only when a rapist said to hurt so-and-so there is permission to hurt him, since there is none. After all, let's take it into our own hands that 'the words of the rabbi and the words of the student - whose words do you listen?', and the statement of an evil person ('he told me to do this...') is not a reason to permit a prohibition.

d. Sale in Onam

In sales law, the Shulchan Aruch ruled (Hoshen Mishpat Sof Siman Ra):

In which Onam they said that he cancels the Makh, in Onam Dathi Lia from behind me; But in Onam Dathi Leah from her souls, the stomach of the one who is sold because he is pressed for death, no. And even in the case of Onam Dati Leah from behind me, it is true that we will force him to sell, but we will not force him to sell, but to give him a deformity, and because he did not have the deformities he had to sell, not that he would be raped, and that he would be raped.

That is: there are cases where if we know that a seller sold the object because of rape, when they forced him to sell, the bargain is void. But the Shulchan Aruch emphasizes that it is ruka when the rapist obliges to sell the object, and not in the case where the owner of the object is forced to sell it as a result of other financial constraints and the like.

Here too we meet in the above discussion: the question before us is whether the seller desires the ability to transfer ownership of the object or not. In the event that he is forced to sell - he does not want the ability to transfer ownership: he would be better off without this ability. But in the case where he wishes to sell the object in order to receive money for it or a benefit from the one who receives it - he desires the existence of the ability to transfer the object, and therefore we understand that he is interested in the transfer of this ownership and it exists ⁰⁵.

pen. Another case: a man has a forbidden object with him, and he is afraid of being caught by the king who will punish him with the death penalty. His only way to be saved is to sell

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the object to another. The sale applies, since he is interested in the ability to transfer ownership of the object, and without this ability he was in danger (it should be noted that in contrast to the previous example, in which what interests us is whether the food is interested in the existence of the food and we said that if he is not interested in the existence of the food it is like Onam and is exempt from blessing - Here the question is whether he is interested in the ability to employ ownership, in that the object will not remain with him but will be transferred to another owner; therefore, when he is not interested in the object - this indeed makes him interested in the transfer of ownership to him, and in any case it is similar to healing and not to rape, and Doc).

In this issue, of sale in their own right, it is impossible to find an intermediate case, in which the usurper is not interested in the existence of the ability to transfer ownership but is forced to do so by reality. This is because the transfer of ownership is essentially human, and only an act caused by human coercion can cause me to be forced to do so even though I do not wish for such an action to exist.

A blessing for food in rape .ג

This is the language of the Shulchan Aruch and Rama in Orach Haim Siman Red (8-9):

All the eaters and the poor who eat and drink for medicine, if they taste good and the palate enjoys them, bless them beginning and end. Hega: If we force him to eat or drink, the one who enjoys it does not bless him, since he is punished for it.

Eat a forbidden food or drink from the danger, he blesses it from beginning to end.

Rama says that one who is forced to eat or drink - does not bless, and yet does not gain anything from the words of the Shulchan Aruch that the food and drink for healing and because of the danger must be blessed. The latter explained that there is a difference here between healing her past and rape to commit a transgression, and we will quote the words of the Shulchan Aruch rabbi:

Likewise, the person who eats on Yom Kippur is sick, or he who eats something forbidden because of the danger, since he who enjoys it should be blessed at the beginning and at the end, even though he does not enjoy it willingly at all, except because of his illness." And some say that the healthy person who is forbidden to eat does not bless his eating and drinking, even though it is impossible not to enjoy it. Because how can God bless who created this food or this drink and has no desire for it now? Which is not the case with a sick person, since he is already sick and wants to be cured by this food or drink - especially since he must thank God that he is blessed, and even if for the sake of healing alone he does not have to bless The Hahanin's blessing - In any case, one should bless for the eating and drinking that he desires in order to be cured, since he is already sick. But in the case of the set, even though the sets had already come upon him, if food had not been created, they would not have forced him to eat it.

That is: when without the food there was no danger here - according to the Rama'a it is not possible to bless, since he really does not desire the existence of this food, which causes him danger. But when he is sick, and the food is a cure for the disease - after all, without the food the danger would be greater, and he desires the existence of the food, therefore

he blesses it.

We will now discuss an intermediate case: a Jew has food in his pocket that the king forbids to have. And here come the king's policemen, and the only way to get rid of the food is to eat it quickly. If the food is not eaten immediately, the Jew will taste and be killed. According to the explanation we gave - he does not bless the food, because now he does not desire the existence of this food, which causes him danger.

The money, because "it is forbidden to save oneself with the money of one's friend". The Shachak there (Basakh 24) spread on the Shulchan Aruch and wrote:

Precisely if we force him for money just for nothing - then even if we force him to bring a debtor with his rabbinat in his hand, he accidentally 'saves himself with his friend's money' and it is the blood of the persecuted who broke the tools above, the sign of Shfm. What is not so is the next person who is forced to bring so-and-so's money - then the rape **begins on that so-and-so, and this is not called saving himself with his friend's money, but he is forced to** do as the master tells him, and if he does not do so, he will be found saving his friend's money with his **soul, and you have nothing to do with an opener soul.**

That is to say: everyone admits that it is initially permissible to harm another's money instead of supervision, since "you have nothing that stands in the way of supervision". In the Shulchan Aruch we saw that he always owes when he saves himself with his friend's money, but the Shekh believes that he does not always have to pay after hurting another in order to save himself; When the rapist prepared and set aside a certain amount of money from the rapist, he was forced to take it because of mental control - it is impossible to oblige the rapist to pay the tax.

Let's try to understand the Shach's words: what is the difference between someone who takes money just because a rapist tells him to bring him money for nothing and if not they will kill him, and someone who was told by a rapist to take it from a certain person? -

This is explained by the fact that the discussion here is not whether the act is permissible. The money was taken on the basis of the rule of law because "you have nothing that stands in the way of mental control". The discussion is only who should bear the consequences

after the money is taken. By this the Shach understood that if the rapist wanted the particular money - "the rape starts with the so-and-so" , since by law the rapist had to take this money according to the rapist's demand. Therefore, the consequences of the damage to the money are not on the rapist but on the owner of the money, and the rape is considered his rape. That is: in this case the rapist's intention changes the law, since his intention is the one that determines In his words, there is no excuse for committing a crime - but his intention is to make us decide that a certain person was raped, and therefore he is the one who has to bear the consequences of the rape .

Fa. The same opinion is also true in the words of the sheikh there in section 22, that a moser is fired (that he did not take and gave by hand) if he did so because he was raped - even by monetary rape. The explanation there is that a moral obligation is only on account of a felony, and a felony in rape is exempt (even though he was not allowed to commit pecuniary rape in the first place, refer to the commentary of the Gra there at the end of section 20). But it's simple that the exemption is only when the rapist has set aside a certain amount of money for him, then he can claim that it was the luck of a certain person and therefore the rapist exempts him from paying. When he was not singled out from Mak and he

Summary of the division .n

In the issues we have seen so far, the division between healing and salvation is a division between a situation in which the person who does a certain act wishes to be able to do it and a case in which without the possibility to do this act - he would have been better off.

The law in reality rape	The law is in their own right	The law: in healing	- you ! Agreed to divide Between healing and salvation	the subject
permitted	permitted	forbidden	Is the rapist interested in the existence of the slain	Gentile devotion to murder
exemption	exemption	have to	Is the rapist interested in the existence of the	Punishing Israel who was

not greeting	not greeting	congratulating	Is the rapist interested in the existence of the food	A blessing for food in rape
is no such case)	is not addicted	Equipment	Is the rapist interested in the existence of a transfer of ownership	Sale in Onam

1. A financial institution for rape

Ita in Shulchan Aruch Hoshen Mishpat Shefah (2, 4):

Gentiles will rape him, or Israel a rapist... and he carried and gave in the hand - even though he is a rapist must pay, the rescuer himself with his friend's money must...

He carried his friend's money in his hand and we let him pay... even though the king tried to bring it. If a rapist said to someone "Bring me the money of so-and-so or I will kill you" - the rapist is allowed to bring the money. The Shulchan Aruch says that even though he was allowed to bring (since "you have nothing that stands in the way of the supervision of the soul") - he must later pay the husband

P. As explained at the end of the previous comment.

Summary 7.

Unlike the first four cases we brought - the discussion about the morality of rape deals with a different perspective. The justification for the distinction between healing and rape in the case of morals is related to the intent of the rapist's actions, which is the one that causes, according to the Shach, that the owner of the money will not be able to sue the one who legally saved himself, since the luck of the owner of the money caused the rape.

The law in reality! rape	The law on rape	The law in healing 1	He argued for a distinction between healing and salvation	1 the subject
permitted	Gentile 1 is allowed to kill another to be	A Gentile is not allowed to kill another		1]
exemption	Enos is exempt from	He who passed and was healed have to	Is the rapist interested in the act	The first cases
does not greet	He who is forced to eat is not <u>blessed</u>	Whoever eats a ban for the purpose of healing blesses him		
must pay	Exemption from paying	must pay	Who was raped?	Taking money by rape

This opinion will teach us what the law is in the case of wealth that blocks the way to salvation and someone fleeing from a murderer must harm him in order to be saved: in such a case the rape fell on the fugitive, **and not on the owner of the wealth, since the rapist intended to harm and injure the fugitive; Therefore, the fugitive will have** to pay the owner of the money, as much as he "saves himself with his friend's money" who must pay a fee. And they also simplified the words of the Shulchan Aruch in the sign of Shem, 3:

A pursuer who was pursuing his friend to kill, ... 3. The pursuer who broke the tools of a pursuer, is exempted, **so that he may not be punished for his body. And if they belonged to another person, the debtor, whom the rescuer himself recognized in the money, is liable.**

What emerges from this: the explanation in the case of rape is not the question of whether the rapist is interested in keeping the money. Even when he is not interested in keeping the money - he must pay if he harmed him, since "it is forbidden to save himself with his friend's money." The dispute between the Shachak and the Shulchan Aruch is only about a case where the rapist was allowed to do what he did, but we have to decide who should bear the consequences of the rape. In this, the Shachak believes that the intent of the rapist, who intended to harm so-and-so, means that so-and-so cannot bring claims to the rapist, since the rapist can say to him: What I did - I did legally, and the rape belongs to you and not to me. It unfolded through the rapist taking the money - after all, the rape is considered rape that fell on the rapist, and he is the one who has to bear the consequences.

He intentionally harmed his friend's money in order to prevent financial damage to himself - he cannot get rid of it by claiming that he is on their own. The rape fell on him and he has to bear the consequences.

Feb. And comment on the words of the great light in the sign 1, page 20 and 21.

The Gozal chapter in Tara: "He is a strong man and a man who is assik Hamra in the desert... said Hai, from Maikra he is chasing me and all of me/ and as if there was a danger of putting a donkey in a ship, but they were not used to putting it in as we do now and later it was done so that the donkey was faltering and a problem for shipwrecks - If he threw a debtor in the river, the donkey's owner does not pursue him, and when his donkey stumbles, he is an oppressor and saves himself with the money of his fellow debtor. And it means **that he who saves himself with his friend's money is obligated even if he saved himself in danger**

Souls...

But the House of Yosef (at the end of Siman Shaf) brought the words of the answers from Maimonites and divided it: And the words of Tima are, Datu whoever has a bad dog or a harmful thing must kill and remove the harmful thing so that others are not harmed.

The House of Joseph believed that even if the owner of the donkey did not commit a crime - there is no obligation to pay him for his donkey that was thrown into the water, and this is because the donkey is harmful to all the passengers of the ship. Since this is how it is permissible to defend against him and prevent his harm (and as we proved above in the body of the chapter (paragraph 12) from the Gemara that it is permissible to harm a harmer in order to be saved from his harm even if he harms by rape).

The Rama (in the Rama'a Keg, 3^{Pad}) was asked about the words of the House of Yosef, and these are the words of the questioner:

And I, a layman, am very curious about his words, they were like a bad dog or a harmful thing that he had to remove the harmful thing and kill it, and he is not afraid and does not put it down and does not remove it - he is a persecutor, and therefore all those who are killed are exempt and the commandment is binding, but the one who brought the donkey into the ship and did not know the evil of his deeds and was accustomed to let in now Becomes an enemy and jumps and skips and becomes shipwrecked and thrown into the river, the rescuer himself must pay according to his friend's money.

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The questioner understood in the words of the answers from immunities that it is forbidden to harm the pest if the damage is due to the rape of the owner. The Rama in his answer (Simen Tza, 3) did not accept this claim:

I don't see an argument in this at all, and that's because I don't care if the owners didn't know - anyway the dog or the donkey they chase, and who is better than their owners who said the next one to kill you is wise to kill and there is no difference between the first time and the second time. Didn't they say: 'All the bulls are under sustainable conservation'

Fed. This sign is the question to which the answers are given in the sign tza (and it should be commented on the opening of Hoshen in the Laws of Torts (chapter 12, section 2b) who quoted the questioner's words in the sign keg according to the Rama's opinion, and not the answer of the Rama that was printed in the sign tsa).

Appendix B

; The dam said On a donkey jumping on a ship.

Ita in the Gemara (Bava Kama Katz, 2):

TR: When he saw that there was a walk in the desert and stood on it, he recruited a carnivore - a calculator according to wealth and there is no calculator according to souls, and if they hired a tourist who walks before them - a calculator even according to souls, and to use it according to the custom of the Khmerin..., TR: A ship that was going on a sea walk, he stood on it A surge to the nature and the kilo of a load - a calculator according to load and there is no calculator according to money, and there is no change from the customs of the shippers.

Likewise, the Dambam (Halchot Gzila and Abida 12:11; 10) and the Shu'a (Hom Sof Siman Arab) ruled:

A caravan that was parked in the desert and stood on it was recruited to prey, and they decided with the Hagaim a money and gave it, a calculator according

to their money and not a calculator according to souls, and if they hired a tourist before them to inform them of the way, a calculator paid according to money and according to souls, and they did not change from the customs of the dates.... A ship that was traveling at sea and stood A surge according to the nature and the kilo of a load, a calculator according to a load and there is no calculator according to money, and let's not change from the custom of the shippers.

Later in the Gemara, there is an incident that happened:

He raised dakdim and asik hamra to the bara kami deslico inshi bambara. I have a problem. Ata that one increased the salt of her to Hamra, that one increased and her breasts to Nahara and drowned. Ata lekmiya darba, mushroom. Leah Abaye said: 'And he saves himself with his friend's money!'

He said to her: 'The island of Maikra is chasing him.'

There is a case here where a poor donkey throws a whole ship overboard, and Raba is fired from paying for this donkey. In the answers given at the end of the tort book (mark as ^{expired}) it is explained that this is a case in which the owner of the donkey committed a crime:

^{expired} It was also brought up in Mordechai Baba Kamma Chapter Ten.

The donkey, that is - the entire burden of the loss should fall on the owner of the donkey alone, whose cargo is now damaging the ship, and not any other cargo. And if so - either way, the owner of the donkey alone bears the burden of the loss, and how does the RMA write that they have to pay a levy

To answer these two difficulties we will have to go deeper into the distribution of the payment on the ship. The division in the ship is different from the divisions mentioned in Shira. In Sheira we **divide according to money or according to souls, that is: according to what each person earned from the rescue; But** the division according to load is not related to rioch, because it is possible that a weight thrown by one will be much more expensive than the same weight thrown by

another, and according to Rashi:

A calculator according to Meshui - if he threw away one hundred liters of gold,
he will throw away one hundred liters of iron.

And as Rabbi Moshe of Rottenburg commented in Sho'at (Hom, 20):

And here it really seems that there is a dilemma that really has to be made difficult? Death payment should be approximately the loss if there was no rescue, and this evidence was based on the business of souls - even if they saved themselves with money, they would not be sold at the end of the day and the calculation will be according to money, but they would be sold at the beginning of the day if they did not save themselves... and why really not Was it also said in the Denizil ship at the beginning of Dina? If they had not lightened the load, the golden bearer would have lost a lot and he would have given about this amount in the rescue, also more in the lightening of the load, this would be called a rescue.

Why is there this difference between a ship and a ship? Apparently one could answer that the reason is that when one does harm - it is permissible to defend against its harm; And even if it is harmful in rape. Here the weight is the cause of damage, so each is allowed to throw away the excess weight of the other, in proportion to how much this weight is harmful (so that in practice each person throws his share from the ship according to the relative share of the weight he has).

This is how we can understand the words of Rabbi Moshe of Rottenburg where he answered;

But the division is explained here because the loss is by the cargo, and there is no difference whether the cargo is gold or iron, which is not the case in Gaim.

And also in the words of the Maharshadam (Hoshon Mishpat Siman Shadm ^{here}) can be understood as follows:

Mouth. And also refer to Ibn Hazel, Laws of Habul and Mazik 8, 15.

And so the passage stopped: 'Felga nakaza kana', and in any case, the person who kills the person must die, as in the second half of the Shlima chapter, 'A bull that gored four and five'/ and if the gored person comes to save himself and kills the bull - who is obliged to pay? Therefore, in your words there is no claim about the Karo in this.

The Rama agrees with Beit Yosef that it is permissible to defend ourselves against a bull that harms us, even if it is the rape of the owner. He brings evidence: we have a rule that 'all bulls are in custody'. If so, there is no obligation to keep a tame bull in a special way, and half of the damage he owes for his damages is compensated, and from the legal point of view the owner is not to blame for the damage. Despite this, it was concluded that killing a person must kill her. If he is liable for the death of an individual who killed a person - simply that the person can defend himself and kill him, and the owner cannot demand payment because if we had not killed him to save ourselves from him - he would have been killed in a court of law. What emerges is that it is simply permissible to defend oneself against a bull that harms and causes people to be killed, and there is no obligation to pay the owner for the damage caused to them by this defense - even if the damage was not their fault.

And here, after the Rama rejects the questioner's words and agrees with the principle we found in Beit Yosef - he qualifies his words, and says that this case differs from the usual rule that it is permissible to defend oneself against harm by rape:

But know that in my book that I wrote about the columns in Syayata Dashmia, when you knew that being my people, I wrote that there is nothing in the words of the Karo in this, but not on your behalf, only because it is not a change at all what the donkey skips and jumps on the ship, since their way of bringing in the donkeys is not a crime for the owner of the donkey, and therefore they must pay a silent payment for the ship that they weighed Masha as explained there.

His words are not clear: on the one hand, he wrote above that it is permissible to defend against a bull that harms even though it is in the name of the owner - but at the end of his words he says that in the ship this rule is not true because the owner did not change and is not at fault. So what if the owner is not at fault? After all, at the beginning of the

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answer, Rama wrote (and proved) that even when the owner is not guilty, it is permissible to defend oneself against the damage of his ox!

Another problem with the Rama: The Rama writes that everyone should pay the owner of the donkey that was thrown into the water. How is the payment split on the ship? by freight. Well - we will check what is the heaviest load on the ship in this case: the only heaviest load is

or other ships to carry themselves and their chattels - they calculate according to the number of persons and according to the cargo that these persons carry. Here the danger exists, and the pump is not what causes it. The discussion is how to divide the way to solve the problem, and in this the calculation is according to the weight. We see from this that the calculation according to load is not related to tort law - but rather to an opinion estimate of the distribution of the burden in the case of solving a common problem (and as will be explained further on by Lakman).

When one person's property harms others by rape, the owner of the harmful property does not have to harm his property in order to stop the harm. But in the ship it means that everyone must throw away their belongings according to their share, and cannot say to others 'if you want - throw them away yourself'.

In the case of a ship there is no one harmful, but all are harmful to each other. And it is a novelty to say that in such a situation each person is allowed to defend himself against the other only according to the ratio of the damage the other causes him (and according to this it turned out that two bulls harm each other - the owners are allowed to defend themselves against each other only in proportion to the damage they cause each other; and it is a novelty)^{Paz}.

From all the complaints we learn that the division by load is not tort law. The obligation to participate with one another arises from the need of all in what is done (and we have extended this in another place¹), and the form of division is determined by the opinion of people. People's opinion is that the burden of rescuing from damage is usually divided so that everyone pays according to what they benefited from, that is: according to their part that was saved thanks to the act of rescuing (according to souls / according to money). But in the case where the money also causes some damage - even though it is not complete damage according to tort law, but rather it burdens and makes it difficult to rescue even if it's due to harm - the opinion of people is to divide it according to the difficulty that the money causes, and not according to the pleasure that comes from the act of saving.

Paz Another note: if the division is for the purpose of the permit to defend against a pest - here you have to understand why if

One has thrown away his burden others have to participate and pay him. He decided to throw it away and now there is no damage. He might have been allowed to throw away others', but he didn't. The others did not actually harm him, and where does their charge to him come from? Although it can be argued that they owe him a "enjoyable" state - but then it should be discussed in the terms of an 'Aryan smuggler of his friend's property', see Hoshan, the case of Siman Kakh and Akhmal.

tin. A main and important source of this partnership is found in the netivot of the law, in the words of Sec. 3.

This is the Danachshol that Rambam the late Maimonides wrote in chapter 12 of the laws of robbery and theft from shooting **in a ship in which many merchants put in many goods each of them according to their value, and they said, ``Hoi Tama, because the evildoer pursues like this," and proof of the fact that we** oblige each one according to his burden, no According to the money and not according to the souls. And as it is written: 'And it is easy for you to calculate according to the value and not according to the money'. And Rashi ^{Fu interpreted} : 'If this one had a thousand liters of gold and this one had a thousand liters of iron - it casts a thousand liters of iron and this one has a thousand liters of gold', this is equivalent to lightening the load. And why was that? But because we see that the burden is the pursuer, and what is a gold coin to me and what is an iron coin to me? In Chapter 8 of the Laws of Harbinger and Damager, Rabbi Laber did not dwell on the laws of a carrier and damager, of which he pursues. And so just his words, depshita demiri that we know who the persecutor is, and we were the very same deed of Dhamra mentioned above that was not mentioned in the words of the Rambam, but that the rabbi (Rambam) changed the language to Ashmoinen dela lima, rather a faded Hamra that is actually harmful and harmful (which allowed this because the Rabbad in obtaining it), but the Rambam s'al the cargo is also called a chaser.

According to this understanding, there is a law of tort here: like an ox that went up on top of its friend - it is permissible for the injured party to defend himself by causing damage to the injured party; Similarly, a cargo that causes a ship to sink - it is allowed to throw it into the sea without considering the damage caused to its owner, even if it is illegal.

Although this understanding, that this is a tort law, is difficult for several reasons:

The Berita says that they follow the custom of the Spaniards. And if this is tort law - why write such a thing? After all, this is a complete law (and if the custom

does change the law of the consent of the townspeople and their regulations -
then it should be written on all the laws in tractate Baba Kama).

According to this explanation - the division by load is only when the load is
harmful. however •. We found explicitly in Yerushalmi that the division according to
load is not only when the load is harmful, but also when a difficulty arises as a result
of the load even though it is not harmful. This is how it is written in Yerushalmi (Bava
Metzia 6:4): 'The hirer who joins a wagon or a ship calculates according to cargo and
according to persons and not according to money'. That is: if a group of people are
stuck in the desert because their caravan or ship broke down, and they need to rent
a caravan

The damage is due to the sea travel, and if so there is damage here caused by the sea; Similar to robbers who caused a donkey to jump, and we treat this as damage caused by the robbers, so the distribution will be according to souls like all the needs of the war against robbers. For this reason in this case - they are divided according to souls (as explained in Sea of Solomon on Baba Kama (chapter ten, sign 2; and there Nev) and 17 (at the end of sign 5) in the explanation of the Rama'a method).

It turns out that the Rama's and Beit Yosef's disagreement is how to look at a donkey that jumps on the ship - is it called the gudum of the loss, or is it a 'victim' of circumstances that all the passengers must face together. If he is the cause of the loss - it turns out to divide so that the cause is eliminated (which is actually the division by freight); But if he is a victim of the sea trip - everyone shares in that, as much as it is a common ^{danger} .

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be the cause of the loss, refer also to Shuat Yachin and Boaz 2, 4; And the old Ritts Association was frozen.

This is also the intention of the judges we mentioned above: they do not mean to say that they pay according to the remainder because of tort law, but since they have to split the payment anyway - the simple view is to say that the one who causes damage will pay more, even though it is not damage in the normal tort law.

(An example of this interpretation can be found in the Hand Ramah's explanation of the distribution 'according to the proximity of houses' on page 8, 2 of Baba Batra. The Hand Ramah explains there that when a wall is built, those who are close to it should pay more than those who live in the center of the city, since those who live near the wall cause the wall to be built. be longer to surround their houses as well. You simply cannot say that they are "harmful" - but the lengthening of the wall resulting from their houses makes us look at them as more responsible for building the wall of such a length, and therefore they pay more).

Let's draw a case: the sea is rough and threatens to sink the ship regardless of the weight on it. The only way to be saved is to call for help from another ship, but the cost of this call for help is great. How is this payment divided? Here it is clear that the distribution is according to souls, since the cargo is not the harm but the sea, and we return to the examination of what each one earned in order to divide the burden. And as in the case where robbers fight the ship's men who divide according to souls, since the danger is to the souls of the people; And there is nothing to do with the truck, which does not cause the danger.

Now we will discuss the case where the robbers managed to deliberately make one of the donkeys on the ship start jumping to sink the ship, and have to throw him away to save everyone. Here it turns out that everyone must pay the donkey's owner. The donkey jumps here as a result of the war with the bandits, not as a result of a problem with the donkey. The war with the bandits is a problem that all the ship's men face together and divide according to their souls, so they also have to share the damages of this donkey.

That is: when we estimate how to divide the damage - we need to check what its primary cause is. When the cause is the property (a truck, for example) - divide according to what each one damages (according to the truck). But when the cause of the damage is another danger - even if it caused part of the money to become harmful - everyone continues to deal with it together, and even participates with the owner of the money that is damaging

- because he is harmed by a common danger.

Now the RMA's words are clear: the RMA says that in the case of a donkey jumping on a ship - it is impossible to claim that the owner of the donkey is the one who causes harm, because the damage is caused by the sea. The madness of

A. The words of the Jerusalemite

And this law is explained in Yerushalmi on the Shabbat treatise (end of chapter 10), where it says:

Rabbi Hanina said: Matintin said yes that there is no cure for bloodshed.

Dataninan Taman: 'Most of it is gone, there is no touching it, and there is no repelling one soul from another.' Not the end of the matter when he told him to

kill **so-and-so, but even to heat so-and-so. Tani: Gentile in Israel is forbidden; Israel is a Gentile -permitted.**

It is clear in Yerushalmi that an Israelite who is in danger because they say to him, 'Kill such and such a gentile or you will be killed' - is it permissible to kill the gentile in order to be saved?

Admittedly, one must ask whether the Jerusalemite also speaks of a resident citizen, or only of a Gentile. For it is possible to say that what the Jerusalemite permitted is to kill a gentile, that there is no mitzvah to revive him, nor is it permissible to save him from death (as explained in the first chapter); But a resident resident, who has a mitzvah to live - there may be a prohibition in this matter.

We will explain further: in Israel we found that there is a charge of self-sacrifice for murder, and we also found that in some cases we prohibit not only the body of the offense but also its sections, 'accessories'. And if so, it would be wrong to say that a Jew is forbidden to kill a resident resident in the place of soul control, and even though the prohibition is not 'thou shalt not murder' but 'shed human blood' - perhaps this prohibition is an accessory to the shedding of blood, and therefore a Jew must surrender his soul to him.

And here we have found proof that the prohibition of 'shedding human blood' is not considered to be an accessory to shedding blood. In the third chapter we brought the Mishnah (Aholot 7:6) which permits killing a fetus that endangers its mother as long as the

fetus has not removed its head. The killing of a fetus is forbidden by the law of "shedding human blood" because "it is forbidden from the hands of the Israelites and the Gentiles" (refer to the first appendix to the first chapter). If the soul had to be handed over to the 'shedder of human blood' from the law of its accessories and bloodshed - it is not clear why it is permissible to kill the fetus in order to save the mother.

And if so, we have a clear assumption that 'shedding human blood' is not considered to be an accessory to bloodshed, and one should not give up the soul on this; And in any case, when they say to a Jew, 'The dead live.'

In the third chapter above, we brought the Yerushalmi in tractate Abode Zerah (2, 2), which is similar to this Yerushalmi but the version in it is a little different. And also refer to Moshe on the Jerusalemite there from which it is clear that the second version also does not disagree with this version but adds to it.

Chapter four

The soul of a Jew versus the soul of a Hagar

In this chapter we will deal with the case in which the lives of Israel are in danger and the only way to save them is to harm the gentile, and we will explain that in such a case the gentile must be killed in order to save Israel.

We saw in the third chapter the source of the charge of self-sacrifice for the murder of Israel:

All crimes in the Torah if a person is told to go and do not kill - he should go and not kill, except for idolatry and incest and bloodshed... The killer of Gofiya Menlan? Sabra he, Dahua Data Lakemia Darba, said to her: Meri Dorai [city governor, Rashi] told me Zil Kataliya to Palnia, and no, Katalina to you. He said to her: Likatloh and not tikatol. Why did you face Ddma Didach blush tefi? Dilma Dama Dahua Gabra blush Tefi? ^A

Hence the simple rule that if Reuven is told 'Kill Shimon or we will kill you', he must not kill Shimon to save himself.

In the third chapter, we learned about a dispute between the arbitrators in the event that a gentile is threatened and told to kill his friend and if not, they will kill him: according to the Maharash Yaffe, it is permissible for a gentile to kill his friend in order to save himself from death, because now he is a complete murderer, and a gentile has no obligation of self-sacrifice at all. Whereas according to Parshat-Derekh, even among non-Gentiles we say the claim "Mai khazada dadma didach somek tafi", and it is forbidden for a gentile to kill his friend in order to save his life.

^a Gentile or we will kill you' .

Sanhedrin witness, a; Yoma Feb, II; Pesachim so, 2. .א

Simply put, according to the Maharash Yaffe, there seems to be no room for questioning, .ב since the entire prohibition of a Jew to kill a gentile stems from the prohibition of a gentile to kill a gentile, and if a gentile is allowed to kill a gentile in such a situation - there is no source for prohibiting it for Israel. and refer to Lakman.

After all, he (Rashi) felt that it was about the souls of Israel and because of their likability before God. -. But in the soul of the foreigner we do not find this kindness, and it is like all the other mitzvot rejected

· minded .

And the Maimonides in the Basic Laws of the Torah, Chapter 5, Law 7, writes:

And the killing of a soul from Israel to heal another soul or to save a person from the hand of a soul, something that the opinion tends to is that no one loses a soul for a soul...

Maimonides emphasizes "killing a soul from Israel", and is not satisfied with the words "killing a soul". And the Rambam is precise in his language also in the halacha: If Gentiles said to them, give us one of you and we will be killed, and if not we will kill all of you - let them all be killed and not give them one soul from Israel...

and if he does not have to - let them all be killed and not give them one soul from
Israel.

The Rambam constantly bothers to add the word "from Israel", and hence if it was a person
who is not from Israel, the law would be different.

Even in the Fruit of Magadim it is made clear that only in the bloodshed of a Jew in the
Jews of the Law will he kill and not cross, but *in the case of a resident adult Jew, Reuven
is allowed to kill Japheth in order to save himself. This is how the fruit of Magadim wrote in
Orach Haim Shecht, 1 (in gold squares):

It is also doubtful whether the ruler said a certain person was killed and if it was
not Katlina to you, and such and such a doubt a baby is found in the city half by
half, if it is said that it does not belong to the front, then it is a sight and it is
doubtful. Or Delma did not hate. And now

The fruit-magadim is satisfied with what is to be done when a Gentile ("the government")
threatens a Jew to kill someone who is undoubtedly a Jew, a Gentile doubt - like a baby
found in a city where half of the inhabitants are Jews

We also referred to the words of Rabbi Yisraeli Lakman in note 12, see *ibid.* .n
And to comment that according to the Maharash Yaffe - apparently it is simple that there .i
is no obligation to sacrifice one's soul for killing a gentile, since according to his method
there is no obligation to sacrifice one's soul for gentiles, and if so it is permissible to "bend
down" to kill another in order to be saved, and it is also permissible for a Jew to kill a
gentile since the entire prohibition stems from what is forbidden to gentiles and when
They are allowed - so are we. And in his opinion, Rashi and the Rambam wanted to teach
that it was not wrong to say that after we committed ourselves to killing a gentile -
murdering a Gentile is included in the prohibition because it is an 'accessory' of
bloodshed, and therefore killing a Gentile is more serious for Israel than for Gentiles.

A resident or we will kill you' - he is allowed to kill in order to be saved (and we will prolong the holocaust between a gentile and a fetus in the womb).

ב. Proof from the words of Dashi and the DMBAM

Also in the words of Rashi and the Rambam, we see that the law of charging devotion of the soul is only true in the case of a Jew against a Jew and not in the case of a Jew against a non-resident.

In the three places in the Gemara where this law and this act of the same one who came before Raba are mentioned - in the Sanhedrin (Ad, 1), in Pesachim (Kha, 2) and in Yoma (Fab, 2) - 'Marikh Rashi expands on the interpretation of this, with slight differences of style; And it is clear from his words that this law is correct precisely because it is the killing of Israel. For example, Rashi's commentary on the issue of Yoma:

Why did you face the Dadam Didach blush Taffey - that is, why don't you think of Mister Milta because "and you will live in them and not die in them", the meaning of the word is that the soul of Israel is more beloved before the place than the unleavened bread, God said, cancel the mitzvah and live this one. But now that **Israel has** been killed here and the mitzvah has been thrown away, why would it be better in the eyes of the place to violate its mitzvah, why would your blood be dearer to it than the blood of your fellow Israel?

Rashi interprets that since in any case there is a loss of life from Israel, that is why we tell the questioner that he must not kill his friend to save himself, because "why should your blood be more pleasing to Him (the Almighty) than the blood of your friend Israel?" And it is clear from these words that when The choice is between the loss of the soul of a resident citizen and the loss of the soul of Israel - the decision is simple enough (we have quoted here the words of Rashi in Yoma which are the most explicit on this point, especially in the closing sentence. However, the same conclusion is also clear in his language during Passovers and the Sanhedrin).

It is also accurate from the words of Rashi Rabbi Shaul Israeli in his book Amud Yamini

(Simon 16 4:8):

d. Although it should be noted that there is no evidence from the permit to kill a fetus of a child with difficulty according to the words of Rabbi Unterman that we brought in a comment in the previous chapter that the fetus is killed because it pursues and harms the mother. But in any case this method too - in the case of 'killing a resident or we will kill you' there is no obligation of self-sacrifice as is proven in the words of Rashi and the Rambam, the prophet of Lakman; And killing a fetus is more serious than killing a Gentile, as we will explain at the end of the chapter.

The rest, a court where there are Gentiles and Israelites, even one Israel and a thousand Gentiles and it fell on them - an avalanche from those overseeing everything from Israel, one of them interpreted to another court and **the same court fell on him, they oversee him lest the one who interpreted was Israel and the rest were recruited.**

That is, only in the event that there is a concern for the supervision of a Jew's soul can the Shabbat be violated.

Admittedly, the judges discussed whether it is permissible to violate the Durbanan prohibition in order to save the life of **a resident (whom we are commanded by the Torah to revive); And as stated in the Baor-Halacha on Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim, a sign of section B:**

And the inhabitant lives from his child because we are commanded to revive him and precisely in things that are not blasphemy and it is possible even with the prohibition of instigating them, such as this we are commanded to revive him not decreed [see PMG].

And in any case, there is no dispute that the prohibition of Dauriyta is not rejected because of the supervision of the soul of the residents.

And according to this there is further evidence for what we have proven from the words of Rashi and the Rambam: if Shabbat is rejected from the life of Israel, and the life of a resident resident is rejected from Shabbat - then simply the life of a resident resident is rejected from the life of Israel, and it is permissible to kill a resident resident in order to save Israel.

And this opinion is strengthened according to the explanation of the "no front" opinion

among the Jews (which was already explained in Pisca in the third chapter). This is how

Rashi wrote in Yoma:

Why did you not see your face, did you blush, that is, why do you think of the servants of Milta because "and you will live in them and not die in them", the meaning of the word is according to the fact that the soul of Israel before the place is more lovable than the unleavened bread, God Almighty will cancel the mitzvah and live this. But now that Israel has been killed here and the mitzvah has been thrown away, why would it be better in the eyes of the place to violate its mitzvah, why would your blood be dearer to it than the blood of your fellow Israel?

Rashi interprets that the hassbra of "May Hazad" came to deal with a different sabra according to which we should apparently have allowed that Jew to kill his friend in order to save himself from death - after all, all transgressions in the Torah are rejected in the place of soul control, as we have learned

H. It should be noted that all of this is about the very law of rejecting prohibitions in order to heal a Gentile, but apart from that there is in the Halacha » the consideration of fearing enmity that will lead to danger, and in the Halacha in fact there is still a lot of consideration for these considerations, which are something that is still present in our generation with our many iniquities (although it does not exist in Gary is a resident of course). See the summary of this in the medical halachic encyclopedia Argu Goy, vol . 127

and half gentiles - and if not he will kill him; In such a case, is he allowed to kill, since the other **is only a Jewish doubter. In any case, you see that it is simple for PMG that if it is a gentile - of course a Jew is allowed to kill him in order to save himself.**

This is about someone who, because of doubt about his Jewishness, must observe the entire Torah, and if so - it cannot be said that his status is less than that of a resident (since he observes 13 mitzvot, and not just Sheva). In spite of this, it is simply a fruit of mischief that is allowed to be killed instead of the supervision of the soul of Israel if he is indeed a Gentile.

ג. Sober from a mental control test

It's a simple matter in the Shas and in the rulings that the soul control of a Jew rejects the entire Torah, while the soul control of a gentile does not reject Torah prohibitions. Regarding the control of a Jew's soul, the Maimonides writes in the Laws of Basic Torah Chapter 5, Law 1:

When a gentile rises up and forces Israel to transgress one of the mitzvot mentioned in the Torah or they will kill us, let him transgress and not kill as it is said in the commandment "Whoever does them, a person will live by them" and live by them and not die by them.

And also in the laws of Shabbat, chapter 2 of Halacha 1:

Shabbat is postponed in case of danger to souls like all other unleavened bread, therefore a patient who is in danger has all his needs done on Shabbat...

And regarding the supervision of the soul of a resident resident, the Rambam writes later in the same chapter of the Laws of Shabbat, in the Halahav:

From childhood you are the daughter of a resident because we are commanded to revive him and they do not desecrate the Sabbath on her.

In other words, even a resident resident, who has a mitzvah to live, is not allowed to desecrate Shabbat.

And another example later in the chapter in Halacha as:

"and

G. And so are the words of the Light of Life (Exodus 11:16): "He will also desire, according to what we mentioned in the verse, only my Sabbaths, because G-d commanded the Sabbath to be profaned for the sake of soul control. Here the scripture makes it clear that the Sabbath will not be diminished by keeping it, except for about the Israelites, but about others To revive ACM, even if there is a resident resident who keeps seven unleavened bread and runs the risk of death, Israel will not desecrate the Sabbath for him."

Lika their information from Israel Shari - in that it is a mitzvah for Israel, I will not say the most, the Gentile ■ that Shabbat is obligatory and for Israel a mitzvah... and for those who pass away, it is obligatory and Israel is exempted - I will depart from any place that is not Shari'i. Who is Kesha Damarinan in the episode Ben Soror and Teacher, 'His head came out, no one can touch it, a duck pushes soul against soul', but before his head came out, the animal reached out and cut him into parts and took him out to save his mother, and **it is not allowed to act as a heathen in a nation because they were warned about the embryos! And there is one who learns that Nami in Israel is a mitzvah** to save,

and it is possible to defile in Goy Shari.

The Tosaf formulates the conclusion at the very beginning of their words, "In a matter that is a trouble to Israel, they will not do it the most", and they prove it from the wrong law that Shabbat must die (as it is written in Gemara Sanhedrin Noah, 2), while Israel has no such prohibition at all - and apparently this contradicts the rule "Licha Midi" "Del Yisrael Shari and Gentiles are prohibited"! But since Israel has a mitzvah in this matter, that is, Israel has in general the mitzvah of Shabbat, therefore there is no difficulty in saying that there will be a detail here that is forbidden to the Gentiles and allowed to Israel. And the additions continue and ask how it is possible that Israel is allowed to kill a fetus in order to save its mother, while it is forbidden for Gentiles! And the additions are justified here, too, "in Israel there is a mitzvah in order to save", and since there is a mitzvah here in Israel, a situation can arise where this is forbidden among Gentiles and not among Israel. But finally the additions write that even in Gentiles it is permissible to kill the fetus in order to save its mother.

In any case, we learned from the words of the Tosaf that when it comes to a matter of a mitzvah in Israel, it should not be prohibited on the grounds of "likha midi". And in any case

פרק רביעי: נפש יהודי מול נפש הגוי <קסג

it is clear that in our case, when Reuben the Jew was forced to kill the Gentile in order to save himself, since Reuben is doing this as a commandment to save the soul of Israel from death, the prohibition to kill a Gentile should not be applied here, which all derives from the reasoning of "Shit from the hands of Del Israel, and a Gentile is forbidden". Although it is generally forbidden for Israel to kill a Gentile, but instead of a mitzvah it is not so.

And from Sbara 2 of Tosaf it is clear that the prohibition of killing a gentile was completely permitted and not merely rejected because of the supervision of Israel's soul (regarding the difference between 'permitted' and 'rejected' see Yoma 6, 2; Ve Pesachim Ez, 1; And in Beit Yosef Orach Haim, the beginning of the sign of forgetting; and in Shu'a, there, section 10; and Akhmal).

"He shall live in them" - "and he shall not die in them", and if so the prohibition of bloodshed should also have been rejected on behalf of Reuven's open mind who threatened his life if he did not kill Shimon. And on this Rava said: It is true that soul control rejects all the mitzvot, "according to the fact that the soul of Israel before the place is more beloved than the mitzvot", but this is only when the soul of a Jew will truly be saved through the transgression. And in this case, since one Jew will die and there is no profit here in saving the life of a Jew, therefore it is forbidden for one Jew to kill the other.

If so, all of this is only true when it comes to two Jews, in which case there is no permit for soul control since one Jew will eventually die. But when it comes to the life of a Gentile versus the life of Israel, the initial argument that a Jew is allowed to commit a crime in order to save himself is repeated, for here there is the soul control of a Jew - who rejects the entire Torah - versus the soul control of a resident citizen, who does not reject even a Torah prohibition (as we have seen above).

In other words: controlling a Jew's soul allows one to transgress all the prohibitions of the Torah. But in the prohibition of bloodshed, since the possibility of saving Reuben is at the expense of Shimon's life, therefore again the permit of soul control does not belong. But when the saving of Reuben is at the expense of the life of the resident Hagar Hagar, then the permission for soul control stands, because here at last there is the saving of one soul from Israel, which rejects the entire Torah ⁹.

The words of the Tosaf regarding "Likha Midi" .ד

Another justification can be given for the Halacha we have learned so far, that it is permissible for a Jew to kill a resident citizen in order to save his life.

We have already mentioned above that the prohibition for a Jew to kill a Gentile stems from the rule of "Licha from the hands of the Israelites and a Gentile is forbidden", as explained in the first chapter. And here are the additions in the Sanhedrin Net, we discussed the rule of "Licha Midi" and wrote:

ninth. And if you say: apparently we found that Israel's life is worth less, since Israel was killed for wrongful offenses and not killed for them; And a Jew is obligated to sacrifice his soul for 3 mitzvot (and for all of them during the annihilation) and a Gentile is not obligated to

this! The answer is that one should not learn from this that Israel's life is worth less, but that when Israel commits an offense there is a much more serious injury here than the offense of a Gentile, and therefore for Israel's offenses there are severe punishments and the obligation of self-sacrifice (and this should be extended further in the context of explaining the issue of a sinful Gentile who converted in the Sanhedrin AA, II; and ACM).

It is permissible to cut the fetus in the intestine, either in balm or beer, - Because

he is chasing her to death. And if he takes out his head, no one touches him, no

Soul is pitted against soul, and this is the nature of the world.

In his words, it can be seen that the permission to kill the fetus is that it persecutes and endangers the mother. And this means that the permission to kill the fetus is only when without its presence - the danger would not **exist (and as we explained the division between healing and saving in the first appendix to the third chapter)**. And according to this it is indeed permissible to kill a fetus in the case of "kill such and such a fetus or we will kill you", since without the fetus the danger would not exist*; But there is no permission to kill the fetus of one woman in order to heal another, because here the danger exists without the fetus, and the killer is the one who decided to connect the fetus with the danger.

And it is true that Reka, in his additions to the Mishnah in Aholah (end of chapter 7), puzzled the Rambam:

Seemingly puzzling, this one is not because it pursues us, it has gone out, most of it has not been touched, but on the basis of reason because it is not called a soul.

And the teacher of education wrote (Mitzvah Ritza-Ritzu, 6):

I didn't get to understand, d...ha ramtor to cut the fetus we were dela hoi nefesh, but chaser no hoi.

But some recent scholars have written in the Rambam's commentary that indeed according to his method it is permissible to kill a fetus only when its presence causes danger, and without it being a 'persecutor' because of its presence - there is no permission to kill it.

For example, the famous Jew wrote this (Taniina, Hoshan Mishpat, net):

In any case, it was not allowed to kill for the sake of saving his mother if it was

not calculated a little
as a pursuer

11 In a simple way, there is no division between a case in which the fetus pursues and actually endangers the mother, and a case in which its presence endangers the knowledge that it is not actually pursuing ("kill the fetus or we will kill you"). After all, a chaser in their own right is not killed, and if the fetus is killed - it should not be hanged for being a chaser except for the fact that its presence is a danger to others whose lives precede it (and as the Mishnah says: "because its life precedes its life"). And this is how he ruled in Parashat Chaveh 17 about the meaning of "killing a passerby or we will kill you" that it is permissible to kill him, see there (though see what we brought in the name of Rabbi Unterman in note MH in the Korem chapter).

And at the conclusion of the chapter, we came to a clear conclusion that wherever the presence of a gentile endangers the lives of Israel - it is permissible to kill him (even if he is a follower of the nations of the world and he is not at all to blame for the situation that has arisen).

ה. The controversy in healing the fetus - and comparing it to a gentile

We found that it is permissible to kill a fetus in order to save Israel, according to the words of the Mishnah in Aholah (7:6):

The woman who makes it difficult for the child cuts the child in the intestine and takes him out limb by limb because he swims ahead of his life. Most of it came out and no one touches it, no one pushes a soul against a soul.

Varshi (in the Sanhedrin eb, 2) interprets:

And Katni Risha 'the animal reaches out and cuts him and dismembers him', Daval and from the fact that he did not go out into the air of the world, what a soul he is and he can be killed and save his mother.

That is: it is permissible to kill a woman's fetus as long as it has not removed its head if the

woman dies without it, because it is not yet a "soul" and its "life precedes its life".

The mishna talks about a case where the fetus is killed which endangers the mother, and without the presence of this fetus - the mother was not in danger. And the question arises: what is the law in the case where the danger is not related to the fetus - but it is possible to use it and save a woman by killing it. Is it permissible to kill the fetus of one woman in order to save another woman (or another man)? (For example: when you can kill the fetus and use substances from its body to produce a certain medicine for patients).

And here, according to the words of the above-mentioned Rashi - it seems that there is no division in this: if there is no duty of self-sacrifice for killing a fetus - then this is permitted in any need to save lives; Just as it is permissible to transgress all the prohibitions in the Torah instead of controlling one's soul, whether it is salvation from the presence of the prohibition or whether it is the utilization of the prohibition and healing from it (for example: eating forbidden foods for medicine).

But in the Rambam's language (Halchot Mukchik 1:9; And bring the Shulchan Aruch in the chest of the court) there is room for discussion, and this is his language:

And more specifically in the words of the Brahmin there:

- Damdina Makhilin her is not even dangerous except another one of them, therefore
he said risk her or have a child.

We see that the life of an unborn child is more important than the life of a gentile, and even a living resident, since to save his life one desecrates the Sabbath (and violates all the commandments that are rejected due to the control of the soul? If so, **it is understandable why it is permissible to heal in the life of a gentile; while there is no permission to heal in the life of a fetus: the life of a gentile does not desecrate the Sabbath , and from this we see that his life is not like the life of Israel, and therefore it is permissible to use** it for the purpose of saving Israel. But a fetus - whose life is precious to the point of desecrating the Sabbath - is not permitted to be killed in order to save others, except in the case where his presence causes danger, and then reality forces us to decide and consider whose life is better, And in such a case we decide that the life of a child is better than the life of a fetus (whose killing does not require death).

According to this we will also explain the additional reasoning we wrote for the permission to kill a Gentile in order to save Israel. We wrote that when there is a mitzvah to Israel - there is no rule of 'licha midi', and if Katz when there is a mitzvah to save Israel - the prohibition to kill a Gentile who originates from 'licha midi' is nullified.

And apparently it should also have been the case with the embryo, that when there is a possibility of saving Israel by killing it, the prohibition to kill it is void, which also stems from 'Licha Midi'. And why did the latter write that the fetus should not be cured? After all, there is no 'likha midi' instead of a mitzvah!

And it should be clarified this way: although there is no 'likha midi' instead of a mitzvah, when we have a discussion about the life of a fetus - we have conflicting mitzvahs: on the one hand, there is a mitzvah to save Israel, but there is also a mitzvah to save the fetus - and they even desecrate the Sabbath for it! In such a situation, it is not clear where the 'mitzvah place' is leaning, and therefore the prohibition of killing a fetus remains in place.

13. We wrote about raids that desecrate the Sabbath to save a fetus. Although we found two opinions on this in the Rishonim, refer to Torat Adam to Ramban Shear Mimish, the matter of danger; In Barash, chapter eight, Duma (sign 13) and Baran there (3, 2 from the pages of the Rif, 45 'and it is written'); Britba on Nada Med, II. But according to Halacha it was decided that this is permissible (and in any case a mitzvah), both in the words of the first (and in particular the Berbers of the Ritva), and in what we brought inside from the words of the Tor and the 2H, and as the Maharash Kluger ruled in the Sefer HaHaim about the way of life of Teriz; And so it is in the interpretation of the halacha with the sign of DH 'or doubt!'; And in Beit Meir for the way of life, a sign of And in any case Man Ramer also said that one does not desecrate the Sabbath to save a fetus - there is still a difference between him and a Gentile since there is a mitzvah to save it (see also the next note) and the prohibition of killing it is more severe than the prohibition of killing Gentile (see the note after the next one).

And this is how they also wrote Seder Tahor (for the gods there); Tolls from Shed, (Hoshen Mishpat 2 set, 2); Rabbi Chaim Halevi's innovations (on Maimonides there); and the innovations of the Maharam Shik (Sanhedrin 7, 2).

But it is important to note that even for this method, that it is forbidden to heal a fetus in order to save Israel, it is permissible to heal a Gentile in order to save Israel, as we simply concluded above, and as is proven in the words of Rambam who says:

And the killing of a soul from Israel to heal another soul or to save a person from the hand of a soul, something that the opinion tends to is that no one loses a soul for a soul... *

We see that the Rambam emphasized that the prohibition is only towards Israel, and writes this also about cases of healing in another, and not just salvation from an enemy?

And even though the prohibition of killing a worker is learned from "Licha Midi" like the prohibition of killing a Gentile - here there is a big difference between them. Here we wrote that it is proven that the life of Israel precedes the life of Gentiles than those who desecrate the Sabbath for the salvation of Israel and do not desecrate the Sabbath for the salvation of a Gentile. But a fetus is not a foreigner for this matter, since it is ruled by Halacha that the Sabbath is profaned to save a fetus, as explained in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Haim, 5):

The one who sits on the bed and dies, a knife is brought on Shabbat even through the public authority, and they tear open her stomach and take out the blood lest she be found alive.

And he also wrote the column on the laws of Yom Kippur (Orach Haim Teriz):

A fetus who has smelled food, and if she is not given it, she or the child will be in danger of whispering in her ear that today is the Day of Atonement, if she makes up her mind, it is better, and if not, she puts kush with sauce and benjamin in her mouth, if she makes up her mind, it is better, and if not, we give her some of the sauce, and if we don't make up her mind, she will eat it *Gotgin* from the prohibition itself.

12. And so it also means in the words of the Hakmat Shlomo on the Shulchan Aruch in Orach

case it is simple that a Gentile is allowed to volunteer and give a heart or a liver to save Israel (refer to Minchat Shlomo (ibid., 5) which says that it is permissible to receive organs for transplantation in a Gentile hospital, even though this is prohibited in Israel).

But with a gentile - there is no mitzvah that postpones Shabbat in his salvation, therefore the salvation of Israel postpones his life and cancels the prohibition of eating, which does not exist in the place of the mitzvah of the salvation of Israel™•™.

Hand. It must be testified that apparently it could be said that there is a division between a gentile and a resident citizen, that a resident citizen - there is a mitzvah to revive and save him - it is impossible to say that the prohibition of killing him is void instead of the mitzvah of saving Israel, since in any case there is also a mitzvah to save him, and if so, which 'place of mitzvah' is repugnant you the other? But in a gentile - there is no mitzvah to save him - indeed instead of saving Israel, the prohibition to kill him is completely null and therefore this is allowed.

But in the words of Maimonides, we see that the mitzvah of saving a resident is not like the mitzvah of saving Israel. After all, the Rambam in the Book of Mitzvot listed the mitzvah of reviving a resident living within the mitzvah of charity (Eshin, Ktza), and not as a mitzva in itself (and refer to the omission of the mitzvah to the Ramban, 16). That is: in his opinion, there is nothing special here to save a resident, but a commandment to support and help a resident (of which saving lives is naturally included, but not the main point). In the mitzvah of charity there are laws of priority, "the poor of your city come first" (meaning: the mitzvah is what I have to take care of the other according to the level of connection to me), therefore when there is a mitzvah of saving Israel and against it there is saving a resident citizen - simply the mitzvah of charity here is to save Israel, and there is no mitzvah save the resident Hagar. It turns out that in the situation of saving Israel by killing a resident citizen - there is no prohibition to kill the resident resident since there is no immediate likha instead of a mitzvah. But the mitzvah to save a worker is not only a charity but a mitzvah to save souls, and therefore it is considered and checked its position against other mitzvahs; In any case, there is a 'mitzvah place' here both to save the fetus and to kill it - and the prohibition to kill it remains in effect in the state of healing.

And this corresponds to the well-known saying of Judah (the above) in the Rambam's commentary, which says explicitly that Laman said that one does not desecrate the Sabbath for the salvation of a fetus (refer to the previous comment) - there is no permission to heal with it for the salvation of Israel: Danger to his mother - in any case,

since he must not be killed in any case, if so, if he thinks a little more persecutory, it is better to stay in the house and don't do it."

Tu. What emerges from this is that there is a difference between the prohibition of killing a fetus and the prohibition of killing a Gentile, even though both are taught from the Licha Midi explanation. And it is clear: we saw in the Tosafs that you believed 'likha midi' does not exist in place of a mitzvah, that is: it has to be integrated with the rest of the laws of the Torah in Israel. And if so, everywhere you need to check exactly ■ what is learned from the Shabara, and in any case how to behave when the Shabara meets other Torah laws.

In the prohibition of killing a gentile we learn that just as it is wrong to kill a gentile - so Israel is forbidden to kill a gentile. The prohibition of a Gentile to kill a Gentile is related - as are the commandments of the Gentiles - to "Derech Eretz" and the return of the world. When it is necessary to save Israel - there is a mitzvah that is more important than Derech Eretz and the return of the "world", therefore the prohibition to kill a Gentile does not exist.

The prohibition to kill a fetus teaches something a little different: there we learn that just as it is wrong to worship the fetus of a gentile as a god who has already been born and therefore it is forbidden to kill it - so Israel should worship the fetus of Israel as if it were a god

B. Details that were said in the seven mitzvot, and were not said in the third mitzvot. For example: the prohibition of killing a fetus, the prohibition of suicide, the prohibition of killing a Gentile. From the comments of the Gemara about the fact that "likha from the hands of the Israelites is forbidden" we see that these things are forbidden in Israel as well. That is: there are several points that were not addressed by the 13 Mitzvot, and the attitude towards them remains that was before the giving of the Torah.

To sum up so far: 13 Commandments clarify and change Israel's attitude to the Seven Commandments, and thus they essentially 'replace' the laws stated in the Seven Commandments. But there are some details in the seven mitzvot that are not referred to in the 33 mitzvot; We remain indebted to these details, as we were indebted to them before the Torah was given.

The division between suicide and killing a fetus and ב. killing a neighbor

Now we will divide the second group, the cases in which there is no reference to a mitzvot, into two types: suicide and killing a fetus are one type; And the prohibition of killing a

Gentile is another type.

Here is an explanation - the rule "lika midi" should not be compared in these cases: when we talk about the prohibition of killing a fetus or suicide - we are copying the behavior of a gentile towards a gentile - to the obligation of a Jew towards a Jew. Here the explanation is simple: if a Gentile is not allowed to kill the fetus of a Gentile or himself - it turns out that a Jew is also not allowed to kill the fetus of a Jew or himself. These mitzvahs teach that a person's life is not in his hands and that a worker is already the beginning of a soul, therefore he must be treated as a living being and not killed.

But when we come to discuss the killing of a Gentile - it is possible to reject the theory of "Licha Midi", because just as a Gentile is not allowed to kill a Gentile, so Israel is not allowed to kill Israel; And we shouldn't learn from this about Israel's harm to the Gentiles, which may have a permit since they are not worthy.

And this is seen in the words of the Rabbi and the Maharsha in the Sanhedrin. The Gemara (Net, 1) says:

Lika their information is forbidden to Israeli priests and foreigners. - and not?

And what a beautiful title! - Hetam because of the lack of people who conquered Ninhu.

And the Haran (on page Nez, 1) makes it difficult for the Gemara from what we see there that plundering the gentile is permitted:

And Ika Lamidak: And since it is permissible for Israel to rob the Kuthi from Dauriata - if so, it is forbidden from the hands of Israel's Sheri and Kuthi, and Israel Sheri is forbidden to usurp the Kuthi and the Kuthi is forbidden to usurp his fellow Kuthi. And that Tima d'Israel Nami is not allowed to rob his fellow Israel, and if he does, he will suffer

attache

The ratio of 7 mitzvahs to 13 mitzvahs

The first Adam obeyed my seven commandments. Then the Israelites were commanded to perform three mitzvahs at Mount Sinai."

Now, after the situation at Mount Sinai, what is our attitude to the seven commandments?

A. The replacement of the seven commandments as Tarih

Three mitzvot relate to the bear what is measured in seven mitzvot. Simply, the Gemara (Sanhedrin Nez, 1) states that there is no mitzvah that was said to the Gentiles and not to the Israelites.

Although there are still films that were written in seven mitzvot and are not in the third mitzvot. These details are divided into two groups:

A. Details that are forbidden to Gentiles - but regarding which there is an explicit reference in the Mitzvah Tir'ag that permits them to Israel. For example: Israel is allowed to take a wife of good standing, but for Gentiles it is forbidden. The Gemara (Sanhedrin Net, 1) explains that there is a reason for this division, since we are people of occupation and Gentiles are not people of occupation? Another example: a gentile is forbidden (according to some opinions) to eat meat that has been cut from a slaughtered animal after slaughter, since it is a 'part of the animal' for him. But for a Jew this is permitted, since for a Jew slaughtering allows the animal to be eaten and now its meat is not a part of the animal for him (Chulin 3:1). In other words: the Torah, which established new boundaries for Israel, expropriated us from a prohibition that existed against Noah's sons. Another example (cited in the Tosaf in the Sanhedrin there): Gentiles are forbidden to fast - and for Israel it is a mitzvah on Shabbat, and in any case it is permissible on all days of the week. The mitzvah to fast on Shabbat reveals that we are exempt from the general prohibition of Gentiles to fast.

17 There is an opinion in the Gemara that Noah was commanded to do so (Sanhedrin Nu, 2 -

Nez, 1). And refer to Rambam (at the beginning of PS of the Laws of Kings) who states that the first man was enjoined in six mitzvot, and added to Noah the prohibition of an animal part (and refer to 29 there).

18 We have written here in general terms, although there are mitzvahs that were already commanded by the ancestors, see Rambam there.

19. And by virtue of this it is clear that a commandment that was said only once (before giving the Torah) was said to Israel and not to the children of Noah. about. And we will not go into an explanation of what 'Ben Kibush' is here.

And for this division we also found a form of Halacha, in which we see that the prohibition of killing a fetus is more severe than the prohibition of killing a Gentile (even though both are taught from "Licha Midi"): after all, there is a dispute as to whether it is permissible to heal a fetus (ie: to kill it in order to be saved when without its presence the danger exists) , but there is no prohibition to be healed in the life of a Gentile (and as stated in the body of chapter 4).

'Daa and other Gentiles' .ג

We will further explain the division in the "Licha Midi" explanation between a case of killing a gentile and suicide and killing a fetus.

The Gemara in Baba Kama (Lach, 1) says:

Rabbi Yosef: "He stood and measured the land and saw no more Gentiles" - what did he see? He saw seven mitzvahs that Noah's sons accepted and did not fulfill, he stood and permitted them. Itagori Etgar? AB, we are a hired sinner! Mr. Baria Darbna said: to say that even if they maintain them - they don't get paid for them. and not? And the condition, Ram says: Why is it that even a foreigner who practices Torah is such a high priest? TL: "Whoever makes them and lives in them", priests and Levites and Israelites, it is not said but Aram, have you learned that even a Gentile who deals with the Torah is like a great priest! Say: You do not receive a reward for them as a mitzvah and doer, but as one who does not have a mitzvah and does it, Dr. Hanina: The mitzvah and doer is greater than one who does not have a mitzvah and does it.

That is: at the time of the giving of the Torah, when God returned to the nations and was disappointed in their refusal to keep the Torah (and even the seven mitzvot, since he only offered them the mitzvot included in the seven mitzvot!), He permitted them and exempted them from keeping the seven mitzvot. The Gemara says that the intention is not for them to get rid of the observance of the seven mitzvot, since then he would be a guilty sinner; Except they aren't

In the Kiddoshin (21:2) they explained that Israel is forbidden by the Torah to marry the wife of a Gentile man because he also "cleaves to his wife and not to his friend's wife", and simply that this prohibition is not on the part of the woman's 'claim' that it is prohibited even with her consent and desire. The Gemara makes this prohibition more difficult than the permit of a woman who has a degree, and this is not "Israel in the Gentiles" but an offense between a person and a place. And according to this, the Gemara's excuse is * they are wrong, they are not the people of occupation, but Israel, who are the people of occupation - in their occupation, they forfeit the marriage that was between the Gentile and her husband, and therefore now she is no longer a man's wife, and there is no prohibition in this (and also refer to the end of the words of the above-mentioned Rabbi on page Nz).

From the hands of Delisrael Shari and my brothers and sisters it is forbidden - Lita, Daha Amarinan Lakman Gabi Yafet **Tavar 'and since Yafet is a title of Delisrael Shari and my Koti is forbidden/ even though Israel is forbidden it is surely a title of Israel his friend.... But Israel in the Sharia Shreya Rahmana** as it is written 'See and leave the Gentiles' - Amr Vathir allowed his own money to Israel.

As a scholar: The Dan understands that in Masbara it could be said that there is no difficulty in robbing the gentile, since Israel is forbidden to rob from Israel, just as it is wrong to rob from a gentile, and in this the "likha from the middle" takes place. He makes an excuse that the reason why it is not difficult to plunder the gentiles is because there is a special reason for the permission - 'See Vaither Gentiles' (as explained in the Gemara in Baba Kama, which was brought to Lakman).

And so it is in the Madsha'a on the Gemara on page Get:

It is necessary to punctuate the title of Israel in Israel Nemi is prohibited as above!

In other words: the Maharsha understood that it is simply not possible to make it difficult for a woman of good standing, since Israel in Israel is forbidden from doing so, and if so there is no difficulty "in the least" from the fact that Israel is a Gentile is allowed.

Although the conclusion of the Mahdsha says that it is proven from the Gemara that even in such a case "likha midi" belongs, but it remains in the TSA that it was not made difficult by the gentile plunder that is permitted:

And why is Israel's desire for a foreigner and a foreigner for a foreigner forbidden

- a mother will not make it difficult for her to steal ^{her} body .

And it follows from this that when we talk about "likha midi" in the case of suicide and the killing of a fetus - the justification is stronger than in the case of killing a Gentile, that then there would be a reason to say that there is no "likha midi" in this case if it were not for the words of the Gemara on Yafta ²³ .

XX. It seems that his intention is that it is difficult to divide our issue and the issue two pages ago that explicitly states that Gentile robbery is permitted: after all, they are actually one sequence of discussion of the mitzvot of the sons of Noah.

approx. Apparently, the Rabbi's innovations were not in the eyes of the Maharsha.

Kg. It should be pointed out that without the words of the Rabbinical Rabbi and the Maharsha, and without the inclusion and the words of the judges to the effect that there is a prohibition to kill a gentile (as follows) - it would be possible, apparently, to explain the Gemara in one way: one could say that there is really no "Icha midi" in killing a gentile and robbing it, because one should not learn from the prohibition of a Gentile among the Gentiles to the prohibition of Israel among the Gentiles. And in commenting on the difficulty of the Gemara from the wife of Japheth Tavar, it must be explained according to the words of the Tosaf

They want to create a situation of a permit for Jews when it is forbidden for Gentiles, although there is certainly reason for some to say that there is no comparison between a Jew and a Gentile.

This is also strengthened by the fact that, in fact, according to the 37th Mitzvot, there is no place at all for the reality of a gentile as it is. A gentile is supposed to become a resident ger, and as long as he has not become a resident ger - he is in a broken state of 'not commanding and doing', and according to Maimonides there is no place to leave such a gentile in the world (as explained at the end of Chapter 8 of the Laws of Kings). Isi (and the Gemara and the scribes") on the prohibition to kill a gentile does not stem from the very value of his life, which are actually not legitimate as they are.

And to sum up: the justification for obliging Israel to prohibit the killing of a fetus and suicide is much stronger than the justification for obliging them to prohibit the killing of Gentiles. And because of this there is also a place for the halachic division between a passerby and a Gentile in the case of using his soul for the salvation of Israel.

The explanation for this is that killing a grave and suicide are not synonymous in the TJG

Admittedly, despite the justification for prohibiting killing a fetus and suicide, these are still not exactly the same prohibitions as outright murder. After all, an Israelite who kills a fetus is not obligated to kill it, and it is also permissible to kill a fetus when it endangers its mother or others.

And this should be further explained:

In the Sages (Shemot Rabbah 30:9) it is explained that seven mitzvot are "raw" compared to 13 mitzvot: God gave the nations of the world raw mitzvot that touched them

and did not distinguish between impurity and purity. Israel came and he interpreted the mitzvot for each and every one of them and gave them a reward...

This is why it is said 'His laws and judgments for Israel'.

And it was explained by the Maharal in the book Tefarat Yisrael (chapter 17): that it is not appropriate to say that the difference between Israel and the nations of the world is a little and Israel is all, and according to this the difference will only be in the quantity of matzah and not in the quality of the matzah - only in quality

c. And according to those who disagree with the Rambam on this matter (see, for example, the words of the Rambam on Deuteronomy 20:10), whoever does not live as a resident and remains in the fence is not doing a mitzvah and therefore we can use them for tax and slavery as we wish, and so on.

XXI were brought in the first and second chapters of the book. You are rewarded for fulfilling the seven mitzvos as one who commands and does, but as one who does not command and does.

That is: after the giving of the Torah, the Almighty 'gave up', so to speak, from treating the Gentiles as those who could converse with Him, and as those who are commanded by mitzvot and in any case their lives have meaning. In fact, they have now become those who do not command and do, similar to animals who live in this world without awareness and meaning for their lives.

And the origin of the prohibition of killing a Gentile is in seven mitzvot. Before the first Adam was commanded in the seven commandments it was not forbidden to kill each other. It is the obligation to the seven commandments that made human life more precious than animals. When the Gentiles became those who do not obey the commandments and do them - then they no longer belong to those who are obliged to observe seven commandments, and if so their lives are not as precious as they were ^{before}.

It is true that the Bible (Exodus 21:14) states in raids that it is forbidden to kill a Gentile even after the giving of the Torah:

"And because a man will dare to kill as a trick from a forgetful people, you will put us to death" - his fellow man, to the exclusion of others. Issi ben Akiva says,

before the giving of the Torah we were warned about bloodshed, after the giving of the Torah, under those who were aggravated they were relieved. They really said exemption from the laws of flesh and blood and his judgment is committed to heaven.

Issi says that it is not possible for a Jew to be allowed to kill a Gentile when it is forbidden for a Gentile.

But it still shouldn't be compared completely to the prohibition of killing a fetus or suicide. By killing a fetus and committing suicide we learn about the attitude towards the precious life of Israel from the duty of a Gentile to the precious life of a Gentile; But by killing a gentile we learn that this is forbidden only from the sect that we are not

jug. It is true that they can somewhat correct this situation, and become permanent residents by agreeing before three of Israel to keep seven mitzvot. Then they will become permanent residents, converted from all the Gentiles of the world to all annexes to the people of Israel. But in this they return to their first state only because of their dependence on us, and they have no ability to return to their previous state on their own.

so. And regarding Gar Toshav: the Torah indeed commands to revive him, thus treating his life as having meaning and value. But this is on the condition that he depends on and is tied to us and not to animals that he has on his own (as explained in the previous comment), and therefore he is not included in the act of murder, there is no desecration of Shabbat for his life, and there is no charge of self-sacrifice for the prohibition to kill him.

The prohibition of suicide is also a reference to the infrastructure of existence: the will to live. There is no reference to this in the 33 mitzvahs, since the very existence is like matter without form, and the 33 mitzvot are **a reference to the form.**

Referring to the infrastructure of existence - it has a serious side and a light side: on the one hand this is the basis on which the general stands, but on the other side - the main thing is not dealing with the raw basis but with the form.

A similar example to this is found in the mitzvah "He did not create anything out of nothing" (Isaiah 1:18), that is: the mitzvah to live a married life and bear children. On the one hand, it is said about this mitzvah that it is a great mitzvah, and therefore it rejects other mitzvahs; As explained in the Gemara (Baba Batra 13:1 and 8) that forced the rabbi to free his slave, half of whom is freed so that he can observe the mitzvot of Shabbat, even though upon his

release the rabbi violates the mitzvot of "forever you shall serve"). But on the other hand it will be explained in the signature of a writer (Babba

The Ramban, that even before M. Yom (from the beginning of pregnancy) it should be said: Prosecute him one Shabbat so that he observes many Shabbats, that is, those who prostrate Shabbat for the sake of observing the Shabbat that will come after he is born and will be alive." , letter 15 DH 'and it will be seen according to my opinion') which brings the possibility that the prohibition of the OTZ - harming the "growth of future life" - is also learned from the prohibitions of the sons of Noah; and it fits our words. her. In this way the Gemara (Sanhedrin No, 2) will also be explained, which teaches the obligation of seven mitzvot from the verses: "Manhani Milei - Rabbi Yochanan said: Damer read: And the Lord God commanded the man to say, "Eat of every tree of the garden you shall eat." - And he commanded - these are the law, and he also says: For I knew him because he commanded his sons, etc. The Lord - This is God's blessing, and He also says: And in the name of the Lord, death will die. God - this is idolatry, and he also says: You shall have no other God. On man - this is bloodshed, and he also says: Man's blood is shed, etc. To say - wo adultery, and also he says: To say that a man will send his wife away and she will go away from him and marry another man. Of every tree of the garden - and not plunder, eat thou shalt eat - and not a member of the animal." And here is the meaning of the Gemara in simple terms: "And these are the laws of the law" - that is: since the Almighty considers man and commands him with mitzvot - it's simple that we too should take his words seriously, And condemn those who cross them. "God is the blessing of God" - because God reveals himself to us in his name - simply that we should respect him and not despise his name. And also on this way, give the wise and he will be wise more (and this is also explained by the way of learning the additional mitzvot that is cited in the Gemara, from other verses, where - in most of the mitzvot - there are no commands and warnings, but reality and existence teach that these things are prohibited, see also there). We see that the obligation of seven mitzvot stems from the very existence, and not from an explicit commandment as in the 33rd Mitzvot, and Doc.

The unleavened bread is also the robe, because to the nations of the world he did not give them the unleavened bread only veils and did not **distinguish between impurity and purity, and this dictates that the Torah is not worthy of them in the clarity of wisdom and understanding completely, and therefore even if he gave them the unleavened bread they would not have the unleavened bread to distinguish between a thing and a thing which is the** clarification of the mind in the Torah When distinguishing between a thing and a ^{thing}.

And this corresponds to the commentaries that the main purpose of the seven mitzvot of the sons of Noah is to preserve the dwelling of the world, that the world will not be destroyed ⁹⁰. This is how we found that they wrote that the seven commandments of the sons of Noah are the "correction of the world and kiomeral," and it is clear to every person that all these commandments are impossible for the state to exist without Eden and all the kingdoms practice this and punish those who break it. They are etiquette mitzvots that the mind obliges and they are also the laws of the state, without which it is impossible to exist in the world ." ^{Lev}. And in the words of the Lubavitcher Rebbe (in the Purim meeting 557 Gal ³): "7 Mitzvot Debni Noah, as they are God's commandment (between a person and a place) , and as long as their existence should be because God commanded them, then their content is the existence of the world in a way to 'sabbath its creation'."

In other words: seven mitzvos are the instrument for the existence of the raw world, the "substance".

And here killing a fetus is a reference to a raw form of life, which has not yet materialized in this world. A fetus is actually a potential of Haisli. This part of reality is not referred to in the third mitzvot, but rather in the seven gross mitzvots.

power And see also the words of the Ramban in his interpretations of the Book of Mitzvot Sharesh 14; And in the book of education Mitzva 16.

Nineteenth And just as we found it wrong that Shabbat must die, Sanhedrin Noah, II. Warsaw there. And see in the book Etz Hadar to Rabbi Kook, letter 2, that among Noah's sons the

dwelling of the world is a mitzvah.

r To. The Holy Bible in his book Beit Elakim Sha'ar Hayesodot 44,
No. Set the table for the future, the laws of kings, a sign of time.

heart. Maor and Shemesh parashat law. And in Mosheh Hachma Deuteronomy 3:4: "Their mitzvot is only keeping the order close to the moral religion", see there. And see in the Book of Scripture and Kabbalah in Exodus 13:4; XX, II, and other places in his book.

y Lg. Clause to him.

Led. As it is also explained in the sabra that permits the profanation of Shabbat for him - "Profess one Shabbat for him so that he may observe - in the future - many Shabbats", and according to the words of Ash Ash (1, Ksav): "And it is permissible for him to profane the Shabbat according to the Bible, it must be said that the Torah permitted the profanation of Shabbat for The growth of the future life, as he wrote

Subjugation, differentiation, sweetening .ה

After we have clarified the difference between the prohibition of killing a fetus and suicide and the prohibition of killing a gentile - we will arrange a structure that will compare the references to the obligation of Jews to seven mitzvot, as explained so far.

In fact, we have three types of reference: in killing a Gentile, we saw that we are indeed adopting the prohibition that exists among Gentiles, but the explanation is external and in any case according to Halacha, the life of a Gentile will be rejected whenever killing him saves Israel; In most of the prohibitions of the seven mitzvot, we have seen that the three mitzvot clarify and regulate what is forbidden to Israel and what is permitted, and in this they distinguish Israel from the Gentiles and place them in an independent and different system; In the killing of a fetus and suicide, we saw that there are prohibitions that deal with the beginning of existence and to which there is reference in the seven commandments because the seven commandments deal with raw life, in the essence of existence.

We will arrange things according to the structure of 'submission, separation, sweetening', which is explained in Hasidism:

Subjugation - Killing a Gentile: In a reformed situation there is no place for the prohibition of killing a Gentile, since the reality of a Gentile who is not a resident is not legitimate, and as Rambam wrote: "Moses commanded from the mouth of the hero to compel all those in the world not to accept the mitzvos commanded by Noah's sons, and anyone who does not- He will be killed, and the one who accepts them is what is

called a resident ^{resident} everywhere ." So the very practice of prohibiting the killing of Gentiles is already a great submission, which teaches that the world is not reformed and we have not been able to find out the reality with the help of the mitzvot. We are forced to submit to this reality and understand that as long as we have not succeeded - We maintain the current reality and do not 'break the rules', and in the meantime the ban on killing a gentile is valid even though he was not required to be a resident citizen.

Differentiation - 33 Commandments: In the details to which the 33 Commandments refer, and in any case we are not related to what is said in the Seven Commandments, we learn about the difference between Jews and Gentiles. When the Torah sets different rules for Israel, it excludes us from the Gentiles, and we feel that we no longer have a share and inheritance with them. What the Gentiles were commanded does not concern us, the sons of God, who have received our share and inheritance.

Ma. And we explained in a comment above that even according to the Ramban there is no obligation to compel all the islanders of the world to be permanent residents - this is because we do not care about them, and therefore if they have not received seven mitzvot on them, they can be conquered and used for all the needs of Israel.

Batra Shem 25 "And again") that although for every mitzvah a beit din made a priest until his soul was released - there is no compulsion in the mitzvah zabat, since it is only a mitzvah from the words of Kabbalah.

We have an example of a mitzvah that deals with the essence of human existence in Ulsli, and therefore it is a great mitzvah and rejects other mitzvahs; But it is not a maduraita and therefore there are easier things than the mitzvot from the Torah.

And similarly to killing a fetus: on the one hand, it is an act of harming a life that is being created, and there is a cute prohibition in this; But on the other hand, it is an injury to raw life, which does not yet have a form for this, and therefore it has no reference in the Mitzvot and there are no ^{halavim} mitzvah for it. When there is a conflict between the 13th and the Sheva - the 13th has the upper hand, because the main thing is the reference to the existing form, and not to the raw material. That is why it is permissible to kill a fetus whose presence is harmful in order to save Israel - there is a mitzvah of saving here from the 13th Mitzvot (the "form") which rejects the prohibition to kill a fetus which is only learned from "likha midi" (the "material").

And this is similar to what is explained in the Mishnah (Baba Matziyya 3:1) that his father's honor came before his father's honor:

The loss of his father and the loss of his grandfather - of his predecessor, whom his father brought to this world, and many who learned wisdom bring to the life of the next ^{world}.

, the world ; And his Lord added the form, the Torah, the world to come. Argue first, since the main thing is the form, and not the raw material (this is despite the fact that without the material - the form has nothing to apply to ¹¹).

to him. And see Lakoti Chasot HA page 159 Note 63 Shi'el that this commandment also belongs to Gentiles, and it fits our words here.

to And suicide is also an injury to a formless cocoon, since a body without the will to live is like matter without form. damp. And in the Shulchan Aruch (Yorah Dea, Rish Siman Ramb): "A man owes his greater respect and reverence to his father than his father."

Lt. Therefore, there is something in the mitzvos of honoring a father and mother that is more

demanding and real than your honor. While in his respect the main thing is distance and fear, and from this the cancellation and use of the rabbi - in respect of a father and mother forced him to feed and water a basket, and even take out his own if he has one; And it should be done even at the expense of his work time until he has to zad on the openings (refer to all this in Simen Ram and the holocaust in honor of his rabbi in Simen Ramb).

M. And it corresponds to what is explained there that if his father was wise - the loss of his father precedes it.

Chapter five

Killing gentiles in war

After we dealt with killing Gentiles in peacetime - we will deal with killing Gentiles

in war.

Let's go back and summarize the basics we've learned so far about Gentile life: The prohibition for Israel to kill a Gentile stems from the fact that a Gentile is not allowed to kill a Gentile, and it is forbidden to kill a Gentile from the hands of Del Israel. For this reason Israel is allowed to kill a gentile in the case where a gentile is allowed to kill a gentile.

It is permissible to judge and kill a Gentile who transgresses seven commandments; It is true that some have written that this is forbidden where there is enmity; Some have written that this is forbidden at this time in Darbanan; And there are also opinions that this is only permitted when it is done for the sake of justice and not as an 'exploitation' of justice in order to kill the Gentile whose presence disturbs us for other reasons.

There is a dispute as to whether gentiles must be self-sacrificing in order not to commit murder. In any case, I believe that when a gentile helps a murderer and causes the death of another - it is permissible to kill him, even if he causes danger by outright rape.

In any case where the presence of a gentile poses a danger to Israel - it is permissible to kill

The gentile (as for example in the text of 'Kill such and such a gentile or I will kill

you').

Now we will deal with killing gentiles in war. War is a complex situation in which many opinions - realistic and halachic - meet with each other. We will list

assumptions and cases, when in practice you have to take into account all these factors together.

A. pursuer

The first and simplest justification for allowing the killing of an enemy in war is a persecutory justification. This is how the Shulchan Aruch in Hoshan wrote the sentence of Siman Takha (and so it is in Rambam in the Laws of a murderer and the preservation of the soul 1:6):

The one who pursues his friend to kill, and they warned him, and indeed he pursues him, he was even the pursuer. Little, after all, all Israel is commanded to save him limb from limb from the persecutor, and if they cannot

• **The sweetness - killing a fetus and suicide: in killing a fetus and suicide the sweetened attitude to the seven commandments is expressed. Now we refer to them and are committed to them, not because of 'no choice' and a bad reality that has taken over us - but rather that the seven mitzvot teach us about details that are ancient and raw, and therefore they were not reflected in the mitzvot.** In these details there is a high and ancient side to the mitzvot (and it corresponds to the fact that they were given to the first man before the sin of ^{Mb}).

Mb. And refer to the jurisprudence of Derv Kahana Pisca 12: "Rabbi Yoda bar Rabbi Simon Fatah: 'Many girls made a valiant one, and an elite one against her.' Adultery and the plundering, and all of them in one verse, Heda is written: 'And the Lord God commanded the man to say, of every tree of the garden you may eat,'... Noah was commanded about a member of the animal, as it was said: 'But flesh with its blood in it you shall not eat.'" Abraham was commanded On the word, which is said: 'And thou shalt keep my covenant.' Isaac was educated for eight days, as it is said: 'And Abraham circumcised his son Isaac, who was eight days.' About the Hibmah, which is said: 'And Judah said to Onan, come to your brother's wife and you will be hibmah.' But at Sinai we were commanded 13 mitzvot, two hundred and forty-eight commandments to do, and three hundred and sixty-five commandments not to do. Two hundred and forty-eight commandments to do, against two hundred and forty-eight Organs that exist in a person, every organ says to a person, please do this mitzvah in me. And three hundred and sixty-five mitzvahs are not done, against the hot days, every day says to a person, please do not do this offense in me. The lie of grace - was a lie Noah's life, 'and Noah found pleasure'. And the vanity of beauty', vanity was the beauty of the first Adam; The heel apple of the first Adam was a hot wheel darkener. And don't be surprised, at the practice in the world of a man making two discrins, one for him and one for his family, whose he is pleasing, and not his own, so the first Adam was created for the use of the Almighty, and a wheel of heat was created for the use of creatures, not least that the apple of Adam's heel The first darkens a hot wheel? ! And what if the apple of his heel darkened the wheel of heat and hid his face all the more! And

of all - 'A woman who fears God, she will glorify', this is Moshe."

And it seems that the meaning of the Midrash is: "The lie of grace and the vanity of beauty" - despite the virtue of the first Adam, his condition was nonexistent, he fell after the sin, while the Torah of Moses - "A woman who fears God" - exists even after she was punished by death and even after the sin of the calf, and therefore "she Be praised." In other words: there is something more stable and stronger in the 13 mitzvot than in the seven mitzvot, even though the seven mitzvot were given to the first man before the sin that darkened the wheel of heat.

But all the people of the city wanted to stand up against them in a burst, lest they kill their king, which is why "the slain Maran pursues, and they say, 'And they will kill every male'"... V

about. who help the needy

A persecutor law exists even when the persecutor does not threaten to kill directly but indirectly -

In Goma - and as it is written in the Shout of the Rivash Siman Ralach (Rashuch typeface):

See there which brings another possibility that the people of the city were killed because they were complicit in the usurpation of Dina.

And to Lakman we will deal further with the explanation of the killing of the people of Nablus according to the Rambam and the Ramban. In any case, it's simple that they don't disagree about the laws of a chaser, but rather that they believe that if it is a single act - there is no reason to claim against the people of Nablus, who are defending themselves against the sons of Jacob, that they are a chaser, because there really is no justification because of a single act to breach the fence of an entire city and change the entire Arrangements there, and the people of the city should be allowed to take care of the deed (even if they do it at a slightly different pace than we would do). Only if this act is part of society as a whole being spoiled and distorted (as in the explanations of the Rambam and the Ramban) - the sons of Ya'akov are allowed to handle the matter themselves and harm all the people of the city, and we will prolong it.

The laws of a persecutor are also true among Gentiles, as seen in the Gemara (Sanhedrin .7 eb, 2): "A persecutor who was pursuing his friend to kill him, says to him: See that he is Israel, and he is a member of the covenant, and the Torah said, 'Whoever sheds a man's

blood will shed his own blood', the Torah said: Shadow each other's blood with each other's blood." The verse 'shed the blood of man' speaks of Noah's sons, and you see that the Gemara understands where the laws of a chaser are written, meaning that even among gentiles it is permissible to kill the chaser; This is also proven in the Gemara there on page Nez (end of page 1 and beginning of page 2) which deals with the laws of persecution among gentiles, see ibid. And according to the words of the teacher of education (Ratso, 5): "After a while God enlightened my eyes model Gabi ben Noah from an explicit reading in the Torah Danitan to save the persecuted in the soul of a pursuer even to another son of Noah, Deshem Eb, 2 explained 'He pursues his friend and told him that Israel is him, etc.' And the Torah said, "Whoever sheds the blood of a man shall shed his own blood, and the shadow shall shed one's blood with another's blood"... and this verse was said to the sons of Noah Drodf, they are allowed to kill...". This is also seen by the Maimonides in the Laws of Kings 9:4; Rabbi Zoin also wrote in the "Light of the Halacha" in the article "The War"; And in Shadi Hamad, the G system at the edge of the field, sign 6. It is true that some have written that among Gentiles only the persecuted is allowed to kill the persecutor, and others are not allowed to help him. But apart from the fact that their words are harsh, as explained in Shadi Hamad there, they are not relevant here, since even according to their simple method it is permissible to kill a Gentile who pursues Israel (since even a Jew who pursues a Jew is allowed to kill); And even in a war between gentiles - usually the one who helps a certain side does so because he is afraid that if he does not do so he will also be among the victims of the side against him, and if so he will also be persecuted and for all intents and purposes he is allowed * to take part in killing the wicked.

Regarding a chaser in the Gramma, more recent scholars wrote: see, for example, Or- .ה Shimch Halkhots Mukhak PA 88, Sho'at Galia Tractate Yod C. H.

neither pursue nor save him unless they kill the pursuer, then they kill him even though he has not yet killed.

Here we are talking about a Jew who is chasing his fellow Jew, who must save the chased even at the cost of killing the chaser, and it is explained in the Halacha that the chased is saved by killing the chaser even when the chaser is small, which is not punishable (except that in the law of rescuing a chased person there is a proviso that if it is possible to save by harm In one of the persecutor's organs, one should do so and it is forbidden to kill him.

As explained further in the words of Rambam (ibid.).

And later in the Rambam's words in the same chapter, the magnitude of the obligation of

the mitzvah to save the persecuted, the severity of the prohibition to stand for the blood of bad people, and the merit of saving a soul from Israel is explained:

[Yid] Anyone who can save and did not save violates the rule of 'thou shalt not stand in the blood of thy neighbor', and likewise who sees his friend drowning in the sea, or a bandit comes upon him, or an evil animal comes upon him, and he can save him himself, or hires others to save him and did not save him, or hears that he is being drafted or that computers are being handed over There is evil on him or there is a trap for him and he did not open his friend's ear and let him know, or he knew about the Gentile or the rape that he was committing on his friend and he could appease him because of his friend and remove what was in his heart and they were not appeased, and everything according to these things, the person who does them violates 'You shall not stand on the blood of your neighbor'...

[Tach AAP there is no lokin on these enemies because there is no action in them, they are severe, whoever loses one soul from Israel is as if the whole world is lost and whoever sustains one soul from Israel is as if the whole world exists.

This is how the living light explained the killing of the people of Nablus by the sons of Jacob (Genesis 4:20):

'And they will kill every male' - hard, why should they kill someone who has not sinned? And the witness: Why didn't they preempt the first offender? ² Indeed, here the sons of Jacob did not intend to kill anyone but a person guilty of a crime

And the arbitrators went on to discuss whether the persecuted himself should also be **.א** careful about the matter. See the words of the Riksha that were quoted in the Mishna to the King of the End of the Laws of Harmful and Harmful, in the key book of the Frankel edition there, and in the Shu'at Yaviya says Chom Chd C. H.

According to the order of the verses, the people of the city were killed first, and only **.ב** then Nablus and Mor, the perpetrators of the crime.

ג. Support and isolation

A citizen who encourages the war - gives strength to the king and the soldiers to continue it. Therefore, any citizen in the kingdom who is against us who encourages the fighters or expresses displeasure at their actions is considered a persecutor and his killing is permitted. Also considered a persecutor is anyone who weakens our kingdom with speech and the like. This is how the Maharal explains (in Gor Aryeh on Parashat Matot) the killing of Balaam in the Midian War:

He came out of Midian to meet them and was giving them bad advice, and for that he now deserves to be put to death **because he was pursuing and seeking to kill all of Israel, and anyone who brings a curse to the hearts of people** in war is causing them to run away from the war and the runaway will be killed, so let him be put to death by what he did now.

This is how Rabbi Shaul Israeli explained in his book Amud Yamini (Simen 16, chapter 3),
- in connection with the reality described in his words:

As reported, the population of the Arab border villages knowingly shelters the murderous gangs, so that they can do their deeds without fear of punishment. Since it is clear that these gangs must be punished not only for their actions in the past as murderers, but also as persecutors due to their future trends, the population that helps them, helps them and strengthens their hands in all kinds of ways - in effect helping the persecutor to commit murder... It is clear that giving this help gives a broader base for their actions in the future, so that the number of actions will increase by this encouragement given by the population... since according to the accepted estimate the population encourages the gangs' actions in all kinds of ways and this certainly helps to increase and expand their actions in the future, and it is found that the entire population is in this case a stalker who managed to save their lives...

to remark that in reality most of those who participate in the military formation also do actions in the war that help "this war, and not just continue a routine activity designed to help against other enemies).

.ד And even towards our warriors this opinion is said, because of which it is permissible to kill one of our soldiers who flees from the battle as explained in Sota Med, 2; And as explained by the commissioner in Emek she asked, Camb.

A chaser who was chasing his friend to kill, either by himself or in a gramma,
saves the chased
in the soul of a chaser.

This is how the person who gives away Israel's wealth to the Gentiles is killed, since giving away wealth leads to the danger of lives; According to Maimonides (Havil and Misik Laws 8, 11-11):

It is permissible to kill morals anywhere and even in this time when there is no law of souls, and it is permissible **to kill before he surrenders, except when he said that we have quarreled with a certain moral with his body or with his money, and even with a small amount of money, he allowed himself to be killed... and acts are done at all times in the cities of the West to kill the** morals
who were held to deliver Israel's money.

Likewise, even a small amount of Israel's money in the hands of foreigners, if it was held in devotion, will be put to death by any person because he is a persecutor.

And as the Ahiezer explains (19:3):

A model chased by a grama, so also a din chases, here is every dinny dedicated
because of a grama is...

A soldier of the enemy in intelligence, maintenance and the like helps the army that is fighting us. A soldier in the enemy's medical corps is also considered a persecutor because without the medical corps the army would be weaker, and the medical corps also encourages and strengthens the fighters and helps them kill us.

A citizen who helps the fighters is also considered a persecutor and can be killed. A civilian who works in a factory to make weapons and supplies weapons to the army is no less than a soldier who serves in the intelligence corps and provides information. Anyone who helps the army of the wicked in any way that strengthens murderers and is considered a persecutor?

and. Admittedly, this argument must be limited: a citizen who manufactures weapons for the kingdom in which he lives[^] and he does this even during routine times, since the kingdom needs weapons to exist against the wicked, can claim that he is not helping the war of the righteous, but helping his kingdom to exist against the wicked, And his right to do so is explained by 'my previous life'. This is similar to a person who is forced to take a place to save himself from the danger of falling stones, and a murderer takes advantage of this fact and pursues another person. that he would not be able to escape to this place because he had already been captured. In such a situation, we explained (in chapter three, in note eb) that the person who took the place is not considered a persecutor in their own right, because he has the right to take the place by claiming 'my previous life', since he is doing so because of a danger that threatens him regardless of the murderer. According to this, even here such a citizen can claim that it is not his fault that the evil king takes advantage of his good deeds for the purpose of evil deeds. Indeed, such a person is not considered a willful persecutor, and he should be included among all the people of the kingdom with whom we will deal with lying (although there are

And will endanger us in the future - there is no need to carefully examine whether at this very moment he is actually helping the persecution against us.

and. Suspicion of bloodshed

The halacha has ruled that wrongdoers are suspected of bloodshed and one should beware of them, and several laws have been established based on this, such as the Rambam's ruling in the Laws of a Murderer and the Preservation of a Soul, Chapter 12 (and in the Shulchan Aruch he is a judge of the Cang-Kano opinion):

(0 It is forbidden for a Jew to associate with Gentiles because they are suspected of bloodshed. And he will not accompany them on the way. Hit a Gentile on the way back to our right. Whether they are ascending or descending, there will not be Israel below and a Gentile above, but Israel above and a Gentile below lest it fall upon him to kill him. And let him not be anointed before him, lest he run his skull... <9) It is forbidden to lick medicine from the Gentile unless we despair of him living... (11) And it is forbidden to cut hair from them with the permission of the individual, lest they kill us...

Although there are many details in these laws, such as for example if the gentile is a doctor "specialized in many" then it is permissible to be cured by him because there is no fear that

he will damage his art, and so on.

And we found that there are situations in which it is not only necessary to be careful of the gentiles - but it is even permissible to kill since they are held to persecute and endanger us.

This is what he wrote in Sefer Hassidim (Margalioth edition, Siman Alef 17):

Jews who were walking on the road and hit them on the way and stood on top of the Jews and the Jews killed the hosts, and there are foreigners there and they are afraid that they will tell their sons or relatives and take action against them, therefore the Jews can kill even those foreigners, even though the foreigners said, we will not say that we should not believe the foreigners that it was said about them, through whom Shoa spoke And their right hand is a false right' and we also found in David that it was said 'And David shall not live male or female... Lest they say to the Philistines'.

In the Gemara Avoda Zera (10:2) it is told about the kosher Roman emperor Antoninus who was friendly with Rabbi Yehuda the Hanasi:

Hoh Leah Ha Nakrata [cave] Dahuh Aayla Beitia Beit Rabi. Every day, Hoh Mayiti Teri Abdi, Had Kataliya Abba Debi Rabi and Had Kataliya Abba Davitiya.

Many persecutors and... ד

Regarding what we wrote - in the previous paragraph - one can seemingly argue: the permission to kill a pursuer is when it will help, but here there are many pursuers, and killing one of them will not help. If so, anyone who aids the war can say: Why are you killing me? After all, even without me, the war continues and the danger towards you continues!

Although it is clear that the claim is incorrect: we are allowed to save ourselves from the persecutors. It doesn't matter who we start with, as long as we kill the pursuers and escape their danger. And come to yourself: if you say that the presence of many causes the question of who to start with, and this question is supposed to hinder us from saving ourselves - then it is the giver: the presence of everyone hinders salvation, and this is a reason to treat everyone as a complete persecutor and kill him so that he does not cause a "dangerous" question This life.

Held to be a stalker ה

Do not kill a stalker after he has stopped stalking. But this is true on the condition that no more danger is expected from him in the future. In cases where there is a presumption that he will continue to pursue - he can be killed even when at this moment he is not actually pursuing.

This is what we found with regard to Moser, whose killing stems from a persecutory law, and it was ruled in Aruch Hoshan's Law of Simin Shafach, ¹¹⁸ :

The moral doer who planned and delivered, must not be killed/unless he was held to deliver, for he will be moved to deliver others.

And in comparison to our subject, if even in a Jew we say that since he was "held to deliver" he can be killed, especially in a Gentile population that "encourages gang activity in all kinds of ways" (in the words of an Israeli rabbi).

And see in the Shach, *ibid.* Skanu, 60 (and also in the opinion of the Rabbi there that the one who was ordered to hand over was not killed by the hands but by the gramma - this is because in his opinion the one who was held to hand over is not considered a complete persecutor, because there is no certainty that he will hand over again, but that the Sages corrected To be killed in the Gemara in order to keep people away from it. But simply, even according to his method, whoever threatens to surrender - it is permissible to kill him with the hands, as explained in the Gemara in Baba Kama (Kiz, 1) Rabbi Kahana killed with his hands the one who threatened to surrender, and the Rabbi justified him).

We didn't discuss that of every neighbor who owes what he had to save beginning with B... also in P. There is no • Moridin Dhabi C. Kanach s.l. Domtar and 16th Cholk and s.l. Dasor a.s. and b. .]

And regarding the fear of the above-mentioned danger, I simply do not know. And evidence from the M.M.S. Gabi Antoninum killed his slaves because of the doubt is proven in the Dia model because of the doubt it is permissible to kill and even **DSL Hatham is forbidden to take them down because of this alone' n)**.

It is true that some judges have written that today there is no need to be careful with these laws, because they were said precisely in relation to a certain reality, and not when reality

changes and we have gentiles before us who can clearly be said not to be suspected of this.

This is what the Meiri wrote in a foreign work ^{20:13} :

We have seen many who are surprised that in these times no one is careful about these things at all and we have already explained the main purpose of the book about which nation it revolves around as evidenced by the days of the Jews whom we mentioned that they are all ancient nations that were not fenced in the ways
of religions...

It is also mentioned in the Shu'at of Hut Yair, Siman Su, and it is the answer of the Gaon
Rabbi Meir Teterin to Baal Hut-Yair/:

To reconcile the custom that is used to unite with the Arabs at any time and moment, and the KL is permitted to unite with the Dakhshidi heathen, bloodshed... and there is no reason to forbid them from the negotiations that lead to unity with the Arabs. And according to MS Eti Shapir, since in our time there is no custom in this, and rather prepares and punishes the death penalty for the murderer, not suspicious cases of bloodshed at this time.

He also wrote the Halachah Ha'ai-Adseti and brought his words also in Mishna-Borura ¹⁶ . And the judges compared it to the explicit ruling in the Shulchan Aruch regarding Rabia.

Because the law is that there are no witnesses

12. Tea is similar to the light of life that we brought from Shambar that they tried to protect
Nablus and Hamor and therefore were killed.

13. And in the revisions of the Ritva Abode Zerah 20:1 he wrote: "And there are those who practice it even with the permission of the Gentile [that is, to allow a Gentile woman to breastfeed a Jewish child with her permission] and they say that at this time Lika was afraid of bloodshed, he was afraid of the kingdom and more than the evils of his soul",
Ayesh.

Hand. Admittedly Hav Yair himself disagrees with this as mentioned in the notes to Lakman,
and see the report from the Resh'am 64 Siman 3g.

And wrote the additions that set:

Had Katil Abba Debi Rabbi - And the shedding of blood is one of the seven commandments, and even for Israel it is forbidden to say that the stars and shepherds in the crowd of a minute were neither raising nor lowering. And he would have been afraid lest the matter should be reported to the ministers and they would have killed him and said if he wanted to kill you, it would be wise to
kill him.

That is, according to additions, Antoninus was allowed to kill his slaves because he was afraid that they would pose a danger to him (and this is similar to the fact written in the book of Hasidisia). And in the Yad Eliyahu Society (Lublin Siman 10) he learned practical
halacha from this:

a question. If one ACM wants to kill Jew A and there is ACM A standing by him and does not want to save Israel, he also does not want to help the ACM, and the persecuted Israel shouted to the mentioned ACM to save him from the other and he replied that he did not want to help or to be useful only in Israel And don't do it, and after that when Israel overcame the above-mentioned persecutor, it is not permissible to kill the second one because he did not want
to save the rapist who wanted to kill him.

He is also afraid that some danger will come to him when he discovers what the Israelis did to the persecutor they killed, that they will taunt him that he could
have saved himself with one of his limbs and the like.

Answer. [At the beginning I will bring MS the Rambam Parshath Wiselach and Zel 'Rabbits will ask how the sons of Jacob did to shed clean blood'... and I will give an answer in favor of the Rambam... We will return to the discussion of the question. In May Dela Miha, the ACM depends on the above-mentioned phlogta
Dalharambam must if

This addition was brought up by the 16th and the Shach in their dispute which we dealt .ו
with in chapter 2.

J. It is true that the words of these additions should be further clarified, because apparently it could have been made more difficult: why is Antoninus allowed to bring his slaves into a situation where they are suspected of endangering him and then killing him? Let him not go to a rabbi's house, and thus he will not have to reach this situation! But the Tosafs understood that this is permissible since Antoninum's visits to a rabbi are an existential necessity, both for him and for the world to be corrected by a Roman emperor repenting, and therefore it is permissible for him to continue this act and if they become persecutors - their heads bleed (and similar to what we explained in the second chapter (end of Pisca 13) Regarding the killing of the people of Nablus according to the Ramban, see *ibid*).

11 And in Rabbi Meir Arik's glosses to Sefer Hassidim (published by the Mossad Rabbi Kook) he did mention additions in a foreign work.

"The law is knowing that Esau hates Jacob" (Rashi Genesis 3:4). And perhaps for this reason, no voice was brought to the Shulchan Aruch regarding the laws that stem from the fear of "lest they kill us", because even when it appears that progress has taken place, one must feel a lot and not rely on an external kindness that appears to the Yeniseis (and the example of this is the German nation, which was considered to be enlightened and progressive, and here It turned out to be a cruel and terrible animal of prey, as we know).]

But everything to be relaxed about the suspicion of bloodshed is about ordinary times. In wartime, suspicions are certainly heightened. And if in times of peace and in a reformed kingdom, some of the judges wrote that just a gentile is not suspected of bloodshed because he has a fear of punishment for fear of the government that "prepares and punishes the death penalty for the murderer" - then in times of war the reality is the opposite, that there is a government here that wants to kill us, and in any case the gentiles instead There is an interest in killing us. And here it's not just "fear" - but that at least most of them are held to endanger and haunt us. And this reinforces what we brought about killing the enemy from being one who is held to pursue and kill us.

And in this context it is appropriate to quote the words of the Sage in the Midrash Rabba on Parashat Phinehas (in Midbar Rabbah Parsha 11:4):

"Bound up the statesmen and beat them because they are your oppressors" - round up the statesmen, why? Because they are your oppressors. This is why the sages said: The wise man came to kill you ·

That is: when 'they oppress you' - they treat you like enemies (as Rashi interpreted there about 'arrange the statesmen' which means 'you must enmish them', treat them as enemies) - they are held to be persecutors, and they are in the fence of 'come to kill you' that you must go ahead and kill him.

17 And the opinion of Hav Yair himself was a sign of evil, in his answer back to Rabbi Te'terin, and from his words: "Because it was a demon's taste - even in their days they would without a doubt punish for bloodshed [and yet they were afraid]. Moreover, they did not kill... only on the suspicion of rabiya which on its own part is a despicable and bitter thing in their eyes and they are not suspicious of it and this is the main reason... and that is why the House of Joseph did not remember in the Shulchan Aruch to make it easy for Yahud Yisrael or Israelite * even though they are united by this sign.

18 And it is explained in Meiri on the Sanhedrin (Heb, 1) that this is the source of the Gemara's statement where "the Torah said: If he comes to kill you, he will be killed."

An animal in the surrogates of the Gentiles because they are suspected of the rabia, but in Shu'a Yore-Dea Kang, 1 it was ruled: **"And in places where they are not suspected of it, it is permissible to beat and punish it"** (and see Beit Yosef there in the name of Haran).

If so, it can be seen from the Gemara and the scribes that there is indeed a basic suspicion towards gentiles when it comes to observing the seven commandments, and as it is written in the Gemara that God saw that the gentiles do not observe the seven commandments (Avodah Zerah 2:2). However, over the generations there can be a progression of different nations or groups, which accept as a rule to observe the seven commandments or some of them, and especially when this is done together with a system of punishment, then it can be defined that a certain nation or a certain country is bound by the same thing. And as we found in relation to foreign worship, there is a different treatment in the Halacha for Gentiles who work in foreign worship and Gentiles who are known not to work in foreign worship, such as the Muslims (see for example the Rambam Laws of Forbidden Foods PI 17).

[We have mentioned three crimes here, fornication, incest (rabia) and bloodshed. But it seems that there is a division between them: idolatry stems more from the "custom of the

ancestors" and habits (see Gemara Chulin 13:2), and therefore it is easier to come to the definition of a nation that does not practice idolatry, since there is no reasonable fear that an atheist would practice idolatry contrary to his religion. On the other hand, bloodshed and violence are things that arise mainly from the desire of the human heart, and therefore the fear of them is greater, but nevertheless the existence of a punishment system changes this reality.

And in a certain respect the suspicion of bloodshed is greater than the suspicion of quartering, etc.: First, because a person quartering an animal is something that among the reformed nations is considered an abominable thing. And secondly, because in bloodshed the factor of hatred of Israel intervenes,

Tu. He also wrote in the life of Adam the laws of Tzitzit rule 11 section mb. And at more length in his book Binat Adam, the chapter of the House of Women, Ted included: Those who are suspected of bloodshed and the blood of Israel were like water for them, which is not the case even in their time.

16 Mark 26: "And look at the lives of people who wrote for the sake of it, lest it be accompanied by the idea that they are still suspected of bloodshed." And he also wrote in the commentary Tefarat Yisrael on the Mishnah in Job Zera chapter 2, letters 4-

This is how the Ramban says in Genesis (4:13) about the killing of the people of Nablus: . And what will the rabbi demand for them? And that the people of Nablus and all seven believers were not worshipers of idolatry and revealed adultery and did all the abominations of God? And the scripture screams about them in several places (Deuteronomy 12:2) 'On the high mountains and on the hills and under every fresh tree', etc., 'You shall not learn to do', etc. And he read 18 like this, except that the matter is not left to Jacob and his sons to judge them.

But the issue of Nablus, because the sons of Jacob, because the people of Nablus were wicked and their blood was as important to them as water, they wanted to take revenge on them with a vengeful sword, and they killed the king and all the people of his city because they were his slaves, and disobeyed his discipline.

That is: we usually do not harm any Gentile who violates seven mitzvot in our environment, because we have no interest in them. But when we have a war with them, it is part of their

general wickedness, and now we are condemning them for wickedness.

Also according to the Ritva that we learned in the second chapter - 'not bringing down' is because of enmity; And in time of war there is no fear of enmity, since the enmity exists and the act does not cause more enmity.

And also according to Rabbi Yona, who believes that the Rabbis forbade discussing and killing a gentile who violates seven mitzvot - it turns out that this is only during peacetime, when the killing is breaching a fence and vandalism, and therefore the Sages forbade it; But in times of war, when there is anyway a situation of killing, there is no prohibition to treat the enemy nations as they are.

And in the words of the 16th century that Rabbi Yona believes that there is a prohibition from durbanan per dunam - it is proven that this is only in peacetime, since he proves his opinion from the words of Rambam " who says that it is forbidden to kill Gentiles, and Rambam there makes it clear that it is only with Gentiles "that there is no war between us and them".

approx. And we expanded further on these words of the Ramban in the second chapter (in verse 13), see there.

It should be noted that the Ramban says here that there is no need to know about each person in detail where and when he transgressed seven mitzvot, since Shimon and Levi certainly did not know about each of the people of Nablus where and when he transgressed; But their belonging to the nation held by it is enough to kill them (see chapter two in note 10).

Kg. At the beginning of chapter 10 of the laws of idolatry.

Going through murder and robbery .ז

So far we have talked about the fighters in our country from the side of Dini Rodof. Now we will refer to the Gentiles who pass over

< Seven mitzvot and attitude to their transgressions.

Here are the Gentiles who are partners in the war against us - must die for being bloodshed. Even those who do not kill with their hands must be put to death, as we have shown in the third chapter (in pisca 20) **wrong people must also be put to death for murder by grama (and for this they are condemned even after the war, when they no longer persecute).**

Another reason for charging the death of gentiles who fight with us is that they commit robbery (for in war, one captures land or loot from the enemy, or harms him and causes him financial losses' ⁹).

In the war over the Land of Israel, this reason is strengthened, since Gentiles who claim the land for themselves are taking the land from us, which is our inheritance from our ancestors?

Working on seven mitzvot .n

Apart from these transgressions, which those who fight us commit, their wickedness to fight us is part of what they break seven commandments in ^{general}. And so in such a situation we have an interest in discussing and killing them for all their wickedness.

19. And to comment that the Ramban in his words on Nablus (Bereishit 4:13) says that causing damage is a section of the law, not of robbery, see there; In any case, we must die for this, since it is an offense in the grave (and also refer to the Tosafs in Baba Metzia, 2 DH Tashich).

about. As explained in the foreign work Neg, 2 and Babba in Tera Kit 1-2; And also refer to the name Mashmuel Judges of Terah. We extended the explanation of this matter in the article "Ownership of the Land".

XX. And it is difficult to plan a war with a nation of gentiles who do not violate seven mitzvot, since there is no reason to fight them and it is forbidden in any case; And they also will not start a war against us if indeed they observe seven mitzvot.

In addition, it should be noted that if there are individual gentiles within the nation who observe seven mitzvot - naturally these gentiles are less suspected of endangering Israel, and their ability to harm us is not as high as the ability of the majority of the people of their nation explained above (the reasons for still allowing their killing when necessary will be addressed later).

Each of the people of Nablus must judge those who commit crimes around him, and if he cannot - surely he must not interfere with others who wish to bring justice to those who commit crimes.

The reality of the people of Nablus and their lifestyle were such that they simply would have interfered, if they could, with the actions of Shimon and Levi. In such a situation, they are certainly considered to be canceling legal mitzvahs, and they cannot claim that it was only from oneness.

We have learned that the existence of a society of wicked people who violate seven commandments and allow us to remain in them, leads to the fact that we cannot do justice with the one who harmed us, since this society protects and covers him ; And in such a situation - it is proven that they are breaking the law, not because of their selfishness or the like, but because of malicious intent.

jug. There is a hint of the matter in the Rambam's language which says that we will pledge "all the owners of Nablus to kill." 'The owners of Nablus' is an expression used by a number of judges (chapter 9), where the people of the city are referred to as 'the owners of Nablus' because they had to decide and determine what would happen in the city. Even here the Rambam wants to say that the people of Nablus determined by their actions the reality of not reacting to the Nablus act and they cannot say that they are not connected to the act, as was explained inside (we heard in the name of Rabbi Menachem Flickam Shalita).

so. In this context, it is requested to quote the Rambam's words at the beginning of chapter 6 of the Laws of Law: "A person's way of creation is to be drawn in his opinions and actions by his peers and his friends, he follows the custom of the people of his country, therefore a person should connect with the righteous and always sit with the wise in order to learn from their actions, and to stay away from the wicked who walk in the dark So that he does not learn from their actions, he who Solomon says walks with the wise and shepherds like the shepherds of the flock, and says blessed is the man, etc. In a bad way like our times, or he cannot go to a country whose customs are good because of the

recruits or because of the sick, he sat alone alone, as it is said, he sat alone and alone, and if there were evil and sins that he is not allowed to live in the country unless we interfere with them and practice their bad customs, he went out to the caves and the deserts and the deserts, and to He will lead himself in the way of sins like a giant, as it is said, "Who in the desert will host guests."

c. Let's explain things further: Maimonides said that the people of Nablus cannot be killed for violating seven commandments in general, even though it was these transgressions that created the atmosphere that allowed Nablus to do what it did. If we follow this path - then every gentile who violates seven mitzvot helps and assists to a certain extent another gentile who is in a distant place, because some kind of atmosphere is created in which it is permissible to pass ¹ on seven commandments, and this is not a direct enough connection to the sons of Jacob to say that they do justice and do not use the ability to discuss to 'solve problems' (after all, all the peoples of Canaan created such an atmosphere, and it means in Rambam that there is no permission to kill everyone but only the people of Nablus) . That is why Maimonides explains that the people of Nablus are

Violation of Mitzvot Dinim .ט

It is true that according to the Rambam (according to the interpretation of the Beit Yosef) we wrote in the second chapter that a gentile should not discuss seven mitzvot if our people do it for a side reason other than the desire to deal with this offense; But even according to his method, it is possible to discuss the Gentiles who fight us for breaking the law. After all, Rambam wrote in the Laws of Kings (end of chapter 9) about the deed of Shimon and Levi:

And as it is prescribed for the law, they must sit down judges and judges in each and every province to discuss these six mitzvos, and warn the people, and Ben Noah who transgressed one of these seven mitzvos will be killed with a sword, and because of this all the owners of Nablus will be liable for murder, for Nablus was looting and they saw and knew and did not discuss it. And Noah's son was killed for one witness and as one judge without warning and according to relatives, but not with the testimony of a woman and no woman will judge them.

And here is the Rambam's question about the Torah (Bereshit 4:13):

And the Yerushalmi said in Noah's law, Heta Dino was killed, Lakh Shahad was killed. In Israel's law, any law that you know you are free from, you are not

allowed to run away from, and any law that you know you are not free from, you are allowed to run away from, but in their law, even though you know you are free from it, you are allowed to run away from it. It seems from this that the gentile may say to the litigants that I do not need you, because an addition is in Israel you shall not dwell before anyone (Deuteronomy 117), you shall not hold back your words before anyone (Sanhedrin 62), nor shall a son be killed when he does not make himself a police officer and governor to judge his masters.

That is: the Ramban claims that the people of Nablus cannot be blamed for what their king did: after all, he has the power and the government, and how can it be claimed that anyone from Nablus is guilty of not observing the commandments of the law and stopping the king's actions? Should they risk their lives to judge the king?

And this is how the Maharal also makes it difficult for Gour Aryeh there (and similarly to the difficulty in the light of life):

And truly these are the words of Tima (=of Rambam), because how is it possible for them to judge the son of the president of the country? Because they were afraid of them, even though they were commanded on the law - we would have been able to judge them, but they are merciful, and how could they judge them?!

The Rambam's intention must be explained:

11 Roadblocks

After we have concluded who participates in actions that help the wicked in Kom Asha - we will discuss the damages that are caused in 'Shab and Do' by people who do not necessarily belong to the army of the wicked. For example: civilians live near a weapons factory or an army camp of the wicked, and bombing the place will harm them as well. If we don't bomb the place - we will endanger the souls of our kingdom's people .

The things we wrote above are also true here:

If the citizens stay of their own accord and thereby block the way to harm the wicked - they persecute 90 (and the same goes for financial rape). Although if it is a case of rape - they don't have to get up and leave the place. Even according to the separation of ways that obligates a Gentile to surrender his soul in order

not to murder - in a way. There is simply no obligation to stand up and do an act, since in this you thought, 'Why is there a front?' In D.H. 'Waha', see *ibid*).

However, even though they are allowed to stay - it is allowed to kill in order to be saved: According to the Mahrash Yaffe - this is permissible because it is permissible to kill others in order to be saved, and Gentiles do not have an obligation to sacrifice one's soul in order not to murder (and in any case we are also not commanded to sacrifice one's soul for killing them as above).

Even according to the parting of the ways, it is permissible to kill those who remain: we explained well in the third chapter that those whose presence helps the murderer - even if it is through rape - is considered harmful, and it is permissible to harm him in order to stop his harm.

Even if the citizens have been tied up or imprisoned, and they have no choice but to stay where they are and be hostages - it is permissible to run them over and kill them if this is the way to be saved from the wicked, just as it is explained that even those who help with murder against their will - are allowed to be killed.

Nineteenth As we brought up in the third chapter (in paragraph 23) when we were dealing with roadblocks, a person who also pursues in return is considered a pursuer.

J. Martyrs who share with the enemy

So far we have dealt with Gentiles who have a reason to kill because of their wickedness. Now let's discuss those who are not interested in war and are strongly opposed to it." First we will discuss the laws of Gentiles. Those who fight among themselves, and we believe that Gentiles are also allowed to hunt down such martyrs in terms of the laws of souls between Gentiles (which were explained at length in the third chapter). In any case, this is also allowed for Jews, since the prohibition of a Jew to kill a Gentile is the same as the prohibition of a Gentile to kill a Gentile (as was explained in the first chapter),

Let's start with a soldier who participates in fighting against us, but he only does this because he was forced by threats to take part in the war.

If they threatened him with threats of money and the like - then he is completely evil. There is no permission to participate in the persecution and killing because of the fear of losing money, and if he does and - he pursues everything (in fact, even the person who kills me because I preceded him in buying a good bargain is a murderer because of financial rape...").

And if he was threatened that if he did not participate in the war he would be killed - according to the Mahrash Yaffe system he is allowed to participate in the war, since wrongdoers are not commanded to sacrifice their souls for murder and therefore he is allowed to kill others in order not to die. But just as he is allowed to kill others - so others (even gentiles) are allowed to be killed in order not to die, and therefore according to the Mahrash method it is simply beautiful that it is allowed to kill such a soldier.

And according to the crossroads - he must not participate in the murder even if he has to give up his soul for it; And if he does so - he is evil and it is permissible to kill him as persecutor.

We will come back and remind you that this is about any type of war partnership: a combat soldier, a front-line soldier, civilian help or various types of encouragement and support.

Those who must stand up and condemn Nablus if they can because they are sons of that

kingdom, and cannot claim that they are martyrs because they are held to interfere with the sons of Jacob if they stand up and condemn Nablus.

XXI And in any case, we are not in a hurry to kill seven mitzvot according to the different opinions, and Doc.

power See also Baba Batra from the end of page 2.

And if so, in a war between Jews and gentiles - all of us are allowed to kill the gentiles in order to save the lives of Israelis, as will be explained in the fourth chapter; And this is also allowed in the case where we **take advantage** of the presence of the innocent babies to harm their parents and the like.

Hand. Summary of the reasons for killing the enemy in war

So far we have listed five reasons for harming enemies in war: being persecuted by their partners in the war, being persecuted because they are suspected of hating and shedding Israel's blood, being in violation of seven commandments, being helping a murderer even if in rape, and the permission to kill a Gentile to save Israel.

We will detail the relationship between them in more detail:

The one who actually pursues is killed simply and clearly, and this is a reason that stands on its own. Also simply that in reality killing the actual persecutors is the main goal in the war; And this is the most useful and necessary act to prevent the shedding of Israel's blood.

When it is necessary to kill others - the additional reasons must be examined: in principle, when there is a need for soul control, it is permissible to kill them, since it is permissible to kill a gentile in order to save Israel; And apart from that, even a Gentile is allowed to kill another Gentile who helps the murderer (even if it is Onso) as explained. Although in a simple way we prefer to kill the persecutors than to kill them.

But this opinion, that it is preferable to harm precisely the persecutors and not others, is also conditional on the two additional reasons:

The fact that the Gentiles must die because of the seven commandments of the sons of Noah means that we will not hesitate to kill them if there is a need (such as a need for revenge, which is not an immediate necessity of saving

To. And in Israel against Gentiles there is also more innovation than in the words of the

Mahrash Yaffe between Gentiles, since even according to the method of the Mahrash Yaffe there is no permission for a third gentile to intervene and kill one to save another - which is not the case in Israel vis-à-vis Gentiles, all of Israel is commanded to save Jews even at the cost of gentile lives . In any case, in war usually this difference is not reflected because everyone is considered persecuted by the kingdom of conviction that endangers all those who fight it.

No. And what we wrote there in note 16 that there are opinions not to use this permission in any case - these opinions * do not belong in times of war because they are based on the fact that it is permissible to invest a lot for the restoration of a world, and in times of war it is precisely this type of killing that will bring about the restoration of a world; Look there and check.

Babies are often in this situation: they block the way to rescue with their presence, and they do it outright rape and without preparation. Despite this, it is permissible to infer that their presence helps the murder. :

In a situation of war many times (and perhaps it is more correct to say: in most wars) a situation of 'fog' is created due to the presence of many people, some of whom are the fighters or those who encourage them and some are not. In this way, a situation can be created in which there will be enemy soldiers in the city who assimilate into the population, some of which do not help them in any way.

It is permissible to harm these people because their presence helps the murder (similar to a murderer who shoots at someone from a gathering of many people, who is allowed to kill as we explained in the third chapter), even if they are really innocent on their part.

12. Healing by killing innocents from the enemy

So far we have been killing innocents when their presence interferes with our war. Although there are situations in which we would initially want to harm the innocent, and their presence and killing is actually beneficial and helps us. For example: harming the babies from the evil king's family, who are currently innocent and killing them helps us hurt and hurt him so that he stops fighting us.

In the opinion of the Maharash Yaffe, it was explained in the third chapter that Gentiles are allowed to kill each other in order to be saved from death. And if so, according to his method, it is simply permissible for the Gentiles to take this step in war if in this way they minimize the damage to the souls of this murderous king.

Although we explained there that it is possible to learn in the opinion of the Mahrash Yaffe that this is permitted only when the presence of the slain is harmful; But there is no permission to take advantage of his presence to be saved. Also, according to the parting of the ways, this is forbidden, because according to his method it is forbidden for a gentile to kill another gentile in order to be saved. And if so, in their opinion, there is no source from this to allow it (we will deal with it in the next chapter).

13. Jewish life versus Gentile life

All the discussion between the above-mentioned latter - is only about war between Gentiles.

פרק חמישי: הריגת גויים במלחמה *רא

When there is a war between Israel and Gentiles - there is another justification for allowing the killing of Gentiles, and that is: the priority Israel's life has over Gentile life. It will be explained in the fourth chapter that when the life of Israel is in danger - it is permissible to kill a gentile in order to be saved, and in this case one should not hand over one's soul to all Alma.

Lech, brought to Lakman) that this is "a way of advice in the first place" for me, that is, there is no only permission. The Hand Eliyahu also proves this from the proximity to "the good that snakes tear his mind" - surely this is "good advice" for me (and not only permission).

And if so, we are not talking about righteous gentiles that we are forced to kill because Israel's soul control rejects gentile life, or because they help a murderer in rape; Nor are we talking about complete persecutors, or those who are kept persecuting as a continuation, because in such a situation we would not call them 'good of the Gentiles.'"

And it seems to me that there is no way for a heathen who pursues Israel to be killed in war, if it is difficult: Peshitaz, and what did we need to learn from this? Isn't it better to be kosher among the Gentiles than kosher in Israel because the one who killed you is the wise one to be killed!

But here we are talking about those whom we could think of as 'the best of the Gentiles', and therefore we will avoid killing them as much as possible - and the Sages came and taught us not to hesitate, but to kill quickly, because their wickedness makes us suspect them and treat them like snakes, especially since they are anyway They break seven mitzvot and must die.

to him. This is for Shunar, which is relevant to our matter: "Even in the interpretation, there is no muridin Dhab C. Kanach s.l. Demtar and the TZ Cholk and s.l. "And the same is true, and it is not taken away from the good of the people who killed a person who was killed by the permission of Kamer, and his neighbor will say of him a good name, that snakes have torn his mind, and this is the way of advice in the first place, Kamer."

And the explanation of his words: according to the method of the Bi and the Shach (which we learned in the second chapter), it is permissible to kill a gentile who does not observe seven mitzvot. And the "Kum Yeshuot" made it difficult: after all, the Toss as foreign worship (20:2) made it difficult for the judgment that "there is no muridin" from the

פרק חמישי: הריגת גויים במלחמה *רא

mimra "the good of the Gentiles is slain", and they want it to be during wartime. But according to the Bible, it is not clear what was difficult for Tos, since "there is no muridin" is permission and it does not contradict "the good of the Gentiles killed"! And the "Yid Eliyahu" excuse, that "the good of the heathen killed" is not a mere permission but "a way of advice in the first place", which means that from the proximity to "the good of the snakes that tear his mind", and therefore it was difficult to conclude that this contradicts the law of "no muridin" meaning that there is no It is a mitzvah to take down. Therefore, you will want "the best of the Gentiles to be killed" in times of war, when there really is a mitzvah in the matter.

to And of course this good advice is binding, because if there is a fear of danger to Israel - it must be removed in a permissible way (and as is also proven in the previous comment that this advice is a mitzvah and not a permission; and the meaning of the word 'advice' is that the Torah does not renew a mitzvah here but teaches us how to relate to reality and anyway we learn from it what must be done).

damp. And in such a situation it is permissible to kill Israel as well, and not only 'Gentiles'.

souls but only with a general benefit later). And along with the claim that it is better to let them repent and observe mitzvot from then on - comes the claim that they are suspected of shedding blood, **especially in times of war, and therefore one should not expect those who fight us to repent, but** to treat them in the right way and to treat them with compassion. ^{to} c.

Now we will bring the guidance of the sages towards Gentiles in war, and we will see how the things we have seen so far in the words of the sages are formulated.

Tu. 'It is good that Gentiles are killed in war'

Ita in Tractate Sofrim (10:7):

The best of heathens in time of war is death.

And it is also said in the Michilta about the verse "And he took six hundred chariots in the desert and all the chariots of Egypt" (Exodus 14:7), as well as in Rashi's commentary on the Torah there:

And all the vehicles of Egypt... Whose property were they? From the fear of God's word ⁶ - This is why Rabbi Shimon used to say that a priest who is killed in Egypt is good if his brain is torn by snakes.

This law was brought forth as a halachic ruling in many early and recent rulings (see, for example, a sub-section on the Rambam in the laws of the killer of the 11th century; and the subjects of the instruments in Tor and Beit Yosef Yore-Dea, Siman Kanach, and Hoshen-Misfat, Siman Tacha).

And the meaning of the language is that in time of war "it is commanded to lower them and roll the dead over them" according to the language of the Sama (Hom Techa Ski'hali), and as he wrote in Shu'at Yad Eliyahu (Lublin Siman

heart. And also refer to the book 'Yisod Mora' to Raba'a, page eight: "And he mentioned two reasons for 'rounding up the politicians': one - a blatant thing; and the other - that they thought to do you more harm for killing their president's daughter." And this is as we said here: First - they must die for being sinners and making mistakes in Baal Pa'or; Nor should we expect that we will correct them and bring them back to repentance since they think

badly of us for falsely killing them.

Lg. This opinion that they should not be expected to correct is also true to a certain extent regarding babies, as explained at the end of the chapter, see *ibid*.

Led. About whom it was said: 'Fear the word of God, Pharaoh's servants sent his servants and his treasury into the houses' (Exodus 9:20), and thus the Hebrews and the treasury did not die from the blows of the word and the hail (see also Rashi Shem 9:10).

her. And so it is also proven in Beit Yosef Yore Dea Kanah DH 'and what he wrote'.

And according to the fact that God shook Pharaoh and all his army in the sea and not a single one remained in them, there must have been many of those fearing God's word that they all plunged into the sea, and we could learn from them because they feared God, even though they were among the persecutors, they did not go to kill the Israel only walked in honor of the pharaoh and on the way that it was said, 'God will fear my son and the king', meaning that those who fear God will also fear the king, but they did not intend to kill any Israel, and why then did they shake in the sea? But surely God, blessed be He, who examines all pleasures and tempers, knows that although they already feared God, now their hearts turned to haters, and to kill and dismember, and they did not have even one good thing in them, because their way was that they never had any fear in their whole souls, only internal fear, only external fear, and their pleasure as That was the issue here, that those who hated themselves so that they would not die in their death were fearful from the beginning and now they have become haters finished

And the Maharal Begor Aryeh (on Parashat Beshalach ^M) in the commentary to this Mimra explains that the Sages emphasized that we should not expect reconciliation and repentance from the Gentiles with whom we are at war:

Kosher for Gentiles killed - the meaning of "killing the Gentiles" is not that Razel Dish never said to kill the Gentiles because the species and the heretics lower them and do not raise them up, but they never said about the Gentiles and did not say that, but it means in Kahai Gona in war that if a Gentile comes to you for war And he fell into your hand in that battle, do not have any mercy on him at all and kill him when he was here because the Egyptians came against Israel and killed them

and their children and in the same way they said slain, and also in the passage of Judges the scripture said Hear Israel you are close today to war against your enemies if they fall into your hands do not have mercy on them they also do not have mercy on you , and these are the Gentiles who came against Israel to war and they are their enemies fighting them.

That is: in a war between Jews, we understand that there is always an opening for repentance and a return to brotherhood with those who fought against us, as explained in the Book of Chronicles (2:20) about the fact that at the end of the war between Judah and Israel, the people of Israel freed the captives from Judah

M. And he also wrote in 'Beer Gola', the seventh well; And similarly to what the IAB wrote in his comments on the book "Tribe of Judah", it was cited in the "Zfonot" file, part 9 on page 4; And similarly refer to the Great Knesset at the end of his comments on Beit Yosef in Hoshen Mishpat Tacha.

And as he explained in the book Side by Side there:

Rather, I shoot a Gentile who is at war among other Gentiles who are men of war, even if he does not pursue you to kill you, even if it is permissible to kill him, because it is likely that he will stand to help the Gentiles, as the one who feared the word of God did in Egypt. Buffy, every neighbor and easy-going gentile material.

yes n'l

You can see from the asides that we are not talking about someone who will obviously help persecute us, because in such a situation there is no division between Israel and the Gentiles, and any persecutor is allowed to kill . Rather, this is a situation in which we must be satisfied with whether this Gentile is indeed going to persecute us - and on this the Sages say: He will probably persecute us with his wickedness, and do not hesitate to kill him.

And in this interpretation, Yanchamanu emphasizes the great suspicion towards the Gentiles:

It is a good thing that the slayer is dead - because he is not [a soldier that we

are not] afraid of him, and we are assured of his goodness and thereby he can harm them without their knowledge, therefore one must be careful of him not to promise his faith. And it is good that in snakes one should guard against it more and more because he who is in possession of a good does not pay attention to it
to beware of it and thereby easily harms it...

And in the interpretation of Be'er Avraham on the Mecheleta:

And Rabbi Shimon says in this that the best of them from all places his heart and his thought that lies within him is full of fire like a snake. And more like a snake that does not surrender by any blow and has no remedy but to crush his brain and even if he is stopped for years there is still a fear that he will not throw a weapon in his mouth. Therefore, there is no advice but if you immediately see him racking his brains and then anyway it is not harmful that it is not in his mind nor in his ability, likewise you have to lead with them because they have no faith and confidence in them at all.

And in the vestment of the light (on Rashi, by Rabbi Mordechai Yaffe the owner of the vestment) he explained in detail the difference between Israel and Gentiles in this:

Lt. That is: simply that in the words 'a Gentile who is at war among other living men of war' he means one who is indeed here, but he is not one of the 'men of war' but is just next to them; After all, if he is one of the enemy's men of war (soldier) - surely he is being held to persecute us, and it is impossible to call him 'good' as above.

And the Radak wrote (in his commentary on 1 Chronicles 22:8) that David behaved properly since his intention was to save himself:

Even with the blood of the Gentiles that he shed who were not members of his war, it is possible that there were good and pious people among them, nevertheless they were not punished because his intention was for the brides of the wicked not to break into Israel, and to save himself when he was in Erin
Philistines, no **man or woman would live** .

And the reality is that during war we will harm anyone who is feared to endanger us (now

or in the future), because the fear is great and there is no prohibition in killing him since he does not keep seven mitzvot ^{Mag}.

16 Sure

When we discuss the killing of babies and children - on the one hand we look at them as completely innocent, since they are not free of reason™ and therefore are not condemned for having broken seven mitzvot and no intentions can be attributed to them. But on the other hand, there is great concern about their actions when they grow up. And as we found some examples of this concern:

Mb. In a simple way, the Geshori Gezeri and Amalek peoples must die from the mitzvah not to revive a soul from seven peoples and Amalek, and as the Melbim wrote there and it is proven from the verses in the book of Joshua that Geshor and Gezer are from seven peoples. And according to this the scripture's reasoning for David killing a man and a woman so that they would not tell Achish his intention was that David made sure to also kill a 'man and a woman' who are not of these nations and only live together with them, and this is because they are suspected of telling Achish and thereby endangering David and his men (see a similar explanation elsewhere in the book "Emeri Noam" on the Torah in Midbar no, 17).

Mag. And in this context, the duty to kill every male is clear in a situation where we are occupying the territory of an enemy who did not agree to respond to our call for peace; Since the remaining of large males is a danger to our rule in that place. But we will not enter into the clarification of this law which belongs to the war of occupation and not to the "help of Israel in the midst of trouble", and as we wrote in the introduction. gauge. It is about those who are not of sound mind, and not about a certain age; Because among Gentiles, bigness and smallness are not determined as in Israel, but according to the discretion and opinion of each one (see for example Or Shimch Halkhot Isori Biya 3:2; the beginning of the book 'Etz Hadar' (to Rabbi Kook); Menchat Shlomo 1:4).

After taking care of them with devotion. But in a war between Gentiles - it is only a mistake to take this path. And just as the Anointed of War opens his words by saying (Mishna in Suta 8:1):

"And he said to them, ``Hear Israel," etc., "about your enemies" - and not about your brothers, not Judah about Shimon, nor Shimon about Benjamin, and if you fall into their hands, they will have mercy on you, as it is said: And they will be restored, and they will be restored, and they will be attacked with donkeys for every one who fails, and they will bring Jericho, the city of dates, to their brothers, and they will return to Samaria." You walk on your enemies, if you fall into their hands there is no mercy on you!

We should not expect an answer from them, and we must fight them firmly and kill them because a time of war only increases their wickedness, and ignoring this is dangerous and stupid.

And in accordance with these words, it is said in the book of Samuel 1, chapter 27, about King David who killed all the enemy's men in his wars so that they would not tell Achish the king of Gath about his actions, because David would tell Achish that he was fighting against the sons of Judah:

(8) David and his men went up and spread out to the Geshurites, the Gezrites, and the Amalekites, for here are the settlements of the land from the land of Shukha to the land of Egypt. Achish did not raid them today and David said about the Negev (he admitted and about the Negev they were porters and about the Negev the Kini: (11) And neither man nor woman will live to bring a wine to the Amir lest the Amir will judge us as David did and thus his judgment?

Ma. An anointed of war should warn against this mistake, since the Jews themselves are truly merciful and with a tendency to the line of kindness and not to strength of hand and firmness, therefore they imagine that the Gentiles are also like this, and in any case tend to treat them with kindness; And they do not understand that the reality of the Gentiles is different, because they are not merciful by nature, and with them it is precisely firmness that subdues their evil instincts and allows them to be corrected. An example of this

mistake is found in Ahab who shows mercy to the king of Aram (1 Kings chapter 20), and from there we also see that the king of Aram assumed that he would indeed have mercy on him because it is the nature of Israel that 'kings of kindness are'. And unfortunately, even in our generation, we can all already see how right the words of the Mishnah and the Mishnah were in this, how in Gentiles it is firmness that subdues their evil inclination and allows them to be corrected, and how much the one who is wrong in this sheds Israel's blood (and the Lubavitch Rebbe has already gone on to shout about this countless times).

His soul is hot, but he does what he needs with himself to revive his soul, and since a person does this to himself and it is impossible to condemn him - but that it is not hot who does this to the souls of others, and for this reason the Torah permitted the killing of the child and that he does little harm - in order to postpone a great harm that would have come to the world in their lifetime and there is no

This is hot, but it is an intellectual matter to observe.

And even though it mainly refers to seven nations - this is because this name is absolute and it will certainly be so, but in the cases of other nations (such as the Babylon prophesied about by Isaiah) - one must examine in each case whether there really is such a fear and how great it is.

And in any case, we learn that there is a reason to harm the children if it is clear that they will grow up to harm us, and in such a situation the harm will be aimed precisely at them (and not only while harming the adults, when they are also damaged).

Mo. And in a simple way they also benefit from this because otherwise they will grow up in an uncorrected way and we will have to kill them anyway (similar to a disobedient son and a teacher who was condemned for his end). And it is possible that this is what our rabbi in my life was referring to at the beginning of his words, "That which the Almighty uproots as heat above - what we are rooting for them below as if we had done nothing", that is: since this nation and all its spiritual power must be uprooted anyway ("to uproot their appointed ministers", Ays.) - these children will not have existence, and will end up being children of death in a world where they have no place; Therefore it is better to kill now. from A similar example: Jehu killed the entire house of Ahab, and from the verses it means

that he also killed little babies since he did not leave a remnant for the house of Ahab (2 Kings 9:11; Ibid., 17). It also means that if it weren't for his later corruption, his actions would have been acceptable and proper (ibid. 10:3; although because of his corruption, it was considered to be a previous bloodshed for him, as explained in Hosea 1:4 and the commentaries there, and as we brought in note 9 in the second chapter); And he simply kills them so that those who might destabilize the kingdom do not grow up because of their belonging to the previous dynasty.

In addition, we found that there is a concept of fishing according to the ban, according to David Ramban (Vikrah 27:90) about the war with the Canaanite king of Arad (Bamidbar 11:1-3): 'If you give this nation into my hands and I confiscate their cities' - all the people in them will die,... because we mean the extermination of the enemies and their destruction." Although it seems that this is not a reason to allow killing, but in a situation where there is reason to allow killing - the boycott adds validity and responsibility to the killing ; and therefore we did not prolong it here, and with God's help we will prolong it when we deal with the kingdom and the public in Israel (where the main renewal of the boycott is).

It was ruled that it is forbidden to give birth to a gentile and to breastfeed her son, so as not to give birth and raise a son for foreign labor (foreign labor 20:1; Tosha Yore Deh Kand^{what} . And from this we see that we assume that when they grow up they will adhere to the actions of their parents. Although this opinion is about not saving, and from it there is still no permission to do an act and kill.

But also regarding standing up and killing in practice - here we found that the prophet Isaiah (Yid, 21) calls to kill the children of Babylon, even though they are small and not yet wise, because it is our sins that when they grow up they will take hold of the deeds of their fathers and cause harm:

They prepared a kitchen for their sons in the oppression of their fathers, but they got up and drove them away and filled their faces with cold tears.

And in the commentary of the Radak there (and it is in Rashi's interpretation and in Yonatan's translation):

Let them be killed and that is because of the iniquity of their fathers, and you have to fear that the sons will be as bad as the fathers, therefore kill them so that they will not rise up and inherit the land.

And in his commentary on the Torah (Deuteronomy 20:10) Erich Labarin extends this explanation as a reason for killing the child in the Seven Nations War:

There is no harm in killing the young, which are the branches of the bitter root, the bitter and hasty heathen, for surely they will be caught in the ways of the ancestors to do all the abominations God hates and Israel will learn from them, and he also mentioned in this verse: 'so that they will not teach you to do all their abominations'. And lest you say, when they grow up, they will come to the covenant and do penance - go out and learn who spares their blood, God be blessed that he knows that they will not do penance, and so Isaiah, peace be upon him, said in the interpretation: 'They have prepared for their sons a slaughterhouse for the iniquity of their fathers, but they will inherit the land and fill the face of the earth with cities.' And if so - if the victim lives, is not their life the cause of a very great harm? his whole body, or he will drink the bitter drink

like wormwood so that the disease will repel him, and here he does not do all this

what. And it must be discussed whether this prohibition exists only for those who practice idolatry, or for all gentiles who do not observe seven mitzvot; Refer to this in Peri Magadim on Orach Haim Siman (which proves his words from the language of the Shu'a in Yod Kand, and also means in the language of the column there), and in contrast to it in the words of the Great Kneset and the Rabbi of the Shu'a there. There is clearly something to extend this matter, but this is not the place.

Why can the king oblige the people of his kingdom to go to war and risk their lives? This is not about harming someone whose presence distracts us and prevents us from harming the wicked; but in exploiting and using an innocent life to harm the evil king.

And as David said to his men, "Such and such shall the sword eat" (2 Samuel 11:20), and he explained in the Citadel of David there: **"For the way of war is that the sword eats both priest and priest, and in saying that not a few died, and the way of war is that even of the victors many fall."** And in Malbiim there he even says **that David's intention is to say that** it is good to do acts of this kind in war, even though they will certainly cause deaths on our side now, since in any case it will cause fewer deaths later, see there.

The Gemara Bivamoth says that David handed the sons of Saul over to be killed in order to remove the wrath of God from the Israelites because of the Gibeonites' claim, and explained by some of the latter (from the Rabbinat Hayut on the Gemara there; and in his book Torat Nabiyim chapter seven ('Judgment of the King of Israel'); 'Aven Hazel At the end of Chapter 3 of the Laws of Kings; 'Eshel Avraham' (to Rabbi Neimark) on the Gemara there; 'Yisod Yosef' (part 6, page 10)) that it was permissible for David to lawfully kill a king who kills for the sake of the hour and for the correction of the world even innocent people (and it is in accordance with the words of the Rambam) At the end of Chapter 3 of the Laws of Kings: "Anyone who kills souls without clear sight, or without warning, even in favor of one, or a hater who kills by mistake, the king has permission to kill and fix the world as the time calls for, by killing many in one day and hangs and hangs hanging for many days to terrorize And to break the hand of the wicked of the world", and it means in his words that he is alluding to this gemara in Yavem, as will be explained in some of the aforementioned latter).

Although it should be noted that the Ritba on Yavmot there wrote: "It means that every hour and gender commandment is sacred, and a court prepares and punishes not from the Torah, and it is not an actual displacement, but it will be sterilized according to the view of the human race." That is: he believes that this is allowed because of the power of a court. And it turns out that the Ritba did not want to say that it was a king's rule, because there it was to remove the foam from heaven, and not from an external enemy; And David deals with such a problem as a court and Sanhedrin, and not by virtue of being a king (in any case, it is clear that there is no difference, and if a court has such power in problems related to it - the king also has such power in handling wars and the like).

(And also refer to Hatam Sofer (ibid., end of the sign) from which it means that the court did not have the power in this case either, but rather the removal of the Torah in order to prevent the blasphemy of God; and it seems that he believed that the court also did not have the power to decide on killing people because of a sign from heaven).

And in this matter of the killing of innocents by the king for the sake of the kingdom, we must also mention the actions of Jehu towards the house of Ahab, which are justified by the prophet, as we brought in the comment at the end of the previous chapter. And with God's help we will explain the basis of this power among Jews as well, both the power of a court and the power of a king; Here we have given only examples of the fact that it is permissible for the king to harm the people of his kingdom (the innocent) for the sake of the kingdom.

Chapter six

Deliberate harm to the innocent

In the previous chapter we dealt with harming Gentiles in war, and we saw that apart from the wickedness of the Gentiles (which is greatly manifested in times of war) there is also room for the killing of innocents if avoiding harming them helps the murderers.

In this chapter we will deal with cases of injury to the innocent, and we will explain when it is necessary and permitted.

Killing innocents from the kingdom of the righteous - .x presenting the question

We will first discuss those that are certainly innocent: what the kingdom hurts its own people. Malchut takes her people and forces them to go to war in which they risk great danger to the point of death?

A. As we found in the Mishnah in the Sutta (6, 4) that policemen are stationed who kill the fugitive from the battle, and it is clear that these policemen cannot discuss with each fugitive whether he was already in great danger and therefore he is allowed to flee; But we don't allow anyone to escape and everyone must fight to the death.

Hachat Sofer (Orah Chaim Rahetz explained the words of the Gemara in oaths to her, 2: "Shamuel said: "Shamuel Malkhuta Dakatla Hadd Meshita, Alma does not marry..." This is about the kingdom of Gentiles, who are allowed to go to war for the need and honor of the kingdom even if they kill a sixth of the people of the kingdom (and see Also in Shu'at Amri Ash Yorah Dea Nev; and there are those who understood the Gemara there in different ways (see Rashba, Ritba and Rasha, there), but we brought the one concerning the permission of a Gentile king to kill the people of his kingdom in war.) He also wrote Bahemek says (Genesis 9:6): "... in war there is no time to hate, no time to kill, and there is no punishment for it at all. Because that is how the world was founded. And so in the oaths of the Kingdom of God, there is no punishment, and even the king of Israel is allowed to wage war, even though Back that some of Israel will be killed by this."

And they also simplified the Rambam's words in the Laws of the Kings (5:2): "Mitzvah war (which includes a narrow hand as explained there in the previous halacha) does not need to involve a court of law, but goes out of its own accord at any time, and forces the people to go out." And it is even easier that this is allowed with gentiles, among whom there is less

materialism and the mitzvot are intended more for the return of the world (as we extended in the third chapter; and also refer to Radv7 at the beginning of chapter 4 which says that the laws written there about the king's coercive power are also true for a gentile king).

their actions... ³ And it was from the wisdom of the Creator that the existence of this species [the human species] is because He willed, its reality, which He gave in His nature that His people would have the power of leadership... and among them are those who have the power to oblige them to do what they have determined...

and to carry it out, and they are the king who holds them lawfully.

And as he wrote in the Book of Education (Mitzva Maz):

It will be revealed to all that a king in judgment will stand up, that the gods of the fear of judgment will kill people one another, therefore God, blessed be He, has marked the death of the murderer.

If there is no central government, the situation becomes distorted and intolerable, both in matters of officials and in matters of souls: therefore it is in the interest of all people and the good of human beings in general to be

third. And also refer to Shu'at Yachin and Boaz (2, 15): "This article was remembered by the Razal in the Peka Dashab... ⁷And Rabbi Bar Mahsiya said Rabbi Hama Bar Goriya said Rabbi: Under Ishmael and not under a Gentile, under a Gentile and not Under a friend, under a friend and not under a wise man, under a wise man and not under an orphan and a widow". Friends, and were those friends very bad and hostile to Israel?.. and therefore they said under ACM just any ACM there would be, and not under a friend. Under a friend and not under TAH, that even though the friend produces a lot with it, he has the terror of a government and the last And the tyrants of a people will fear him and will not fear him and will not corrupt him, because the political group will not pay except in a trial, as it is said, a king in a trial will put a country, and therefore under a friend who has too much fear and not under a TAH because he does not have so much fear of the government, and as they said in tractate Pesachim "7 Deuteronomy commanded his sons, and one of them is: Do not pass through the city whose head is 18, and it is for the reason we said... according to 18 it has no form of government and no place of government and

the burglars break into it, and therefore under a friend who has a terror and not under a H. who has no mother, and yet TAH Taffi is better and he has a mother and government Taffi, an orphan and a widow, and therefore under T "H and not under an orphan and a widow."

d. And see also the teacher of Nabukim 1855, where the Maimonides gave the following example to know the reality of a certain thing: "For example, if a person asks you, 'Does this country have a king?' and you say to him: Yes, without a doubt. Tell him that this waiter, as you see him, is a weak man with a small body and in front of him is this large amount of dinars, and this other man with a large and strong body, a poor man, is standing before him and asks him to donate one jar to him, and he did not give and even reprimanded him and pushed him over his words. And if it were not for the fear of the king, he would They were killed immediately or pushed and took the money in his possession, this concept is proof that there is a king for this country. It was found that you proved the reality of the king in the normal state of the country, which was caused by the fear of the king and the fear of his punishment."

ב. The need for royalty

Let's go ahead and remark that conducting wars in an aggressive manner is a necessary necessity for the benefit of humans

x All of them, and we will expand a little in explaining this:

From the time Cain killed the calf until this very day, there has been a grave danger to the peace of mankind and that is the danger of murder and violence, and as it is written in

Gemara Avoda Zara 4:1:

"And man shall be like the fish of the sea"... - What are the fish in the sea, every one that is great among them devours its fellow, not even human beings, if it were not for the fear of the kingdom of God, every one that is great of its kind devours its fellow. And we had our religion: Rabbi Hanina, the deputy of the priests, says that he prays for the peace of the kingdom, that if it were not for the fear of the kingdom, each man would be devoured by his life.

The association of human beings into a framework of "kingdoms" and the like, gives the possibility to ensure that there is protection for the weak person against the strong person, protection for the righteous and honest person against the violent evil, the murderer and the robber.

For this, of course, the kingdom needs to have **the power of coercion**, punishment, etc., in order to impose fear and deterrence on the wicked, because it is impossible to rely on the good will and volunteerism of the citizens, so that the situation of "all the greatest of his friends - and all the gods and the egoists of his friends - swallows his friend" That's why sages say that a "show of kingship" is an essential need for the benefit of all people. And as the Gemara brings from the Mishnah in tractate Avot (3, 2) that "pray for the peace of the kingdom".

And according to the words of the Rambam in the Teacher Nabukim (part 3, 3):

It has already been well explained that man is political by nature [=human nature obliges him to live in the form of a state], and that his nature is to be in a group and not like the other animals...-it is not possible in any way for his society to succeed

unless by a leader who definitely balances the

ב. And by the way, we will mention the words of the Sages (Bereishit Rabbah 22:8) that Abel's death was due to his mistaken "moral" considerations: "Rabbi Yochanan Abel said, "He was a mighty man of Cain, and there is no such thing as a 'victim'" but a teacher who was under him, he said to him : We are both in the world, what are you going to say to father? We were filled with pity for him, he immediately stood over him and killed him, saying:
You shall not work with a cloth, and a cloth shall not let you down."

ג. faction and kingdom

According to what we have written, it becomes clear that the establishment of a kingdom is similar to the situation of a group of people who were told "Give one of you and we will kill him - or we will kill all of you". If the kingdom does not have the power of coercion - everyone is in fear that they will die because of the victory of the wicked in the world. The wickedness of the world presents us with a situation of 'Sacrifice some of you in the war against the wicked - or else you will all die in the chaos that will remain because of the oppression of the wicked'.

What is the ruling in the case of 'give one of you and kill him' among Gentiles? Above (in the third chapter, paragraph 8-9) we dealt with this, and we explained that according to the interpretation of the ways that requires Gentiles to sacrifice their souls for murder - in such a case it is possible for all of us to draw a lot to decide who will die in order to save everyone, since Masbara is the required solution, and with Gentiles dedication The soul is determined by the mind.

Another example of a type of fate is given in the case of organ transplantation. Here it is possible to extend the lives of all the people of the kingdom by establishing a 'transplant bank' together, that is: everyone will undertake that if he is in a terminal condition and without hope of prolonging his life - organs will be taken from him for transplantation in order to prolong the lives of other people; And in exchange for that - if he needs organs for transplantation, he will receive them from others.

Among the Jews there is no permission for this, because when you kill one to take a limb

from him - here you are killing one for the sake of another, and this is strictly prohibited by the judges (and with God's help we will extend it when we deal with the laws of souls in Israel). But among Gentiles - there is no justification for prohibiting it: everyone benefits from it, and if so - there is no prohibition to kill one to save another, since there is no justification for such a prohibition. The justification is precisely to resolve the matter and thus earn another life.

This is allowed even when it is not known with certainty who will die after the rescue operation. For example: an earthquake brought down a building. Dozens of people are trapped under the rubble, and there is no way to rescue them manually and safely before they all die of hunger and thirst. Their only way to escape is to operate a tractor that will break into the building from a certain direction, and clear the rubble to save the people. However, some people will be hurt because of the landslide that the tractor will cause ¹. In the Gentiles this is allowed: the slain cannot claim 'from the front'

G. Refer to the introduction of Hafen Yehoshua who describes a situation similar to this. are incorporated in a framework, and in order for the kingdom to be meaningful it must have the power and possibility of coercion.

And here, as long as there are wicked people in the world who are ready to win the war in any way, then if there are limitations on the way of war of the righteous people, the result will be the victory of the wicked. Therefore, it is in the best interests of all human beings to enable the conduct of wars in an aggressive way, including the use of our citizens for the purpose of winning the war.

Without the king's ability to kill his warriors for the purpose of war - the kingdom would be able to force people to fight up to a certain level, but it would be impossible to force them to die or risk great danger for the sake of the kingdom. This makes the battlefield against outside enemies (army) or crime and anarchy (police) something that the kingdom does not control. In war, many situations are dangerous, and if in a time of danger it is not possible to compel the soldier to stay and fight - this is a great weakness for the army of a kosher king. It is true that volunteering (even without a king) is allowed, and if the king succeeds in arousing volunteerism among his people, they will wake up to fight for the kingdom, even at the cost of their lives, and thus do what is lawful; But volunteerism, with all its importance, cannot be a sufficient framework that holds a large public of many people.

Army and police are built on a framework of coercion - within which volunteerism is very significant and even primary. But without the coercive framework, volunteering will also be harmed and it is not possible to have a monarchy with police and military.

To sum up: if a king cannot harm his citizens for the sake of war - his power is limited, and there is no doubt that sooner or later the kingdom will not last against the wicked who do not hesitate to harm souls for their victory.

On the permission to volunteer and die for others when faced with a danger common to all we will expand elsewhere.

The reserve service in the State of Israel today is a good example of this: there is a law that requires you to join the reserves, but it is clear that this law cannot maintain the reserve system by itself, and the main content that drives the system is volunteerism. Despite this, the law is very important because it 'encourages' the system and makes it stable and not dependent on the whims of each soldier, so people are willing to volunteer.

In other words, it can be said: the prohibition of bloodshed between Noah's sons is a prohibition of killing in the way of corrupting and corrupting the world. However, in times of war - the consideration of the correction of the **world** and its goodness allows that there will be no prohibition to kill, so that a nation can deal with the wicked within it and with wicked enemies from the outside, and thus the righteous can defeat the wicked. This situation is true as long as we have not reached the end of days, when "Nation will not lift sword against nation and they will no longer learn war" ⁹.

ד. Killing the enemy by killing Anshua

If the king is allowed to kill his men for the purpose of the war - the same reasoning also applies to people who belong to the kingdom of conviction. In the war of the righteous against the wicked, we assume that unrighteousness will hurt the horse of all of us if we let it raise its head, and the people of the wicked kingdom will also suffer from it (later, if not now).

In fact, we claim against every person from the kingdom of conviction: if you belong to the

king of evil - blood on your head for aiding murderers; And if you don't help him - you have to help us, and it is permissible to kill you as we kill our own people (because we are all in a common trouble and in such a situation it is permissible to kill a few to save the many). This opinion allows harming even babies and completely innocent people on purpose, if it is necessary to fight the wicked. For example: if harming the children of an evil king will put pressure on him to prevent him from behaving wickedly - it is possible to harm them (even without the justification that they will turn out to be wicked when they grow up (see the end of the previous chapter)).

ה. Healing - summary of the reasons for the permit

We will now summarize the various reasons we have seen so far for intentionally harming the innocent (ie: healing them, not saving them):

א. Israel is allowed to be healed in Gentile life.

ב. According to the Maharash Yaffe, which says that non-believers are not required to commit murderous devotion - it is simply permissible for a gentile to be healed in a gentile. Although according to the intersection there is no permit for this,

ninth. And according to the words of the depth, which were brought as the first comment to this chapter. J. If not - why not surrender and let them rule? ...

Towards those who are not killed, since everyone will die anyway without the act and therefore there is no reason to prohibit it.

It is also possible to decide in advance on fate, or on the distribution of the burden of risk. For example: a group of people in the desert, and their drinking water runs out. Their only way to be saved is to march to a place of resettlement, but on the way there are predatory lions. In order to be saved from the lions, you have to do a diversion, that is: when the lions come, you have to give them one of the people, they will **attack him and kill him, and the rest of the people will be saved. The people conclude a division of times between them: if the lions arrive in the first hour of the journey - they will send so-and-so to the lions** ; at the second hour - unknown; And so on. With Gentiles this is allowed: there is no reason to prohibit killing here, because without the act of killing everyone will die, and it makes sense to be saved in this way.

A kingdom is similar to these examples: in a kingdom we decide to divide the burden among the people, when in the end it is possible that some people will have to die, but it is better that way than for everyone to suffer from the non-existence of the kingdom. Everyone takes a risk that they will die for the kingdom - but in the end there is a general feeling here for everyone. Masbara is asked to 'go for it', and among gentiles there is no reason to forbid doing so if indeed it turns out.

And as he wrote on the right page (at the end of Mark 17):

And therefore it was allowed to endanger individuals in war for the sake of the peace of the whole group because, as such, this can lead to the saving of many more lives than could be killed by the sword of the hater."

H. Later in his words there, he wrote that this is also allowed in Israel for this reason, and he wanted to distinguish between this and the case of a faction in which it is forbidden to hand over one person even if they all die, since in war one does not hand over hands and it is not known in advance who will hand over. But in this his words are renewed, because it is difficult to say that in war when it is necessary to kill someone with your hands (such as running over someone who is blocking the road as rape and without that the whole

campaign is lost; or harming hostages held by the enemy while harming the enemy) - this is prohibited. And we have not found that if there is a case where it is not necessary to hand over and it is not known in advance who will be killed, it is permissible to kill (for example: Gentiles force us to do an action that will cause one of our faction members to be devoured by lions, and it is not known to whom it will happen). And it seems that the 'right column' according to his method is a valid interpretation of a faction, see what he wrote in his book Havat Binyamin, a monitor on the dam prohibiting a faction, but his words and so on must be commented on. In any case, as Israel, we need to extend more in the explanation of the permission to war (and also in the permission to go to war with permission), and another vision for the time with God's help when we will deal with the kingdom with Israel.

And as explained in Ecclesiastes (8:11):

. As there is no proverb, the act of evil is quick; therefore, the heart of the sons of Hachem is full of instigation to do evil.

And the stone writer Ezra (and similarly in Rashi):

For not doing anything revenge and payment and recompense for the evil act quickly - on

Yes, the hearts of men are full of desire in their souls to do

evil because the fear of them has ceased'?

That is: revenge is a necessary necessity to make the convictions unrewarding and

Justifications for Empowerment™; And the size of the convictions is the size of the action required against it ¹.

In the name of R. Yossi, from the beginning of the creation of the world, the Almighty saw that in the measure by which a person is measured, he is measured, therefore the scripture said, "Behold, it is very good; behold, it is better than its measure."

13. And as it was expressed in the Sha'at Chaim Bid (Simon Ket) about cruel behavior towards the wicked: "To make a written judgment with measure for measure and from it many will see and see and will not continue to do such a thing".

Hand. An example of this can be found in the words of the Ba'h (in the Sha'at al-Hakehodah Nab) which says that it is possible to delay the burial of the dead for the purpose of revenge: "My blood knows how many days and years it takes to delay it without a grave

in order to try to take revenge so that there will not be a desolate Israel among them, God forbid if he does not take revenge." And refer to this also in Magan Avraham and Mishnah Berura in Orach Haim Sof Siman Shu; And in the Tzemach Tzedek association

(the first) Siman Kiya (cited at the opening of the response to the Tchoum Tcho, s.k.a. Tu. And according to this, 'revenge' from the tongue of resurrection. That is: revenge is not just an 'external' and 'technical' need because it is the 'only way' to prevent evil in the future, but there is a real need for it on the part of the victims, and according to the verse, 'And the land will not be avenged for the blood that is shed in it unless it was shed with blood' (in the Desert of La, Lg). And as the Ramban wrote in the additions to the Mitzvot Asa, 13: "Let us plead in the case of the murderer after we commit to death in court, let the redeemer of the blood seek us and pursue him and take his revenge on him", and also refer to the Rambam in the Laws of a Murderer 1, 2. And it is also explained in the BH there that the main honor of the murdered person is to take revenge on the murderers, and therefore other matters of his honor are rejected (as well as in the Shach Yore Dea Shasad, Sec. 11; Shu'at Maharil Siman Se; Havat Yair Kemo).

And it becomes more clear according to the words of the Shem of Shmuel (Metuto 138): "But the slayer of revenge is out of spite, because if his heart warms for the magnitude of the injustice he has done, there is no room for moderation here, and he recalls that this is the opposite of the warmth of the heart, and in the matter of Pinchas it is written, 'Envy my jealousy', Rashi interpreted 'Avenge my revenge', because the one who comes to the king is not allowed to do so unless his heart warms to the great injustice, it is permissible to take revenge and kill him."

That is: revenge is the heat of justice, compared to the heat of lust for conviction. Just as there is enthusiasm for wickedness - so there should be enthusiasm for righteousness to fight wickedness. Since the wicked act 'without calculation' - we also act 'without calculation' to maintain a correct balance and measure against measure; And then

And also according to the Maharash Yaffe - we have seen opinions that there is an obligation of self-sacrifice in the case of healing and only in salvation are Gentiles allowed to kill another in order to be saved.

**For the kingdom of death to hurt and heal some people when it .ג
benefits all; and talk**

This is true both towards the people of the kingdom and towards people who belong to the kingdom of the enemy.

priorities .ד

We will arrange the priorities for hitting the enemy according to what we have learned so far:

The main part of the war is against the persecutors themselves or those who deliberately help them.

Although the war is also on those who are suspected of their wickedness to help the murderers; And in any case, they assumed that they must die for breaking seven mitzvot.

If necessary - we will also harm innocents who help murderers (even if in rape).

And if necessary - we will also harm those who are innocent and do not help the murderer.

According to the crossroads - in the last situation we will have to consider which way more people will die. If harming many innocent people of this type will result in saving a few people from the kingdom of righteousness - there is no reason to allow it; Because there is no reason to prefer the blood of the people of the Kingdom of Righteousness over the blood of the innocent from the Kingdom of Conviction . It is true that when considering blood against blood in a war - we must consider both the individual case we are dealing with, and the general consideration that the side of the righteous should be as strong as possible and as little hurt as possible (and as we will continue with the considerations of Lakman's revenge). And all this - in a war between Gentiles. But in a war between Israel and the Gentiles - simply that it would be preferable to kill Gentiles so that Jews would be saved, since Israel's life is better as we saw in chapter four; And more - the Jews are the ones who correct the world and bring the word of God (and in particular seven commandments) to the whole world.

Revenge .7

One of the needs that exists in harming the wicked is revenge. In order to defeat the wicked, you have to behave with them in a way of revenge and measure against Madhib.

v'.

11 Although refer to the method of the Mahral in the one that was brought at the end of the chapter.

12. The sages explain that the behavior of 'measure for measure' is inherent in the foundation of the world (Bereishit Rabba, Parsha 9): "Rabbi Simon in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Abba all measures are invalid, measure for measure is not invalid, Rabbi Huna

And it is also found in the following actions [of the Almighty] in human beings that great plagues came down in a few individuals to kill them, or a matter including the death of families or climates, the son and the son - the son and they would not allow him a place for a seed and not be born, like the sinking of places and the noise and the horrors of the slain and the movements of a people for the destruction of others in the sword to commemorate them... and it is necessary for the leader of the marina when there is a prophet ^{who} resembles these titles and these actions will come from him as a lesson and according to the law... and there will be at some times and for some people a watcher and avenger and a husband of heat as they promised, not for the sake of the people to the bar, since he will command the burning of anyone and he is unquenchable And he is not foaming at the mouth, nor is he speaking about it, but according to what they see, they commit to it and look at what this action will do from the enormous benefit to a great nation, don't you look at the scriptures of the Torah when he commanded to destroy seven nations and said not a soul will live, trust him immediately so that they will not learn from you to do all their abominations who have done to their God and you have sinned against God your God, he will say: Do not think that this is cruelty or asking for the redemption of blood, but it is a work that will be cut off by the human mind, that all who lead astray from the path of truth will be removed, and those who hinder will be removed from all who prevent the perfection that is its attainment will be exalted... and for these is a book that contains all of his

commandments He will rise above all his actions, as there is no doubt that he will kill the workers of the work of Nara, even though they are small Nim as the sin of their ancestors and their forefathers, and this tzuvah is continued with thanksgiving everywhere, as he commanded in the rejected city to excommunicate it and everything in it · all this to protest that impression that leads to the great loss as we have explained, and we have already left the matter of the chapter but we explained why he had enough here from the memory of his actions Zachdon These are alone, and he is because he needs them in the leadership of the states, because the purpose of man's virtue is to elevate him as much as his ability, that is, to make our actions seem like his actions, as they said in P. ^{Holy} will you be, believe what he is a nerd even if you were a nerd, what is a heathen even if you were merciful ⁰ .

19. That is: when he wants to do the right thing and adhere to God up to the level of prophecy (refer to Habarbanal's interpretation there, and as is proven by the context). about. See also Rambam's Laws of Foreign Worship 4:6, and in the money Mishna and Migdal Oz there; And Mordecai on the Sanhedrin, sign Tishtez. come. And also refer to his words in the teacher in the third part, Ma: "Just as one person is punished, it is appropriate that one family or one nation be punished, so that the other families will hear and be afraid and not get used to it.

And also in the Psalms (end of chapter Noah):

A righteous man's chest will be avenged, his mouth will be filled with the blood of the righteous, and he will say, "But there is no fruit for the righteous, even there is a God who judges in the land."

And according to Rashi:

And Adam said, "But there is fruit for the righteous - then the creatures will say, surely there is fruit and payment of wages."

In the act of the righteous that God avenged you.

And the Rambam in Morah Nabukim (1, Nadi') explains the need for

revenge:

The war on guilt is appropriate. And refer to this at greater length in the third chapter of the booklet 'Blessed is the Man' (which was also printed in the book of remembrance 'Blessed is the Man'; and see in the same book in the article 'Making Revenge on the Goyim'). And even the dead care about revenge (as we mentioned above), because in the world of souls there is an identity between personality and justice, and the soul demands justice - which is revenge, as explained.

16 See, for example, the Ramban on Genesis Mat, 16, which explains the verse 'Dan Yedin Ammu': "And the reason is that the Philistines harmed all of Israel several times, because in the days of Shamgar ben Anat they began (Judges 3, no), and in the days of Yiftach it is written (Ibid. 10, 7) And he sold them into the hands of the Philistines, and also after Abdon ben Hillel (ibid. 12:13), and God delivered them into the hands of the Philistines for forty years (ibid. 13:1), and there was no one among the judges who submitted to them or defeated them at all. Even though it is written in Shamgar (ibid. 3, No) He killed the Philistines six hundred men in the cattle raider, it is not revenge because it is not a great blow, therefore it is written in Samson (Ibid. 13:5) and he began to save Israel from the hands of the Philistines, and took Israel's revenge from them, because he killed a large number of them, and all the Philistine captains the dead". That is: the blow that Shamgar ben Anat struck the Philistines was a defensive one, but against ■ the Philistines' actions it was not sufficient at all. Samson treated them appropriately for their actions towards us, and therefore he did take revenge appropriately and thereby (relatively) corrected the situation.

17 And we found that revenge is required more towards gentiles, and not towards Israel, since we were commanded "You shall not punish your people", which means that we expect Israel to understand and return to repentance without revenge. And it also seems that among Israel - revenge sometimes interferes with repentance, and causes a stiff neck; And not taking revenge allows for inner thought and leaving the bad path; But towards Gentiles, revenge is emphasized, since this is the way to stop the conviction (and this is also similar to what we brought in the previous chapter from the words of the Anointed War, which tells the people not to have mercy on the enemy Gentiles because there is no hope and chance for their reconciliation from this and mercy on them will only harm and be interpreted by them as weakness, unlike Israel with whom we hope and expect reconciliation and reconciliation even during the war).

18 Look inside further, here we quoted only what concerns the need for revenge, and there it also talks about the mental state of the leader at the time of revenge.

And the commentators explain that this is a cruel death, according to the words of the Rabbi there:

; He wanted to say that his part with his sword was as if he were splitting trees to fulfill the mitzvah of God, may God be blessed.

And here it was such a benefit to give fear to those who remained that they would not fight with Israel.

And we found sharper descriptions of the form of killing Agag in the words of the Sages when they discuss the behavior of measure against measure with the enemy (Midrash Rabbah Icha, end of Parsha 3):

'Give them a reward' - Jeremiah said 'Give them a reward', and Asaf said (Psalms 19) 'And give back to our neighbors seven times to their place', what is 'to their place'? Rabbi Yehuda ben Gadiya said that they will be rewarded for what they did in the temple which is placed in the bosom of the world, how Daath said (Ezekiel 33) 'From the end of the earth to the end of the help', and Rabbi I said what they did in the word that was given in the bosom of Adam, said Rabbi Yehoshua Deschanin and R. A Levite in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, who used to take the words of Israel and throw them upwards and say, "You have chosen what you have chosen, until Shmuel the prophet stood up and interrupted them. He said, 'And Samuel said, 'Bring me Agag, the king of Amalek,'" , Rabbi Abba Bar Kahana said: He began by cutting pieces of meat into small pieces and feeding them to the Neamits [daughters of Yana], as it is written (Job 18) 'he will eat with the cloth of his skin', Rabbi Yitzchak said: He brought four condisin and strained them, and said, "Agg indeed Sir Mr The death - this is how the ministers describe bitter deaths, Rabbi Yitzchak said: Castrate, because he used to take the words and throw them up, on this day he was repaid from it, this is what he wrote: "And Samuel said, When a woman is wise with your sword, so shall your mother be wise with women." 'Wishesaf' - teaches that four pieces were cut.

And when David defeats Moab and Ammon, he treats them cruelly (Samuel 28:2; 12:10):

פרק שישי: פגיעה מכוונת בחפים מפשע ♦ ריג

He struck Moab asleep in Babylon and laid them on the ground, as a measure of two ropes to kill and the full rope to revive, and Moab shall be to David the bearers of Menachh ²⁴.

jug. And also refer to Bilkot from the people of Loez there: "And the reason: according to the fact that the king of Moab killed his father, mother, and brothers when he left them in the land of Moab to flee from Saul, as it is said in 1 Samuel (chapter 22) 'And he comforted the face of the * king of Moab,'" etc. And when David left there and went to the forest of Horat The king of Moab killed his father, mother, and brother, except for one who escaped and was revived by the Ammonite snake. And here is the action of the Moabites, a vile and despicable act that they violated the trust that David gave them, and such an act will not be done among the reformed among them."

And that's why sometimes they do cruel acts designed to create the right balance of horror and a situation where it doesn't pay to convict. As the Ramban explained (in Madbar no, 6: : ²) the killing of the males in the tef of Midin

" and added every trace of Tef for revenge.

That is: Midin's injury to the Israelites (especially at this time before the entry into the land and the war with many Gentiles) must be corrected with the help of a harsh act of killing the tef, and therefore Moses commanded to do so.

And according to this account - the Tef are not killed because of their wickedness, but because everyone has a need for revenge on the wicked, and the Tef are the ones whose killing will satisfy this need"; And you can also look at them as those who were unique in the faction, because reality singled them out to be those whose killing would save everyone and prevent evil in the future (although it turns out that this consideration is definitely joined by the consideration we brought at the end of the previous chapter, that they are anyway suspected of being evil when they grow up).

Revenge also affects the form of killing. The cruel behavior of the Gentiles means that we will also behave cruelly with them, measure for measure. For example in the book of Judges (chapter 1):

Hanam Adni Bezeq and they chased after him and grabbed hold of him and cut off his eyes, hands and feet. And my lord said, Seventy kings, enjoying their hands and their feet cutting, were gathering under my messenger, in Ashed I did, for God has paid me, brought it, Jerusalem Ramat Shem.

And in the killing of Agag (1 Samuel 15:3):

And Shmuel said, "When women have become wiser than women, so shall women be wiser than women."

At a loss, because they will say that he will do to us what was done to so-and-so's children, to the point that if a bad person is born among them, a loser who will not feel the harm of his soul and will not look at the evil that they will do, he will not find a helper from his family to help him with his opinions that he wants to do.

approx. And so it is in Shu'at Radvaz, part 5, and a sign of 2 thousands.

Kg. As the Migdal Oz said to the Rambam in the remote city: "The women and the children,

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even though they did not sin, were punished for the sake of the elders for two reasons: Shit - that they are their grandfather and cause the gathering of the elders; and also - to kill the elders by killing them, whom they like."

This is also how the words of the verse in the Psalms (in Psalms Kelez) are well explained:

: Daughter of Babylon the robber, blessed is he who has paid you your reward, which you have rewarded us, blessed is he who will hold and smash your wrongdoers to ^{hell} .

That is: the cruelty of the Babylonians compels us to treat them with similar cruelty, and to smash their wrongdoers against the rocks."

And so we found cruel behavior towards the Kotim in the days of Shimon the righteous (Yuma Sept, 1):

We immediately pierced their heels and tied the tails of their horses, and they would grind them on the thorns and the barrens until they reached Mount Geriz. Because when they arrived at Mount Gerizim they plowed it up and sowed it as ash, as they wanted to do to the house of our God. And that day they made it a good ^{day} .

Although these considerations of the need for cruel revenge depend on the behavior of the enemies and the form of wars in the world, and when the enemy behaves with less cruelty - there really is less need for this type of behavior ⁹ . According to the words of Rabbi Kook zt'l (in his books, part 1 page k):

And the matters of war were absolutely impossible when all the neighbors were real werewolves, only Israel would not fight, then they would gather and destroy the rest of them;

The phrase "I did not decree death for the sons of Noah" does not appear at all). And it is true that it means so in the interpretation of the Razo and the Bardal, and Barshi on the Book of Chronicles (and also refer to the interpretation of the gifts of priesthood).

And even if it is interpreted that there is criticism in the Midrash - it seems that the criticism does not arise from the act itself, which may be necessary in times of war; Rather, the criticism stems from the fact that he later worshiped idolatry. That is: since he is an idolater in any case - it is revealed that his cruel actions towards the Reds do not

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stem from a good source but from cruelty, and therefore the Almighty punishes him with this iniquity (as Hosea (1:4) says about Jehu, 'For I have shed a little skin and I have poured out the blood of Yanrael On Beit Nhua, see the commentaries there, and note n J in the second chapter).

c. And the bard, Rabbi Shlomo ben Yitzchak Gironeri, in his lament 'Shekorot and no men' for Tisha B'Av wrote: 'Then with the rocks of your branches I will smash your taffet'.

XXI At the end of the previous chapter we brought a verse from which it means that the children in Babylon are killed because they are kept to grow up to be wicked like their parents; And according to this, revenge is only a consideration of the form of the killing. power And also refer to the Gra'a commentary to the Book of Esther (9:5) on the verse "And the Jews smote all their enemies with the stroke of the * sword and killing and destruction" which explains that it was a cruel killing so that they would see and be seen. Nineteenth And it should be noted in this context that the Arab enemy is known today for cruel and wild acts, and lack of measure against measure towards them only increases their cruelty.

And the people who were in it he brought out with a broom and iron chisels and iron chisels and the knight

He will do the same in a rectangle to all the sons of Ammon.

And according to the Harlab'ah there:

That the name of the people is in this sentence that there is cruelty in it which will not disappear, and here was his will in this that the other nations would be afraid of fighting Israel like this.

so. Another example of cruel behavior in war can be found in the Book of Chronicles 2 (Ka, 11-12): "And his strength grew stronger, he strangled his people, and the river of salt went up, and the sons of Sheir were ten thousand. And ten thousand lives were destroyed by the sons of Ninhochah, and they brought them to the top of the rock, and they were all cut off from the top of the rock."

It is true that in the Midrash (Icha Rabbah, opening of Yad) there is criticism of this cruel form of killing, which was not consumed: "And I raged and raged, I raged and there was no rest, I raged and there was no rest. , I played upon you in the days of Amaziah, as it was said, "And Amaziah became strong and led his people, and the salt brook went." : I did not decree the death of the sons of Noah but by the sword, and these - and they brought them to the top of the rock and threw them and they were all split open, and there was no rest, at that time the Almighty said: What are these doing here? They will find out." In any case, it can be seen from the words of the midrash that there is no criticism of the actual killing of the captives, but that the killing should have been done with the sword and not in such a cruel way.

And it should be noted that this is how the midrash is interpreted in some commentaries (see, for example, in Sefer Yaffe, a branch of the Marash Yaffe, and in Malbiim on the Chronicles there) - but in other commentaries, it means that they interpreted it differently, because of the comparison of the midrash with the Gemara. It is said in the Gemara (Sanhedrin KG, 1): "And Rabbi Yochanan said on the behalf of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochi: May it be written, 'A wise man judges a man who is an oiler and a wretched man, and there is no rest.'"], as it is said, 'And he sacrificed to the God of Darmesh who was striking him, and he said [that] the God of the kings of Aram is helping them with a sacrifice and a helper, and they were [him] to defeat him and all Israel.' After Amaziah came to strike the Edomites, and he brought the gods of the sons of Seir and set them before God, and before them he bowed down and bowed down to them. In the Gemara it is explained that G-d's

'no pleasure' is from both when he was 'angry' in the days of Ahaz and when he was 'playing' in the days of Amaziah (meaning: he gave the red men in his hand to do with them as he wished) - 'there is no pleasure' because they continued to worship idolatry.

And if we want to unite the Midrash with the Gemara - it turns out that the Midrash's intention is that God's words, "I did not decree death for the sons of Noah but with the sword", their intention is to say that I gave the Reds into the hands of Israel to such an extent that Israel could kill them with a special death, and this expresses a great victory that God gave in their hands - and nevertheless 'and there is no satisfaction' because of the foreign work that Amaziah worked (and this explanation also fits the versions in which In other words: contrary to the Rambam and the Ramban who explained why each of the people of Nablus must die according to the Torah - the Maharal believes that there is no need for it: the Torah gave power in the hand of a king to use the people of his kingdom, and even their lives are in his hands as we saw above. The result is that the people of the kingdom are partners in a very binding partnership. The Maharal believed that this creates a new fence in the kingdom: the kingdom is one entity. In a situation where everyone is united with each other

We are fighting the possibility of putting up with us before we hurt them. But he replies that calling for peace is only valid in a war that is initiated by us, but if they (and even some of them) provoked our kingdom - there is no obligation to call for peace, and it is permissible to kill them all (and we need to discuss in his opinion what is the magnitude of the provocation that exempts us from calling for peace (which means that it is also exempt ■ A fourth spirit duty that usually exists in a war of authority)).

And refer to the Mishna Merkavat at the beginning of Chapter 6 of the Law of Kings, which in his opinion there is an obligation to call for peace even in the war of 'helping Israel in the midst of trouble' (in a reality where it does not endanger the lives of Israel, of course), and this is not sufficient as Haral. And in his opinion it should be explained that in the Madin war (see Madbar Rabbah 11:5) there was a temporary order not to call them to peace (whereas according to the Maharal there was no temporary order but that God only said that in reality the Madinians were preparing to fail and encircle us and to you they are considered to be the ones who started the war and there is no It is necessary to call them peace; and also refer to the language of the Ramban at the end of his additions to the Book of Mitzvot concerning Zahatz.

One must ask about the Maharal who wrote in Gur Aryeh about the book of Deuteronomy (20:10) that there is no obligation to call for peace to the people of Canaan because they

are wicked and do abominations to God. And the things are difficult on their own, and more difficult than what he wrote in Genesis: on their own, they are difficult because if there is no obligation to call for peace to those who violate the seven commandments - one must understand to which war the call to peace belongs, since it turns out that it is forbidden to go to war against the keepers of the seven commandments (as the Chazon Ish wrote (Aven Ha'ezer came up, 4 (Da'ah 'to know'), and also refer to the Ramban on the book of commandments, the forgetfulness of the levin mitzva 17 ('and there is no Moses and Israel to set', etc.)); and difficult from what he wrote in Genesis, because if there is no need to read Peace to the people of Canaan - What is the need to justify the fact that they did not call Nablus for peace by the fact that they started a war with what they usurped its law? After all, it is permissible to fight them even without this reasoning! The war against them because they are wicked, and when the cause of the war is their wickedness - there is no need to call them for peace; and this is different from a normal war of authority, the purpose of which is to increase the greatness and fame of our king, etc., then the war against wickedness is not the main motive for the war and therefore does not exempt from calling for peace. And this explains Even in the case of Dina - the war was not because of the wickedness of the people of Nablus (for the sons of Jacob did not fight all the wicked Canaanites who were in the land), but a usurpation of Dina; therefore Mt. Hours are not a reason to be exempted from calling for peace in this case (we gave a similar explanation in the explanation of the words of Rambam and Beit Yosef in the second chapter, see ibid.

On the contrary, it was very necessary to strike fear into the savages also by
cruel leaderships, only with an eye to bring humanity to what it should be?

The Maharal's words .n

So far we have addressed each of the enemies and checked whether and when it is
permissible to kill.

In addition to these explanations - we found the Mahdal who disagreed with the Dambam
and the Ramban in explaining the Nablus event, and according to this he innovated in
matters of wars. And this is his language (in the lion's cub on the account of Shimon and
Levi):

But it is difficult: if Nablus sinned - the whole city, what did they sin to kill?... And
it does not seem too questionable because there is no blood of two nations such
as the Israelites and Canaanites who are two nations according to the scripture
'and we were one nation' and from the beginning they were not considered one
nation, and therefore they were allowed to fight as a nation who came to fight
another nation that the Torah ^{did not allow} .

To. Admittedly, also refer to his words in the book 'Oroth' (Israel and its Resurrection, 15)
about the fact that there is a side to the wickedness of today that hides behind an image
of 'goodness' and 'morality' foam and murderous lust: "Greater than it [the gross
wickedness of the past] is the venomous conviction of The types, for which she is looking
for a place in the essence of the Holy, 'a celestial body shall be grasped and she is in the
palaces of a king', she strives to leave all the filth of the world, all the physical grossness,
and all the evil tendencies possessed by the gross body, in the interior of its Khmer
elements, and ascend with it to the happiness of the Holy, that he immediately defiles and
becomes enraged when touched by the swept hand.... This is how the lament [=Cain's
continuation] goes, conviction, the desire to please the Lord, that the Lord will rest upon
her and to her offering, and in her duty she knows very well that the Lord is fed up with
her and her face falls And she was very sorry and her anger was stored up inside her, and
every time the hand of the murderer is found, the color of the sinner, to which the desire
of the blood of the canine, is shown in all its abomination" (the words were written even
before "the actual wickedness of the "civilized nation" of Germany was revealed to the

eyes of the condemned). And therefore one should be careful not to fall into this trap of convictions, even when her actions seem relatively corrected.

No. The continuation of his words there: "And even on the back of Damara the Torah, 'For you will approach a city to fight against it and call to it for peace' - we mean that they did not do anything to Israel, but how much more did they do to Israel such a thing as that which they broke into them to make a waste of them - even on the back of that only one of them did, since the whole of the people is - since those who caused a disease to them are allowed to take their revenge from them, and most of all the wars they are in, such as 'rounding up the statesmen' and so on, even on the backs of many who have not done anything, this is no difference, since they were in the same nation that did evil to them, it is allowed to come They are for war, and so are all wars." That is: he makes it difficult for Shimon and Levi to call for peace, in which we see that we have to give to the nation

And what emerges from these things is in the Mahral's opinion that if any of the people of the kingdom harmed our kingdom and the people of his kingdom did not punish him - then it is like a hand that hurt us when the mouth did not bother to ask for forgiveness and correct the hand's disfigurement; And in such a situation it is permissible to harm any part of the offending body. And there is no need to discuss the question of who is innocent and who is not, just as when we defend ourselves against evil we do not hesitate to hit him with members who were not actually involved in his actions against us.

to him. You don't need a decision of a nation to allow the blood of the kingdom to be condemned, and even individuals from the affected kingdom can harm them! After all, Shimon and Levi are not royalty, but individuals from the House of Jacob (and Jacob opposes the act), and despite this, the blood of the people of Nablus was allowed to them because of their action towards Dinah. That is: the blood of the people of Nablus was permitted because a nation harmed a nation here, and not the official decision of the aggrieved nation permits the blood of the offending nation.

to And it must be discussed whether this permission of the Maharal is also valid for visitors from a third nation who are currently in the battle'; The nation we are fighting against: it can be said that they are not part of this nation, and therefore are not considered one body with it; But it is possible that if they are here now they are "swallowed" within the nation they are in (and in any case in many situations there is permission to kill because of the reasons listed in the previous chapters).

and shared in a body that takes care of their existence and ^{a heart} - they are also obligated to each other's actions (just as a leg is obligated to the actions of the hand)/

Based on the words of the Mahar'li, it is possible to quote from the book on the call to : salvation (Deuteronomy 4:11-11) which says 'And if peace be upon you' - can it even be a part of it? You will learn to say: 'And it opened for you' - all of **it and not part of it**.

We see here that we treat all the people of the city as one, and if the city does not agree to the call for peace - even the only ones who wanted to complete suffer from hunger, thirst and diseases :

heart. Although it is necessary to discuss the words of the Maharal whether this law is true precisely between kingdoms (meaning: a rule that unites the most basic existence; compared to the partnership of city people, for example, who share in many matters of money, but there is a kingdom above them that unites existence against enemies and the like); Or it is true between two nations even though in practice they do not have two different kingdoms.

Lg. And in this context the words of the Maharal should also be cited in another place (Gor Aryeh for Parshath Vishav (chapter 60:2)) who discusses the question of how the sons of Jacob married Canaanite women, contrary to the words of Abraham and Isaac to their sons not to marry wives from the daughters of Canaan: "And if you say: And Rabbi

Nehemiah I will explain to her that they were Canaanites (the wives of the tribes) - ask her if Abraham came and warned, etc. 10! And it must be said precisely when the 12 tribes of Israel were not yet born that they were the sons of Israel - if they carried Canaanites they would not be null and void within Klal Israel, but when they were all 12 tribes and they were considered a nation, as written above by Shechem ben Hamour, 'and we were one nation', and before that there were two nations - if so, a nation was named after them as soon as the tribes were born, and when they were considered a nation there is no prohibition in this according to the fact that anyone who connects to a nation is then a nation and a caste with them completely and is considered Israel in general".

Led. In a simple way the Maharal proved this from all the wars written in the Bible, as he cites as an example later in his words the war of Midin; And in his opinion it is more spacious to say that this is how the Torah treats all wars - than to list reasons for killing each individual. And so the Torah's words regarding Amalek and seven nations become more clear.

her. Admittedly, these things do not provide complete proof of the Mahral's method, because it is possible to explain that the Torah instructs us not to accept a partial agreement to peace because the result is obscurity of the enemies and their ability to evade, etc., and similar to the arguments we presented above.

Chapter Three - Considerations of Souls Between Grimm

Gentiles are not obligated to be devoted to their mitzvot. .X

When a murderer threatens a gentile to 'kill so-and-so or I will kill you' - .ב
opinions differed on whether it is permissible for a gentile to kill so-and-so in
order to be saved.

When someone causes a gentile to die (falls on him, etc.) - it is permissible .ג
for all Alma to kill the one who harms him, even if the harmer did it by complete
rape.

**When a murderer uses a hostage to block the murdered - it is .ד
permissible for the murdered to be murdered**

Kill the blocker to be saved.

Debi chapter 7 - Soul considerations: Israel versus foreigners

A Jew is allowed to kill a Gentile in the case where a Gentile is allowed to kill .X
a Gentile, because the prohibition in **Israel stems from the same
prohibition that exists among the Gentiles. In any case, it
is simple that** Israel is allowed to kill a Gentile hostage if this is his way
of being saved. .

When Israel is threatened to 'kill such and such a gentile or we will kill you' it .ב
is allowed to kill the gentile in order to be saved, and even according to the
separation of ways that prohibits such a case between gentiles; This is because
there is devotion only for 3 offenses (and not for 'shedding human blood').

Chapter Five - Killing gentiles as war

Gentiles who support or encourage acts of murder of their royalty and the like .X
- must be put to death according to persecutor law, and are ordered to be
killed in order to save them from harm.

Even those who do not encourage murder - it is allowed to be killed so that .ב

Conclusions in brief

Killing a Gentile

A gentile is not allowed to kill a gentile, and if he kills he must die (this is .X
learned from the verse: "She shed. The blood of a man shall be shed in a
man's blood").

**The prohibition "Thou shalt not kill" refers to a Jew who .ב
kills another Jew.**

A Jew who kills a Gentile does not have to die. .ג

The prohibition for a Jew to kill a gentile is from the verse "shed the blood of .ד
man", since we have a rule that "it is forbidden to strike from the hands of
the Israelites and a gentile is forbidden", that is: Jews are also obligated to
the seven commandments of the sons of Noah.

Chapter Two - Killing a gentile and having a mitzvah stroke

A Gentile is judged in one favor, in one judgment and without notice; .X
Therefore, the person who knows a gentile who has transgressed one of the
seven commandments can judge him and kill him. Beit Yosef and Rama also
ruled on the matter.

The Gemara wrote that it is forbidden to kill a gentile (even if he violates .ב
seven mitzvot) in a satma, since it is permissible to judge him out of concern
for the fulfillment of the seven mitzvot and not just to kill him (in which case
it is a way of corruption). Although a gentile can repent and stop committing
crimes from then on, then he should not be put to death for crimes committed
before that.

The 16th ruled that despite the oil of the Torah it is possible to discuss with a .ג
Gentile - the Rabbis forbade doing so.

The Egyptian Gentile to Israel - since we are dealing with him - we condemn .ד

him.

Jews are not harmed, for the following reasons:

When a Jew is told "Kill so-and-so gentile or we will kill you" - the Jew does .1
not have to give up his life, because there is no rule of thumb in this "Why
did you have such and such a gentile?"

In the case where a murderer takes a hostage and hides behind him to .2
threaten a gentile (even if not during war) - the threatened is allowed to
kill the hostage as well in order to save himself. And in times of war, the
presence of the innocent helps the murderers, so it is permissible to kill in
order to be saved. And since in these cases the Gentiles are allowed to
behave this way with each other, therefore the Jews are also allowed to
behave this way towards the Gentiles.

According to the above reasons, it is also permissible to kill completely
innocent people, such as babies,

When it was consumed to save the souls of Israel.

We found in the Halacha that the Gentiles They are generally suspected of .ג
. spilling Israel's blood, and in war this suspicion becomes very strong.

The wickedness of those who fight us is part of the fact that they generally .ד
violate the seven commandments of the sons of Noah, and therefore we have
an interest in discussing and killing them for their transgressions.

**Because of the two previous sections, Sages decisively .ה
stated that in times of war - "it is good that the Gentiles are killed":**
they must die for their transgressions, and there is no place to try and correct
them in such a situation because their wickedness and danger is great.

Even babies who do not break seven mitzvot - there is a consideration to kill .ו
because of the future danger that will result if they are kept to grow up to be
wicked like their parents (as we found in the prophet's words about the
children of Babylon), even when they are not a shelter for the wicked or the
doubt where they are may prevent us from harming the wicked.

Chapter Six - Deliberate injury to the innocent

In the case of 'give us one of you and we will be killed and if not we will kill .א
all of you' among gentiles - it is permissible to hand over individuals in order
to save all, because there is no reason for the prohibition.

C

Gentile kingdoms are allowed to endanger their people during a war, since .ב
that way everyone profits and this reason is enough to harm the lives of
Gentiles. And for the same reason it is also permissible to harm people from
among the enemy when it is necessary. -

.. c. Revenge and the behavior of measure against measure is consumed and

important in war and in subduing convictions, both in harming innocents and babies, and in a cruel form of war in measure against measure.

According to the Maharal, it is permissible to harm all the people of a certain kingdom" if the people of that kingdom harmed our kingdom (since all the people of the kingdom are considered as one body).