

## CHAPTER I

# Worker-Peasant Alliance as a Rural Development Strategy for China

with Deng-yuan Hsu

During the past few years, some high-level government officials and many social scientists in China have admitted the many accomplishments made in rural areas under the leadership of Mao Zedong.<sup>1</sup> While they acknowledged the building of an agricultural infrastructure, the increase in land productivity, the mechanization of agricultural production, and the provision of the basic necessities of life for the majority of China's rural population, they have conveniently avoided analyzing Mao's model of development.

Such an analysis would reveal the fundamental differences between two lines—Mao's versus Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping's—and would undermine Deng's interpretation of China's development and the reasons behind his Reform. Mao believed that the continuing class struggle after the land reform was the driving force in China's rural development. He placed the alliance between workers and peasants at the center of this struggle during the reconstruction period following the revolution. This class analysis fundamentally distinguished his line from the Liu-Deng line.

Deng and his associates attacked Mao for stirring up class struggle that hampered the development of economic forces. On the contrary, the evidence shows that class struggle led to changes in the relations of production and thus to the further development of productive forces. We will also emphasize the importance of the ideological struggle between Mao's line and the Liu-Deng line, and thus help explain Mao's national campaign to "Learning from Dazhai" in the early 1970s and Deng's effort to discredit Dazhai in order to push his line of "letting a small number of peasants get rich first" when his Reform began.

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## Collectivization of agriculture

Between 1949 and 1952, land reform in the newly liberated areas of China's countryside gave hundreds of millions of peasants land—a plot of land for each family—for the first time in their lives. Although holdings averaged only 0.2 hectares per capita, peasants cultivated their land with great enthusiasm. The output of both grain and cotton went up rapidly between 1949 and 1952. By 1953, however, grain production became stagnant and cotton production decreased sharply.<sup>2</sup>

After one hundred years of destruction from wars and perhaps as many years of neglect by landlords, China's natural environment for agriculture was fragile, and arable land was scarce and infertile. Aside from owning very small plots of poor land, the majority of peasants owned very few productive tools. Among the poor and lower middle peasant households—60 to 70 percent of China's peasantry—many did not even own a plow, let alone other tools or draft animals. Without farm tools, enthusiasm alone could not continually increase production.

Moreover, in 1953 and 1954, floods and drought affected large areas of farmland. Individual peasants were defenseless against such natural disasters, and there were also personal mishaps such as illness or the death of a family member. As a result, many peasant families were forced into debt. Facing debts at usurious rates, many peasants were forced to sell their land. Before the cooperative movement began, land sales and private borrowing had started to rise, as had the number of peasants who hired themselves out as farm hands.<sup>3</sup> Had there not been a cooperative movement, there would have been further polarization and re-concentration of land ownership.

Small landholdings and inadequate farm tools were the main economic reasons behind the formation of mutual aid teams at first, and elementary cooperatives next. Peasant households pooled their land, labor, and productive tools to farm together. Output was distributed according to the amount of land, tools and labor contributed.

With increases in production, the cooperatives began to accumulate funds to buy the farm tools from households that had owned them. In the advanced cooperatives, both the land and the tools were collectively owned by the cooperatives, so there were no more dividends paid for either land or tools contributed and the distribution of output was based only on the amount of labor contributed. Then the communes were established in 1958.

At each stage of the cooperative movement, some peasants gained and some lost. The success of the movement depended on the fact that the majority had gained. At the elementary stage of the movement, the ones who lost were those who had owned more land or tools. They were mostly the originally rich and upper-middle class peasants, and some originally poor peasants' households who had more able-bodied productive labor and were able to save some of their income to buy productive tools and thus become new upper-middle class peasants.

If cooperatives had not been formed, these upper-strata peasants would have been at an advantage. With more land and farm tools, they would easily have been able to hire

additional farm labor. By paying these laborers low wages, they could have accumulated more surplus and would then be able to afford more tools and even acquire more land.

However, with the poor and lower-middle class peasants joining the cooperatives, these rich and (new and old) upper-middle class peasants could no longer find anyone to hire. The upper-middle class peasants hesitated in the beginning. But when they realized they had no other alternative, they eventually joined. In the end, both the rich and upper-middle class peasants joined the elementary cooperatives and received dividends from the co-ops for the use of their land and tools. These dividends, however, were not large enough to compensate for what they could have accumulated, had there been no co-op.

The majority of peasants, who would clearly have gained in joining the co-ops, also hesitated initially because it was an entirely new experience with an uncertain future. Moreover, unless the poor and the lower-middle class peasants were convinced that they would eventually win the battle, it would have been difficult to hold them together. Without much land, very few tools, and no experience of working together, their cooperation was not on firm ground.

In this regard, the prestige and the credibility of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its chairman, Mao Zedong, played a very important role. The party pushed for collectivization, and the majority of the peasantry believed that the CCP, which led them to victory in the revolution and throughout the land reform, would not betray them. Those who had joined the cooperatives badly needed the land and the tools owned by the rich and upper middle peasants, but in order to win them over, the ones who had joined first (mostly the poor and lower-middle class peasants) had to stand firm and not waver. The high tide of the movement came as more and more co-ops were formed and proved successful.

When the cooperative movement progressed to the advanced stage, the ones who lost were clearly those who had had to sell their property to the coops. These more well-to-do peasants would have been better off if they had been allowed to draw dividends continuously from such property, rather than having to settle for a final lump sum based on a "negotiated" price, to which they reluctantly agreed. Those who gained most from growth of the cooperative movement were clearly the majority of the peasants who had never owned anything but a small strip of land and their own labor.

Among those who benefited were the families who had no productive labor, such as elderly peasants without sons and widows with young children. Many of them lost their loved ones in the revolutionary war. Mao was very concerned about the livelihood of these people because the State was in no position to help them. Mao said that each cooperative would be able to "carry" a few such families.<sup>4</sup> These families could not contribute anything to the common "pot," but had to eat from it. From a point of view of pure self-interest, cooperatives would be unwilling to carry such a burden; they had to be persuaded to do so.

Some China specialists in the West seemed to believe that during its initial stage, the cooperative movement was voluntary and participatory, but these voluntary and

participatory elements were lost when the socialist high tide came. But a revolution of such magnitude and depth, involving hundreds of millions of people and changing the social order that had existed for more than three thousand years, met strong resistance from the beginning from those who were to lose their economic and political advantages along the way. It was a political struggle from the start and grew more intense as the movement progressed.

Mao repeatedly reminded the cadres who were organizing the cooperatives to make sure that the leadership of the co-ops remained in the hands of the poor and lower-middle class peasants who supported the movement most staunchly. The rich peasants, who would have preferred to see the cooperative movement collapse, often worked to sabotage it whenever they had a chance.

Although the land reform was a greatly popular success, peasants had difficulty holding on to the land they acquired, and polarization had begun to develop even before the cooperative movement started. Small peasant farming was not a form of production that could be stabilized. The same was true for the mutual aid teams and elementary cooperatives. One tendency was for those who had owned the productive tools to leave the co-op in the belief that they would be better off, at this point, on their own.

The other problem of elementary cooperatives, as William Hinton explained in *Shenfan*, was that when yields began to increase after the formation of the co-ops, it became obvious that most of the increases were due to more intensive labor rather than to better land or implements. The majority of members, who contributed only labor, resented the fact that those who owned the implements continued to draw large shares of the co-op's rising income. The issue of how to split the income became more complex and divisive.<sup>5</sup> The solution was to move to advanced cooperatives, in which the co-ops bought the productive tools from their owners, and the income was then distributed only according to amounts of labor contributed.

The Unified Purchase System also played an important role in aiding the cooperative movement. In the fall of 1953, the CCP's Central Committee decided to adopt the policy of State monopoly in the purchasing and marketing of grain and other raw materials. The enforcement of this policy put an end to the connection between the rich peasants, who had surplus grain for sale, and the grain merchants who still controlled a certain amount of the grain supply and could profit from speculation.

Mao thought of development during the transition period as a class struggle in which the workers and the peasants had to maintain a solid alliance. China's revolutionary war was fought by this alliance, based on land reform, which meant the end of feudalism and freedom from foreign domination. This alliance, as Mao saw it, would determine the course of the country's development, and could only be achieved through the leadership of the workers and by the collectivization of agriculture on the one hand and state ownership of industry on the other. The material basis of the alliance in the transition period was a course of development that mutually benefitted the workers and the peasants. Peasants supplied cheap grain, cotton and other raw materials to workers, and workers supplied manufactured consumer and producer goods to peasants.

If the cooperative movement collapsed, the alliance between workers and peasants would collapse with it, because individual peasant farming would lead to polarization and divisiveness within the peasantry. The rich peasants in the countryside would then form their own alliance with the capitalists and merchants in the cities.

It is essential to understand within this context the events that took place between 1953 and 1959, including the Great Leap Forward and the Lushan Conference. There was great haste in the completion of the collectivization process. Was such haste necessary? Mao believed that it was necessary “to strike while the iron was hot.” Given the political situation at the time, it is questionable whether there was an alternative. As Hinton wrote in *Shenfan*:

Looking at the result this time around, one is forced to conclude that, after all, Mao was right. Land Reform gave mutual aid and cooperation a momentum among the former poor and hired that made it possible for new collective relations of production to sweep the countryside. Mao seized the opportunity and led the movement to completion. Had he not done so, he would have missed a unique historic opportunity and would have doomed the countryside to the kind of fragmentation and polarization that is now once more running rampant.<sup>6</sup>

Those within the CCP who would rather see China develop along the Liu-Deng line saw clearly from the start that the collectivization of agriculture would place roadblocks for their own alliance, i.e., the alliance between the capitalists and merchants in the city and the rich peasants in the countryside. These two antagonistic lines began to clash at the completion of the land reform and came to a direct confrontation at the Lushan Conference. Thus it was not an accident that Deng seized the first opportunity to de-collectivize agriculture when, some two decades later, he and his associates took decisive steps to change the course of development.

## **The relationship between agriculture and industry**

When the first Five-Year Plan ended in 1957, the income gap between the urban and the rural population had widened. According to Christopher Howe:

In any event, urban incomes moved rapidly ahead, but there was little or no increase in peasant incomes. As a result, a very serious situation arose. For not only was inequality increasing, but by 1957 the growing incomes of the much enlarged number of wage earners were making demands on food and other supplies that could not be met.<sup>7</sup>

Mao obviously began to worry about this situation before 1957. When Mao wrote “On the Ten Major Relationships” in April 1956, he placed “the relationship between heavy industry on the one hand and light industry and agriculture on the other” as number one of the ten. Mao stressed the importance of agriculture and light industry, citing the

grave problems in both the Soviet Union and the East European countries that resulted from their lopsided stress on heavy industry. Although Mao noted that China had not so far made the same mistake, he said:

The problem now facing us is that of continuing to adjust properly the ratio between investments in heavy industry on the one hand and in agriculture and light industry on the other to bring about a greater development of the latter. Does this mean that heavy industry is no longer primary? It still is, it still claims the emphasis in our investment. But the proportion of agriculture and light industry must be somewhat increased.<sup>8</sup>

Mao warned against the overemphasis on heavy industry so China could avoid the mistakes of Soviet development. His concern was reflected in the Second Five-Year Plan and beyond.

## **The material base of the worker-peasant alliance**

From the Second Five-Year Plan until 1978, the State not only redirected investment toward agriculture but also increased investment in industries that produced agricultural inputs. In addition, the State cut agricultural taxes as a percentage of its revenue, thus reducing its budgetary dependence on agriculture. During this same period, the State also gradually increased its expenditures on agriculture, both in absolute amounts and in relation to its total expenditures. Moreover, the State also made adjustments to improve the terms of trade for agricultural products by continuing to reduce the prices of industrial products sold to the agricultural sector and increasing the prices of agricultural products. The prices farmers paid for agricultural inputs and consumer goods (in terms of wheat) declined steadily during these two decades. The figures in Table 1 reveal the shift in emphasis in China's development policy.

All of these favorable conditions helped the agricultural sector to develop. With more development, the agricultural sector was able to buy more from industry. According to Nicholas Lardy, the total amount of producer goods purchased by the agricultural sector increased both relatively and absolutely in the two decades between the late 1950s and the late 1970s. In relative terms, the agricultural sector's purchases of producer goods increased as a percentage of the sector's gross income from commodity sales to the State—from 16 percent in 1956 to 60 percent in 1978. In absolute terms, the total amount of producer goods purchased by the agricultural sector also increased from 3.26 billion Ren Min Bi (RMB, the Chinese currency unit) in 1957 to 29.37 billion RMB in 1978.<sup>9</sup> Such increases were even more significant because the prices of these goods were either stable or falling.

In the course of development under Mao, China's agriculture was not squeezed excessively or sacrificed unduly. In buying grain and other raw materials from the peasants, the State paid low prices although these were gradually raised. These low-priced purchases, however, enabled the State to supply the urban population with low-priced

**Table 1.** Changes in the economic relations between the State and the collectives, 1957–1978

	1957	1978
Agricultural investment as a % of total state investment	7.8 <sup>a</sup>	12.5 <sup>b</sup>
Investment in agricultural inputs as a % of heavy industry investment	3.0 <sup>a</sup>	11.1 <sup>b</sup>
Agricultural taxes as a % of total state revenue	9.6	2.5
State expenditures on agriculture as a % of total state expenditures	7.4 <sup>a</sup>	12.6 <sup>c</sup>
Terms of trade for the agricultural sector	130.4	188.8

Source: Nicholas R. Lardy, *Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development*, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 130–131; Statistical Yearbook of China, 1983, 445–447; and Xi-Yi, *Pricing Problems Under Socialism* (in Chinese), Beijing: China's Finance and Economic Publishers, 1982, p. 76.

(a) for the period 1953–1957; (b) for the period 1976–1978; (c) for the period 1976–1977.

food and clothing, so that wages could be kept fairly low, thus allowing industries a higher rate of accumulation. Moreover, with the low-priced raw materials, the State made profits in industries that used these inputs, such as textile, tobacco, alcohol, and food processing.

Part of these combined state profits was then invested in industries that produced agricultural inputs, such as machinery, equipment, fertilizer, and pesticides. These producer goods were then sold back to the agricultural sector at low and decreasing prices. Thus, the agricultural sector was able to afford buying increasingly larger quantities of such modern farm inputs. The purchase increases were most significant from the mid-1960s to late 1970s. In addition, the State increased its investment in agriculture, which usually went to building large-scale agricultural infrastructure that the communes could not afford. Therefore, the agricultural sector was not drained of its resources although there were net outflows. Instead, it was continuously being replenished with modern products from the industrial sector. The exchange between agriculture and industry benefitted both sectors and was the material foundation of the worker-peasant alliance.

Even though it was not possible to achieve total parity between the two sectors, the policy in the Mao era emphasized investment in agriculture. In the majority of Third World countries, by contrast, surpluses from agriculture were drained to develop industry. A similar pattern appeared in China in the decade of Deng's Reform that began in 1979.

Deng's rural reform started with raising the purchase prices of grain and other crops by 20 percent in 1979, with another 50 percent added for bonus prices; these prices were

further raised several times in the next few years. The peasants were, of course, overjoyed at first by the sudden increases in their incomes, especially those farm households that had large quantities of crops to sell at the much higher bonus prices. China experts in the United States and other Western countries praised Deng's policy and began to criticize the overexploitation of agriculture under Mao. Although consumption levels of farm households were raised for a brief period after the Reform, those who could afford to buy consumer durables and to build themselves new houses did not earn their incomes from selling grain. In most cases, they got rich first through privileges and connections.

But the higher levels of consumption enjoyed by the rural population could not be sustained. While the State paid the farmers higher prices for grain and other crops, it drastically cut back investment in agriculture and in industries that produced agricultural inputs. At the same time, the State did not raise the prices of staple foods for urban consumers for fear of inflation and discontent, thus adding to large budget deficits. After the 1984 Reform, the State cut subsidies to agricultural-input industries, which were then forced to cut output and raise prices of their products sold to farmers. The prices of chemical fertilizer, pesticides, plastic sheets, agricultural machinery, and diesel fuel all increased sharply. By 1984, the increases in farmers' earnings from higher-priced products were largely canceled out by the increased costs of production. This unfavorable price-cost ratio took the incentive out of farming.

In addition, higher earnings in nonfarm jobs made the hard work and low pay of farming seem even less attractive. In areas where the land is most fertile, such as the Yangtze River delta, there are also more nonfarm employment opportunities available. In most farm households, the more productive members either take factory jobs or engage in commerce, thus leaving those with limitations, such as women with children and the aged, to tend the land. On this most fertile land, these part-time tillers have been very reluctant to put in much input or much of their own labor. These areas, which had surplus grain in the past, now have to import grain, mostly from abroad, to feed themselves.<sup>10</sup>

## **Collectivization and modernization of agriculture**

In Mao's model, the goal of agricultural development was to produce enough food and raw material to meet the needs of China's large and growing population. The difficult part, of course, was how to use limited resources to feed a large population. Mao's solution was to pool human and land resources together by collectivization, and to mobilize peasants to put in as much labor as possible to improve the productivity of land. The crop yield had to be raised not only by intensive cultivation, development of new seed varieties, use of fertilizers (both organic and chemical), irrigation and multiple cropping, but also by building irrigation and drainage networks to prevent droughts and floods.

Chinese peasants worked long and hard on farmland capital construction. Since most of the construction work was done during the winter months when farm production was slack, they extended the average number of days worked in a year from 119 in the mid-1950s to 250 in the mid-1970s.<sup>11</sup> During the 1970s, on average, a total of eight billion



days of labor was accumulated in land work each year.<sup>12</sup> The late Alexander Eckstein, in a paper submitted to the U.S. Congress in 1978, described China's farmland capital construction in these words:

It indeed means reshaping the geographical features of an area to provide the physical conditions necessary for the application of an appropriate mix of other inputs—labor, machinery, fertilizer, and the improved seed strains—to bring about high and stable yields. This often requires squaring or terracing the land; at times it involves leveling mountains and transporting soil manually in baskets for several kilometers to build a huge dam or to cover some areas with topsoil. In many areas, it means constructing underground drainage channels, reservoirs, canals, irrigation channels, pumping stations, and tube wells.<sup>13</sup>

None of what Eckstein described could have been achieved without the organization of the communes, which mobilized the labor and allocated the resources needed to make such construction possible. The State also helped finance large construction projects that were too big for the collectives to undertake.

No matter how hard the peasants worked, human power alone could not develop agriculture. During the 30 years before 1979, the number of peasants doubled while the amount of arable land remained fixed. During these years, China more than doubled the crop yield per hectare. Although there have been claims that the productivity of labor in Chinese agriculture has declined, this question requires further study. It is not accurate to calculate labor productivity by simply dividing the value of current agricultural production by the size of the rural labor force, since over 30 percent of the peasants' annual labor time (a percentage which gradually increased from the 1950s to the 1970s) was spent in building the agricultural infrastructure, which should be considered as investment rather than current production.

The modernization of agriculture meant more modern inputs for the agricultural sector from the industrial sector. As we said earlier, the mutually supportive relationship between agriculture and industry made it possible for the agricultural sector to buy increasing quantities of industrial products. Table 2 shows the advances made in terms of using modern inputs for agricultural production between 1952 and 1979. As the table shows, in the 30 years before Deng's reform, China had already achieved some degree of mechanization, which took the hardest manual work out of farming, and greatly reduced the intensity of farm work.

Mao believed that collectivization had to come first before mechanization was possible, while Liu and Deng believed that mechanization had to come first. History has proved Mao was right. Mechanization and modernization would not have been possible without the collectivization of agriculture. In other words, the productive forces began to develop as class struggle brought major changes in the relations of production. One major victory won by the worker-peasant alliance in this class struggle was the collectivization of agriculture, which prevented the reassertion of rich peasants and pushed the rural development to a higher stage. Mao believed, however, that in order to push forward

his line, it was crucial to win the struggle on the ideological front. This was where the “Learning from Dazhai” movement came in.

## The ‘Learning from Dazhai’ movement

The “Learning from Dazhai” movement, which placed heavy emphasis on self-reliance in rural development, was very significant in Mao’s development model. That was why, in attacking Mao, Deng had to discredit Dazhai’s achievements made before his Reform, and remove Chen Yonggui<sup>14</sup> from a leadership position. The “Learning from Dazhai” movement shows that Mao understood the importance of self-reliance because he understood the threat of imperialism to any country that dared to develop its own independent economy.

Mao’s development strategy places the agricultural sector at the foundation of the economy, because self-reliance meant that China must first produce enough food to feed her people. This was also the reason for placing grain production at such a high priority and making it the key link. The Chinese people understood from their experience of the previous 100 years what it meant to depend on the West for any kind of “assistance”—grain, capital, or technology. It was the determination that China must make it on her own that motivated the peasants to work so hard to build the infrastructure needed for the foundation of agricultural production.

China’s peasantry and the Party cadres that led them—and certainly the people of Dazhai—must have drawn inspiration from a short essay written by Mao in 1945, entitled “The Foolish Man who Moved the Mountains”. He recounted an ancient Chinese tale of how a foolish man was determined to move the two big mountains blocking the entrance to his house, instead of walking around them. Mao said that there were two big mountains sitting on top of the Chinese people—imperialism and feudalism. It was up to the determination and hard work of the Chinese people to remove them.

Dazhai was set up as a model because people there did not surrender to nature or to their lack of resources; instead, they fought collectively to gain every inch of arable land and to achieve self-sufficiency in food. They were the “foolish” ones who were trying to move mountains. They believed that persistence, hard work and cooperation would achieve more in the long run than an orientation toward a quick return this year or next.

The “Learning from Dazhai” movement gave rural capital construction a big push nationwide. In Wuxi county of Jiangsu Province alone, one of the richest agricultural regions in China, the amount of land work done in the eight years after the “Learning from Dazhai” movement began (1970–1978) was more than five times the work done in the previous 20 years.<sup>15</sup> Similar experiences could be found in many parts of China. In the 30 years after the revolution, “foolish” men and women, several hundred million of them, collectively worked long and hard to make China self-reliant. When Deng’s reform began in 1979, the central government adopted an exact opposite policy by importing grain from abroad with borrowed money, so that today, peasants in areas as barren as the

**Table 2.** Modernization of Agriculture

	1952	1957	1965	1979
Tractor-plowed area as a percentage of cultivated area	0.1	2.4	15.0	42.4
Irrigation area as a percentage of cultivated area	18.5	24.4	31.9	45.2
Power-irrigated as a percentage of the total irrigated area	1.6	4.4	24.5	56.3
Kilos of chemical fertilizer applied per hectare	0.7	3.3	18.7	109.2
Small hydropower stations in rural areas	98	544	n.a.	83,224
Generating capacity in thousands of kilowatts	8	20	n.a.	276.3
Total horsepower of agricultural machinery (10,000 hp)	25	165	1,494	18,191
Large- and medium-size tractors (in thousands)	1.3	14.7	72.6	666.8
Small and walking tractors* (in thousands)	n.a.	n.a.	4	1,671
Motors for agricultural drainage and irrigation (10,000 hp)	12.8	56.4	907.4	7,122.1
Combined harvesters	284	1,789	6,704	23,026
Motor fishing boats	n.a.	1,485	7,789	52,225

\*Although these were intended for agricultural use, many were used for transporting goods.

Source: *Statistical Year Book of China*, 1983, pp. 186, 197; and *1981 China Economic Yearbook* (in Chinese), VI, p. 13.

old Dazhai have had to give up trying to succeed in local farming and have crowded the cities to find jobs.

When the whole nation was mobilized to learn from Dazhai, the peasants collectively built the foundation of China's agricultural infrastructure and produced more grain and other products. This valuable and significant experience made them realize their own strength. In cooperatively building irrigation and drainage networks, they also began to realize that if they put public interest first, it would translate into personal gain later.

Today, intensive class struggle continues in China while policies arising from Deng's 1979 Reform continue to emphasize privatized agriculture and industry, effectively breaking Mao's strategy for rural development based on the worker-peasant alliance. The outcome of this struggle will depend, to a large extent, on whether a new worker-peasant alliance can be formed in the years to come.

## Notes

1. As reported in *People's Daily* (overseas edition) June 12, 1986, China's vice-premier Tian Jiyun acknowledged that the development of the agricultural infrastructure in the 30 years before the 1979 Reform was the main reason for increases in agricultural production since the Reform. Since the June 4 massacre, the current regime, fearing the loss of credibility of the Chinese Communist Party, has repeatedly praised the achievements of the past 40 years.
2. See Su Xing, "The Two Line Struggle, Socialist vs. Capitalist, after the Land Reform," *Jing Jin Yan Jiu* (*Research in Economics*) 7 (1965), 24.
3. *Ibid.*
4. For Mao's view of the agricultural cooperatives, see "On the Co-operative Transformation of Agriculture," (July 31, 1955), "Rely on Party and League Members and Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants in the Co-operative Transformation of Agriculture," (September 7, 1955), "The Debate on the Co-operative Transformation of Agriculture and the Current Class Struggle," (October 11, 1955), "Prefaces to Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside," (September and December 1955) in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* Volume V (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977).
5. William Hinton, *Shenfan* (New York: Random House, 1983), 142–143.
6. Hinton, *Shenfan*, 165.
7. Christopher Howe, *China's Economy: A Basic Guide* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 191.
8. Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Major Relationships," in *Selected Works* Volume V, 285–286.
9. Nicholas R. Lardy, *Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 7–8.
10. Lardy, *Agriculture in China*, 7–8.
11. Thomas G. Rawski, *Economic Growth and Employment in China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 7–8.
12. Shi Bing, "More Inputs to Promoting Agricultural Development," *Problems of Agricultural Economy* 1 (1987), 8.
13. Alexander Eckstein, "The Chinese Development Model," in *Chinese Economy Post-Mao, A Compendium of Papers* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 88.
14. Chen Yonggui (Chen Yung-Kuei) was a peasant who, as secretary of the Party branch in the Dazhai production brigade, led a local mass movement that emphasized self-reliant efforts to reclaim arable land and improve agriculture amidst the area's harsh environment. He was gradually promoted, elected to the Politburo in 1973 (reelected in 1977), and named a vice-premier of the State Council in 1975, until he was dismissed from the State Council in 1980.
15. Information obtained during an interview with Wuxi county officials by Pao-yu Ching in 1979.